D. 16 - Parts of penance
After the Master has examined penance in general, here he moves to the parts of penance; and this is divided into two parts: in the first, the parts of penance are distinguished; in the second, he raises certain questions comparing the parts of penance with each other, at Distinction 17: here arises a manifold question. (Sententiae IV, 17.1 (92). 1.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, he distinguishes the parts that are, as it were, integral parts of penance, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction; in the second, he distinguishes the parts that are like subjective parts, at: to the foregoing it must be added, etc. (Sent. IV, 16.3 (88). 1.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, the parts of penance are distinguished; in the second, he teaches the manner of repenting according to those parts, at: and so discretion is most necessary for the penitent. (Sent. IV, 16.2 (87). 1.)
Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows the number of parts; second, he examines the individual parts in detail, at: compunction is commended to us there. (Sent. IV, 16.1 (86). 3.)
And so discretion is most necessary for the penitent. Here he shows the manner of repenting, and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows the manner of a worthy penance; second, the manner of a false one, at: and just as there are worthy fruits of penance and true satisfaction, so there are unworthy fruits. (Sent. IV, 16.3 (88). 1.)
Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he assigns the manner of penance from the words of Augustine as to the contrition of the heart; second, as to the confession of the mouth, at: let him beware lest, because of shame, he splits up his confession; (Sent. IV, 16.2 (87). 5 Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, c15 n31.) third, as to making satisfaction by the work of abstaining from sacred things and from illicit things, at: let him beware, too, lest he come to the Lord’s body before he is strengthened by a good conscience. (Sent. VI, 16.2 (87). 5 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, c15 n31..)
To the foregoing it must be added, etc. Here he assigns other subjective parts, as it were, of penance. And concerning this he does two things: first, he distinguishes them, second, he examines each of them in detail, and namely, the penance for venial sins, which involves a particular doubt, at: as to what is sufficient for venial sins, Augustine indicates. (Sent. IV, 16.6 (91). 1.)
Here four questions arise. First, about the parts of penance. Second, about the remission of venial sins in this life, which pertains to one part of penance. Third, about the circumstances of sin, according to which the manner of penance should be formed. Fourth, of impediments to true penance.
Question 1
Component parts of penance
Concerning the first, two questions arise:
first, the parts of penance that are integral to it;
- second, the parts assigned second.
- Article 1
The component parts of penance
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, a. 1.) It seems that penance does not have parts. For nothing simple has parts. But according to Ambrose, every sacrament is simple. (This statement cannot be found in the works of Ambrose.) Therefore, penance, since it is a sacrament, does not have parts.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism is more manifold in power than penance: for it completely takes away original and actual sin as to guilt and punishment, which is not true of penance. Therefore, since parts are not assigned to baptism, neither should parts be assigned to penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, medicine should be proportionate to the disease. But sin, which is a spiritual disease for which the medicine is penance, does not have parts like this. Therefore, neither should parts be assigned to penance.
On the contrary (1), the penitent imposes on himself a penalty due for sin. But for sin committed against God there is not only due an interior penalty but an outward one, as is evident in hell. Therefore, both kinds of penalty are required for the perfection of penance. Therefore, penance has parts.
Furthermore (2), spiritual sickness should be more carefully healed than physical. But the healing that is done against physical sickness is distinguished according to certain parts, for first the sickness is removed, and then the after-effects of the sickness. Therefore, penance too, which is the healing for a spiritual sickness, should have parts.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that these three parts are inappropriately assigned to it: namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction. (Parallels: below, d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 4; d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 3; ST III, q. 90, a. 2; SCG IV, ch. 72; de Eccles. sacram.) For every part of a sacrament is conferred by ministers of the Church. But no minister of the Church confers contrition on a penitent. Therefore, it is not a part of the sacrament of penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin is forgiven by the sacrament of penance. But sometimes sin is forgiven before confession, as the Master shows below, in the following distinction. Therefore, confession is not a part of penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a sacrament of the new law, grace is conferred on the recipient. But in satisfaction no grace is conferred. Therefore, it is not part of a sacrament.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the fruit of a thing and its part are not the same. But satisfaction is called a fruit of penance in the text. Therefore, satisfaction is not a part of penance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they are subjective parts. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, a. 3.) For those parts of penance, as is clear from the text, are taken according to the sins of the heart, the mouth, and works. But these are the subjective parts of sin. Therefore, any parts assigned to penance are also subjective parts of it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the complete whole does not result from its part, for it does not follow that if there is a wall, there is a house. But penance results from every one of the parts assigned: for it follows that a person who is contrite repents therefore; and similarly with the others. Therefore, they are not integral parts, but subjective ones.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, integral parts of any whole that has permanent existence exist at the same time. But penance has a permanent existence, like all the other sacraments. Therefore, since the parts of penance do not exist at the same time, they are not integral parts but subjective ones.
On the contrary (1), subjective parts are not required for the perfection of the complete whole: for in every subjective part the perfect nature of the whole is found, like the perfect nature of animal in man. But the parts assigned to penance are required for its completion, as it says in the text. Therefore, they are not subjective parts.
Furthermore (2), no individual thing has subjective parts; for example, one animal does not have subjective parts. But the assigned parts are the parts of any single penance; which is clear from the fact that one penance is only done for a single sin to the extent that the three things mentioned are found in it. Therefore, they are not subjective parts.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they are also parts of the virtue of penance. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, aa. 1–2.) As it says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 8, 1178a34–35.) for the perfection of moral virtue an inward and an outward act is required. But penance is a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice. Therefore, for its perfection there is an interior contrition, and a confession, and an outward satisfaction; and these are also the parts of the sacrament of penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, satisfaction is the act of a certain virtue, and that virtue is none but penance; and likewise with the other acts. Therefore, they are parts of the virtue of repentance, not only the sacrament of penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, justice requires that someone be punished by the same things through which he sinned. But these three things that are assigned as parts of penance are penalties corresponding to the three things by which we sin. Therefore, they are required for the perfection of justice, but only with respect to that part which is called penance. Therefore, they are parts of the virtue of penance.
On the contrary (1), an act is not a part of a habit. But the virtue of penance is a habit, while these three things are acts. Therefore, they are not parts of the virtue of repentance.
Furthermore (2), the subject of virtue is the mind, according to Augustine. (See the note at d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, obj. 1, for a discusssion of the “Augustinian” definition of virtue.) But confession is not in the mind as its subject, and likewise neither is satisfaction. Therefore, they are not parts of the virtue of repentance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer by saying that in penance there is no outward thing for the matter, like water in baptism, but this very human act stands in the place of matter in this sacrament, which by a certain recompense takes away the offense from previous fault. Now in human acts there is a certain progression of attaining perfection because of the different parts of a man, each one of which moves another. And so it is necessary that the different things be considered according to their order to the perfection of penance; and these are called the parts of penance.
Reply Obj. 1: There is some doubt about that citation, whether it is from Ambrose. But if it be granted, it should be understood that the sacrament is simple by reason of its principal effect, and the simple power that it works. But the material in the sacrament can be composite, as is evident in confirmation and the Eucharist. And so also with regard to our act, which is like the matter in penance, parts are assigned to it.
Reply Obj. 2: Parts are not assigned to penance with regard to sacramental power, but with regard to what is material in it. Now in baptism the mater is an external thing, in which there is only one existing thing to consider. And so parts are not assigned to baptism, for although there is a certain act of ours in baptism, it is not of the essence of baptism, but a disposition to baptism.
Reply Obj. 3: Good, according to Dionysius, is caused by a single and integral cause; but evil arises from individual lacks. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) And so, for the completeness of sin it is enough for a failing to be found in any step of a human act. And because of this, nothing like integral parts are assigned to sin, as to penance, which repairs the good lost.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said, as has been said, that penance abolishes the offense of a previous fault by way of a certain recompense. However, this recompense differs in two ways from the recompense in retributive justice.
First, because in retributive justice the one who sinned is related to the recompense as merely suffering it, as the penalty by which compensation is made for the fault is inflicted on him by another. And so no sorrow for the sin is presupposed for this recompense, but the sorrow is inflicted by the compensating punishment. In penance, though, the one who sinned is related to the recompense as also doing it, for he seeks out the compensating penalty of his own will; and so displeasure with his fault is prerequisite.
Second, it differs because in retributive justice the compensating penalty is reckoned according to the judgment of the judge, not of the one against whom the sin was committed. But in penance the compensating penalty must be reckoned according to the judgment of the one the sin was committed against; for this kind of recompense is made to reconcile an offended spirit, which reconciliation cannot happen unless the penalty of the one compensating suffices for his will. And so in penance the manner of the satisfying penalty must be taken from the judgment of a priest, who occupies the place of God on earth. Therefore, this is common to both kinds of recompense, that recompense is not made according to the judgment of the one who sinned, but another man’s judgment.
Now right judgment requires recognition of the fault, which is called confession if it is made by the one who sinned to the one who must assess a penalty; but it is called conviction if it is otherwise. Since in penance the one who sinned seeks to make satisfaction of his own accord, it requires confession.
And so recompense is completed by three steps. The first, being displeased with the past fault; otherwise, one would not seek of his own will to make compensation; and this is perfected by contrition. The second is that he make his fault known to God through the priest; otherwise he would not offer himself for recompense according to the judgment of the one he had sinned against; and this is confession. The third is that he make compensation in accord with the priest’s judgment; and as to this it is satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 1: In the sacraments that have for their matter a certain physical thing, the Church’s ministers have two kinds of acts; namely, the sanctification of the matter by the word of God, and the application of the matter to the one who receives the sacrament. But in this sacrament which has for its matter a human act itself, the matter cannot be applied by the ministry of a priest to the person who receives the sacrament, for the acts are not from without. And so the consummation of those very acts pertains to his ministry according to absolution and the imposition of a penalty; which is like a kind of sanctification.
Reply Obj. 2: Even if sin is forgiven before the actual confession, nevertheless it is never forgiven before someone intends to confess; just as also before actually receiving baptism someone obtains the reality of baptism by his intention of being baptized.
Reply Obj. 3: Grace is conferred by the intention of making satisfaction, although actual satisfaction presupposes grace. Or it could be said that by satisfaction the penitent obtains the complete effect of grace blotting out his sin, for he is completely freed from the guilt of sin.
Reply Obj. 4: The last thing in which a thing is consummated is called that thing’s end, as form has the nature of an end. And because satisfaction is the last part in which penance is consummated, this is why it is called the ‘fruit,’ which connotes the character of an end.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that certain people say that there are subjective parts, if one considers penance in one way according as it has only the nature of penalty: for each of these parts is a certain punishment.
