D. 17 - Comparing the parts of penance
After the Master has distinguished the parts of penance, here he raises some questions about those parts; and it is divided into two parts: in the first he raises the questions; in the second, he pursues them in detail, at: for some say that no one is cleansed from sin without confession by the mouth and satisfaction in deed. (Sententiae IV, 17.1 (92). 2.)
And this part is divided into two: in the first, he details one question about the relation of contrition to confession, namely, whether by contrition alone or confession sin is forgiven; in the second, he pursues the questions about confession itself at: let us now examine the second part of the question. (Sent. IV, 17.2 (93).1.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he gives the reasons on the affirmative side; second, the negative side, at: but those who deny it struggle with the determination of the authorities; (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).5.) third, he determines the truth, at: what, then, is to be felt concerning this? What to be held? (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).11.)
Let us now examine the second part of the question. Here he pursues questions about confession in itself. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he pursues questions raised above about confession on the side of the person to whom the confession is made; in the second, he concludes from what has been said an answer to a certain question about the necessity of confession, at: and so, if it is asked for what is confession necessary . . . we say: because it is a kind of punishment for the sin. (Sent. IV, 17.5 (96).1.)
The first is in three parts: in the first he pursues the second question raised above, namely, whether it is necessary to confess to a man, and whether a confession made to God would suffice, citing arguments for the truth and against the truth. In the second, he pursues the third question, namely, whether it is necessary to confess to a priest, or could it be made to anyone, at: now, before we respond to the aforesaid authorities . . . let us examine a third question. (Sent. IV, 17.4 (95).1.) In the third, he answers the objections to the second question that are made against the truth, at: and so, from these and many other testimonies, it is made very clear . . . that sins are to be confessed first to God, then to a priest . . . the statement of John Chrysostom . . . is not to be understood in that sense, etc. (Sent. IV, 17.4 (95).8.)
The first is in two parts; in the first, he objects against the truth; in the second, in favor of it, at: but that it is necessary to confess to priests is proven not only by that authority of James . . . but also by many testimonies of others. (Sent. IV, 17.3 (94).1.)
Now, before we respond to the aforesaid authorities . . . let us examine a third question. Here he does two things: first, he shows that when the possibility is present, confession is to be made to a priest; second, he distinguishes in this between mortal and venial sin, in accord with St. Bede, at: but Bede draws a distinction between the confession of venial and mortal sins. (Sent. IV, 17.4 (95).7.)
Here there are three questions. The first concerns the justification of unbelievers. The second, contrition. Third, confession. But satisfaction was discussed in Distinction 15.
Question 1
The justification of sinners
Concerning the first, five questions arise:
first, what is the justification of sinners;
- second, what is prerequisite for it;
- third, what else must be present for it;
- fourth, the order of these things;
- fifth, how they exist.
- Article 1
What is the justification of sinners
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 1 and a. 6, ad 1; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 1.) It seems that this description that is set down in the interlinear Gloss on Romans 8 is inadequate, namely: justification is the remission of sins, and the consummation of good works. For sins infect all the powers. But justification is only in the will, for according to Anselm, justice is rectitude of the will kept for its own sake. (Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, ch. 12 (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, 1:194).) Therefore, since justification is nothing else than the acquisition of justice, it seems that it is not the remisson of all sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Bernard says that justification is the revelation of divine counsel. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistle 107, par. 7 (Bernardi Opera, ed. Leclercq and Rochais, 7:272).) But the divine counsel is revealed sometimes to those whose sins are not forgiven, as is clear from the case of Nebuchadnezzar (cf. Dan 2). Therefore, justification is not the remission of sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, justification, as some people say, is the effect of general justice, by which a faithful person is made from an impious one. But the remission of sins is not an effect of justice, but of grace. Therefore, justification is not the remission of sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, consummation of good works in a penitent happens through satisfaction. But a man is justified by contrition alone before satisfaction, as is found in the text. Therefore, justification is not the consummation of good works.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justification is something different from calling. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 1, ad 3.) For in Romans 8, four things are listed in order: namely, predestination, calling, justification, glorification. But the second of these stands apart from the first. Therefore, the third also differs from the second.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, calling also happens among those remaining in sin: I have called you and you have refused (Prov 1:24). But justification does not, since it is the remission of sins. Therefore, justification is not calling.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, calling implies distance in the one who is called. But justification implies a drawing near to God in the one who is justified. Therefore, justification is not calling.
On the contrary (1), the Gloss on Romans 8:30 says that to call is to help the understanding of the faith. (Glossa, PL 114:498.) But that help is not through gratuitous grace; for then it would be also for the wicked, which is against the intention of the Gloss there. Therefore, it is by sanctifying grace. But the infusion of sanctifying grace is justification. Therefore, calling is the same as justification.
Furthermore (2), a motion from one term to the opposite term, like from whiteness to blackness, is the same thing in essence. But calling names a motion from one term, namely, sin; justification names the approach to another term, namely, justice. Therefore, justification and calling are the same thing.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justification is not the same as the renewal and healing of the mind. For someone can be justified in this life, but not renewed or healed. Therefore, justification is neither of these. The proof of the middle term as to justification is from the fact that it says: they are justified freely by his grace (Rom 3:24). The proof as to the healing is clear from what is said in the Gloss about Psalm 103(102):3: who heals all your diseases, that in the end he will heal weaknesses, when this corruptible thing puts on incorruption—which will not happen in this life. The proof as to renewal: the Gloss on Romans 6:4, so that we may walk in newness of life, says that it is perfected in our future immortality.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that have different opposites are themselves different. But the opposites of these things are different both in name and in definition. For impiety is opposed to justification, oldness to renewal, infirmity to healing. Therefore, they are not the same.
On the contrary, renewal of the mind and healing happen by the remission of sins. But justification is nothing other than the remission of sins. Therefore, it seems that justification is the same as renewal and healing of the mind.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justification is not reducible to the divine attribute of mercy. For according to Augustine, (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 72, par. 3.) it is a greater thing to make a pious man out of an impious than to create heaven and earth. But the creation of heaven and earth, because it shows infinite power, is reducible to the attribute of power. Therefore, the justification of the impious is reduced to it as well, and not to mercy.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God, inasmuch as he is good, makes all good things. Therefore, inasmuch as he is just, he makes men just. But to justify is nothing other than to make just. Therefore justification is reducible to the attribute of justice rather than mercy.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Ambrose says that a certain something precedes in sinners by which they are worthy of justification. (It is not clear which passage of Ambrose is being referred to, but there are pertinent texts in de Poenitentia, Book 2.) But it pertains to justice to render to someone what is worthy. Therefore, justification is reduced to the attribute of justice.
On the contrary (1), man’s misery chiefly consists in sin; for it is sin that makes nations wretched (Prov 14:34). But to take away misery pertains to mercy. Therefore, since justification is the remission of sins, it seems that it is reduced to the attribute of mercy.
Furthermore (2), justification happens by grace. But grace is an effect of mercy, as is clear by what the Apostle quotes in Romans 9:15: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. Therefore, it pertains to mercy.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that justification by definition denotes a movement toward justice. Now according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129a31ff.) justice is said in three ways. For in one way it is a specific virtue establishing equality in exchanges and distributions of communicable goods, which are necessary in life. In another way it is a general name for all virtues, according as their acts are ordered to the common good according to the direction of the law. The third way conveys a certain state of rectitude in a man in relation to his parts, namely, as each part of his soul is subject to what is above it, whether to another part, or to God himself; and the Philosopher calls this metaphorical justice, in the fact that the different parts of a man are counted as different persons.
Now this rectitude is destroyed by any kind of sin, and it is repaired by grace. And so this justice is also called general, inasmuch as it includes all virtues, not indeed in the manner of the universal whole, like the second kind of justice; but general is said in the manner of the integral whole: and justification is said of the movement toward this justice. Now in any movement there is a withdrawal from one term, and this is touched on in the designation mentioned above where it says: the remission of sin; and there is the approach toward the other term, which is touched on in saying: and the consummation of good works.
Reply Obj. 1: All this rectitude is originally from the will, which is the principle of merit and demerit. But it is also in other parts of the soul that are rectified, as in its subject.
Reply Obj. 2: Revelation there is taken materially, namely, for what counsel is revealed in. Now the counsel of divine predestination was about justification; and therefore this counsel is revealed by justification itself, as an effect by its cause; and so the objection ceases.
Reply Obj. 3: Justification can be taken in two ways: either according as it corresponds to being justified, and then it means the movement toward the justice mentioned; or according as it is taken for having been justified; and then it is the formal effect of the justice mentioned, since something was formally justified by it, as something is white by whiteness.
Now just as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so does the rectitude of the powers from grace, which is the perfection of the essence. And among those powers, the will, which moves the others, bestows rectitude upon them in a certain way. And so the first cause of the justice mentioned is grace, and consequently, charity, which perfects the will toward its end, from which this rectitude exists. And because of this, justification itself and the remission of sins is an effect of general justice as of a proximate formal cause; but it is an effect of charity and grace as of the proximate cause of the causes, just as someone is called equal both from equality and from the quantity that is the cause of the equality. And since something should be named from its proximate causes or its terms, this is why the motion discussed, or the terminus of that motion, is named rather from justice than from charity or grace.
Reply Obj. 4: The consummation of good works can be taken either as the performance of those works—and then the objection holds, but this is not how it is taken here; or in the infusion of habits, from which good works have their perfection; and that is how the consummation of good works is called justification here.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that calling happens in two ways: one that is external, like what happens through preaching; and this is not justification, but does dispose to it. The other is interior; and sometimes indeed this does not attain its end due to a failure on the part of the one called; and this calling is nothing else than a certain impulse or movement toward the good sent by God. And this calling is also not the same as justification, but a path to it. But sometimes it reaches its end, namely, when someone hears the one calling him and comes to Christ, as it says in John 6:45: everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me. And this calling is the same as justification according to substance, but it differs in notion. For calling is said about a person’s withdrawal from sin by the infusion and help of grace; but justification has to do with the ending terminus, namely, the state of rectitude mentioned above. And this is how calling is taken in Romans 8:30, as is seen in the Gloss. For the help for faith that God gives us by calling us, is grace, which causes the working of faith by love.
And so of those four that are listed there, predestination is the cause of justification in the one justifying, while calling is the same as justification but differing in notion, as was said; but glorification is the fullness of justification, whether it is referred to the perfection of grace, or to the perfection of glory.
Reply Obj. 1: Calling is placed before justification there, because withdrawing from one term comes before approaching the other.
Reply Obj. 2: The objection proceeds from the first two kinds of justification, not the third.
Reply Obj. 3: That person who is justified is not justified with respect to the term that he is far from, but the term that he is close to; and this fits with what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the rectitude of justice mentioned above is said metaphorically for healing of the soul and its newness, by the fact that healing means the due balance in the parts of the body, while newness contains integrity and strength and seemliness. And through all these it is clear that the rectitude in the soul’s powers that is called justice contains all these things by a similitude. But since no thing is so similar to one thing that it cannot be made also similar to another, this is why things that are said metaphorically do not conform so much to one thing that they cannot also conform to others, as ‘lion’ is said metaphorically of both God and the devil. And therefore healing and newness can signify by a similitude the integrity of grace, through which guilt is taken away, which is why guilt is also called by a similitude ‘oldness’ and ‘illness’ of soul; and it can also signify the integrity of nature, which punishment takes away, so that it also may be called oldness or illness. But because guilt is the cause of punishment, thus oldness is included in oldness and illness in illness, as an effect in a cause. Therefore it is clear that justification itself, by which grace is acquired and guilt is taken away, can be called renewal and healing, although the removal of punishment can also be called renewal and healing.
Reply Obj. 1: As to the fault, a renewal can happen in this life, but not entirely as to punishment, and it is likewise with healing; and this is how those authorities are speaking.
Reply Obj. 2: Those things also represent, by a similitude, the same thing as impiety, as is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, It should be said that in every action that God does in creation, all his attributes concur (otherwise his action would not be perfect), but nevertheless, some actions or effects of his are appropriated to one attribute more than another, inasmuch as that attribute is more manifest by such an action or effect than by another; as by revelation of future events the fullness of divine wisdom is manifest, and so it is appropriated to his wisdom. And since in the justification of the impious, divine mercy is manifest the most, therefore, it is reduced to this attribute.
Reply Obj. 1: The difficulty that exists in the justification of the impious is mostly from the lack of congruity between the impious and the reception of justification’s effect. And so when an effect like this is brought about, it indicates mercy more than power. But the effect of creation contains difficulty because of the magnitude of the deed, or because of the manner of doing it, since something is made out of nothing; and therefore it most of all manifests power.
Reply Obj. 2: Justification manifests divine justice as its exemplar cause, but mercy as its efficient cause, while an effect properly corresponds to its efficient cause. But the goodness of creation manifests the divine goodness in both ways, for his goodness moves him to communicate similar goodness. But mercy moves him to justify men more than justice.
Reply Obj. 3: That is not to be understood as though anyone were sufficiently worthy before justification, otherwise grace would not be grace; but rather that there is in a person a certain disposition to justification, by which he is less unworthy than others; and so a worthiness like this is not enough for justice.
Article 2
Prerequisites for justification
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 112, a. 2; q. 113, a. 3; Super Ioan. 4, lec. 2; Super Heb. 12, lec. 3.) It seems that some preparation by which a person does what is in him is not prerequisite for justification. For the person who strives to sin does not prepare himself for grace by doing what is in him. But sometimes someone is justified who is inclined toward sin, as is clear with Paul in Acts 9. Therefore, the preparation mentioned is not prerequisite for justification.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the charity in God is much greater than what he commands man to do. But he commands man to do good to his enemies (Matt 5:44). Therefore, much more will he do good by justifying those who practice enmity against him by sinning. And so, the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing greater can be thought than the goodness of God. But good is diffusive of itself, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:693).) Therefore, since it would be a greater diffusion of goodness if grace were given also to those struggling against it, it seems that the infusion of grace by which justification happens does not require any preparation.
On the contrary (1), someone who has closed physical eyes cannot receive physical light. But someone who does not prepare himself by doing what is in him does not open his spiritual eyes, which he has closed by sinning. Therefore, he cannot receive the light of spiritual grace. And thus he cannot be justified.
Furthermore (2), Augustine says, the one who created you without you will not justify you without you. (Augustine, Sermon 169: “qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te” (PL 38:923).) Therefore, some preparation is required on our part.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there is nothing in a person that he could do to prepare himself for having grace. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 112, a. 2; Super Ioan. 4, lec. 2; Super Heb. 12, lec. 3.) For commenting on Exodus 7:3, he has hardened his heart, etc., the Gloss says that his heart was so hardened that nothing could make him acceptable to God. But only a work acceptable to God prepares one for having grace. Therefore, there was nothing in him that he could do to prepare himself; and the same argument applies to others.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that when faith obtains justification, the will accompanies grace, it does not lead it; it follows on its heels, it does not go ahead. (Augustine, Epistle 186, par. 3: “cum ergo fides impetrat iustificationem, sicut unicuique deus partitus est etiam ipsius mensuram fidei, non gratiam dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed ipsa gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici, comitante non ducente, pedisequa non praeuia uoluntate” (CSEL 57:53).) But if a person could prepare himself for grace he did not yet have, his will would go ahead of grace. Therefore, no one can do something by which he prepares himself for grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one can prepare himself for grace if not by acting rightly. But according to Augustine in his book of the Retractions, mortals do not live rightly unless first the free will is freed from the depravity of sin, (Augustine, Retractions (CCSL 57), Bk. 1, ch. 9, line 96: “uoluntas ergo ipsa nisi dei gratia liberetur a seruitute, qua facta est serua peccati, et ut uitia superet adiuuetur, recte pie que uiui a mortalibus non potest.”) which happens through grace. Therefore before grace is possessed a person cannot prepare himself for grace.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, faith directs the intention. But the operation that is done without a right intention cannot prepare one for grace. Therefore, it is necessary that faith precede preparation; and so since faith pertains to grace, as Augustine proves by the Apostle’s words, there can be no preparation for grace before grace.
On the contrary, God does not command man to do the impossible. But he commands that man prepare himself for grace by doing something, as is clear from James 4:8: draw near to God and he will draw near to you. Therefore, it is possible for a man to do something to prepare himself for grace.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that it is not necessary for the person who does what is in him to be justified. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 112, a. 3.) For what is done freely is done out of generosity, not out of necessity. But we are freely justified, as is clear from Romans 3:24. Therefore, it is not necessary that we be justified, no matter how much we have been prepared.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is compared to us as a potter to clay, as is clear from Isaiah 64:7, Jeremiah 18:3–6, and Romans 9:20. But no matter how much clay is prepared, it is not necessary that a vessel be formed from it. Therefore, no matter how much a man is prepared, it is not necessary that grace be poured upon him.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is considered necessary to be another seems to be sufficiently ordered to it. But our acts that are sufficiently ordered to something are said to be meritorious of that. Therefore, someone will merit justification according to the acts by which he has prepared himself, if justification follows that preparation by necessity.
On the contrary (1), it is impossible for the highest truth to lie. But truth itself promises to give grace to anyone who does what is in him: turn to me and I will turn to you (Zech 1:3); and if anyone shall . . . open to me, I will come in to him (Rev 3:20). Therefore, it is necessary that anyone who does what is in him, be justified.
Furthermore (2), commenting on the text, we are justified by faith (Rom 5:1), (The Moos edition gives what is apparently a different reading, although without calling attention to it: “Praeterea, Rom. 3, 21, super illud: Justitia Dei manifesta est, dicit Glossa,” etc.) the Gloss says: God receives those seeking refuge in him; otherwise there would be iniquity in him. (Glossa, PL 114:380.) But it is impossible for there to be iniquity in God. Therefore, it is necessary that he justify those who do what is in them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the will, which is susceptive of the perfection of justice, cannot be subjected to this perfection by an outside agent to whom it grants nothing; for that would be working by violence, which does not fall within the voluntary, since it cannot be forced. And so it is necessary that it cooperate in its own perfection; and this cooperation is called the preparation for grace, which does what is in one. But it is not always necessary that preparation like this precede justification in time, as it is necessary in natural changes for alteration to always precede generation in time. For since an act of the will is in a person’s own power, it can be as intense from its beginning as is sufficient for preparation. But a natural disposition does proceed toward a form subsequent to this intention. Now among those who incur fault not by their own will, and do not have the use of the will, no preparation is required on their part, as is seen in the case of children in baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: The justification that we are now discussing is always with the cooperation of the will, which is called preparation. But this cooperation, as was said, begins sometimes long before grace is bestowed. But sometimes, because it is perfect, it has justification immediately attached to it. And so it can happen that while someone has the plan and intention of sinning, suddenly his will is converted to God, either taking the occasion from something outside it, as was the case with Paul; or even by some interior impulse, in which the heart of a person is moved by God. And so it does not follow that such a person would have grace without doing what is in him.
Reply Obj. 2: Man is not commanded to do goods to his enemies that they have no capacity for, but goods that they can receive; and God fulfills this the most, for the goods that they have a capacity for, namely, natural ones, he bestows on those who practice enmity against him by sinning. But they do not have a capacity for the good of grace unless their wills consent. And so what he is prepared to give, they do not wish to receive.
Reply Obj. 3: Such a diffusion of good cannot be understood unless someone is susceptible to that perfection of which he (That is, the one who resists grace, according to the objection.) is not capable; and so that argument proceeds on false grounds.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the preparation that is required in the matter in order to receive the form includes two things: namely, that it be in due proportion to the form, and that it be in due proportion to the agent who must introduce the form. For nothing brings itself from potency into act. Now due proportion to the reception of the agent’s action is considered according to the due approach unto the agent.
But in spiritual things this is not to be understood as a spatial approach, but a spiritual one, which happens in two ways. First, by likeness of nature, according as corruptible things are said to be more distant at first from incorruptibles, in On Generation 2, (There may be various texts that Thomas has in mind; perhaps the closest is Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 2, ch. 10, 336b25ff. Moos gives 338b30 as a reference but it does not seem correct.) and because of this they receive being weakly. And likewise spiritual things are closer to God than corporeal things; and because of this angels, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, n. 2 (PG 4:179).) receive more abundantly from divine goodness. Second, by affection, for according to Augustine, we draw near to God by our affections, not by our place. (Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms (CCSL 38), Ps. 8, par. 1; cf. In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 32.) But there are two kinds of due proportion of matter to form, namely, by the natural order of matter to form, and by the removal of impediments.
Therefore, for the will to prepare itself for justifying grace, it must place itself in the right proportion to God who gives the grace, and to the grace that is given. But the proportion to God by the likeness of nature is not in the will’s power; likewise, neither is the proportion of the capacity for grace, for these pre-exist from creation. And therefore it remains that in the will itself it may draw near to God by affection and desire, and be ordered to grace by the removal of any impediment, which impediment, of course, is sin. And so, by displeasure with sin and affection for God someone prepares himself for grace; and when he does these two things efficaciously, he is said to do what is in him; and he receives grace. The first of these is said in James 4:8: draw near to God and he will draw near to you; the second, in Revelation 3:20: if anyone shall open to me, I will come into him.
