Chapter 16 — That the end of everything is a good

Accordingly, if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above, (Ch. 3.) it follows that good is the end of each thing. For everything is directed by its action to some end, since either the action itself is an end, or the end of the action is also the end of the agent, and this is its good.

Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good, for the Philosopher defines good as that which all things desire. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.1.) Therefore, the end of everything is a good.

Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and in which it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection is moved towards it as far as lies in it, and if it have that perfection, it rests in it. Therefore, the end of a thing is its perfection. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore, everything is directed to good as its end.

Further. Things that know the end and things that do not know the end are equally directed to the end, although those which know the end are moved to it essentially, but those which do not know it tend to it as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end are always directed to a good as their end, because the will, which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore, those things that do not know the end are also directed to a good as their end. Therefore, the end of all is a good.