But this cannot be: for the complete whole is not predicated of each of its many parts taken together, whether it is a genus or a species: for three men are not animal, but animals. Therefore, since three parts of penance are not three penances, but one, it cannot be that they are subjective parts.
Furthermore, the penalty that the penitent suffers falls completely within the definition of satisfaction: for a man does not satisfy by outward penalty alone, but also inner penalty; otherwise mental prayer would not be satisfactory. And so also the penalty that exists in contrition, and the one that exists in confession, fall under parts of satisfaction. And since satisfaction is the last part, the whole sacrament is named from the penalty, as a thing is named from what is the last thing in it.
And so others say that these are potential parts. But this again cannot be. For among potential parts the whole is present according to the nature of its own essence in every complete part, as the essence of the soul is in any of its powers; but the whole nature of penance according to the species does not exist in any of these. Furthermore, one of them does not include in itself the force of all the others, which is required in potential parts; but each one serves its own purpose.
Therefore, it should be said with others that they are integral parts. But it should be known that there are two kinds of integral parts. Some are parts of quantity; which are sometimes of one nature as in homogeneous wholes; but sometimes of different natures, as heterogeneous wholes. But some are parts of the essence, like matter and form, and not of quantity; and these always have different characters, and they have an order of nature to each other and sometimes also an order of time among those things whose being is not simultaneous. And these are the kinds of parts that we are speaking of now: for the sacrament of penance is composed out of these three things according to the nature of its species; and one is prior to the other according to nature, and sometimes also according to time, in the fact that human acts, which are the materials in penance, do not exist whole at the same time, but they come one after other; but sometimes many of them, of which one is prior to another by nature, are simultaneous in time.
Reply Obj. 1: The parts of penance do not respectively correspond to those individual parts of sin in reality, because for any of these sins the three parts of penance are necessary. But they would by a certain adaptation, considering a likeness to medicine for a disease as to the same instrument. For some people say that in every sin these three can be found, for there is an inner mouth and an outward mouth; and an inner act and an outward act; and so also these three were subjective parts of sin. But it is clear that this is not according to the intention of the text, which speaks about the outward mouth and work.
Reply Obj. 2: Among the parts of successive things the whole can be concluded from any part, as: it is the third hour, therefore, the day. But the whole is not predicated of one part: for we do not say that an hour is a day. But nevertheless of all parts taken together in some way the whole is found to be predicated, although improperly. And so also penance is concluded from any part of penance, by the fact that penance does not have its whole being at the same time. Nevertheless, the whole is not predicated of the parts, whether separately or combined, properly speaking.
Reply Obj. 3: The material in penance is our acts; and since acts do not have permanent being, therefore, neither does penance; and so this objection proceeds on false grounds.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that no composition arises from what comes after a thing, for components are prior to what they compose. And so since our acts come after the virtues by which they were elicited, different acts which progress according to an order from virtue do not make any composition in virtue. And so the three things mentioned are not parts of the virtue of penance, but of the sacrament of penance. For these acts are like the sacrament’s matter, and the parts of a thing are sometimes taken as belonging to the division of matter.
Reply Obj. 1: External acts are required for the second perfection of moral virtues; but integral parts must be of the first perfection.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the three things mentioned are acts of the virtue of penance, it still does not follow that they are parts of it; for in any of the acts named all circumstances are found by which the mean of virtue is completed.
Reply Obj. 3: These three things are required for the virtue of penance, but not as parts, but rather as acts, as was said.
Article 2
The parts assigned second
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, a. 4.) It seems that the penance that precedes baptism should not be included as a part of penance. For baptism is the door to all the sacraments, and penance is called the second plank in relation to baptism. But the second is not before the first. Therefore, penance is not something before baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the actions of a certain nature do not belong to someone who has not been generated in that nature. But baptism is a kind of generation into spiritual life. Therefore, no action of the spiritual life pertains to someone who is not baptized. But penance is this kind of action, since it is a sacrament. Therefore, it cannot belong to someone before baptism.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, penance is ordered only against fault. But actual fault is sufficiently washed away in baptism. Therefore, penance does not need to precede baptism.
On the contrary (1), commenting upon the text, then the people of Jerusalem and all Judea were going out to him (Matt 3:5), the Gloss says, then the example was given to those to be baptized of confessing their sins, and promising better things. (Glossa, PL 114:79.) But this belongs to penance. Therefore, before baptism there should be penance.
Furthermore (2), commenting on Psalm 4:4: the things you say in your hearts, be sorry for them upon your beds, the Gloss says, so that when the old man has been destroyed through penance, we may offer the sacrifice of justice by the regeneration of the new man. (Glossa, PL 113:849.) But regeneration pertains to baptism. Therefore, there is a penance that is before baptism.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that penance before baptism is not only about actual sin, but also about original sin. For in his book On Penance, Augustine says, speaking about the penance before baptism, except for children, no one passes into Christ unless he begins to be what he was not, unless he repents of what he was. (Augustine, Sermon 351, ch. 2 (PL 39:1537).) But everyone was infected not only with actual sin, but also with original sin: for unless this was the infection he was speaking about, he would not have excepted children, who have no other infection. Therefore, there should be penance for original sin before baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the penitent bears his own punishment, so that he will avoid the one to be inflicted on him by God. But for original sin a punishment is inflicted by God. Therefore he should do penance for it.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, we do penance for actual sin because it displeases us. But original sin ought to displease us. Therefore, we should do penance for it.
On the contrary (1), penance regards what is willed. But we contract original sin without willing it. Therefore, penance is not done for it.
Furthermore (2), medicine should correspond to the sickness. But original sin is not contracted by any pleasure in the one who contracts it. Therefore, it seems that its healing does not come through any penal suffering, and thus, not by penance, which expresses ‘penalty’ in its name.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that after baptism no penance should be distinguished for venial sins. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, a. 4.) For it is superfluous to do by many things what can be done by one. But venial sin is healed by the Eucharist. Therefore, it is superfluous that penance is ordered toward healing it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, for things that are not in our power, penance is not required. But it is not in our power to avoid venial sins: for no one can avoid all venial sins. Therefore, there is no penance for venial sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, there are different medicines for different diseases, for according to Jerome, what heals the heel does not heal the eye. (Pseudo-Jerome, Exposition of the Gospel of Mark, on 9:28 (CCSL 82:42).) But penance is a remedy against mortal sin. Therefore, since venial sin differs infinitely from mortal sin, as the penalty shows, it seems that it is not ordered against venial sin, but against mortal.
On the contrary (1), what can do something greater can also do something lesser. But penance destroys mortal sin, which is more difficult. Therefore, it also destroys venial sin.
Furthermore (2), according to Augustine penance is someone punishing himself in retribution for what he regrets having committed. (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 8 (PL 40:1120).) But someone should regret committing venial sins and punish these in himself. Therefore, there is a penance for venial sins.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that we are bound to do penance for venial sins. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, a. 4.) For just as a man is bound to strive for glory, in the same way he is bound to remove an impediment to glory. But a man cannot attain glory unless his venial sins are forgiven. Therefore, since they cannot be forgiven without penance, it seems that a man is bound to do penance for venial sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, certain venial sins are done with mortal consent: for consenting to the enjoyment of mortal sin is a mortal sin. But a man is bound to avoid mortal sin. Therefore, he is bound to dissent from venial sin sometimes. But dissenting from sin belongs to penance. Therefore, a man is bound to do penance for venial sin sometimes.
On the contrary, no one is bound to undo deeds done that he was not bound to avoid before he did them. But a man is not bound to avoid venial sin before he does it; otherwise anyone doing it would sin mortally. Therefore, much less is he bound to repentance for it.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that those three parts are not sufficient. (Parallel: ST III, q. 90, a. 3.) For just as mortal and venial sins are committed after baptism, so also before baptism. But after baptism the penances for mortal and venial sins are distinguished from each other. Therefore, also before baptism; and so there are four parts.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, punishment is farther from fault than venial sin is from mortal. But it is necessary to do penance for the punishments of this present misery, as Augustine says in his book On Penance. (Augustine, Sermon 351, PL 39:1537.) Therefore, since the penance for venial sins is distinguished from the penance for mortal sins, there should also be a distinction between the penance by which we repent of the punishments of earthly pilgrimage, and the penance for venial sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, solemn penance is a certain mode of penance, as was said above, Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 5. Therefore, since he did not make mention of it, it seems the parts are insufficiently listed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that penance can be taken in two ways; namely, as it is a virtue, and as it is a sacrament.
Now according as it is a virtue, it denotes a detestation for sin with the intention of blotting it out according to the condition of the sinner’s state. And since anyone who does not detest sin has his will still fixed on sin, since the will once fixed on something is not torn away from it without it remaining actually or habitually, unless by actual dissenting from it, either in particular or at least in general. Now the will that remains fixed in sin is not receptive to baptismal grace. And so, prior to baptism, as if removing an obstacle, there is required a detestation for sins committed and an intention of destroying them, which destruction indeed occurs in baptism. And so it is clear that a repentance is required before baptism, according as it is an act of virtue, which is prior to baptism in time or at least in nature.
But penance, according as it is a sacrament, is administered by the Church’s ministers. And since the Church’s sacraments are only administered to those who belong to the Church, therefore the sacrament of penance is not applicable before baptism, since a man comes to belong to the Church by baptism.
And by this the answers are clear to all the objections except the third.
Reply Obj. 3: Penance is not required before baptism because of baptism’s insufficiency, but in order to remove any impediment to baptismal grace, so that baptism may have its own effect.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that repentance can be taken broadly or properly. Indeed, repentance properly denotes sorrow for sin committed in the past; and so there is no way for there to be repentance for original sin, since it was not committed.
But penitence can be said broadly for all displeasure with past evil, and in this way, in someone who has free will there should be repentance for original sin, for by the very fact that something pleases someone, anything that presents an impediment to it will displease him. Now original sin is an impediment to glory, toward which everyone should strive in his desires. However, there should not be confession about this, since confession is only about deeds; nor satisfaction, since all that is due for original sin is the penalty of loss, while penance conveys the penalty of the senses.
By this the answer to the objections is clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that we incur venial sin by our acts, and we should pay a sensible penalty for it; and so penance works toward the remission of venial sins in contrition, confession, and satisfaction, not only penance as a virtue but also penance as a sacrament. For after baptism someone is able to receive the Church’s sacraments when he sins venially.
Reply Obj. 1: It is superfluous to use many things principally for bringing about the same effect if any one of them would be sufficient. But no sacrament is used for the remission of venial sins as its principal effect, as was said above in Distinction 2, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 4. And so it is not unfitting if remission of venial sin is a consequence of many sacraments.
