Chapter 7 — That evil is not an essence

From this it follows that no essence is evil in itself.

For evil, as we have said, (Ch. 6.) is nothing else but the privation of what is connatural and due to anyone, for the word ‘evil’ is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is the nonexistence of something in a substance. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, [8].) Therefore, evil is not a real essence.

Again. A thing has being in respect of its essence. Now insofar as it has being, it has a share of good: for if good is what all desire, being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore, a thing is good insofar as it has an essence. But good and evil are opposed to each other. Therefore, nothing is evil insofar as it has an essence. Therefore, no essence is evil.

Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner, neither can it be something made, since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore, nothing is evil as to its essence.

Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what is like and becoming to it. Now everything intends a good by acting, as we proved above. (Ch. 3.) Therefore, no being, as such, is evil.

Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of that thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance, although perhaps it may not be natural to some other substance. Thus heat is natural to fire, although it is not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore, evil, since it is the privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore, no essence is evil in itself.

Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form, since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the ratio of goodness: for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends, and the act by which whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore, whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore, evil has not an essence.

Further. Being is divided into act and potency. Now act, as such, is a good, because a thing is perfect insofar as it is in act. Again, potency is a good, for potency tends to act, as clearly may be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary to it. Moreover, it is in the same genus as act. Also, privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore, everything that is, in whatever way it is, is good insofar as it is a being. Therefore, evil has not an essence.

Again. It has been proved in the second book (Ch. 15.) of this work that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God: and we have shown in the first book (Ch. 28, 41.) that God is perfect goodness. Since, then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil.

Hence it is that it is said: God saw everything that he had made, and it was very good (Gen 1:31); and: He has made everything good in their time (Eccl 3:11); and: Everything created by God is good (1 Tim 4:4).

Again, Dionysius says that evil is not a thing that exists, that is, in itself, nor is it something in things that exist, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.

By this is refuted the error of the Manicheans who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature.