D. 14 - Definition of penance
After the Master has considered confirmation and the Eucharist, which are the sacraments of those progressing, ordered toward their perfection in good, here he begins to examine penance, which is ordered toward the removal of evil that appears in this life by the actions of those progressing. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he defines those things that pertain to the essence of the sacrament; in the second, he examines certain accidents of this sacrament, such as time and things like that, at Distinction 20: it must also be known that the time for repentance lasts until the last moment of life. (Sententiae IV, 20.1 (109). 1.)
The first part is in two parts: in the first of these he considers the sacrament of penance; in the second, the minister of this sacrament, at Distinction 18: here it is usual to ask if the sin is entirely remitted by God through contrition of the heart and from the moment when the penitent has the intention of confessing. (Sent. IV, 18.1(97).1.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, he considers penance in general; in the second, he considers it by moving through its parts, at Distinction 16: in the performance of penance, three things are to be considered. (Sent. IV, 16.1 (86).1.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, he examines what belongs to the definition of penance, and excludes the error of those who add to the definition of true penance what does not belong to its definition; in the second, he determines what is integral to it, at Distinction 15: by the above authorities, the error of those is convicted who say that penance is not to be done frequently . . . by the same authorities is rejected also the opinion of those who assert that one who is bound by many sins may truly repent of one of them, and obtain the Lord’s forgiveness for it, without doing penance for the rest. (Sent. IV, 15. 1 (79).1.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, he shows what is the definition of penance according to the truth; in the second, he excludes the error, at: adhering too strongly to these words, some people contend that one who is truly penitent does not again sin damnably. (Sen.t IV, 14.2 (75). 3.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the necessity of penance; second, he inquires what penance is, at: Baptism is a sacrament only, but penance is called both a sacrament and a virtue of the mind. (Sent. IV, 14. 1(74).2.)
Concerning this he does two things: first, he sets down those things from which penance can be defined; second, he sets down the definition, at: as Ambrose says, “penance is to decry past evils, and not to commit again things that which are to be decried”. (Sent. IV, 14. 2 (75).2 citing Ambrose, Sermo 25, n1.)
Concerning this he does two things: first, he gives the genus; second, he mentions the act, at*: it is called ‘penance’ from ‘punishing’*. (Sent. IV, 14.2(75).1.)
Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he includes penance in the genus of virtues, and the genus of sacraments; second, because a virtue requires a teaching to inspire it, and a sacrament needs a teaching to instruct about it, he includes the teaching on penance, at: John’s preaching began from penance. (Sent. IV, 14.1(74).3.)
It is called ‘penance’ from ‘punishing’. Here he touches on the act of repentance; and concerning this he does two things: first, he takes the act by the interpretation of its name; second, he shows the origin of the act, at: the virtue of penance has its beginning in fear. (Sent. IV, 14.2(75).1.)
Adhering too strongly to these words, some people contend that one who is truly penitent does not again sin damnably. Here he excludes the error of those who add perseverance to the end to the definition of penance. And it is divided into two parts: in the first he sets down the error; in the second, he excludes it, at: but Ambrose says: “this is true penance: to cease from sin”. (Sent. IV, 14.2 (75).7 citing Ambrosiaster, In epistolas sancti Pauli, 2 Cor 2, 7.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he claims that the error arises from the definition given; second, he shows how this is confirmed following other authoritative texts, at: they also bolster this view with other testimonies. (Sent. IV, 14.2 (75). 3) And he cites four authoritive texts: the first is from Isidore; the second, from Augustine, at: also Augustine; (Sent. IV, 14.2 (75).5) third, from Gregory, at: also Gregory; (Sent. IV, 14.2 (75).5) fourth, from Ambrose, at: also Ambrose. (Sent. IV, 14.2 (75).6)
But Ambrose says, etc. Here he excludes the error mentioned, and concerning this he does two things: first, he excludes the error through Augustine; second, he resolves the authoritive texts cited, at: and so the above words . . . may rightly be taken. (Sent. IV, 14. 3 (76). 2)
And here he does two things concerning this: first, he resolves the definition first given, from which the error mentioned seemed to result; second, he resolves the text from Isidore at: But “he is a derider and not a penitent;” (Sent. IV, 14.3 (76). 3, citing Isidore, Sententiae, Bk. 2, ch. 2, n. 4.) third, he resolves the text from Augustine, at: as for that statement, “the penance is vain which is polluted by a subsequent fault,” is to be understood as follows; (Sent. IV, 14. 3 (76).4 citing Isidore, Synonyma, Bk. 1, n77.) fourth, the text from Ambrose, at: as for that which Ambrose says. (Sent. IV, 14.4 (77).1) And the text from Gregory is resolved like the others.
Concerning the third of these, he does three things: first, he resolves the text from Augustine cited earlier; second, he cites something else to the same purpose, at: in the same way is also to be understood the statement that Augustine makes elsewhere; (Sent. IV, 14.3 (76).6) third, he resolves it, at: what he said above . . . are to be understood of the penance of the perfect, or of the penance sufficient for salvation. (Sent. IV, 14. 3 (76).7)
Concerning the fourth he does two things: first, he resolves the text from Ambrose; second, he proves by authority and examples that penance can be repeated, contrary to what Ambrose seemed to say, at: but that penance is not only done once . . . is proven by many testimonies of the saints. (Sent. IV, 14. 5 (78).1)
Here there are two questions: first, concerning penance itself; second, concerning its effect.
Question 1
Penance in itself
Concerning the first, five questions arise:
first, what penance is;
- second, its relationship to other things;
- third, its subject;
- fourth, its continuation;
- fifth, about solemn penance.
- Article 1
What penance is
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 22, q. 2, a. 1; ST III, q. 65, a. 1; q. 84, a. 1.) It seems that penance is not a sacrament. For in every sacrament of the new law there is something material, which is the cause of grace, as is evident from Hugh’s definition of a sacrament cited above, Distinction 1, Article 5, Subquestion 5. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) But there is nothing like that in penance. Therefore, it is not a sacrament of the new law.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the Master says in Distinction 1, all sacraments of the new law consist in things and words. But in penance there are no determinate words that are of the essence of the sacrament. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every sacrament is presented by the ministers of the Church. But not penance: quite the contrary, for it arises from within, since it is conceived in fear, as it says in the text. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, all of our sacraments are actions of our hierarchy. But Dionysius does not set forth anything concerning penance when treating of the other hierarchical actions. (In other words, looking through the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies, one finds various sacraments expressly treated, but penance is not among them.) Therefore, it is not a sacrament.
On the contrary (1), there are seven sacraments of the new law, as has been said, (Above, in d. 2, a. 2.) which would not be the case if penance were left out. Therefore, penance is a sacrament.
Furthermore (2), the sacraments, according to Hugh, (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 5 (PL 176:323).) are a certain medicine, which is applied to the wounds of sin. But sin is most especially healed by penance. Therefore, penance is a sacrament.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that penance is not a virtue. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 1.) For sacramental graces differ from virtues, as was said above, in Distinction 1. And this is why neither baptism nor any of the other sacraments is counted as a virtue. But penance is a sacrament. Therefore, it is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was said in Book II, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 4, grace and virtue differ by their essences. But penance is grace, as it says in the text. Therefore, it is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no passion is a virtue, nor is there virtue with passion, as a certain philosopher said. (See ST I-II, q. 59, a. 2.) But repentance is a passion, for it is sorrow. Therefore, it is not a virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, any virtue exists by its order to the good. But penance is named by its order to evil. Therefore, it is not a virtue.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, every virtue is a disposition of the perfect, as is clear from the Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 7, ch. 3, 246a13.) But penance is not a disposition of the perfect, but of the imperfect, just as shame is, for both presuppose an evil in the person in whom they exist. Therefore, penance is not a virtue, just as neither is shame, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 15, 1228b10.)
On the contrary (1), precepts of the law should only concern acts of the virtues, for this is what the lawgiver intends, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b3.) But the act of penance falls under the precept of the law, as is clear from the text. Therefore, penance is a virtue.
Furthermore (2), we only merit by acts of virtue. But to repent is meritorious, as is self-evident. Therefore, penance is a virtue.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is a general virtue. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 2.) For something is only driven out by its contrary. But penance drives out every sin. Therefore, it is contrary to every sin; therefore, it is a general virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every specific virtue has a specific object. But penance does not have one: for it works on the matter of every virtue and every vice. Therefore, it is not a specific virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to repent of evils committed results from a man having a right faculty of choice, which is why an incontinent man can repent, but not an intemperate one, for he has a bad faculty of choice. But any virtue makes choice upright, as is said in the Ethics 3. (There are many passages to which this could be referring, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 1106b15 and 1106b35; Bk. 3, ch. 2, 1111b5; Bk. 3, ch. 5, 1113b2–6.) Therefore, to repent is the act of every virtue. And therefore penance is not a specific virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every specific virtue is either a cardinal virtue or a part of one, if it is a moral virtue. But penance, if it is a virtue, can only be a moral virtue, because it has a passion attached to it. But it is not a cardinal virtue, nor is it contained among the parts of any cardinal virtue listed by the philosophers, for they made no mention of the virtue of penance. Therefore, it is not a specific virtue.
On the contrary (1), just as habits are distinguished by their objects, so are passions. But the passion of repentance is distinct from other passions. Therefore, the virtue of repentance is distinct from the other virtues.
Furthermore (2), everything that perfects the free will for a determinate act is a specific virtue. But to detest sin with the hope of forgiveness, toward which repentance perfects us, is a specific virtue reducible to another virtue. Therefore, repentance is a specific virtue.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is a theological virtue. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 3, corp. and ad 1.) For every virtue that has God for its object is a theological virtue. But repentance is this kind of thing, for it reconciles us to God. Therefore, it is a theological virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the causes of contraries are contrary. But concupiscence, which is opposed to charity, is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10). Therefore, charity is the cause of the destruction of sins, which pertains to penance. Therefore, penance is charity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to justify belongs to faith, as is clear from Romans 3:28. But justification is an effect of penance. Therefore, it is the same as faith, and so, the same as before.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every moral virtue consists finding the mean regarding its matter. But penance does not consist in the mean regarding its matter, for every sin committed is detested. Therefore, it is not a moral virtue, and therefore it is a theological one.
On the contrary (1), the object of a theological virtue is God. However, this is not the object of repentance, but rather sins committed. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (2), repentance has a passion joined to it. But no theological virtue does. Therefore, etc.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it cannot be reduced to justice. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 3.) For justice is a certain equality, according to the Philosopher. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129a34.) But penance cannot render equal recompense for having offended God. Therefore, it is not justice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, commenting on the text, blessed are you who weep now (Luke 6:21), the Gloss says, this is prudence, by which it is shown how wretched are these earthly things, and how blessed are the heavenly ones. But to grieve is an act of penance, as it says in the text. Therefore, penance is prudence, not justice.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Isidore says: perfect compunction is that which repels the affection of all carnal desires. (See Isidore, Sententiae, Bk. 2, ch. 12, sent. 1–2: “Conpunctio cordis est humilitas mentis cum lacrimis, exoriens de recordatione peccati et timore iudicii. Illa est conuersis perfectior conpunctionis affectio, quae omnes a se carnalium desideriorum affectus repellit, et intentionem suam toto mentis studio in Dei contemplationem defigit” (CCSL 111:118).) But compunction is a part of penance, as will be said below, in Distinction 16. Since, then, it belongs to temperance to repress carnal desires, it seems that penance should be reduced to temperance, not justice.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, virtues are distinguished according to their objects. But penance and shame have the same object, namely, sin. Therefore, they are the same thing. Since, then, shame is reducible to temperance, it seems that penance would likewise be reduced to it, rather than to justice.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, Chrysostom says that penance compels the penitent person to endure all things willingly. (John Chrysostom, as cited in Gratian’s Decretals, d. 1, ch. 40 (PL 187:1532), where the text reads: “Perfecta poenitentia cogit peccatorem omnia libenter sufferre.”) But this is an act of patience. Therefore, since patience is reducible to fortitude, it seems that penance would likewise be reduced to it, rather than to justice.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in the text that penance is a certain retribution. But retribution is listed as a part of justice by Cicero. (See Cicero, de Inuentione, Bk. 2, ch. 53, par. 161, in Teubner (E. Stroebel, 1915), M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, 2:148.) Therefore, the virtue of penance will be reduced to justice.
Furthermore (2), Isidore says: when a man condemns his own wrong deeds by a worthy act of penance, then he assumes the judgment of himself. (Isidore, Sententiae, Bk. 2, ch. 13, sent. 3 (CCSL 111:120).) But judgment pertains to justice. Therefore, so does penance.