Reply Obj. 2: Although it is not in our power to avoid all venial sins, it is nevertheless in our power to avoid individual ones.
Reply Obj. 3: Although venial and mortal sin are different diseases, nevertheless they share in the one account of actual sin; and so penance is a medicine against both.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that when someone is said to be bound to something, a certain necessity attaches to it. Now there are two kinds of necessity.
One is absolute, and according to it a man is bound to do those things without which there is no salvation. And in this way one is not bound to do penance for venial sin, for he does not incur death from it, unless perhaps he disregard penance of scorn.
The other kind of necessity is conditional for attaining a certain end, as something may be called necessary without which we cannot attain the end aimed for. And in this way it is necessary that a man do penance for his venial sins, if they are to be forgiven him in this life. But according to this a person is not said to be bound to anything in the proper sense; and so it should be said that a man is not bound to do penance for venial sins, unless speaking more broadly.
Reply Obj. 1: If someone never does penance for his venial sins, he can attain life, for also after this life venial sins may be remitted, as will be said later.
Reply Obj. 2: Dissent means resistance to future sins, but penitence means displeasure over past sins, and so it is not necessary that dissent pertain to penitence.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that those three parts of penance are distinguished according to the different modes in which penance is done; and so they are subjective parts of the virtue of repentance, not the sacrament of penance. For one part does not pertain to the sacrament of penance, although the other two parts can belong to penance as a sacrament. And these modes are taken according to the different states of the penitent, for either he is outside the Church even in number, and then it is his first penance which is before baptism; or he is outside in merit but not in number; and then it is a second penance, which has to do with mortal sins; or he is within the Church in every way, and then the third kind of penance applies to him, which is for venial sins.
Reply Obj. 1: The state of man before baptism is not differentiated by venial and mortal sin as to his being in the Church or not being in the Church; but afterward, it is differentiated by mortal and venial sin, because a person becomes outside the Church in merit by mortal sin committed after baptism, but not by venial; and so the situation is not the same.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says that penance has to do with sufferings according as they incline to fault; also, when penitence is taken broadly for displeasure.
Reply Obj. 3: Solemn penance does not cause a different state of the penitent as to what was said; and so no mention is made here of it.
Question 2
Remission of venial sins
Next we consider the remission of venial sins; and concerning this, two questions arise:
first, the mode of remission;
- second, the cause of remission.
- Article 1
The mode of remission
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 87, a. 1.) It seems that venial sin can be forgiven while the will is still set on it. For the willing of venial sin does not exclude grace. But there is no venial sin that grace cannot forgive, since mortal sin, which is much more difficult, is forgiven by the power of grace. Therefore, venial sin can be forgiven while the will is still set on it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as mortal sin is opposed to charity, so is venial sin opposed to the fervor of charity. But what is compatible with charity does not impede the remission of mortal sin. Therefore, since the fervor of charity is compatible with a will permanently in venial sin, it seems that it can forgive venial sin in someone who has a will still clinging to it.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was said, for the will to be removed from what it was once fixed on, it requires actual displeasure. But sometimes venial sin is remitted in someone who has no displeasure with his venial sin, as is seen in the case of martyrs, who go straight to heaven, although perhaps they are not thinking about their venial sins, and do not have any actual displeasure. Therefore, it seems that venial sin can be forgiven someone whose will remains set on it.
On the contrary (1), while the cause remains, the effect cannot be removed. But the will’s clinging to something inordinately will be the cause of venial sin. Therefore, while the will is fixed on it, venial sin cannot be remitted.
Furthermore (2), the affection for an act has the nature of sin, just as so does the very working of sin. But the work itself of venial sin, while it remains, prevents the venial sin from being forgiven. Therefore, so does affection for it that remains.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one venial sin cannot be remitted without another. (Parallel: ST III, q. 87, a. 3, ad 2.) For just as was said in the preceding distinction, anyone the Lord cured, he freed in every way. But no one can be forgiven venial sin unless the Lord cures him. Therefore, if he is absolved from one venial sin, he is absolved from all.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, venial sin adheres more than mortal, which is why venial sin remains when the mortal sin has been forgiven. But one mortal sin cannot be remitted unless all others are. Therefore, neither can one venial sin be remitted without the others.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sin is not remitted to someone who displeases God. But venial sin displeases God. Therefore, as long as one venial sin remains, no other will be forgiven.
On the contrary, it takes more grace to remit mortal sin than venial. But one venial sin that remains fixed in the heart does not prevent the remission of a mortal sin. Therefore, much less does it prevent the remission of another venial sin.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that venial sin can be remitted without mortal sin being forgiven. (Parallel: ST III, q. 87, a. 4.) For commenting on the text, whoever is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone (John 8:7), Augustine says that all of them were in mortal sin, for venial sin was forgiven them by their ceremonies. (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 20, PL 40:1129.) Therefore, venial sin can be forgiven without mortal sin being forgiven.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, mortal and venial sin are divided against each other. But mortal sin can be forgiven without venial. Therefore, venial sin can be forgiven without mortal.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, for sin that was sufficiently punished, no other penalty is owed: for God does not take a double vengeance. (See Nahum 1:9 (LXX).) But someone who has mortal sin can sufficiently punish venial sin in himself, since a finite penalty is owed for it. Therefore, it will not be kept further for punishment. But a person is never absolved from the debt of punishment unless he is first absolved from his guilt; otherwise unordered guilt would remain unpunished. Therefore, while mortal sin remains, venial sin can be remitted.
On the contrary, Gregory says that venial sin overshadows the mind, but mortal sin completely darkens it. (See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 4, pars. 4–5, 16, and vicinity.) But shadows are only removed by light. Now the spiritual light is grace, which also clears away mortal sin. Therefore, venial sin cannot be forgiven without the remission of mortal sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that any sin must be remitted in two regards: namely, as to guilt, and as to punishment. Now the second remission cannot happen without the first; for as long as the guilt remains, the debt of punishment remains. Now guilt consists in the disordering of the will; and so guilt cannot be taken away unless the will is reordered; which cannot be as long as it remains disordered, otherwise two opposite things would be true at the same time. And therefore in no way can venial sin be remitted as long as the will remains in it.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not from a lack of grace that the venial sin in which the will still remains cannot be forgiven, but from a lack in the one who needs forgiveness, in which lack there is an impediment to forgiveness.
Reply Obj. 2: Any mortal sin whatsoever is opposed to any little charity; but not every venial sin is opposed to all fervor of charity. For ‘fervor of charity’ is said by a likeness according as it pours out, bubbling over in a way to the outside. Now from that part in which venial sin is committed, the fervor of charity does not appear, but something outside of charity. And so, although the fervor of charity exists in one respect, there can nevertheless be tepidity in others.
And thus not all fervor is opposed to every venial sin, which is why the comparison of mortal sin and charity to venial sin and the fervor of charity is not the same.
Reply Obj. 3: The will that was fixed on something is only removed from it by actual assent, if it occurs to the memory; otherwise a habitual assent suffices, (Moos notes that St. Thomas later disagreed with this point. At ST III, q. 87, a. 1, Thomas writes: “For the remission of venial sins, habitual displeasure does not suffice.”) as also happens with mortal sins that, though forgotten, are forgiven.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that with things that have no relation to each other, one can be taken away without the other; but if they are interdependent in some way, one cannot be taken away without the other.
Now mortal sins, although they have no relation in what is turned to, nevertheless are related in their turning away, for they all turn from the one unchangeable good. And therefore one cannot be remitted without the others, since remission of fault has more to do with opposing the turning away than with what was turned toward, for fault is remitted according to the restoration of what the fault separated one from.
Now venial sins are not related either in their turning toward or their turning away, for in them there is no turning away from the end, unless there is some defect in one of the acts that is expedient to the end; and this is why one venial sin can be forgiven without another.
Reply Obj. 1: The remission of venial sin is not compared, properly speaking, to healing; for infirmity, which is treated by healing, represents the privation of strength. But there is no privation or weakening of spiritual strength or virtue in venial fault, but only a disposition to have virtue stripped away; and so that argument is not to the point.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is not said to cling more than mortal sin on its side, as though it remained more firmly in the soul, but on our side, for we cannot avoid venial sin as easily as mortal sins, which we are obliged to have forgiven by necessity.
Reply Obj. 3: Mortal sin so displeases God that it even makes the sinner himself displeasing to God, inasmuch as it takes away the beauty of grace, which God loves in him.
But although venial sin displeases God, because it is disordered, nevertheless, it does not make the sinner displeasing to God, for he is not deprived of the brightness of grace, but is clouded over in a certain way, inasmuch as its outward radiation is impeded. And that is why Gregory says that venial sin overshadows, but mortal sin darkens completely: and because of this one venial sin does not prevent another from being able to be forgiven, although one mortal sin prevents the forgiveness of another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that when what comes first is removed, what comes after is removed; nor can what comes after be restored unless what comes first has been restored. Now, the fervor of charity, to which venial sin is opposed, comes after charity itself. And therefore as long as charity is not restored, neither can the fervor of charity be repaired. And the remission of venial sin consists in this repairing, just as also the remission of mortal sin consists in the repairing of charity. And so venial sin cannot be remitted to anyone to whom mortal sin is not remitted.
A reason can also be given on the side of the forgiver, for mortal sin separates us from God, who alone forgives sins. And so someone who has mortal sin does not feel this effect in the remission of venial sin. Likewise, too, on the side of that by which the remission happens, namely, charity, which covers all offenses (Prov 10:12), and which mortal sin destroys.
Reply Obj. 1: What Augustine there calls venial sins were irregularities that they contracted according to the law.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin does not turn away from God, nor does it destroy charity, like mortal sin; and so it does not prevent the remission of mortal sin, as is the case with the reverse.
Reply Obj. 3: Punishment, even of all, does not take away the offense, unless it is accepted by the one against whom the sin was committed. Nor can it be accepted as long as enmity remains toward him; and so while the enmity of man remains toward God by mortal sin, punishment does not purge even the least little venial sin. And that is why the Lord says that their fasts were not acceptable to him when they fasted to quarrel and fight (cf. Isa 58:4).
Article 2
The cause of remission
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 21, q. 2, a. 1; ST III, q. 87, a. 2; a. 4, ad 2; de Malo, q. 7, a. 11.) It seems that venial sin cannot be forgiven without an infusion of new grace. For when the act of venial sin passes, the guilt remains in the soul. But the guilt is founded on a stain. Therefore, since a stain cannot be wiped away from the soul by anything but grace, just as neither can darkness be driven out by anything but light, it seems that venial sin cannot be forgiven without an infusion of grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, venial sin consists in the fact that God is loved less than he should be. But this lessening can only be removed by an increase in charity, which only happens by a new sending of the Holy Spirit, as was said in Book I, Distinction 15, Question 5, Article 1, Subquestion 2; and consequently a new grace. Therefore, venial sin cannot be remitted without an infusion of grace.
