D. 22 - On the effect of penance

After the Master has determined the time of penance, which is concomitant with penance itself, here he examines certain things that pertain to its effect, which is the remission of sins. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires whether the remission of sins is irrevocable, or whether forgiven sins may return one day; in the second, since in any sacrament the effect is the sacrament’s reality, he inquires what is the sacrament-and-reality in penance, at: after the aforesaid, it remains to investigate. (Sententiae IV, 22.2 (126). 1.)

Concerning the first he does three things: first, he raises the question; second, he sets down different opinions about the resolution of this question, at: the solution to this question is obscure and complex. (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 1.) Third, he pursues the opinions in detail, at: those who say that remitted sins return fortify themselves with the authorities that follow. (Sent. IV, 22.2 (125). 2.)

And concerning this he does two things: first, he details the first opinion; second, the second opinion, at: but because it seems incongruous that remitted sins should again be imputed, it pleases some to hold that no one is again punished by God for sins which have been remitted. (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 10.)

Concerning the first he does three things: first, he cites authorities who confirm the first opinion; second, he objects to the contrary, at: to them, it is objected, etc. (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 8.) Third, their solution is set forth, at: but to this it may be said, etc. (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 9.)

After the aforesaid it remains to investigate, etc. Here he inquires what is the sacrament and what is the reality in penance; and concerning this he does two things: first, he raises the question; second, he resolves it, at: some say that the sacrament here is that which is done outwardly alone. (Sent. IV, 22.2 (126). 2.)

And this is divided into two parts according to the two opinions that he cites. The second part begins at: but some say that inward and outward penance are the sacrament. (Sent. IV, 22.2 (126). 5.)

Concerning this he does two things: first, he explains the opinion; second, he gives the objections to the contrary, at: if that is so, then not every evangelical sacrament brings about that which it signifies. (Sent. IV, 22.2 (126). 3.)

And it is divided into two parts according to the two objections he has cited; the second begins at: also, if outward penance is the sacrament and the inward one is the thing of the sacrament, the thing precedes the sacrament more often than the sacrament does the thing. (Sent. IV, 22.2 (126). 4.) And both are divided into objection and solution, as is clear in itself.

Here there is a twofold question. First, about the return of sins. Second, about what is the sacrament or reality in penance.

Question 1

On the return of sins

Concerning the first, four questions arise:

first, whether forgiven sins return;

• second, concerning ingratitude, through which sins are said to return;
• third, which sins are able to return through ingratitude;
• fourth, whether someone relapsing is bound to confess sins that he had previously confessed.
• Article 1

Whether forgiven sins return

Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 88, a. 1; Super Matt. 18, in fine.) It seems that forgiven sins return in someone who relapses. For Pope Leo says: what divine mercy soldered together, an itch casts back at it; for iniquity repeated drains away the mercy granted. (This quotation does not appear to be in the works of Pope Leo the Great; St. Thomas never quotes it elsewhere.) Therefore, it seems that by falling back into sin, forgiven sins return.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when a covering is removed, what was covered appears. But charity covers a multitude of sins (1 Pet 4:8). Therefore, when charity is removed by subsequent sin, the sins that were forgiven return.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Scripture says, if the righteous man turns away from his righteousness . . . none of the righteousness that he had done will be remembered (Ezek 18:24). Therefore, he is in the same state as if he had done no righteousness. But if he had not done the righteousness of penance, his sins would not be remitted. Therefore, that remission is annulled, and this is how the remitted sins return.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, someone who offends God sins more than someone who offends man. But if a person is freed by a certain master, he is brought back into slavery if he commits a new offense against him. All the more, therefore, if someone freed by divine grace from his servitude to sin should offend God by falling back into sin, is he recalled into his original slavery; and thus the sins remitted return.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, after true contrition for past sins, if someone should fall back into sin, and die suddenly, it is clear that he would go to hell. Therefore, he will be punished there for the sins that had been forgiven him, since his punishment was not entirely remitted. But he will be punished forever there, for there is no redemption in hell. (From the seventh responsory of the traditional Office of the Dead.) Therefore, he incurs the same debt of punishment that he had, and so it seems that in this person the forgiven sins return; and someone who has confessed and not done full satisfaction is in the same situation.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as sins are forgiven by penance, so previous merits are put to death by actual sin. But by penance, which destroys sin, previous merits revive. Therefore, by the sin that destroys penance, in which sin is forgiven, forgiven sins revive.

On the contrary (1), Augustine in the book of his Responses to Prosper says, if anyone withdraws from Christ and finishes this life estranged from grace, what does he do but enter into perdition? But he does not return to what had been forgiven, nor will he be damned by original sin. (Printed in the works of Prosper of Aquitaine: Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum calumniantium, response 2 (PL 51:158).) Therefore, forgiven sins do not return.

Furthermore (2), one person does not because worse than another by the same, equal sin. But it happens that an innocent person and a penitent person may sin by the same and equal mortal sin. Therefore, the penitent does not become worse by this sin than the innocent person. However, he would if sins that had been forgiven returned. Therefore, they do not return.

Furthermore (3), a contrary does not bring back its contrary. But it sometimes happens that the sin that someone commits after penance is contrary to the sin that was effaced by penance, as avarice is contrary to prodigality. Therefore, subsequent sin does not bring back previous sin.

Furthermore (4), no one incurs the stain or debt of punishment of sin except by committing that sin. But before a penitent committed simple fornication, he would not have the stain or liability of a murder which had already been forgiven him. Therefore, neither after fornicating does he commit murder; therefore, the murder forgiven him does not return either as regards guilt or as regards liability to punishment.

I answer that, it is necessary to say in some way that sins return, for the authors expressly say this.

Some granted this simply in everyone who suffered relapse; nor was it their intention to say that the same act of sin would be recalled in number, or the same stain in number that had been previously removed by penance, for what dissolves entirely into nothing cannot be taken up again in the same number; but rather that just as before penance is completed a person is impeded from receiving grace from God by the sins he has committed, so he is impeded by the same things after he falls from the state of repentance by falling into the mortal sin from which he had withdrawn. For this is how sin is said to remain as to guilt, inasmuch as by an act that has already passed away, a person is impeded from receiving grace, as though by a certain obstacle placed between God and the soul. But it is said to be remitted as to the guilt when someone is not deprived of grace by reason of past acts.