Reply Obj. 1: If a meritorious work were called a work acceptable to God, then it is plain that neither Pharaoh nor anyone situated in mortal sin can do a work acceptable to God. But if every work that is good in its genus and done from a good intention were called a work acceptable to God, then Pharaoh is said to have been unable, not because he was unable in any way, but because of fastening his stubborn will on evil, into which, deserted by divine grace, he had fallen.
Reply Obj. 2: Our will follows at the heels of divine grace in every way, and in no way does it go ahead of it. For the will itself, which precedes sanctifying grace, comes to us from God, who calls us to this by the will he has given us, whether by scourges or some inner or outward help. Nevertheless, this will still does not precede, but follows at the heels of sanctifying grace, for it is not its cause, but it prepares its path in another way.
Reply Obj. 3: Without sanctifying grace, life cannot be lived rightly by mortals, according as ‘rightly’ means the rectitude that attains the last end. But even without it something can be done rightly, by the rectitude that an act has from its matter and circumstances and due end, but not without the grace that is called God’s freely-given will.
Reply Obj. 4: Right intention leading specifically to the last end cannot exist without faith; but nevertheless the last end, namely, God, can exist in the intention even of someone who does not have the end, by the general or natural knowledge that he does have of God. And so even someone who does not have faith can prepare himself for having it, and for the grace, if sin displeases him and he directs his affections to God, to the extent of his knowledge.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there are two kinds of necessity; namely, absolute necessity, and conditional necessity. Now in speaking about the first kind of necessity, it is not necessary that anyone receive grace who prepared himself sufficiently for grace, for neither essential necessity, according to which it is necessary that God exist, nor the necessity of force or prohibition, can apply to those things that are done by divine will.
But when speaking about the necessity that is conditional on the divine plan, by which he willed because of the benevolence of his goodness to communicate to each person according to his own capacity, it is necessary that he pour the form into any matter that is prepared. Nevertheless, this is not true in the same way with all forms, for the forms that are produced in matter by means of secondary agents are received in the matter disposed by conditional necessity in relation to God, by whose power all the other agents act. But it is by absolute necessity in relation to the proximate agents, who act by the necessity of nature because of the order divinely imposed on them, which cannot be ignored. Now the forms that are introduced directly by God do not have an absolute necessity on the part of the agent, but a certain one on the part of the receiver, as in the perfections that are of natural being, as is the rational soul. But the forms that are not due to nature, like grace and virtues, produced immediately by God, have nothing of absolute necessity, but only of conditional necessity based on the divine order, as was said.
And by this the responses to the objections are clear; for the first arguments proceed from absolute necessity, but the others from a necessity conditional on the divine plan.
Article 3
Other conditions for justification
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 2; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 2; Super Eph. 5, lec. 5.) It seems that an infusion of grace is not required for justification. For justification is not less than creation. But God created without any medium. Therefore, he also justifies without grace as a medium.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, when there is something between two contraries, one of these can be removed without the other being posited. But between the state of grace and the state of guilt is the middle state of innocence. Therefore, guilt can be removed by justification without grace being infused.
On the contrary, sin is only forgiven someone by reason of charity, for charity is what covers all offenses (Prov 10:12). But charity cannot exist without grace, for it never exists unformed. Therefore, neither can the remission of sins happen without an infusion of grace.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a movement of the free will toward God is not necessary for justification. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 37, a. 2, ad 7; ST I-II, q. 113, a. 3; de Veritate, q. 28, aa. 3–4; Super Ioan. 4, lec. 2; Super Eph. 5, lec. 5.) For someone who is drawn is not moved by his free will. But someone who comes to God is drawn through justification: no one comes to me unless my Father draws him (John 6:44). Therefore, in justification there is not a motion of free will.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as grace is from God, so is wisdom. But for someone to accept wisdom from God, no motion of the free will is required. And this is why it is given to someone asleep, as is seen in 1 Kings 3:15, of Solomon; and in Job 33:15–16 it says, in sleep . . . then he opens the ears of men. Therefore, a motion of the free will is not required for receiving justifying grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a person is justified by baptism. But in baptism no motion of the free will is required for receiving its effect, for children and those sleeping can receive its effect, as it says in the Decretals of Innocent III. (Innocent III, Decretals, extra. De baptismo et ejus effectu, ch. “Majores.”) Therefore a motion of the free will toward God is not required for justification.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says, the one who created you without you will not justify you without you. (Augustine, Sermon 169: “qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te” (PL 38:923).) Therefore, a motion of the free will toward God is required for justification.
Furthermore (2), Bernard says that the gift of grace is as impossible without the consent of the recipient, as without the grace of the giver. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Will, par. 2 (Bernardi opera, ed. Leclerq and Rochais, 3:166).) But consent is not without a movement of the free will. Therefore, a movement of the free will is required for justification.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this motion of the free will toward God is not a movement of faith. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 4; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 4; Super Eph. 2, lec. 3.) For in order for God to draw near to us by justification, we must draw near to him by affection. But charity makes us draw near to God by affection. Therefore, this motion of the free will toward God is not of faith but of charity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Isaiah 26:18 says, out of fear of you, Lord, we have conceived a spirit of salvation. Therefore, since this conception happens in justification, it seems that it is a movement of fear, not of faith.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, disposition and perfection must exist in the same thing. But the motion of faith is in the intellect, while justification is especially in the affections. Therefore, it is not a motion of faith.
On the contrary (1), We are justified by faith (Rom 5:1); and, in purifying their hearts by faith, he has made no distinction between them and us (Act 15:9).
Furthermore (2), justification is a work of prevenient grace. But prevenient grace is faith, as the Master says in Book II, Distinction 27. Therefore, the motion of faith is required for justification.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no contrition or motion of the free will against sin is required; (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 5; ST III, q. 86, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 158; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 5.) for commenting on Luke 7:47: her sins are forgiven her, for she has loved much, the Gloss says that the ardor of charity consumes the rust of sin in itself. (Glossa, PL 114:272.) But the ardor of charity can exist without a motion against sin. Therefore, a motion against sin is not required for justification.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, conversion toward God is more potent for the good than turning toward temporal things is for the evil. But turning toward a changeable good sufficiently introduces fault. Therefore, conversion toward God also sufficiently justifies; and thus no motion against sin is required.
On the contrary, commenting on Psalm 51:17: the sacrifice to God is a broken spirit, the Gloss says, a broken and contrite spirit is a sacrifice in which sins are absolved.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a fourth thing should not be added, namely, the remission of sins. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 6; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 6.) For an effect is not numbered with its causes. But contrition and the infusion of grace are the causes of the remission of sin. Therefore, it should not be numbered with them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the removal of a privation is nothing other than the introduction of a habit. But guilt is the privation of grace. Therefore, the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace are the same thing; and so they should not be numbered with each other.
On the contrary, The generation of one thing is the corruption of another; (See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 3, 318a23–24.) and nevertheless generation is numbered alongside corruption. Therefore, since the infusion of grace is the remission of guilt, the one should be numbered with the other.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the necessity of instilling habits of virtue infused in the soul is from the fact that those acts that a person must do to obtain eternal life are above the ability of human nature. For our own powers are not sufficient for meriting an infinite good. Now just as future beatitude has infiniteness from its object, and consequently it imparts to its meritorious acts an infinite power in some way, so that they are proportionate to such an end, so also offenses committed against God have a certain infiniteness from the one they are committed against. And so human nature does not suffice for the remission of guilt; and because of this, for its remission, just as for the meriting of eternal life, grace must be infused.
Reply Obj. 1: Grace is not related to the remission of guilt as an intermediate agent, but as a formal cause, by which sin is remitted; just as fire removes cold, having caused heat in a subject, not as an instrument, but as a contrary form. And in creation there is also a natural form, by which a created thing formally receives being, or even that by which it exists, whatever that may be.
Reply Obj. 2: Although according to the order of the argument the inclusion of grace does not follow from the removal, that is, the negation, of guilt; nevertheless the destruction of pre-existing guilt cannot happen except by grace. For that goodness of innocence, which seems to be a middle between the other two, would not suffice to render someone worthy by an immunity from the infinite offense committed before, although it would suffice to render him immune in whom the sin did not precede. For in someone who has sinned, it requires not only that the sin be gone in act, but also that the sin committed before be expiated, and covered in a certain way; which cannot be done except by someone having an infinite power.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the grace that is given for living rightly and for the remission of sins has to do with the will before the other powers, for it is by it that we sin and live rightly. And so the infusion of justifying grace must take place in such a way that it applies to the will; and because of this it is necessary that every notion of violence be excluded from this infusion, for it has no capacity for violence. But in order for violence to be removed from the action, the one receiving the action must cooperate with the agent according to his own manner. And so among those things are such as to act, it is required that they cooperate actively. But among those that are such as only to receive, like prime matter, the inclination to a form is enough for the removal of violence; and from this natural generation is named.
But there is as much of contrariety there as there is of violence; and so when the will does not have a contrary act, as is the case with children, grace can be infused by the sacrament without violence against the will, as in baptized children; and without the sacrament, as is seen in those sanctified in the womb. But when the will has its own act, as is the case in adults, the act of the will is required to receive grace, directing the soul to grace’s giver. And so for the justification that happens through the infusion of grace, the motion of the free will toward God is required.
Reply Obj. 1: That drawing that the Lord speaks of does not mean forcing, but leading along and helping to act well.
Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom has more to do with the intellect than the will, but grace more with the will, as was said; and thus, since the intellect can be forced, but not the will, this is why for receiving wisdom and other perfections of the intellect, the consent of the receiver is not required, as it is for the perfection of grace. And so the revelations of those things that pertain to wisdom are made during sleep, as seen in Numbers 12:6; but the infusion of grace is not.
Reply Obj. 3: By baptism even adults can receive grace while asleep, for although an actual disposition is not present by the actual movement of their wills, there is nevertheless a habitual disposition by the previous movement of the free will; which indeed sometimes disposes one sufficiently to receive grace, and then grace is immediately infused, as was said. But sometimes it disposes insufficiently, and then such insufficiency cannot be supplied except by another act of the free will, either through the sacrament, which works dispositively for grace, as was said above in Distinction 1; and because of this without the sacrament no adult can be justified unless by an actually existing movement arising from his free will; but by the sacrament he can, so long as the movement of the free will that prevents a fictive reception came first.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that anything whose nature is to follow from several things is attributed to the one that is first; as life is attributed to the nutritive soul, for it is first among the principles of life in things that live bodily. Likewise an animal is said to be an animal by its first sense, which is touch, as is evident from On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 13, 435a12–14.) And so if justification follows the motion of the free will toward God, it must be attributed to that motion that appears naturally prior to justification. Now the mind is moved toward God by both the intellect and by the affections, and these two movements of the mind can be together, although they can be thought of separately, for one is the rule of the other, and by the act of the intellect its object is presented to the will, for its object is the good imagined or understood, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3. (Ibid., ch. 10, 433b10ff.) But the movement of the intellect naturally comes first, as an object naturally precedes the act of a power; and since the movement of the intellect toward God is by faith, justification requires the movement of faith.
Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free will, along with which grace is infused, must be taken in its last perfection. Now the act of faith is not complete unless perfected by an act of the affections. For no one believes unless he wills to, as Augustine says; (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 31, par. 2.) and therefore an act of charity is always joined to the act of faith in justification; and by these two things the soul draws near to God. For there can be no doubt about whether an act of faith is always united to an act of charity, from the fact that the object is presented to charity by faith; just as also we never actually understand except by an imagination actually arising.
Reply Obj. 2: Fear is a remote disposition to grace, for it never attains to grace unless love is joined to it. But we are speaking here of the last disposition to grace, with which grace is given.
Reply Obj. 3: In things that are ordered to each other, it is not necessary for there to be the disposition and the perfection in the same thing. For a disposition arising in what is prior orders toward the perfection accomplished in what comes later, just as the movement of the imagination is a disposition to the perfection of the intellect, and likewise the movement happening in understanding can be a disposition to the movement of the affections.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that just as in natural generation, in which one form is expelled and another is introduced, because of the fact that the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, there must be something disposing to both; so also in justification, by which grace is conferred and guilt is expelled, there must be a disposition of the will according to its proper act toward both. And therefore just as by the movement of the free will toward God the person who is justified is disposed to obtain grace, so also by the motion of the free will against sin he must be disposed to the expulsion of guilt. And therefore in the justification by which the innocent would be justified, only a disposition to the introduction of grace is necessary. But in the justification by which the impious are justified, there must be two dispositions: one for introducing grace, namely, the movement of the free will toward God; and the other for expelling guilt, namely, the movement of the free will against sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The fervor of love necessarily has joined to it the hatred of its opposite. And so the fervor of love does not work to the remission of guilt without detesting sin, which directly corresponds to the remission of guilt.
Reply Obj. 2: Conversion to God suffices for obtaining grace as far as in it lies, just as turning toward a changeable good suffices for guilt; but a turning toward sin is required, as it were, to remove an impediment. Or it could be said that even in sin turning toward does not cause guilt without a turning away; and likewise, two things are necessary in justification.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that those things that are related incidentally to something are not included in it. But the remission of guilt is related incidentally to the infusion of grace, for it arises from the subject where it finds guilt. For the infusion of grace could exist without guilt being remitted, as it was in the state of innocence, and in Christ as a man from the first instant of his conception. And thus the infusion of grace does not include the remission of guilt.
And so since the remission of guilt is necessary for the justification of the impious, which we are speaking of, it is necessary that it be numbered along with the infusion of grace. And this is why there are four things that are required in justification itself: namely, the infusion of grace, the remission of guilt, the movement of the free will toward God, and the movement of the free will against sin.
Reply Obj. 1: That objection holds for an effect proportionate to a cause, which is understood in the cause itself; but it is not this way with the remission of sin, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Sin and grace are not related as affirmation and negation, or as privation and habit: for someone can be devoid of grace and nevertheless not have sin, as in the case of Adam, according to those who say he was not created in grace; for sin means that something exists or did exist in the sinner. For once an act of sin has passed, the preceding sin still remains in some way in the sinner himself, according as by it he became guilty before God, just as also meritorious acts remain, as was said above in Distinction 14, and so the argument does not proceed.
Article 4
The order of events in justification
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 6, ad 3; a. 8, ad 1; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 7.) It seems that the removal of guilt naturally precedes the infusion of grace. For in commenting upon Psalm 63(62):2: so I have come before you in the sanctuary, the Gloss says, unless someone is first lacking in evil, he will never arrive at good. (From Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms (CCSL 39), Ps. 62, par. 9: “nisi quis primo sitiat in isto deserto, id est malo in quo est, numquam peruenit ad bonum quod est Deus.”) Therefore, the remission of the evil of fault is prior to the attainment of the good of grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are related as purification and illumination. But purification precedes illumination, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) Therefore, also the remission of guilt precedes the infusion of grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in any motion, withdrawal from the starting terminus precedes approach to the ending terminus; whether in time, if it is a successive motion, or at least in nature, if it is a sudden change. But sin is the starting terminus of justification; the ending terminus is grace. Therefore, remission of guilt precedes the infusion of grace.
On the contrary (1), a cause naturally precedes an effect. But the infusion of grace is the cause of the remission of sin, for God forgives sins by the infusion of grace. Therefore, the infusion of grace comes first.
Furthermore (2), Ambrose says that perfect virtue destroys iniquity when it enters the soul. (Cf. Ambrose, de Apologia Dauid ad Theodosium Augustum, ch. 13, par. 63: “Itaque quemadmodum intrans in animam sapientiae disciplina inprudentiam tollit et scientia ignorantiam, sic perfecta uirtus iniquitatem et remissio peccatorum delet omne peccatum” (SC 239:343).) But anything is naturally prior to what it does. Therefore, virtue and grace, which destroy sin, are prior.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the movement of free will precedes the infusion of grace. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 8, ad 2; de Veritate, q. 28, q. 8.) For the disposition naturally precedes perfection. But the motion of free will is a disposition to grace. Therefore, it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the infusion of grace and remission of guilt accompany each other. But the motion of contrition, which is the movement of the free will against sin, causes the remission of guilt. Therefore, it is prior to it and to the infusion of grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the justification of the impious, as is clear from what has been said, is the remission of guilt. Therefore what follows the remission of guilt follows justification. But the movement of free will does not follow justification, but is essential to it. Therefore, it does not follow the remission of sin; and so the same as before.
On the contrary (1), the movement of the free will, namely contrition, is meritorious. Therefore, it is informed by grace. But grace informing an act is prior to it, since it is its cause. Therefore, the infusion of grace and remission of guilt precede the movement of the free will.
Furthermore (2), the first act precedes the second. But the infusion of grace and the remission of fault pertain to the first act, which is the form, while the motion of the free will either toward God or away from sin pertains to the second act, which is operation. Therefore, the infusion of grace is prior.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the motion of the free will against sin precedes the movement of the free will toward God. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 8, ad 3.) For the movement of the free will against sin seems mostly to pertain to fear. But fear precedes charity, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Epistle 140, ch. 18 (CSEL 44:193).) Therefore, the motion of the free will against sin precedes the movement of the free will toward God, which is charity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the motion of the free will against sin is like removing an obstacle. But a motion does not attain its due term unless the obstacle is removed, as is evident from local motion. Therefore, the movement of the free will against sin precedes the movement of the free will toward God as the due end.
On the contrary (3), the movement of free will toward God is the movement of faith, but the movement of free will against sin is a movement of repentance. But faith precedes the virtue of penance, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that the movement of free will toward God is prior to the movement of the free will against sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that every priority according to the order of nature is in some way reducible to the order of cause and caused, for a principle and a cause are the same.
Now in causes it happens that the same thing is a cause and caused, according to the different kinds of causes, as is clear from the Physics 2 and the Metaphysics 5; (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 195a5; Metaphysics, Bk. 5, ch. 2, 1013a23.) just as walking is an efficient cause of recovering health, and recovering health is the final cause of walking; and similarly with a condition that is between matter and form: for according to the genus of material cause, matter is the cause of form as supporting it, and form is the cause of matter as making it to be in act according to the genus of formal cause.
Now everything by which matter is made proper to its form, like dispositions and the removal of impediments, stand on the side of the material cause by a kind of reduction. And so in natural generation when the corruption of one thing is the generation of another by the fact that one form is brought in and another is driven out, the removal of the pre-existing form stands on the side of the material cause; and thus according to the order of the material cause it naturally precedes the introduction of the other form; but according to the order of the formal cause it is the other way around. And since form and end and agent coincide in the same number or species, therefore also in the order of the efficient cause the introduction of the form is prior; for before the form is introduced, it is the likeness of the acting form by which the agent acts; and likewise in the order of the final cause: for nature principally intends the introduction of the form and to this it orders the expulsion of anything with which the introduction of the form cannot stand.
And so, since the infusion of grace and remission of fault, as is clear from what has been said, are related as the introduction of one form and the expulsion of another, it is clear that according to the order of the material cause, the remission of guilt precedes the infusion of grace. But according to the order of the formal, efficient, and final cause, the infusion of grace is prior by nature; and because of this either one can be said to be the cause of the other. For the infusion of grace is the cause of the remission of guilt by the mode of a formal cause; but the uprooting of vices is said to work the entry of virtues by the mode of a material cause
And by this the responses to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that there are many opinions about the order of the motions of free will for the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt.
For some people say that the movements mentioned go first, and they grant that the movement of the free will toward God is not a movement of formed faith, but unformed faith. And the movement of the free will against sin is the movement of attrition, not contrition; for nothing that precedes grace can be formed by grace. But this cannot be: for a penitent is justified in the very movement of contrition, just as a child is justified in the very act of cleansing. But someone is justified when he receives grace, which is why with the infusion of grace and justification there is a movement of contrition; but a movement of attrition precedes as preparatory. However, we are not speaking now about the preparations for justification, but about those things that enter its substance.
And so some people say that the infusion of grace precedes the movement of the free will toward God and against sin, so that it can inform them; but the remission of guilt follows both of them. But this cannot be: for nothing falls between the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt, because this is its primary and principal effect. And furthermore, just as for a motion of contrition it is required for grace to be present, it is also required for guilt to be absent, for it cannot exist with it.
And therefore others say that the infusion of grace and remission of guilt precedes the other motions mentioned simply. But this also does not seem to be entirely true: for those movements would not be required for justification unless they had a certain causality with regard to it.
And therefore it should be said that in a certain way the infusion of grace and remission of guilt come first, but in a certain way, the movements mentioned do; which is clear from what is similar in natural generation, namely the term of alteration. For in the same instant the alteration terminates in the disposition that is necessity, and generation terminates in form. And still according to the order of nature one is before the other in some way, for the disposition that is necessity precedes the form according to the order of material cause, but form is prior according to the order of formal cause; and according to this mode, that consummate quality is also the formal effect of substantial form, according as substantial form is the cause of incidentals.
And so since those movements that are bound up in the justification of the impious are like a last disposition to the reception of grace in its own mode, they do precede in the way of material cause, but they come after in the way of formal cause. And so nothing prevents them from being formed, because this pertains to the account and perfection of formal being, just as qualities that are introduced together with substantial form are formed somehow by substantial form, and just as the qualities mentioned, before their own completion and the introduction of the form, were not formed but unformed; so also it is with the motion of the free will, if nevertheless having continued to the end, it is perfected by the infusion of grace. Nor is it unfitting, for even if it is in some way the same thing according to the genus of nature, nevertheless it is not the same according to the genus of morals. For it happens that one motion may be of virtue according to the genus of nature, and of vice according to the genus of morals, as is seen in someone who, while going to church, changes his intention from evil to good.
