Chapter 6 — Answers to these arguments

In order that the solution of the arguments here give may be made clear, we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. Evil is in a substance through its lacking something natural and due to it, for it is not evil that a man does not have wings, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man does not have blond hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he has no hands, which are natural and due to him if he is perfect, and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due. Consequently, the aspect of evil is always understood thus in a privation.

Matter, since it is in potency to all forms, is adapted to all of them by nature, yet no one is due to it, since it can be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter: for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly, the privation of such a form in relation to matter is not an evil to matter, but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is its evil. Thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil of fire.

And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except insofar as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject in which it is, it will be an evil simply; otherwise, it will be the evil of something but not simply. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil simply, but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil simply, but an evil of the air.

On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must be an evil simply.

Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or casual, as the first argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or casually. Thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitous nor casual; it would be casual if such a result were to occur only in few.

Therefore, the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue beside the intention of the generator, nevertheless always follows, since the presence of one form is always accompanied by the privation of another. Therefore, corruption does not ensue casually, nor even seldom, although sometimes privation is not an evil simply, but the evil of some particular thing, as stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the thing generated of that which is due to it, it will be casual and an evil simply, as in the birth of monstrosities: for this does not follow of necessity from that which was intended, but is opposed to it, since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated.

Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect in the active force. Hence if the agent’s force be defective, this evil ensues beside the intention; yet it will not be casual, because it follows of necessity from such an agent (provided always that the agent in question always or frequently suffer this defect). But it will be casual if this defect seldom accompanies this agent.

In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow: for movement is not caused by universals but by particulars, in which are actions. Accordingly, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of a rational good, moral evil ensues not casually, but either always or frequently, as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery; hence the evil of adultery is not a casual sequel. It would, however, be a casual evil, if sin were to ensue seldom from what he intends, as in one who, while firing at a bird, kills a man.

That anyone should intend such goods which frequently result in privation of a rational good is due to the fact that many live a sensuous life, because sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place. Privation of the rational good ensues from many goods of that kind.

Hence it follows that, although evil is beside the intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states—accidentally, however, and not essentially. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake, while the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it simply. For instance, the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety does not intend the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo not simply, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the sake of obtaining a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it simply, but for the sake of something in particular. Therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary in the same way as the throwing of a ship’s cargo into the sea.

The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of corruption is never found without the change of generation: consequently, neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of generation, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of air. Accordingly, nature intends directly that there should be air; but it does not intend that there should not be water except insofar as this is involved by the existence of air. Therefore, privations are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally, whereas forms are intended directly.

From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil simply is utterly beside the intention in the operations of nature (for example, the birth of monstrosities), but what is evil not simply, but relatively is intended by nature not directly, but accidentally.