But this opinion cannot stand; since for causing darkness either of two things is sufficient of itself, namely the disposition of the receiver or the interposition of an obstacle; and therefore if darkness had to be removed, it would be necessary both to take away the indisposition, and to remove the obstacle. And so penance, which took away the darkness of sin, not only removed the indisposition to receiving grace that existed in the soul, but also removed the obstacle of the previous sin, not indeed as if that act had not happened, but so that it would not have the force of impeding grace. And indeed, this force cannot be restored to the aforementioned act, unless it were repeated, which is impossible. And therefore it cannot be said that sins return as to their stain in the manner described above.

And therefore others have said that sins forgiven do not return through any given subsequent sin, but only by four sins: namely, fraternal hatred, apostasy from the faith, contempt for confession, and being sorry that one had repented. Therefore, they have made the verse: hates his brother, becomes apostate, scorns confession, regrets having repented: the original sin returns. But this opinion has less reason than the first, for it cannot assign the cause why forgiven sins would return for these sins more than for others; also, because it sometimes happens that other sins are worse; unless because they were led by authoritative texts and certain frivolous reasons to say that forgiven sins would return through these sins, and it seemed to them absurd to say that the preceding sins would return by every subsequent sin. Nor is it enough that they say that God forgives sins under the condition of avoiding these four things, for a sufficient cause brings about its effect absolutely, depending on nothing in the future. Now the grace and Passion of Christ, by virtue of which the sacraments have efficacy, is more than sufficient in itself to blot out all guilt. And furthermore, there is no reason why previous sins would be forgiven more under the condition of avoiding these sins than under the condition of avoiding others, since every sin would be contrary to grace, through which the forgiveness of sins comes about.

And therefore it should be said with others that there are two ways that something can return: either in itself, and in this way forgiven sins would never return as to the stain, and consequently not as to the obligation to punishment either; or in its effect, and in this way forgiven sins return inasmuch as something of forgiven sins remains in the ones that follow. For by the fact that a man offends God by sinning after his previous sins have been forgiven, the act of subsequent sin acquires a certain deformity of ingratitude; and therefore it is commonly said that they return as to ingratitude.

Reply Obj. 1: The mercy of God, through which the remission of sins happened, is ordered to two things. One is in the present, namely, the remission of previous sins, and this effect cannot be drained away by subsequent sin. The other is in the future, namely, obtaining eternal life; for grace, through which the remission of sins happened, made a person worthy of eternal life, and this effect can be drained away by subsequent sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is said to cover sins for God who sees all; and therefore it must destroy them, not indeed as though the act had not happened, but that it does not have the power of impeding grace. But before the eyes of men something can be covered that still remains in itself; and the objection applied to this kind of covering.

Reply Obj. 3: His righteousness will not be remembered as to the effect that it would have brought about in the future, for he will not attain eternal life by it; but it will be remembered as to this effect, which is to abolish past sins, which his righteousness did in the present.

Reply Obj. 4: Although someone freed from slavery is reduced to the same servitude that he had been freed from, nevertheless, he is not a slave for the same reason as he was before, but for another reason, namely, the offense committed after his emancipation. And likewise, someone who falls back into sin is reduced to the slavery of sin, yet not so that he is a slave to sin by the sinful acts by which he was formerly so, but by the act of that subsequent sin. Hence forgiven sins do not return, but a new one is introduced.

Reply Obj. 5: For the part of the penalty that a person was forgiven in confession or contrition, he will never be punished, but for what remains. According to some people, he will still be punished eternally. For by reason of the court in which it is punished, eternal punishment is due, as it is with venial sins that are punished with temporal punishment in purgatory and with eternal punishment in hell. But this does not seem to be the same, for the reason venial sin is punished eternally in hell is that it always remains, since there is nothing that can remove guilt there; but by the very fact that a punishment is paid, it is expiated. And so others say that the punishment that someone owes after his sins are forgiven will be punished in hell, but only temporally. Nor because of this does it follow that there is any redemption in hell, for the punishment that is paid is not redeemed. Nor is it unfitting that the punishment of hell is diminished in something incidental until the day of judgment, just as it is also increased.

Reply Obj. 6: Mortal sin did not put to death previous merits as though they were not in themselves living, which is why they led to the glory of the elect. But they were put to death only as to that person to whom they belonged, who was prevented from acquiring their effect. And therefore with the impediment removed, they remain in their own efficacy as to him. But by penance, sin is not only put to death in the sinner, but also in itself. For the remission of sins is principally the work of God, but putting previous merits to death is the work of man. Now a man cannot simply void the work of God by his own action, although he can impede it from benefiting him. And therefore by his subsequent sin a man cannot cancel out the forgiveness of previous sins, but he can by his own action void what was done by him. And therefore he can thoroughly undo the mortification of previous merits by subsequent merits, particularly if he is helped by grace.

Article 2

Ingratitude, through which sins are said to return

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 107, a. 2, ad 1; ST III, q. 88, a. 4.) It seems that ingratitude is not a specific sin. For what is found in every sin is not a specific sin. But we incur ingratitude by any sin, for we offend God, who is most generous to us, by any sin, as far as in us lies. Therefore, ingratitude is not a specific sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every specific sin is opposed to a certain specific virtue. But no specific virtue can be assigned as opposed to ingratitude, since it is against all virtues, for all are conferred on us by God’s grace. Therefore, ingratitude is not a specific sin.

On the contrary, wherever there is found a special account of deformity, there is found a specific sin. But this is the case with ingratitude. Therefore, it is a specific sin.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an innocent man is no less ungrateful if he sins than a penitent. For the person who is bound to greater thanksgiving becomes more ungrateful by his offense. But the innocent are bound to thanksgiving more than the penitent, inasmuch as they have a nobler gift from God. Therefore, they are more ungrateful if they sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as by the grace of God a man is lifted up from a fall, so also by grace he is held up so that he will not fall. But ingratitude implies contempt for grace. Therefore, the innocent man is ungrateful when he sins by condemning the grace that sustains him, just as the penitent is by condemning the grace that raised him up again.