And by this the response to the objections is clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the motion of the free will toward God, as is clear from what has been said, directly corresponds to the infusion of grace; but the motion of the free will against sin directly corresponds to the remission of guilt. And therefore there is the same account of the order between these things, and of the order of the remission of sin to the infusion of grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of servile fear, whose act is not the movement of free will that is together with justification; for servile fear is not together with grace, by which this motion is informed; and thus the argument is not relevant to the matter at hand.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument holds, since it is prior in the way of a material cause, to which the removal of impediments is reduced.
Reply Obj. 3: The order that is found among the virtues is according as they elicit their acts, which they do by the mode of a formal cause; and so that argument proceeds according to the way of a formal cause.
Article 5
How justification occurs
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; ST I, q. 105, a. 7, ad 1; ST I-II, q. 113, aa. 9–10.) It seems that the justification of the impious is miraculous. Because, as Augustine says, it is a greater thing to make a pious man of a wicked one than to create heaven and earth. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 72.) But the creation of heaven and earth is miraculous. Therefore, the justification of the impious is as well.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the greater the resistance, the more difficult the action. But in creation there is no resistance, for what does not exist cannot resist. But in the justification of the impious there is a resisting contrariety, namely, the impiety found in them. Therefore it is more difficult; and so the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every divine action that happens outside the order of that thing in which it is worked is a miraculous action; just as it is outside the order of a corpse that it be restored to life; and so the resuscitation of the dead by divine power is miraculous. But that the will is drawn to something is against its own order, as it is free. Therefore, since the will is drawn by God to the good in the justification of the impious, it seems that justification is miraculous.
On the contrary (1), that justification should happen is not beyond hope. But this is of the essence of a miracle. Therefore, justification is not miraculous.
Furthermore (2), things are called miracles that rarely happen. But people are often justified. Therefore, it is not a miraculous action.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the infusion of grace and remission of guilt do not take place at the same instant. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 7; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 2, ad 10; a. 9.) For grace is only given to those who are worthy. But no one is worthy who has guilt. Therefore, grace is given to someone whose guilt is already taken away; and so they are not simultaneous.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, when grace comes, it expels guilt. But nothing acts except after it exists. But grace does not exist before it is present in the subject. Therefore, it is necessary that grace be first in the subject before it expels fault; and so the infusion of grace and remission of guilt are not simultaneous.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, guilt and grace are not in the soul in the same instant, for contraries are not at the same time in the same thing. Therefore, the last instant in which guilt is in the soul is different from the first instant that grace is in it. But between any two instants there is a middle time. Therefore, guilt is expelled from the soul in the time before grace is infused.
On the contrary (1), between the first moment of time and the last moment of time falls a middle time. But after fault has been expelled from the soul, it is not in it, nor is grace in it before it is infused. Therefore, if guilt is expelled at a time before grace is infused, there will be a certain time in which both grace and guilt are absent from the soul; which is impossible: for if someone died in that moment, he would neither go to hell nor to heaven finally, which is impossible.
Furthermore (2), the remission of guilt and infusion of grace are related to justification like the introduction of one form and the expulsion of another in natural generation. But those two things are in the same instant. Therefore, so are these two. Proof of the middle term: for the terminus of any movement is in an instant. But both of the things mentioned are the terminuses of a change, as the Commentator says about the Physics 6. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, text. 45.) Therefore, they are in the same instant.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justification is successive. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 113, a. 7; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 2, ad 10; a. 9.) For no motion is in an instant. But in justification itself there is the movement of the free will. Therefore, it is not in an instant, but successively.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the intellect is simple, so also the free will is simple. But because of the simplicity of the intellect it is impossible for it to understand many things at once. Therefore, because of the simplicity of the free will, it is impossible for the free will to be directed toward different things at the same time. Therefore, since in the justification of the impious there is a movement of the free will toward God, and against sin, the justification of the impious will not be in an instant but successive.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be. But what is coming to be does not exist as a permanent thing, while what has come to be does. Therefore, it is impossible for something at once to happen and to have happened. But justification is a certain happening. Therefore, it is impossible to be being justified and to have been justified at the same time: therefore, justification is successive. For between any first and last instant of time, there falls a middle time, as was said.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, forms that are received more and less are not introduced all at once into their subject. But grace is received more and less. Therefore, it is successively infused into its subject, and so justification is successive.
On the contrary, divine power is more efficacious for acting than the power of nature. But by the power of nature the generation by which a fire comes to be is in an instant. Therefore, much more is someone made just in an instant by divine power.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that three things are included in the essential definition of a miracle, of which the first is that whatever happens by a miracle is done above the power of a created agent’s nature; second, that in the receiving nature there is no natural order to receiving it, but only obediential potency to God; third, that the effect itself is brought about outside the motion customary for such an effect. An example of the first is the glory of bodies in the resurrection, to which nature cannot attain; an example of the second is the illumination of the blind, in whom there is no natural potency to receive vision; an example of the third is the conversion of water into wine outside the course of nature.
And these three always coincide in some way in a miraculous act; for even if visual potency does not exceed the powers of nature, speaking absolutely, since it is introduced by generation, nevertheless it does exceed the powers of nature given the lack of potency in the recipient. And if the potency is present absolutely at a certain time, as in the conversion of water into wine, nevertheless, by comparison with the manner of its happening, neither is present. And so in the definition of a miracle is included difficult, as to the first characteristic; beyond hope, namely, of nature, as to the second; unaccustomed, as to the third.
And so that effect which is directly from God alone, and yet a natural order exists in the recipient for receiving that effect, by no other manner but this one, will not be miraculous; as is clear with the infusion of the rational soul.
And it is the same way with the justification of the impious, for a natural order to obtaining the rectitude of justice is in the soul: nor can it be obtained by any other mode than directly from God; and so the justification of the impious is not miraculous in itself; but it can have a something miraculous attached to it, which prepares the way for justification.
Reply Obj. 1: The word of Augustine is to be understood as to what happens, for in creation it happens according to the being of a nature, which is less than the being of grace, which is given in justification. But as to the mode of doing it, the act of creation is more difficult, which does not presuppose any potency, and yet some people say that creation is not miraculous, by the fact that there is no other mode of bringing these things into being.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways that a contrary found in a subject can resist an action. In one way inasmuch as it acts against the one acting, which is seen among things mutually acting and acted upon. In another way, by presenting an impediment in what is susceptible to the reception of the form. There cannot be any resistance to divine action in the first way, because he is the agent who is in no way acted upon. And so resistance against his action can exist only on the part of the effect of the receiving; but a contrary impedes its own contrary from being received into a subject formally, but not actively, inasmuch as it makes the potency no longer proper to that form. And so it is clear that what takes away all potency in this way resists more than what makes a given potency no longer proper. And so it is more difficult to make something out of nothing than out of a contrary. But nature can do this, while it cannot do the first.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is not drawn in justification by the mode of force, but so that it chooses freely what God moves it to.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the expulsion of a form means the terminus of that movement that is directed to corruption; and the introduction of a form likewise means the terminus of that motion that precedes generation, for generation and corruption are equally terms of motion. Now everything that is moved, when it is in the term of motion, is disposed according to what the motion is ordered toward. And so, since the motion of corruption tends toward non-being, but generation tends toward being, when a form is introduced, a form exists; but when it is expelled, it does not. And since a form is said to be introduced when it first exists, but expelled when it first does not exist, there cannot be matter without this or that form. So at the same time there is the expulsion of one form and the introduction of another. Therefore, since similarly the soul cannot exist without either guilt or grace, the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are simultaneous.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as whiteness is never in something not white, because its very presence makes something white, so also grace is never in someone unworthy, because its very presence makes one worthy. And because of this it is not necessary that someone be worthy of grace before he has it.
Reply Obj. 2: Grace does not act for the destruction of guilt like an efficient cause, but like a formal cause, which is simultaneous with its formal effect, which is to be this, and not to be the contrary.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the soul in itself is above time, as it says in the Book of Causes, (Proposition 2.) nevertheless its act is measured incidentally by time, which is the measure of the first motion, inasmuch as, namely, the motion of the intellective soul is intertwined with the movements of the sensitive soul, which are executed by the physical organs, and depend in a certain way on them. And so it does not seem that it should be said that its changes according to the life that it now leads should be measured by another time than the one that measures the movement of the heaven, as was said about the motion of the angels in Book 1. (Dist. 37, q. 4, a. 3.) And because of this, between any instant of its time and another, a middle time can be taken. And so it should be said that a last moment cannot be assigned in which guilt exists, but a first moment in which it does not; but a first instant can be assigned in which grace exists. And how this is true is clear from what was said above in Distinction 11, Question 1, Article 3, Question 2, about the transubstantiation of the bread into the body of Christ.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that forms have two modes. For there are some forms that receive more and less according to their distance from their opposite, and according to their closeness to their cause, like whiteness. And so this kind of form is also received successively in its subject; and after it is received, it is intensified or lessened. And there is another kind of form that does not admit of more or less, nor of this way or that way, for its imposition is in something indivisible, like substantial form; and a form like this is neither received successively in the subject, nor intensified or lessened after it has been received. But there is another kind of form that stands in the middle, for it does not admit of more or less according to its distance from its contrary, precisely because it can in no way mingle with its contrary, and in this it shares with substantial form. But nevertheless it is susceptible to more and less according to its closeness to its cause, as is seen in the case of light. And so a form like this is not received successively in its subject, just as neither is substantial form; but still after it is in it, it can be intensified and lessened, like an accidental form that has a contrary.
And this is the kind of form that grace is, for it can endure no mingling with its opposite, because its opposite has more the nature of a privation than of something positive, like darkness. And therefore it must be received all at once in its subject; and nevertheless it can be intensified and lessened according to its closeness to the cause of grace. And thus, just as the introduction of a substantial form into matter is instantaneous, and in the same instant is the expulsion of the other form, and in the same instant the complete disposition, which is a necessity for the form, and the per se terminus of alteration; so also the infusion of grace is instantaneous, and in the same instant there is the remission of sin, and the motion of the free will, which is like a complete disposition to receiving grace. And so all that is required for justification exists in an instant; and so justification is not successive, but all at once.
Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of motion, as is clear from On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 7, 431a6–7.) For there is a certain motion that is an act of something imperfect, which is a departure from potency to act; and it is necessary that this kind of motion be successive, for it always looks toward something in the future for the perfection of its own species, precisely because a part of this motion belongs to another species than the whole motion, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174a19ff.) This is clear in the change of the motion to whiteness, one part of which is the motion to a medium color differing in species, if it be taken piecemeal.
Another motion is the act of something perfect, which is rather called an operation, which does not look to anything in the future for the completion of its own species, like sensing; and a motion like this is not successive, but immediate. And if it happened that such a motion were in time, this would be incidental, for it is measured by whatever instant of time in which it is said to exist; like being a man is in time and in an instant; and such a motion is the motion of the free will, of which we are speaking. And therefore it is in an instant. But it would be different if it were a conferring motion, for then it could not be in an instant, because of the transfer of one thing into another.
Reply Obj. 2: When the intellect understands something as in an order to another, it understands both things. But it does not follow that it understands many things when it understands them as one, as when it understands the relation of one to another. Likewise, the free will also can be moved at the same time toward different things if one is ordered to another. And because of this the movement of commanded virtue is simultaneous with the movement of commanding virtue, for the movement of commanded virtue is ordered to the end of commanding virtue, as when someone wishes to undergo death for God’s sake, his free will is moved by a movement of fortitude at the same time as a motion of charity, which commands the act of fortitude. And so since a movement of free will against sin elicited by penance is commanded by charity, for someone detests the sin he has committed for God’s sake, both movements can be at the same time.
Reply Obj. 3: In changes that are the terminus of a motion, coming to be and having come to be are the same in reality, just as being terminated and to have been terminated. But it is signified in different ways in becoming, namely, according to its relation to the preceding motion, whose terminus is essentially in having been done. And therefore it does not follow that it is and is not at the same time, but that it has being after not having being.
The solution to the fourth objection is clear from what has been said.
Question 2
On contrition
Next contrition is asked about; and concerning this, five questions arise:
first, what it is;
- second, what it should be about;
- third, how much there should be;
- fourth, its duration;
- fifth, its effect.
- Article 1
What contrition is
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: SCG IV, ch. 72.) It seems that contrition is not sorrow for sins assumed with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, as some people define it. For sorrow differs from fear in that sorrow is about present evil, but fear is about future evil. But the sins that a man is contrite for do not exist when the contrition exists, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, there cannot be sorrow for them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the City of God, sorrow is for those things that happen to us against our will. (Augustine, On the City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 14, ch. 15: “sed dolor carnis tantum modo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio, sicut animi dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt.”) But sins are not like that. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if one sorrows for past sins, either he wishes them not to exist or that they had not existed. But if he wishes them not to exist, and they already do not exist, then he has what he wants; and therefore it is more a joy than a sorrow. However, if he wishes that they had not existed, this is impossible, because what has been done cannot not have existed, and then his will is foolish, which is not something that should be said about a contrite person, for no one who acts according to virtue is foolish, as it says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 1123b3–4.) And so there is no way that contrition is sorrow.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as sorrow is required in contrition, so also is shame, as well as joy. Therefore, it should not be called sorrow any more than shame or joy.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, contrition heals all sins. But contraries heal their contraries. Therefore, contrition should be the contrary of all sins. But certain sins are sorrows, like envy and sloth. Therefore, contrition is not sorrow.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, contrition is given to us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore, contrition is not a sorrow assumed.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, contrition sometimes follows confession. But someone who has confessed one sin now is not bound to confess it again, as will be said later, Distinction 22, Question 1, Article 4. Therefore, it is not necessary for there to be a purpose of confessing in contrition.
Obj. 8: Furthermore, satisfaction and confession are necessary for punishment to be remitted that has not been remitted by contrition. But sometimes everything is forgiven in contrition. Therefore, it is not necessary that the contrite person always have the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that contrition is not the act of a virtue. (Parallel: SCG IV, ch. 72.) For emotions are not acts of virtues, for we neither praise nor condemn them, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 5, 1105b31–32.) But sorrow is an emotion. Therefore, since contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every act of virtue is from someone who has virtue. But ‘contrition’ does not signify as though something flowing from the contrite person, but rather as something that flows into that person from another effect. And it is the same way with remorse, which is another name by which it is called. Therefore contrition is not the act of a virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as ‘contrition’ comes from ‘terere’, to grind, so does ‘attrition.’ But attrition is not the act of a virtue, as everyone says. Therefore, neither is contrition.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, acts of virtues are the same way in every age, because they are of natural law. But contrition does not seem to be always the same way in the old and new law. For there was neither confession nor satisfaction, against which it is divided. Therefore, contrition is not the act of a virtue.
On the contrary (1), nothing is meritorious but an act of virtue. But contrition is a kind of meritorious act. Therefore, it is an act of virtue.
Furthermore (2), just as it pertains to virtue to do good, so also to avoid evil, by the fact that both are parts of general justice, which is every virtue. But we avoid evil by contrition. Therefore, contrition is an act of virtue, like the acts by which we do something good.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that attrition can become contrition. (Parallel: SCG IV, ch. 72.) For contrition differs from attrition as formed from unformed. But unformed faith becomes formed. Therefore, attrition can become contrition.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, matter receives perfection once privation is removed. But sorrow is related to grace as matter to form; for grace informs sorrow. Therefore, sorrow that was unformed before, due to fault, which is a privation of grace, will receive the perfection of being informed by grace once the fault is removed; and so the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what has the whole being of its species in an instant remains the same in different instants of time, just as to be a man is the same in the first instant of generation as in all the following instants. But the movement of the free will is like this, as was said above. Therefore, it can remain the same in different instants of time; therefore, it is the same in number with grace and without grace; and so it seems that that movement of the free will that was unformed before, afterward can be formed; and so attrition will become contrition.
On the contrary (1), when things have completely different principles, one of them cannot become another. But the principle of attrition is servile fear, while the principle of contrition is initial fear. Therefore, attrition cannot become contrition.
Furthermore (2), natural things do not become matters of grace, according to the more common opinion. But what is called natural is before grace; and this is how attrition is counted among natural things. Therefore, it cannot become contrition, since contrition is a good of grace.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer by saying that the beginning of all sin is pride, by which a man, cleaving to his own feelings, withdraws from divine commands; and so it is necessary that what destroys sin makes a man depart from those feelings. Now someone who remains in his feelings is called rigid and hard by a likeness, and therefore he is said to be broken when he is forced away from his feelings. But between breaking and crushing, or contrition, in material things, from which these names are transferred to spiritual things, this is the difference, as it says in the Meteorology 4, (Aristotle, Meteorology, Bk. 4, ch. 9, 386a12–14.) that things are said to be broken when they are divided into large parts, but crushed or ground when what is solid in them is reduced to the smallest parts. And since it is required for the remission of sin that a man abandon all affection for sin, by which he keeps a certain continuity and solidity in his feelings, this is why that act by which sins are forgiven is called contrition, ‘grinding down,’ by a likeness.
Indeed, many things can be considered in contrition, namely, the very substance of the act, the mode of acting, the principle and effect; and according to this different definitions of contrition are found to have been handed down. For as to the substance of the act, the definition mentioned is given. And since an act of contrition is an act of virtue, and part of the sacrament of penance, therefore it is manifested in the definition mentioned insofar as it is an act of virtue, by the fact that its genus is set down, namely, sorrow, and its object, in for sins; and the choice that is required for an act of virtue, in saying, assumed; but as it is a part of a sacrament, its order to the other parts is touched upon when it says, with the purpose of confessing, etc.
Another definition is also found that defines contrition according as it is the act of a virtue alone; but a difference is added to the definition mentioned, narrowing it to a specific virtue, namely, repentance: for it says that repentance is voluntary sorrow, always punishing for the sins that one is sorry to have committed. For in adding ‘punishment’, it is narrowed to a specific virtue; and the truth of this was discussed above, in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 3. For there a similar definition of penance is given, to which this account of contrition particularly applies.
Now the other definition is found in Isidore, which goes thus: contrition is remorse and humility of mind with tears, coming from the memory of sin and the fear of judgment. (Isidore, Sententiae, Bk. 2, ch. 12, sent. 1: “Conpunctio cordis est humilitas mentis cum lacrimis, exoriens de recordatione peccati et timore iudicii” (CCSL 111:118).) And indeed, this touches on the reason for the word in saying, humility of mind, for just as by pride someone is rendered rigid in his own sense appetites, in the same way when a contrite person draws away from his sense appetites, he is humbled. It also touches on the outward manner in saying, with tears; and the principle of contrition in saying, coming from the memory of sin and the fear of judgment.
Another definition is taken from Augustine’s words, which definition refers to the effect of contrition, namely: contrition is the sorrow remitting sin.
Another is taken from Gregory’s words, which goes thus: contrition is the humility of spirit annihilating sin, between hope and fear. (Cf. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143B), Bk. 33, par. 12.) And this refers to the reason for the name in saying that contrition is humility of spirit; and its effect, in saying, annihilating sin; and its origin, in saying, between hope and fear; nor does it only include its principal cause, which is fear, but also its secondary cause, which is hope, without which fear can cause despair.
Reply Obj. 1: Sorrow only has to do with what is present in some way. Now past sin, although it is not actually present, is nevertheless present in its effect, whether the disposition to sin, or the guilt or stain, or even the temporal loss, which cannot be recovered even by doing penance; or also the loss of the dignity of innocence, to which no one can return, by which it could have been said, my heart has not reproached me in my whole life (Job 27:6). Or it could be said that past sin excites sorrow, as it is present in one’s memory, just as also in remembering past sad things, we are as affected by those things as if they were present. It can also be said that just as the memory that is in the intellective part is not only about past things, but present things as well, as was said in Book I, Distinction 3, Question 1, Article 4, although the memory that is in the sensitive part is only about past things; so sorrow, which is in the appetite of the intellective part, can be about both past and present, although the sorrow in the sensitive part is only about present things, by the fact that the intellect abstracts from any difference of time, just as also from the other material conditions that the sense appetite is concerned with.
Reply Obj. 2: Although when sins happened, they were voluntary, nevertheless when we are contrite about them, they are not voluntary. And thus they have happened against our will, not of course according to the will that we had when we were willing them, but according to the one we now have, by which we wish that they had never been.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the complete will for the impossible cannot exist in a wise person, nevertheless, a conditional will, which is called wishfulness, can be about impossible things, by which even a wise person would wish something that is impossible, if it were possible. And this will is enough for causing sorrow; and particularly when the impossibility of obtaining what we will comes from us; and this is how it is in this case.
Reply Obj. 4: Although there is joy and shame in contrition, nevertheless the joy does not directly have to do with sin, but rather with the grace recovered, or also the sorrow itself, by which grace is recovered. Likewise, shame has to do with the effect of sin, which is disgrace, because modesty, according to the Philosopher, is the fear of disgrace. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 9, 1128b11–12.) But sadness has to do directly with sin itself, and so contrition, which is ordered to blotting out sin, is said to be sorrow more than anything said above.