Quaestiuncula 6
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the definition that Gregory and Ambrose give for penance is inadequate: penance is weeping over past evils, and not committing again things to be wept over. (Parallels: ST III, q. 85, a. 10, ad 4; q. 85, a. 1, ad 2. As given in Lombard’s text for this distinction.) For virtues are not acts, but habits, as was said in Book II, Distinction 27. But to weep is an act. Therefore, it should not be included as the genus of penance, which is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what pertains to bodily change is not essential to a virtue, which is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 8, 1128b10.) that shame is not a virtue, since those who are ashamed blush. But weeping names a bodily change. Therefore, it is not essential to penance, which is a virtue; and so it should not be included in its definition.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is stupid to grieve over what cannot not be. But the past cannot not be. Therefore, it is stupid to grieve or weep over past sins. But no virtuous man is stupid, as is evident from the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7, 1123b3–4: “no excellent man is foolish or silly” (Oxford trans.).) Therefore, weeping over the past should not be included in the definition of a virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in a definition nothing should be included that does not pertain to the nature of the thing defined. But penance, according to its own account, regards the past. Therefore, there should not be included in its definition, not committing things to be wept over, which would pertain to the future.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, penance is defined as follows: true repentance is not allowing things that will be repented, and bewailing those that have been allowed. (In ch. 25 (PL 58:1218).) Therefore, it seems that in the foregoing definition the parts of the definition are in the wrong order.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, we must ask how the other definitions apply to penance, since there should be a single definition for a single thing.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that as was said above in Distinction 1, a sacrament actively conveys sanctity by the mode that befits us, the ones who are being sanctified, namely such that the signification of this invisible sanctification is attached to it by visible signs, as in the sacraments we are now discussing. And this is why wherever there is a certain sanctification signified by certain sensible signs, there is a sacrament; and so, since this is the case in penance, it is clear that penance is a sacrament.
Reply Obj. 1: Among bodily medicines, some consist in the patient’s only enduring or receiving something, like surgery on a wound or the application of a bandage, while others consist in the patient’s active exertion, like exercises and things like that. In just the same way, among the sacraments some do not require any act from the one who is sanctified for the sacrament’s substance, except incidentally, like removing anything that prevents it, as is seen in baptism and confirmation and the others like them. But some sacraments do require the act of the one who receives the sacrament, essentially and per se, for the essence of the sacrament, as is seen in penance and marriage. Therefore, in those sacraments that are completed without our act, it is the matter that causes and signifies, like a medicine applied from without. But among those sacraments that require our act, there is no matter of this kind, but the acts themselves appearing outwardly do here what the matter does in the other sacraments. Now, how those things that are outwardly performed are the cause of sanctification in penance will be clear from what follows. To be sure, in this definition ‘material element’ must be taken in a general way for the sensible cause, whether it is a certain corporeal matter, or a certain sensible act.
Reply Obj. 2: In this sacrament there are certain things, namely, those external acts themselves, and certain words, namely, the words of the priest absolving, which are the form of this sacrament, in which the act of absolution is expressed. But this sacrament does not require so much determination of the words as in baptism and in the Eucharist, for there is no material to be sanctified by the word of life, (See Ephesians 5:26.) as in those sacraments.
Reply Obj. 3: The sacrament of penance is also presented by the ministers of the Church, for the priests absolve those confessing and impose satisfaction on them. But the fact that they have a certain principle in us is from that part by which our act is required in this sacrament, as was said.
Reply Obj. 4: The intention of Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy was not to hand down the teaching on the sacraments—which is why he examines certain things that are not sacraments, like monastic final vows and the funeral rites for the dead—but to show that outward rites represent spiritual acts. And since in penance and marriage there is no determined rite, by the fact that they do not have a matter like the other sacraments, as was said, he therefore did not examine these two sacraments. But it does not follow from this that they are not sacraments.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in penance a man stands as both recipient and agent. For he receives forgiveness and reconciliation from God through the Church’s ministers; and according to this it has the nature of a sacrament. But on the part of the act there are diverse opinions. For some people say that it is only an act of virtue, and not a virtue. But this cannot be the case, for since the acts of the virtues do not exist in someone sleeping, a sleeper could not be called repentant, which is false. And so others have said that on this part penance is a virtue, not speaking properly, but commonly, as all praiseworthy things are called virtues, even if they are passions. But this is not true. For according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, (In fact, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 1106b36 et seq.; Bk. 3, ch. 2, 1111b5–6.) the chief thing in moral virtue is choice; hence every habit that makes the right choice can be called a virtue, properly speaking. And so, since the act of penance is not caused only by a passion, but rather by choice, even if there is no passion, it is evident that penance or repentance is a virtue properly speaking, and not speaking improperly, as is the case with shame and that sort of thing.
Reply Obj. 1: Penance is not a virtue and a sacrament in the same respect. Inasmuch as the penitent receives the grace that cures the wound of sin by penance, it can be a sacrament. But inasmuch as by an infused habit one is directed to the right act, in this way it is a virtue. And since no right act is essential to baptism, this is why baptism is never called a virtue, nor is confirmation for the same reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Penance is not the same thing as grace in its essence, but it is called grace because it coincides with grace in its proper effect. For grace’s proper effect is to justify, and to render a person pleasing to God; and this is also the effect of penance, as will be said later.
Reply Obj. 3: The passion of repentance is not a virtue, nor is it an act of virtue. But it can accompany virtue, for as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b24.) virtues are not still and unmoving, as some people say; rather, they have both joy and sadness joined to them according to what kind of passions they are. For an act of penance, according as it is a virtue, does not arise from a passion, but from a due choice.
Reply Obj. 4: That good to which a virtue is directly ordered is its perfect act; and thus there are certain virtues that have their chief act in withdrawing from something, as was said in Book II, Distinction 23, about temperance and modesty and things like this. And in the same way penance’s perfect act is in withdrawing from a certain evil; nor does it follow because of this that it is not a virtue.
Reply Obj. 5: Shame is the fear of what is disgraceful. Now fear has to do with the future, but the future is only feared according as it has a proximate disposition in its cause. And so shame establishes a proximate disposition in someone who is ashamed to commit something disgraceful, as the Philosopher speaks of shame; and therefore, it necessarily includes imperfection in the person that it is in. But penance relates to disgraceful things in the past, which may be succeeded by perfection in the present, and so it is not necessarily the act of someone imperfect.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some people have said that repenting is not the act of a specific virtue, but common to all virtues. But this cannot be, for there is something in the nature of repentance, as we are speaking of it now, which does not belong to the nature of virtue in general, namely, satisfying for sins committed.
And therefore others say that repentance is a specific virtue, and it is specified by the fact that the sin committed by oneself is detested. But this cannot specify a virtue, for since virtue is contrary to sin, it is completely opposed to it existing in the same subject. And this is why it is common to every virtue that it drives out vice from its subject.
And so others say that it is specified by the fact that sin committed by oneself is detested under the hope of forgiveness. But this cannot be the case, for no virtue receives its species by the fact that it is commanded by another virtue. But to say, out of hope of forgiveness, means nothing else than commanded by hope. And so from this it would not be able to be a special virtue, just as neither would an act of chastity that was commanded by charity receive the species of a specific virtue.
And so it should be said rather that repentance takes the specific nature of its object from the fact that it regards sin committed by oneself as atonable by the act of the penitent. And in this way the act of repentance is not simply to detest sin, for this belongs to every virtue, but to detest it in making expiation for it, both as to the guilt and as to liability to punishment; for no other virtue does this.
Reply Obj. 1: Every virtue drives out the sin formally opposed to it as to its first actuality, which is informing the subject. But in the other virtues, the second actuality, which is their operation, is not directed principally to repelling sin, as is the case in penance. And so penance does not expel sin formally, but, as it were, effectively. For it has the expulsion of sin as its matter, and it works against it so that it is expelled. And this is why it is not opposed formally to every sin, but only to a certain one, which is impenitence; and consequently it is not necessary that it be a general virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the act of repentance concerns the matter of all vices, and consequently, of all virtues, nevertheless it considers the specific nature of the object in the matter it operates on, as was said, just as in a certain way magnanimity has the acts of all the other virtues for its object and matter, under the aspect of greatness; for it works great things in all the virtues, as is said in the Ethics 4, Chapter 9. (In fact, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 1123b30.) And thus, just as magnanimity is a specific virtue, so is repentance.
Reply Obj. 3: Although it follows from every virtue, according as one has right choice, to absolutely detest evils committed, nevertheless, to detest them for the sake of expiation is the proper matter of a specific virtue.
Reply Obj. 4: This virtue is reducible to a certain cardinal virtue, as will be said. Nevertheless the philosophers made no mention of this virtue for this reason: the remission of sins, or their expiation, pertains to God’s providence over human acts, inasmuch as he is offended by fault, and appeased by penance. Now the philosophers did not consider virtues directive of human acts as they are ordered to God’s providence, but as they are ordered to the human good. And so they made no mention of repentance. But from its likeness to the others that they did examine, we can understand it. For just as it belongs to a certain virtue that a man make amends to someone he has offended by his sin, so also it belongs to a certain virtue that a man make amends to God, whom he has offended by his sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that a theological virtue has the same thing for its object and its end. However, this is not the case in penance: for its object is sin committed, which it intends to atone for, while its end is God, to whom it intends to be reconciled. And therefore it is not a theological virtue, but should be numbered among the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that penance reconciles one to God, this does not refer to penance’s relation to its object, but rather to its end. But its order to its object is referred to in saying, weeping over sins committed, and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways that infused virtues are related to God. For some of them have God as their object and end, like the theological virtues. Some do not have him as the object in which their act terminates, but for their proximate end: and this is seen in latria, which has as its matter certain professions of service, which are directed at God as their end; and virtues like this are the closest to the theological virtues. And this is why the acts of these virtues are attributed to the theological virtues as the closest ones commanding them. And thus Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity. (See Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (CCSL 46), ch. 1: “Hic si respondero fide spe caritate colendum deum, profecto dicturus es breuius hoc dictum fuisse quam uelles, et deinde petiturus ea tibi breuiter explicari quae ad singula tria ista pertineant, quid credendum scilicet, quid sperandum, quid amandum sit.”)
However, certain virtues do not have God as their object, nor as their proximate end, but as their last end, like temperance, which has the passions for its matter and a calm soul for its proximate end; but it orders this finally to God. Now, although penance does not have God for its object, it does however have God for its proximate end, for someone is moved to destroy sins that were committed in order that he might be reconciled to God. And so its act, namely of expelling sin, or justifying, is sometimes ascribed to faith, sometimes to charity.
And from this the resolution to the third objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 4: The mean in justice is not found in the same way as in other moral virtues, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 33. For the mean of justice is found by the equalizing of one thing to another. Now this equalizing happens in commutative justice, when something is taken away from the one who has more and given to the one who has less. But someone who offends or injures another, has more, and the one who is injured, has less, inasmuch as for the latter, what was due him was taken away, and the former enjoyed his own will in what was not due to him. And so retributive justice takes away from the one who committed the offense as much more as he had than he should have, and gives it to the one who was injured, when it punishes the other person for his honor and in his satisfaction. And this is how retributive justice establishes a mean in offenses, which are its matter: not by holding to a mean in offenses, as if it retained some and cast away others (as temperance sets a mean in sensual pleasures); but by apportioning the due penalty for every offense. And in the same way penance imposes the due penalty on oneself for any sin committed; although not such that it forgives certain sins and retains others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that since justice is a certain equality, there can be no true equalizing where the complete notion of justice is not present, but only a certain mode of justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 7, 1134b9 et seq.) that the relation of master to servant is not justice simply, but dominative justice. Therefore, since there is the greatest distance between man and God, there could not be any justice, properly so called, of man toward God, but a certain mode of justice, by a likeness as it were. Now there are two ways that a man can be made debtor to another man. In one way, by what was given to him by the other, as in voluntary interactions like buying and selling. In another way, by what he took from the other, as in involuntary interactions like theft, assault, and things like that. And in the same way someone becomes debtor to God by receiving something from him; and by this account latria or religion renders due honor to God. In the other way, by having sinned against God; and that is how penance renders a debt to God. And so just as religion is considered a part of justice by Cicero, not like a species of it, but like a potential part, inasmuch as it partakes in a certain mode of justice, in the same way penance should also be counted as a part of justice.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the Ethics, as we have in Book 5, Chapter 8, (In fact, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 14, 1163b15.) virtue does not always require an equality, but what is possible suffices, as in honors toward parents and gods. And this is why, just as latria is a part of justice, although it does not render an honor equal to the benefits received, penance is as well, although it cannot render anything equal to the preceding offense.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the act of prudence is united to acts of the other moral virtues, it is also joined to the act of penance in the same way. And the objection proceeds according to this. Or it may be said that the Gloss does not speak about the sorrow of repentance, but the sorrow by which we spurn earthly things when we aspire to heavenly things.
Reply Obj. 3: Penance makes use of temperance for its own end; and the authoritative citation of Gregory and Isidore should be understood in this way, not as though repelling carnal desires were the act elicited by repentance.
Reply Obj. 4: Shame is in a different genus than penance, for shame is a kind of fear, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 9, 1128b11.) whereas penance is a kind of sorrow; and so they are not the same, although both have the disgraceful deed as their object.
Reply Obj. 5: It belongs to penance to suffer difficulties voluntarily taken on, but patience is properly enduring the difficulties imposed by others; and so they are not the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 6
To the sixth question, it should be said that penance and retributive justice concern the same thing in a certain way, namely, the punishment of an offense. But they differ in two ways. First, because retributive justice resides properly in the judge imposing the penalty which the culprit sometimes suffers unwillingly; but penance resides in the culprit himself, who voluntarily undergoes a penalty for the fault committed. Second, because retributive justice regards offense in general, but the virtue of repentance regards offense against God. And so penance must consist in amends for an offense, willingly taken on, and such as befits an offense against God.