On the contrary, it is right judgment that he should love more to whom more has been forgiven, as is clear from Luke 7:47. But more has been forgiven the penitent than the innocent. Therefore, he is bound to love more; therefore, he is more ungrateful if he sins.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that as much guilt arises from the ingratitude of a person who relapses into sin as there was in his former sins. (Parallel: ST III, q. 88, a. 3.) For the ingratitude of the one who scorns something is as much as the original benefit was. But the benefit of the remission of sin is as great as the sin committed. Therefore, the ingratitude is as great, and so it seems that guilt arises equal to the forgiven sins according to the ingratitude of the subsequent sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things can only be commensurate according to the quantity that they have. But the guilt of those who fall back into sin out of ingratitude is measured according to the quantity of the sins forgiven them. For the more and the greater the sins that are forgiven someone, the more ungrateful he becomes by scorning it. Therefore, the whole guilt of former sins returns through the ingratitude of someone who relapses.

On the contrary, the quantity of guilt is according to the quantity of deformity in the fault. But sometimes there is not as much deformity in the sin of someone who relapses as there was in the many other sins that were previously forgiven him. Therefore, equal guilt does not return.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that ingratitude is privative of thanks, and thanks responds to a giving. Now there are two kinds of giving. One regards a debt, either already existing, like when someone gives someone what he owes; or one that arises, like when someone buys or gives something, so that something else becomes owed to him. And this kind of giving pertains to justice. But the other kind of giving does not relate to a debt in either way; and this is properly called giving, and pertains to liberality. And because nothing inclines one to this kind of giving but the wish to give, it is called gratuitous, and thanks are properly owed to this kind of giving, so that someone may return the favor according to his own manner. Therefore, from failing to thank in this situation a person is called ungrateful, and more ungrateful the more he departs from this. Thus the first degree of ingratitude is in the effect, when someone neglects to return something for benefits received; the second is in the affections when he scorns it; the third, in the intellect when he even forgets it; the fourth, and worst, that he does something undue against his benefactor. Now ingratitude in these first three degrees is always a specific sin; but in the fourth degree it is a deformity connected with sin, for by the fact that something undue is done, it is established as a sin. But by the fact that it is said to be done against a benefactor, an aggravating circumstance is added, which is ingratitude. Therefore, since every sin is against God, a man incurs ingratitude by any sin, for God is our greatest benefactor; and in this way any sin, after benefitting from the forgiveness of sins, has ingratitude joined to it. And therefore the ingratitude, according to which sins are said to return, is not a specific sin, although a certain kind of ingratitude is a specific sin.

Reply Obj. 1: In the notion of general sin there is not only what is found in all sins, but also what is never found without some other sins: for nothing is in the genus that is not in a certain species of it. Therefore, to the extent that it is found separate from other sins, it is called a specific sin, although sometimes it is also joined with others.

Reply Obj. 2: Ingratitude, as was said, destroys thanksgiving, which is an act of justice, for the person who first gave made the one who rendered thanks his debtor, although he did not intend this. And so it is opposed to justice.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that speaking of the penitent and the innocent per se, as to the good of the remission of sins and the preserving of innocence, setting aside other gifts, then in a certain way the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent. For thanksgiving has to do with the quantity of the gift, and the mode of gratuitous giving, and it takes its measure from both. For greater thanks are owed both to a greater gift and to a more gratuituous gift. Therefore, if the quantity of the gift is considered, then the innocent person is bound more, for what he has received is greater; but if the gratuitousness is considered, the penitent is bound more, for the farther someone is from deserving what he receives, the more the giving is gratuitous on his part, although not on the part of the giver, who gives to everyone with equal generosity. For he is farther from deserving the remission of sins than an innocent person from deserving to stay that way. And therefore in a certain way each one is bound more to thanksgiving, and in a certain way, equally.

And by this the answers to the objections are clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that some people have said that by the ingratitude of someone who falls back into sin as much guilt returns as there was in all the previous sins. But this cannot be; for the quantity of guilt follows the quantity of sin; but the amount of sin into which someone relapses is sometimes much less in its genus than the sins that had already been forgiven. And it cannot be that the circumstance of ingratitude gives so much quantity to it, for this ingratitude arises from the fact that something undue is done against the precepts of God. Therefore, the measure of the ingratitude is according to the measure of the undue; and so the quantity of sin that it has by its genus gives quantity to the ingratitude. Therefore, the quantity of ingratitude cannot be greater than the quantity of sin. And therefore it must be said instead that an equal guilt does not return according to absolute quantity, but it does return equal according to proportionality, for the worse the sins that were forgiven, the greater was the benefit of their remission, and the greater the benefit, the greater the ingratitude. And so the amount of guilt for previous sins remains in a certain way in someone who relapses, but not according to an absolute equality; just as neither is the benefit equal to the sin forgiven in quantity, but much greater; nor is ingratitude according to absolute quantity as great as the benefit.

And according to this the answers to the objections are clear.

Article 3

Which sins return through ingratitude

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 88, a. 2; Super Matt. 18, in fine.) It seems that venial sins do not return through ingratitude. For just as venial sin returns through ingratitude, so also it makes others return through ingratitude. But venial sin does not make others return through ingratitude, otherwise forgiven sins would return all day long. Therefore, neither does venial sin itself return by ingratitude.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a certain sin returns through ingratitude by the fact that it makes ingratitude greater. But forgiven venial sin does not make ingratitude greater, for it does not diminish charity. Therefore, neither does it return by ingratitude.

On the contrary, venial sins are counted among our debts in the Lord’s Prayer, which is especially effective against venial sins. But in the text it says that every debt is demanded of the one who relapses. Therefore, venial sins also return.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that original sin does not return. For if a sickness returns, the medicine should be brought back. But baptism, which is the singular medicine against original sin, is not repeated in any way. Therefore, neither does original sin return.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin that we incur by our act is actual sin. But original sin is not actual. Therefore, original sin does not return by an act of subsequent sin.

On the contrary, is what is expressly said in the text.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that forgiven sins do not return through those four sins more than through others. For a person is ungrateful to God by the fact that he does something against God. But other sins are against God just as much as those four. Therefore, forgiven sins return through ingratitude in all sins.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sin against the Holy Spirit is worse than anything mentioned above. Therefore, it should rather be said that sin returns by it.