Reply Obj. 5: Sorrow is not only opposed to joy in its genus, but sorrow about a good is also specifically opposed to joy about a good, and sorrow about an evil to joy about an evil. And so sometimes someone is also sorry about having sorrowed before; and because of this contrition, although it is a sorrow, can heal the sins that consist in sorrow. Or it could be said that although some sins consist in sorrow, nevertheless, the cause of that sorrow is a pleasure, or an illicit love; and according to this they can be healed by a sorrow that is contrary, as it were.
Reply Obj. 6: Contrition is from God alone as to the form by which it is informed; but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free will and from God, who works in all the works both of nature and the will.
Reply Obj. 7: Contrition naturally precedes confession, but the fact that sometimes it follows is incidental, from a failing in the penitent. And still when that happens he should also have the purpose of confessing, if something occurs to his memory that was not confessed.
Reply Obj. 8: Although the whole punishment can be forgiven through contrition, nevertheless confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because a person cannot be sure that his own contrition was enough to take away everything, and because confession and satisfaction are under precept, and so he would be constituted a transgressor if he did not confess and make satisfaction.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, I answer that contrition, according to the proper meaning of its name, does not signify an act of virtue, but rather a certain physical emotion. But here we are not asking about this kind of contrition, but about the one that this name is adapted to mean by a likeness. For just as inflating one’s own will to do evil denotes in itself evil by its genus; so also the annihilating and crushing that will denotes in itself good by its genus. For this is to detest one’s own will by which sin was committed; and so contrition, which signifies this, denotes a certain rectitude of the will. And because of this, it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sin, namely, penance, as is clear from what was said in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 3.
Reply Obj. 1: In contrition there are two kinds of sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, which is an emotion; and this is not essentially contrition as an act of virtue, but rather one of its effects. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts external penalty on the body to compensate for an offense which was committed against God by the service of the members, so also it imposes a penalty of this sorrow on the concupiscible appetite itself, because it too cooperated in the sin. But this sorrow can still pertain to contrition as a part of the sacrament, for sacraments by nature not only exist in interior acts but also in outward ones, and in sensible things. There is another sorrow in the will, which is nothing other than displeasure with some evil, according as the affections of the will are named according to the names of emotions, as was said in Book III, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 5. And this is how contrition is sorrow by its essence, and it is also an act of the virtue of penance.
Reply Obj. 2: Contrition, taken passively, by its very notion means an emotion inhering in a certain body; but that it be inflicted by another is not conveyed by the meaning of its name, but as from something following on its meaning, namely, from the nature of the thing ground down, which is not such as to act on itself. And so when the name ‘contrition’ is transferred to an act of the will, which is such as to move itself, the likeness of both the action and the passivity is preserved there in that will. For inasmuch as that rigidity in which someone follows his own will is dissolved, contrition is like something suffered by the will itself; but inasmuch as no one forces it, but this happens of its own accord, it is said to grind itself down.
Reply Obj. 3: ‘Attrition’ means an approach to a perfect wearing away; and therefore in physical things, something is said to be attrite that is in some way crushed and worn away, but not completely. But contrition is said when all the parts are ground together by division to the smallest pieces. And so attrition in spiritual things signifies a certain displeasure with sins committed, but not a perfect one; while contrition is a perfect displeasure.
Reply Obj. 4: Contrition, according as it is considered in itself, was always the same under every law. For it is always necessary to avoid future sins, just as it is always necessary to sorrow for sins committed. But according as it conveys its order to the other parts of penance, it was not always done in the same way, because the other parts did not always exist in the same way. And so it is not necessary that the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, which is included in the definition of contrition, always existed in the same way.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there are two opinions about this. For some people say that attrition becomes contrition, just as unformed faith becomes formed. But this, as it seems, cannot be; for although the habit of unformed faith may become formed, nevertheless, those acts of unformed faith never become acts of formed faith, for that unformed act passes away, and does not remain when charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not name habits, but only acts; for habits of infused virtues that have to do with the will cannot be unformed, since they result from charity, as was said in Book III, Distinction 23, Question 3, Article 1, Subquestion 1. But before grace is infused, there is no habit from which an act of contrition is elicited afterward; and so in no way can attrition become contrition, and this is what the other opinion says.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not the same with faith as with contrition, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Once a privation is removed from matter which remains with a perfection replacing it, that matter is formed; but that sorrow that was unformed does not remain when charity comes, and so it cannot be formed. Or it should be said that the essence of matter does not have its origin from form, as an act has its origin in the habit by which it is formed; and so it is not unfitting matter to be informed by the same form again by which it was not informed in the beginning; but this is impossible for an act, just as it is impossible that something the same thing in number arise from a principle from which it did not arise before; for a thing only comes into being once.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the motion of the intellect and will has the whole of its species in one instant, as an abiding thing does, nevertheless, it is measured in time according to its accidents, according as its causes are variable by time. For in the same way a man’s being, which is in an instant, is measured by time; and as long as the causes of a man’s being remain the same, that being also remains; but when the causes are changed, that being is changed, with what was there before having been destroyed: for the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 3, 318a23–24.) And likewise that disposition of the will that caused such an act is changed and passes, and that act does not remain the same, nor once it passes can it ever be resumed again.
Article 2
The matter of contrition
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallel: de Malo, q. 7, a. 11, ad 3.) It seems that man should be contrite about penalties, not only faults. For Augustine says in his book On Penance: no one longs for eternal life unless he repents of this mortal life. ((Pseudo?) Augustine, Sermon 351, PL 39:1535.) But the mortality of life is a certain penalty. Therefore, a penitent should also be contrite about penalties.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is maintained above (See Lombard, Sentences, d. 16, ch. 2, n. 1, citing Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 14, n. 29.) from Augustine’s words that the penitent should be sorry for the fact that he has stripped himself of virtue. But deprivation of virtue is a kind of punishment. Therefore, contrition is also sorrow for punishments.
On the contrary, no one keeps what he sorrows over. But the penitent, according to his name, keeps a penalty. Therefore, he does not sorrow over his punishment; and so contrition, which is a penitential sorrow, is not about punishment.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems we should have contrition for original sin. (Parallels: ST III, q. 87, a. 1; de Malo, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3.) For we should be contrite about actual sin, not by reason of the act as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, because an act according to its own substance is a certain good and from God. But original sin has a deformity, just as so does actual sin. Therefore, we should also be contrite about it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, by original sin a man was turned away from God, because his punishment was losing the divine vision. But it should displease anyone to have been turned away from God. Therefore, a man should have displeasure in original sin, and so he should have contrition over it.
On the contrary, medicine should be proportionate to the sickness. But original sin was contracted without our will. Therefore, it is not required that we be purified from it by the act of the will that is contrition.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that we should not be contrite about all actual sin committed by us. (Parallel: de Malo, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3.) For contraries cure contraries. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b17.) But some sins are committed by sadness, like sloth and envy. Therefore, their medicine should not be a sadness, which contrition is, but a joy.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot be about what is not subject to knowledge. But there are certain sins that we do not have in our knowledge, like forgotten ones. Therefore, contrition cannot be about these things.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, by voluntary contrition those things are blotted out that were committed by the will. But ignorance takes away the voluntary, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1110b18.) Therefore, there should not be contrition about those things that happen through ignorance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, there should not be contrition about a sin that is not taken away by contrition. But there are some sins that are not taken away by contrition, namely, venial ones, which still remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore, contrition should not be about all past sins.
On the contrary (1), penance is medicine against all actual sins. But penance does not apply where there is no contrition, for it is the first part of it. Therefore, there should be contrition for all sins.
Furthermore (2), no sin is forgiven unless someone is justified. But contrition is required for justification, as was said before. Therefore, it is necessary to be contrite for every sin.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a person should also be contrite about future sins. (Parallel: de Malo, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3.) For contrition is an act of free will. But free will extends more to future things than to past ones, for choice, which is an act of the free will, is about future contingents, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 3, 1112b9.) Therefore, contrition is more about future sins than about past ones.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin is worsened by its consequent effect. And so Jerome says that Arius’s punishment has not yet been determined, because it is still possible for others to be ruined by his heresy, whose ruin is always increasing his punishment. And it is the same with someone who is judged a murderer if he struck with lethal force, even before the victim dies. But in the meantime a sinner should be contrite for his sin. Therefore, not only as it has quantity from the past act, but also as it has quantity from the future; and this is how contrition has to do with the future.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of penance. But penance always has to do with the past. Therefore, so does contrition; and so it is not about future sin.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a man should have contrition for the sin of another. (Parallel: de Malo, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3.) For a person does not ask indulgence unless for a sin that he is contrite about. But indulgence is asked for the sins of others: who can understand sins? . . . from those of others spare your servant (Ps 19:12–13). Therefore, a person should be contrite for the sins of others.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a person is bound by charity to love his neighbor as himself. But because of his love of self he both sorrows over evils and desires goods. And since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor as for ourselves, it seems that we should be sorry for his sins as for our own. But contrition is nothing other than sorrow for sins. Therefore, a man should be contrite for another’s sins.
On the contrary, contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents of anything but what he did himself. Therefore, no one has contrition about another’s sins.
Quaestiuncula 6
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that contrition is not required for individual mortal sins. (Parallels: above, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 5, ad 3; below, d. 21, exposition of the text, ‘Quod omnia’; ST I-II, q. 113, a. 5, ad 3; ST III, q. 87, a. 1.) For the motion of contrition is in an instant in justification. But in an instant a person cannot recall every single sin. Therefore, he does not have to have contrition for individual sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, contrition should be about sins according as they turn a person from God, because turning to a created thing without turning from God does not require contrition. But all mortal sins share in this turning away. Therefore, one contrition suffices against all of them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, actual mortal sins have more in common with each other than actual sins have with original sin. But one baptism wipes out all actual and original sins. Therefore, one general contrition wipes out all mortal sins.
On the contrary (1), there are different medicines for different sicknesses: for what heals the heel does not heal the eye, as Jerome says. (Pseudo-Jerome, Exposition of the Gospel of Mark, on 9:28 (CCSL 82:42).) But contrition is a single medicine against one mortal sin alone. Therefore, one common contrition does not suffice for all sins.
Furthermore (2), contrition is explained in confession. But it is necessary to confess each individual mortal sin. Therefore, it is also necessary to have contrition for them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that contrition means, as was said, the crushing of something both hard and whole. But this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, for the will, which is its cause in someone who acts wickedly, stays within its own bounds, nor does it yield to the precept of the law. And so a displeasure in this evil is called contrition by a likeness. But this likeness cannot be generalized to the evil of punishment, for punishment simply means loss of goods; and so there can be sorrow about the evils of punishment, but not contrition.
Reply Obj. 1: Penance, according to Augustine, should be about this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality, unless every sorrow is called penance in a broad sense, but by reason of the sins to which we are led by the infirmity of this life.
Reply Obj. 2: That sorrow in which someone grieves over the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially contrition itself, but its principle; for just as someone is moved to desiring something on account of the good that he expects from it, so someone is moved to sorrow over something because of the evil that resulted from it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that contrition, as was said, is sorrow regarding and in some way crushing the hardness of the will; and therefore it can only be about those sins that arise in us from the hardness of our wills. And since original sin was not brought upon us by our wills, but it was contracted from the vitiated origin of our nature, this is why there can be no contrition for it, properly speaking. But there can be displeasure about it, or sorrow.
Reply Obj. 1: Contrition is not about sin only by reason of the substance of its act, because it does not have the nature of evil from that; nor again only by reason of its deformity, because, in itself, a deformity does not imply the nature of fault, but sometimes it conveys a penalty. But contrition should be about sin as it denotes any deformity arising from an act of the will, and this is not the case with original sin, and so there is no contrition about it.
And the second objection should be answered the same way, because the will’s turning away is what contrition should be directed to.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that every actual fault happens from our will not yielding to God’s law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting outside it. And since a hard thing is what has a power so that it does not easily allow itself to be acted on, (Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8, 9a25.) for this reason in every actual sin there is a certain hardness in the will. And because of this if sin must be cured, it must be remitted by contrition grinding it down.
Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from what has been said, contrition is opposed to sin as it proceeds from the will’s choice to not follow the command of divine law, but not as to what is materially in the sin, and this is what choice applies to. For the will’s choice applies not only to acts of the other powers, which the will uses to its own end, but also its own proper act. For the will wills itself to will something; and so the will’s choice applies to that sorrow or sadness that is found in the sin of envy and others like it, whether the sorrow is in the sense appetites or in the will itself; and so the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways to forget something: either so that it is completely cut out of the memory, and then a person cannot examine it; or so that it is partly cut out of the memory, and partly remains, as when I seem to recall having heard something in general, but I do not know what it was in particular; and then I search in my memory to recollect it. And in accord with this any sin can also be forgotten in two ways: either so that it remains in the memory in general, but not specifically; and then a person should reflect in order to find that sin, for a person is especially bound to have contrition for any mortal sin. But if he cannot discover it, it is enough to be contrite for it according as it is held in his awareness; and so a person should not only be sorry for his sin, but for forgetting it, which happens out of negligence. But if the sin is completely wiped out of his memory, then he is excused from the duty by his powerlessness to do it, and a general contrition suffices for everything in which he offended God. But when the powerlessness is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then a man is bound to be contrite for it specifically; as a poor man who cannot pay his debt is excused, but he is still bound whenever he first becomes capable.
Reply Obj. 3: If ignorance entirely took away the will to act wickedly, it would excuse it, and there would be no sin; but sometimes it does not completely take away the will, and then it does not excuse from all, but from much. And so a person should have contrition for sins committed through ignorance.
Reply Obj. 4: Venial sins can remain after contrition for mortal sins, but not after contrition for venial sins. And so there should be contrition for venial sins as well, just as there is also penance for them, as was said above in the previous distinction.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that in all moving and moveable things the order is such that a lower mover has its own motion, and beyond this it follows in some way the motion of a higher mover, as is seen in the movement of the planets, which, beyond their proper movements, follow the motion of the first sphere. Now for all the moral virtues the mover is prudence itself, which is called the charioteer of the virtues; and so any moral virtue with its proper motion has something from the motion of prudence. And therefore since penance is a certain moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, with its proper act it follows the movement of prudence. Now its proper act is toward its proper object, which is sin that has been committed; and so its principal act, namely, contrition, according to its own species regards only past sin. But as a result it regards future sin according as it has something of the act of prudence attached to it, and yet it is not moved toward that future thing by reason of its proper species; and because of this someone who has contrition is sorry for past sin and guards against future sin: but contrition is not said to regard future sin, but rather caution is, which is the part of prudence attached to contrition.
Reply Obj. 1: Free will is said to be about future contingents according as it is about acts, but not according as it is about the objects of acts, for a person can think about past things and necessary things by his free will, but the very act of thinking, according as it falls under his free will, is a future contingent. And so the act of contrition is also a future contingent, according as it falls under the free will; but its object can be the past.
Reply Obj. 2: That resulting effect that worsens sin already preceded in act as in its cause. And so, when it was committed, it possessed its entire quantity, and from its consequent effect it did not increase anything with regard to its character of fault, although it increased with regard to its incidental penalty, according as many people will have reasons for grieving in hell for the many evils that resulted from their sin. And this is how Jerome is speaking. Therefore, contrition is not necessary for anything but past sins.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question it should be said that one has contrition for the same thing that one was previously hard and untouched about. And therefore it is clear that contrition for sin is in the same place where the hardness of sin was before; and so there is no contrition for the sins of others.
Reply Obj. 1: The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others inasmuch as by associating with sinners a person contracts a certain uncleanness through his consent, as is written: with the perverse you will be perverted (Ps 18[17]:26).
Reply Obj. 2: We should sorrow over the sins of others, but it is nevertheless not necessary that we be contrite over them, for not every sorrow about past sin is contrition, as is clear from what has been said. (See d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 6
To the sixth question, it should be said that contrition can be considered in two ways: namely, as to its principle and as to its terminus. And I call the principle of contrition that thinking in which someone thinks about his sin and grieves over it, even if not with the sorrow of contrition, at least with the sorrow of attrition. But the terminus of contrition is when that sorrow is already informed by grace. Therefore, as to contrition’s principle, it is necessary that it be about the individual sins that someone has in his memory; but as to the terminus it is enough that there be one general contrition for all; for then that motion acts in the power of all the preceding dispositions.
And by this the answer to the first objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Although all mortal sins share in the turning away, nevertheless, they differ in the cause and manner of turning away, and in the amount of the resulting distance from God; and this is according to the different ways of turning toward something else.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptism acts in the power of Christ’s merit, because he had infinite power for blotting out all sins. And because of this one baptism suffices against all. But in contrition, our act is required along with Christ’s merit; and so it is necessary that it respond individually to each individual sin, since it does not have infinite power for contrition. Or it could be said that baptism is a spiritual generation, but penance as to contrition and its other parts is a certain spiritual healing by the mode of a certain change. Now, it is clear in physical generation, which happens along with the corruption of something else, that one generation removes all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, which were accidents of the thing corrupted; but in an alteration only one accident is removed which is contrary to the accident that the change terminates in. And likewise one baptism simultaneously wipes out all sins while bringing in a new life; but penance does not wipe out all sins unless it is directed toward each of them individually; and so it is necessary to be contrite for and to confess individual sins.
Article 3
The quantity of contrition
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: above, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 1.) It seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow that can exist in nature. For sorrow is a feeling of injury. But other injuries are felt more than the injury of sin, like the injury of a wound. Therefore, contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, we take our judgment of the cause from the effect. But tears are the effect of sorrow. Therefore, since sometimes a contrite person does not shed physical tears for sins, which nevertheless he does shed for the death of a friend, or from being struck, or for other things like this, it seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more that something has its contrary mixed in with it, the less intense it is. But the sorrow of contrition has much joy mixed into it, for a contrite person rejoices in his liberation, his hope of forgiveness, and many things like this. Therefore, his sorrow is less.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things that displease a contrite person more than his past sins, for he would not wish to endure the punishment of hell rather than sin, nor again would he have endured all temporal punishments, or would even endure them now; otherwise few people would be found to be contrite. Therefore, the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.
On the contrary (1), according to Augustine, every sorrow is based in love. (Augustine, On the City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 14, ch. 9, n. 1.) But the love of charity, in which the sorrow of contrition is founded, is the greatest love. Therefore, the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.
Furthermore (2), sorrow is about an evil. Therefore, there ought to be more sorrow about a greater evil. But guilt is a greater evil than punishment. Therefore, sorrow for fault, which is contrition, exceeds every other sorrow.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. (Parallel: below, a. 4, qa. 2.) For no sorrow can be more immoderate than the kind that destroys its own subject. But if the sorrow of contrition is so great that it causes death or the corruption of the body, it is laudable. For Anselm says, if only they so anointed the depths of my soul that they dried up the marrow of my body; (Anselm, Prayers or Meditations, oratio 7 (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, 3:24).) and Augustine says in On the Contrition of the Heart, (Pseudo-Augustine, On Contrition of Heart, ch. 10, PL 40:949.) Chapter 10, that he deserves to blind his eyes with crying. Therefore, the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sorrow of contrition proceeds from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Therefore, neither can the sorrow of contrition.
On the contrary, every moral virtue is corrupted by excess and defect. But contrition is the act of a moral virtue, namely, penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore, there can be excessive sorrow for sins.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there should not be greater sorrow for one sin than for another. (Parallel: below, a. 5, qa. 3, ad 2.) For Jerome praises Paula for lamenting the least sins as though they were great. (Jerome, Epistle 108, n. 15 (PL 22:891).) Therefore, one should not be more sorry for one sin than for another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the movement of contrition is immediate. But one movement cannot be more intense and less intense at the same time. Therefore, contrition cannot be greater for one sin than for another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, contrition is particularly about sin in its turning away from God. But all mortal sins share in this turning away, for they all destroy grace, by which the soul is joined to God. Therefore, contrition should be equal for all mortal sins.
On the contrary (1), it says in Deuteronomy 25:2: according to the measure of the sin shall also be the measure of the lashes. But the lashes are commensurate with the contrition for sin, for contrition has the aim of doing satisfaction attached to it. Therefore, there should be more contrition for one sin than for another.
Furthermore (2), a person should have contrition for what he should have avoided. But a person should avoid one sin more than another because it is more serious, if the necessity falls upon him to do one or the other. Therefore, someone should sorrow more over one sin, namely, a more serious one, than another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that just as was said above, there are two kinds of sorrow in contrition. One is in the will itself, which is contrition itself essentially, and which is nothing other than displeasure in past sins; and this kind of sorrow in contrition surpasses other sorrows, for the more something pleases one, the more its contrary displeases. Now the end pleases above all things, since all things are desired for the sake of it; and therefore the sin that turns away from the end must displease above all things. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, which is caused by the first kind of sorrow, whether from the necessity of nature, according as the lower powers follow the motion of the higher ones; or from choice, according as a repentant person voluntarily stirs up in himself sorrow for sins.
And in neither way is it necessary that it be the greatest of sorrows, for the lower powers are moved more vehemently by their proper objects than by the overflow from the higher powers. And therefore the closer the operation of the higher powers is to the objects of the lower powers, the more they follow their motion. And so there is greater sorrow in the sensitive part from a sensible injury than the sorrow that overflows to it from reason. And likewise there is greater sorrow that overflows from reason deliberating about physical things than overflows from reason considering spiritual things.