On the contrary, the addition of new grace increases the grace that was already there, if it finds any. But since venial sin does not take away grace, if it could not be forgiven without an infusion of grace, then every time venial sin was forgiven, grace would have to be added to grace. Therefore, after venial sin a man would always return to a greater grace than he had before, which is false: for then the frequent repetition of venial sins would not dispose someone to mortal sin.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that venial sin can be remitted by grace without contrition. (Parallels: ST III, q. 87, a. 3.) For as Gregory says, what water is to a furnace, venial sin is to the fervor of charity. (See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 16, par. 67.) But the fervor of charity can exist without contrition: for someone can be fervently converted to God, and nevertheless, not grieve for his sins, which is to have contrition. Therefore, venial sin can be forgiven without contrition.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, contrition does not only denote sorrow for past sins, but also the resolution of not sinning again. But venial sins are forgiven someone who does not have such a resolution, since he knows that he cannot lead the present life without venial sin. Therefore, venial sin can be forgiven without contrition.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, someone existing in venial sin can die in his sleep and go straight to heaven as he is; for example, if he is killed because of having staunchly confessed his faith before. But while he sleeps, he cannot have contrition. Therefore, since his venial sins are forgiven him, it seems that they can be forgiven without contrition.
On the contrary, if grace could forgive venial sin without anything attached to it, grace would not coexist with venial sin. But venial sin does coexist with it. Therefore, it is necessary for some motion of contrition to arise for the remission of venial sin.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a man is also bound to confess his venial sins: confess your sins to one another (Jas 5:16), where the command of confession is given, as it says in the text. (Parallels: below, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 5; d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 3.) But according to the Gloss, it speaks about the confession of venial and mortal sins; for it says that the greater should be confessed to priests alone, but the lesser may be confessed to one’s companions. (The Gloss, that is, of Bede; PL 13:40.) Therefore, we are bound to confess venial sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a man is bound to make satisfaction for venial sins: for satisfaction is an act of justice, but we are bound to acts of justice. But satisfaction should be made according to the judgment of the priest, who holds the place of God; but this can only be done if one first confesses. Therefore, a man is bound to confess venial sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is a command of the Church that a man confess at least once per year. (As dictated by Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council, “Omnis utriusque sexus.”) But some people have only venial sins. Therefore, they are bound to confess those.
On the contrary, no one is bound to the impossible. But to confess all venial sins is impossible, since they escape our awareness. Therefore we are not bound to confess them.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that by a bishop’s blessing, holy water, and things like that, venial sin cannot be forgiven. (Parallels: ST III, q. 87, a. 3; de Malo, q. 7, a. 12.) For something comes to be and corrupts from the same causes, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b7.) But venial sin is caused by our acts. Therefore, it is necessary that there be something in us by which it is remitted, and so since those things are external, venial sin cannot be remitted by them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, venial sin, as was said, is not remitted without contrition. But contrition suffices in itself for its remission. Therefore, none of the things mentioned work to its forgiveness.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the things mentioned have equal relationship to all venial sins. Therefore, if any venial sin were remitted by them, all of them would be remitted; and then a man would be very often without venial sin, which does not seem true.
On the contrary, it is commonly said that there are many remedies against venial sins; for example, beating of the breast, sprinkling with holy water, extreme unction, and every sacramental anointing; a bishop’s blessing, blessed bread, general confession, compassion, the forgiveness of another’s faults, the Eucharist, the Lord’s Prayer, and other things, however light, as penance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that a man in mortal sin turns away from God by establishing another end for himself. And so he loses the light of grace, just as someone who turns his face away from the sun would lose the sun’s light. And because of this mortal sin cannot be forgiven except by an infusion of grace. But by venial sin man does not cling to a changeable good as his end; and so he does not turn away from his end, which is the unchanging good, and this is why a man does not lose grace by venial sin. And therefore it is not necessary that for venial sin to be forgiven, new grace should be poured in, but it suffices that the grace that was already possessed should move forward into action, for the venial sin did not take away the habit, but only impeded virtue’s act.
Reply Obj. 1: A stain can exist in two ways. In one way by the privation of beauty: and this is not how a stain remains in venial sin, for it does not destroy grace, which is the adornment of the soul. In another way by the fact that the beauty present is prevented from appearing outwardly, just as the beauty of a face can be sullied by dust; and this is the kind of stain that exists in venial sin, for it prevents the adornment of grace from being shown in external acts. And so it is not necessary that such a stain be destroyed by an infusion of grace, but by an act that destroys the impediment to grace.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin does not consist in a man habitually loving God less, for venial sin does not diminish charity; otherwise it would sometimes take it away entirely. But it consists in the love of God not being shown in all a man’s acts, because of a certain disordering in them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that venial sin is not forgiven, as was said, as long as the will remains in it. But to withdraw the will from what someone previously wanted means that what he wanted must displease him. Now displeasure like this is called the sorrow of contrition, when it is informed by grace. And so venial sin is not forgiven without contrition. But it should be known that contrition can be taken in three ways: either actual, habitual, or a middle way. Now the contrition that exists habitually is not enough for the remission of venial sin; for then whoever had the virtue of penance, whose act is a certain contrition, would receive the remission of venial sin, and then venial sin could not exist with grace. Nor again is it required that there always be an actual contrition; for it would follow that the sin that someone does not have in his memory or his awareness could not be forgiven. And so it should be said that contrition is required by a middle mode, when, namely, although sin does not displease explicitly in act, nevertheless it displeases implicitly; for from the virtue of the act that one does, explicit displeasure with venial sin would follow if one’s thoughts were directed to it.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the fervor of charity can exist while a man is borne toward God by the motion of charity, without him thinking explicitly on an act of venial sin, nevertheless, in that motion displeasure with venial sin, whether one or all, is contained implicitly. For if one is fervently borne toward God, anything that delays one from God will displease him. And so there can be so fervent a motion of charity toward God that it consumes all venial sins even without actual thought about them.
Reply Obj. 2: Mortal sins are in our power, so that not only individual ones may be avoided, but even all of them. Venial sins, however, although individual ones can be avoided, all of them cannot, which arises from the weakness of nature. And so in contrition for venial sins, the resolution to not sin venially is not required, as it was required for contrition for mortal sins, but that both his past sin displeases him and the infirmity by which he tends to venial sin, even though no one can be entirely immune to it.
Reply Obj. 3: The suffering endured for Christ has the force of baptism, as was said above in Distinction 4, Question 3, Article 3, Subquestion 3. And so it purifies one from all venial and mortal sin, unless it finds the will actually resistant: and because of this the venial sin that perhaps one incurs even after a fervent confession does not delay someone from going straight to heaven, and particularly since the very suffering of martyrdom has the force of purification. But concerning others who die in their sleep, it should be said that their venial sin is remitted them after death, even as to guilt.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that confession is necessary for the penitent to receive a satisfaction according to the mode of the offense. Now no satisfactory penalty is assigned as due for venial sin, for that penalty would be proportionate to the penalty of mortal sin, from which venial sin is infinitely distant. And so venial sin can be remitted by inner contrition alone. And that a certain satisfaction is outwardly enjoined is more for exciting devotion or contrition than for satisfaction; and so we are not bound to confess our venial sins, whether by an absolute necessity, for in that way we are neither bound to do penance for them, nor to avoid them; nor even by conditional necessity dictated by a certain end, namely, their remission: for even without confession, whether actual or intended, venial sins can be remitted. Nevertheless, it does belong to perfection to confess them.
Reply Obj. 1: Those words of James are a precept as to mortal sins, but as to venial sins they are a counsel.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument proceeds from a false supposition, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: In that case, because of the Church’s precept, some people say that a man is bound to confess venial sins. But others say that it suffices that he present himself to the priest and show himself to be free of mortal sin to be admitted to communion. For the Church’s precept is intended to obligate those who have certain things that should be confessed, for the fixing of the time falls more under precept than the act of confession itself. And so if grace were conferred on someone such that he was free from venial sin, as it was conferred on the Blessed Virgin, he or she would not be bound by that precept.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that, as has been said, venial sin is forgiven through the fervor of charity, which explicitly or implicitly contains contrition; and so those things that are in themselves of a nature to excite the fervor of charity are said to forgive venial sins. But there are things like that which confer grace, such as are all the sacraments, and things by which impediments to fervor and grace are removed, like holy water, which represses the power of the Enemy, and a bishop’s blessing, or even an exercise of humility on our part, like beating the breast, or the Lord’s Prayer, and the like.
Reply Obj. 1: Our act is required for the remission of venial sin, but these things are said to remit venial sin inasmuch as they arouse our fervor to act.
Reply Obj. 2: These things do not wipe out venial sin without contrition, but they are said to wipe it out inasmuch as they cause contrition.
Reply Obj. 3: The amount of remission is according to the amount of fervor. And so according as these things arouse greater or lesser fervor, whoever has contrition within, at least implicitly, for more or fewer sins, has more or fewer venial sins forgiven accordingly, and not always all.
Question 3
The circumstances of sin
Next the circumstances of sin are considered: and concerning this, two questions arise:
first, about the circumstances in themselves;
- second, how they are related to sin.
- Article 1
Circumstances in themselves
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 7, a. 1; q. 18, a. 3.) It seems that circumstances are not properties of a moral act, or conditions of one. For Boethius says in his commentary on the Topics 4 that circumstances are that which make fitting the substance of the rhetorical question. (Boethius, de Topicis differentiis (ed. Nikitas), Bk. 4, ch. 10, par. 1.) But a rhetorical question does not pertain to the genus of morals, but rather to the genus of rational philosophy. Therefore, circumstances are not the condition of a moral act.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is surrounding something is not in it. But the condition of a moral act is in it. Therefore such a condition cannot be called circumstances, ‘what stands around.’
Obj. 3: Furthermore, moral acts themselves are a kind of circumstance by which a rhetorician’s speech is strengthened; for it is circumstances, according to Cicero, from which argumentation takes its trust and authority, and a speech adds support. (This seems to be a misquotation. The text of Cicero reads: “Confirmatio est, per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio” (de Inventione [Teubner, ed. Stroebel], Bk. 1, ch. 24, par. 34, p. 31.) But circumstances do not have their own circumstances, just as neither do accidents have their own accidents; otherwise it would go on infinitely. Therefore, circumstances are not a condition or property of a moral act.
On the contrary (1), ignorance of the circumstances excuses a moral act from sin. But this would not be the case unless they were conditions of a moral act. Therefore, they are conditions or properties of a moral act.