On the contrary, the authors speak mostly about these sins.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that venial sins return through ingratitude in the same way that mortal sins do. For just the remission of mortal sins must be attributed to God’s benefit, so also must the remission of venial sins; and according as the benefit of forgiveness is scorned in some way in the sin that follows, forgiven sins are said to return through ingratitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Although venial sin does not take away grace, nevertheless it is removed through grace. Now mortal sin both takes away grace and is taken away by grace. And therefore mortal sin both causes ingratitude, by which other sins return, and it returns by ingratitude. But although venial sin return, nonetheless it does not make others return, for it does not cause ingratitude.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it does not diminish grace, nevertheless it leaves behind greater ingratitude, as the benefit of grace is taken away.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that original sin also returns in the same way, since it is removed by the benefit of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument would proceed if original sin returned per se, but now it is not said to return in itself, but in another, in which its quantity in some way remains, as was said.

The second objection should be answered in the same way.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that just as by these sins forgiven sins return out of ingratitude, so also by those. Nevertheless, in these there is a certain special thing beyond the others, for not only are the sins against the forgiver himself, which exists in all other sins, but they also are against the remedy by which sins are forgiven. Now the forgiveness of sins is attributed first to faith, second to charity, third to penance. And this is why apostasy from the faith, which is opposed to the first, and fraternal hatred, which is opposed to the second, and the other two which are opposed to the third, have a special reason for making sins return, not because of greater gravity, but for the reason given.

And by this the answers to the objections are clear.

Article 4

Whether someone relapsing is bound to confess sins that he had previously confessed (Moos notes that many manuscripts lack this article, while others add it on the last page. The text has an unusually high number of variant readings, which Moos gives in his footnotes.)

Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. It seems that someone who falls back into sin is bound to confess prior sins he has already confessed. For ingratitude seems to be the worst sin, since by it other sins return in a certain way. But a person does not confess ingratitude, unless he confesses other sins whose forgiveness he was ungrateful for. Therefore, someone who relapses must confess his previous sins.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, by confession the amount of fault must be made known to the priest. But the quantity of sins previously forgiven remains in a certain way in the sin that someone relapses into, as was said before. Therefore, someone who confesses this sin must also confess the others.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Gregory, one sin disposes to another, and in this way, one will be the cause of the other. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143B), Bk. 25, par. 9.) But a remedy cannot be sufficiently applied to a disease unless the cause of the disease is known. Therefore, since confession is made so that the remedy may be applied to the disease exposed, it seems that someone relapsing is bound to confess his past sins, which were the cause of his relapse.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it sometimes happens that a person relapses after confessing, but before completing the penance. But it is evident that after he has done penance for the relapse, he is bound to make satisfaction for those previous sins. Therefore, it seems that at least in this case one is bound to confess prior sins.

On the contrary (1), it is said in Nahum 1:9: God will not judge twice in the same matter. Therefore, if someone has been judged in the forum of conscience about a certain sin, it is not necessary that he be exposed to judgment again.

Furthermore (2), in the decrees on penance, distinction 1, it says: it is not necessary that what we have confessed once to priests we confess again; but we must confess them before the true judge in the language of the heart, not of the flesh. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, d. 1, ch. 87 (PL 187:1555), citing Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperf. in Matth., hom. 40.) Therefore, the same as before.

I answer that, concerning the opinion which holds that forgiven sins return either in guilt or in liability to punishment, it is necessary to say that someone relapsing is bound to confess previous sins again, since he has become subject to them as much after his relapse as before. But according to the other opinion which says that forgiven sins do not return except in ingratitude, there are two opinions.

For some people say that if someone who falls back into sin confesses to the same priest to whom he confessed before and who has full memory of the prior sins, he is not bound to repeat the prior sins to him, except in a general way, so as to accuse himself of ingratitude, as long as he had already made satisfaction for the previous sins before his relapse. But if he has fallen before completing his penance, he would be bound to confess the former sins again even specifically, so that the repetition of satisfaction might take its measure from them. But if one confesses to another priest, or confesses to the same priest sins that had been forgotten before, whether he had made satisfaction before his relapse or not, he is bound to confess again all his sins specifically, both so that the amount of ingratitude may be made known to the priest by the consideration of the sins forgiven before, and so that the priest may know the face of his sheep, which could not happen unless he knew his past morals, whether, namely, he had lived innocently or unjustly.

But this opinion does not seem rational; for by the fact that former sins were forgiven and they do not return, it is not necessary that they be brought into judgment again, for neither would God bring them back under judgment, if someone should die without confession after having fallen back into sin, but he would be damned only for the sin that he had fallen back into. And even if he had not done full satisfaction for the sins, it does not seem necessary that he confess them specifically after falling; for after his falling, their obligation to punishment is not changed. Therefore, the same satisfaction is due for them as before. Therefore, after falling the penitent is bound to complete what was imposed on him before, but not to receive any other satisfaction for those sins. Likewise also it is not necessary that he confess again, so that the amount of ingratitude may be known. For just as the quantity of sin is increased by ingratitude for sins forgiven, so also it is increased by ingratitude for benefits received. Therefore, by the same argument the person confessing would be obliged to reveal to the priest all God’s benefits shown to him, which no one asserts. Also in the same way, it is not necessary that anyone confess to the priest his whole state for the priest to know the face of his sheep, but only those things that must be judged by him. Otherwise it would be necessary for an innocent to reveal to the priest to whom he confesses his venial sins, all his sinful tendencies, and his whole condition, which no one asserts.

Therefore, the opinion of others is that after having fallen, no one is bound to confess former sins, whether in general or specifically; for ingratitude, by reason of which sins are said to return, is a certain circumstance of sin, nor does it draw them into any other genus of sin. However, circumstances like this are not necessary to confess, as was said above in Distinction 16, Question 3, Article 2, Subquestion 5. But by this opinion it seems to remain that a remedy cannot fully be applied to the ailment of someone relapsing. For many things are expedient to the spiritual welfare of someone who relapses, which are not necessary to an innocent person, so that, namely, greater caution may be applied about them.

And therefore it seems we must distinguish that there are two ways that something should be confessed in confession. In one way directly, and then that is said to be revealed whose abolishment is sought through the confession; and in this way a person who relapses is in no way bound to confess forgiven sins whether in general or specifically, regardless of whom he confesses to. The other way, indirectly, as what the due mode of making satisfaction cannot be known without. For since contrition, according as it is necessary to salvation, includes the intention of repenting, confessing, and making due satisfaction, someone who confesses is bound to reveal to the priest whatever allows him to know what satisfaction should be appropriately imposed, just as the person confessing confesses to the priest sometimes that he is unwell, so that he will not impose fasting on him. And this is how someone who relapses is bound to make known his forgiven sins as much as suffices for knowing what satisfaction should be imposed on him, so that if he has often suffered the lapse of the flesh from a certain occasion, this occasion may be severed by the satisfaction, and likewise with the other sins. And for this it seems enough to confess forgiven sins in general. Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary to descend to certain particulars according as the one confessing sees fit, for no certain rule can be fixed ahead of time in these matters.

Reply Obj. 1: Ingratitude as it is understood here is not a sin, but a circumstance of sin. Nor is it a circumstance that adds a new species, since anyone who sins incurs ingratitude, at least for the benefits he has received from God.

Reply Obj. 2: The amount of fault which exists from the species of sin must be made known to the priest by confession, but not necessarily the amount that is from every circumstance, as was said above in the place mentioned.

Reply Obj. 3: The text of Gregory is not pertinent to this question. For Gregory speaks about sins that are not effaced by penance, for they soon drag us into another sin by their weight. And furthermore, it is not necessary to confess all occasions of sin, but only those without the cutting off of which a sufficient remedy for sin cannot be applied.

Reply Obj. 4: Even in that case he is not bound to confess again sins that have already been forgiven; but it suffices for him to do the satisfaction imposed on him before, as was said in the main response.

Question 2

Reality and sacrament in penance

Next we must ask about the reality and sacrament in penance; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, what is the reality here, and what is the sacrament;

• second, the unity of this sacrament;
• third, its institution.
• Article 1

What is the reality here, and what is the sacrament

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 65, a. 1; q. 84, a. 1.) It seems that outward penance is not a sacramental sign. For a sacramental sign, according to Hugh, is a material element. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) But outward penance is not an element, but an act. Therefore, it is not a sacramental sign.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sacramental signs of the new law are in a certain way a cause of grace. Therefore, if outward penance is a sacramental sign, it will therefore be a cause of grace, and thus grace will be from our acts, which is the Pelagian heresy.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every sacramental sign is sanctified by the word of life. But no form of words is applied to outward penance to sanctify it. Therefore, it is not a sacramental sign.

On the contrary, in every sacrament there must be some sign. But a sign is something apparent to the senses. Therefore, since in the sacrament of penance nothing outward appears but outward penance, it seems that this is the sacramental sign.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that inward penance is not the reality of this sacrament. (Parallels: ST III, q. 84, a. 1, ad 3.) For the reality of a sacrament is never the cause of the sacramental sign, but just the reverse sometimes. But interior penance is the cause of outward penance. Therefore, it is not its reality.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, outward penance naturally signifies interior penance. But the reality behind the sacrament is signified through the sacrament by its institution, as is clear from Hugh’s definition in the place cited. (Ibid.) Therefore, the interior penance is not the reality behind the outward penance.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, interior penance seems to be the same as contrition. But contrition is not the reality of this sacrament, since it is a part of the sacrament. Therefore, interior penance is not the reality of this sacrament.

On the contrary (1), interior baptism is the reality behind the outward baptism. Therefore, by the same reasoning, interior penance is also the reality of the outward.

Furthermore (2), what immediately causes the sacrament’s effect is the reality behind the outward sacrament, as is evident in the case of the character. But interior penance is what immediately causes the remission of sins, which is the last reality of this sacrament. Therefore, etc.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the remission of sins is not the reality behind this sacrament. (Parallel: ST III, a. 84, a. 1, ad 3.) For the efficacy of the sacrament and the ministry of its minister extend to the same thing. But the ministry of the priest does not extend to the remission of guilt, as the Master said above in Distinction 18. (See d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 4, resp.) Therefore, the remission of guilt is not the reality of this sacrament.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in any sacrament the outward signs have a certain likeness with the reality behind the sacrament. But confession and satisfaction and contrition do not seem to have any likeness with the remission of sins. Therefore, this is not the reality in this sacrament.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in baptism the reality behind the sacrament does not always precede the sacrament, even if sometimes it does precede it. But the remission of sins always precedes the sacrament of penance, at least as regards some of its parts; for satisfaction can only belong to someone who is in a state of grace, since his sins have already been forgiven; confession also perishes from a dead man, as it says in Sirach 17:28. Therefore, the remission of sins is not the final reality of this sacrament.

On the contrary (1), penance is called the second plank after the shipwreck, as baptism is the first. But the final reality of baptism is the remission of sins. Therefore, of penance as well.

Furthermore (2), the reality behind the sacrament that was instituted for a cure is the curing of the disease. But penance was instituted for curing the disease of actual sin. Therefore, its remission is the reality of this sacrament.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that in any sacrament a certain advancement or motion of the recipient is made toward sanctity. Now in physical movements sometimes what is moved does not cooperate with the motion except by receiving the impulse of the agent, as happens in generation, by which something acquires the first perfection of its being, which is also the first active principle in it. And similarly also when it acquires some added perfection that exceeds the limits of its form, as when a wall is painted or the air is illuminated. But sometimes a perfection is first received as the sufficient principle of that motion; and then it operates that motion, as is seen in the case of natural local motion, and in the healing that happens by the power of nature alone. But sometimes a perfection possessed does not suffice for bringing about the effect, but it cooperates with an external agent, as is seen when art assists nature.

And the movement toward sanctity is also according to these three modes. Thus in baptism, which is the regeneration of the spiritual life, the whole sanctification is from without; nor is the recipient actively related to this sanctification, but as a receiver alone. Therefore, the sacramental sign there is the outwardly applied matter, but not any act on the part of the baptized. And it is the same way in confirmation, the Eucharist, and last rites, and in holy orders, which are ordered to adding a certain sanctity to that first sanctity received in baptism. Hence they have their place even where baptismal grace has been preserved. But in the advancement toward sanctity by the path of merit it suffices to have an inner principle, namely, grace; and therefore without anything added from without, someone who has grace attains this advancement by his own acts, for the spiritual life is unimpaired in him.