And so the sorrow in the sensitive part arising from reason’s displeasure with sin is not greater than the other sorrows that are in it; and likewise neither is the sorrow that is voluntarily assumed; both because the lower affections do not obey the higher ones at will, so that as much suffering would follow in the lower appetites as the higher appetite orders; and also because sufferings are assumed by reason in acts of virtue according to a certain measure, which sometimes the sorrow that is without virtue does not preserve, but exceeds.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as there is sensible sorrow from the sensation of an injury, there is also interior sorrow from the knowledge of something harmful. And so, although the injury of sin is not felt by the outward senses, nevertheless it is felt to be the greatest according to the interior sense of reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Physical changes immediately reach to the passions of the sensitive part, and by means of them to the affections of the higher appetites. And that is why physical tears flow more swiftly from sensible sorrow or even sensible hurt than from the sorrow of spiritual contrition.
Reply Obj. 3: That joy that a penitent has from his sorrow does not diminish his displeasure, because it is not opposed to it, but it increases it according as every operation is increased by its proper pleasure, as is said in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175a30.) just as whoever delights in learning some science, learns more. And likewise, whoever rejoices in his displeasure has displeasure more vehemently. But it can well be that that joy tempers the sorrow in the sensitive part resulting from reason.
Reply Obj. 4: The amount of displeasure about any thing should accord with the amount of its badness. Now, badness in mortal fault is measured from the one sinned against, inasmuch as it is unworthy of him, and from who sins, inasmuch as it is harmful to him. And since a man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate his fault more as it is an offense against God than as it is harmful to him. But it is chiefly harmful to him because it separates him from God; and on this side the separation from God, which is a certain penalty, should displease him more than the fault itself, inasmuch as it causes this harm (because what is hated because of something else is hated less), but less than the fault as it is an offense against God. Now, among all the penalties the order of wickedness depends on the amount of harm; and so, since there is the greatest harm where the greatest good is taken away, separation from God will be among the greatest penalties.
There is also another amount of incidental evil, which it is necessary to attend to in displeasure according to the account of present and past; for what is past is not now; and it has less of the nature of good and evil; and this is why a person flees more from enduring any evil in the present or future than he shrinks from it in the past. And so neither does any passion of the soul directly correspond to the past as sorrow corresponds to the present evil, and fear to a future one; and because of this, given two past evils, the soul shrinks more from the one from which a greater effect remains in the present or is feared in the future, even if it was less in the past. And since the effect of previous sin is sometimes not felt as much as the effect of previous penalty, both because fault is more perfectly healed than penalty, and because a physical defect is more manifest than a spiritual one, this is why even a well-disposed person sometimes feels more horror at previous punishment than previous sin; although he would be more ready to suffer the same punishment than to commit the same sin.
The relation of the fault to the punishment should also be considered, since certain punishments, like separation from God, have an offense against God inseparably joined. Some also add perpetuity, like the punishment of hell. Therefore, that punishment that has offense attached should be judged just like sin; but the one that adds perpetuity is to be fled more than simple sin. Nevertheless, if the nature of offense is separated from these, and the nature of punishment is considered alone, it has less of wickedness than sin, inasmuch as sin is an offense against God, and because of that it should displease us less.
It should also be known that although the disposition of a contrite person should be like this, nevertheless, he should not be put to the test regarding these things. For a person cannot easily measure his feelings; and sometimes what displeases less seems to displease more, because one is closer to sensible hurt, which we notice more.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that on the part of the sorrow that is in the reason, namely, of the displeasure at sin as an offense against God, contrition cannot be too great, as neither can the love of charity, to which this displeasure is directed, be too great. But as to the sensible sorrow it can be too great, just as also outward affliction of the body can be too great, as was shown above from Jerome’s words in Distinction 15 on the question of fasting. For the preservation of the subject and his good condition sufficient for fulfilling his responsibilities should be taken for the measure among all these things; and because of this it says, present your bodies as a living sacrifice . . . your reasonable service (Rom 12:1).
Reply Obj. 1: Anselm desired that his bodily marrows be dried up by the oil of devotion not as to the natural fluid, but as to fleshly desires and concupiscences. Augustine, however, although he recognized that he deserved to lose his outer eyes on account of sin, since any sin deserves not only eternal but also temporal death, nevertheless did not wish to blind himself.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument is based on the sorrow that is in the reason; but the third is based on the sorrow of the sensitive part.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that we can speak about contrition in two ways. In one way according as it corresponds individually to individual sins; and in this way as to the sorrow of the higher affections it is required that a person grieve more over a greater sin; because the reason for sorrow, namely, the offense against God, is greater in one thing than another; for God is more offended by a more disordered act. Likewise too, since a greater penalty is due to a greater fault, even the sorrow of the sensitive part, according as it is assumed by choice for sin as sin’s punishment, as it were, should be greater for a greater sin; but according as it arises from the impression of the higher appetite, the amount of sorrow is found in the lower appetite according to its disposition for receiving impressions from the higher parts, and not according to the amount of sin. In another way, contrition can be taken as it is simultaneous with everything else, like in the act of justification. And indeed this contrition proceeds from the consideration of individual sins; and so although it is one act, nevertheless the distinction of sins remains in it virtually. Or at least it has the aim of thinking about the individual sins attached to it; and so it is also habitually more about one than another.
Reply Obj. 1: St. Paula is not praised for sorrowing over all her sins equally, but because she sorrowed as much over small sins as if they were great, as compared to others who sorrow over sins; and she grieved much more deeply over greater ones.
Reply Obj. 2: In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although there cannot actually be found a distinction of intention corresponding to the different sins, nevertheless it is found there in one way, as was said, and also in the other way, according as individual sins have an order to what a contrite person is grieving over in that general contrition, namely, the offense against God. For whoever seeks or loves any whole also loves its parts, even if not in act, and in this way, according as they have an order to the whole, some more, some less; as someone who loves a certain community loves individuals virtually, more and less according to their order to the common good. And likewise, whoever sorrows over having offended God in many things implicitly sorrows differently according as he offended God more or less by them.
Reply Obj. 3: Although any mortal sin turns one away from God and removes grace, nevertheless, certain ones distance us from him more than others, inasmuch as they contain greater discord than others in their divergence from the ordering of divine goodness.
Article 4
The duration of contrition
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 14, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 1; ST III, q. 84, a. 8; a. 9, ad 1.) It seems that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For just as there should be sorrow for sins committed, there should also be shame. But the shame for sin does not last throughout life, and, as Ambrose says, someone whose sin has been forgiven has no reason to blush. (Ambrose, On repentance (SC 179), Bk. 2, ch. 7.) Therefore, it seems that neither does contrition last, which is sorrow for sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said, perfect charity casts out fear, for fear has to do with punishment (1 John 4:18). But sorrow also has to do with punishment. Therefore, in the state of perfect charity the sorrow of contrition cannot remain.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, about the past there cannot be sorrow, which is properly about present evil, except as something from the past remains in the present. But sometimes one reaches a certain state in this life in which nothing of past sin remains, neither the disposition, nor the guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore, it is not necessary to be sorry for that sin any longer.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it says in Romans 8:28, all things work together for the good of those who love God, even sins, as the Gloss says at the same place. (Cf. Augustine, On Correction and Grace, ch. 9, n. 24.) Therefore, it is not necessary after the remission of sins that a person be sorry for sin.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, contrition is a part of penance divided against satisfaction. But it is not necessary to make satisfaction forever. Therefore, it is not always necessary to be contrite for sins.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in his book On True and False Penance: where sorrow has limits, repentance fails; where repentance fails, nothing remains of forgiveness. (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 8 (PL 40:1124).) Therefore, it seems, since it is necessary to not lose the forgiveness granted, that it would always be necessary to be sorry for sins.
Furthermore (2), it says in Sirach 5:5: do not be without fear regarding propitiation for sins. Therefore, a person should always sorrow in order to have propitiation for sins.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not expedient to sorrow over sins continuously. (Parallels: above, d. 14, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 2; ST III, q. 84, a. 9.) For sometimes it is expedient to rejoice, as is clear from Philippians 4:4: rejoice in the Lord always; where the Gloss says that it is necessary to rejoice. But it is not possible to rejoice and to sorrow at the same time. Therefore, it is not expedient to grieve over sins continuously.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is evil in itself and to be fled is not to be taken up, except to the extent that it is needed as a medicine for something, as is seen in the case of burning and cutting a wound. But sadness is bad in itself; as is said in Sirach 30:23: drive sadness far from you; and afterward the cause is given: for sadness kills many and there is no advantage from it. The Philosopher also expressly says this in the Ethics 7 and 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 13, 1153b1–2; Bk. 10, ch. 2, 1172b18–19.) Therefore, one should not grieve over sin longer than suffices for blotting out the sin. But immediately after the first sorrow of contrition, sin is blotted out. Therefore, it is not expedient to grieve any further.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Bernard says in Sermon 11: sorrow for sins is necessary, even if it is not continuous; for it is honey mixed into absinth. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs, Sermon 11, par. 2: “Et quidem necessarius dolor pro peccatis, sed si non sit continuus. Sane interpoletur laetiori recordatione divinae benignitatis, ne forte prae tristitia induretur cor, et desperatione plus pereat. Misceamus absinthio mel, ut salubris amaritudo salutem dare tunc possit, cum immixto temperata dulcore bibi poterit” (Bernardi Opera, ed. Leclerq et al., 1:55).) Therefore, it seems that it is not expedient to sorrow continuously.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says: let a penitent always sorrow, and let him rejoice in his sorrow. (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 8 (PL 40:1124).)
Furthermore (2), it is expedient always to continue acts in which beatitude consists, as much as is possible. But the act of sorrowing over sin is one of these, as is clear from Matt 5:4: blessed are those who mourn. Therefore, it is expedient to continue to grieve as much as is possible.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also after this life souls are contrite for sins. For the love of charity causes displeasure with sin. And after this life charity remains in some people both in act and in habit, for charity never passes away, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:8. Therefore, displeasure about sins committed remains, which is the essence of contrition.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the fault is more to be grieved over than the punishment. But souls in purgatory grieve over their sensible punishment and the postponement of glory. Therefore, much more do they grieve over fault committed by them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the punishment of purgatory makes satisfaction for sins. But satisfaction has its efficacy from the force of contrition. Therefore, contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary (1), contrition is part of the sacrament of penance. But the sacraments do not remain after this life. Therefore, neither does contrition.
Furthermore (2), contrition can be so great that it wipes out fault and punishment. Therefore, if souls in purgatory could have contrition, the punishment they are sentenced to could be dismissed by the force of their contrition, and they could be freed from all sensible punishment, which is false.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that in contrition, as was said, there are two kinds of sorrow. One is a sorrow of reason, which is detesting sins committed by oneself; the other is a sorrow of the sensitive part, which is a result of the first one. And with either one, the time for contrition is the whole state of the present life. For as long as someone is in this state of life, he detests the hindrances by which the attainment of the end of that life is impeded or delayed. And therefore since by past sin our life’s course toward God is delayed, because the time that was assigned for running the course cannot be recovered, as was said above, it is necessary that the state of contrition remain always in this life’s time as to the detestation of sin. Likewise too as to the sensible sorrow, which is assumed as punishment by the will. For because a person deserved eternal punishment by sinning, and he sinned against an eternal God, when the eternal punishment is changed to temporal punishment the sorrow should remain at least for a man’s ‘forever,’ that is, in the state of this life. And because of this Hugh of St. Victor says that when God absolves man from eternal guilt and punishment, he binds him with a chain to the perpetual detestation of sin. (Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sentententiae, ch. 11 (PL 176:148).)
Reply Obj. 1: Embarrassment has to do with sin only as it has disgrace. And so after the sin, when the fault has been forgiven as far as guilt is concerned, there is no longer any place for shame; but the place for sorrow does, for it is not only about fault as it has disgrace, but also as it has harm attached to it.
Reply Obj. 2: The servile fear which charity casts out is opposed to charity by reason of its slavery, by which it has to do with punishment. But the sorrow of contrition is caused by charity, as was said. And so it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 3: Although by penance a sinner returns to original grace and purity from the guilt of punishment, he still never returns to the original dignity of innocence. And so some consequence of past sin always remains in him.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as man should not do bad things so that good things may come (Rom 3:8), neither should he rejoice over bad things because good things happen to arise from them by the action of divine providence, for sins were not the cause but rather impediments to those goods; but divine providence caused them. And a man should rejoice about the goods, but be sorry for the sins.
Reply Obj. 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment allotted, which must be imposed for sins; and so it can be terminated, so that it is not necessary to make further satisfaction, for this punishment is chiefly proportionate to the fault on the part of what is turned to, in which it has a finite nature. But the sorrow of contrition corresponds to the fault on the part of the turning away from God, in which it has a certain infiniteness; and thus true contrition should always remain. Nor is it unfitting if, when what follows is removed, what preceded remains.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that this is the condition found in acts of virtue, that there cannot be excess or defect, as is proved in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 1106b24–28.) And so, since contrition, as it is a certain displeasure in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be an excess there, whether in intensity or in duration, unless as the act of one virtue impedes the act of another virtue more necessary for that time. And therefore however long a person can be continuously in an act of this displeasure, the more the better, as long as he is available for acts of the other virtues at their time, according as is necessary. But passions can have excess and defect both as to intensity and as to duration. And so just as the passion of sorrow that the will assumes should be moderately intense, so also it should last moderately, lest, if it should last too long, a man should fall into despair and despondency, and vices like that.
Reply Obj. 1: Worldly joy is impeded by the sorrow of contrition, but not the joy that is from God, because it has this sorrow itself as its matter.
Reply Obj. 2: Sirach is speaking about worldly sadness, and the Philosopher speaks about the sadness that is a passion, which should be used moderately, according as it is expedient to the end for which it was assumed.
Reply Obj. 3: Bernard is speaking about the sorrow that is a passion.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that three things must be considered in contrition. The first is the genus of contrition, which is sorrow. The second is the form of contrition, which is an act of virtue informed by grace. The third is the efficacy of contrition, for it is meritorious, and sacramental, and in some way satisfactory. Therefore souls that are in heaven after this life cannot have contrition, because they are free of sorrow on account of the fullness of joy. But those who are in hell lack contrition, because if they have sorrow, they still lack the grace to inform their sorrow. (In other words, the damned will not, in fact, have sorrow for their sins, but even if they did have such sorrow, it would be uninformed by grace, and therefore could not count as contrition.) But those who are in purgatory have sorrow for sins that is informed by grace, but not meritorious, because they are not in the state of meriting. But in this life all three aspects mentioned can be found.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow except in those who are capable of sorrow; but the fullness of joy excludes all capacity for sorrow from the blessed; and so although they have charity, nevertheless they lack contrition.
Reply Obj. 2: Souls in purgatory are sorry for sins, but that sorrow is not contrition, because contrition’s efficacy is lacking from it.
Reply Obj. 3: That punishment which souls endure in purgatory cannot properly be called satisfaction, because satisfaction requires a meritorious work; but in a broad sense the rendering of punishment due is called satisfaction.
Article 5
The effect of contrition
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1; SCG IV, ch. 72; de Veritate, q. 28, a. 8; Quodl. IV, q. 7, a. 1.) It seems that remission of sin is not an effect of contrition. For God alone remits sins. But we are in a certain way the cause of our contrition, because it is our act. Therefore, contrition is not the cause of the remission of guilt.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, contrition is an act of virtue. But virtue follows the remission of guilt; for guilt and virtue do not exist at the same time in the soul. Therefore, contrition is not the cause of the remission of guilt.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing prevents one from receiving the Eucharist but guilt. But a person who is contrite should not approach the Eucharist before confession. Therefore, he has not yet obtained the remission of guilt.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Psalm 51(50):17: the sacrifice to God is a contrite spirit, the Gloss says, contrition of the heart is the sacrifice in which sins are absolved.
Furthermore (2), virtue and vice are corrupted and generated by the same causes, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b7.) But sin is committed by the heart’s disordered love. Therefore, by the sorrow caused by the ordered love of charity, the sin is absolved; and this is how contrition blots out sin.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that contrition cannot completely take away the liability to punishment. (Parallels: SCG III, ch. 158; SCG IV, ch. 72; Super Heb. 6, lec. 1.) For satisfaction and confession are ordered to freeing one from the liability to punishment. But no one has such perfect contrition that he does not need to confess and make satisfaction. Therefore, contrition is never so great that it takes away the whole liability to punishment.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in penance there should be a certain recompense of suffering for fault. But any fault is enacted by the members of the body. Therefore, since it is necessary for a due recompense of suffering that through those members by which someone sinned he also be tormented (Wis 11:17), it seems that such punishment for sin could never be discharged by contrition.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sorrow of contrition is finite. But for certain sins, namely, mortal ones, the punishment owed is infinite. Therefore, there can never be so much contrition that it wipes out the whole punishment.
On the contrary (1), God accepts the heart’s affections more than outward actions. But by outward acts a man is absolved of penalty and guilt. Therefore, it is the same with the affections of the heart that are contrition.
Furthermore (2), an example of this is found in the thief to whom it was said, today you shall be with me in paradise (Luke 23:43), because of a single act of penance. But whether all the liability is always taken away by contrition was discussed above in Distinction 14, Question 2, Article 1, Subquestion 2, where this was discussed in relation to penance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that small contrition does not suffice for wiping out large sins. For contrition is the medicine for sin. But physical medicine that heals minor physical maladies does not suffice for healing greater ones. Therefore, the least contrition does not suffice for wiping out the greatest sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it was said above that it is necessary to have greater contrition for greater sins. But contrition does not wipe out sins unless it exists as is necessary. Therefore, the least contrition does not wipe out all sins.
On the contrary, any sanctifying grace at all wipes out all mortal fault, because it cannot exist together with it. But any contrition at all is informed by sanctifying grace. Therefore, no matter how small it is, it wipes out all guilt.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that contrition can be considered in two ways, either as it is part of a sacrament, or as it is an act of a virtue; and in either way it is a cause of the remission of sin, but differently in each. For as a part of the sacrament, first it works toward the remission of sins instrumentally, as was seen in the other sacraments in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 1. But as an act of virtue, it is like a material cause for the remission of sin, because it is like the necessary disposition for justification, as was said above. Now a disposition is reducible to a material cause, if it is taken as a disposition that disposes the matter to receiving; but it is different with the disposition of an agent to acting, because that is reducible to the genus of efficient cause.
Reply Obj. 1: God alone is the efficient principal cause of the remission of sin; but there can also be a dispositive cause from us. And it is similar with a sacramental cause: for the sacraments’ forms are the words uttered by us, which have the instrumental power of bringing down grace, by which sins are remitted.
Reply Obj. 2: The remission of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace in one way, and in another way it follows: and according as it follows, the act elicited by virtue can be a kind of cause of the remission of guilt.
Reply Obj. 3: The administering of the Eucharist pertains to the Church’s ministers; and thus someone should not approach the Eucharist before the remission of sins through the Church’s ministers, although the guilt is remitted with respect to God.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the intensity of contrition can be considered in two ways. In one way, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure; and thus it happens for charity to be so intense in the act that contrition following from it will merit not only the removal of guilt, but also the absolution from all punishment. In the other way, on the part of the sensible sorrow that the will excites in contrition; and since that is also a kind of punishment, it can be intensified so much that it suffices for the wiping out of penalty and guilt.
Reply Obj. 1: Someone cannot be sure that his contrition is sufficient to wipe out punishment and guilt, and this is why he is bound to confess and make satisfaction; especially because contrition would not be true unless it had the purpose of confessing attached to it, which purpose should also be carried out because of the precept regarding confession.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as inner joy overflows even to the outer parts of the body, so also is inner sorrow drawn off to the outer members; and this is why it says, a downcast spirit dries up the bones (Prov 17:22).
Reply Obj. 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in intensity, as also the punishment due to mortal sin is finite, nevertheless it has an infinite power from the charity by which it is informed; and in accord with this it can avail to the expunging of guilt and punishment.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that contrition, as has often been said, holds two kinds of sorrow. One, which is the displeasure with sin committed, belongs to the reason; and this can be so small that it would not suffice for the nature of contrition, as if sin displeased someone less than separation from the end should displease one, just as also love can be so tepid that it is not enough for the nature of charity. A person has the other kind of sorrow in his senses; and the smallness of this does not hinder the nature of contrition; for it is not essentially related to contrition, but joined to it almost like an accident; and again it is not in our power. Therefore, it should be said thus that no matter how small the sorrow is, as long as it is enough for the nature of contrition, it wipes away every fault.
Reply Obj. 1: Spiritual medicines have infinite efficacy from the infinite power that works in them; and so the medicine that is enough for healing a small sin is also enough for healing a large one; as is evident from baptism, by which both great and small sins are absolved. And it is similar with contrition, as long as it attains the nature of contrition.
Reply Obj. 2: This follows of necessity, that one person sorrows more for a great sin than for a small one, according as it is more opposed to the love that causes the sorrow. But even so, if another person had as much sorrow for a greater sin as this person has for a smaller one, it would be enough for the remission of guilt.