But just as with men, who see what appears outwardly, an offense’s recompense is performed outwardly, similarly for God, who searches the heart, the recompense must begin to occur in the very affections of the heart. Now outward recompense for a past offense is done well in two ways. The first is in the fact that someone submits outwardly to the penalty for the offense he committed; the second is in that he is on his guard in the future lest he commit a similar offense. And a man must exhibit these two things in his heart by penance: first, sorrow of heart for the evils that he did; second, the intention of not committing such things again; and the definition includes these two things, although they are not put forth in the form of a definition. And this is why when the Master reduces it to its due form, he includes three things, namely, genus, in saying, it is a virtue; sorrow for the past, by saying, in which we weep over wrongs committed; and the aim of future amendment, in saying, with the intention of making amends. But the other things that are said relate to the same thing, as will be evident in the exposition of the text.
Reply Obj. 1: Since habits are known by their acts, this is the reason that it is usual for authors to define habits by their acts, putting the acts in place of the habits. In the same way accidental differences are sometimes included in definitions in place of essentials because they are less hidden, as the Philosopher says. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 7, ch. 12.)
Reply Obj. 2: What pertains to physical change does not pertain to virtue as its essential act, but it can pertain to virtue as the material that the virtue works on, since even physical passions are the matter of virtue. And according to this it should be said that sensible sorrow or physical weeping can be a certain material of the virtue of penance itself, inasmuch as the penitent person renders these things to God as though due for the offense committed. And therefore if the act of repentance is signified by weeping, then it signifies nothing else but detestation; but if it should name the material of repentance, in this way it can also signify sensible or physical weeping.
Reply Obj. 3: Although sin is past as to its act, nevertheless it remains as to the effect, whether of culpability or of stain or of divine offense. And this is how someone can grieve over sin in the present, for sorrow is about the present. Or it could be said, and this is better, that although the will does not aim at what is impossible, there is nevertheless a certain wishfulness about it, that is, a conditional will: for we would will, if it were possible, that this never have happened. And according to this they also take from the condition mentioned a certain character of the present, so that there can be sorrow, which only concerns present things, about these things as well.
Reply Obj. 4: Although regard for the future does not pertain to repentance as repentance, nevertheless as something that amends for offenses committed against God, it does require a consideration of the future, namely, the aim of avoiding it in the future. And this aim is understood in the passage: not committing again things to be wept over, that is, to have the aim of not committing them. Or it could be understood as to perfect repentance, so that what is added is not of the essence of repentance, but of its perfection, since without this it does not obtain its ultimate fruit; or so that it refers to the same time, as the Master says.
Reply Obj. 5: Ambrose orders the parts of the definition according to their order to penance, for he places first what is more essential to penance. But Augustine orders them by their order to the penitent person, for it happens first that someone withdraws from his intention of sinning, as though removing the impediment to penance.
Reply Obj. 6: It is not unfitting for the same thing to be given different definitions according to the differences that are found in things. Therefore, the definition cited from Gregory and Ambrose, which the Master reduces to the form of a definition, is the most complete one, for it touches on the genus and the act and the object, and each of those things is required to show amends to God. And Augustine’s definition cited in the text amounts to the same thing, namely: repentance is a certain retribution of the sorrowful, etc., except that he expresses more the proximate genus of it, for he places it not only in the genus of virtue, but in the genus of justice, by saying retribution; and he also includes its proper species rather than proximate differences, in adding the notion of punishment to sorrow.
And Ambrose’s other definition (From a sermon “On Holy Lent” attributed to Ambrose: Sermon 25, n. 1 (PL 17:665).) comes back to the same thing, which lays down that penance is a sorrow of heart and bitterness of soul for the sins that someone has committed; except that he does not include one of those things that the definitions mentioned do contain, namely, detestation for the sins committed. But the other account, in which it says that penance is the best thing that recalls all failings to the perfect, is given by the effect of penance, and it is called the best thing not simply, but in the genus of withdrawing from evil after having committed sins.
And likewise also that definition of Damascene, penance is the removal from what is against nature, in what is according to nature, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 30.) is given by the effect: and they come down to the same thing as it were: for the sin that is called defect in the first description, is called being against nature in the second; but the state of grace or virtue, which is called ‘perfection’ in the first definition, is called ‘being according to nature’ in the second, because nature is ordered to this.
Article 2
Relationship of penance to other things
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 5.) It seems that the virtue of penance is not conceived in fear. For what exists by infusion does not have its cause in its subject. But since penance is a virtue, which Augustine says that God works in us without us, it exists by infusion. (The classic definition of virtue, “Virtus is a good quality of the mind, by which we live rightly, which no one uses badly, and which God works in us, without us,” given by the Master in Sentences, Bk. 2, d. 27, ch. 5 (Quarrachi 1:446) and accepted in the medieval schools, is compiled from various sayings of Augustine (e.g., de Libero arbitrio, Bk. 2, ch. 19). A formulation similar to Lombard’s is found in Peter of Poitiers’ Sentences, Bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 211:1041).) Therefore, it does not have its cause in its own subject, and so it is not conceived in fear.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, anything that issues in perfect being is not only conceived perfectly but also generated perfectly. But penance issues in perfect being, for it draws the weak back toward the perfect. Therefore, its generation should not be conceived in fear.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a man is more inspired to penance by the expectation of glory than by the threat of punishment, which is why John, preaching penance, said: do penance, the kingdom of heaven is at hand (Matt 3:2). But the expectation of glory belongs to hope, or to charity, which it arouses, while the threat of punishment has to do with fear. Therefore, it should have been said that it arises from either hope or love, rather than from fear.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if it were conceived in fear, it would be either original fear, servile fear, worldly fear, or pious fear. But it is not worldly fear, for that would rather lead one into sin. Likewise, it is also not servile fear, for that does not exist together with penance, while the thing that generates and the thing generated, or the thing that conceives and the conceived, must exist together. Likewise, neither is it original fear, or pious fear, or filial fear, for these do not precede penance, but what conceives must precede what is conceived. Therefore, in no way is penance conceived in fear.
On the contrary (1), according to Augustine, fear leads to charity. (Augustine, Sermon 348 (PL 39:1526).) But the introduction of charity and the other virtues comes through the act of penance. Therefore, penance takes its beginning from fear.
Furthermore (2), contraries are the principles of contraries. But the pleasure of sin attracts one to sin. Therefore, the harshness of punishment also draws one back from sin. But one draws back from sin through penance. Therefore, fear, which has to do with punishment, is the principle of penance.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that penance is the first of the virtues. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 6.) For commenting on Matthew 3:2, repent, the Gloss says, the first virtue is to punish the old man through penance and to hate vices. (Glossa, PL 114:79.)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the cause precedes the effect. But penance is the cause of justification, in which all the virtues are poured into a person. Therefore, it is prior to the other virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in any movement, leaving the starting point comes before advancing to the ending point. But the virtue of penance is ordered to receding from evil, while all other virtues are ordered toward obtaining the good. Therefore, the virtue of penance precedes all other virtues.
On the contrary (4), faith is a cause of fear. But fear precedes the virtue of penance as its cause. Therefore, so does faith; and thus penance is not the first virtue.
Furthermore (5), penance proceeds from right choice, as was said above. But right choice proceeds from every virtue. Therefore, penance comes after all the virtues.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that penance is not a foundation. For what follows upon a foundation should not be called a foundation, but rather, the edifice built upon it. But faith, which is a foundation, as it says in Hebrews 11:1, precedes the virtue of penance, as has been said. Therefore, penance is not the foundation of the other virtues.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, concerning Sirach 25:10, how great is he who finds wisdom, the Gloss comments: a holy fear of the Lord remains for the ages; it is the foundation of faith, and the origin of charity. But penance follows fear. Therefore, it is not the foundation of the other virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no foundation has a foundation of its own, for then there would be an infinite regress. But certain other virtues are a foundation, like fortitude, as the Gloss says about this text: do not fear those who kill the body (Luke 12:4). (See Gloss, PL 114:294.) And again, as Bernard says in his book On Consideration, humility is a certain stable foundation for virtues. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Consideration, Bk. 5, par. 32: “Virtutum siquidem bonum quoddam ac stabile fundamentum, humilitas” (Bernardi opera, ed. Leclercq and Rochais, 3:493).) Therefore, penance is not the foundation of the other virtues.
On the contrary (1), Hebrews 6:1 says: not laying again the foundation of penance from dead works.
Furthermore (2), the foundation is the first part of a building. But before one can build a spiritual building, one must destroy Satan’s building, which penance does. Therefore, penance is a foundation.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the sacrament of penance is not the second plank. (Parallel: ST III, q. 84, a. 6.) For second is only said in relation to a first. But the first plank in the text is said to be baptism, in relation to which penance is not second, for it is not the second sacrament, but the Master examines it in the fourth place. Therefore, penance is not the second plank.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Acts 2:38, Peter says, do penance and be baptized every one of you. Therefore, penance is not the second plank after baptism, but vice versa.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, concerning the text, they proclaim their sin like Sodom (Isa 3:9), the Gloss says, the second plank after the shipwreck is penance; and the consolation of wretchedness to hide its infidelity; and this is Jerome’s gloss. (See Jerome, Epistle 120, n. 9 (PL 22:1185).) But penance does not hide sins, but rather exposes them. Therefore, it is not the second plank.
On the contrary, Jerome says in the text: it is called the first plank on account of liberation from shipwreck. But baptism frees from original sin, which is the first shipwreck, while penance frees from actual sin, which is the second shipwreck. Therefore, baptism is the first plank, and penance, the second.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that God does pour the virtue of penance into us; but a certain disposition proceeds from our part, and according to this it has some origin in us. But since human acts do not proceed out of necessity, but out of free will, a cause cannot be assigned on our part for any of our acts from which they would always proceed, but from which it happens for the most part because of an existing disposition in us toward this action, which inclination nevertheless does not incline us necessarily. For this reason, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1, all moral discussions are such that we must understand them as holding true for the most part. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 3, 1094b13.) But since the act of penance is a calling back from sin, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 30 (PG 94:975).) its origin in us must be taken according to the existing disposition in sin. Now a person who is in sin does not have healthy appetites, so that he may be recalled from sin by the sweetness of divine goodness, but his affections are infected by an inordinate love of himself. And so, by punishments that are contrary to his nature and his will, he is recalled from sin, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10, about such people, that they follow their own pleasures, and flee the opposite discomforts; but they have no understanding of the good and true delights, nor do these seem able to be enjoyed. (A composite text from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 1 (1172a25) and ch. 6 (1176b19ff.).) And this is why in them as in many, the act of penance takes its beginning from fear, although for some, the act of penance also is started by love.
Reply Obj. 1: Although it does not have a cause in the subject, nevertheless, it has its disposition in it; and this is how the origin of penance is assigned here.
Reply Obj. 2: Conception is properly said for the generation of something within the womb. And since the first existence of the act of penance is in the heart, but afterward it extends externally by confession and satisfaction, therefore, so that he might designate its first origin, he said that it is conceived in fear.
Reply Obj. 3: The goodness and glory of God, in themselves, are more of a nature to recall someone from sin; but not on the part of those who are in sin, who do not have the taste for the things mentioned.
Reply Obj. 4: Penance is conceived in servile fear, which has to do with punishment. Nor is it necessary that servile fear and penance exist together: for servile fear is not the cause of the very being of penance, but of its generation, just as taking medicine is a cause of health, but they do not exist at the same time.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that all virtues are infused together as habits, but when one is said to be prior to another it is according to the order considered in their acts. However, since man tends toward God by acts of the virtues, it is necessary for the order of acts to be considered according to the order of those things that are in the motion. However, the motion of the will, which is the kind of motion that we have in the moral virtues, is preceded by the motion of the understanding, for the appetible imagined or understood moves the appetite, as is said in On the Soul 3; (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 10, 438a9ff.) and it is preceded, again, by the judgment of possibility: for choice, which is the chief movement of virtue, does not concern something judged impossible. Now the movement of the appetite consists in two things, namely, in flight from evil, and in pursuit of the good; and these two things are ordered in different ways. For sometimes someone flees evil because of the desire for good, but sometimes just the reverse. And this movement is quite frequent in the turning of the sinner toward God by the act of penance, as was said. And so the movement of faith precedes the movement of penance, for whoever would approach God must believe (Heb 11:6). And again the movement of hope is joined to the movement of fear, by which one judges it possible to obtain forgiveness; and thus Gregory says that the penitent person is moved between hope and fear. (See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, (CCSL 143B), Bk. 33, par. 12: “Mola enim superior aut inferior tollitur, si per praedicantis linguam in peccatoris pectore aut timor a spe, aut spes ab timore diuidatur.”) Then, in many cases, the movement of penance follows, and then the motion of charity and of other virtues in order. Sometimes the movement of love also precedes the movement of penance, as was said; but that love is not charity, for charity once lost is only recovered by contrition for the preceding sins, which is the motion of the virtue of penance. And according to this it should be said that the virtue of penance is prior to certain virtues, namely, charity and the ones following from it; and it follows others, namely, faith and hope.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope do not have the nature of perfect virtue except insofar as they are informed by charity, and according to this they follow penance; and so in a certain way it is true that it is the first among all the virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Unformed faith and hope are also had without grace, and so they need not be superadded in justification; and so penance is not their cause.
