D. 15 - Requirements for penance
After the Master has considered penance according to its truth, showing what penance is according to its true account, and removing the error of certain people who wished to add future perseverance to the definition of penance, here he considers penance according to its integrity, removing the error of certain people who held the false opinion that it is possible to do penance for one sin and not for another, which is against the integrity of penance. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he gives the arguments that are the cause of the error; in the second, he disproves this error, at: I judge that a sufficient response has been made to those. (Sententiae IV, 15.7 (85). 3.)
The first is in two parts, according as the error mentioned was posited in two ways; for in the first part he criticizes the arguments of those who said that penance may be done for one sin without the others, and be fruitful for the present time; in the second, he criticizes those who held that this was fruitful not for the present, but for the future, when one has done penance for the other sins, at: and yet it seems to some that it was satisfaction, but it is fruitless. (Sent. IV, 15.6 (84). 2.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, he excludes the argument that proceeded from the authority of the canon; in the second, the arguments taken from the authority of the saints and from reason, at: they bring forward other authorities. (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 5.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he raises the objection; second, he resolves it, at: but that text is only to be understood of those who are changed for the good by their present sufferings; (Sent. IV, 15.1 (79). 3.) third, he excludes a certain doubt arising from the previous resolution, at: attend, reader, to these words. (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 2.)
They also bring in other authorities. In this part he does two things: first, he lists the arguments of those people, the first of which is from Gregory’s authority, the second from Ambrose’s authority, and the third taken from reason, as as is clear from the argument itself. Second, he resolves them: first, the text from Gregory, at: to these people one may answer as follows, (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 7.) etc.; second, the text from Ambrose, at: as for what Ambrose says, (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 8.) etc.; third, the argument from reason, at: as to the objection, etc. (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 9.)
And yet it seems to some that it was satisfaction, but it is fruitless. Here he destroys the arguments of the other position; and concerning this he does two things: first, he lists them; second, he resolves them, at: but we understand these statements as applying to one who in charity at some time does good things and is good, but at another time is wicked. (Sent. IV, 15.6 (84). 4.)
And he gives two solutions, of which the second begins here: this may also be taken of the good works which are done by a man while he is wicked. (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 1.)
And concerning this he does two things; first, he shows that good deeds done without charity, even if they are avail for a more tolerable judgment, nevertheless are not sufficient for obtaining eternal life. Second, he shows that it is the same with works done in charity that are afterward made dead by sin, at: Ezekiel says that even the good works which someone does in charity are not in God’s memory, if the doer falls afterwards and does not rise from his fall. (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 2.)
I judge that a sufficient response has been made to those. Here he disproves this error; and concerning this he does two things: first, he disproves the error; second, he concludes to the truth, namely, what is true and sufficient penance, at: from the above, a very clear notion of true penance and satisfaction is presented. (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 7.)
Here we must ask about satisfaction and its parts; and so four questions arise here. First, concerning satisfaction in itself. Second, about almsgiving. Third, about fasting. Fourth, about prayer. For a man makes satisfaction by these three things.
Question 1
Satisfaction
Concerning this, five questions arise:
first, what is satisfaction;
- second, whether it is possible for us to make satisfaction to God;
- third, how a human being can make satisfaction;
- fourth, by what things;
- fifth, whether restitution is a part of satisfaction.
- Article 1
What is satisfaction
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor a virtue’s act. For every virtue’s act is meritorious. But satisfaction is not meritorious, as it seems; for merit is free, but satisfaction regards a debt. Therefore, satisfaction is not the act of a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every act of a virtue is voluntary. But sometimes satisfaction is made for something unwillingly, as when a person is punished by a judge for an offense committed against another. Therefore, satisfaction is not the act of a virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 2, 1111b5.) in a virtue of habit the main thing is choice. But satisfaction is not made through choice, but rather chiefly regards outward works. Therefore, it is not the act of a virtue.
On the contrary (1), satisfaction belongs to penance. But penance is a virtue, as was said before. Therefore, satisfaction is the act of a virtue.
Furthermore (2), any act done to blot out sin must be an act of virtue: for a contrary is destroyed by its contrary. But by satisfaction, sin is completely annihilated. Therefore, satisfaction is the act of a virtue.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not an act of justice. (Parallels: ST III, q. 85, a. 3; q. 90, a. 2.) For satisfaction is done in order to be reconciled to the one whom one has offended. But since reconciliation belongs to love, it pertains to charity. Therefore, satisfaction is an act of charity, and not of justice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the causes of sin in us are the soul’s passions, by which we are incited to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher, (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1.) is not about passions, but about activities. Therefore, since satisfaction for sins means to cut out their causes, as it says in the text, it seems that it is not an act of justice.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to be careful in the future is not an act of justice, but rather an act of prudence, which includes caution as one of its parts, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 1, Subquestion 2. But this pertains to satisfaction: for it belongs to satisfaction to not grant admittance to the suggestions of sin. Therefore, satisfaction is not an act of justice.
On the contrary (1), no virtue concerns the account of the due, except justice. But satisfaction pays due honor to God, as Anselm says. (See Anselm, Cur Deus homo, Bk. 1, ch. 11: “Sic ergo debet omnis qui peccat, honorem deo quem rapuit solvere; et haec est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator deo debet facere” (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, 2:68).) Therefore, satisfaction is an act of justice.
Furthermore (2), no virtue has to do with making external things equal, except justice. But this is done by satisfaction, since it establishes an equality by making amends for the previous offense. Therefore, satisfaction is an act of justice.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the definition of satisfaction from Augustine is unfittingly set down in the text. For he says that satisfaction is cutting out the causes of sin, and not granting admittance to their suggestion. For the actual cause of sin is the fomes. But in this life we cannot get rid of the fomes. Therefore, satisfaction is not cutting out the causes of sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the cause of sin is stronger than sin. But a person cannot get rid of sin by himself. Therefore, much less can he do so to the causes of sin; and so the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, satisfaction, since it is a part of penance, regards the past, not the future. But refusing to entertain the suggestion of sin regards the future. Therefore, it should not be included in the definition of satisfaction.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, satisfaction is said about a past offense. But no mention is made of the preceding offense. Therefore, the definition of satisfaction is unfittingly assigned.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, as mentioned above, Anselm gives another definition in Book I of Why God Became Man, namely, satisfaction is paying the honor owed to God, in which no mention is made of those things that Augustine includes. Therefore, Augustine’s definition seems to be unfitting.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, an innocent man can pay the honor owed to God. But making satisfaction does not apply to the innocent. Therefore, Anselm’s definition is badly assigned.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that a certain act may be called an act of virtue in two ways. In one way, materially, and this is the way that any act that does not have implicit malice or a lack of due circumstances can be called an act of virtue: for virtue can use any act such as walking, speaking, and things like that for its own end. In another way a certain act may be called an act of virtue formally, for it has the implicit form and nature of virtue, as enduring bravely is said to be an act of fortitude. However, what is formal in any moral virtue is the notion of the mean; and so every act that includes the notion of the mean is formally an act of virtue. And since an equality is a mean, which satisfaction implies by its name (for nothing is said to make satisfaction except according to the proportion of equality to something else), it is clear that satisfaction is also formally an act of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Although making satisfaction in itself is owed, nevertheless, to the extent that the person making satisfaction performs this work voluntarily, it has the nature of something freely done on the part of the doer. And thus the person makes a virtue of the necessity: for paying a debt has merit from the fact that it involves necessity, which is contrary to the will. And so if the will assents to to the necessity, the quality of merit will not be destroyed.
Reply Obj. 2: The voluntary is not required from an act of virtue in the one who suffers, but in the one who does it, since it is his act. And so when the one on whom the judge imposes recompense is related to the satisfaction passively, and not actively, it is not necessary that the satisfaction be voluntary in him, but in the judge making him do it.
Reply Obj. 3: The most important thing in virtue can be considered in two ways. In one way, the chief thing in it as it is a virtue, and so what belongs to its definition or is closer to it is more important in virtue; and in this way choice and interior acts are the most important things in virtue, as virtue. In another way, the chief thing in virtue can be considered according as it is this particular virtue; and in this way the most important thing in it is what gives it its determination. Now interior acts in any virtue are determined through external ones: for choice, which is common to all virtues, becomes specific to this virtue by the fact that it is the choice of this act. And that is how external acts in any virtues are more principal; and this is also how it is in satisfaction.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 3, 1131a15.) the mean of justice is taken according to the equalizing of one thing to another in a certain proportion. And this is why when an equalization like this carries the very name of satisfaction: since satis, the adverb ‘enough,’ indicates an equality of proportion, it is clear that satisfaction is formally an act of justice. But an act of justice, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5, 1134a3.) is either from oneself toward another, as when someone renders to another what he owes him; or else it is from someone else to another person, as when the judge makes justice between two people. However, when an act of justice is between oneself and another, the equality exists in the one doing this act; but when it is between two other people, the equality is established in the one undergoing the justice. And since satisfaction expresses an equality in the one making satisfaction, it names an act of justice that is from oneself toward another, properly speaking.
But someone can do justice from himself toward another either in his actions and passions, or in external things, as also an injury may be done to another either by taking something of his or by some wounding action. And since the use of external things is to give them, this is the reason the act of justice that establishes an equality in outward things is properly said to be a rendering. But making satisfaction manifestly shows equality in actions, although sometimes one thing is set down for another. And since equalizing only happens with inequalities, this is the reason that satisfaction presupposes an inequality of actions, which indeed constitutes the offense; and this is how it is related to the previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense except retributive justice, which establishes an equality in the one who undergoes the justice, regardless of whether the one suffering is the same as the one acting, as when someone imposes a punishment on himself, or whether they are not the same, as when a judge punishes someone else; retributive justice relates to both. It is likewise with penance, which implies an equality only in the one doing it, for he binds himself to the punishment, so that penance thus becomes in a way a species of retributive justice. And because of this it is clear that satisfaction, which conveys an equality with regard to the previous offense in the one doing it, is a work of justice according to that part which is called penance.
Reply Obj. 1: Satisfaction, as is clear from what has been said, is a certain recompense for an injury inflicted. And so as the injury inflicted directly brought about an inequality of justice, and as a result, an inequality opposed to friendship, so also satisfaction leads directly to an equality of justice, and consequently to an equality of friendship. And since every act proceeds as elicited by that habit to whose end it is immediately ordered, but it proceeds as commanded by the one to whose end it further tends, this is why satisfaction is elicited by justice, but commanded by charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Although justice is chiefly about activities, nevertheless it is also about passions as a result, inasmuch as they are the causes of activities. But justice restrains anger, so that it does not unjustly impose an injury on another, and concupiscence, so that it does not approach the bed of others. In the same way, too, satisfaction can cut out the causes of sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Any moral virtue takes part in the act of prudence, by the fact that prudence formally completes in them the account of virtue, since it is by prudence that the mean is taken in individual moral virtues, as is clear from the definition of virtue given in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 1106b24–28.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that justice does not extend only to removing a previous inequality by punishing past fault, but it also protects the future equality: for according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b17.) punishments are medicines. And this is why satisfaction, which is the act of justice imposing a penalty, is also a medicine, curing past sin and preserving from future ones. And so when a man makes satisfaction to a man, he both compensates for the past and guards against the future. And according to this satisfaction can be defined in two ways. In one way with regard to past fault, which it heals by compensating; and in this way it is said that satisfaction is a recompense for injuries inflicted according to the equality of justice; and Anselm’s definition, which says that to make satisfaction is to pay due honor to God, as might be considered due by reason of a fault committed, is said to amount to the same thing. In another way it can be defined according as it preserves from future fault; and this is how Augustine defines it. However, preservation from physical illness happens by the removal of the causes from which the illness can be contracted: for once these are removed, the illness cannot follow. But in a spiritual ailment it is not this way, for the free will cannot be forced; and so it cannot be avoided in its foregoing causes, although with difficulty can it be contracted once the causes are removed. And so in the definition of satisfaction he includes two things: namely, cutting off the causes as to the first, and the free will’s refraining from sin as to the second.
Reply Obj. 1: The proximate causes of actual sin must be considered here, which are said to be two: namely, lust, whether from the habit left behind by an act of sin or other things left behind by past sins; and outward occasions of sin, like place, bad company, and things like that. And such causes are removed in this life by satisfaction; although the fomes, which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not completely removed by satisfaction in this life, even if it is weakened.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the cause of evil or privation, in the way it has a cause, is only a defect in the good, but good is more easily destroyed than established, therefore it is easier to cut out the causes of privation and evil than to remove evil itself, which is only removed by establishing the good; which is evident in the case of blindness and its causes. And nevertheless the causes of sin mentioned are not sufficient causes, since sin does not necessarily follow from them, but they are certain actions. Nor again is satisfaction made without God’s help, since it cannot exist without charity, as will be said.
Reply Obj. 3: Although penance has to do with the past in its first intention, nevertheless it regards the future as a result, inasmuch as it is a preserving medicine; and so it is also with satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 4: Augustine defines satisfaction according as it is made to God, from whom in the truth of the matter nothing can be taken away, although the sinner, as far as in him lies, does take something away. And thus in such satisfaction amendment in the future is required more chiefly than recompense for the past; and because of this, Augustine defines satisfaction from this side. Nevertheless, the recompense for the acts of the past can be known from one’s guarding against future ones, for it is done about the same things in reverse. For in looking at past deeds, we detest the causes of sin on account of those sins, beginning the motion of detestation from our sins; but in taking care about the future we begin from the causes, so that we may avoid sin more easily once its causes are removed.
Reply Obj. 5: It is not unfitting that several different definitions should be given of the same thing according to the different things that are found in it; and this is the way it is in this case, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 6: The debt is to be understood as what we owe God by reason of a fault committed: for penance regards the debt, as has been said before.
Article 2
Whether satisfaction toward God is possible
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; q. 85, a. 3, ad 2.) It seems that a man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction must be equal to the offense, as is clear from what has been said. But an offense committed against God is infinite, for it takes its quantity from the one it is committed against, since someone who strikes the prince offends more than if he struck someone else. Therefore, since an action of man cannot be infinite, it seems that man cannot make satisfaction to God.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a slave, since everything he has belongs to his master, cannot compensate his master for anything. But we are God’s slaves, having from him whatever we have of good. Since, therefore, satisfaction is a recompense for past offenses, it seems that we cannot make satisfaction to God.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, that man who has not enough to pay off one debt with all that he has, cannot satisfy for another debt. But whatever a man is and can do and has, is not enough to pay his debt for the benefit of his condition. This is why it says in Isaiah 40:16 that the trees of Lebanon would not suffice for a burnt offering. Therefore, in no way can a man make satisfaction for the debt of an offense committed.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man must spend all his time in the service of God. But time lost cannot be recovered, because of which it is most serious to throw away time, as Seneca says. (Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, Ep. 1.) Therefore, a man cannot make recompense to God, and so the same as before.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, actual mortal sin is more serious than original sin. But no one could make satisfaction for original sin, unless he were God and man. Therefore, neither for actual sin.
On the contrary (1), as Jerome says, whoever says that God has commanded anything impossible of man, let him be anathema. (In fact, the words of Pelagius, Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum; see also Jerome, Dialogi contra Pelagianos, bk. 1, para. 14 (CCSL 80; PL 23:507).) But satisfaction is commanded: bear fruits worthy of penance (Luke 3:8). Therefore, it is possible to make satisfaction to God.
Furthermore (2), God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore, also to God.
Furthermore (3), due satisfaction is equated with the punishment of fault: for justice is the same as retaliation, as the Pythagoreans said. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5, 1132b21.) But it happens that one assumes a penalty equal to the pleasure that there was in sinning. Therefore, it happens that one makes satisfaction to God.
I answer that, as was said above, a man becomes debtor to God in two ways. In one way, by reason of the benefits he has received; in another way, by reason of sins committed. And just as thanksgiving or worship, or what is of this kind, answers the debt of benefits received, in the same way satisfaction answers the debt of sins committed. However, among those honors that are for parents or gods, even according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 14, 1164b15.) it is impossible to render the equivalent according to quantity; but it is enough that a man render what he can: for friendship does not require an equivalent except according as it is possible. And this is also a certain kind of equal, namely, according to proportionality: for just as what is due to God is related to God himself, so is whatever this man can render related to him. And this is how the form of justice is preserved in some way, and it is the same on the part of satisfaction. Therefore, a man cannot make satisfaction, if the satis, ‘enough,’ means an equality of quantity. However, it does happen if it means equality of proportion, as was said, and just as this suffices for the account of justice, it also suffices for the account of satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as an offense contains a certain infinity from the infinity of divine majesty, so also satisfaction takes a certain infinity from the infinity of divine mercy, according as it is informed by grace, by which whatever a man can render is made acceptable. Nevertheless, some people say that it contains an infinity in regard to the turning away, and on this side it is forgiven freely; but in regard to what is turned toward it is finite, and so satisfaction can be made for it. But this amounts to nothing, for satisfaction does not correspond to sin except as it is an offense against God, which it does not possess in turning toward something else, but only in the turning away from God. But others say that even as to the turning away satisfaction can be made for sin by virtue of the merits of Christ, which had a certain infinity, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 18, Question 1, Article 6, Subquestion 1. And this amounts to the same thing as was said before, for through faith in the Mediator grace is given to believers. However, if he gave grace in another way, satisfaction would be sufficient in the way described.
Reply Obj. 2: Man, who was made in the image of God, partakes in a certain freedom, inasmuch as he is master of his own acts by his free will. And thus by the fact that he acts through his free will, he can make satisfaction to God. For although he belongs to God, according as it was granted to him by God he has nevertheless handed it over freely, as he is his own master, and this does not apply to a slave.
Reply Obj. 3: That argument concludes that an equivalent satisfaction cannot be made to God; but not that a sufficient satisfaction cannot be made to him. For although man owes all that he can do to God, it is nevertheless not required of him that he necessarily do all that he can, for it is impossible, according to the state of this present life, that he spend all his power on one single thing, since he must be concerned with many things. But a certain measure is applied to a man, which is required of him, namely, fulfilling God’s commands, and he can do something above and beyond these, so that he may make satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 4: Although man cannot recover past time, he can still compensate in the future what he should have done in the past; for he did not have to do for the due precept all that he was able, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: Original sin, although it has less of the account of sin than actual sin does, is nevertheless a more serious evil, for it is the infection of human nature itself. And therefore through one mere man’s satisfaction it could not be expiated, like actual sin.
Article 3
Conditions for satisfaction
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 86, a. 3.) It seems that man can make satisfaction for one sin without another. For when things are not connected with each other, one can be taken away without another. But sins do not have a connection with each other, otherwise whoever had one would have all. Therefore, one can be expiated by satisfaction without another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is more merciful than man. But a man receives the cancellation of one debt without another. Therefore, God also accepts satisfaction for one sin without another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, satisfaction, as it says in the text, is cutting out the causes of sin, and not granting admittance to their suggestion. But this may be done for one sin without another, so that, for example, one might restrain lust and pursue greed. Therefore, satisfaction can be made for one sin without another.
On the contrary (1), it says in Isaiah 58:4 that the fast they did for contentions and quarrels had not been accepted by God, although fasting is a work of satisfaction. But satisfaction cannot be made except by a work acceptable to God. Therefore, no one who has any sin can make satisfaction to God.
Furthermore (2), Satisfaction is a medicine for the healing of past sins, and the preservation from future ones, as was said. But sins cannot be healed by anything but grace. Therefore, since any sin removes grace, satisfaction cannot be made for one sin without the others.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone who was once contrite for all his sins and afterward fell into sin, could make satisfaction for the other sins that had been forgiven him through contrition, even while he lacks charity. (Parallel: below, d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.) For Daniel said to Nebuchadnezzar: redeem your sins with almsgiving (Dan 4:24). But he was still a sinner then, which the subsequent punishment showed. Therefore, someone can make satisfaction while he is still in sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love (cf. Eccl 9:1). Therefore, if satisfaction could only be made by someone who has charity, no one would know if he could make satisfaction; and this is unfitting.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, an entire act is informed by the intention that a man has in the beginning of the act. But when a penitent began to do penance, he was in charity. Therefore, all the satisfaction following will have efficacy from that charity that informs his intention.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of penalty and fault. But this equalizing of penalty can also be done in someone who does not have charity. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary (1), charity covers all offenses (Prov 10:12). But it belongs to the virtue of satisfaction to blot out offenses. Therefore, without charity it does not have its own virtue.
Furthermore (1), almsgiving is especially a work of satisfaction. But almsgiving done without charity is not worth anything, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:3: if I give all my means to feed the poor . . . but have not charity, it is no profit to me. Therefore, neither would any satisfaction be.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that after a man has had charity, his previous satisfaction begins to be effective. (Parallel: ST III, q. 89, a. 6, ad 3.) Commenting on Leviticus 25:25: if your brother, falling into difficulties, should sell his possessions, the Gloss says that the fruits of a good conversion must be counted from the time when one sinned. But they would not be counted unless they received a certain efficacy from the subsequent charity. Therefore, they begin to have efficacy after charity has been restored.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as satisfaction’s efficacy is impeded by sin, in the same way baptism’s efficacy is impeded by false pretenses. But baptism begins to take effect once the pretenses have ended. Therefore, so does satisfaction, once the sin is over.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if many fasts were imposed on someone for sins committed, and he completed them while falling into sin, although he may confess them again, he is not bound to do those fasts again. However, he would be bound if his satisfaction had not been fulfilled by them. Therefore, by subsequent penance previous works of satisfaction receive efficacy.
On the contrary (1), works done without charity are not satisfactory because they are dead works. But they are not brought to life by penance. Therefore, neither do they begin to be satisfactory.
Furthermore (2), charity only informs the acts that proceed from it in some way. But works cannot be acceptable to God and thereby also satisfactory unless they are informed by charity. Therefore, since works done without charity have proceeded from charity in no way, nor are they able to proceed from it later, they can in no way be counted as satisfaction.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that works done without charity are meritorious of some good, at least a temporal one. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 27, a. 4; ST III, q. 89, a. 6; de Potentia, q. 6, a. 9; De malo, q. 2, a. 5, ad 7.) For just as punishment is related to an evil act, so is reward related to a good one. But no evil deed is unpunished before God, the just judge. Therefore, neither does any good deed go unrewarded, and so by this good deed, something is merited.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a reward is not given without merit. But rewards are given for works done without charity, as it says in Matthew 5, (See verses 2, 5, and 16.) about those who do good works because of human glory, that they have received their reward. Therefore, those works were meritorious of some good.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, two people existing in sin, of whom one does many things that are good by genus and circumstances, while the other does none, are not equally close to receiving good things from God. Otherwise one would not advise him to do a good deed. But anyone who approaches God receives more of his good things. Therefore, the one who does this by his good works merits a certain good from God.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says, that the sinner is not worthy of the bread that he eats. (It is not clear where this saying comes from; Thomas does not cite it again, and the other scholastics who quote it do not provide the name of a work.) Therefore, he cannot merit anything from God.
Furthermore (2), whoever is nothing cannot merit. But a sinner who does not have charity is nothing according to his spiritual being, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:2. Therefore, he cannot merit anything.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the works mentioned do nothing to mitigate the punishment of hell. (Parallel: ST III, q. 89, a. 6, ad 3.) For the amount of punishment in hell will be according to the amount of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish the quantity of sin. Therefore, neither do they diminish the punishments of hell.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the punishment of hell, although it is infinite in duration, nevertheless is finite in intensity. But anything finite is consumed by some finite thing taken away. Therefore, if works done without charity took away something of the punishment due for sins, those works could be multiplied so much that the punishment of hell would be completely taken away, which is false.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Church’s offerings are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, as Augustine says in his Enchiridion, the Church’s offerings do not benefit the damned in hell. (See Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate (CCSL 46), ch. 29; cf. PL 40:283.) Therefore, much less do works done outside of charity.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in his Enchiridion: they count toward full remission, or that damnation may be made more tolerable. (Ibid.)
Furthermore (2), it is greater to do good than to avoid evil. But avoiding evil always averts punishment, even in those who lack charity. Therefore, much more would the doing of good.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that certain people have said that someone can make satisfaction for one sin without another, as the Master says in the text. But this cannot be. For since a previous offense should be taken away by satisfaction, the satisfaction must be does in a manner suitable for taking away the offense. Now the removal of an offense is the restoration of friendship; and so if there is something that blocks the restoring of friendship, satisfaction cannot even exist between men. Therefore, since any sin impedes the friendship of charity, which is between man and God, it is impossible that a man make satisfaction for one sin while retaining another, just as neither would a man make satisfaction who threw himself at another’s feet for having slapped him, and then gave him another slap.