But in someone who sins mortally after baptism the solidity of the spiritual life is destroyed, for grace and charity are destroyed. But nevertheless spiritual life still remains in its root, namely, in the sacrament of faith, just as in someone who is dangerously ill the root of life still remains in his heart. And this is why for the restoration of the original wholeness received in baptism a person can cooperate through what still remains. Yet it is not enough unless he is helped from without, because his spiritual life is not sound. And therefore in the sacrament of penance, which is ordered to the reparation described, the sacramental sign is not any matter outwardly applied, but outward acts by which a person cooperates with his own salvation; and the completion of the reparation from without is signified by the absolution of the priest, as the matter in the other sacraments receives sacramental efficacy by the sanctification of the minister. And this is why outward penance is the sacramental sign in the sacrament of penance.

Reply Obj. 1: ‘Element’ is taken broadly for anything sensible; and external penance consists in acts that can be sensed.

Reply Obj. 2: The matter that is the sacramental sign in the other sacraments, inasmuch as it is given from without, represents the outward agent in sanctification. And therefore in a certain way it belongs to it to cause grace, as was said in Distinction 1. But the outward penance, which is the sacramental sign in this sacrament, represents the cooperation of the receiver, and not an influence that is from the side of the outward agent. And therefore it does not apply to it to cause grace in any way.

Reply Obj. 3: In the other sacraments the form of words is applied to the sacramental signs to sanctify them, because they contain and cause grace. But outward penance is a sign not causing grace; and therefore it is not necessary that it be sanctified by any form of words, but the words that are uttered by the absolving priest are immediately directed toward the person who subjects himself to the sacrament. Therefore, he is sanctified by the power of absolution, and receives grace. But his confession is not sanctified in such a way that he would receive grace from it, as was the case in baptism with the sanctification of the water.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the reality of any sacrament is proportioned to the sacrament of which it is called the reality. Now outward penance, which is the sacrament alone in penance, is sacrament as sign alone on the part of the act of the penitent, but as sign and cause together if the act of the penitent is joined with the act of the minister. And so inward penance is the reality behind the outward penance, but only as signified by the acts of the penitent; as signified and caused, however, by the same acts when the absolution of the minister is added, by which a man in some way is disposed to grace; as also in the sacrament of the Eucharist the true body of Christ is the reality only signified by the species of bread and wine, but caused by the words of the minister. And those two things joined together are sign and cause.

Reply Obj. 1: Interior penance can be considered in two ways. In one way as a certain act of virtue, and thus inward penance is in every way the cause of outward penance, as also in the other virtues inward acts are the causes of outward ones. In another way as the act operating toward the healing of sin; and in this way it pertains to the sacrament of penance; and thus the interior repentance is not the cause of the outward, but the effect or the thing signified by it. For it does not have the efficacy of working against the disease of sin, except by the supposition of intending outward penance and the desire for absolution; although inner repentance working against the disease of sin precedes outward penance in time, as the justification from sin sometimes precedes the sacrament of baptism because of the intention of it.

Reply Obj. 2: Although inner repentance, as it is a certain act of virtue, is naturally signified by the outward, nevertheless inasmuch as it heals a disease, it is able to be caused and signified by these signs from its institution.

Reply Obj. 3: The three parts of penance exist both in outward penance and inner repentance; for confession and satisfaction, which seem to pertain only to outward penance, are found in interior repentance in their intention and premeditation; and even contrition, which seems to belong only to interior repentance, is found in outward penance according to certain signs, by which it is sensibly manifested, whether to others, or at least to the penitent himself, who perceives the sensible sorrow in himself.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the final reality of any sacrament is not only what it effects as actually performed, but also what it brings about by existing in intention, as is clear regarding baptism in adults. And therefore since penance as a sacrament existing in one’s intention effects the remission of sins not only as to the punishment but also as to the guilt, the remission of sins is the reality of the sacrament of penance itself in both ways, which sometimes precedes the outward sacrament in time, but sometimes is brought about about in the sacrament itself, for when someone approaches confession with attrition, not full contrition, if he places no obstacle, then in the very confession and absolution grace and the remission of sins is given to him. This is why commenting on Psalm 96:6: confession and beauty are before him, the Gloss says, if you love beauty, confess, so that you may be beautiful, that is, upright.

Reply Obj. 1: The power of the keys also extends in a certain way to the remission of guilt, according as it is in the intention, as was said above in Distinction 17, Question 3, Article 5, Subquestion 1. (Moos gives as the reference dist. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 4, in the response, at “Et ideo per baptismum.”)

Reply Obj. 2: The remission of sins has a certain likeness with those things that are done in penance, for the infusion of grace which causes the remission of sin is represented by the absolution of the priest, and the preparation for grace as to the motion of free will against sin is represented by contrition. But as to the movement of free will toward God, it is represented by confession, in which one entrusts oneself to God for healing. But the treatment of the traces left behind by sin is both signified and effected by satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the remission of sins happens in the very confession and absolution, as was said, and then the reality does not precede the sacrament.

Article 2

The unity of the sacrament of penance

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that penance is not one sacrament. For a sacrament is in the genus of signs. But there are several signs in penance, namely, confession and satisfaction. Therefore, it is several sacraments.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the acts of different agents are different acts. But for confession, the act of a penitent who has contrition and confesses and makes satisfaction must go together with the act of the priest who gives absolution. Therefore, since penance consists in an act, it seems that it is not one act, but many.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the genus is not predicated of its many species in the singular, but in the plural. But above, in Distinction 16, (See d. 16, q. 1, a. 2.) three species of penance are assigned, namely, penance before baptism, penance after baptism for venial sins, and penance for mortal sins. Therefore, the species of penance mentioned are several, and not one sacrament.

On the contrary (1), there are only seven sacraments. But if penance were several sacraments, there would be more than seven sacraments. Therefore, it is only one sacrament.