Question 3
On confession
Next confession should be asked about. And concerning this, five questions arise:
first, the necessity of confession;
- second, what confession is;
- third, to whom should it be made;
- fourth, how it should be;
- fifth, the effect of confession.
- Article 1
The necessity of confession
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 69, a. 1, ad 2; SCG IV, ch. 72.) It seems that confession is not necessary to salvation. For the sacrament of penance was ordained on account of the remission of guilt. But guilt is sufficiently forgiven by the infusion of grace. Therefore, confession is not necessary for doing penance for sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, some people are read to have been forgiven without having confessed, as is seen in the case of Peter, and Mary Magdalene, and also Paul. But the grace forgiving sin is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore, it is not now necessary to salvation for a man to confess his sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sin that was contracted from another should have its medicine from another. Therefore, actual sin, which someone has committed by his own action, should have medicine from himself alone. But penance is ordained against this kind of sin. Therefore, confession is not necessary to repentance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, confession is required in a trial, so that the punishment may be inflicted according to the amount of fault. But a person can inflict more punishment on himself than may be inflicted on him by another. Therefore, it seems that confession is not necessary to salvation.
On the contrary (1), in his book On the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius says: if you expect medicine, you must lay bare the disease. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy (CCSL 94), Bk. 1, prose 4: “si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet uulnus detegas.”) But it is necessary to salvation that a person receive medicine for his sins. Therefore, it is also necessary to salvation that he lay bare the disease by confession.
Furthermore (2), in the secular courts the judge is not the same as the accused. But the spiritual court is more orderly than the secular. Therefore, the sinner, who is the accused, ought not to be his own judge, but must be judged by another; and so he must confess to him.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it belongs to natural law. (Parallel: below, a. 2, qa. 2, ad 1.) For Adam and Cain were not bound to anything but the law of nature. But they were reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore, the confession of sin is of natural law.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, those precepts that remain from the old law in the new law are of natural law. But confession was in the old law; which is why it says, tell, if you have anything to justify yourself (Isa 43:26). Therefore, it belongs to natural law.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Job was not subject to anything but natural law. But he confessed his sins, as is clear from his saying about himself, if as a man I have hid my sin (Job 31:33). Therefore, it is of natural law.
On the contrary (1), Isidore says that natural law is the same among all peoples. (Cf. Isidore, Etymologies (OCT, ed. Lindsay), Bk. 5, ch. 4: “Ius naturale [est] commune omnium nationum.”) But confession is not done the same among all. Therefore, it is not of natural law.
Furthermore (2), confession is done to someone who has the keys. But the Church’s keys do not derive from the institution of natural law. Therefore, neither does confession.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not all people are bound to confession. (Parallels: above, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 3; below, a. 3, qa. 5, ad 3; Super Matt. 3.) For, as Jerome says, penance is the second plank after the shipwreck. (Jerome, Epistle 130, n. 9 (PL 22:1115).) But some people did not suffer the shipwreck after baptism. Therefore, penance does not apply to them; and so neither does confession, which is a part of penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in any court, confession should be made to a judge. But there are some people who have no man as judge over them. Therefore, they are not bound to confession.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, there are some people who have no sins but venial ones. But a person is not bound to confess these. Therefore, not everyone is bound to confession.
On the contrary (1), confession is divided against satisfaction and contrition. But all people are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore, all are bound to confession.
Furthermore (2), this is evident from the Decretals, On Penances and Remissions, where it says that all people of both sexes who have reached years of discretion must confess their sins.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one is bound to confess immediately. (Parallel: Quodl. I, q. 6, a. 2.) For Hugh of St. Victor says: if necessity is not what it is claimed to be, the contempt is not excused. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 2, pt. 14, ch. 8 (PL 176:567).) But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore, everyone is bound to confess immediately when he can.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everyone is bound to avoid spiritual disease more than physical disease. But when someone physically infirm delays seeking a doctor, it is not without detriment to his health. Therefore, it seems that it cannot be without detriment to salvation that someone does not confess his sin immediately to a priest who is available.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is due without a deadline is due immediately. But there is no deadline for a man’s confesion to God. Therefore, he is bound to do so immediately.
On the contrary (1), in the Decretals (The same passage referred to immediately above.) a specific time is given for confession and the reception of the Eucharist together. But someone does not sin if he does not receive the Eucharist before the time determined by law. Therefore, he does not sin if he does not confess before that time.
Furthermore (2), whoever omits what he is bound to do by precept sins mortally. Therefore, if someone does not immediately confess when he has access to a priest, if he is bound to confess immediately, he would sin mortally; and for the same reason at another time, and so on; and this way a person would incur many mortal sins for one delayed penance, which seems unfitting.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that certain people could be dispensed from confessing to a man. (Parallels: below, d. 21, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2; SCG IV, ch. 72; Quodl. I, q. 6, a. 1.) For the precepts that are from positive law are subject to the dispensations of the Church’s prelates. But confession is one of these, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, someone can be dispensed from having to confess.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what was instituted by man can also receive a dispensation from a man. But confession is not read to have been instituted by God, but by man: confess your sins to one another (Jas 5:16). But the Pope has the power to give dispensations in matters that were instituted by the apostles, as is seen in the case of those remarried. Therefore, he can dispense someone from confessing.
On the contrary, penance, which confession is a part of, is a sacrament of necessity, like baptism. Therefore, since no one can give a dispensation from baptism, neither can anyone be dispensed from confession.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the Passion of Christ, without whose power neither actual nor original sin is forgiven, works in us through the reception of the sacraments, which have efficacy from it. And so for the remission of both actual and original fault, a sacrament of the Church is required, whether actually received or at least in desire, when an emergency, not contempt, excludes the sacrament. And consequently those sacraments that are ordered against a fault that cannot coexist with salvation are necessary to salvation. And so just as baptism, in which original sin is wiped away, is necessary to salvation, so also is the sacrament of penance. Now just as by the fact that someone seeks baptism, he subjects himself to the ministers of the Church, to whom the administering of the sacraments belongs; so also by the fact that someone confesses his sins, he subjects himself to the Church’s minister, so that he may obtain the forgiveness administered by him through the sacrament of penance. And the minister cannot apply a fitting remedy unless he knows the other’s sins, which happens by the sinner’s confession. And therefore confession is necessary to salvation for someone who falls into actual mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Infused grace is enough for the remission of guilt: but after guilt is forgiven the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. But for the infusion of grace to be obtained, sacraments of grace are ordained, before the reception of which, either actually or in intention, a person cannot obtain grace, as is seen in the case of baptism. And it is similar with confession. And furthermore, by confessing, shame, and the power of the keys, to which the one confessing subjects himself, and by the satisfaction enjoined which the priest modifies according to the character of the crimes made known to him in confession, he expiates the temporal punishment. But nevertheless the fact that confession works to the remission of punishment is not what makes it necessary to salvation, for that punishment is temporal to which a person remains bound after the forgiveness of guilt. And so without being expiated in the present life there would be a path to salvation. But it is necessary to salvation because it works to the remission of guilt in the way described.
Reply Obj. 2: Even if we do not read about these people confessing, it could have happened nevertheless. For many things happened that are not written. (See John 21:25.) And furthermore, Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments. And so without those things that pertain to a sacrament, he can confer the reality of the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 3: The sin that was contracted from another, namely, original sin, can have its remedy entirely from without, as is seen among children. But actual sin, which everyone commits from himself, cannot be expiated except by some cooperation from the person who sinned. But it is still not enough to expiate sin by himself, as it was enough to commit the sin: because sin is finite on the part of what is turned to, which is the part the sinner brings on himself. But on the side of the turning away, it possesses an infinity, and this is the side on which the remission of sin must begin; for what is last in generation is first in resolution, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 3, 1112b23–24.) And therefore it is necessary that actual sin also have its medicine from another.
Reply Obj. 4: Satisfaction would not be enough for expiating the punishment for sin from the amount of punishment that is imposed in satisfaction, but it is enough as it is a part of the sacrament, having sacramental power. And so it is necessary that it be imposed by the administrators of the sacrament; and thus confession is necessary.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that as was said in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 2, Subquestion 3, sacraments are a kind of protestation of faith. And so it is necessary that they be proportionate to the faith. Now faith is above the knowledge of natural reason; and so sacraments too are above the dictates of natural reason. And because natural law is not born of opinion, but instilled by a certain innate force, as Cicero says, (Cicero, de Inuentione, Bk. 2, ch. 22, par. 65 (Teubner, ed. Streubel).) this is why sacraments are not from natural law, but divine law, which is above nature. And sometimes the word ‘natural’ is according as whater is placed in a thing by its Creator is natural to it. Nevertheless, those things are properly said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature, but those things are said to be above nature which God reserves to himself without the ministry of nature, whether in the working of miracles or in the revelations of mysteries, or in the institutions of the sacraments; and so confession, which has a sacramental necessity, is not of natural law but divine.
Reply Obj. 1: Adam was blamed for not admitting his sin before God. For the confession which is made to God by the recognition of sin is of natural law. But now we are speaking of the confession that is made to a man. Or it could be said that to confess sin in a trial is of natural law, namely, when someone brought into court is interrogated by the judge; for then he must not lie by excusing or denying his sin; which is what Adam and Cain are blamed for. But the confession that is made to a man of one’s own will for obtaining the remission of sins from God is not of natural law.
Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of natural law remain in the same way under the law of Moses and the new law. But confession, although it did exist in some way under the law of Moses, nevertheless was not the same as under the new law, nor as it was under the law of nature. For under the law of nature the inner recognition of sin before God was enough; but in the law of Moses one had to admit one’s sin by some outward sign, as by the offering of a sacrifice for sin, by which it could also be made known to men that one had sinned. But it was not necessary to expose the specific sin one had committed, or the circumstances of the sin, as is necessary in the new law.
Reply Obj. 3: Job is speaking about the concealment of sin that an arrested person makes in court by denying or excusing his sin, as is found in the Gloss at the same place.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that we are obliged to confess from two sides. One, from divine law, by the fact that this is medicine; and according to this, not everyone is bound to confess, but only those who incur a mortal sin after baptism. In the other way, by the precept of positive law, and that is how all are bound, by that institution of the Church enacted in general council under Innocent III: both so that everyone would recognize himself as a sinner, for all have sinned and need God’s grace (Rom 3:25); and so that all might approach the Eucharist with greater reverence; and so that the governors of the churches would be aware of those under them, lest a wolf should hide in the flock.
Reply Obj. 1: Although in this mortal life a person can avoid the shipwreck after baptism, which is by mortal sin, he still cannot avoid venial sin, by which he is disposed to the shipwreck, and against which penance is also ordered. And penance still has a place even among those who do not sin mortally, and consequently, so does confession.
Reply Obj. 2: There is no one who does not have Christ as his judge, to whom he should confess through his deputy. And even if the priest is lower than him, inasmuch as he is a prelate, nevertheless as he is a sinner, the priest is his superior and Christ’s minister.
Reply Obj. 3: A person is not bound to confess venial sins by the force of the sacrament but by the Church’s institution, when he does not have other sins to confess. Or it could be said, according to some people, that the decree mentioned does not oblige any but those who have mortal sins; which is clear from the fact that it says that all sins must be confessed, which cannot be understood to refer to venial sins, because no one can confess all of them. And accordingly, the person who does not have mortal sins is not bound to confess venial ones, but it is enough for the precept of the Church that he present himself to a priest, so that he may show himself free in conscience from mortal sin; and this is considered as his confession.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that since the purpose of confessing is attached to contrition, a person is bound to this purpose when he is bound to contrition; namely, when sins occur to his memory, particularly when he finds himself in danger of death or in some crisis, in which without the remission of sin he would necessarily incur a sin, as when he is bound to celebrate Mass but has no access to a priest, at least he is bound to have contrition, and to have the purpose of confessing.
But there are two ways that a person is actually obliged to go to confession. One is incidental, namely, when he is bound to something that he cannot do without sin unless he has confessed; for then he is bound to confess, for example, if he must receive the Eucharist, which no one should approach after mortal sin unless he has confessed, if he has had access to a priest, and the necessity is not pressing. And from this arises the Church’s obligation that all confess at least once per year, for it has decreed that once a year, namely, at Eastertide, all receive sacred Communion; and so all are bound to confess before that time.
In the other way, a person is obliged to go to confession per se; and in this way there seems to be the same argument about delaying confession as baptism: for both are sacraments of necessity. Now a person is not bound to receive baptism immediately when he has the intention of baptism, so that he would sin mortally unless he were baptized immediately; nor is there any time determined beyond which one would incur mortal sin if baptism were deferred. But it can happen that delaying baptism is or is not a mortal sin; and this depends on the cause of the delay. For as the Philosopher says in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 8, ch. 1, 251a20ff.) the will does not delay to do the work it wills, except for some reasonable cause. And so if the cause of delaying baptism had mortal sin joined to it, for example, if because of contempt, or something like that, one delayed baptism, the delay would be a mortal sin; otherwise, it would not. And so it seems to be the same thing with confession, which is not more necessary than baptism.
And so a person is bound to fulfill those things that are necessary to salvation in this life; and so if the danger of death threatened, even speaking per se, a person would be obliged to go to confession right then, or to receive baptism. And this is also why James (See James 5:14–16.) proclaimed the precept about going to confession and receiving the last rites at the same time. And so the opinion of those who say that a man is not bound to confess immediately seems probable; although it is dangerous to delay.
But others say that someone who is contrite is bound to confess immediately once he has the due opportunity according to right reason. Nor is it a problem if the decree pre-assigns a limit, so that a person confesses once per year; for the Church does not favor delay, but forbids negligence in greater delay. And so by that decree a person is not excused from guilt in delaying as to the forum of his conscience, but he is excused from punishment as to the forum of the Church, so that he would not be deprived of proper burial rites if he were prevented by death before that time. But this seems too harsh: for affirmative precepts do not oblige immediately, but at the determined time, not of course because then they can be fulfilled conveniently (for then if someone did not give alms from his surplus whenever a poor man came before him, he would sin mortally, which is false), but because the time confers an urgent necessity. And so it is not necessary that, if one does not immediately confess when offered the opportunity, even if a greater opportunity were not to be expected, he would sin mortally; but when the need for confession arises from the moment in time. Nor is this from the Church’s lenience, that one is not bound right away, but from the nature of an affirmative precept; and so before the Church’s statute it was also owed less.
But some people say that those in the world are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them, but religious are bound to immediately, because the whole year is the time of penance for them. But this is nothing: for religious are not bound to different things than other people are bound to, except those things that they have obliged themselves to by their vows.
Reply Obj. 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary to physical health that one seek a doctor right away, except when the need for care is pressing; and it is the same with a spiritual illness.
Reply Obj. 3: Keeping another’s belongings against the owner’s will is contrary to a negative precept, which obliges always and at all times; and that is why one is bound to return it right away. But it is different with the fulfillment of an affirmative precept which always obliges, but not at all times. And so one is not bound to fulfill it right away.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that the Church’s ministers are instituted in a Church divinely founded; and therefore the institution of the Church is presupposed to the activity of the Church’s ministers, just as the work of nature presupposes the work of creation. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, this is why it does not pertain to the Church’s ministers either to decree new articles of the faith or to remove the ones decreed, or to institute new sacraments, or to remove those instituted. But this belongs to the power of excellence, which is due to Christ alone, who is the Church’s foundation. And so, as the Pope cannot give a dispensation such that anyone may be saved without baptism, so neither without confession, according as one is obliged by the force of the sacrament. But he can give a dispensation from confession as one is obliged by the Church’s precept, so that someone may defer his confession longer than the Church has established.
Reply Obj. 1: The precepts of divine law do not oblige less than the precepts of natural law; and so just as a dispensation cannot be given from natural law, so neither can it be given from positive divine law.
Reply Obj. 2: The precept of confession is not instituted purely by man, although it was promulgated by James. But it had its institution from God, although we do not read about the explicit institution of it. Nevertheless, a certain prefiguration of it is found also in the fact that those who were prepared by John’s baptism for the grace of Christ confessed their sins to John. (See Matthew 3:6.) And also in the fact that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests; (See Luke 17:14.) although they were not priests of the New Testament, nevertheless the priesthood of the New Testament was signified in them.
Article 2
What confession is
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that Augustine defines confession inappropriately when he says, confession is that through which a hidden disease is opened to the hope of forgiveness. (This appears to be a new creation and not the words of Augustine verbatim; for similar ideas, see Exposition of the Psalms (CCSL 39), Ps. 66, par. 7.) For the disease that confession is ordered against is sin. But sin is sometimes open. Therefore, he should not have said it was a hidden disease for which confession is the medicine.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the beginning of penance is fear, as was said in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 2. But confession is a part of penance. Therefore, he should not have included hope as the cause of confession, but rather fear.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is placed under a seal is not opened, but rather it is closed. But the sins that someone confesses are placed under the seal of the confessional. Therefore, sin is not opened in confession, but rather closed.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, some other definitions are found to be different from this one. For Gregory says that confession is the detestation of sin and the breaking open of the wound. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospel, Bk. 2, homily 40, par. 2: “Quid est ergo peccatorum confessio, nisi quaedam uulnerum ruptio?” (CCSL 141:394).) But some people say that confession is the legitimate declaration of sins before a priest. But others say thus: confession is the sacramental accusation of a wrongdoer out of shame, and making satisfaction through the Church’s keys, obligating one to complete the penance imposed. Therefore, it seems that the definition assigned above does not contain all the things that are contained in these, and so it is insufficient.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that confession is not the act of a virtue. For every act of a virtue is from natural law, for we are adapted to virtues by nature, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103a24–25.) But confession is not from natural law. Therefore, it is not an act of a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, an act of virtue has more to do with the innocent than with someone who has sinned. But the confession of sin that we are speaking of cannot apply to the innocent. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the grace that is in the sacraments differs in a certain way from the grace that is in the virtues and gifts, as was said in Distinction 1. But confession is a part of a sacrament. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue.
On the contrary, precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession falls under precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue. Furthermore, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for it opens heaven, as the Master says in the text. Therefore, it seems that it is an act of virtue.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to that virtue which is its cause. But the cause of confession is the hope of forgiveness, as appears from the definition cited. Therefore, it seems that this is an act of hope, not of penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, shame is a part of temperance, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33. But confession works from shamefacedness, as appears in the definition designated above. Therefore, it is an act of temperance, not penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, an act of penance depends on divine mercy. But confession depends more on wisdom because of truth, which must exist in it. Therefore, it is not an act of penance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the article about judgment moves one to penance because of fear, which is the origin of penance. But the article about life eternal moves one to confession because of the hope of forgiveness. Therefore, it is not an act of penance.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, it pertains to the virtue of truth to show someone himself such as he is. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7, 1127a23–25.) But this is what a person confessing does. Therefore, it is an act of the virtue that is called truth, and not of penance.
On the contrary, penance is ordered to the destruction of sins. But confession is ordered to the same thing. Therefore, it is an act of penance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that in the act of confession many things occur to be considered. First, the very substance of the act, or its genus, which is a kind of manifestation. Second, what it is about, namely, sin. Third, to whom it is made, namely, a priest. Fourth, its cause, namely, hope of forgiveness. Fifth, its effect, namely, absolution on the part of the punishment, and obligation to another part to be discharged. Therefore, in the first definition of Augustine both the substance of the act is touched upon, in opening, and what confession is about when he says, a hidden disease, and the cause, in the hope of forgiveness; and in the other definitions some of these five designated things are touched upon as is evident to anyone who looks closely.
Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be said that although sometimes a priest knows of someone’s sin as a man, nevertheless he does not know it as Christ’s vicar; just as also a judge sometimes knows something as a man that he does not know as a judge; and as to this it is opened up by confession. Or it could be said that although an outward act of sin is in the open, an interior act which is nevertheless more important is concealed; and so it must be opened by confession.
Reply Obj. 2: Confession presupposes charity, because someone confesses when alive, as is said in the text. But contrition is what charity is given in; while servile fear, which is without hope, goes before charity. But someone who has charity is more moved by hope than by fear; and so the cause of confession is set down as hope rather than fear.
Reply Obj. 3: Sin is opened to a priest in confession, and closed to all others by the seal of the confessional.
Reply Obj. 4: It is not necessary that in every definition everything is referred to that concurs in the thing defined. And thus some definitions or assignations are found to be given according to one cause, some according to another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that for something to be called an act of virtue, as has been said before, it is enough that it imply in its own account a certain condition that pertains to virtue. Now, although confession does not denote all the things that are required for virtue, nevertheless it conveys by its very name a revealing of something that someone holds in his conscience, for in this way the mouth and heart come together in one. For if someone utters with his mouth something that he does not hold in his heart, it is not called a confession but a deception. Now this condition pertains to virtue, that someone confess with his mouth what he holds in his heart; and so confession is good by its genus, and it is an act of virtue; but nevertheless it can be done badly, unless it is invested with the other due circumstances.
Reply Obj. 1: Natural reason in general inclines toward confessing the truth in the right way, where it is fitting and to whom it is fitting, and this is how confession belongs to natural law. But the determination of circumstances, when and how and what must be confessed, and to whom, is from the institution of divine law about confession, which is what we are speaking about. And so it is clear that natural law inclines to confession by means of divine law, by which circumstances are determined, as is also the case in all things that are of positive law.