Reply Obj. 1: Since sins are not connected by being all rooted in some one thing, a person may commit one without another. But all sins are forgiven according to one and the same thing; and this is why the remission of different sins is connected, and satisfaction cannot be made for one without the others.
Reply Obj. 2: In the obligation of debt there is only the inequality opposed to justice, because one person has what belongs to another. And that is why for restitution all that is required is that the equality of justice be restored, which can indeed be done about one debt and not another. But where there is offense, there is not only the inequality opposed to justice, but also to friendship. And therefore for offenses to be taken away through satisfaction, it is not only necessary that the equality of justice be restored by the compensation of an equal penalty, but the equality of friendship must also be restored; which cannot be done while there is anything that would impede friendship.
Reply Obj. 3: One sin draws a person into others by its weight, as Gregory says; (See Gregory, Moralia in Iob, Bk. 25 (CCSL 143B), par. 9: “Peccatum namque quod paenitentia non diluit ipso suo pondere mox ad aliud trahit.”) and so whoever retains one sin does not sufficiently cut out the causes of others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that some people have said that after all sins have been forgiven through penance and contrition, if anyone before performing the satisfaction should fall back into sin, and should make satisfaction while in sin, that satisfaction would benefit him, so that if he should die in his sin, he would not be punished in hell for these sins. But this cannot be: for in satisfaction it is necessary that, even once friendship has been restored, the equality of justice be also restored, since its contrary does away with friendship, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 1, 1163b32 et seq.; Bk. 8, ch. 4, 1157a15.) Now, equality in making satisfaction to God is not according to equivalence, but rather according to his acceptance, as was said. And this is why it is necessary that, even if the offense has already been forgiven by preceding contrition, there be works of satisfaction accepted by God, which acceptance charity gives to them. And thus works done without charity do not make satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 1: Daniel’s counsel is understood as to cease from sin and repent, and that is how he could make satisfaction by almsgiving.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man does not know for certain whether he had charity when he did satisfaction, or whether he has it, so also he does not know for certain whether he has made satisfaction. And therefore Sirach 5:5 says: do not be without fear about the atonement for sins. Nevertheless, it is not required that because of this fear a man repeat the satisfaction he has completed, if he has a mortal sin on his conscience. For although he will not expiate the penalty by satisfaction like this, nevertheless, he will not incur the guilt of omission from neglecting to do his satisfaction; just as neither does someone who approaches the Eucharist with a latent mortal sin that he is not conscious of incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.
Reply Obj. 3: That intention was interrupted by the subsequent sin, and therefore it does not give any force to the works done after sin.
Reply Obj. 4: A sufficient equalization cannot be made, whether according to the divine acceptance or according to equivalence; and so this argument does not follow.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some people have said that works done in charity, which are said to be living, are meritorious of eternal life, and satisfactory with regard to punishment being dismissed; and that works done without charity are brought to life by subsequent charity, so that they are satisfactory, but not meritorious of eternal life. But this cannot be: for works done out of charity have both qualities for the same reason, namely, from being pleasing to God. And therefore just as grace’s subsequent arrival cannot make them pleasing in the one respect, nor can it as to the other.
Reply Obj. 1: It should not be understood that the fruits are counted from the time in which one was first in sin, but from the time when he stopped sinning, namely, when he was last in sin. Or it is understood from the moment he was contrite for sin, and did many good things before having confessed. Or it may be said that the greater his contrition was, the more he diminished his punishment, and the more good things he does while still in sin, the more he disposed himself for the grace of contrition. And so it is probable that he would owe less of a penalty; and because of this it should be considered differently by a priest, and given a lesser penance, since he found him so well disposed.
Reply Obj. 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, but satisfaction does not; and so once charity has come, which takes away the pretense and sin, it makes baptism have its own effect. But it does not do this with satisfaction. And furthermore, baptism justifies by the very fact of having been done, for it is not of man, but of God. And so it is not made dead in the same way as satisfaction, which is a work of man.
Reply Obj. 3: Some works of satisfaction leave a certain effect in the one doing them, even after the act of satisfaction passes, as bodily weakness remains from fasting, dimishment of wealth from almsgiving, and so on. And satisfactions like this done for sins do not need to be repeated, because they are accepted by God as penance in what remains from them. But satisfactions that do not leave behind any effect in the one doing them once the act has passed, must be done again, as it is with prayers and the like. Now an interior act, which completely passes, can in no way be made alive again, but must be repeated.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that, as was said in Book III, Distinction 18, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 1, merit is properly said of an action which makes it so that it would be just to give something to the one who did it. But justice can be said in two ways. In one way, properly, namely, what regards the debt on the side of the receiver. The other way is by a certain likeness, which regards the debt on the side of the giver. For it is appropriate that the giver give something that nevertheless is not owed to the receiver. And thus justice is said to be befitting of the divine goodness, as Anselm says, because God is just when he spares sinners, for it befits him. (Cf. Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 10: “Cum enim punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, non quia illorum meritis, sed quia bonitati tuae condecens est. . . . ita iustus es non quia nobis reddas debitum, sed quia facis quod decet te summe bonum” (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, 1:109).)
And according to this, merit can also be said in two ways. In one way, an act that makes it so that the one doing it should receive something; and this is called condign merit. In another way, what makes it so that the giver should give, according to a what befits him; and this merit is called congruous merit.
Now since in everything that is freely given the first account of giving is love, it is impossible that someone should cause such a debt to himself if he lacks friendship. And therefore since all goods, both temporal and eternal, are given to us by divine generosity, no one can acquire the debt of receiving any of them, except through charity for God. And this is why works done without charity are not meritorious condignly, neither for eternal nor for temporal goods before God. But since it befits divine goodness that everywhere it finds the disposition, it adds perfection, this is why someone is said to merit some good congruously by works done without charity. And according to this these works bring about a threefold good: namely, obtaining temporal goods, disposing toward grace, and habituating to good works. But since this merit is not merit properly so called, therefore it should rather be conceded that works like this are not meritorious of anything, than that they are.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 14, 1163b15–17.) by all the things that a son can do, nothing can render him equal to his father for those things that he received from his father, which is why nothing can make a father debtor to his son; and much less can man make God his debtor because of the equivalence of works. And so no work of ours is able to merit anything by the quantity of its own goodness, but from the power of charity, which causes those things that belong to friends to be shared. Hence, however great is the good work done without charity, it does not make it so that the one doing it has a debt of receiving anything from God, properly speaking. But a bad work, by the quantity of its badness, merits punishment according to equivalence, for no bad deeds done are on the part of God to us like good works. And so although a bad deed merits punishment condignly, nevertheless a good work does not merit reward condignly without charity.
To the second and third it should be said that they proceed from congruous merit. But the other arguments proceed from condign merit.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that to diminish the punishment of hell can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that someone is freed from the punishment which he already deserved. And in this way, since no one is freed from punishment unless he is absolved of guilt, for the effects are not diminished unless the causes are diminished or removed, by works done without charity, which can neither take away guilt nor diminish it, the punishment of hell cannot be mitigated. In another way, such that merit impedes punishment, and in this way works like these do diminish the punishment of hell. First, because a man avoids the guilt of omission, who has done works of this kind. Second, because works like this dispose one toward good, in a way, so that a man commits sins from less contempt, so that he is also held back from many sins by works like these. But works of this kind merit the reduction or deferral of temporal punishment, as is said of Ahab in 1 Kings 21:29, just as in the same way also the bestowal of temporal goods.
But certain people say that they reduce the punishment of hell, not by taking anything away from its substance, but by strengthening the subject, so that he can better endure it. But this cannot be: for strengthening is nothing but the removal of one’s ability to suffer. But one’s ability to suffer is according to the measure of guilt, and so if the guilt is not reduced, neither can the subject be strengthened. Some people also say that the punishment is reduced as to the worm of conscience, although not as to the fire. But this is also nothing: for just as the punishment of fire is equated with the guilt, so also is the punishment of remorse of conscience; and the same argument goes for both.
And by this the answers to the objections are clear.
Article 4
Which actions are satisfactory
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. (Parallel: SCG III, ch. 158.) It seems that satisfaction need not be done by penal works. For by satisfaction, recompense must be made for a divine offense. But no recompense seems to be done by penal works, for God does not delight in our punishments (Tob 3:22). Therefore, satisfaction need not be done by penal works.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the more a certain work proceeds from greater charity, the less it is penal; for charity does not hold punishment (cf. 1 John 4:18). Therefore, if satisfactory works must be penal ones, the more they are done out of charity, the less they will be satisfactory, which is false.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to satisfy is, as Anselm says, to pay due honor to God. (See Anselm, Cur Deus homo, Bk. 1, ch. 11 (for the text, see above, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2, sc 1).) But this also can be done by other things than penal works. Therefore, satisfaction need not be done by penal works.
On the contrary (1), Gregory says: it is just that a sinner inflict greater laments by penance, the more he has inflicted loss by his guilt. (See Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospel, Bk. 1, hom. 20, par. 8: “Per hoc ergo quod dicitur: Facite fructus dignos paenitentiae, uniuscuiusque conscientia conuenitur, ut tanto maiora quaerat bonorum operum lucra per paenitentiam, quanto grauiora sibi intulit damna per culpam” (CCSL 141:160).)
Furthermore (2), the wound of sin must be perfectly healed by satisfaction. But the medicine for sin is punishment, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b17.) Therefore, satisfaction must be done by penal works.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the scourges with which we are punished by God in this life cannot be satisfactory. For nothing can be a satisfactory work except what is meritorious, as is clear from what has been said. But we do not merit except by things that are in us. Therefore, since the scourges with which we are punished by God are not in us, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, satisfaction is only of the good. But scourges like that are brought against the wicked, and they are owed to them in particular. Therefore, they cannot be satisfactory.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, satisfaction regards past sins. But sometimes these scourges are inflicted on those who do not have sins, as is seen in the case of Job. (See chapters 1 and 2.) Therefore, it seems that they are not satisfactory.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Romans 5:3: *tribulation works patience, and patience, testing—*and purification from sin, as the Gloss says there. Therefore, scourges purify for sins, and thus they are satisfactory works.
Furthermore (2), in the text, Ambrose says: and if faith, that is, the consciousness of sin, should fail, suffering makes satisfaction. (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Psalm 118, littera 18, ch. 2, on verse 137 (CSEL 62:396).) Therefore, scourges of this kind are satisfactory.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that satisfactory works are unfittingly enumerated, since it says that there are three: almsgiving, fasting, and prayer. (Parallels: below, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 3; q. 3, a. 1, qa. 5, ad 2; q. 4, a. 7, qa. 1.) For a satisfactory work should be penal. But prayer holds no suffering, but pleasure, since it is a medicine against the sadness of punishment. This is why it says in James 5:13: is anyone sad among you? Let him pray and praise God. Therefore, it should not be counted among satisfactory works.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. But, as Jerome says, bodily diseases are cured by fasting, mental diseases by prayer. (Jerome, On Mark, ch. 9 (PL 30:616).) Therefore, there should not be any other satisfactory work.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, satisfaction is necessary to the cleansing of sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins: give alms, and all are cleansed for you (Luke 11:41). Therefore, the other two are superfluous.
On the contrary (4), it seems that there should be more works listed. For contraries cure each other. But there are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore, more works of satisfaction should be included.
Furthermore (5), pilgrimages also are imposed for satisfaction, and disciplines, or floggings; which are not counted under any of these. Therefore, they are insufficiently numbered.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that satisfaction, as was said, is directed toward a past offense for which recompense is made by satisfaction, and also toward future fault, from which we are preserved through it. And in both respects satisfaction is required to be done by penal works. For recompense for an offense means an equalizing, which must be from the one who offended toward the one against whom the offense was committed. Now, in human justice, equalizing is attained by taking away from the one who had more than was right and adding to the other from whom something was taken. However, although nothing can be taken away from God as he is in himself, nevertheless, a sinner, as far as in him lies, has taken something from him by sinning, as was said. And so for a recompense to be made, something must be taken away from the sinner by satisfaction, which is given up in honor of God. Now a good work, by the kind of thing it is, does not take anything away from the one who does it, but rather perfects him. And this is why the taking away does not happen by a good work, unless it is a penal one. And so in order for a certain work to be a satisfactory one, it must be good, so that it may be in honor of God; and it must be penal, so that something is taken away from the sinner. In the same way, punishment also preserves from future fault; for it is not easy for man to return to sins that he has experienced a punishment for. And this is why, according to the Philosopher, punishments are medicines. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b17.)
