Chapter 29 — That man’s happiness consists not in glory

Therefore, it is evident also that man’s supreme good does not consist in glory, which is the recognition of one’s good name.

For glory, according to Cicero, is the general recognition and praise of a person’s good name, (Cicero, On Invention, bk. 2, ch. 55.) and according to Ambrose, it consists in being well known and praised. (It is actually Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 13 (PL 42:770).) Now men seek praise and distinction through being famous, so that they may be honored by those whom their fame reaches. Therefore, glory is sought for the sake of honor: consequently, if honor be not the highest good, much less is glory.

Again. Those goods are worthy of praise by which a man shows himself to be directed to his end. Now he who is directed to his end has not yet reached his last end. Therefore, praise is not bestowed on one who has reached his last end; rather does he receive honor, as the Philosopher says. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.12.) Therefore, glory cannot be the supreme good, since it consists chiefly in praise.

Besides. It is better to know than to be known, because only the higher things know, whereas the lowest are known. Therefore, man’s supreme good cannot be glory, which consists in a man being known.

Further. A man does not seek to be known except in good things, and in evil things he seeks to be hidden. Therefore, to be known is good and desirable on account of the good things that are known in a man. Therefore, these good things are better still. Consequently, glory, which consists in a man being known, is not his supreme good.

Moreover. The supreme good must be perfect, for it satisfies the appetite. But the knowledge of one’s good name, in which glory consists, is imperfect: for it is beset with much uncertainty and error. Therefore, glory of this kind cannot be the supreme good.

Furthermore. Man’s supreme good must be supremely stable in human things: for it is natural to desire unfailing endurance in one’s goods. Now glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable; since nothing is more changeable than human opinion and praise. Therefore, such glory is not man’s supreme good.