Chapter 15 — That there is no highest evil

It follows from this that there cannot be a highest evil which is the principle of all evils.

For a highest evil must exclude the association of all good, just as the highest good is that which is wholly disconnected from all evil. Now there cannot be an evil entirely apart from good, for it has been proved that evil is seated in some good. (Ch. 11.) Therefore, nothing is supremely evil.

Again. If anything be supremely evil, it must be essentially evil, even as the supreme good is that which is essentially good. But this is impossible, since evil has no essence, as was shown above. (Ch. 7.) Therefore, it is impossible to suppose a supreme evil that is the principle of evils.

Also. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. Now every evil is caused by a good, as we have proved. (Ch. 10.) Therefore, evil is not a first principle.

Further. Evil does not act except by virtue of a good, as we have proved. (Ch. 9.) But a first principle acts by its own virtue. Therefore, evil cannot be a first principle.

Moreover. Since that which is accidental is subsequent to that which is essential, (Aristotle, Physics ch. 2, [6].) the accidental cannot be first. Now evil does not occur except accidentally and unintentionally, as we have proved. (Ch. 4.) Therefore, evil cannot be a first principle.

Again. Every evil has an accidental cause, as we have shown. (Ch. 13.) But a first principle has no cause, either essential or accidental. Therefore, evil cannot be the first cause in any genus.

Furthermore. An essential cause precedes one that is accidental. (Aristotle, Physics ch. 2, [6].) But evil is none but an accidental cause, as we have proved. (Ch. 14.) Therefore, evil cannot be a first principle.

By this is refuted the error of the Manicheans, who maintained the existence of a highest evil, which is the first principle of all evils.

The end of things