Reply Obj. 1: Although God does not delight in punishments as punishments, he does delight in them as they are just, and in that way they can be satisfactory.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as penalty is considered in satisfaction, so also difficulty is considered in merit. Now the reduction of difficulty on the part of the act itself reduces merit, other things being equal; but the reduction of difficulty from the promptness of the will does not diminish merit, but increases it. And likewise the reduction of penalty from the promptness of the will, which charity does, does not diminish the efficacy of satisfaction but increases it.
Reply Obj. 3: What is due for sin is recompense for the offense, which cannot happen without the punishment of the sinner, and Anselm understands the debt in this way.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that recompense for a past offense can be done either by the one who offended, or by another. However, when it is done by another, such recompense has more the nature of retribution than satisfaction. But when it is done by the one who offended, it also has the nature of satisfaction. And so if scourges that are inflicted by God for sins come to belong somehow to the one enduring them, they take the nature of satisfaction. Now, they come to belong to him to the extent that he accepts them for the purification of sins, making use of them patiently. Yet if he altogether dissents from them by impatience, then they do not become his in any way; and so they do not have the nature of satisfaction, but only of retribution.
Reply Obj. 1: Although those scourges are not at all in our power, nevertheless in this respect they are, namely, that we make patient use of them. And this is how a man makes a virtue out of necessity; and so they can be both meritorious and satisfactory.
Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says, just as gold glows and chaff smokes in the same fire, (In fact, Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 47), Bk. 1, ch. 8: “sicut sub uno igne aurum rutilat palea fumat.”) so also the good are purified and the wicked are more corrupted by impatience in the same scourges. And so although the scourges are common to both, nevertheless satisfaction only belongs to the good.
Reply Obj. 3: Scourges always have to do with past fault, but not always the fault of a person, but the fault of a nature. For if in human nature no fault preceded, no punishment would have existed. But since fault preceded in the nature, divine punishment is inflicted on a certain person without personal fault, for the merit of virtue and as a guard against subsequent sin. And these two things are also necessary in satisfaction. For it is necessary for there to be a meritorious work, so that honor may be shown to God, and it is necessary virtues be guarded, so that we might be preserved from future sins.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that satisfaction, as was said, must be such that something is taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we only have three goods: namely, the soul’s goods, the body’s goods, and fortune’s goods, namely, external goods. We do indeed take something away from ourselves of fortune’s goods by almsgiving, and from bodily goods by fasting. But from the soul’s goods it is not necessary that we take something away as to their essence or as to their diminishment, for by them we are made acceptable to God; but by the fact that we submit them to God completely, and this happens through prayer. This number is also fitting as regards the fact that satisfaction excises the causes of sins; for three roots of sin are listed in 1 John 2:16: concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life. And fasting is ordered against the concupiscence of the flesh; almsgiving against the concupiscence of the eyes; and against the pride of life, prayer, as Augustine says, commenting on Matthew. (The Moos ed. notes that this text has not been found in Augustine’s works. One manuscript has “Enarrationes in Ps. 42, in fine” (PL 36:482), but the text is not pertinent.) It is also fitting according as it pertains to satisfaction to not grant admittance to the suggestions of sin, for every sin we either commit against God, and prayer is ordered against that; or against our neighbor, and almsgiving is ordered against this; or against ourselves, and fasting is ordered against this.
Reply Obj. 1: According to some people, there are two kinds of prayer: one kind which is contemplative, whose conversation is in heaven (Phil 3:20); and this kind, because it is completely pleasurable, is not satisfactory. The other is founded on grieving over sins; and this kind contains pain, and it is the part of satisfaction. Or it may better be said that certain prayer has the nature of satisfaction, because although it has the sweetness of the spirit, it still has the affliction of the flesh, for, as Gregory comments on Ezekiel, when the fortitude of inner love grows in us, the strength of the flesh is doubtless weakened. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel (CCSL 142), Bk. 2, hom. 2, line 301.) And this is also why Jacob’s thigh muscle is read to have been withered by his struggle with the angel in Genesis 32:25.
Reply Obj. 2: Fleshly sin is said in two ways. In one way, what is fulfilled in bodily pleasure, such as gluttony and lust. In another way, what is fulfilled in those things that are ordered to the flesh, although not in the pleasure of the flesh, but rather in the pleasure of the soul, like greed. This is why such sins are like a middle ground between spiritual and fleshly sins; and thus it is necessary that a certain satisfaction correspond specifically to them, namely, almsgiving.
Reply Obj. 3: Although some of these acts are individually attributed to individual sins by a certain fittingness, because it is suitable that one is punished through the very things in which he sinned (Wis 11:16), and that the root of the sins committed be pulled up by satisfaction, still, any one of these can satisfy for any sin. This is why for someone who cannot complete one of these, another is enjoined; and almsgiving can particularly take the place of the others, inasmuch as someone can buy himself other works of satisfaction by almsgiving in a certain way among those to whom he gives alms. And so it is not necessary that if almsgiving cleanses all sins, the other satisfactions are therefore superfluous.
Reply Obj. 4: Although there are many sins in species, nevertheless, all can be traced back to these three roots, or to those three kinds of sin that we said all satisfactions correspond to.
Reply Obj. 5: Whatever belongs to bodily affliction comes under the heading of fasting; and whatever is spent on the benefit of one’s neighbor has the nature of almsgiving. And likewise, whatever shows worship to God takes the nature of prayer. And so one single work can hold several notions of making satisfaction.
Article 5
Whether restitution is a part of satisfaction
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. It seems that restitution is a part of satisfaction. For satisfaction reconciles us to God and our neighbor. But by restitution a man is reconciled with his neighbor. Therefore, restitution is a part of satisfaction.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, satisfaction happens by the contrary of the sin, as we make satisfaction for gluttony by fasting. But the contrary of the sin of wrongful taking is restitution. Therefore, restitution is a certain part of satisfaction.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Ambrose says that true penance is to cease sinning. (In fact, Ambrosiaster, On the Second Letter to the Corinthians, 2:7, PL 17:282.) But whoever restores something has ceased sinning: for as long as someone keeps what belongs to another against his will, he sins. Therefore, restitution is a part of penance. But this is only true under the notion of satisfaction. Therefore, it is a part of satisfaction.
On the contrary (1), satisfaction made to God, as is clear from Anselm’s definition quoted above. (Cur Deus homo, Bk. 1, ch. 11 (for the text, see q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2, sc 1).) But restitution is made to one’s neighbor. Therefore, restitution is not a part of satisfaction.
Furthermore (2), satisfaction is included in the judgment of the priest imposing the penance; but restitution is not. Therefore, restitution is not a part of satisfaction.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that what has been taken need not always be restored. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 62, aa. 2–4; q. 79, a. 3, ad 2; Quodl. XII, q. 16, a. 3.) For good reputation cannot be restored. But reputation can be taken away. Therefore, restitution cannot be made of everything taken.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, losses inflicted on one’s person are the greatest. But this kind of loss cannot be restored, like the loss of virginity, or cutting off one’s limbs. Therefore, not everything taken away can be restored.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever prevents someone from obtaining something seems to have taken it from him. But this need not be restored or compensated, as when someone prevents another from obtaining a prebend. Therefore, it seems that not everything taken away must be restored.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever gives the occasion of loss seems to have given the loss. But someone who digs under the seed sown on the ground gives the occasion of loss concerning the whole crop that could have followed from it. And likewise whoever keeps the money of his lender past the fixed time, when the other could have been profiting from it, seems to have caused the loss of the whole profit that he could have had. Yet it does not seem that he is bound to the restoration of the whole profit that could have been had, or of the crop that could have been harvested. Therefore, it is not necessary that there always be a restoration of what has been taken.
On the contrary (5), it seems that a man must restore more than he has taken away. For the precept of the old law is, as is clear from Exodus 22:1, that four sheep are to be rendered for every one, and five cows; and this precept, since it is about moral acts, seems to be a moral one. Therefore, it is still in effect; therefore, a man is bound to fourfold or fivefold restitution.
Furthermore (6), the things that are written in Scripture are given to us for an example. But in Luke 19:8 it says that Zacchaeus offered to restore fourfold whatever he had received by fraud. Therefore, this should also be the mode of restitution for us.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that only someone who takes is bound to restitution. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 62, aa. 6–7.) For no more is required in restitution than was inflicted in loss. Therefore, if only one person inflicted the loss, he alone is bound to restitution: otherwise the injured party would receive much more than what he lost, if restitution had to be made to him in cash by anyone who consented.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, restitution is made to no one but the one who suffered the loss. But it happens that someone might command, or counsel, or agree to another’s loss, and yet the other does not suffer loss. Therefore, such as these are not always bound to make restitution.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one is bound to incur personal loss for the sake of averting another’s monetary loss: for charity should be ordered. But sometimes if someone has exposed a robber, he might incur danger to his person. Therefore, it is not true that someone who does not expose a robber is bound to restitution, as some people say.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, even many good men do not stop those whom they see unjustly taking the belongings of another; nevertheless, it would be hard to say that they were bound to the restitution of everything. Therefore, even someone who does not stop thievery is not bound to restitution, as some people say. The same thing can also be objected about those who do not oppose it, but who could oppose it.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that restitution does not always have to be made to the one who suffered the loss. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 62, a. 5.) For no one can make restitution to someone he does not know. But sometimes a thief does not know whose things he stole. Therefore, it seems he is not bound to make restitution to him.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone who takes something is not bound to anything but restoring it. But sometimes he cannot reach the one to whom restitution must be made without great loss; perhaps even with the loss of more than the worth of the thing to be restored. Therefore, it seems that in such a case he is not bound to restore it.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a person may take something unjust in the pillaging of a state. But he cannot restore it to its owner since either he does not know who he is, or he is dead. Therefore, it seems that he is not bound to make restitution.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a certain prelate of the Church may unjustly grant some of the Church’s property. But that man is not bound to return it to the Church, as it seems, since they would come to the hands of that prelate, who is not worthy to receive them. Therefore, it seems that restitution is not always to be made to the one who suffered the loss.
On the contrary, by restitution the equality of justice is made whole. But the equality of justice is that what is taken from the gain is applied to the loss, as is said in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, 1132a9–10.) Therefore, it seems that restitution is always to be made to the one who has suffered the loss.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the inequality opposed to justice happens in two ways. In one way in external things, like when one person keeps the belongings of another; in another way in actions and sufferings, like when someone beats another in violence. And these two are sometimes separate, as is evident in itself; but sometimes they are united, as when someone takes something by violence, and inflicts injury and abuse on the one from whom he took it. And according to this repairing the equality of justice means two things. For repairing the inequality existing in things is called restitution; but repairing the inequality existing in actions and sufferings is named satisfaction. And this is why sometimes there is satisfaction without any restitution, as when someone humiliates his neighbor by saying certain insults to him; but sometimes there is restitution without satisfaction, as when someone returns what has been loaned. But sometimes both are required, as when a person takes away someone’s belongings by violence, and then we speak of the restitution of the thing wrongly taken, in which a man offended God and his neighbor.
Therefore, some people say that this kind of restitution is not a part of satisfaction, because it is not due to God alone; nor is it for the priest’s judgment, but it is a preliminary to satisfaction. But this amounts nothing: for every sin that is committed against one’s neighbor is also committed against God; and just as love of God is included in the love of neighbor, so also making satisfaction to one’s neighbor has satisfaction to God joined to it. Nor is it any objection that this does not fall under the judgment of a priest, for a priest is not there in place of our neighbor, but in place of God, and so the satisfaction that must be made to God depends on his judgment, but not the satisfaction that is to be made to God and neighbor together.
And so others say that it is a part of satisfaction. But this, too, is not true: for satisfaction removes an offense, and frees from punishment. But no one by the very fact that he stops offending thereby obtains reconciliation for a previous offense or escapes the punishment due to it. But he obtains this alone, that greater offense and punishment do not accumulate. And this is why stopping the offense is no part of satisfaction, but it is a preliminary to satisfaction.
And so since restitution is nothing other than to stop the offense, since one offends by the fact that he keeps the belongings of another against his will, it is clear that it is not a part of satisfaction, properly taken, but a precondition for satisfaction. But it is not for the reason given before: because we do concede that satisfaction made to one’s neighbor is a part of the satisfaction made to God; but restitution is not a part of satisfaction whether it is made to God or one’s neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: Man is not reconciled for an offense against his neighbor by restoring his things to him, but by showing a certain humility to him beyond that; and so it does not follow that restitution is a part of satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 2: Restitution is not contrary to taking or keeping unjustly, but rather it is the negation or absence of it; and so it is not fitting that this suffice for satisfaction, as neither does it make satisfaction for gluttony that someone does not eat immoderately, but that he abstain even from moderate eating.