Furthermore (2), the unity of the cause is inferred from the unity of effect. But penance is ordered to one effect, namely the remission of actual sin. Therefore, it is only one sacrament.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this sacrament consists more in those things that are performed by the priest than in those things that are performed by the penitent. For sacrament is named from ‘making sacred,’ as was said above. (At the start of dist. 1.) But to consecrate belongs to a priest, who is called a priest (sacerdos) by the fact that he gives sacred things. Therefore, this sacrament consists more in the absolution of the priest than in the act of the penitent.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever approaches a sacrament is said to receive the sacrament. But the penitent is not said to receive confession, but absolution. Therefore, the sacrament consists more in absolution than in confession.

On the contrary (3), the whole is the sum of the parts. But the parts of penance are taken from the side of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Therefore, the sacrament of penance consists more in the act of the penitent than in the absolution of the priest.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the words of the absolving priest should be in the manner of a prayer. (Parallels: ST III, q. 84, a. 3; de Forma absol.) For Pope Leo says that God’s indulgence cannot be obtained by anything but the prayers of a priest; (Leo the Great, Epistle 108, ad Theodorum Foroliviensem Episcopum (PL 54:1011).) and he is speaking of the absolution given by priests. Therefore, the absolution should be made in the manner of a prayer.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God alone remits sins. But penance is ordered to the remission of sins. Therefore, the absolution, from which penance has its efficacy, must be made in the manner of a prayer to God.

On the contrary, penance has a certain effect, like the other sacraments. But because of the certitude of effect in other sacraments, we use indicative verbs. Therefore, it should be the same in penance.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that when a certain effect proceeds from multiple causes converging at once, then none of them is the per se cause, but all are one cause, as is evident with those who row a ship. Therefore, since the effect of penance only results from all the things that are required for penance existing in some way, all those things have the nature of one cause with respect to this effect. And since sacraments effect by signifying, this is why all those things also have the nature of one sign, as long as each one incompletely signifies that effect; and because of this all these things are one sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: The effect of penance is not sufficiently represented by any of those several things, but by all of them together; and therefore all are one sign.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said, the acts of the penitent are the matter of this sacrament, like the material element in other sacraments. Therefore, just as by the matter and form one sacrament is brought about in other sacraments, so here it is done by the act of the penitent and the absolution of the priest.

Reply Obj. 3: The penance before baptism is not a sacrament. However, penance after baptism for mortal and venial sins is a sacrament, not two, but one: for this sacrament is ordered principally to mortal sin, and to venial sin as a result.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in the sacraments, in which there is matter and form, the signification is from the side of the matter principally, but the efficacy is from the side of the form. And therefore since the acts of the penitent in this sacrament are like the matter, and the absolution of the priest is like the form, this sacrament principally consists in the act of the penitent as regards the notion of signifying, but as to its efficacy in the absolution of the priest.

And by this the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: In other sacraments the element outwardly shown is the matter, but here what is in the place of the matter and sign is the act proceeding from the interior. And therefore it is not the same in the reception of this sacrament and in the others.

Reply Obj. 3: The multiplication in baptism does not happen on the part of the form but on the part of the matter in baptism, namely, immersion. And in the same way the parts of penance are also assigned on the side of the penitent more than on the side of the one giving absolution. And just as uttering the form is not divided against the three immersions, so the priest’s absolution is not considered a part in contrast with the three other parts of penance.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that there are some sacraments in which a certain effect always results in the recipient from the administration of the sacrament, nor is it impeded because of an indisposition of the recipient’s will, as is the case in all the sacraments that imprint a character. And this is why in those sacraments the words express the sacrament’s effect in the present tense for the sake of certitude, either by the indicative mood, as in baptism and confirmation, or by the imperative mood, as in holy orders. However, in penance all effect of absolution is impeded by the indisposition of the will; and yet in itself this absolution brings about its effect sufficiently with certitude, unless there is some impediment; and therefore absolution is given in the indicative mood, but it is prefaced by a prayer, namely, Misereatur, so that the effect of absolution may not be impeded. However, this is not about the sacrament’s existing, but about its existing well.

And by this the answers to the objections are clear.

Article 3

The institution of the sacrament of penance

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 84, a. 7.) It seems that the sacrament of penance does not have an institution. For what belongs to natural law does not need institution. But it is from the dictates of natural law that a man repents his wrongdoing. Therefore, it should not have an institution.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same penance is both a sacrament and a virtue. But the virtue of penance does not have institution, as neither do the other virtues. Therefore, neither does the sacrament of penance.

On the contrary, institution is included in the definition of a sacrament given by Hugh, as was seen above, in Distinction 1.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this sacrament was instituted before Christ. For the punishment of Gehenna was prepared for sinners before sin, as is clear by the fact that it says: for Topheth his burning place was prepared from yesterday (Isa 30:33): that is, this punishment was prepared from the beginning for the wicked. But God is more inclined to have mercy than to punish. Therefore, also before sin the remedy against sin, which is penance, was prepared, and thus penance was instituted before Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Lord instituted the sacrament of the Eucharist by consecrating it. Therefore, he likewise instituted the sacrament of penance by imposing punishment. But under the law of nature he imposed the punishment for sin immediately after sin, as is seen in Genesis 3. Therefore, the sacrament of penance was instituted under the law of nature before the coming of Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the parts of the sacrament of penance are contrition and confession and satisfaction. But before Christ in the time of the law of Moses contrition is commanded: rend your hearts (Joel 2:13); and confession: no one who conceals transgressions will prosper, but one who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy (Prov 28:13); and satisfaction, in Leviticus 4 and 5, where is commanded what should be offered for every sin. Therefore, the sacrament of penance was instituted before the coming of Christ.

On the contrary (1), penance is a sacrament of perfection, for by it we obtain the remission of sins. But before Christ’s coming there were no sacraments of perfection: for the law brought no one to perfection (Heb 7:19). Therefore, the sacrament of penance was not instituted before Christ’s coming.