Reply Obj. 3: The end that is prior in intention is last in execution; and therefore, although in physical movement leaving the starting point comes before advancing to the ending point, nevertheless, in the movement of the will it is just the opposite, since it is because of some good to be obtained that the will withdraws from something contrary or from its impediment.
The fourth we concede, insofar as such faith is not a virtue.
Reply Obj. 5: Repenting an evil committed, although it may arise from the choice of good, nevertheless also sometimes happens from another reason, namely, flight from the evil of punishment, as was said; and even when it stems from the choice of the good, the first motion of penance does not arise from the formed choice of the good through some habit of another virtue, but through some natural appetite, or even from the good habit of the virtue of penance itself; and so the first movement of penance precedes the motion of the other virtues. But it is not unfitting that the motions of the other virtues sometimes cause certain motions of penance, just as someone, out of love for temperance, has a movement of repenting his previous lust: for also sometimes the movement of a preceding virtue arises from a subsequent virtue, as when someone is moved to the love of God, which demands chastity, from the fact that chastity pleases him.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that something is called a foundation in spiritual things from its likeness to a physical foundation, which has two properties. The first is that it is the first part of an edifice; the second is that the whole edifice is supported by the foundation. And this is why in spiritual matters, something is called a foundation when it has a character of priority or of conserving and supporting other things, or even the character of both.
Now priority can be found in two ways. In one way, as to instruction in spiritual things; and in this way those things that must be taught first in the Christian religion are called the foundation (cf. Heb 6:1). In another way, as to spiritual life; and in that way faith is called the first foundation simply; but fear and penance are first in the genus of those things that belong to the affections as to fleeing from evil, while charity is first as to the obtaining of good, as it says, rooted and founded in charity (Eph 3:17). But under the aspect of supporting, humility is called a foundation in prosperous times, but in adverse times, fortitude is. Now penance and fear, in withdrawing from evil, are foundations in different ways: for fear is first in the entire genus of withdrawing from evil, but penance concerns specifically withdrawing from evils committed; and so fear also precedes penance, as the principles of a genus precede the principles of a species.
And by this the answers to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that Jerome’s expression is metaphorical. For those who sail the sea by a favorable route are sustained by the first plank, namely, their unharmed ship. But once they have suffered a shipwreck, they are brought to the port of safety by the aid of some plank broken from the ship. And this is the second plank, which is after the shipwreck; not that it is the second after the shipwreck, but because it arises after the shipwreck and it is the second from the first that was before the shipwreck. And this is why it is his custom, as is clear to anyone reading his words, to call everything that offers a remedy after any danger arises, the second plank after the shipwreck. Now baptismal grace, by which we are brought together in the Church, the figure of which was Noah’s ark, is called the first plank before the shipwreck. But since for those who have suffered a shipwreck through mortal sin and fallen from the grace of innocence, there remains no other remedy but penance, therefore penance is called the second plank.
Reply Obj. 1: The other sacraments do not rescue one from the shipwreck wrought by mortal sin without penance. And so they cannot be called a second plank, like penance, which rescues one after a fall. And this is why although it is not the second sacrament, it is nevertheless the second plank.
Reply Obj. 2: Peter does not speak there of penance the sacrament, but of the repentance that is required in baptism, which does pertain to the first plank.
Reply Obj. 3: The kind of concealment of sin that Jerome mentions there is not contrary to the kind of manifestation of it that happens in penance, but rather to the kind that people make who, shamelessly advancing in sin, glory in having done evil, and boast of their sins. And this kind of concealment pertains to shame; and according to the same likeness it is called a second plank: for the first plank of a favorable voyage is for a man to not commit a sin; the second, that he be ashamed of having committed a sin. But a sufficient remedy is not given by the plank of shame, except to the extent that it leads to the amendment from sin and penance. And so it is not properly called the second plank like penance. Nevertheless, it can be called a second plank: for the second plank in a physical shipwreck does not always free one from danger, even if in some way it does in itself impede the danger.
Article 3
The subject of penance
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 85, a. 4.) It seems that penance exists in every power. For nothing acts where it does not exist. But penance drives sin out of every power. Therefore, it is in every power.
Obj. 2: Again, it seems that it is in the concupiscible appetite. For the act of penance is a sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible appetite, along with joy. Therefore, penance is in the concupiscible appetite.
Obj. 3: Again, it seems that it is in the irascible appetite. For the act of penance is a certain retribution of the one who is sorry. But retribution belongs to the irascible appetite, for anger is an appetite for vengeance. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 1378a31.) Therefore, penance is in the irascible appetite.
Obj. 4: Again, it seems that it is in the memory. For just as fear is about the future and joy is about the present, so memory is about the past. But the act of penance concerns an evil committed, which is past. Therefore, it is in the memory.
Obj. 5: Again, it seems that it is in the reason. For penance is a part of justice. But justice is in the reason. Therefore, so is penance.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that among the innocent penance cannot exist. (Parallel: ST I, q. 110, a. 3.) For repenting is weeping over evils committed. But the innocent have not committed any evil. Therefore, penance cannot exist in them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, penance, by its name, implies a penalty. But no penalty is due to the innocent. Therefore, there is no repentance in them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, penance coincides in the same thing with retributive justice, as was said above. But for all who remain innocent, retributive justice would have no place. Therefore, neither does repentance, and so it does not exist among the innocent.
On the contrary (1), all the virtues are infused together. But repentance is a virtue. Therefore, since all the other virtues are infused into the innocent at baptism, penance is also infused.
Furthermore (2), someone who was never physically ill is called healable. Therefore, it is the same with someone who has never been spiritually sick. But just as actual healing from a wound of sin does not happen except by an act of penance, in the same way no one is able to be healed who does not have the habit of penance. Therefore, someone who has never had the ailment of sin does have the habit of penance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the holy ones who are in glory do not have penance. (Parallel: See, in this article, qa. 4, ad 4.) For just as Gregory says in the Morals on Job, (See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 4, par. 36.) the blessed remember sins the way, once we are healthy, we remember suffering without pain. But penitence is a suffering of the heart, as was said. Therefore, the saints in the heavenly fatherland do not have penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But in Christ there was no penitence, nor faith, which is the principle of penance. Therefore, neither will there be penance in the saints in heaven.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the habit that does not lead to an act is useless. But the saints in heaven will not perform an act of penance, for that would be for them something against their desire. Therefore, there will be no habit of penance in them.
On the contrary (4), penance is a part of justice. But justice is immortal and perpetual (Wis 1:15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore, so will penance.
Furthermore (5), in the lives of the fathers we read that a certain church father said that even Abraham will be penitent for not having done more good deeds. But someone should be more penitent for evil committed than of good omitted to which he is not bound, for that is the kind of good he is speaking of. Therefore, there will be penitence there for evils committed.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that even an angel, good or bad, is susceptible to repentance. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2; ST I, q. 64, a. 2; de Malo, q. 16, a. 5.) For fear is the origin of repentance. But fear does exist in them: the demons believe and tremble (James 2:19). Therefore, there can be repentance in them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 4, 1166b24.) that bad men are filled with regret, and this is their greatest punishment. But the demons are the most wicked, and no punishment is missing from them. Therefore, the demons can repent.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, something is more easily moved to what is according to its nature than to what is against its nature, as water which is heated by violence also reverts by itself to its natural property. But an angel can be changed to sin, which is against their whole nature. Therefore, much more can one be called back to what is according to nature. And this is what repentance does. Therefore, they are susceptible to repentance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:926).) the same judgment is made of angels and separated souls. But in separated souls there can be repentance, as some people say, just as in the blessed souls that are in heaven. Therefore, there can also be repentance in angels.
On the contrary (1), a man is brought back to life by repentance, when his sins are forgiven. But this is impossible in angels, as was said in Book 2, Distinction 7, Question 1, Article 2. Therefore, they are not susceptible to repentance.
Furthermore (2), Damascene (Ibid., ch. 3 (PG 94:867).) says that man engages in repentance because of the weakness of his body. But angels are incorporeal. Therefore, there cannot be any repentance in them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that certain people say the subject of all virtue is the free will. But this cannot be, for every ordered human act proceeds as elicited by a certain human virtue. Now every human power has a certain ordered act (and I call the reason a human power, or whatever obeys reason); and so in every power like this there can be a virtue, which elicits the ordered act of that power; and more was said about this in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 2, Article 4, Subquestion 1.
And so some people say that penance is in all the powers. But this cannot be, for a single habit can only exist in a single power, just as a single form can only be in one matter, and a single accident can only be in a single subject.
And so others say that it is in the irascible appetite; for, as Augustine says in the text, there is a certain retribution that anger seeks. But this cannot be, since pursuing revenge on someone else, which contains a certain arduousness, pertains to the irascible appetite; but suffering retribution does not seem to be irascible.
And so certain people say that penitence is a sorrow, and because of this it is in the concupiscible appetite. But this also does not hold up; for that sorrow that exists in the concupiscible appetite is a passion, while the sorrow that is the act of penance is not a passion.
And so it should be said with other people, that penance is a part of justice; and so, since justice is in the reason, not indeed as to the cognitive part, but as to the affective part, penance as a virtue is also in the reason. But the penitence that is a passion is in the concupiscible appetite as its subject, for it is a certain sorrow. But this passion is like the matter in the virtue of penance, for with this sorrow the virtue of penance makes up for sins committed; just as also the punishment that the guilty man suffers is the matter in retributive justice.
Reply Obj. 1: Penance does not drive out every sin formally, but effectively, as it were. And this is why it is not necessary that it be in, as its subject, every power where there can be sin, but rather, that those things that are in those powers be subject to it as its material. And penance does have this, since it exists in the reason, to which all the other powers are subordinated as being moved and regulated by it.
Reply Obj. 2: The sorrow that exists in the concupiscible appetite is not the act of the virtue of penance, but the matter of it, as was said. But the sorrow that is a detestation of faults committed is its act; and this belongs to the will, in which justice exists, whose act is to detest preexisting inequality and to reduce it to equality.
Reply Obj. 3: The exercise of redress is the matter in penance, just as it is in retributive justice; for it does not seek to redress from an appetite for vengeance, but for the sake of restitution of equality.
Reply Obj. 4: Although penance is about the past, like memory, nevertheless, it regards the affections, while memory is a purely cognitive power; and so penance cannot exist in it.
We grant the fifth objection.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that a habit is a mean between a power and an act. And since when what comes first is taken away, what comes after is as well, but not vice versa, therefore when the power for an action is taken away, the habit is taken away, but a habit is not taken away by removing its action. And since the removal of the matter takes away an action, because the action cannot exist without the matter on which it operates, this is the reason that the habit of a certain virtue may belong to someone who does not have the matter, because if the matter were at hand, then it would result in the act, as a poor man may have the habit of generosity, but not the act, since he does not have great riches which are the matter of generosity, but it is possible for him to have them. And so since the innocent in the state of innocence do not have sins that they have committed, which are the matter of penance, but they could have had them, the act of penance cannot exist in them, but the habit can. And it does if they have grace, with which all the virtues are infused.
Reply Obj. 1: Although they had not committed any sins, nevertheless, they were able to commit them; and so it is fitting for them to have the habit of penance. But nevertheless this habit can never result in an act, except perhaps with regard to venial sins, since mortal sins destroy it. Nor, however, is it in vain, since it is the perfection of a natural power.
Reply Obj. 2: Although they do not actually deserve any punishment, nevertheless it is possible for something to exist in them for which they would have to suffer punishment.
Reply Obj. 3: In the power for sinning that remains, retributive justice would still have a place as a habit, although not as an act, if there were no actual sins.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but according to the acts that they have in their end, as was said in the main response of Book 3, Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 4. And since the virtue of penance is a part of justice, which is a cardinal habit, whoever has the habit of penance in this life will have it in the future life; but it will not have the same act that it has now, but another, namely, thanking God the forgiver of sins for his mercy.
Reply Obj. 1: That authority proves that they do not have the same act that penance has here; and we concede this.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ could not sin, as was said in Book III, Distinction 12, Question 2, Article 1. And so the matter of this virtue did not pertain to him, neither actually nor potentially. And because of this, it is not the same with him as with other people.
Reply Obj. 3: To repent, properly speaking, as it names an act of penance that exists now, will not exist in heaven; but neither will the habit be in vain, since it will have another act.
We concede the fourth objection.
Reply Obj. 5: But since the fifth argument argues that the same act of penance will exist in heaven which exists now, it should be said to the fifth that in heaven our will will be entirely conformed to God’s will. And so just as by his antecedent will God wills that all things be good, and as a result that there be no evil, but not by his consequent will, it is also this way with the blessed; and this kind of will is improperly called repentance by that holy father.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that penance or repentance in us can be taken in two ways. In one way, according as it is a passion, for then it is nothing else but sorrow or sadness for evil committed. And although as a passion it only exists in the concupiscible appetite, nevertheless some act of the will is called repentance by a likeness, in which someone detests what he does; just as also love and other passions are said to be in the intellective appetite, as was said in Book III, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 5. In the other way, it is taken as a virtue; and in this way, to detest an evil committed with the aim of amendment and the attempt of atoning or appeasing God for the offense committed is its act.