Reply Obj. 3: Ceasing from sin is said to be a part of penance, not indeed by stopping past sins, except as the preliminary for penance, but by cutting off the causes of future sins, as was said before.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that for satisfaction a man must be reconciled to his neighbor, just as to God. Now reconciliation is nothing other than the repairing of friendship. But while the cause of friendship’s dissolution remains, friendship cannot be repaired; which cause indeed was the inequality caused by an unjust taking or keeping. And so the person who does not restore what was wrongly taken or kept cannot make satisfaction, nor be reconciled to God. But it should be known that, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 14, 1163b15.) friendship does not always require the equal, but what is possible. And so if anything has been taken that cannot possibly be restored, the will of restoring it with as much restitution as is possible suffices according to the condition of both to the judgment of good men.
Reply Obj. 1: Someone who exposes the wickedness of another to him who has the authority to correct—or even, if the wicked one be incorrigible, exposes him in the sight of the whole Church, that being put to shame he may desist from sin, or at least that they may depart from his corrupting company, provided the exposer preserve the order of fraternal charity—does not unjustly strip away that other’s good reputation; hence he is not bound to the restitution of his reputation. But if he did it with the intention of defaming, he does take it unjustly, even if what he says is true. And then he is bound to restore the man’s reputation, either by admitting he spoke falsely, if he spoke falsely, or in any other way, by not lying if he spoke truly, yet without saying that he had spoken truly, for he should not restore another’s good reputation with a lie.
Reply Obj. 2: Restitution is chiefly found in losses that were inflicted on matters of fortune, which can be restored. But in those matters that the objection refers to, which cannot be restored to the same good, restitution must be made as it is possible, namely, according to the judgment of good men.
Reply Obj. 3: The person who prevents someone from obtaining a living, if he does this because the man is unworthy, or so that he may be provided for better by another, does not act unjustly; and so he is not bound to restitution. But if it is for the sake of wounding him in the soul, he is bound to restitution, not indeed as much as the living was valued at, for he himself did not obtain it, but having considered the conditions of each according to the judgment of good men.
Reply Obj. 4: Someone who digs under the seed is not bound to as much grain as the field could produce, but as much as the field customarily did produce when sowed this way; for the crop of a field can be impeded by many things. And something similar should be said about someone who did not pay his debt on time, because he is not bound to restore as much as could possibly have been earned with it, but according to the estimation of the profit that typically came from it, having considered the labor, and misfortunes too, that may otherwise happen in profit; for profit does not arise from money alone, but from industry and labor.
Reply Obj. 5: That precept of the law, although it had to do with morals, nevertheless is not a moral precept, but a judicial one. For such precepts were given to that people for their place and time; and so they would not oblige now unless they were newly established by someone who had the power of establishing them. Nevertheless, inasmuch as they contained something of signification through Christ, precepts like these were fulfilled, as also the ceremonial ones.
Reply Obj. 6: Zacchaeus did not say this as if it were a necessary thing, but rather out of abundance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said certain verses were given about those who are bound to restitution: command, counsel, consent, flatterer, shelterer, participant, am silent, not preventing, not exposing. But only five of these are always obliged to restitution; and the first of these is command, when someone orders another to be despoiled: otherwise tyrants would not be bound to restitution. Second is consenting to commit a robbery in someone without whom the robbery could not be done. Third is recourse, namely, when someone provides shelter for thieves, and offers them protection. Fourth is participation, when someone joins a thief in robbing, and receives a part of the spoils. Fifth is not preventing, namely, when one is bound to prevent it by his office, like the rulers of a land, who should preserve justice, if they do not prevent it when they can, they are bound to restitution. But among the other causes enumerated, a person is not always bound to restitution, except in certain cases, when he believes that his counsel was probably effective, and that otherwise the unjust taking would not have been committed. Likewise too, not every flatterer, that is, sycophant, is bound to restitution, but the one who incites someone to take things by his wheedling, saying that it would be a sign of his strength and energy. Likewise too, someone is said to be silent who is bound by his office to speak out and who does not speak out; and then he is not always bound to restitution, unless he arranges that an unjust taking be done; but he should bring in the one who took it so that he may return it. Likewise too, not everyone who does not expose a thief is bound to restitution, but the one who is jealous of the theft, and takes part in the profit. But in all of these, if the main perpetrator makes restitution, the others are acquitted of the debt of restitution.
And by this the responses to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that to restore is to establish someone anew in possession of his own belongings; and therefore it is evident that restitution should be made to the one who has been deprived of his own belongings.
Reply Obj. 1: When the owner of stolen things is unknown, the poor are his heirs; and so one is not acquitted of the debt of restitution, unless he gives to the poor on behalf of the soul of the one to whom restitution should have been made, after having applied due diligence, of course.
Reply Obj. 2: If a thing is of great value, he should convey it himself, if he can opportunely; nor is it a problem if he suffers a loss in returning it, because he was the cause of its unjust confiscation. But if it cannot be conveyed, or if it is not a thing of great value, he can give it to the owner’s relatives, if he has some, or to some monastery, if he does not have relatives, under the condition that they are bound to render it to him, if he ever requires it, or ever comes for it.
Reply Obj. 3: The man who takes something in this way must make restitution to the poor of that town, or donate toward the other community needs of that state according to the judgment of the bishop, or of those to whom the care of that country belongs.
Reply Obj. 4: Restitution must be made to the Church, so that those things come into the possession of the successor of that prelate: for although he did not deserve to receive them, nevertheless the Church should not lose them.
Question 2
Almsgiving
Next we ask about almsgiving. And concerning this, six questions arise:
first, what it is;
- second, its effect or fruit;
- third, its parts;
- fourth, what alms should be given from;
- fifth, who can give them;
- sixth, to whom they should be given.
- Article 1
What almsgiving is
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that the definition of almsgiving that some people assign, (cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, Bk. 4, q. 29, member 1.) almsgiving is a work in which something is given to the needy out of compassion for God’s sake, is unfittingly assigned. For visiting the sick is set down as a species of almsgiving. But in this work, nothing is given. Therefore, giving should not be included in the definition of almsgiving.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the very thing given is called alms, for we say ‘to give alms.’ But what is given is not a work, but a certain thing. Therefore, alms is not a work.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in almsgiving something is given sometimes to prebendary clerics, who are, however, not needy, but rich. Therefore, it is not of the nature of alms that they be given to the needy.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a work that is done by choice is more praiseworthy than a work that is done from emotion, for it is more like God, who does nothing from emotion. But compassion is a certain emotion, for no one has compassion unless he suffers. Therefore, alms are not necessarily given out of compassion.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, an act does not get its species by its last end, but by its proximate end; otherwise all acts of virtue would be of one species. But the last thing set down in a definition should be the specific difference. Therefore, since God is the last end of all of our actions, it seems that he should not be included in the definition of almsgiving as though he were the final difference.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction. (Parallels: above, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 3; below, qa. 3.) For making satisfaction is not necessary unless one has sinned. But if a man never sinned, he would still have need of giving alms. Therefore, it is not a part of satisfaction.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the whole cannot be perfect if part of it is taken away. But someone can perfectly make satisfaction for a certain sin, even if he never gives alms. Therefore, almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing can be a part of a whole unless it differs from the other parts. But almsgiving does not differ from fasting and prayer as it pertains to penance, for it belongs to all of them to be penal acts, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in sacraments of necessity, as is clear in baptism, a remedy is applied that no one can do without, like water. But penance is a sacrament of necessity, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, since almsgiving cannot be done by just any given sinner, because it is only for those who possess something, it seems that it should not be included as a part of penance and satisfaction.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Luke 3:8, bear fruits worthy of repentance, Bede’s Gloss says that to give alms is a part of penance. (See Bede, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke, on Luke 3:8 (PL 92:354).) But this would only be by reason of satisfaction. Therefore, it is a part of satisfaction.
Furthermore (2), in the secular forum someone is not only punished by injury to the body, but also by taking away his goods. But in the forum of penance satisfaction happens by penal works. Therefore, not only should fasting be a part of penance, by which the body is afflicted, but also almsgiving, in which temporal things are taken away.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving is not an act of virtue. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 1.) For in 1 Timothy 4:8, where it says that piety is profitable for all things, it is explained as generous almsgiving. But piety is not a virtue, but a gift. Therefore, almsgiving is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no emotion is a virtue, as the Philosopher proves in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b4 et seq.) But almsgiving proceeds from mercy, which is an emotion, as the Gloss on Psalm 37(36):26 proves: he shows mercy all the day long: almsgiving begins from mercy. (See Cassiodorus, Exposition of the Psalms (CCSL 97), on Psalm 36:27: “Miseretur et commodat: siue eleemosynas dicit, ubi ante misericordia tangit animum, et sic aperit manum. Ipsa est enim perfecta eleemosyna, quae prius a se incohat, et sic ad alterius iuuamina uenire festinat.” Cf. PL 70:265.) Therefore, it is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is nothing in a genus that is not in one of its species. But it seems that almsgiving cannot be reduced to any species of virtue: for only three virtues are found whose work concerns outward goods, and almsgiving is not among them; namely, justice, liberality, and magnificence. Now almsgiving is not an act of justice, because it is not returning someone else’s things, but giving one’s own; likewise neither is it liberality, because liberality does not require neediness, which almsgiving does; likewise neither is it magnificence, because it can be in small things and in large things. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue.
On the contrary (4), succoring the wretched is an act of justice, as is clear from Augustine, (See all the quotations from Augustine’s Enchiridion (chs. 72–77) given by Peter Lombard in this distinction, chs. 4–5.) and was held in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 2, Article 2, Subquestion 3. But to succor the wretched pertains to almsgiving. Therefore, almsgiving is an act of justice, and thus it is an act of virtue.
Furthermore (5), nothing is meritorious unless it is an act of virtue: for happiness is virtue’s reward, as even the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 9, 1099b16–18.) But almsgiving is extremely meritorious. Therefore, it is an act of virtue.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving does not come under precept. (Parallels: below, a. 4, qa. 2, ad 1; ST II-II, q. 32, a. 5; q. 66, a. 7; q. 87, a. 1, ad 4; q. 108, a. 4, ad 2; Quodl. VI, q. 7, aa. 1–2; Quodl. VIII, q. 6, a. 2.) For commenting on the text, the crowds asked him, ‘what then shall we do?’ (Luke 3:10), the interlineal Gloss says, stricken with terror, they seek counsel from John’s words. But John answers that they should distribute alms. Therefore, to give alms is a counsel, not a precept.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, anyone can licitly keep his own things. But keeping one’s own things means not giving alms. Therefore, giving alms is not under precept.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if almsgiving comes under precept, it only comes under a negative precept: for Ambrose says, feed the man dying of hunger: if you do not feed him, you have killed him. (Cf. Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 86, “Pasce,” PL 187:412.) Now, do not kill is a negative precept. But it does not fall under a negative precept; otherwise a man is always bound to give alms, for negative precepts oblige always and at all times. Therefore, giving alms does not fall under any precept.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that falls under precept at some time imposes mortal sin on those who transgress. But this is not the case with almsgiving: because the probable opinion can always remain to someone, that if he does not help, another person would, for one person could not help everyone. Therefore, to give alms does not come under precept.
On the contrary (1), the Gloss on the text: so whenever you give alms (Matthew 6:2) says, the desire for praise of oneself mingles with the conscience giving alms in order to fulfill the precept. Therefore, giving alms does fall under a precept.