Furthermore (2), the sacrament of penance has its efficacy from the keys of the Church. But the keys did not exist before Christ’s coming. Therefore, neither did the sacrament of penance.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it was not instituted under the new law after Christ’s coming. For the new law is the law of remission and grace. But penance is the sacrament of punishment, for it is a certain veangance, as Augustine says. (Pseudo-Augustine, On true and false repentance, ch. 8, n. 22 (PL 40:1120).) Therefore, it did not have to be instituted in the new law.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since the institution of the sacraments pertains to the power of excellence, it belongs only to Christ. But Christ is not read to have instituted this sacrament, for it cannot be said that he instituted it where he says, do penance (Matt 3:2), for by the same argument John would have instituted it, for he preached this earlier. And also, the keys of the Church, which furnish efficacy to this sacrament, did not yet exist; nor again can it be said that it was instituted when he sent the lepers to the priests, for the administering of this sacrament does not pertain to priests of the law, to whom the lepers had been sent. Therefore, this sacrament was not instituted in the new law.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sacrament of the Eucharist, which Christ instituted, he himself also used. But the use of this sacrament is never read about, for in John 8 he forgave the sin of the adulteress without sacrament, for he did not impose any satisfactory punishment. Therefore, he did not institute it.

On the contrary, penance is a sacrament in the new law. But the sacraments of any law have their institution in that law. Therefore, it was instituted in the new law.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that the sacrament of penance consists in a determinate mode of doing penance, which mode indeed is not the same among all people, nor at all times. And thus the obligation to that mode exists from a certain institution: and because of this, the sacrament of penance has its own institution.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural law dictates to man that penance should be done, but the particular mode of doing penance that is observed in the sacrament of penance is not from the dictates of natural law, but from its institution.

Reply Obj. 2: Penance is a virtue as it is from the dictates of natural law. And thus it does not have an institution insofar as it is a virtue, but as to the determinate mode that makes it a sacrament. And both of these are found in one penance, and thus the same penance is a sacrament and a virtue, and from natural law in one respect, and from its institution in another.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that when something that belongs to the essence of a thing is changed, it is not the same thing in number. Therefore, since the determinate mode that is observed in the Church by penitents is of the essence of this sacrament, this sacrament did not exist before this mode of doing penance existed. And since this mode did not exist before the coming of Christ, therefore neither should the sacrament of penance be said to have existed beforehand; although something like it did exist before the coming of Christ, and some mode of doing penance. But in the law of Moses there was a determinate mode, but it was different than this mode. But in the time of the natural law there was no determinate mode, but everyone determined his own mode of doing penance, according to what came into his heart. For all sacraments of that time were celebrated by desire, according to Hugh. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 11, ch. 3 (PL 176:343).) And thus penance is a sacrament of both the old and the new law, and of natural law; and as it is a sacrament of the new law it was not instituted before the coming of Christ; inasmuch as it was a sacrament of the law of nature, it was not instituted in a determinate way, but man was incited to determine some mode of doing penance, which incitement indeed could not have existed before fault, after which the need for medicine is recognized. And so penance, even when it is not a sacrament of the new law, nevertheless was instituted before the coming of Christ in some way, but in no way before sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The sacrament of penance too was prepared before sin in God’s foreknowledge, but not in institution, just as also the punishment of hell was not ordered to man’s punishment before sin, but in God’s foreknowledge. But for the punishment of the demon, who had already sinned, it was also actually ordered.

Reply Obj. 2: That imposition of punishment did not belong to the sacrament of penance, but rather an act of retributive justice, since he had prompted him to repentance when he said, Adam, where are you? (Gen 3:9); where, according to the Gloss, he is brought to the recognition of his sin.

Reply Obj. 3: In the law of Moses there was a kind of confession, for in general one professed his sin while making offering prescribed by the law for that sin, but not specifically, as it is in the new law. Nor again was it made to a priest possessing the keys, as sacramental confession is. Nor was there satisfaction according to the judgment of such a priest, nor contrition with the intention of this confession and satisfaction; and thus there was a certain kind of penance then, but not what is now a sacrament.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that penance was instituted by the Lord in different places as to different things. For as to usefulness it was instituted in Matt 3:2 where he said: do penance, which is why it continues, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. But as to necessity, where he said in Luke 13:5: unless you do penance you will all perish together. But as to the power of the keys, where he said to Peter: whatever you bind on earth, will be bound in heaven and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven (Matt 16:19) and where he said to everyone, whatever sins you forgive, they are forgiven (John 20:23). And afterward James explained something of the mode of penance, where he said, confess your sins to one another (Jas 5:16).

Reply Obj. 1: The punishment that is assumed in penance is like nothing in comparison to the punishment that is forgiven. And thus penance is more a sacrament of forgiveness than punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The Lord first instituted the sacrament of penance in Matt 3:2, as has been said, when he said: do penance. For repenting and doing penance is not the same: for to do penance means outwardly demonstrating the inner repentance. Nor did John institute it, although he likewise preached it: for John preached it as the king’s herald, while Christ preached it as our king and lawgiver, whose word had power, as it says in Matthew 7:26. But when he sent lepers to priests, he did not institute it, but prefigured the sacrament of penance.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ did not make use of any sacrament unless by taking it unto himself so as to give an example to others. (Thomas clearly has in mind here the consuming of the Eucharist at the Last Supper, where Jesus gave an example of what the disciples were to do with the consecrated food and drink. The baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, while not the same as the Christian sacrament, would be another illustration of the same idea.) This is why he also did not baptize, but his disciples did, as it says in John 4:2; and so since the use of penance did not apply to him for himself, who did not commit sin; therefore, neither did he use it for others. But as the Lord of the sacraments he supplied the effect of the sacrament without sacraments.

Exposition of the Text

He shall undoubtedly revoke the sentence, etc: (Sententiae IV, 22. 1 (125). 2 citing Ambrose, On the letter to the Ephesians, dist. 17. c. 4, n2.; cf. Gratian, Decretum, c 9, q 2, c 1.) This is to be understood as referring to the last effect of mercy, which is eternal life.

But also the original sins which had been remitted to him in baptism: (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 3 citing text attributed to Rabanus but actually taken from Gratian, Decretum, de poenitentia, D4 c1.) it is said in the plural because he inclines to different actual sins, as was said in Book II, Distinction 33. (See Bk. 2, d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.)

But one who had not persevered did not make worthy and sufficient satisfaction: (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 9.) This is true if it is understood about its sufficiency for obtaining glory. Otherwise, it is false; and it proceeds here according to the error that was disproved in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 1, namely, that no one would fall, if it were true.

Becomes as guilty as he was before: (Sent. IV, 22.1 (125). 10.) The as does not mean equality, but likeness.