Chapter 30 — That man’s happiness does not consist in wealth

Hence it is evident that neither is wealth man’s supreme good.

For wealth is not sought except for the sake of something else, because of itself it brings us no good, but only when we use it for the support of the body, or for some similar purpose. Now the supreme good is sought for its own sake, and not for another’s. Therefore, wealth is not man’s supreme good.

Again. Man’s supreme good cannot consist in the possession or preservation of things whose chief advantage for man consists in their being spent. Now the chief advantage of wealth is in its being spent, for this is its use. Therefore, the possession of wealth cannot be man’s supreme good.

Moreover. Acts of virtue deserve praise according as they lead to happiness. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.12.) Now acts of liberality and magnificence, which are concerned with money, are deserving of praise on account of money being spent, rather than on account of its being kept: it is from this that these virtues derive their names. (“The word liberality is rightly derived from spending: because when a man spends money, he liberates it from his keeping, and shows his mind to be liberated from affection for it.” (Commentary of Ferrariensis, who for magnificence reads munificence, which is derived from munus, a gift.)) Therefore, man’s happiness does not consist in the possession of wealth.

Besides. Man’s supreme good must consist in obtaining something better than man. But man is better than wealth, since it is something directed to man’s use. Therefore, man’s supreme good does not consist in wealth.

Further. Man’s supreme good is not subject to chance. For things that happen by chance escape the forethought of reason, but man has to attain his own end by means of his reason. But chance occupies the greater place in the attaining of wealth. Therefore, human happiness consists not in wealth.

Moreover. This is evident from the fact that wealth is lost involuntarily. Also, because wealth can come into the possession of evil persons, who, of necessity, must lack the highest good. Again, because wealth is unstable. Other similar reasons can be gathered from the arguments given above. (Cc. 28–29.)