Now the detestation of evil belongs to someone according as he has a natural order to the good. And since this inclination is not completely destroyed in any creature, this detestation also remains among the damned, and as a result the passion of repentance, or something like it, as is said in Wisdom 5:3: groaning and repenting within themselves. And this kind of repentance, although it is not a habit, but a passion or an act, can in no way exist among the blessed angels, in whom no sins were previously committed. But among the bad angels it exists, since there is the same account of them as of damned souls, for according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 94:878).) what is death to man is the fall in the angels. But sin in an angel is irremissible, as was said in Book II, Distinction 7, Question 1, Article 2. And since sin, as something that can be forgiven and atoned for, is the proper matter of this virtue that is called penance, for this reason since the matter cannot apply to them, they have no power of executing the act, and thus neither does the habit apply to them; and so angels cannot be the subject of the virtue of penance.
Reply Obj. 1: Fear generates in them a certain motion of repentance, but not one that is a virtue.
And a similar answer should be given to the second objection.
Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines them to the good; but their free will is fixed in malice. And since the movement of virtue and vice does not follow the inclination of nature, but rather the movement of the free will, for this reason although by nature they are inclined to the good, it is not necessary that the movement of virtue exist in them, or that it is even possible for it to exist there.
Reply Obj. 4: One cannot reason the same way about the holy angels as about the holy souls. For in the holy souls there was or there could have been forgivable sin, but not in the angels. And so although they are alike in their present state, they were not as to their past state, which repentance directly regards.
Article 4
The duration of penance
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 17, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 3, corp.; ST III, q. 84, a. 8 and a. 9, ad 1.) It seems that it belongs to the nature of true penance that it continue until the end of life. For penance is like a certain recompense made to God for an offense committed. But the offense was infinite, which is why eternal punishment is due for mortal sin. Therefore, for the penance that erases this guilt to be true, it must also last until the end.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing is destroyed except by something stronger than it. But penance is stronger than sin, since it expels it. Therefore, since true penance can only be stopped by sin, it seems that if it were true, there would be no way that someone could fall from the state of penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is easier to prevent sin from happening than to destroy sin once committed. But penance destroys the sin that has been done. Therefore, much more does it impede any sin from being committed, and so the same as before.
On the contrary (1), baptism is a more efficacious sacrament than penance, for it even takes away all punishment. But baptismal grace is taken away by subsequent sin. Therefore, much more is the virtue of penance.
Furthermore (2), no virtue can remain without charity, and once it is possessed, all virtues accompany it. But it happens that charity once possessed can be lost, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 1. Therefore, the same with the virtue of penance.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is necessary for the sorrow of penance to be cut short by joy. For joy and sorrow are contrary affections. But contraries are not such as to exist in the same thing. Therefore, since it is sometimes necessary for the penitent to rejoice in his penitence, as it says in the text, the sorrow must be cut short by that joy.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the wicked are sad about their joy, so also the good rejoice in their sorrow. But the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 that the things that delight the wicked make them grieve afterward; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 4, 1166b19–25.) which cannot happen at the same time as they are delighted. Therefore, nor can the good rejoice over their sorrow while they are grieving.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it were said that the sorrow is the cause of the joy, and that is how they can exist at the same time, to the contrary: an opposite is not the cause of its own opposite. But sorrow is the opposite of joy. Therefore, it cannot be its cause.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Galatians 5:22, but the fruits of the Spirit, the interlinear Gloss says that the virtues are called fruits, because they delight their possessors with holy delight. But penance is a virtue. Therefore, in its act, which is to grieve, it contains delight.
Furthermore (2), according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, the sign of a habit having been generated is that delight is taken in its work. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 1104b4.) But penance is a certain habit. Therefore, its act contains delight; therefore, it is not cut short by joy.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the sacrament of penance cannot be repeated. (Parallels: ST III, q. 84, a. 10; Super Heb. 6, lec. 1.) For just as baptism has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, so does penance, and all the other sacraments. But the Passion of Christ is one, and this is why baptism cannot be repeated. Therefore, neither can penance be repeated.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Gregory says, easy forgiveness offers an incentive for wrongdoing. (In fact, Ambrose (and one manuscript of the Scriptum does indicate Ambrose; see Moos, p. 608), Sermon 8 on Psalm 118, n. 26 (PL 15:1374).) But God must not give anyone the occasion for sinning. Therefore, he should not give the opportunity to repeat penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, spiritual healing, which happens through penance, is symbolized by physical healing, which the Lord worked miraculously. But in those healings it is not read that anyone was ever healed twice. Therefore, neither can someone be healed twice spiritually through penance.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Sirach 2:18: for according to his greatness, so also is his mercy with him. But his greatness is infinite. Therefore, so also is his mercy; it is not restricted to one penance, so that afterward he would not spare those converted to him.
Furthermore (2), it says in Matthew 12: whoever sins against the Father or the Son, it will be forgiven him. (This is a most bizarre citation to make, since Matthew 12:32 says: “Et quicumque dixerit verbum contra Filium hominis remittetur ei qui autem dixerit contra Spiritum Sanctum non remittetur ei neque in hoc saeculo neque in futuro” and there is no text of this sort that mentions the Father. However, Thomas may have picked up this misquotation from St. Peter Damian, who writes in his Epistle 180 (Monumenta Germaniae historica, Briefe d. dt. Kaiserzeit, n. 4, ed. Reindel): “Reconsecratus ergo a rebaptizato nequaquam diversa dampnatione dividitur, cui nimirum pari impietatis piaculo sotiatur, nisi fortassis et hunc sceleratius peccare quis asserat propter hoc, quod veritas dicit, quia, qui peccat in Patrem vel Filium, remittitur ei, qui autem peccat in Spiritum sanctum, neque hic remittitur neque in futurum” (vol. 1, p. 486).) But it happens that after having done penance, someone may sin out of weakness, which is to sin against the Father, and out of ignorance, which is to sin against the Son. Therefore, sins of this kind are forgiven; and therefore penance can be repeated.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that that opinion which held that no man could fall away from true repentance is erroneous, and similar to the one mentioned in Book III, Distinction 31, Article 1, that charity once possessed can never be lost. Nevertheless, concerning charity those who considered its efficacy seemed to be moved most by the fact that it appeared unable to be conquered by any sin; but concerning penance they seemed to be moved because penance’s integrity required its continuation to the end of life. But both of these are silly. First, because no matter how much efficacy a certain virtue has, it does not remove the flexibility of the free will while one is in the state of a wayfarer. Likewise, what is future cannot be of the substance or of the integrity of any virtue, except as it is present in the apprehension or in the will. For a virtue, as a habit, does not regard anything in the future, since a habit of virtue is about enduring things, not successive ones; and so it has all its own perfection together in an instant which can all flow out together into one act, for acts are like habits, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b21.) And thus what is future is not of its integrity or essence. And this is why since penance is a virtue, and according as it is a sacrament, it does not extend beyond the act of the virtue, and its future continuation will not be integral and essential to penance, except in intention; and so there can be true repentance and nevertheless someone might fall away from it afterward.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the offense possessed infiniteness, so also does a single act of contrition possess a certain infiniteness, both by virtue of the grace that gives an infinite value to its works, namely, so that by these works a man may merit an infinite good, and by the merit of Christ, which works in all the sacraments and in all our merits.
Reply Obj. 2: Neither penance nor any virtue acts out of necessity, but from the freedom of the will. And so although penance is stronger than sin, and can expel sin, nevertheless a man having the virtue of penance can voluntarily subject himself to sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is conquered by someone weaker, who conquers the stronger man because he did not take enough care. And in the same way, a penitent who was freed by penance from the sin he had committed is conquered by a sin not yet committed because of his negligence.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that joy and sadness are opposites according to their genus; however, not every joy is opposed to every sadness, but only when it regards the same thing. Now if they are about contraries, or about different things, one can be the cause of the other or the material for it; for anyone who rejoices in what is present will be saddened by its absence by that very fact. In the same way too, when it is fitting or appropriate for us to be sad about something, sadness can be the matter for joy. Therefore, if joy and sadness are taken as direct opposites, then they cannot exist at the same time in the same person in the same respect, but if they are about different things or opposite things, then they can indeed exist together as to their cause, for there can be the will about one thing and the will about the other; and likewise, if they both share one account. But as to the feeling that is required for either one, since joy does not exist without perceiving something fitting, nor sadness without perceiving something harmful, it is impossible that both exist together intensely. For the soul, when it is intensely occupied with one, is withdrawn from the other. But they can exist imperfectly together, so that one is more perfect right now and the other one afterward.
Now the sorrow that is in penitence is for sins committed; and this is why joy about the same thing cannot exist together with it. But joy in the hope of forgiveness can exist, which begins from sorrow; or also by this very fact that in exhibiting sorrow for sins committed, one does what one should; and so detestation of the sins committed, which are the cause of sorrow, and the will to detest them, which is the cause of joy, exist together, for one wills to detest them. And since the two share one account, this is why the soul can be turned to both together, inasmuch as, in a certain way, one thing is made from the two of them. Now when from two things one is made, one is like the material element and the other like the formal; and so the soul is turned to one of them first and to the other afterward, and because of this both cannot be in it according to their own complete accounts, but sometimes the one, and sometimes the other. For when the soul is fully focused on the hope of forgiveness or the propriety of sorrow, then joy is principal, and sorrow for sin is consequent; but when it is chiefly focused on the sin committed, then it is the reverse.
Reply Obj. 1: Sorrow for sins and joy in this sorrow are not contrary affections, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: The object of joy is something fitting; but the object of sadness is the harmful opposite. And this is why the sorrow that someone rejoices in is not contrary to the one rejoicing, but fitting. But the joy that someone is sorry for is contrary to the one sorrowing. And so when someone rejoices there cannot be sorrow at the same time about this joy concerning the same thing; but when someone sorrows there can be joy about it at the same time.
The third objection should be answered like the first.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that it is erroneous to say that penance cannot be repeated, and it is contrary to divine mercy. Now there are four reasons that it can be repeated, while baptism cannot. The first is that penance does not imprint a character like baptism: for a character is indelible. The second is that baptism is against a disease that cannot be contracted again, namely, original sin; but penance is against actual sin, which can happen again. The third reason is that baptism has all its efficacy from the Passion of Christ without our action, and so, since there is only one Passion, baptism is also only once. But penance also requires our act, as was said before, and its account admits of repetition. Fourth, baptism is a spiritual generation, but repentance is a certain spiritual healing; but things are generated only once, but can be cured or healed many times, as long as they live in this life.
And by this the answer to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: As the just Lord loves justice supremely, so he hates sin supremely. And so, on his side, he is always prepared to destroy sin, as long as it does not remain on the man’s part, by neglecting or rejecting penance. But nothing prevents some people from taking the occasion for wrongdoing from this, for the opposite would give the occasion of despairing, which would be worse.
Reply Obj. 3: Although it is not written that any sick person was cured by the Lord more than once, nevertheless, it does not explicitly deny that this happened either. And furthermore, we see this illuminated by faith, that men become sick often and they are cured by divine power, which restores all things.
Article 5
Solemn penance
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. It seems that no penance should be made public or solemnized. For it is not permitted to a priest, even in extreme fear of death, to tell anyone’s sins, no matter how public they were. But sins would be made public by a solemn penance. Therefore, it should not be solemnized.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a sentence should be made according to the condition of the forum. But penance is a kind of sentence that has to do with the internal forum. Therefore, it should not be made public or solemnized.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, penance brings all failings back to the perfect, as Ambrose says. (In fact, Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticum, Bk. 3, ch. 9, n. 17 (PL 45:1631).) But solemnization does the opposite, for it entangles the penitent in many failings. For a layman cannot be promoted to the clerical state after a solemn penance, nor can a cleric be ordained to higher orders. Therefore, penance should not be solemnized.
On the contrary (1), penance is one of the sacraments. But in every sacrament a certain solemnity is employed. Therefore, it should also be employed in penance.
Furthermore (2), medicine should correspond to the disease. But sin is sometimes public, and draws many to the example of sinning. Therefore, penance too, which is its medicine, should be something solemn and public, by which many may be edified.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that solemn penance can be performed more than once. (Parallels: below, in the exposition of the text, ‘Quod tamen’; ST III, q. 64, a. 10, ad 2.) For the sacraments that do not imprint a character are repeated with their own solemnities, like the Eucharist and extreme unction and such. But penance does not imprint a character. Therefore, it may be repeated with its own solemnities.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, penance is solemnized because of seriousness and the public nature of the sin. But after having done penance, sometimes similar sins are committed, or even graver ones. Therefore, solemn penance should be employed again.
On the contrary, solemn penance represents the first man’s expulsion from paradise. But this only happened once. Therefore, solemn penance should also only happen once.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, a question arises about the rite of solemn penance. And it seems that it is not to be imposed on women. For a man, on whom solemn penance is enjoined, should cut off his hair, but this does not befit a women, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 11:6. Therefore, they ought not to do solemn penance.
Obj. 2: Again, it seems that it should be imposed on clerics. For it is imposed because of the seriousness of the misdeed. But the same sin is more serious in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore, it should be imposed more on a cleric than on a layman.
Obj. 3: Again, it seems that it can be imposed by any priest. For absolving in the penitential forum belongs to the one who has the keys. But a simple priest has the keys. Therefore, he can be minister of this penance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that there are four reasons a penance should be public and solemn. First, so that a public sin may have a public medicine. Second, because one who has committed the gravest of crimes deserves the greatest shame in this world. Third, so that it may deter others. Fourth, so that it might give an example of doing penance, lest those who are stuck in grave sins should despair.