Furthermore (2), the mean of virtue pertains to the genus of morals. But the mean in moral virtues is taken according to the due limitation of the circumstances, like when it is appropriate, and where, and how, as the Philosopher teaches in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1111a3–5.) Therefore, they are conditions of a moral act.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the circumstances were unfittingly enumerated in this verse: who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 7, a. 2; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6; Super III Ethic., lec. 3.) For that which is the cause of a thing cannot be its circumstances, because the cause is prior while the circumstances come after, like properties. But the acting person (who is referred to when it says who) is the cause of a moral act. Therefore, he should not be included as a circumstance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same thing cannot be the circumstance of itself. But what denotes the substance of a moral act, whose circumstances are being considered. Therefore, it should not be counted among the circumstances.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the same thing cannot be the circumstance of a thing and what gives that thing its species, for that is intrinsic to the thing. But moral acts receive their species from their end; which is why Ambrose says, the intention imposes the name on your work. (This appears to be a misquotation, as Ambrose writes: “Adfectus tuus nomen imponit operi tuo: quomodo a te proficiscitur sic aestimatur” (de Officiis [CCSL 15], Bk. 1, ch. 30, par. 147, p. 53).) Therefore, why, which denotes the end, should not be called a circumstance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what contains other things should not be enumerated with them. But in the mode, all the other circumstances are included. Therefore, how should not be included among the other circumstances.
On the contrary (5), it seems that there are more circumstances. For the Philosopher in the Ethics 3 includes concerning what and with what instrument. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1111a4–5.) Now these things are not contained in the verse. Therefore, it seems they are insufficiently numbered.
Furthermore (6), they are called circumstances because of this, that the mean of virtue varies according to them. But the mean of virtue varies according to how much and how often. Therefore, they are circumstances. Therefore, since these are not contained in the verse mentioned, it seems that the circumstances are insufficiently enumerated.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the circumstances that Augustine names in the text are inappropriately listed. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 7, a. 2; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6.) For circumstances, as was said, are the condition of a moral act. But the fact that someone continues a long time in sin has more to do with the state of the sinner than the act. Therefore, it should not be called a circumstance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, an attack or previous temptation is sometimes not in our power, namely, when the temptation comes from the Enemy. But circumstances, since they are conditions of a moral act, are in our power as it seems. Therefore, how much temptation befell someone should not be included among the circumstances.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, punishment consequent on sin is not a circumstance of sin. But the loss of virtue is a penalty of loss consequent on sin. Therefore, it should not be included among the circumstances.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, one sin is not the circumstance of another. But ingratitude is a sin in itself. Therefore, it should not be included as a circumstance of sin.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, those circumstances are not included by the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, nor by Cicero in his Rhetoric, nor by Boethius in the Topics 4. (See the preceding citations for these passages.) Therefore it seems they are unfittingly listed by Augustine.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that our acts are called moral according as they are ordered by reason to the end of the will; for it is from this that they have the nature of good or bad. Now everything that is ordered to the end must be proportioned to the end; and so reason, which orders our act to its end, pays attention to how the act is proportioned to those things that can coincide in the act; and this commensuration of one with the other is called the circumstances. And since at least two terms must exist in any proportion (for nothing is proportionate to itself, but only to something else), this is why the circumstances of a moral act are usually taken in two ways: for circumstances can be taken either as what coincides with an act, to which it is proportioned, like the place and the time; or as the concept itself that is drawn from those things, like when or where. So therefore the last way of taking circumstance will be the condition or property of an act; but by taking it in the first way, some circumstances are properties of an act, like a mode of acting, and some are outside it, like place and time.
Reply Obj. 1: A rhetorician’s question regards good and evil according to a certain genus of cause, for in a trial the reward or punishment is expected that are owed to a good or evil act. Now a demonstrative speech seeks the praise or censure of a person, which are owed to good and bad acts; but a deliberative speech asks what is useful to be done, which also requires attention to the character of good and bad. And so from the same things that make moral acts good and bad, rhetoricians take arguments for persuading.
Reply Obj. 2: Anything that is not of the essence of a thing is said to ‘stand around’ something, whether it is in it, like whiteness is in a body, or not in it, like the place where it is located. And so conditions or properties can be said to be circumstances of an act, and particularly by reason of a relation toward the outside.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no accident of an accident, as though it were in itself the subject of another accident; but an accident can have an accident to the extent that one accident adheres to a substance by means of another accident, like color adheres in a body by means of surface. And so, too, something can be a circumstance or a certain quality of the act itself, even though the circumstance is a condition of the person acting.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that that verse distinguishes circumstances according to the designation of Cicero and Boethius, according as they are considered by rhetoric, which takes from them arguments for excusing or accusing. For a rhetorical argument is taken either from what is attributed to a person, and then it is who; or from what is attributed to the matter discussed, and this is either contained with the matter itself, and then it is what as to the substance of the outer deed, why as to the inner intention of the doer, or it is contained in the very unfolding of the deed; and for this there are four things: namely, how as to the quality of the act, where and when as to the measure, by what means as to the instruments.
Now they can be enumerated differently according as they pertain to morals. For the proportion of an act to its end can be taken either according to what is in the act itself, or according to what is outside it. If the first, either as to the species of the act, and that is what; or as to its mode, and that is how. But if by its relation to what is outside, either by relating it to its cause, or relating it to its measure. If the first, either the final cause, which is why, or the efficient cause or instrumental cause, and then it is by what means; or the principal cause, and then it is who. But if in relation to the measure, either it is to the place, and then it is where; or to the time, and then it is when.
Reply Obj. 1: Those circumstances that are taken on the part of the agent have more to do with condition of the person as to his properties than with the substance of the person. And the substance of the act varies by conditions like these, because something applies to one that does not apply to another. Furthermore, although the person acting is prior, nevertheless, the proportion inherent in the act from the agent is a circumstance of the act.
Reply Obj. 2: Certain acts are good or bad by their genus, and so the circumstances of a moral act can be taken from the very genus of the act. Now that by which the act is placed in such and such a genus, although it is of the substance of it inasmuch as it is in the genus of the moral, yet it is outside its substance if the very substance of the act is considered absolutely; and so certain acts are the same in natural species that differ in moral species, like fornication and the marital act.
Reply Obj. 3: The end is two-fold, namely, the last end and the proximate end. Now the last end cannot be included as a circumstance, because all circumstances are taken in proportion to it. The proximate end is also two-fold. There is a certain one that is the work’s end, in accord with which the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 1107a9.) that some works are joined to a bad end, and this end gives the act its species. Hence either this is not a circumstance, if the moral genus alone is considered; or in reference to the very substance of the act, it is included in the circumstance what. Now the other end is the end of agent, who sometimes intends good from a bad act, or vice versa; and this end is called the circumstance why. Now, the act does not receive its proper species from this, but something like a common species, according as acts commanded take on the species of the virtue or vice that commands them above the species that they have from the habit eliciting them.
Reply Obj. 4: The mode of a thing is in the thing itself as a result of its substance. And since some circumstances are taken from what is outside a thing, but some from the very species of the act (which two things do not pertain to the mode); for this reason not every other circumstance is included in mode, if mode is taken properly.
Reply Obj. 5: In the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1111a3–5.) the Philosopher also assigns seven circumstances, but his designation differs from the designation given in two things. First, because the Philosopher includes two circumstances, what and concerning what, which are included as one in Cicero’s designation, because the object called concerning what gives a rationale to the act that is called what. But the Philosopher distinguishes them, for besides the whole account of the object which gives its species to the act, special conditions can be considered in the object which diversify an act in goodness or badness among those acts that do not involve badness in themselves, among which acts they also diversify the amount of badness. Second, because the Philosopher sets down when and where as one circumstance, because both of them are taken from an extrinsic measure; but in the designation above they are distinguished because of the different characters of the measure. However, when the Philosopher says, by what instrument, it is the same as Cicero’s saying, by what means, since all the means are like the instruments of action, which the agent uses for his end.
Reply Obj. 6: Since mode implies a measure, all the things that pertain to a measure either by the mode of continuous quantity or discrete quantity, are implied in how, ‘quomodo.’ Or it could be said that the act’s quantity can be measured by three things. First, by the act’s very intensity, and then this is the same as how; second, from the quantity of the object, and then it is included in what; third, from the time; and then it is included in when: for how many times is also reducible to mode.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that Augustine enumerates here the circumstances as they should be considered by penitents, who should be grieving over their sins; and so he names those circumstances that can especially induce sorrow for sins. Now these are two, namely, privation of the good, and as to this he says that one must grieve, since he has deprived himself of virtue; and the introduction of evil, which indeed is worsened either incidentally, to the extent that the occasion for excuse is taken away, and then one should grieve if he had sinned with no temptation or only a little one: or in itself, by certain circumstances adding deformity to the act, and then as to the person of the agent, he teaches us to consider the state of the sinner, and the benefit he received from God beforehand. As to all, he teaches us to consider at what time and when he sinned; he also teaches us to consider concerning what, in saying: after the manner of a prostitute; and again how, in that he says, and the mode of his own work; and the place in that he says, if in a sacred place.
Reply Obj. 1: The fact that someone remained a long time in sin regards the condition of the act, or the transgression, if he sinned repeatedly or continuously; or omission, if he delayed repenting the sin committed even once before.
Reply Obj. 2: Although temptation is not in our power, nevertheless, to resist or not resist is in our power; and so in accord with this the circumstances of the sin can be drawn from the foregoing temptation.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the loss of virtues follows sin according to the order of nature, it is nevertheless concomitant with sin according to time; and so it can be included as a circumstance. And furthermore, even certain circumstances, according to Cicero, are taken from what follows the substance of the deed, according as the act varies in goodness and badness by its relationship to it.
Reply Obj. 4: In one way, ingratitude is a special sin; in another way it is a circumstance of sin; and how this is will be said further on in Distinction 22, Question 1, Article 2, Subquestion 1.
Reply Obj. 5: All those circumstances can be reducible to the seven listed above: for ingratitude is reduced to the condition of the person, as is clear from what was said; but prior temptation is reduced to why, because temptation particularly consists in the appetite for something by which a man is incited to sin; but privation of virtue is reduced to what, because the sin itself according to its own species is able to take away virtue. And with the others it is easy to see.