Reply Obj. 2: Although an innocent person could have the habit of that virtue whose object is sin committed, nevertheless he does not have the act while his innocence endures, as was said above about repentance. And so also the confession of sins, which is what we are discussing, does not apply to the innocent, although it is an act of a virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the grace of the sacraments and the grace of the virtues are two different things, nevertheless, they are not contrary, but distinct. And so it is not unfitting that the same thing be an act of virtue according as it proceeds from a free will informed by grace, and a sacrament or part of a sacrament according as it is medicine ordained as a remedy for sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in the virtues this is to be considered, that when a special account of good and difficult is added above the object of the virtue, it requires a special virtue, as great expenses pertains to magnificence, although moderate expenses and donations generally pertain to liberality, as is clear in the Ethics 2 and 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 7, 1107b8–9; Bk. 4, ch. 1, 1120a10.) And it is similar with the confessing of truth, which, although it pertains to the virtue of truth in an absolute sense, nevertheless according as a certain account of good is added, begins to pertain to another virtue. And so the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7, 1127a33.) that the confession that is made in court does not pertain to the virtue of truth, but rather to justice. And likewise the confession of God’s blessings in divine praise does not pertain to the virtue of truth, but to the virtue of worship; and so also the confession of sins for obtaining their remission is not elicited by the virtue of truth, as some people say, but by the virtue of penance; but it can be commanded by many virtues, according as the act of confessing can be derived from the end of many virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Hope is the cause of confession not as eliciting it, but as commanding it.
Reply Obj. 2: Shamefacedness is included in that definition not as a cause of confession, since it is rather its nature to impede the act of confession, but as a concurrent cause for freeing from punishment, inasmuch as that shamefacedness is a certain punishment. And in this way the Church’s power of the keys is also a concurrent cause of confession working toward this.
Reply Obj. 3: According to a certain correspondence, the parts of penance can correspond to three attributes of the Persons, so that contrition corresponds to mercy or goodness, because of the sorrow for evil; confession corresponds to wisdom because of the manifestation of the truth; satisfaction corresponds to power because of the work of making satisfaction. And since contrition is the first part of penance bestowing efficacy on the other parts, therefore in the same way the whole of penance is judged according to its contrition.
Reply Obj. 4: Since confession proceeds more from hope than from fear, as has been said, this is why it depends more on the article of eternal life, which has to do with hope, than the article of judgment, which has to do with fear; although penance stands the other way around by reason of contrition.
The solution to the fifth is clear from what has been said.
Article 3
To whom one should confess
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. It seems that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not obliged to go to confession except by divine institution. But divine institution proposes to us confess your sins to one another (Jas 5:16), where no mention is made of a priest. Therefore, it is not necessary to confess to a priest.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, penance is a sacrament of necessity, like baptism. But in baptism the minister is any human being, because it is a sacrament of necessity. Therefore, it is the same in penance. But confession is to be made to a minister of the Church. Therefore, it suffices to confess to anyone.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, confession is necessary for a manner of satisfaction to be assigned to the penitent. But sometimes someone who is not a priest could more wisely give the penitent a manner of satisfaction than many priests. Therefore, it is not necessary that confession should be made to a priest.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, confession in the Church is ordered to rectors knowing the face of their own flocks (Prov 27:23). But sometimes a rector, or a prelate, is not a priest. Therefore, confession is not always to be made to a priest.
On the contrary (1), the absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which confession is made, only pertains to priests, to whom the power of the keys was committed. Therefore, confession should be made to a priest.
Furthermore (2), confession is prefigured in the raising of the dead Lazarus. But the Lord commanded his disciples alone to unbind Lazarus, as is seen in John 11:44. Therefore, confession is to be made to priests.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in no case is it permitted to confess to anyone other than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as the definition listed above has it. But administering a sacrament pertains only to that person who is the minister of the sacrament. Therefore, since the minister of the sacrament of penance is a priest, it seems that a confession may be made to no others.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, confession in any judgment is directed to sentencing. But in the secular court a sentence that is not handed down by the judge is null; and so confession must be made to no one but the judge. But there is no judge in the forum of conscience but the priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore, confession is to be made to no other.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a lay person baptizes without necessity, it should not be repeated by a priest. But if someone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to confess again to a priest, if he survives the emergency. Therefore, the confession of a priest cannot be made to a lay person in a case of necessity.
On the contrary, is what is determined in the text.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that outside the case of necessity someone who is not a priest cannot hear a confession of venial sins. For a certain sacrament is committed to be administered by a lay person by reason of necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary to salvation, as was said above. Therefore, it is not committed to a lay person.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the last rites are ordered against venial sins, just like penance. But that cannot be given by a lay person, as is clear from James 5:14. Therefore, neither can a confession of venial sins be made to one.
On the contrary, is what Bede says in the text.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not necessary that a man confess to his own priest. (Parallel: SCG IV, ch. 72.) For Gregory says, it was established for us by the apostolic government and office of piety that it is permitted to monks who are priests maintaining the figure of the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve sins. (Cf. Gratian’s Decretals, Pt. 2, cause 16, q. 1, can. 24 (PL 187:998).) But monks are not anyone’s own priests, since they do not have the care of souls. Therefore, since confession is done for the sake of absolution, it suffices that it be done to any priest.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a priest is the minister of this sacrament, so also of the Eucharist. But any priest can consecrate. Therefore, any priest can administer the sacrament of penance. Therefore, it is not necessary that it be done with one’s own priest.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what we are specifically bound to do does not fall within our choice. But the priest to whom we must confess does not lie within our choice, as is clear from Augustine in the text, for it says, whoever wishes to confess his sins so that he will find grace, let him seek a priest who knows how to bind and loose. (This is a paraphrase of Lombard’s editorial comments, which then lead into lengthy quotations from Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance.) Therefore, it seems that it is not necessary that a person confess to his own priest.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, there are some people, like prelates, who do not seem to have their own priests, since they do not have superiors. But they are bound to go to confession. Therefore, a person is not always bound to go to his own priest.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is instituted for the sake of charity does not war against charity, as Bernard says. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 2, par. 5: “Sicut e regione iniquum procul dubio foret, si statuta pro sola caritate, contra caritatem tenerentur” (Bernardi opera, ed. Leclerq, 3:257).) But confession, which was instituted for charity, would war against charity if a man were obliged to confess to one priest alone; for example, if a sinner knew his priest to be a heretic, or a provoker of evil, or fragile, someone who might be prone to a sin that someone confessed to him, or if he was probably suspected of revealing confessions, or if the sin that someone had to confess had been committed against him. Therefore, it seems that it is not always necessary to confess to one’s own priest.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, in what is necessary to salvation men are not to be restrained, nor hindered from the path of salvation. But it seems to be a major restraint if it is necessary to confess to one man: and by this many can be held back from confessing, either by fear or shame, or something like it. Therefore, since confession is necessary to salvation, people should not be constrained, as it seems, to confess to their own priests.
On the contrary (1), Innocent’s decree established that all people of either sex should confess once a year to their own priests.
Furthermore (2), just as a bishop is related to his diocese, so a priest is to his parish. But it is not permitted for one bishop to exercise his episcopal office in the diocese of another bishop, according to the statutes of canon law. (Gratian, Decretals, Pt. 2, cause 9, q. 2, c. 3, “Nullus primas” (PL 187:789).) Therefore, neither is it permitted for one priest to hear confessions of another’s parishioners.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a person cannot confess to anyone but his own priest, even by a privilege or the command of his superior. (Parallels: Contra impugn. ch. 4; Quodl. XII, q. 19.) For no privilege can be granted to the detriment of another person. But this is to the detriment of the other priest, if someone else hears the confessions of those entrusted to him. Therefore, this cannot be obtained by privilege or permission or the command of one’s superior.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, something that impedes a divine command cannot be granted by a man’s command or privilege. But it is a divine command to rectors of the churches that they diligently come to know the face of their sheep (Prov 27:23), which would be prevented if someone else heard the confession of their own. Therefore, this cannot be ordained by any man’s privilege or command.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the person who hears the confession of another is his proper judge; otherwise he could not bind and loose him. But one man cannot have many proper judges or priests of his own, for then he would be bound to obey many men, which would be impossible if contrary things were commanded, or things that are not possible together. Therefore, a person cannot confess to someone other than his own priest, even by his superior’s permission.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, someone does injury to the sacrament if he repeats the sacrament over the same material, or at least he does something fruitless. But someone who has confessed to another priest is bound to confess again to his own priest, if he asks, for he is not absolved from the obedience by which he is bound to him for this. Therefore, he cannot licitly confess to someone other than his own priest.
On the contrary (1), those things that belong to holy orders can be entrusted to someone else having holy orders by anyone who can do those things. But a superior or a bishop can hear the confession of someone who is from the parish of some priest, for sometimes he might reserve certain things to himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore, he can also entrust to some priest to hear the confessions of another’s flock.
Furthermore (2), whatever the lower ranking can do, the higher ranking can do. But that priest can give permission to his parishioner to confess to another. Therefore, much more can his superior.
Furthermore (3), any power that the priest has for his people, he has from the bishop. But it is by that power that he can hear confessions. Therefore, by the same reasoning, so can another to whom the bishop grants this power.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the grace that is given in the sacraments descends to the members from the head; and so he alone is the minister of the sacraments, in which grace is given, who has the ministry over the true body of Christ. And this belongs to the priest alone, who can consecrate the Eucharist. And thus, since grace is conferred in the sacrament of penance, only a priest is the minister of this sacrament. And so sacramental confession, which should be made to a minister of the Church, must be made to him alone.
Reply Obj. 1: James is speaking from the presupposition of divine institution. And since divine institution preceded confessions being made to priests by the fact that he gave the power of forgiving sins to the apostles, as is clear from John 20:22–23, this is why James is to be understood as instructing confession to be made to priests.
Reply Obj. 2: Baptism is more a sacrament of necessity than the sacrament of penance, both as to confession and absolution. For sometimes baptism could not be omitted without risking eternal salvation, as is seen in children, who do not yet have the use of reason. But it is not so with confession and absolution, which only pertain to adults, in whom contrition with the intention of confessing and the desire for absolution suffices for freeing them from eternal death. And therefore it is not the same with baptism as with confession.
Reply Obj. 3: As was said in Distinction 15, Question 1, Article 2, the amount of suffering is not the only important thing in satisfaction, but also its power as a part of the sacrament; and so it requires a minister of the sacraments, although the amount of the penalty can also be fixed by another than a priest.
Reply Obj. 4: To know the face of one’s sheep is necessary for two reasons. First, so that they may be ordered together with the flock of Christ; and in this way to know the face of one’s flock pertains to pastoral care and concern, which is sometimes the responsibility of those who are not priests. Second, so that they may provide an appropriate medicine of salvation, and thus knowing the face of the sheep pertains to the one who offers the medicine of salvation, namely, the sacrament of the Eucharist and the others, that is, the priest. And this is the kind of knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordered toward.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that just as baptism is a sacrament of necessity, so is penance. But baptism, which is a sacrament of necessity, has two ministers: one whose responsibility it is to baptize by his office, namely, the priest; and another to whom the administering of baptism is entrusted by reason of necessity. And so also the minister of penance, to whom confession is to be made by his office, is the priest; but in necessity, a lay person may also take the place of a priest, so that a confession may be made to him.
Reply Obj. 1: In the sacrament of penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, namely, the absolution and imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the one who receives the sacrament, which is also essential to the sacrament, namely, contrition and confession. Now, satisfaction takes its origin from the minister inasmuch as he imposes it, and from the penitent inasmuch as he fulfills it; and for the fullness of the sacrament both must concur when it is possible. But when there is an imminent need, the penitent should do what is from his part, namely, have contrition, and confess to whomever he can. Even though he cannot complete the sacrament, such that he would do what is the priest’s part, namely, absolution, still the Highest Priest will supply the lack of a priest. Nonetheless, confession made to a lay person out of desire for a priest is sacramental in a certain way, although it is not a perfect sacrament, because it is lacking what is on the part of the priest.
Reply Obj. 2: Although a lay person is not the judge in an absolute sense of someone who confesses to him, nevertheless by reason of necessity he makes a judgment over him, namely, according as the person confessing subjects himself to him for lack of a priest.
Reply Obj. 3: It is necessary that a man be reconciled through the sacraments not with God but also with the Church. But he cannot be reconciled with the Church unless the Church’s sanctification reaches him. Now in baptism the Church’s sanctification reaches a person by the element itself outwardly applied, which is sanctified by the word of life according to the Church’s form by anyone. And therefore from the fact that person has once been baptized by anyone, it is not necessary that he baptized again. But in penance the Church’s sanctification only reaches a person through a minister, for there is no physical element outwardly applied which confers invisible grace by its sanctification. And so, although that person who has confessed to a layman in a moment of need did obtain forgiveness from God because he fulfilled, as well as he could, the intention he had formed of confessing according to God’s mandate, nevertheless, he is still not reconciled to the Church, so that he should be admitted to the Church’s sacraments, unless he is first absolved by a priest; just as the person who is baptized in the spirit is not admitted to the Eucharist. And so it is necessary that he confess again to a priest, when he has access to one. And particularly because, as was said, the sacrament of penance was not completed, which is why it must be completed, so that he may obtain a fuller effect from the actual reception of the sacrament, and so that he may fulfill the mandate about receiving the sacrament of penance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that by venial sin a man is neither separated from God nor from the Church’s sacraments, and so he does not need a conferral of new grace for its forgiveness, nor does he need reconciliation to the Church. And because of this it is not necessary that anyone confess his venial sins to a priest: for a confession made to a lay person is a kind of sacramental, although it is not a complete sacrament, and it does proceed from charity; and it is the nature of sacramentals to remit venial sin by such things, like beating the breast and holy water.
Reply Obj. 1: And by this the solution to the first is clear; for venial sins do not need the reception of the sacrament for their dismissal, but any sacramental would suffice for that, like holy water or the like.
Reply Obj. 2: Last rites are not given directly against venial sin, nor is any sacrament, as was said above in Distinction 2, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 4.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the other sacraments do not consist in the recipient of the sacrament doing anything, but only receiving, as is seen in baptism and the others. But the act of the recipient is required for receiving the benefit of the sacrament in someone who is arbiter of his own will, by removing obstacles, namely, false pretenses. But in penance the act of the one receiving the sacrament is of the substance of the sacrament, in that contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are the acts of the penitent, are parts of penance. Now, since our acts have their principle in us, they cannot be administered to us from another except by command. And so it is necessary that the person who is established as minister of this sacrament be such that he can command something to be done. Now, someone does not have command over another unless he has jurisdiction over him; and so it belongs to this sacrament of necessity not only that the minister have holy orders, as in the other sacraments, but also that he have jurisdiction; and so just as someone who is not a priest cannot confer this sacrament, so neither can someone who does not have jurisdiction. And because of this a confession must be made not just to a priest, but to one’s own priest. For since a priest does not absolve except by binding someone to do something, the only one who can absolve is one who can bind someone to do something by his command.
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, for example, to whom care of a parish is committed. For some people were saying about them that by the fact that they were monks, they could not absolve and impose penances; which is false.
Reply Obj. 2: The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require command of any man, but it is different with this sacrament, as was said, and so the argument does not follow. And nevertheless it is not permitted to receive the Eucharist from someone other than one’s own priest, although it would be the true sacrament that is received from him.
Reply Obj. 3: The choice of a wise priest is not committed to us, as something to be done by our own will, but by permission of our superior; if perhaps our own priest were less suited to apply the healing remedy to sin.
Reply Obj. 4: Because it is the responsibility of prelates to administer the sacraments which only the pure should handle, for this reason it is granted to them by law that they can choose the proper confessors for themselves, who are their superiors in this; just as one doctor is cured by another, not as he is a doctor, but as he is a sick person.
Reply Obj. 5: In those cases in which the penitent has probable fear of danger to himself or the priest arising from a confession made to him, he should have recourse to the superior, or ask permission from him to confess to someone else. If he cannot have permission, the judgment is the same as of that person who does not have access to a priest; and so he should rather choose to confess to a lay person. Nor does anyone transgress the precept of the Church in this, for the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept. But this is charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim 1:5). Nor again is any injury done to the priest; since he deserves to lose his privilege who abuses the power granted to him. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 11, q. 3, ch. 63, “Privilegium.”)
Reply Obj. 6: In the fact that one must confess to one’s own priest, the path of salvation is not restricted, but a sufficient path to salvation is established. Now the priest would sin if he did not easily grant permission to confess to another, for many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to a certain priest. And thus those who are too anxious to know the consciences of those entrusted to them through confession throw many into the snare of damnation (1 Cor 7:35), and consequently, themselves as well.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that there are two ways a certain priest can be impeded from hearing someone’s confession. In one way, because of a lack of jurisdiction; in the other way because of an impediment to the exercise of his holy orders, like priests who are excommunicated, or demoted, etc. Now, anyone who has jurisdiction can entrust what belongs to his jurisdiction to another; and so if someone is impeded from hearing another’s confession by a lack of jurisdiction, it can be committed to him to hear confessions and give absolution by anyone having direct jurisdiction over those people, whether the priest himself, or the bishop, or the Pope. But if he cannot because of an impediment to the exercise of his holy orders, it can be granted to him to hear confessions by whoever can remove the impediment.
Reply Obj. 1: No detriment is done to someone unless an indult of jurisdiction granted in his favor is taken away from him. Now, all power is committed to any man not in his own favor, but for the benefit of the people and the honor of God. And so, if it seems to be expedient to promoting the salvation of the people and the honor of God that what belongs to someone’s jurisdiction be committed to others, injury is done to none of the prelate’s inferiors, except those who seek what is their own, not what belongs to Jesus Christ (Phil 2:21), and who govern the flock, not to feed them, but to be fed by them (Ezech 34:2, 8).
Reply Obj. 2: The rector of a church should be familiar with the face of his sheep in two ways. In one way by the concerned consideration of their outward behavior, in which he should keep watch over the flock committed to him; and in this knowledge it is not necessary that he trust what is before him, but he may investigate the certitude of the fact, as much as he can. The other way is by the revelation of confession, and as to this knowledge he cannot take greater certitude than that he trust what is submitted to him, because this is for the assistance of the conscience of the other. And so in the forum of the confessional a person is trusted to be both for himself and against himself, which is not the case in the forum of external judgment. And so it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the person telling him, having confessed to the other with the power to give absolution; and so it is clear that this knowledge of the sheep is not impeded by another person being granted the privilege of hearing their confessions.
Reply Obj. 3: It would be unfitting if two people were equally installed over the same people; but that two, of whom one is more principal than the other, should be constituted over the same people is not unfitting; and accordingly, the parish priest and bishop and Pope are directly over the same people, and anyone of them can commit to another the things that pertain to him for that jurisdiction. But if the superior, who is also more principal, should do this, there are two ways he can commit it. Either so that he establishes someone in his own stead, as the Pope and the bishop establish their own penitentiaries; and then this person is more principal than the lower prelate, as the Pope’s penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and a bishop’s penitentiary is higher than a parish priest, and the person confessing is bound to obey him more. In the other way, so that he establishes someone as the coadjutor of that priest, and since a coadjutor is directed to the person to whom he is given as a coadjutor, therefore the adjutant is less principal; and so the penitent is not bound to obey him as much as his own priest.
Reply Obj. 4: No one is bound to confess sins that he does not have; and so if someone had confessed to the bishop’s penitentiary, or to another person having a commission from the bishop, since sins were forgiven him both before God and before the Church, he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, no matter how much he asks. But because of the Church’s statute about making a confession to one’s own priest once a year, the same must be held as about the person who has only venial sin; for such a person should only confess venial sins, as some people say; or even declare himself free of mortal sin, and the priest is bound to believe him in the forum of conscience. But if he were bound to confess again nevertheless, his first confession would not have been in vain; for the more priests someone confesses to, the more punishment is remitted to him, both because of the shame of confession, which is counted as a suffering that makes satisfaction, and from the power of the keys. And so someone may confess so many times that he would be free of all punishment; nor does the repetition do injury to the sacrament, unless it is to someone in whom sanctification is applied either by the impression of a character, or by the matter of consecration, neither of which exists in penance. And so it is good that the person who hears confessions by the authority of the bishop encourages the one confessing to confess to his own priest; and if he does not wish to, he should be absolved nevertheless.
Article 4
Conditions for confession
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. It seems that confession cannot be unformed. For it says: confession perishes from the dead as if he does not exist (Sir 17:28). But someone who does not have charity, is dead, since it is the life of the soul. Therefore, without charity, confession cannot exist.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, confession is divided against contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction can never arise without charity. Therefore, neither can confession.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in confession it is necessary that the mouth agree with the heart, for the very name ‘confession’ requires it. But the person who still retains an affection for the sin that he confesses does not have a heart conformed to his mouth, for in his heart he holds on to the sin that he condemns with his mouth. Therefore, such a person does not confess.