Reply Obj. 1: The priest does not reveal the confession by imposing such a penance, although it may raise suspicion that some atrocious sin has been committed. For the fault cannot be known for certain from the penalty, since sometimes someone does penance for another, as is read in the Lives of the Fathers about a certain man who, in order to prod his companion to penance, would himself do the penance with him. (Lives of the Fathers, Bk. 5, libel. 5, n. 27 (PL 880:73).) But if there is a public sin, when the penitent himself carries out the penance, he shows that he has been to confession.
Reply Obj. 2: Solemn penance requires a secret forum as to its imposition, for just as a person makes his confession secretly, so also a penance is enjoined on him secretly. But its execution does not require a secret forum, and this is not unfitting.
Reply Obj. 3: Although penance does call back all failings, restoring one to former grace, nevertheless, it does not restore one to former dignity. And so also women, after having done penance for fornication, do not wear a veil, for they do not regain the dignity of virginity; and likewise after public penance a sinner does not return to such dignity that he can be received into the clerical state. And a bishop who ordains someone like that should be deprived of his power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom should demand it. For then by a dispensation he is received into minor orders, but not into priestly orders. First, because of the dignity of those orders. Second, because of fear of it recurring. Third, in order to avoid scandal, which could arise in the people from the memory of previous sins. Fourth, since he would not have the nerve to correct others, since his own sin was public.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that solemn penance should not be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest it become debased by being repeated. Second, because of its signification: for it is a figure of man’s expulsion from paradise, which happened only once. Third, because solemnizing is like a certain profession of keeping penance continually, and so doing it again is opposed to its solemnity. But if someone sins afterward, the place of penance is not closed to him, but solemn penance should not be enjoined upon him again.
Reply Obj. 1: In those sacraments in which solemnity is repeated, the repetition is not opposed to the solemnity, as is the case here; and so it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 2: Although in the nature of the crime the same penance may be due to someone, nevertheless, repeating the solemnity is not fitting, for the reasons mentioned.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that all solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For a solemn penance happens in this way [as given in the Decretals]: at the beginning of Lent these penitents, dressed in sackcloth, with bare feet, eyes downcast, and heads shaven, present themselves with their priests to the bishop of the diocese before the church doors. And once they have been brought into the church, the bishop says the seven penitential psalms with all the clergy, and afterward he imposes his hands upon them, sprinkles them with holy water, and marks their heads with ashes; he covers their necks with goat-hair cloth and tearfully declares to them that as Adam was expelled from Paradise, so they are expelled from the church; and he commands the ministers to throw them out of the church, the clergy following them with this response: “by the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread, etc.” (Gen 3:19). But at the Holy Thursday liturgy every year they are brought back into the church by their priests, and they will be there until the octave of Easter, but such that they will not receive communion nor the kiss of peace; and this is how it happens every year as long as entrance to the church is forbidden them. However, the final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, to whom alone the imposition of solemn penance belongs. (Gratian, Decretals, d. 50, ch. 64 (PL 187:284).)
Now this solemn penance can be imposed on men and on women, but not on clerics because of scandal. However, this kind of penance should not be imposed except for a sin that has shaken the entire city.
But there is a public penance that is not solemn, which is done in the sight of the Church, yet not with the solemnity described above, like a pilgrimage through the world with a long stick. And this can be repeated, and it can be imposed by a simple priest; and it can also be imposed on a cleric.
Reply Obj. 1: The woman’s hair is a sign of being subject, but the man’s is not; and therefore it is not fitting that her hair be cut off in penance like the man.
Reply Obj. 2: A cleric may sin more than a layman in the same kind of sin, but solemn penance is still not enjoined upon him, lest holy orders come under contempt. Therefore, it is not set aside for the sake of the person, but for the sake of holy orders.
Reply Obj. 3: Great sins require greater care to be cured, and so the injunction of solemn penance, which only happens for the gravest of sins, is reserved to the bishop alone.
Question 2
Effects of penance
Next the effects of penance are considered. And concerning this, five questions arise:
first, whether penance takes away sins;
- second, whether it restores virtues;
- third, whether it revives preceding works;
- fourth, whether the effects mentioned come from penance as a virtue or as a sacrament;
- fifth, whether without penance any sinner can attain salvation.
- Article 1
Whether penance takes away sins
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 14, a. 3; ST III, q. 86, a. 1; SCG III, ch. 156.) It seems that sins are not always taken away by penance: for if we sin willfully after knowledge of the truth, there no longer remains a sacrifice for sins (Heb 10:26). But in penance a man offers himself as a sacrifice to God: the sacrifice to God is a contrite spirit (Ps 51[50]:17). Therefore, penance does not wipe away the sins of those who have fallen again after knowledge of the truth.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the interlinear Gloss on this text, he found no place of repentance (Heb 12:17), states, that is, the place of forgiveness and blessing through penance. Therefore, penance does not always take away past sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said about Antiochus in 2 Maccabees, the wicked man prayed to God, from whom he would obtain no mercy (2 Macc 9:13). Therefore, since he had repented of evils committed, it seems penitence does not always wipe away previous sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, sin committed is in a certain way infinite, since it is an offense against God. But our acts are finite. Therefore, since the finite cannot attain the infinite, it seems that penance cannot blot out a sin committed.
On the contrary (1), I came not to call the just, but sinners to repentance (Luke 5:32). But this calling would have been useless to the repentant unless it granted them forgiveness for sins. Therefore, repentance blots out sins.
Furthermore (2), God’s mercy is greater than man’s wickedness; hence he is reprehended who said, my wickedness so great that I cannot deserve mercy (Gen 4:13). But repentance depends on God’s mercy. Therefore, it wipes out all sins, no matter how many they are.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the debt of punishment is completely taken away as well. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 87, a. 6; ST III, q. 86, a. 4; SCG III, ch. 158; Super Rom. 11, lec. 4.) For good is more effective at working than evil, since evil does not act except in virtue of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32 (PG 3:731).) But by one act of sin a man incurs both guilt and liability to punishment. Therefore, by an act of contrition both the guilt and the debt of punishment are absolved.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God does not require more in penalty than there was in the fault. But there is more sorrow in contrition for sin than there was delight in the sin: for the amount of sorrow for sin is according to the amount of love of God, which is greater than all desire for temporal things, as the Gloss says, commenting on the psalm: I have loved your commands above gold and topaz (Ps 119[118]:127). Therefore, he does not require for sin any punishment other than what exists in contrition; and so repentance absolves from all liability to punishment.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, one’s own suffering united with another’s is worth more for removing sin than another’s suffering alone. But in baptism there is no suffering of ours, but by virtue of Christ’s suffering alone, it wipes out all sin, both as to guilt and as to the punishment owed. Therefore, penance too, in which one’s own suffering is united to the sufferings of Christ, should remove all debt of punishment.
On the contrary (1), a punishment is not enjoined on anyone but the one who owes the penalty. But a certain penalty of satisfaction is enjoined on a penitent. Therefore, he still owes the penalty, and so he is not freed from all guilt by penance.
Furthermore (2), penance does not take away what is expedient to one’s progress. But the penalty of satisfaction that remains is for advancement in the virtues. Therefore, it is not taken away by penance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that by penance the vestiges of actual sin, like tendency to wrong, sluggishness, and the like, are also taken away. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 32, q. 1, a. 1; ST III, q. 86, a. 5; q. 89, a. 1, ad 3.) For in natural generation, not only the contrary form is taken away, but also dispositions to that form. But the grace that is given by penance is more powerful than a natural form. Therefore, it takes away not only guilt but also remnants of this kind, which are a disposition to sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as grace exists in the essence of the soul, virtue exists in its powers. But penance restores grace and virtues, as is said. Therefore, just as grace takes away guilt from the soul itself, in the same way through the virtues it takes away from the powers what sin leaves behind.
On the contrary, baptism is more efficacious than penance for removing sin. But baptism does not remove the vestiges of sin. Therefore, neither does penance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that penance can be considered as a sacrament and as a virtue; and in either way it works to the remission of sins. For according as it is a sacrament of the new law, grace is given in it for healing the defect that it is brought against, namely, for the forgiveness of actual fault. As a virtue, it also works toward the forgiveness of sin, in a special way apart from the other virtues. For according to every virtue formed on the part of the habit, sins are forgiven by reason of the grace that is infused with it; but this is formal forgiveness. But penance by reason of its own act causes sins to be forgiven, since sins committed are the matter of its act. For since sin is said to be forgiven or retained by the fact that it has the nature of an offense, what takes away the offense takes away the sin. But since offense, by nature, is a certain inequality, by which someone takes away from another what was his due, sin is forgiven by an act of this virtue, because it brings this inequality back into equality. Now repentance does this, as is clear from what has been said, for it offers to God in recompense for a divine offense a contrite spirit; and so it belongs to penance also on the part of its act to take away sins. And it is done effectively, and not only formally, when sins are forgiven through repentance.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking here about the victim who was offered universally for the sins of the whole world, namely Christ, who is one and unique. Nor is he offered again to blot out sins, but his unique offering is strong enough that by penance and the other sacraments all sins may be forgiven.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason that Esau, about whom the Apostle speaks (Heb 12:17), did not find a place of forgiveness is that he did not truly repent, even if he shed tears outwardly. And this is evident from the fact that he said: the days of mourning for my father are coming, and I will kill my brother Jacob (Gen 27:41).
Reply Obj. 3: And a similar answer should be given about Antiochus, who did not truly repent inwardly, although he uttered outwardly words of repentance, more because of the ailment of his body than for the sake of avoiding offending God.
Reply Obj. 4: The offense is infinite in regard to what is turned away from but not in regard to what is turned toward; and likewise also the act of repentance has an infinity on the part of grace, which is a likeness to God, and working in virtue of divine mercy, which is infinite, although on the part of our act it is finite. But it also has efficacy by virtue of Christ’s Passion, which has a certain infinite value, since it was the Passion of God and man.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 8, friendship consists just as much in a certain equality as justice does. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 6, 1157b36; cf. Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129a34.) Therefore, whoever offends someone sins against the equality of friendship, inasmuch as he does not expend the due affection; and he sins against the equality of justice insofar as he takes away what is due. And just as in an offense sometimes these two things are divided, so also they are separated in their recompense, as when a penalty is imposed by violence against the offending party, recompense is made as to justice, but not as to friendship. Likewise, when the offender heals the offense with words, but has not yet restored what was taken away, he makes recompense to friendship, but not to justice. Therefore, the sinner has violated God’s friendship by the affection for his sin, and he has taken away the honor due to God by his disobedience to divine law. And by the first he lost grace and incurred an offense; by the second, he deserves punishment, so that from the one who took away by disobedience, something may be taken away by punishment. And this being deserving of punishment is called the debt of punishment. And so by penance, in which man submits himself to God by detesting his past sins with the purpose of amendment, he is indeed forgiven his sin as to the offense, but not necessarily as to all the punishment owed, unless he has already paid the penalty; and this is why all the liability to punishment is not dismissed together with the remission of guilt by penance.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as what is perfect is more effective at acting than the imperfect, so also what is perfect is more difficult to become. And this is why, although good is more effective at working than evil, it is more difficult to establish than evil. Therefore, the action of good appears more effective than the action of evil in this, that the action of evil never ends in an evil that does not have an admixture of good, but the action of good ends in a good in which sometimes there is no admixture of evil. Nevertheless it is not necessary, if some evil is incurred by one bad act, that the opposing goods may be restored by one good act.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 8, 1132b23 et seq.) in recompense for an injury, commutative justice does not always impose an absolutely equal quantity in punishment on the one who committed the fault. For if someone struck the prince, it is not enough that he be only struck, but also that he be punished more gravely. Nevertheless, once the person against whom the fault was committed has been taken into consideration, it does impose an equal penalty. And so, since by penance a man does justice from himself to God, it is not enough for there to be as much sorrow in the penalty as there was enjoyment in the fault. For that delight was an injury against God, inasmuch as man, ignoring God, gave himself to delight in sinning.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptism is a spiritual regeneration; and since there cannot be a generation of one thing except by corruption of another, for this reason it is necessary that in baptism whatever belonged to the previous life should be totally abolished, namely, both the guilt and the punishment owed, unless there be a defect on the part of the recipient. But penance is not regeneration, but rather the restoring of the life previously had. And so the argument is not similar.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that as penance does not take away all the debt of punishment by any little act, but it does at that moment when it is brought to completion according to all the parts of penance, in the same way it is also not necessary that by the first act of penance all defects resulting from actual sin, which are called the vestiges of sin, be repaired. But penance already perfected as to all its parts takes away the vestiges of actual sin as well.
Reply Obj. 1: Penance is not compared to generation, but rather to healing, because by penance a man is not given a new life, but he is restored to his former life. Now in healing we see this occur, that once health is restored, certain vestiges of illness still remain before perfect health is restored. In the same way the vestiges of actual sin also remain before penance is completed.
Reply Obj. 2: Sin is committed by the act of a power, and that is why in those very powers other defects besides the removal of virtues are also caused by sin; but this does not happen in the essence of the soul, except for the loss of grace. And so if by the advent of grace into the essence of the soul, stains which were nothing but the lack of grace should be taken away, it is still not necessary that all the other defects should be taken away from the powers as well.
