Chapter 27 — That human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures

From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of food and of sex.

It has been shown (Ch. 25.) that according to nature’s order, pleasure is on account of operation, and not conversely. Therefore, if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations followed by the pleasures mentioned above are not the last end, for they are directed to certain manifest ends: eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of children. Therefore, the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore, happiness does not consist in them.

Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite, for it moves it, as stated above. (Ch. 25.) But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved. (Ch. 26.) Much less, therefore, does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite.

Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man: for it is an abuse of terms to speak of dumb animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are common to man and beast. Therefore, we must not assign happiness to them.

Again. The ultimate end is the most noble of those that pertain to a thing, for it has the meaning of best. But these pleasures are not agreeable to a man according to that which is noblest in him, which is his intellect, but according to his senses. Therefore, we must not assign happiness to such pleasures.

Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him: for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now these pleasures consist in man being united through his senses to things beneath him, namely, certain sensible objects. Therefore, we must not assign happiness to such pleasures.

Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now, the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate: otherwise, they would frustrate one another. Therefore, these pleasures are not in themselves man’s good. But the highest good is good essentially, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore, such pleasures are not man’s supreme good, which is happiness.

Again. In all essential predications, if A be predicated of B simply, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B. Thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing heats most. Accordingly, if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much is very good. But this is clearly false, because it is considered sinful to use them too much: for it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore, they are not essentially man’s good, and human happiness does not consist in them.

Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being directed to happiness. (Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1.12.) If, therefore, human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue: for the act of temperance is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures (from which that act takes its name). Therefore, man’s happiness is not in these pleasures.

Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above. (Ch. 17.) We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things and consequently withdraw him from intelligible things. Therefore, human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans, who ascribed man’s happiness to pleasures of this kind; in their person Solomon says: What I have seen to be good . . . is to eat and drink and find enjoyment in all the toil . . . for this is his lot (Eccl 5:17); and: Everywhere let us leave signs of enjoyment, because this is our portion and this our lot (Wis 2:9).

The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted: for they pretended that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the stomach: therefore, they are called ‘Chiliastae,’ (Augustine, On Heresies, ch.8.) or believers in the Millennium.

The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted, who pretend that the reward of the righteous consists in such pleasures: for happiness is the reward of virtue.