Furthermore (2), that without which charity cannot exist, falls under the precept. But in some cases charity cannot exist without generosity in almsgiving, as is clear from 1 John 3:17: whoever has the world’s goods and sees his brother suffering need, and closes his heart from him, how can the Father’s love remain in him? As if he said, it cannot at all. Therefore, to give alms falls under precept.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the word for alms, eleemosyna, is from the Greek word meaning ‘service that is given to the destitute;’ and it is named from eleos, that is, pity or mercy, which makes another’s misery one’s own. And so just as a man gets rid of as much wretchedness from himself as he can, in the same way the merciful man drives away another’s misery by succoring him: which succor indeed is done by sharing one’s own goods with him; and so the very sharing of one’s own goods with the wretched takes the name ‘almsgiving.’ Now this sharing cannot be meritorious and virtuous except when it is done for God’s sake. And so in the definition given all the things are touched upon that are needed for the perfection of almsgiving as something meritorious. For the very misery of another, which is the principle of mercy, is referred to in its saying, to the needy; but mercy which is born in us out of the stranger’s misery, is touched on in its saying, out of compassion; but mercy’s effect in easing the stranger’s misery as though it were our own, is referred to in saying, a work in which something is given: for this is essential to almsgiving itself; but the intention directed to God which gives it a meritorious character, is touched upon in saying, for God’s sake.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5, 1133a19–20.) everything whose price is usually compared or can be compared with money can come under the notion of giving and receiving. And therefore those acts that are shown in succoring a stranger’s misery are also received as if they were gifts, since they are bestowed without price.
Reply Obj. 2: Habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by their objects; and so sometimes the same name is used equivocally for habit, act, and object, as is clear in the case of faith, which can signify either the habit of faith, or its act, or the very thing believed. And in the same way the name almsgiving sometimes signifies the very thing given, and this is not how it is being defined here; and sometimes the fact of giving, and this is how the definition mentioned is taken.
Reply Obj. 3: Clerics, even if they themselves are not needy, are given alms as ministers of the poor and dispensers of alms; and so what is given to them in alms is passed along to the poor by them.
Reply Obj. 4: As was said in Book 3, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 5, the names for sensible feelings are sometimes transferred to acts of the will, which exist without emotions. And this is how compassion, which properly denotes the emotion of sadness at another’s misery, is sometimes said about an act of the will, in which a stranger’s misery displeases someone. And without this kind of compassion alms should never be given, for someone does not succor another’s misery without willing him not to be miserable. And this kind of compassion does exist in God, because our evil deeds displease him by his antecedent will, and sometimes also by his consequent will. But sometimes compassion properly speaking is attached in us, because a higher appetite naturally moves a lower appetite; which is why, if there is a strong impression in the higher, it will also be in the lower, unless something opposes it. And according to this mercy and shame and certain other emotions are praiseworthy, to the extent that they proceed from the due choice of the good.
Reply Obj. 5: Although to exist for God’s sake does not give the species to almsgiving as to its own first being, nevertheless it gives its final completion, according to which it is meritorious. And thus it is included last in its definition.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that to stop sinning is not of the essence of satisfaction, as is clear from what has been said above, but it is a preliminary to satisfaction, like a foundation for it. And so when someone sins by not doing what he is bound to do, it is clear that whatever someone is otherwise bound to do is not of the essence of satisfaction but a preliminary to it. And so since someone is bound to give alms sometimes and sometimes not, as will be made clear, it is apparent that the almsgiving to which someone is bound is not a part of satisfaction, but a preliminary to it. But the almsgiving to which someone is not bound otherwise can be a satisfactory work, since it is a good work and a penal one, which is what a work of satisfaction requires: for a person is punished not only by affliction of his body, but also by taking away his things.
And by this the response to the first objection is clear. Nevertheless, some people say that even the first satisfactory acts are from the generosity of divine mercy.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument is based on integral parts. But almsgiving is not that kind of part of satisfaction, but rather a subjective part. And so even without it satisfaction has its complete character in any of its parts by itself, as animal does in any of its species.
Reply Obj. 3: Punishment is called an evil inasmuch as it takes away some good, because this is how evil injures a nature. And just as there is a different character of good in riches, which the concupiscence of the eyes seeks after, and of pleasures, which the concupiscence of the flesh seeks after, and in honors, which the pride of life tends toward, so also there is a different character of punishment in almsgiving, which takes away riches, and in fasting, which takes away tasty things, and in prayer, which brings down a proud spirit’s height by humility. And because of this they are different parts of satisfaction. Nor does it matter whether the goods named are simply good, or considered good, as far as the character of punishment goes, just as neither as regards the character of the appetite; for punishment is contrary to the will, as Anselm says.
Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving does not only consist in the conferral of money, but also in any services done for one’s neighbor for God’s sake, as was said. And so even if someone lacks money, he still does not lack the ability to give alms. And if he lacked every ability with regard to physical alms, because of total lack of belongings and weakness of body, he would still not lack the ability with regard to spiritual alms, for he could either counsel another, or pray at the very least; and if he lacked even this ability, his total will would suffice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that since virtue is a habit by which we are directed to acting well, every act that includes a rectitude in itself must be reducible to some virtue, although even in its own definition it does not express everything that is required for the perfection of virtue, like giving when giving should be done is called an act of liberality, although in this is not expressed all the due circumstances that are required for an act of liberality. Therefore, since almsgiving, according to what was said, includes a certain rectitude, because it means giving ordered toward succoring the wretched, which its very name declares, since elemosyna comes from eleos, which is pity or mercy, it seems that almsgiving names an act of virtue in itself, although it does not express all the conditions that are required for the act of virtue. Now liberality orders giving and receiving; which is why almsgiving must be in some way an act of liberality, of which some people include mercy as a part, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 4, by the fact that liberality brings the common good into its giving, but mercy brings in a certain specific good, which is easing the misery of others; and so almsgiving is an act of mercy, and consequently, of liberality.
Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine in Book 10 of the City of God, (See Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 47), Bk. 10, ch. 1, line 77.) the word ‘piety’ is used for mercy itself, in the custom of the common people; and this is how almsgiving is said to relate to piety, and not as piety is one of the gifts. Now the way that the gift of piety differs from mercy, has been said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 4, Subquestion 6.
Reply Obj. 2: Mercy according as it signifies only compassion toward the misery of another, is not a virtue, but an emotion; but as it signifies the choice of the one feeling this compassion, it is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: As is clear, almsgiving is reducible to a certain virtue also assigned by the philosophers, for it is directly reducible to mercy, and by means of mercy, to liberality. For although liberality does not generally require neediness, nevertheless nothing prevents a certain species of liberality from being directed at neediness.
Reply Obj. 4: To succor the wretched, as was said in the same place, (See In III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 4, ad 5.) is not an act of justice by its own notion, but by the notion of its part, according as liberality also can be reduced to justice as a part.
We grant the fifth objection.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that since almsgiving is an act of virtue, it must fall under a precept in some way, for the precepts of the lawgiver are aimed at leading us to virtue, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b3.) Now it can be reduced to this commandment: honor your parents; (See, inter alia, Exodus 20:12, Ephesians 6:2.) for that honor, according to Augustine, pertains to reverence and care in the necessities of life; and by the word ‘parent’ is understood every neighbor. But affirmative commandments do not oblige at all times, although they always oblige; but they oblige for a time and place, and according to other determined conditions.
Now since the use of riches is ordered to taking care of the needs of the present life, which care indeed must be ordered, it is clear that anyone who does not use his riches to take care of the needs of the present life, or who uses them inordinately, departs from virtue.
Now the order of such care must be found with respect to two things. First, on the part of those one helps, so that first, he takes care of himself, afterward, those connected with him, and then strangers. Second, the ordering must be according to the kind of need, so that those in absolute need are helped before any conditional need, which is when someone needs something to preserve an appropriate state for himself. And so the precept of the law does oblige to this, that after someone has taken care of himself and those closely related to him (like his family, which he must manage) with regard to both kinds of need, he may spend what is left in almsgiving for the aid of others with regard to both kinds of need mentioned; just as also in nature what is left over of someone’s food from the nutritive act, in which it is treated as an absolute need, and the augmentative act, in which it is treated as a conditional need, prepares for the preservation of the species, by being put to work for the generative power. And likewise the precept of the law obliges, that the absolute need even of strangers is to be taken care of before the conditional need of oneself or one’s relatives. And thus it is commonly said that to give alms out of one’s surplus falls under the precept, and this is to give alms to anyone who is in extreme need; but to give from what is needed for the second kind of need, but not from what is needed by the first kind of need, for this would be against the order of charity.
Reply Obj. 1: Doing something good that we are not bound to by a precept of the law belongs to supererogation, which counsels are given about; and thus, since giving something from our excess with regard to the first kind of need, but for what is necessary from the second kind of need, to come to the aid of a greater need, even if it is not an absolute need, is a good thing that we are not obliged to by a precept. And so it is supererogatory, and because of this there is a counsel about it; and that is how this Gloss is to be understood.
Reply Obj. 2: As taking excess and what has been lessened should be considered in giving, so also should they be considered in keeping and receiving, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 1, 1121a10.) and so someone, by keeping his own things sometimes is acting against virtue, and as a result, against God’s law, which directs sufficiently to every act of virtue, although it does not do this against the law of the secular forum, which cannot perfectly direct to all virtues. And furthermore, when another is in a state of extreme need, all things become common to him; and so even if he should take by violence or theft, he would not sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Almsgiving, as was said, is reducible to the affirmative precept that is, honor your parents. But since every affirmative precept for the time at which it obliges, introduces a sin of omission, but every sin falls under a prohibition, the affirmative precepts have prohibitions, like negative precepts, attached for that moment in which they oblige, just as also any affirmation has a negation joined to it. And accordingly that sin of omission can be the cause or occasion of another sin, which is how we understand what Ambrose says: feed; if you do not feed him, you have killed him.
Reply Obj. 4: The moment in which the precept about giving alms obliges is taken on the part of the receiver, and on the part of the giver. Now on the part of the receiver, when probable signs appear of extreme future need, unless he is helped; as when someone sees others powerless or indifferent to helping, and a poor man needing food and drink and other necessities of life, and unable to do enough for himself. For one should not wait for the last necessity, because then perhaps he could not be helped, if his nature has been consumed by hunger or thirst. For Chrysostom comments on John: it is not fitting for a howling poor man to call the Deceiver. What do you say, O man? Because of one bread someone gets involved in deception? Certainly, you say. Therefore, let him obtain the greatest mercy, so that he may be rescued from the greatest need. (John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, hom. 77, n. 4 (PG 59:304).) On the part of the giver, when a man has many things that he does not need, whether to sustain the lives of himself and his own, or to keep them in a decent state; even if there are no poor men in extreme necessity around. Nor is it necessary to envisage an occasion of future need beyond probable signs of future need, because this is excessive concern, which the Lord prohibits in Matt 6:31: do not be anxious, saying: what will we eat, or what will we drink, or how will we clothe ourselves? etc.
Article 2
The fruit of almsgiving
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. It seems that almsgiving would free someone who had fallen into mortal sin from the punishment of hell. For it says in Tobit 4:10: almsgiving frees from all sin and from death, and will not suffer souls to go into the darkness. But in this there would be no commendation of almsgiving if it rescued from darkness those who did not have to pay the debt of darkness. Therefore, it also frees from the darkness of hell those falling into mortal sin, who must pay the debt of darkness.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, commenting on the text: piety is beneficial to all things (1 Tim 4:8), Ambrose says, but anyone following piety, if he should suffer the slipping of the flesh, he will be beaten indeed, but he will not perish. (Ambrosiaster, Commentary on 1 Timothy, 4:8 (PL 17:500).) But this cannot be understood as concerning a venial slip, of which someone may repent: for even without almsgiving he would not perish for that. Therefore, those falling into mortal sin are freed by almsgiving from the perdition of hell.
On the contrary, no one is freed from the punishment of hell except by the grace of God: for the grace of God is eternal life (Rom 6:23). But someone who falls into mortal sin lacks grace. Therefore, neither can he be freed by almsgiving from the punishment of hell.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving is less satisfactory than other works of satisfaction, for it says in Matthew 17:20: this kind of demon cannot be driven out by anything but prayer and fasting, but no mention is made of almsgiving. Therefore, fasting and prayer are more efficacious for blotting out sin than almsgiving is.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a work of satisfaction must be penal and acceptable to God. But fasting is more penal than almsgiving and prayer is a work more acceptable to God than almsgiving, inasmuch as it achieves a greater familiarity with God. Therefore, almsgiving is less satisfactory than fasting and prayer.
On the contrary, commenting on this text: piety is beneficial for all things (1 Tim 4:8), the Gloss says, the sum of all Christian discipline is in mercy and piety. (See PL 17:500.) But the sum of something consists in what is foremost to that thing. Therefore, what is foremost among other works of satisfaction is almsgiving.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the virtue of almsgiving consists in the outward gift rather than in interior affections. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 3.) For as is said commonly in offerings for the dead, those for whom more is given are freed more speedily, even if good will is bestowed on someone else. Therefore, the efficacy of the almsgiving consists more in what is given than in the interior affections.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the efficacy of almsgiving is in expiating sins. But where something greater is given, a greater sin is expiated: since for a greater sin a larger amount of money is required to be given in alms. Therefore, the efficacy of almsgiving consists particularly in what is given.