On the contrary, everyone is bound to confess his mortal sins. But if someone who is actually in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess the same things any more, for since no one knows whether he has charity, no one would know if he had confessed. Therefore, it is not necessary to confession that it be formed by charity.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not necessary that confession be complete, namely, so that someone confess all his sins to one priest. (Parallels: de Duobus praecept. carit. 4; De sex artic. 6.) For embarrassment causes a diminishment of punishment. But the more priests one confesses to, the more embarrassment one suffers. Therefore, confession will be more fruitful if it is divided among several priests.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, confession is necessary in penance so that the penalty may be fixed for sin according to the judgment of the priest. But a sufficient penalty can be imposed by priests for different sins. Therefore, it is not necessary to confess all one’s sins to a single priest.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it can happen that after making a confession and doing satisfaction, someone remembers a mortal sin that did not come to mind when he confessed; and then he may not have access to his own priest, to whom he first confessed. Therefore, he could confess that sin alone to another priest; and in this way he would confess different sins to different priests.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, confession of sins should only be made to a priest for the sake of absolution. But sometimes the priest who hears the confession can absolve certain sins but not all. Therefore, at least in that case it is not necessary that the confession be complete.
On the contrary (1), hypocrisy is an impediment to penance, as was said in the preceding distinction. But to divide up a confession pertains to hypocrisy, as Augustine says. (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 15, n. 31 (PL 40:1125).) Therefore, confession should be complete.
Furthermore (2), confession is a part of penance. But penance should be complete, as the Master shows in Distinction 20. (Other manuscripts say d. 15, which is plausible, since both distinctions touch on the need for penance to be complete.) Therefore, so should confession.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone can confess through another, or by writing. (Parallel: Quodl. I, q. 6, a. 1.) For a confession is necessary so that through it the conscience of the penitent may be opened to the priest. But a person can also manifest his conscience to a priest through someone else, or by writing. Therefore, it is sufficient to confess in writing, or by another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, some people are not understood by their own priest because of a difference of language; and such people cannot confess in any way except through others. Therefore, it is not necessary to the sacrament that someone confess himself; and so it seems that if someone has confessed through another in some way, it is enough for his salvation.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is necessary to the sacrament that a man confess to his own priest, as is clear from what has been said. But sometimes one’s own priest is absent, and a penitent cannot speak to him by his own voice. But he can reveal his conscience to him by writing. Therefore, it seems that he must convey his conscience to him by writing.
On the contrary (1), a man is bound to confess his sins, just as he is bound to confess his faith. But the confession of faith is made by the mouth, as is clear from Romans 10:10. Therefore, so is the confession of sins.
Furthermore (2), whoever sinned of himself should do penance of himself. But confession is a part of penance. Therefore, the penitent should confess with his own voice.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that those sixteen conditions assigned by the masters, that are contained in these verses, are not required for confession: let confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful and frequent, naked, discrete, willing, modest, complete, secret, tearful, speedy, courageous and accusing, and let it be ready to obey. For faith and simplicity and courage are virtues in their own right. Therefore, they should not be listed as conditions of confession.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is pure is what has nothing mixed in with it; likewise, what is simple has no composition or mixture. Therefore, it is superfluous to include both.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin that was committed only once. Therefore, if a man does not repeat a sin, it is not necessary that penance be frequent.
Obj. 4: Confession is ordered toward making satisfaction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore, confession too should not always be secret.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is not in our power is not required of us. But to shed tears is not in our power. Therefore, it is not required of someone confessing.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that confession is the act of a virtue, and a part of a sacrament. Now, according as it is an act of virtue, it is properly a meritorious act; and in that way confession is not worth anything without charity, which is the principle of meriting. But according as it is a part of a sacrament, it directs the person confessing to a priest, who holds the keys of the Church, which knows the conscience of the person confessing through confession. And accordingly confession can also exist in someone who is not contrite, because he can make his sins known to the priest and subject himself to the Church’s power of the keys. And although in that case he does not receive the fruit of absolution, nevertheless, he will begin to receive it, as his false pretense abates, just as is also the case in the other sacraments; and so he is not bound to repeat the confession that he made insincerely, but he is bound to confess his insincerity afterward.
Reply Obj. 1: That authority is to be understood as to receiving the fruit of confession, which no one who is without charity receives.
Reply Obj. 2: Contrition and satisfaction are rendered to God, but confession is made to a man; and so it is of the nature of contrition and satisfaction that a man be united to God by charity, but not of the nature of confession.
Reply Obj. 3: Someone who tells the sins that he has, speaks truly, and in this his heart agrees with his words as to the substance of the confession, although his heart may disagree with the confession’s aim.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in physical medicine it is necessary that the doctor know not only the one disease against which he must give the medicine, but also generally the whole condition of the sick person himself, for one sickness may be worsened by the combination of another; and the medicine that applies to one illness may do harm to the other. And it is similar with sin, for what may be a suitable medicine for one sin might present an incentive for another, since sometimes someone is infected with contrary sins, as Gregory teaches in his Pastoral Rule. (Gregory the Great, Regula pastoralis (CCSL 141), pt. 3, ch. 3.) And so it is necessary to confession that a man confess all the sins that he has in his memory: for if he does not do this, it is not a confession but a pretense of a confession.
Reply Obj. 1: Even if the embarrassment is multiplied when one divides many sins among different confessions, nevertheless all together are not so great as that one in which all one’s sins are confessed at once, for one sin considered by itself does not reveal as much of a bad disposition in the sinner as when it is considered together with many others: for a person falls into one sin sometimes by ignorance or weakness, but a multitude of sins shows the wickedness of the sinner, or his great corruption.
Reply Obj. 2: A penalty imposed by different priests would not be sufficient; for anyone might consider one sin alone in itself and not its gravity that it has from its connection with another sin. And sometimes the penalty that would be given against one sin would promote another sin. Furthermore, the priest hearing the confession acts in God’s stead, and so the confession must be made to him in the way that it would be done to God in contrition. And so just as there would be no contrition unless someone were contrite for all sins, so also there would be no confession unless someone confessed everything that occurred to his memory.
Reply Obj. 3: Some people say that when someone remembers a sin that he had previously forgotten, he must confess again also those things that he did confess, and particularly if he cannot have the same priest to whom he confessed before, who knows all his sins, so that the amount of total guilt may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary: for sin has its quantity both from itself, and from its relation to other sins. Now regarding the sins that he has confessed, the penitent has shown the quantity they have in themselves. But for a priest to know both quantities of the sin which had been forgotten, it suffices that the one confessing describe it explicitly and the others in general, by saying that, although he had confessed many others, he had forgotten this one.
Reply Obj. 4: Even if the priest cannot give absolution for all sins, one is nevertheless bound to confess them all to him, so that he knows the quantity of all the guilt, and those for which he cannot give absolution he can refer to his superior.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that confession is not only an act of virtue, but also the part of a sacrament. Now, although according as it is an act of virtue it would suffice for it to be done in any way, although there would not be as much difficulty in one way as in another, nevertheless, according as it is part of a sacrament it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have determinate matter. And as in baptism to signify the interior cleansing that element is taken whose greatest use is in cleansing, so also in the sacramental act ordered to making things known that act is taken which we are most accustomed to use for making things known, namely, by our own words; for other ways are employed to supplement this one.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as in baptism it is not enough to wash someone in any manner whatsoever, but with a specific element, so neither does it suffice in penance to make sins known in any manner whatsoever, but it is necessary that they be made known by a specific act.
Reply Obj. 2: For someone who does not have the use of language, like a mute, or who is of another language, it is enough to confess by writing or nodding or an interpreter: for it is not required of anyone to do more than he is able; although a person should not receive baptism in anything but water, for water is entirely from without and is applied to us by another. But the act of confession is from us; and so when we are unable in one way, we must confess however we are able.
Reply Obj. 3: In the absence of one’s own priest, confession can even be made to a lay person; and therefore, it is not necessary that it be done by writing, for the act of confession pertains more to necessity than the person to whom the confession is made.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that some of the conditions named are necessary to confession, while some are about doing it well. But those things that are necessary to confession either apply to it as an act of virtue, or as a part of a sacrament.
If in the first way, either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the specific virtue whose act it is, or by the very nature of an act. There are four conditions of virtue in general, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 1105a31.) The first is that a person be knowing, and according to this confession is said to be discrete, according as prudence is required in the act of every virtue. Now, this discretion is so that someone may confess greater things with more weight. The second condition is that it be deliberate, because acts of virtue must be voluntary; and as to this it says willing. The third condition is that it be done ‘for the sake of this,’ namely, for the right end; and as to this it says that penance must be pure, namely, so that it has the right intention. Fourth is that it work unmovingly, and as to this it says that it must be courageous, namely, so that one does not give up because of shame. Now, confession is an act of the virtue of penitence, which indeed takes its first impetus from horror at the disgracefulness of sin. And as to this, confession must be modest, so that namely one does not boast about sins because of any worldly vanity mixed in. Second, it progresses to sorrow for sin committed, and as to this it should be tearful. Third, it ends in one’s own abjection; and as to this it should be humble, so that one confesses oneself to be weak and a wretch. But by the proper nature of this act that is confession it makes things known, and indeed, this making known can be impeded by four things. First, by falsehood, and as to this it says, faithful, i.e., true. Second, by concealing, and as to this it says, naked, so that it is not covered by the obscurity of the words. Third, by the multiplication of words, and against this it says that it should be simple, so that one does not recite in confession anything but what pertains to the quantity of sin. Fourth, that nothing be taken away from those things that should be made known, and against this it says, complete.
Now, as confession is a part of a sacrament, it concerns the judgment of the priest, who is the minister of the sacrament; and so it must be accusing on the part of the person confessing, ready to obey in relation to the priest; secret as to the condition of the forum which deals with hidden matters of conscience. But it belongs to the well-being of confession that it be frequent and that it be speedy, namely, that one confess immediately.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not unfitting that the condition of one virtue should be found in the act of another, which is commanded by it; or because the mean that chiefly belongs to one virtue is possessed by other virtues through participation.
Reply Obj. 2: This condition, pure, excludes perversity of intention, by which a person is cleansed; but simple excludes the addition of anything extraneous.
Reply Obj. 3: This is not necessary to confession, but for a confession to be well done.
Reply Obj. 4: Because of the scandal of others who can be inclined to wrongdoing by hearing sins, confession should not be done in public, but in secret. But no one is so scandalized by the punishment of satisfaction, for sometimes similar satisfactory works are done for small or no sin.
Reply Obj. 5: This is to be understood as concerning mental tears.
Article 5
The effect of confession
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1–2; d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 3; SCG IV, ch. 71; Quodl. IV, q. 7, a. 1; Super Ps. 31.) It seems that confession does not free one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition sufficiently blots out fault. Therefore, confession does not free one from the death of sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as there is mortal sin, there is also venial sin. But by confession what was mortal sin before becomes venial, as is said in the text. Therefore, by confession sin is not forgiven, but changed into a different kind of sin.
On the contrary, confession is a part of the sacrament of penance. But penance frees from sin. Therefore, so does confession.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that confession does not free from punishment in any way. (Parallels: above, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 1; a. 3, qa. 5, ad 4; d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 3; SCG IV, ch. 72; Orat. Dom. 9; Super Ps. 31.) For only eternal punishment or temporal punishment is owed to sin. But eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, while temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore, by confession nothing of punishment is forgiven.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the will is counted as the deed, as it says in the text. But someone who is contrite has the intention of confessing. Therefore, that was worth as much as if he had confessed; and so by the confession that he makes afterward, nothing of punishment is remitted.
On the contrary, confession contains suffering. But by other penal works the penalty due to sin is expiated. Therefore, also by confession.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it does not open paradise. For different things have different effects. But the opening of paradise is an effect of baptism. Therefore, it is not an effect of confession.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, when something is closed it cannot be entered before its opening. But someone who dies before confession can enter paradise. Therefore confession does not open paradise.
On the contrary, confession makes a person subject to the Church’s keys. But paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore, it is also opened by confession.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it should not be included as an effect of confession that it bestows the hope of salvation. For hope comes from all meritorious acts. And so it does not seem to be the proper effect of confession.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as is clear from Romans 5:3–4. But a person especially undergoes tribulation in acts of satisfaction. Therefore, bestowing hope of salvation belongs more to satisfaction than to confession.
On the contrary, a person becomes more humble and meek by confession, as the Master says in the text. But by this a person obtains hope of salvation. Therefore, an effect of confession is to grant hope of salvation.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that penance, as it is a sacrament, is particularly perfected in confession, for by it a man submits himself to the ministers of the Church who administer the sacraments. For contrition has the pledge of confession attached to it; and satisfaction is fixed by the judgment of the priest to whom the confession is made. And since in the sacrament of penance, grace is infused, by which the remission of sins happens, as in baptism, therefore in the same way confession forgives guilt, as baptism does, by the power of absolution joined to it. For baptism frees from the death of sin not only in the reception of the act, but also as it is held in pledge, as is seen among those who come to baptism already sanctified. And if someone does not present an impediment, he would obtain the grace remitting sins by the very conferral of baptism, if they had not already been remitted him. And likewise it should be said about confession with absolution joined to it, that according as it preceded in the wish of the penitent, he was freed from guilt, but afterward in the act of confession and absolution, grace is increased; and the remission of sins would also be given, if the preceding sorrow for sins was not sufficient for contrition, and the penitent does not present an obstacle to grace at that time. And so, just as it is said about baptism that it frees from death, the same can also be said for confession.
Reply Obj. 1: Contrition has the pledge of confession joined to it; and so it frees penitents from guilt just as the desire for baptism does for those to be baptized.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is not taken for fault, but for a penalty that can be expiated; and so it does not follow that fault changes into another kind of fault, but is completely annihilated. For something can be called venial sin in three ways. In one way, by its genus, like an idle word. In another way, by its cause, i.e., having the cause of forgiveness in itself, like a sin from weakness. In another way, from its outcome, as it is taken here; for by confession it comes about that a man obtains forgiveness for past fault.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that confession together with absolution has the power of freeing from punishment in two ways. In one way, from the very force of absolution, and in this way, indeed, the pledge of confession frees from eternal punishment, just as from guilt; which punishment is indeed a condemning punishment, and banishes one entirely. The man freed from this yet remains obliged to temporal punishment, according as punishment is a purifying and improving medicine. And this punishment remains to be suffered in purgatory even for those who were freed from the punishment of hell; which punishment indeed is disproportionate to the powers of the penitent living in this world, but by the power of the keys it is diminished to such a degree that what remains is proportionate to the powers of the penitent, such that by making satisfaction he can purify himself in this life. In the other way it diminishes the punishment by the very nature of the act of the one confessing, who has the pain of embarrassment attached; and so the more times one confesses the same sins, the more the punishment is diminished.
And by this the response to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: The will is not counted for the deed in those things that are from another, like baptism; for the will to receive baptism is not of the same value as baptism itself. But the will is counted for the deed in those things that are completely from a man; and again as to the essential reward, but not as to the removal of punishment, and things regarding which merit is found incidentally and secondarily. And so someone who has confessed and been absolved will be punished less in purgatory than someone who is only contrite.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that someone is prevented from entering paradise by guilt and by a debt of punishment; and since confession takes away these impediments, as is clear from what has been said, (In the foregoing two quaestiunculae.) therefore it is said to open paradise.
Reply Obj. 1: Although baptism and penance are different sacraments, nevertheless they act in the power of the one Passion of Christ, by which the entrance to paradise was opened.
Reply Obj. 2: Before the pledge of confession paradise was closed to anyone sinning mortally, although afterward, by the contrition that carries the pledge of confession with it, it would be opened, even before the confession was actually made: but the obstacle of the debt is not completely removed before confession and satisfaction.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that our only hope for the remission of sins is through Christ. And since by confession a person subjects himself to the Church’s keys, which have power from the Passion of Christ, therefore confession is said to bestow hope of salvation.
Reply Obj. 1: Hope of salvation cannot chiefly be from our acts, but from the grace of the Redeemer. And since confession depends on the grace of the Redeemer, this is why it does not only bestow hope of salvation as a meritorious act, but as a part of a sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: Tribulation bestows the hope of salvation by the experience of one’s own strength and the purification from punishment; but confession also does this in the manner explained.
Exposition of the Text
For some say that no one is cleansed from sin without confession by the mouth and satisfaction in deed. (Sententiae IV, 17.1 (92).2.) There is a third opinion that the Master does not touch upon, that fault is forgiven by contrition under one condition, namely, if one confesses. But this opinion is less reasonable than the others, for the state of salvation does not depend on the future, for, as it says, where the tree falls, there it will be (Eccl 11:3). And therefore it is nothing to say that man is led back to the state of salvation by the forgiveness of his sins under the condition of confession simply.
The intention is adjudged as deed. (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).3 citing ordinary gloss on Ps. 31, 5..) This is to be understood about good things as much as about bad, when the pledge is fulfilled, so that nothing delays one from its execution but powerlessness. But if the operation ensuing adds anything to the will, as in those operations that contain pleasure provoking the will in their very act, then the operation also adds to the substantial merit and demerit. Otherwise, it does not, but the operation always adds as to something ensuing, which is the benefit consequent upon the act in good things as its effect, or the harm in bad things.
It does not say, “shall have confessed by the mouth,” but “shall turn and groan”(cf. Ezek 33:14). (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).4.) Therefore, it seems that confession of the mouth is not required. And it should be said that this very groaning has the intention of vocal confession attached to it.
For no one can confess who has not been raised, (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).4.) namely, with a confession efficacious for salvation.
As the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul. (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).4 citing Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 70, 17, sermon 2 n3.) It is not necessary that there be a likeness in all things, but only in the fact that as the soul supplies the body with sense and movement by the fact that it is in the body, so God provides spiritually for the soul which he inhabits by grace.
No one can receive God’s grace unless purged from all sin by the confession of penance or by baptism. (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).7 citing a fragment by Chromatius of Aquileia.) These three purifying things must be distinguished in this way: for baptism purifies from original and actual sin; but penance purifies from actual sin alone, as regards contrition; while confession by the act practiced directly purifies from punishment.
Let no one say to himself, ‘I do it secretly and before God,’ (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).8 citing Augustine, Sermo 392, c3 n3; authorship dubious.) namely, so that he does not make it known to the priest.
If I was ashamed to confess my sins before the people (cf. Job 31:33). (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92). 8.) Therefore, it seems that it is permitted to confess publicly. And it should be said that our text, which is more true, has, if I have concealed my sin as men do (Job 31:33), in which concealment is refused as being against God’s command. But if we maintain the text that is set forth here, it should be said that it is not permitted to confess publicly, unless perhaps that sin be made known, for such humility might harm one’s neighbor who could be scandalized by sin being made known. But making satisfaction publicly in a certain way confesses sin in the sight of the people. Or it could be said that it speaks about confession made in court and not sacramental confession.
No one receives forgiveness for a graver punishment, unless he has paid some penalty. (Sent. IV, 17.1 (92).9 citing Augustine, De continentia, c6 n15.) This text and the following one show that without making satisfaction, sin is not forgiven; which this opinion was also saying.
It has seemed to some that it suffices if confession is made to God alone. (Sent. IV, 17.2 (93).2.) What is set down here as an opinion is a heresy, not that it is explicitly against any article of the faith, whether prior to it or consequent upon it. But it implicitly contains something contrary to the faith: for it follows that the keys of the Church are not necessary to salvation. And in such matters, before it is determined by the Church that something contrary to the faith would follow from these things, this opinion is not judged to be heresy. And this is why the Master and Gratian include this as an opinion. But now, after the determination of the Church under Innocent III, it is considered heresy.
Reveal your way before God (Ps 37:5). Here it is not speaking about sacramental revelation, but about the revelation that is made in the supplication of prayer.
I do not say that you should confess them to your fellow servant, who will reproach you; tell them to God, who cures them. (Sent. IV, 17.2 (93).5.) For whoever confesses to a priest, etc., does not confess to him as to a fellow servant, but as to God.
They will . . . pronounce against themselves a sentence of voluntary excommunication: (Sent. IV, 17.2 (93).7 citing Julian Pomerius, De vita contemplativa, c7 n3.) not that someone can excommunicate himself, but excommunication is here broadly meant for voluntary restraint, by which someone removes himself from sacred things out of humility.
Justice by itself condemns. (Sent. IV, 17.3 (94).5 citing Julian Pomerius, De vita contemplativa*, c7 n2.)* Here Augustine is speaking by hypothesis, i.e., if God used justice alone against us without mercy; for we could not return to his grace after sin without mercy.
The more frequently one confesses, the more easily is forgiveness granted: (Sent. IV, 17.3 (94).6.) not dividing up one’s sins, but confessing wholly to all. But he would obtain greater forgiveness at least because of the embarrassment and the intercession of the priest; or also from the power of the keys, as some people say. But this will be discussed in the next distinction.
Let each take care to seek a priest who knows how to bind and loose. (Sent. IV, 17.4 (95).3.) This knowledge, even if it is not greater, nevertheless, should be great enough that he knows how to distinguish between what is a sin and what is not, and mortal and venial sin; and if there were any doubt about anything, he could have recourse to wiser priests. But many other conditions are included that are required of a confessor so that he may win over those confessing to him, which are contained in these verses: let the confessor be gentle, affable, and pleasant, prudent, discrete, meek, pious, and kind.
Therefore let him not seek priests who, because of some fault, have been severed from the unity of the Church: (Sent. IV, 17.4 (95).5 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, c12 n27.) because such priests do not have the exercise of their holy orders, and they lack jurisdiction. And he is speaking about division by heresy, or schism, or excommunication.
Chapter 153 of 186