Article 2
How circumstances are related to sin
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 73, a. 7; de Malo, q. 2, a. 7.) It seems that circumstances do not worsen sin. For nothing increases except by more of the same; and that is why the concentration of a quality does not increase physical quantity, but only the addition of another body. But circumstances are not sins, but certain accidents of sin. Therefore, they do not make sin more serious.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the whole account of evil in sin is on the part of the turning away, not on the part of what is turned to. But all circumstances accompany sin on the part of what is turned toward. Therefore, they do not worsen the badness of the sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, privations are neither intensified nor diminished. But evil is a certain privation of good, as Augustine says in Book 3, Chapter 7 of his Confessions, and in his Enchiridion. (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate (CCSL 46), ch. 3 and ch. 8; Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 3, ch. 7.) Therefore, the badness of a sin cannot be extended by circumstances.
On the contrary (1), whatever something is caused by, it is also increased by. But sin happens from inordinate circumstances, inasmuch as a defect of circumstance destroys the mean of virtue. Therefore circumstances worsen sin.
Furthermore (2), rhetoricians draw their arguments for accusing and excusing, praising or criticizing, from circumstances, as was said. But accusation and excuse, praise and blame, are based on good or evil, or less good or less evil. Therefore, circumstances increase the goodness or evil of an act.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that among all circumstances, place and time worsen sin the most. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 7, a. 4.) For as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, speaking about circumstances like this, they are the principal things in which the act exists. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1111a20.) But ‘in which’ signifies the very time and place. Therefore, since the principal circumstances make sin more serious, it seems that time and place make it most serious.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems that who does. For sin arises chiefly from the will. But the will is maintained on the part of the agent. Therefore, the condition of the person worsens sin more.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that ingratitude toward God worsens sin the most. For sin receives its character of evil from turning away. But ingratitude directly pertains to this turning away. Therefore, the gravity of the sin is reckoned more from this circumstance.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that previous temptation does. For sin is made the most serious by those circumstances that make forgiveness deserved or undeserved. But sin that happens out of infirmity, which is when someone is faced with grave temptation, is called venial, as deserving of venia, forgiveness. But the sin that is done out of malice, which happens when one works evil by a choice that came before any temptation, is called unforgiveable, for it does not have in it anything worthy of forgiveness. Therefore, this circumstance worsens sin the most.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that circumstances cannot draw an act into a different species or genus of sin. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 17, a. 3; de Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5.) For accidents do not change the species of something. But circumstances are accidents of an act, as was said. Therefore, the species of sin is not changed by them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, an act has its species from its object. But different circumstances do not change the object of an act. Therefore, they do not draw the act into another genus of sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as circumstances concur in an act of sin, so they also do in an act of virtue. But acts of virtue do not change in species. Therefore, neither does an act of sin.
On the contrary (1), what is the cause of something can change its species. For from different causes, different effects follow. But circumstances that are lacking are the cause of sins; and so according to Dionysius, evil happens from particular defects. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) Therefore, a difference in circumstances can change the species.
Furthermore (2), hastily, sumptuously, excessively, greedily, fussily, are different species of gluttony. But they are taken according to different circumstances, as is self-evident. Therefore, circumstances change the species of sin.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that circumstances can make a sin infinitely more serious. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2; below, d. 32, a. 5, qa. 2; ST II-II, q. 110, a. 4, ad 5; de Malo, q. 2, a. 8.) For one circumstance corrupts virtue. But virtue is only corrupted by mortal sin, which has infinite quantity. Therefore, circumstances worsen a sin infinitely.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine nothing is so venial that it cannot become mortal when it pleases. (Moos does not know where this text comes from; it does not appear to be in the works of Augustine.) But pleasure is a certain circumstance, and it is reduced to how. Therefore, circumstances make venial sin mortal, and so they make it infinitely worse.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, an act of virtue is farther from an act of mortal sin than an act of venial sin from one of mortal sin. But one circumstance changed makes an act of virtue an act of mortal sin, like to know one’s own wife or someone else’s. Therefore, much more does it make venial sin mortal; and so the same as above.
On the contrary (4), accidental quantity does not exceed substantial quantity. But the quantity of a sin arising from a circumstance is accidental to it. Therefore, since the quantity of venial sin is finite, the quantity that comes from circumstance will not be infinite; and so it does not make a sin infinitely worse.
Furthermore (5), those things that differ infinitely do not share a genus. But of those things that do not share a genus, one cannot be changed into another, like a line into a color. Therefore, an act of sin cannot be drawn into an infinite quantity by a circumstance.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that all circumstances must be confessed. (Parallels: below, d. 41, a. 4, qa. 1; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2.) For in Genesis 19:17, Lot is commanded to leave Sodom, so that he should not die in any place surrounding the region. But someone repenting of Sodom, that is, sin, leaves by confessing. Therefore, not only sin but all the circumstances surrounding it should be confessed.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a penitent should confess his sin to a priest, so that he can receive from him the manner of making satisfaction. But a greater satisfaction is enjoined for a graver sin. Therefore, he should make known to the priest the circumstances by which the quality of the sin may be considered.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, confession should correspond to contrition. But a man must be contrite about individual circumstances, as Augustine says in the text. Therefore, it seems that all should be confessed.
On the contrary (4), according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 12, 1119a31–32.) the more the pleasures of the flesh are considered in particular, the more they move the appetite. But a man must flee the appetite for such pleasure, by the counsel of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 6:18. Therefore, it seems that at least with sins of the flesh, a person should not confess all individual circumstances.
Furthermore (5), sometimes from reciting the circumstances another person’s sin is made known. But in confession a man should accuse himself, not defame another. Therefore, it seems that we should not confess the circumstances.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 6, among those things that are not great in mass, being greater is the same as being better, (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 6, ch. 8.) among good things, just as also similarly among bad things being greater is the same as being worse. Now badness in an act of sin is from its failing the due proportion to the end, to which it is made proportionate by the commensuration of circumstances with the act, as has been said. And so the lack of due circumstances causes badness in an act. And since by one circumstance lacking or opposed, the term becomes farther from the due proportion to the end, this is why a circumstance makes an act more or less bad; and according to this it is said to worsen the sin.
Reply Obj. 1: That argument holds among those things that are increased by addition, for among things in which increase is by intensity, it is not necessary to add something similar in species, just as it is not necessary to add white to whiteness in order to make it more white, as it says in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 5, ch. 4, 227b9–10.) And likewise it is not necessary for sin to be added to sin to make it a greater sin.
Reply Obj. 2: From turning to a changeable good in a disordered way, an act is rendered unproportioned for turning to the end. And so in sin the foundation of turning away is turning toward, and because of this the circumstances that hold on the part of the turning-toward can increase the badness of a sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Although privations cannot be intensified in themselves, nevertheless they are sometimes said to be intensified by their own causes, as blindness is intensified by getting further from the act of seeing, and likewise, the badness in an act can be intensified by turning to something inordinately.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that good is said according to the order to the end, as it says in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 3, ch. 2, 996a25.) Therefore, since evil is a privation of good, evil can happen in two ways: either according to the act’s very relation to the end, or according to the aptitude of its relation to the end. And so sin happens in two ways, either from the act not being proportionate to the end, as among those things that are evil in themselves; or because it is referred to the end in a disordered way, as is seen among those things that are done with an evil intention, even if what is being done is good in itself. And since that on account of which something is what it is is even more so, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 72a29–30. Or, as the Oxford translation has it: “A thing always belongs better to that thing because of which it belongs—e.g., that because of which we love is better loved.”) therefore quantity of badness in a sin is considered greater by a disordered relation to the end than even a lack of proportion to the end.
Now for the sake of which pertains to the order to the end; and so it must be considered above all others in judging the gravity of a sin. Now, for the act to be unproportioned to the end pertains to this circumstance what, which denotes the account of evil in the act. And so all those things that can contribute to the species of the sin are included in this circumstance, and these are the ones in which a moral act consists as to its goodness or badness. And so this is the second circumstance that makes it more serious, and because of this the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, that the chief things in an act are those in which the act consists, and for the sake of which. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1111a18.)
Now other circumstances make an act more or less serious as they are more or less close to these; and so time and place are bound to worsen it less, since they are entirely extrinsic. But among them the condition of the person does it more, for the agent is more directly related to the end; and after this how, which pertains to the act, and after this the instrument, which pertains to the manner of acting. And this indeed should be taken as being so for the most part; nevertheless, nothing prevents things from standing differently in a given case. For in morality verbal expressions have nothing determinate, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 1104a1–5.)
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not mean the most important things are those in which the act exists as though in the things that measure it, but as in the things that complete its account.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the will belongs to the agent as to its subject, nevertheless it belongs to the end as to its object. And so it draws its character more from the end than from the condition of the agent, and it is more reducible to the end, for powers and habits are distinguished by their objects.
Reply Obj. 3: Ingratitude as a circumstance does not include actual contempt, but figurative, as it were; and so it is not necessary that it make sin worse than a perverse intention, which causes actual turning away from the due end.
Reply Obj. 4: A sin is said to be worthy of forgiveness when it is venial in its cause, according as the voluntary is taken away or diminished, whether by ignorance or by powerlessness; and so that whole difference is reducible to for the sake of which, because the voluntary has to do with the intention of the end.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that it is obvious that sometimes circumstances draw an act into another species of sin, but how this can be is uncertain. For some people say that this happens inasmuch as those circumstances are taken as the will’s end, for a moral act takes its species from the end. But this does not seem to be sufficiently said: for sometimes the species of the sin changes without the intention being directed to that circumstance, as when a thief would take a non-consecrated golden vessel as willingly as a consecrated one; and nevertheless the sin is changed to a different species, namely, from simple theft to sacrilege. And furthermore, according to this only that circumstance which is called for the sake of which could change the species of the sin, which is false.
And therefore it should rather be said that every circumstance can change the species of a sin, but it does not always change it. For since privations and negations differ in species according to the difference of habits and opposite positions, and evil is a privation of the good, it is necessary that where a different good needed for virtue is taken away, there will be different species of sin. Now one single circumstance of sin takes away the rectitude of virtue: and so if other circumstances contribute no additional deviation to the sin, except by the supposition of a person, it will not change the sin’s species, but would perhaps worsen the quantity of that sin.
Sometimes, too, it will not worsen the quantity of the sin: for even presupposing the previous disorder, it adds no disorder. Sometimes, too, it diminishes the sin, if some circumstance reduces the character of sin, like taking the things of another has the character of sin from the circumstance what, inasmuch as it is someone else’s possession. But the fact that one takes it by the left or the right hand, or in the morning or evening, contributes nothing to its character of evil. And therefore those circumstances neither excuse nor worsen, nor change the species. But the fact that one takes a lot or a little does not carry a deformity in itself, except by the supposition of the first, for taking a lot from someone else means departing more from equality. And so a circumstance like this worsens the sin, but does not change it.