On the contrary, commenting on Psalm 126(125):5: those who sow in tears, etc., the Gloss says, a great will gave much, sowed much: in this will that widow who put in two mites did not sow less. Therefore, the efficacy of almsgiving is weighed more from the greatness of the will rather than the greatness of the gift.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the cause of infernal punishment is mortal fault. Now while the cause remains, the effect remains. And so, when someone dies in mortal sin, his last mortal fault cannot be removed from him, just as neither can it be taken away from the demons. For as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 94:878).) what death is to humans, the fall is to demons. It is clear that neither almsgiving done by someone beforehand, nor after his death on his behalf, can free someone who has fallen into mortal sin from the punishment of hell.
Reply Obj. 1: In whatever way that someone is freed from mortal sin by almsgiving, he is freed from infernal darkness. But almsgiving frees a man from mortal sin while he remains in the state of life in two ways: either by preventing future sin, like other meritorious works, which strengthen a man in grace; or by freeing him from the past inasmuch as they dispose someone who has already fallen into sin to recover grace, like other works that are good in genus and done with a right intention.
Reply Obj. 2: This is understood of slipping into mortal sin. But what is said, he will not perish, is not to be understood according to need, but according to a certain disposition; for by the fact that someone existing in mortal sin is free for works of piety, he disposes himself for grace, and is not easily allowed to go to perdition. Or if it is understood about venial sin, the efficacy of almsgiving is shown in this, that diminishes the punishment of flogging; or it hinders venial sin, lest it draw one into mortal sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the efficacy of satisfaction is found in the three parts of satisfaction, like the virtue of the whole power in its parts, which indeed is completely found in one, and less in the others; just as the whole virtue of the soul is found in a rational soul; but in a sensible soul it is found to a lesser degree, and still less in a vegetative soul: for a sensible soul includes in itself the virtue of a vegetative soul, but not vice versa. Now, almsgiving includes in itself the virtue of prayer and fasting for two reasons. First, because the one to whom the alms are given is established as owing a debt of prayer and fasting, and other good things that he can do for the one who gave the alms. Second, because alms given for God’s sake are like a kind of offering made to God; and that is why the Philosopher also says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 2, 1123a5.) that good works have something like what is sacred to God. (Or, as the Oxford translation of Aristotle has it, “gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings.”) Now an offering made to God himself has the force of a prayer. And likewise inasmuch as external goods are ordered to the preservation of the body, taking away from external goods by almsgiving contains something like the virtue of fasting, by which the body is subdued. Likewise, prayer too contains the virtue of fasting, because the stretching of the understanding toward God produces a weakening of the body, as was said. And this is why almsgiving has more completely the force of satisfaction than prayer, and prayer more than fasting; and thus it says, training of the body is beneficial a little (1 Tim 4:8). And because of this almsgiving is more indicated as a universal medicine for sin than others, as it says in Luke 11:41: give alms and all are cleansed for you; and Daniel 4:27: redeem your sins with almsgiving; and Tobit 4:10: almsgiving frees from every sin; and 1 Timothy 4:8: piety avails for all things.
Reply Obj. 1: Satisfaction is a medicine, both preserving from future sin, and expiating from past sin. And although alms have the force of expiating any past sin, they do not, however, have every force for preserving from future sin: because prayer and fasting preserve from certain sins not only by way of merit, which almsgiving also does, but by way of the contrary of one’s practice; and this is how the Gloss says in the same place that the diseases of the body are healed by fasting, but diseases of the mind by prayer. And this is how it should be understood that certain sins are only healed by prayer or fasting.
Reply Obj. 2: Although punishment is required in satisfaction, nevertheless, the goodness of the act is more important in it than the penalty. And since almsgiving has more of the nature of good than fasting, as it is directly related to charity, and as it is not an individual good of the one doing it, but a good shared by the one doing it and the one receiving it, almsgiving will be more satisfactory than fasting. And similarly, it will be more than prayer, although prayer makes a man more familiar to God than almsgiving, as the contemplative does more than the active; still the multiplication of intercessors by almsgiving is worth more for obtaining the remission of sins than the prayers of one man.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that almsgiving, as is clear from what has been said, has efficacy from the person doing it, inasmuch as it is a certain meritorious work, and from the receiver, inasmuch as he is obliged to pray for the person who gave alms to him. If, therefore, the efficacy of almsgiving is considered on the part of the receiver, then a greater efficacy consists in a greater gift, inasmuch as by this more and greater debtors are made. But on the part of the giver and with regard to the essential reward, the effectiveness of almsgiving is weighed more from the affections than from the gift; but with regard to the extra reward, for instance, the remission of punishment or something like it, the efficacy of the alms is increased by the greatness of the gift, unless on other side the intention of the will outweighs the greatness of the external gift. For the will can be so focused that it even absorbs all punishment and guilt, as is said about contrition.
And by this the responses to the objections are clear.
Article 3
Kinds of almsgiving
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 2; Super Matt. 25.) It seems that the seven kinds of physical alms that are contained in this verse are superfluously assigned: I visit, I give drink, I feed, I redeem, I clothe, I gather, I inter. I visit, namely, the sick; I give drink, namely, to the thirsty; I feed, namely, the hungry; I redeem, namely, the imprisoned; I cover, that is, I clothe the naked; I gather, that is, I receive guests; I inter; that is, I bury the dead. For all alms should be ordered tco the benefit of the one to whom they are given. But burial does not benefit the dead, as Seneca says. (See Seneca, de Beneficiis, Bk. 5, ch. 20.) Therefore, almsgiving is not done in burying the dead.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Matthew 25:34–45, the Lord relates the works of mercy by which a man is freed from damnation and merits the kingdom. But the burial of the dead is not included there. Therefore, in this there is not any almsgiving.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, alms are given to assist the needs of others. But certain clothes are not necessary, but for adornment; and certain food and drink are not necessary, but for pleasure. Therefore, it does not seem that clothing the naked and feeding the hungry is always a part of almsgiving.
On the contrary (4), there are many other necessities of human life other than those mentioned, like the blind needing a guide, and the lame needing to be carried. Therefore, since almsgiving is ordered toward all necessities, it seems that the alms mentioned are insufficiently numbered.
Furthermore (5), among other necessities the chief one is poverty. But no mention is made of this. Therefore, the alms mentioned are insufficiently numbered.
Quaestiuncula 2
Moreover, it seems that also the spiritual alms, which are contained in this verse, are unfittingly numbered: counsel, chastise, console, forgive, bear, pray. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 2; Super Matt. 25.) Counsel, that is, teach the ignorant, and guide the doubtful; for two kinds of spiritual alms are understood in this, namely, teaching and counsel; chastise the offender; console, that is, to console the sorrowing; forgive those who offend you; bear, that is, carry the weaknesses and troubles of others; pray for all.
Obj. 1: For almsgiving falls under the precept and obliges for the determined time, as was said. But it is not time for teaching except when someone ignorant comes forth. Therefore, if teaching is a part of almsgiving, it seems that whenever a man sees someone in ignorance, he should teach him.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever determines a certain question teaches the one asking it. But the person who gives counsel, determines the question; for counsel is an inquiry, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 3, 1112b23.) Therefore, no other form of alms should be included in counsel other than teaching.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, almsgiving can be reduced to liberality, as was said. But severity is divided against liberality, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 4, about the parts of justice. Therefore, since chastising the offender pertains to severity, it does not seem that it should be included among the kinds of alms.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, almsgiving is not counted among the parts of charity, but among the parts of justice, since it is an act of satisfaction. Therefore, since forgiving the offender and bearing the troubles of others belong to perfect charity, it seems that they are not parts of almsgiving, which is an act of mercy.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that physical alms surpass spiritual ones. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 3.) For alms are ordered to the assistance of the needy. But the body is needier than the soul. Therefore, physical alms are more excellent than spiritual ones.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the less the almsgiver is compensated, the more acceptable are his alms; and so it says in Matthew 6:5 that they have received their reward who seek praise for their almsgiving. But in physical almsgiving less recompense is made, because spiritual goods shared with others grow in the possessor. Therefore, physical alms are more powerful.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more almsgiving satisfies the desires of the poor, the more pleasing it is. But the desires of the recipients are more satisfied with physical alms than with spiritual ones; for physical lacks are felt more. Therefore, physical alms are more powerful.
On the contrary (1), by spiritual alms the spirit is helped, by physical alms, the body. But the spirit is more excellent than the body. Therefore, spiritual alms are also more excellent than physical ones.
Furthermore (2), the more noble the thing that is given, the better the almsgiving, just as is also seen with physical alms. But the spiritual good that is given as spiritual alms is better than the physical one that is given in physical alms. Therefore, spiritual alms are more powerful than physical ones.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that physical alms are ordered to aiding the needs of the body, which are twofold; namely, common, and special by reason of some accident. Now there are two kinds of common bodily needs: one from the fact that someone has already met with death, and to this is ordered the burial of the dead. The other is according as we need something to preserve ourselves from death, so that we do not meet with it; and this happens in two ways. In one way, by preventing what corrupts inwardly, which is the lack of nourishment; and against this is ordered feeding the hungry and giving drink to the thirsty, according as these two things are needed for nourishment. In another way, preventing what corrupts outwardly; and two kinds of alms are ordered to this, namely, clothing the naked, and receiving guests into the home; for we need these two against intemperate weather, namely, clothing and shelter. Likewise, there can be two kinds of special needs; either from intrinsic causes, like illness, and against this is ordered the visiting of the sick; or from extrinsic causes, like imprisonment; and against this is ordered the redemption of captives.
Reply Obj. 1: Although burial does not physically benefit the dead person in himself, nevertheless it benefits him according as he remains in the memory of men; both because it is considered to the shame of the dead man that he lies unburied; and because by his very grave he remains more in memory, and others are inspired to pray for him; and that is why the word ‘monument’ is derived from ‘memory,’ as Augustine says in the book On the Care to Be Given to the Dead. (de Cura pro mortuis gerenda, ch. 4 (CSEL 41:629).)
Reply Obj. 2: The Lord enumerated those acts of almsgiving in which the greatest need appears, so that the judge’s justice appears even more evident, when he rewards some for almsgiving and condemns others for the omission. And yet in other places in Scripture alms of the other kind are commended, as is clear from Tobit (See chapters 1 and 4.) and Simon Maccabee, (See 1 Maccabees 13.) who built solemn tombs for their parents and brothers, and also Joseph [of Arimathea] who buried the body of the Lord, and is praised for this (Matt 27:59–60).
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes what is for pleasure or adornment turns into need; and this can happen in two ways, either by illness, because the sick are to be sustained with delicate foods and softer clothing, lest their nature should be burdened; or because of long-held custom or even a state of dignity in which someone, even a poor man, cannot use the other things without shame. And thus even Augustine in his Rule commanded those two kinds of men to be aided more richly. (Regula tertia uel Praeceptum (ed. L. Verheijen, “La Règle de saint Augustin,” Etudes Augustiniennes, 1, 1967, 417–37); cf. PL 32:1380.)
Reply Obj. 4: All other necessities are reduced to one of these. For whatever belongs to the care of the sick, all this is contained under visiting the sick.
Reply Obj. 5: Just as money, by the fact that it is a certain measure, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5, 1133a20.) contains all the necessities of life in virtue; so also poverty contains all necessities. And thus to aid a poor man is not a special kind of almsgiving distinct from the others, but generally includes all the others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that those alms are called spiritual by which a man comes to the aid of his neighbor in spiritual things; which indeed happens in two ways. In one way, when someone obtains help for his neighbor from God, and this is what prayer does. In the other way, when someone helps his neighbor by himself, and this either against the defect of punishment or against the defect of fault. If the first of these, this can happen in two ways: for spiritual punishment is either in the intellect, namely, ignorance, and against this defect there is teaching with regard to the speculative intellect, and there is counsel with respect to the practical intellect; or else it is in the affections, namely, sadness, and against this defect there is consolation. But if it is in the second way, namely, against the defect of fault, this also exists in two ways. In one way, on the part of the sinner himself, whose disorder chastisement helps; in the other way, on the part of the person who is injured by the fault of the sinner; and so against fault there are two remedies: namely, forgiveness on the side of the one against whom the fault was directly committed, and bearing with on the side of the one to whom the sinner’s company is burdensome.