Article 2
Whether penance restores virtues
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 152, a. 3, ad 3; ST III, q. 89, a. 1.) It seems that virtues are not restored by penance. For the virtues that we are speaking about are not caused by our acts, for, according to Augustine, God works them in us without us. (See the earlier note at d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1, obj. 1.) But penance consists in our act. Therefore, by penance the virtues are not restored.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing restores virtue unless it is the cause of virtues, just as those things that restore health are the cause of health. But penance is not the cause of all the other virtues; otherwise it would be more noble than the other virtues, since the cause surpasses the effect. Therefore, penance does not restore virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what does not exist cannot restore anything, and what is possessed cannot be restored, just as neither can what exists come into being. But penance is not possessed before all the virtues, since all the virtues are poured in at the same time. Therefore, penance cannot restore the virtues.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the habit of a virtue does not remain alongside the habit of a vice, for contraries cannot exist together in the same thing. But after contrition the habit of a vice still remains, which is clear by the inclination toward one’s former acts. Therefore, repentance does not immediately restore all virtues.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one has a virtue unless he can perform those things that belong to the virtue without difficulty and with pleasure. But after the first contrition, even if it is a true one, there still remains difficulty in doing the works of virtue. Therefore, the virtues are not restored by the first act of penance.
On the contrary (1), Ambrose says that penance is the best thing, which calls all failings back to the perfect. (In fact, Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticum, Bk. 3, ch. 9, n. 17 (PL 46:1631).) But this would not be the case unless it restored lost virtues. Therefore, the virtues are restored by penance.
Furthermore (2), penance’s effect is justification, as will be said below. But general justice, by which someone may be said to be justified, includes all virtues, as it says in the Gloss on Psalm 118: I have done judgment and justice (Ps 119[118]:121). Therefore, all virtues are restored by penance.
Furthermore (3), sins are not forgiven without grace. But sin is forgiven by penance. Therefore, grace is restored by it. But together with grace all virtues are infused. Therefore, penance restores all virtues.
I answer that, grace and virtues in the soul are caused by the inflow of divine light, whose inflow is certainly impeded by sin, which turns the soul away from God, just as clouds moving between us and the sun keep its rays from us. This is why it says: our sins have caused a division between us and our God (Isa 59:2). And since sins are forgiven through penance, as has been said, in the first act of repentance as to the offense; so just as the wind, blowing away the clouds, restores the sun’s light to us, so also by removing what blocks them, penance restores sanctifying grace and all virtues to us.
Reply Obj. 1: God alone is the per se cause of grace and the virtues infused in us; but nothing prevents our acts from also being incidental causes, as removing what obstacles, just as they are also causes of baptismal grace inasmuch as they prevent deception; and this is the way the virtues are restored by penance.
Reply Obj. 2: An incidental cause is not necessarily more noble than its effect, but only a per se cause. Now, we have considered penance an incidental cause of the virtues, by the fact that it removes obstacles, namely, sins.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as in the same instant when the obstacle to the light is first removed, the light breaks forth, and yet the removal of the obstacle is the cause of illumination, so in the same way, in the same instant that the act of penance happens, sin is removed and virtue is restored, and still nothing prevents the virtues from being restored by penance.
Reply Obj. 4: As was said in Book 3, Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 2, Subquestion 4, infused and acquired virtues are not of the same species, and so although the habit born of frequent acts of sin is contary to acquired virtue, it is not directly contrary to infused virtue, which is opposed to sin in the fact that it is an offense against God. Therefore, it is not necessary that immediately when the infused virtues are restored, the habits of vices be completely taken away, although they are hindered, and even diminished.
Reply Obj. 5: Ease in doing works of virtue can come from two things: namely, from a previous habit, and infused virtue does not immediately bestow this ease in its beginning; or else from strongly clinging to the object of virtue, and this can be found in infused virtue from its beginning.
Article 3
Whether penance revives previous works
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qaa. 3–5; ST III, q. 89, a. 6.) It seems that through penance even those good works done previously in the state of mortal sin would now count toward life. For Adamantius (In fact, Origen, Homilies on Joshua, n. 10 (PG 12:880).) says, commenting on Joshua: there are certain people in the Church who believe and acquiesce to divine commands, in relation to religious servants of God and officials, and who are ready enough at the decoration of the church or ministry; but in their conversation they are wrapped in obscene vices, nor do they entirely take off the old man with his acts, employing nothing for the amendment and renewal of their mores. In these things, therefore, Christ granted salvation, but they do not avoid a certain mark of madness. But it seems even more true that for those who seek amendment by penance those good works would count toward their salvation. Therefore, repentance revives those works done without charity for our salvation.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the good by genus and the good of moral virtue are closer to charity and grace than natural good is. But the subsequent grace restored by penance perfects natural things, and according to certain people those very natural things are informed by grace. Therefore, much more would acts that are good by genus or by circumstance, or even acts of acquired virtue, performed without charity, be revived by penance so that they might be beneficial for eternal life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, once the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of those works not counting toward eternal life was the lack of charity and grace. Therefore, since repentance restores charity and grace and all the virtues, it will also revive those good works done without charity.
On the contrary (1), nothing living or having the potential for life is generated before there is a living thing. But a man without charity does not live with a spiritual life. Therefore, he cannot do any spiritually living work, but it is a dead work, not having any potency for life; and so it is not revivable.
Furthermore (2), everything that can be brought to life is in some way meritorious, at least in potency. Therefore, if works done outside of charity could be in some way revived, someone could in some way merit eternal life without charity, which is false.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that works done in charity could not be made dead through subsequent sin. (Parallels: below, d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 3; d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; In III Sent. d. 36, a. 5, ad 1; ST III, q. 89, a. 4; Super Heb. 6, lec. 1.) For what does not exist cannot be put to death. But works that were done in charity pass away and no longer exist when sin follows afterward. Therefore, they cannot be put to death.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, punishment should not exceed guilt. But in anyone who does many good deeds from the greatest charity, the punishment would exceed the guilt if by one little mortal sin, perhaps done unexpectedly, all the previous good works were lost. Therefore, subsequent sin does not make dead all the good previously done in charity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is dead cannot have the act of life with regard to another. But works done in charity, even after the sin of the one doing them, have the act of life among the other saints. This is why it is said in Revelation 2 that one receives the crown of the other. (There is only one mention of crowns in Revelation 2: “Do not fear what you are about to suffer. Behold, the devil is about to throw some of you into prison, that you may be tested, and for ten days you will have tribulation. Be faithful unto death, and I will give you the crown of life” (verse 10). Other mentions of crowns in Revelation seem no more relevant than this one.) Therefore, sin following previous good works does not make them dead.
On the contrary (1), Ezekiel 18:24 says: if a righteous man turns away from his righteousness, I will no longer remember all those things that he has done.
Furthermore (2), the life of the works depends on the life of the one doing them. But by mortal sin the person who formerly acted in charity becomes dead. Therefore, the works done by him also become dead.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that works made dead by sin are not brought back to life by penance. (Parallels: below, d. 22, q. 1, a. 6; ST III, q. 89, a. 5; Super Thes. 3, lec. 1; Super Heb. 6, lec. 1 and 3.) For Hugh of St. Victor (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 2, pt. 14, ch. 4 (PL 176:558).) says that no one should sin in the hope of correction, for what is once lost is no longer recovered. But works done in charity are lost by sin, as was said. Therefore, they can no longer be recovered by charity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing is brought to life except that whose nature it is to have life. But works do not have life, but the one doing them. Therefore, works cannot be brought to life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what does not exist cannot be brought to life. But dead works do not exist. Therefore, they cannot be brought to life by penance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what dies does not only fall from life, but also from the potential for life; for the principles of life are corrupted, without which there is no potential for life. But works formerly done in charity are dead through subsequent sin. Therefore, no potency for life remains in them, and so they cannot be brought to life again.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Joel 2:25, I will repay you for the years the swarming locust has eaten, the Gloss says, I will not allow the fertility that you lost with the disturbance of your soul to perish. (See Jerome, Commentaria in Joelem, on Joel 2:25 (PL 25:972).) But that fertility was the multitude of good works. Therefore, they are restored through penance.
Furthermore (2), Penance recalls all failings back to the perfect, as was said in the preceding article. But this would not be the case unless the works that had died were restored to life. Therefore, by penance they are restored to life.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that penance by its nature is ordered to the removal of evil. And so the fact that certain goods are restored by penance only happens incidentally, insofar as it removes an impediment, as was said. Now a cause that removes obstacles requires some direct cause with respect to the effect that it caused incidentally. Now no cause can be considered the direct cause of reviving the works that were done without charity, because the life of the works depends on the life of the one working them, and so the works have their life from grace or from charity. Now, the grace or charity that repentance restores cannot confer life on previous works, because the habit only forms the act that proceeds from it. And thus it is clear that works done without charity cannot be revived through repentance.
Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore seems to explain the words of Adamantius in the same text, by salvation is understood the sign of salvation, which even sinners receive in the sacraments. Or it could be said that he grants them salvation in hope but not in fact.
Reply Obj. 2: Natural powers are closer to charity and grace than acts of acquired virtues as to the reality, inasmuch as they are the subject of grace and charity. But as to the resemblance of the species it is clearly just the opposite. And furthermore, natural powers remain, but not the acts of sin. And this is why those who said that the natural things are informed by grace were not thinking of the acts that pass away but of the powers and habits, which do remain.
Reply Obj. 3: The reason that those works are dead is that they were not elicited by charity. And therefore the cause of their being dead is not taken away by repentance, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that what properly seems to be alive is what has a certain motion from itself. And thus the word ‘life’ properly refers to all those things that have a certain operation without any outside principle, like those things that understand and sense, or move or desire or are nourished. And this is why the word ‘life’ is extended to all those things that have their due operation or effect; and those things that lack this are called ‘dead,’ as we say that water is living because it bubbles up. Now the proper effect of human works is that a man attain the final end of human life by them, namely, beatitude. And therefore those human works are properly called living that can lead a man to eternal life. But those are called dead that do not have the power of doing this, while those acts are said to be ‘made dead’ which have lost this power, when they had it before. And so, good acts done out of charity, in someone who has grace, are living; but in someone who lacks grace, works not done out of charity are dead. Now works done out of charity beforehand, in someone who loses grace, are made dead by sin, for subsequent sin prevents a man from being led into life by those works.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as works of sin pass away in act, but remain in guilt, so also good works done out of charity, although they pass away in act, nevertheless remain in merit; and according to this they can be made dead.
Reply Obj. 2: By ingratitude a man deserves to lose the benefits he has received, and so by any mortal sin, no matter how small, by which man becomes ungrateful to God for the benefits received, he loses all the preceding goods, no matter how much they would have resulted in eternal life. Nor does the punishment exceed the guilt because of this.
Reply Obj. 3: What is dead in itself cannot have the act of life with respect to another. But taking ‘living’ metaphorically, as was said, nothing prevents that something living in itself be alive in relation to one thing and dead in relation to another. For with respect to one thing it has its own effect, but with respect to another it does not, because of its own indisposition, as light is disagreeable to ailing eyes, but to the pure it is pleasant. (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 7, ch. 16.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that works done in charity, as was said, even if the act passes away, still remain in merit in God’s acceptance of them. And according as they remain like this, they have efficacy, considered in themselves, for bringing the one doing them to eternal life; and in this way they are said to remain alive. But the fact that they do not have this effect in the sinner is incidental, because of the sin that makes a sinner indisposed to receiving the effect of his preceding merits, but not that anything is taken away from his works themselves, since in their own occurrence they would have obtained the efficacy mentioned by the very fact that they were elicited by charity, which subsequent sin cannot take away from them. And therefore once the indisposition is removed from the sinner through repentance, those previous works begin again to have their own effect in him; and according to this they are said to be revived. Now some people say that they are not revived by subsequent penance, since they do not remain, so they cannot be revived. But by the same argument it could be said that neither do the former works count toward eternal life for him who perseveres in righteousness, because what does not exist cannot work to anyone’s good.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of Hugh are to be understood as to the goods lost, which are never recovered, since time lost is not recovered. And this is why its loss is the most serious, as Seneca says; (See Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium (Teubner, ed. Hense), Ep. 1, par. 1: “quaedam tempora eripiuntur nobis, quaedam subducuntur, quaedam effluunt. Turpissima tamen est iactura, quae per neglegentiam fit.”) but he is not speaking about goods that have become dead.
Reply Obj. 2: A work is said to be alive metaphorically, in having its due effect, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Although they do not remain in act, nevertheless they remain in merit in the divine reception of them; just as sins also pass away as acts, but remain as guilt.
Reply Obj. 4: As was said, formerly living works do not die in themselves, but they die incidentally in their relation to that one who performed them. And therefore once this incidental thing is removed, they are said to be revived.