But the fact that someone takes something consecrated that is not his, does carry a new deformity: for by displaying a certain irreverence for sacred things, it has a special character of sin. And so a circumstance like this is said to change the species. But if he were forced to take it, a circumstance like that would partly excuse the sin: for the cause of sin, namely, the voluntary, is diminished.
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever circumstance causes a certain species of sin in an act pertains to the species of the act insofar as it is a moral act. And so it no longer has the character of a circumstance of sin, although it ‘stands around’ the substance of the act, as was said before.
Reply Obj. 2: Every act according has its species from its object as to its substance; but in its character as evil it has its species from a defect. And therefore different species of evil are caused according to the different things that can be lacking; and species of sin are distinguished from one another in accord with this, and not only by the object. But in acts of virtue it is different, for they are not constituted out of any given individual circumstance, the way an act of sin has its character as sinful from some one defect.
And by this the answer to the third objection is clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that a circumstance, as is clear from what has been said, (In the preceding response.) sometimes worsens sin and changes its species, but sometimes it worsens the sin without changing its species. Now when it does not change the species, but worsens the sin, then it still retains the character of a circumstance and cannot increase the quantity of sin infinitely, so that it would make a venial sin mortal. For, as was said, a circumstance that worsens sin on the supposition of a previous deformity has the nature of a greater deformity by virtue of that previous deformity; and so if that were finite, it could not add an infinite deformity. But if it changed species, then it could make the sin infinitely more serious, but it does not always do this. For when a circumstance has a direct opposition to charity from a special deformity that it adds, which is shown in the fact that it is directly against a precept of the law, whose end is charity, then it adds an infinite gravity, namely, the gravity of mortal sin.
But when that deformity does not directly have opposition to the law, so that it is against it, but is beside it, then it does not worsen the sin infinitely, whether it is a venial sin to which it is added, or a mortal sin; just as to the act of gluttony which is eating too hastily, the circumstance of ‘sumptuously’ adds a special deformity, which would also make it a sin by itself. But it is not directly against the law, and so it does not infinitely worsen it. And since the circumstances that change the species are no longer counted as circumstances, as was said, therefore it is said by the masters that circumstances do not worsen sin infinitely.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the habit of virtue is not corrupted by anything but mortal sin, nevertheless the act of virtue is corrupted and impeded even by venial sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure never makes a venial sin mortal, except to the extent that it is clung to as to an end, and consequently it is loved more than God. And so pleasure like this amounts to contempt for God, which has in itself a specific character of sin, and because of this it is a circumstance drawing the act into a different species.
Reply Obj. 3: That argument proceeds concerning the circumstance that draws an act into another species, which, by being of this kind, already loses the nature of a circumstance with regard to a moral act.
Reply Obj. 4: And since the other arguments conclude that circumstances can in no way worsen a sin infinitely, it should be said to the fourth objection that the quantity arising from a circumstance that draws an act into a new species is not accidental quantity, but essential.
Reply Obj. 5: Venial sin and mortal sin differ infinitely on the part of the turning away, but not on the part of what is turned to, for in either case it is a finite pleasure. But sins are divided into species based on what they turn to, because on the side of the turning away they do not differ.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that to confess all circumstances is impossible, but confessing certain ones is necessary. But in this there is a difference of opinion. For some people say that all circumstances that add any notable quantity to the sin must be confessed, if they occur to one’s memory. But others say that it is only necessary to confess circumstances that draw the sin into another genus of sin; and this is more probable. But it should be added that these are the ones that draw the act into another species of mortal sin, and the reason for this is that venial sins need not be confessed, but only mortal sins, which have an infinite quantity in a certain way. And so worsening circumstances that do not give a new species to the sin, or do give a new species, but not of mortal sin, do not need to be confessed. Nevertheless it does belong to perfection to confess them, just as was said about venial sins.
Reply Obj. 1: Although a man cannot leave Sodom, that is, mortal sin, except by confession at least in his intention, nevertheless, a man can leave what surrounds it, that is, venial sin, and the circumstances that amount to venial sins, without confession.
Reply Obj. 2: Specific quantities of sin cannot be made known to the priest, for the sinner himself does not know them. And so it is enough that he be aware of the quantity that arises from the species of the sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Nor is it necessary that the penitent grieve over individual circumstances in contrition, as concerns what is necessary for salvation. But it is necessary that he grieve over individual sins at least in his first contrition, and over the circumstances that changed the species of the sin. But what Augustine says pertains to the perfection of contrition.
Reply Obj. 4: But since the other arguments seem to conclude that circumstances should not be confessed at all, therefore it should be said to the fourth that particular circumstances of carnal sin, which draw the act into another species of mortal sin, must always be confessed. For the grace that is given in the sacrament of penance restores, if by it the inclination to sin from thinking about such things springs up either in the one confessing or in the priest. And so Gregory says in his Pastoral Rule, (Gregory the Great, Pastoral Rule (CCSL 141), Pt. 2, ch. 5, line 75ff.) it happens often that when the soul of the rector learns another’s trials, he himself is also struck by the temptations that he hears. But these by no means should frighten the pastor: for they will be as easily swept away from him, the more mercifully he wearies of the other’s temptation. Still, if someone sees that the priest is lustful and prone to sins like this, he should get permission to confess to another priest; and if it be not given, he should resort to the priest’s superior. But if the circumstances do not worsen the sin infinitely by confering a new species of mortal sin on it, sometimes the circumstances can be praiseworthily left unsaid, applying due discretion, according to the consideration of their baseness and the tendency to incline to sin from its confession in the one confessing or in the priest.
Reply Obj. 5: A man should protect the reputation of others as much as he can, but he should purify his own conscience more. And if a circumstance that leads to the recognition of a person should be necessary to the confession, according to the rule given, then it should be confessed while hiding the identity of the person as much as possible. But if it is not necessary to confess it, it should be omitted, lest it should reveal the sin of another.
Question 4
Impediments to penance
Next the impediments to true penance are asked about; and concerning this, two questions arise:
first, about hypocrisy, which impedes it inwardly;
- second, about outward impediments.
- Article 1
On hypocrisy
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 111; Super Thren. 4.) It seems that hypocrisy is not a sin. For the second plank after the shipwreck is not called a sin. But according to Jerome, the second plank after the shipwreck is to conceal sin, (Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah (CCSL 73), Bk. 2, ch. 3. The actual words of Jerome are rather different than what the objector quotes: “secunda enim post naufragium tabula paenitentiae est et consolatio miseriarum, impietatem suam abscondere.”) which pertains to hypocrisy. Therefore, it is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everyone should avoid scandalizing his neighbors and should protect his own reputation. But these things are done by hypocrisy. Therefore, it is not a sin.
On the contrary, commenting on Matthew 6:16: do not look sad, like the hypocrites, the Gloss says: a hypocrite is someone who pretends to be what he is not, one who plays the part of a different person. But to pretend what one is not is always a sin, just like lying. Therefore, hypocrisy is always a sin.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not a specific sin. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 111, a. 3.) For the sin of pretence is divided against the sin of open malice. But open malice is not a specific sin. Therefore, neither is hypocrisy.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every specific sin consists especially in certain acts. But hypocrisy exists in all the acts of the virtues, and particularly in prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, as is clear in the Gospel of Matthew. (See chapter 6.) Therefore, hypocrisy is not a specific sin.
On the contrary, the sin of pretence is opposed to the virtue that is called truth. But truth is a specific virtue, as is clear in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7.) Therefore pretending, or hypocrisy, is also a specific sin.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is always a mortal sin. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 111, a. 4.) For venial sin does not impede the forgiveness of mortal sins. But hypocrisy does impede it, as is clear from the text. Therefore, it is a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Jerome says that in the comparison of two evils, it is less serious to sin openly than to feign sanctity. (Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah (CCSL 73), Bk. 6, ch. 16, par. 14.) But to sin openly is a mortal sin. Therefore, so is feigning sanctity, always.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 3, 1165b10.) that those who fake friendship are more to be accused than those who counterfeit money, as they commit fraud against something better. But those who counterfeit money always sin mortally. Therefore, so do hypocrites.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that excludes someone from the vision of God is a mortal sin. But hypocrisy does this, as is clear from Job 13:16: every hypocrite shall not come before his sight. Therefore, it is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, the virtue of truth is corrupted as much by a verbal lie as by pretence in works. But a lie is not always a mortal sin. Therefore, neither is pretending.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that hypocrisy should not be considered an impediment to penance more than other vices. For the more serious any sin is, the more it impedes penance. But certain other interior sins are greater than hypocrisy. Therefore, they should be considered greater impediments to penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, hypocrisy, according to Gregory, is the daughter of vainglory. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143B), Bk. 31, par. 45.) But the cause works more of something than the effect. Therefore, vainglory should be considered more of an impediment to penance than hypocrisy.
On the contrary is what appears in the text.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that ‘hypocrite’ properly means someone who displays himself as another person, as though put forth or substituted for another. And this is why in theaters, those who acted as depicting the persons of others were called hypocrites; and this is how the Philosopher takes hypocrites in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 2, 1111b24.) And therefore someone who, although he is not virtuous, displays the person of a virtuous man, is called a hypocrite, for hypocrita in Greek means pretender in Latin. And so to display oneself as better than one is is a vice of boasting, whether it is done in words or in deeds, as it says in the Ethics 4; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, 1127a20ff.) and so hypocrisy is always a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: It is one thing to not make a hidden sin known, which belongs to discretion, and is called the second plank in the way discussed above in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 2, Question 3; and another thing to display a virtue when someone is hiding a sin, which is hypocrisy.
Reply Obj. 2: To keep a sin hidden does enough for avoiding scandal; but to disguise a sin under the appearance of virtue is hypocrisy, and always evil. And by this a person’s reputation is not preserved, but stolen.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that privations are specified by their opposite habits, and so a sin is general when it takes away some condition that is required for any virtue, like disobedience, and that is how it is a general sin. Now hypocrisy takes away the conformity between the sign, which displays the condition of a person, and the thing signified; and this conformity does indeed pertain specifically to one virtue, namely truth; and so it is a specific sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Openness does not carry any specific character of sin, and so open malice is not called a specific sin, like feigning, which does carry a specific character of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting that some specific sin or specific virtue be materially used in acts of other virtues or vices, as magnanimity uses for all other acts of virtue, so that it works great things in them, as is said in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 1124a1ff.) And likewise since hypocrisy is a particular species of boasting, for it does not boast of just anything, but of sanctity, it uses all the acts that can display sanctity, and particularly those in which sanctity is most shown, like prayer, fasting, and almsgiving.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that hypocrisy has the same character of sin as lying: for lying is not always a mortal sin, but only when it is pernicious. And likewise, hypocrisy is not always a mortal sin, but only when it is pernicious, resulting in harm to another person, when because of believing in the sanctity of the other he denies himself what he has, or should have; or in harm to faith and to the Church, when because of the sanctity believed about him, he is believed against faith and the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: The venial sin that does not impede penance does not impede the remission of mortal sin, which happens through penance. But by some venial sins the work of penance can be impeded so that it does not belong to penance. For venial sin impedes the act of virtue, even though it does not destroy the habit, and so it can impede the forgiveness of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: The words of Jerome are to be understood in a certain respect, and not simply: for one sin can be more serious as to one circumstance than another which is more serious simply. Or it could be said that sinning openly is also not always mortal, but sometimes venial.
Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher is speaking about when faking friendship results in harm to a person.
Reply Obj. 4: He is speaking about the hypocrite orders all the good he does to showing off. Or it could be said that he speaks to the fact that good works done out of hypocrisy do not bring one into God’s sight.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that works of penance, particularly external ones, are naturally such as to show sanctity; and this is why hypocrisy employs them while excluding the intention of true penance. And because of this it directly impedes the effect of penance even more seriously than other vices.
And by this the solution to the first objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory arises sometimes even from works done with the right intention, but hypocrisy always perverts the intention behind deeds, and so it does more to impede the fruit of penance.
Article 2
Outward impediments
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; ST II-II, q. 168, aa. 2–4; SCG III, ch. 25, 6th arg.; Super Is. 3, at the end.) It seems that playing does not outwardly impede penance. For what virtue can consist in does not impede penance. But the virtue of eutrapelia consists in games, as is clear from the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 8, 1128a9–10.) Therefore, a game does not impede penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is necessary to intersperse laborious works with rest, by the fact that it is impossible to act continuously. But playing is a kind of rest. Therefore, it is necessary sometimes to play between works of penance; therefore, playing does not impede penance.
On the contrary, the time for laughing is described as different from the time for weeping (Eccl 3:4); But the time for penance is a time for weeping, for penance means to weep over what one has done. Therefore, it is not a time for playing.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that shows do not impede penance. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 167, a. 2, corp. and ad 2.) For shows were instituted for their usefulness to man. But penance does not shear away useful things, but only superfluous ones. Therefore penance is not impeded by shows.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in watching something there cannot be anything but curiosity. But other curiosities, like those of the sciences, are not considered impediments to penance. Therefore, neither should a show be called an impediment to penance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, other things are much more serious sins than shows and games. Therefore, those things should be included much more than these as impediments to penance.
On the contrary, whatever makes a man a sinner does not befit a penitent. But these shows make the spectators of such things shameless and impure, as Chrysostom says. (John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, nn. 7 and 8 (PG 56:373).) Therefore, they do not befit a penitent.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that military exercises or business matters do not impede penance. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 40, a. 2.) For those things that the republic cannot be conserved without are not vices, but rather ordered to virtue. But it cannot be preserved without a military, by which enemies are driven back; or without business, by which necessities are procured for the people. Therefore, such duties can be exercised without sin; therefore, they do not impede penance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, John taught repentance, as is seen in Matthew 3:2. But he did not forbid men from the military, nor publicans from their duties, as is seen in Luke 3:12–15. Therefore, it seems that such duties do not impede penance.
On the contrary, is what Gregory says in the text.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that there are three different kinds of playing. For there is the play that has a disgracefulness in itself, like the games that were held in the theaters to provoke lust; and this kind of playing should be avoided by everyone, and particularly by penitents who should correct their sins by tears. There is another kind of playing that proceeds from the joy of devotion, as David said, I will play and make myself abased before my Lord (2 Sam 6:21–22). And this kind of playing is not to be avoided, but praised and emulated. But there is another kind of playing that contains no disgrace, which the Philosopher calls a liberal pursuit; and this is the matter of a virtue, namely, eutrapelia. And so, if all due circumstances are preserved, it can be done praiseworthily for proper rest, and for spending time agreeably with others. But it can have sin in it when due circumstances are not preserved; and so in this kind of play, something is suitable for one person that is not suitable for another. And a penitent is differently related to this kind of playing than other people, inasmuch as penance requires tears. Still, he can enjoy them moderately, according as they pertain to the recreation of the soul, or to the society of others with whom he lives. And this is why Seneca says, conduct yourself wisely in such a way that no one hold you harsh, lest he condemn you as mean. (Moos notes that this sentence is not from Seneca but from Martin, sixth-century Abbot of Dumiens and Bishop of Braga, in the chapter on continence from a treatise de Quatuor Virtutibus, which had been published among the works of Seneca.)
And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that eagerly watching shows of this kind, if they are about shameful things that provoke sin, is a sin, and sometimes it is also a mortal sin, so much passion can be aroused. And therefore everyone should restrain himself from watching such things, and particularly penitents. But certain shows are about useful things and necessities of life, like hunting and things like that. Such shows distract the soul; therefore, although it can be attended without sin when due discretion is observed with regard to the conditions of the person and other circumstances, nevertheless, they should be avoided by penitents because they should have their hearts collected for God, except as much as necessity demands.
Reply Obj. 1: Penance also pares away some useful things, inasmuch as it imposes punishment for past fault. And so in the text it says that something suffices for someone who has not sinned that does not suffice for someone who is doing penance for sin.
Reply Obj. 2: By this kind of sensible show the soul is more drawn away to vanities than by intelligible things; and so this kind is more to be guarded against; although the sin of curiosity should be guarded against by all.
Reply Obj. 3: Those sins seem to proceed especially from foolish celebrating; and since penance has a sadness attached to it, therefore those sins have a special opposition to penance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that military and business duties, and the office of tax-collectors who exact public taxes, have sin closely connected with them, although they can be exercised without sin sometimes. And since penitents should avoid the occasion of sin while they are making their satisfaction, it is also praiseworthy if they shun such duties. Nevertheless, this is not necessary to penance: for a penitent cannot avoid all occasions of sin while he lives in this world. And therefore it suffices if he avoids the sin risked in these duties, so that a soldier, according to John’s counsel, (See Luke 3:14.) strikes no one and is content with a just wage, and does not use his military office to his ostentation, but for the benefit of Church and state, and for the exercise of his energies. And a merchant should not have a condition in himself which would prohibit him from this duty, in the way that business dealings are not permitted to clerics and monks, although they may sell their belongings; and if they have their dealings at the proper time, not on feast days, or at a time that could introduce sneakiness, such an office may be exercised; and the due mode, so that it is done without fraud, and according to a licit contract. But among tax-collectors, it should be done so that they receive the tolls by the authority of the head of state, and for the sake of the common benefit, namely, for the defense of the land and not immoderately. But what Gregory says in the text should be understood thus: not that it cannot be done without sin, but that it frequently involves one in sin.
And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.
Exposition of the Text
Perfect penance compels the sinner to bear all things gladly. (Sententiae IV, 16.1 (86). 1.) This should be understood about those things that are necessary for the remission of sin; and so it is an accommodated distribution.
There are three varieties of sin, (Sent. IV, 16.2 (86). 2.) etc. To the contrary, he omits sin of the mouth.
Furthermore, commenting on the text, why did I not die in the womb? (Job 3:11), Gregory adds a fourth, namely, kindling adulation. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 4, par. 27, n. 53.)
And it should be said that this division of sins differs from the first, for the first is according to the diversity of instruments, but this one is according to the progress of sin, which is first from within; second, proceeds outward; and third, is confirmed by habit. And this is adapted to the parts of penance: for contrition hides in the heart, confession manifests repentance outwardly, but satisfaction adds the habit of good works. Nevertheless, this is not to be understood as though each part of penance corresponded to one condition of sin, but by adaptation, as has also been said about other things.
To the first it should be said that words have the same position as regards manifestation as does a deed. And so they are included in deeds.
To the second it should be said that what Gregory adds is not in the sinner himself, but in another person; and so Augustine leaves it out.
Satisfaction is ordered by John, etc., (Sent. IV, 16.2 (86). 3.) not that John the Baptist was the author of this precept, but the announcer; for Christ was the institutor of the sacrament, and of its parts.
Let him place himself entirely at the judgment and in the power of a priest. (Sent. IV, 16.2 (87). 3.) Therefore, it seems that if a priest imposes on someone that he enter religious life, he is bound to do it; and particularly because certain canons seem to fix this as a penance. And likewise, that however great a penance he imposes for a small sin, the penitent is bound to do it. And it should be said that it should be understood as about those things that the priest enjoins inasmuch as he has the key of knowledge and authority through the divine judgment, and not according to human error. Now entrance into religious life, since it belongs to the will, cannot be enjoined on anyone; and if some canons are found that impose it, it is more as a counsel than a command: for no matter what penance is required, the easiest religious life is a greater satisfaction, inasmuch as a man gives up his own will, than which nothing is dearer to a man.
“Let him beware lest because of shame, he splits up his confession.” (Sent. IV, 16.2 (87). 5 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, c15 n31.) This inquiry will be taken up when we come to the question on confession.
Let him beware too lest he come to the Lord’s body before he is strengthened by a good conscience. (Sent. IV, 16.2 (87). 5 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, c15 n31.) He is strengthened by a good conscience when he can guess by certain signs that his sin is forgiven; and this when he does what is in himself; and so someone who has access to a priest, and is not compelled by necessity to receive Communion, as parish priests are compelled, should not receive before confession. But also after contrition and confession of serious sins, it seems to be Augustine’s counsel that he not receive immediately, out of reverence for the sacrament, and so that he can be more sure.
We call penances false which are not imposed in conformity with the authority of the saints. (Sent. IV, 16.3 (88). 1.) Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the penances imposed in the canons be always observed to the letter, but penances are to be modified, having considered the conditions of the sin and the sinner.
Which is done for those sins which are contained in the law of the Decalogue, (Sent. IV, 16.4 (89). 2.) as directly against the moral precepts of the Decalogue; but not as aside from the precepts, such as are venial sins.
So also one truly says: as we forgive our debtors. *(Sent. IV, 16.6 (91). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, c71.)*It seems that someone who does not have any sin, sins by saying, Our Father, (Sent. IV, 16.6 (91). 1 citing Mt. 6,9.) for he confesses himself to have debts that he does not have.
Furthermore, it seems the same for the person who does not forgive debts, that he sins by saying an Our Father.
And it should be said to the first that it is not certain to anyone that he is cleansed from all sin, at least venial sin, or from all guilt. Nevertheless, if he should know by revelation, he does not sin by saying it in the person of the Church.
And likewise it is to be said about the second objection that he says he forgives debts in the person of the Church; and so he does not sin by saying this; but he will not obtain forgiveness unless he forgives.
Chapter 152 of 186