Article 4
Whether these effects come from penance as a virtue or as a sacrament
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, a. 1, qa. 1; ST III, q. 86, a. 6; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 8; Quodl. IV, a. 7, a. 1.) It seems that the effects mentioned do not pertain to penance as a virtue. For different things have different effects. But virtue and grace differ, as was said in Book II, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 2. Therefore, since the remission of sin, and the other things mentioned that are attributed to penance, are the effects of grace, they are not effects of penance as a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what applies to penance as a virtue applies to every virtue. But to forgive sin does not apply to every virtue: for it does not apply at least to the acquired virtues. Therefore, neither does it apply to penance as a virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, penance as a virtue is distinguished from faith. But the remission of sins is by the virtue of faith: purifying their hearts by faith (Acts 15:9). Therefore, it is not by penance as a virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, penance is a virtue by one definition and a sacrament by another. But to forgive sins belongs to it as a sacrament; for this is how it is a medicine directed against the sickness of sin. Therefore, it does not belong to it as a virtue.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, penance, inasmuch as it takes away sins, is called the second plank in relation to baptism. But baptism frees froms sins because it is a sacrament. Therefore, penance too does this insofar as it is a sacrament and not insofar as it is a virtue.
On the contrary (1), by its proper act repentance is able to free from sins, as has been said. But it relates to its proper act inasmuch as it is a virtue. Therefore, as it is a virtue, it remits sins.
Furthermore (2), things are taken away by their own opposites. But penance is opposed to sin insofar as it is a virtue. Therefore, insofar as it is a virtue, it takes away sin.
Furthermore (3), every sin is committed by the will, since if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the True Religion (CCSL 32), ch. 14: “nunc uero usque adeo peccatum uoluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit uoluntarium.”) But a thing is generated and corrupted by the same causes, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b7.) Therefore, it must be remitted by the will. But penance has the account of the voluntary insofar as it is a virtue. Therefore, as it is a virtue, sins are forgiven through it.
I answer that, in sin two things can be considered, namely, the very disorder that is in the act, and the stain in the soul that results from the disordered act. Accordingly, sin is forgiven in two ways. For since by this disordered act itself, a man, as far as in him lay, committed an injury against God; therefore, in that regard sin is remitted according as the aforementioned inequality of injury is brought back to the equality of justice, which penance, as a virtue, does by its own act, as was said before. But regarding the stain, sin is remitted by grace, which formally removes the stain, like whiteness removes blackness; and consequently by the other virtues formed by grace. And since penance is one of the virtues, this is why it also remits sins formally on the part of the habit. And this is what certain people say, that penance remits sins inasmuch as it is grace. For it cannot be called grace except insofar as it is informed by grace, or because of the resemblance of its effect, as was said before. But as it is a sacrament, it also takes away sin effectively, for it bestows grace, just as introducing whiteness takes away blackness; and according to this penance, as it is a sacrament, takes away sin, because sacraments of the new law are instrumental causes of grace, as was said in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 1. Now God forgives as the efficent cause of grace, and Christ as man forgives as the meritorious cause of grace, and a priest as minister of God and dispenser of the sacraments. And since all other effects follow from penance inasmuch as it remits sins, as was said, therefore, the account of all those effects of penance is similar.
Reply Obj. 1: The effects of grace and the effects of virtue do not work in the same way, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Not every virtue is informed by grace, nor does every virtue have an act ordered toward restoring the equality mentioned between God and man, as has been said. And therefore it is not necessary that just any virtue remit sins. For this belongs to penance not as it is a virtue simply, but because of the kind of virtue it is.
Reply Obj. 3: Faith is said to purify the heart by the fact that the first movement toward justification is from faith, and it is also the principle of repentance. And that is why what belongs to penance can also be attributed to faith.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as penance is a sacrament and repentance is a virtue under different accounts, so also the effect mentioned applies to penance as a sacrament and to penance as a virtue in different ways, as was said.
Reply Obj. 5: Baptism forgives sin in only one way, which is as a sacrament alone; but penance does in more than one way, since it is both a virtue and a sacrament.
Article 5
Whether without penance any sinner can attain salvation
Obj. 1: To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 1.) It seems that a person may obtain the forgiveness of sins, and all the other effects mentioned, without penance; and so it would not be necessary to salvation. Commenting on the Psalm, those who sow in tears (Psalm 126[125]:5), the interlinear Gloss says, do not be sad, if you have a good will; from this peace is measured. But anyone can have a good will without the sorrow of repentance, or without actual consideration of his own past sins. Therefore, penance is not necessary to salvation.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory’s Gloss on Luke 7:47: her sins, which were many, are forgiven her, says, the ardor of her charity consumes the rust of sins in her. (Glossa, PL 114:272.) But someone can be converted to God ardently through charity without turning his mind to past sins through penitence. Therefore, without penance salvation can be obtained after sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, turning away from God is related to damnation in the same way that turning to God is related to salvation. But turning away from God without any pleasure can be a cause for damnation. Therefore, turning to God without any penitential sorrow can be a cause of salvation; and so, the same as above.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the movement of faith, which precedes penance, could be directed such that it would sufficiently dispose one to have grace. But grace is enough for salvation, even without works. Therefore, without a work of penance a sinner could obtain salvation.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the last instant of life, grace could be infused. But after the last instant, no instant would remain of the present life, which is the only time repentance could be fruitful. Therefore, without any act of repentance a man could obtain salvation through grace.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says: no one who is arbiter of his own will can begin a new life, unless he repents of his old life. (Augustine, Sermon 351, ch. 2 (PL 39:1537).) But no one can obtain salvation unless he is found in newness of life. Therefore, without penance no one can obtain salvation.
Furthermore (2), as baptism is directed against original sin, so is penance against actual sin. But no one can be cleansed from original sin except by receiving baptism, whether actually or at least by desire. Therefore, neither can someone be cleansed from actual sin without penance.
Furthermore (3), everyone says that penance is a necessary sacrament. But this would not be the case if there could be salvation without it. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, while the cause continues, the effect continues. Now the reason why a person is deprived of grace by sin is the sinner’s inequality, by which he offends God. Consequently, as long as this inequality is not brought back to an equality, the deprivation of grace cannot cease. Now this is what penance does by its act, as was said above. And so without an act of penance, the sinner cannot have salvation.
Reply Obj. 1: A good will, which is enough to deserve peace, cannot exist without penitence, because the will is not brought back to an equality; and so the argument proceeds on false grounds.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as among men friendship is not restored after an offense except through some sorrow over the offense, in the same way, neither is charity restored after sin except through penitence.
Reply Obj. 3: In turning away from God, there is always a turning toward some changeable good. And although this turning may not contain any sensual pleasure, nevertheless it always holds a certain pleasantness for the will. And in the same way, in order to turn toward God a displeasure must be added, and this is called the sorrow of penance.
Reply Obj. 4: The movement of faith can only be directed such that it attain grace by including penance.
Reply Obj. 5: Perhaps the last instant of life should not be taken, but rather the first instant of death; otherwise, between the penultimate instant of life and the first instant of death, since they are different instants, there would be a middle time. But supposing that there is a last instant of life, then in that same instant grace will be infused and the man will have the movement of penitence; and such penitence suffices for salvation, as Augustine says in the Book of Ecclesiastical Dogma. (In fact, Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 47 (PL 58:1220).)
Exposition of the Text
After these matters we must treat of penance. (Sententiae IV, 14.1 (74).1) It seems that penance should be considered before confirmation and the Eucharist; for withdrawing from evil, which pertains to penance, happens before being perfected in good, which pertains to those two sacraments. And it should be said that confirmation and the Eucharist are about the first intention of sanctification, but penance is about the second intention, for if a man never fell from baptismal grace, he would never need penance, though he would need confirmation and the Eucharist.
For there is an inner penance, and an outward one. (Sent. IV, 14.1 (74). 2) According to this it also seems that baptism is a virtue, for there is also an inner baptism, namely, baptism of spirit. (Also known as “baptism of desire.”) And it should be said that inner baptism is only called baptism metaphorically; but inner penance is truly called penance. And furthermore, the inner act is not necessary to baptism, otherwise children could not be baptized. But the inner act is necessary to penance.
Lamentations are of no profit, if the sins are repeated. (Sent. IV,14. 2(75). 5, citing Isidore, Synonyma, Bk. 1, n 77.) This is to be understood of those who repeat them with a habitual will. Or it could be understood as meaning that they will not be of any use for obtaining life: for the one who perseveres until the end, he shall be saved (Matt 24:13). Nevertheless, baptism, by reason of the character that it imprints, is worth something, even if a man receives it falsely.
One who cries over sins . . . committed, but does not abandon them, subjects himself to a greater punishment. (Sent. IV, 14. 2 (75).5, citing Gregory, Regula pastoralis, Bk. 3, ch. 30.) This is to be understood about those who outwardly put on a show through hypocritical penance; for, as Augustine says, a feigned justice is twofold iniquity. (Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, Psalm 63 (CCSL 39), par. 11: “simulata innocentia non est innocentia; simulata aequitas non est aequitas, sed duplex iniquitas, quia et iniquitas est, et simulatio.”) Or this is said because the excuse of ignorance or surprise is taken away in the one who directs his attention to his sins in repenting of them.
This is true penance: to cease from sin. (Sent. IV, 14.2 (75).7, citing Ambrosiaster, In epistolas sancti Pauli, 2 Cor 2, 7.) It should be known that ceasing from sin does not mean simply the negation of sin; for not just anyone who leaves off an act of sin is said to cease sinning. But to cease from sin is properly said about someone whom sin displeases, and who exerts himself to give up sinning; and this is true penitence.
With purpose of amendment. (Sent. IV, 14.3 (76).1) But to the contrary, a single habit has a single act; but here four acts of repentance are listed, namely, the purpose of amendment, weeping over past sins, hating them, and willing not to do them again. And it should be said that these four happen one after another in penance, and therefore are considered almost as a single act; for just as love produces delight in the consideration of the beloved, so also the hatred of sin produces sadness about it, and the sadness moves one toward its destruction. And this is why among the four things listed, the first is to hate sins; the second is to weep over them; the third is to destroy them as regards past sins with the purpose of amendment; and as regards future sins by willing not to commit things to be wept over, which is fourth.
One may always punish in oneself, (Sent. IV, 14. 3(76).6, citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, c19, n 35.) habitually or in intention, but not always actually, for sometimes he should be moved by the motions of the other virtues.
What he said above . . . are to be understood of the penance of the perfect, or of the penance sufficient for salvation. (Sent. IV, 14. 3 (76).7) Here he calls ‘perfect’ those who are perfect in penance, continuing in it until the end of life.
If some mortal fault should sometimes find us, which does not consist in a mortal crime or in blasphemy against the faith, but only in a vice of word or behavior, this fault may always be repaired. (Sent. IV, 14.4 (77).3, citing Origen, Homiliae in Leviticum, h 15, cc 25–29, n 2.) It should be known that a mortal fault is one that takes away grace, by which the soul’s life exists; and this is why every mortal fault is against grace; but some are against reason, like perjury; some are also against nature, like sodomy; some, however, are crimes that deserve accusation in court; while some are blasphemy, which is the imposition of something false on God, or taking away from him what exists in him, or attributing to him what is not in him.
And yet this practice is not observed in some churches. (Sent. IV, 14.4 (77).3) This is understood as referring to public penance; but solemn penance, as some people say, is never repeated.
Nor does he grant them any less than he did before, his most generous gifts of life and salvation: (Sent. IV, 14.5 (78).3, citing Augustine, Epistola 153, c3, n7.) namely, on his side, when a man equally prepares himself for possessing grace. Yet it is not necessary that someone always return to equal charity, as was said in Book III, Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 3.
Even if one should have reached the height of evils. (Sent. IV, 14.5 (78).4, citing John Chrysostom, Paraenesis ad Theodorum lapsum, Bk. 1, n 6.) This is to be understood as to actuality, not as to potency; for a person may be so wicked that no one else is worse, but no one is so wicked that no one else could be worse.
And yet he afterward sinned gravely. (Sent. IV, 14.5 (78).5) But to the contrary: Moses also counted the people (Num 1:2), but he is not said to have sinned. And it should be said that Moses counted them at the Lord’s command, but David did it so that he might glory in his people. Moreover, this is why when he sinned the nation was struck, namely for the sake of showing the relation of a people toward its leader, as Augustine says concerning Achan in his commentary on Joshua. (Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum, Bk. 6, Quaest. Iesu Naue, qu. 8, on the sin of Achan (CCSL 33; cf. PL 34:778).) For it is shown the very punishment of Achan shows what great a good unity is in a people, that they should be esteemed not as individuals by themselves, but as parts in a whole.
Or as Gregory says, commenting on Job: who makes a hypocrite reign? (Job 34:30), the acts of rulers are disposed for the qualities of their subjects, so that often because of the demerits of their flock, the good pastor’s life may also fall short; and David sinned by taking a census of his people, and nevertheless, the people suffered the vengeance for this sin. (See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, Bk. 25 (CCSL 143B), par. 16: “Sic pro qualitatibus subditorum disponuntur acta regentium, ut saepe pro malo gregis etiam uere boni delinquat uita pastoris. Ille enim, deo attestante, laudatus, ille supernorum mysteriorum conscius dauid propheta, tumore repentinae elationis inflatus, populum numerando peccauit, et tamen uindictam populus, dauid peccante, suscepit.”)
Or it could be said that because he sinned over glorying in his people, for this reason he was punished with the death of his people, like any master in the loss of his possessions. Nor, however, did the people suffer unjustly, because they deserved this for following Absalom.
Chapter 150 of 186