Or it could be otherwise. The defect that is helped by spiritual almsgiving is either a defect from punishment in the practical intellect or in the speculative intellect; and so there is teaching and counsel, as was said; or it is in the affections, and then there is consolation. Or else, it is a defect from fault, and then either in the person himself, with the hope of amendment, and so there is chastisement; or it is without hope of amendment, and then there remains nothing but to implore divine intervention through prayer; or it is in his neighbor, and then as to his fault, he needs remission; but as to the penalty that he incurs, he needs to be borne with.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as giving physical alms does not fall under an obliging precept except at a time of necessity, and so that someone is helped in the necessities of life, so also a man is only obliged to teach another beyond his due office in matter that concern salvation, and when no one else would instruct them, or when one sees another going astray; unless there were another who was bound to do this by his office. Otherwise, however, teaching is counsel, and it is a certain supererogation, just as was said about physical alms.
Reply Obj. 2: Not every question is counsel, but a question that is about things to be done by us. And since this kind of doubt or ignorance is a special kind of defect, inasmuch as knowledge is lacking, which must guide our works, for this reason counsel is considered a special almsgiving besides teaching.
Reply Obj. 3: Inflicting punishment by chastisement happens in two ways: either inasmuch as it afflicts the one on whom it is imposed, and then it pertains to severity, which preserves the equality of justice according as it pays the penalty for fault; or according as it works to the good of him on whom the punishment is imposed; and this can be broadly reduced to liberality, as every benefit granted is, in some way, of liberality.
Reply Obj. 4: Charity is the mother of all virtues. And so it is not unfitting if the acts that are chosen by other virtues are also commanded somehow by charity.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that almsgiving has efficacy, as was said, both on the part of the giver and on the part of the receiver. But on the part of the giver, almsgiving’s efficacy depends on the condition of the act itself in which he gives relief to his neighbor; and so simply speaking, spiritual alms are more worthy, because spiritual acts are worthier than physical gifts. But on the part of the receiver, almsgiving can be measured in two ways, either by reason of the good that is conferred, and in that way spiritual alms are still more excellent; or by reason of what is needed, and then certain spiritual ones are more powerful than certain physical ones, namely, the ones that are ordered against fault are better than any physical alms, for a man must avoid fault more than any bodily defect, even death. But certain physical ones, namely, those that are for sustaining life, are more necessary than certain spiritual alms, namely, those that are for well-being. But those that are for spiritual well-being are more necessary than those that are for physical well-being. Therefore, in this way it is clear that some spiritual ones are more powerful than all physical ones, and likewise when speaking about either of them by genus.
Reply Obj. 1: Although a body has more lacks than a spirit, nevertheless the lacks of the spirit are more to be fled than the lacks of the body, just as spiritual riches are more desirable than physical ones.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not compensation that diminishes the efficacy of almsgiving, but the intention of compensation. And so although by teaching a person also learns himself, nevertheless he does not always do it for this reason, but only to assist another person. And furthermore the intention of acquiring a certain spiritual good does not diminish its character of merit, because we are united to God by this, as frequently happens.
Reply Obj. 3: If someone feels his spiritual defects less, this is because of his defect. But almsgiving is not measured by the recipient’s receiving of it, but according to how he should receive it: otherwise the merit of the giver would depend on the judgment of the recipient, which is false.
Article 4
What alms should be given from
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 6; q. 107, a. 1, ad 2.) It seems that alms do not need to be given from one’s necessities. For, as Augustine says, he sins who does things in the wrong order. (This saying is attributed to Ambrose in the text of Lombard, Sent. 3, d. 29, ch. 1, n. 1; it appears to be based loosely on Ambrose’s Exposition of Psalm 118, verse 27, littera 4, n. 12 (CSEL 62:73).) But the order of charity requires that a man help himself more than another. Therefore, he sins by denying himself what is necessary to him, so that he may confer it on another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 1, 1120a1 et seq.) that whoever dissipates his own substance, that is, riches, destroys himself; and this is particularly true as to necessities. But a person who kills himself sins. Therefore, he also sins who gives alms out of his own necessities.
On the contrary, whoever gives everything keeps nothing for his own necessities. But the Lord counsels in Matthew 19:21: sell all you have and give to the poor. Therefore, a man can give as alms out of what is necessary to him without sin.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also what has been acquired and possessed through wrongdoing can be made into alms. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3; q. 32, a. 7; Quodl. XII, q. 18, a. 3.) For concerning the text, make friends for yourselves with the mammon of iniquity (Luke 16:9), the Gloss says: iniquity well paid out is turned into righteousness. (PL 114:315.) Therefore, it seems that it is permitted to give alms from things unjustly possessed.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone who is in his last necessity must be helped by any means. But it happens that someone who has only what has been unjustly acquired and kept may see someone in extreme necessity. Therefore, he should give alms to him, and in this way alms can be given from what was wrongly obtained and kept.
On the contrary, Gregory says: it is not counted as almsgiving if what was acquired by illicit things is dispensed to the poor. (Gregory the Great, Registrum epistularum (CCSL 140A), Bk. 9, Epist. 219: “Neque enim elemosina reputanda est, si pauperibus dispensetur quod ex illicitis rebus accipitur, quia, qui hac intentione male accipit, ut quasi bene dispenset, grauatur potius quam adiuuatur.”)
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that shameful profit cannot be made into alms, like what is aquired by prostitution, and gambling, and simony. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 7, ad 2.) For according to the Philosopher, gifts are something like votive offerings to God. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 2, 1123a5.) But these kinds of gifts are not permitted to be offered as a sacrifice or offering to God: do not offer the fee of a prostitute nor the price of a dog in the house of your God (Deut 23:18). Therefore, neither should alms be given from things like this.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the profit of gamblers is base profit. For their winnings are unsuited to free men, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 1, 1122a7.) But alms cannot be given from gambling winnings, as it seems, because one is bound to give them back. Therefore, alms cannot be given from base profits.
On the contrary, Augustine says: you who have something from evil, make of it something good. (Augustine, Sermon 113 (PL 38:650).) Therefore, whoever has acquired something by base gain can spend it in the good use of almsgiving.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that among external things, there are two ways that something is said to be necessary to us. In one way, when someone cannot be and live without it. In another way something is said to be necessary when we need it to live decently, or becomingly according to our state. But this kind of propriety does not consist in anything indivisible, for with many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his own state, and when many things are taken away the condition of his own state is fittingly preserved: but so much could be added that he would be beyond the condition of his state, and so much could be taken away that decency would not be preserved, or the propriety of his state; and this can certainly not settled in a verbal formula, for judgment cannot be made about particulars; but the judgment to be relied upon in this is that of prudence, and of unction, which teaches about all things. (A reference to 1 John 2:20, 27: “But you have the unction from the Holy One, and know all things . . . And you have no need that any man teach you; but as his unction teacheth you of all things.”)
Now in both ways of speaking something can be necessary to someone, in two ways: either by reason of himself, and by some people this is called necessary to the individual; or by reason of those whom he must bear the care of, and this is called necessary to the person, inasmuch as the person pertains to the dignity according as it applies to someone to bear the care of others. Therefore, what someone cannot be or live without, either for himself, or for those he has the care of, should not be spent in almsgiving: for this is called necessary simply, like an absolute necessity, unless perhaps he might, before necessity presses upon him, replenish his supply by another means; for he would die by reason of necessity of this kind. Similarly too, someone should not spend in alms what, if taken away, would prevent him from preserving the propriety of his state in some way, either for himself or for his people, unless he could easily replenish what he needed, or unless someone wished to change his state; for no one should remain inappropriately in any state; or unless another necessity should outweigh it, either of some special person in his last need, or of the Church, or of the state: for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one person. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 1094b10.) However, when the propriety of his state would nevertheless remain if something were added or removed, he can give that in alms; and this is a counsel, not a precept. But what is considered necessary for something that is beyond the propriety of his state should be given away in alms; and this does fall under the precept.
Reply Obj. 1: If someone denied himself something necessary, without which he could in no way be or live decently, and he gave it to another, the order of charity would be perverted in the observance of kindness. But this is not true if he gives more to another than to himself of other things, without which those things mentioned can exist; because it belongs to the virtuous man to give such physical goods more to others than to himself, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 8, 1169a20–28.)
Reply Obj. 2: That argument proceeds concerning things that are necessary according to the first way.
Reply Obj. 3: Those who give away all things for God’s sake change their state of living. Their state’s propriety can be preserved by those things that are supplied by the faithful and devout either daily, or already were furnished in the possessions and revenues.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that what is called ‘licit’ is what no law prohibits. And so something acquired illicitly means what is acquired against the prohibition of the law. But this can happen in two ways: because either the law prohibits this kind of profit itself, or only the cause of the profit. If this very profit is forbidden, then it is impossible that it be kept justly. For by having something against the law, a person becomes possessor of an unjust title and bad faith. But a distinction must be made in these matters. For either ownership is not transferred, as in plunder and theft, and then someone is bound to restore it entirely; or else ownership is transferred, and then either it falls to him from whom the profit was made to seek redress according to some right, as happens in usury, in which, as some people say, ownership is transferred, and in this case even alms cannot be given from this; or else, he cannot seek redress because of the disgracefulness of the crime on the part of the giver, as happens in simony; and in this case something acquired like this cannot justly be kept, but must be paid out in alms. Now if the law has prohibited the act by which someone gains money, but not the money gained by this act, then although by acquiring it he committed such an act against the law, nevertheless by keeping it he does not do anything against the law: as when someone gets money through pandering or prostitution, and so this money can be kept, and alms can be given from it.
Reply Obj. 1: This is to be understood as concerning those things that were acquired by an illicit act, but nevertheless can be possessed justly. Or otherwise it may be said that mammon of iniquity is said of riches licitly acquired and possessed, or inasmuch as only iniquity considers those things to be riches, as Augustine explains in Book 21 of the City of God; (Augustine, The City of God, Bk. 21 (CCSL 48), ch. 27, n. 5.) or inasmuch as they are the occasion of iniquity; or ‘of iniquity,’ that is, inequality, because they are not equally distributed, for the good man needs them and the bad man has them in excess.
Reply Obj. 2: In a case like this, if he can without danger to the poor man, that man who has another’s belongings should inform the one to whom he owes it; and whether he gives permission or not, he must provide for the poor man who is in his last necessity. Nor does he provide something from someone else’s belongings, because such necessity makes all things common. And so he is not bound to restore it, unless the one he owes it to were in similar necessity: for he would be bound to provide for him then, even if he had had nothing of his.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that when the very profit is prohibited by law, as in plunder, usury, and simony, it is not only called base profit, but iniquitous profit; and it has been said how alms may and may not be given from this. But when the act in which the money is gained is prohibited by law, but not the money itself, then it is called base profit, as is the case with prostitution and things like it; and then alms can be given from such money, for one is not bound to give it back.
Reply Obj. 1: From such profit an offering should not be made at the altar, particularly in public, because of scandal and reverence for sacred things, or abomination of crime; but these reasons do not prohibit alms from being given from such profit.
Reply Obj. 2: The winnings themselves of gamblers are prohibited by law. But in this a distinction should be made, for something about a just game is prohibited by natural or divine law, as that someone win from those who cannot dispose of their own property, like minors and the mentally ill and the like; and again, that someone draw another in by greed for making money. But according to positive law, all such profit is forbidden. Now, because positive law is abrogated by disuse, but divine law is not, therefore it seems it should be said that if profit is from someone who does not have the power of disposing of his own property, it is bound to be restored to him, and so alms cannot be given from it. But if one has played with someone who has the power to dispose of what is his, if he is drawn into the game and loses, he can seek restitution; if he has won, he is not bound to return the winnings; for the man who has lost, is not worthy to receive, nor can he licitly keep; unless positive law were abrogated anywhere by the opposite custom. But if one has drawn another in and has lost, giving back does not pertain to him; whereas if he has won, he is bound to restore it to the one he won it from, and cannot give alms from it.
Article 5
Who can give alms
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 8, ad 2; Quodl. III, q. 6, a. 1.) It seems that a wife can give alms out of her husband’s property. For as Augustine says, a wife is taken up into the partnership of marriage, on account of which the woman was not formed from the head nor from the feet, but from the side. (See Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, ch. 1 (CSEL 41:187).) Therefore, if the man can give alms from the household things, which are shared with him by reason of the partnership mentioned, then the wife can do it as well.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is read of Lucy that she gave alms without her husband’s knowledge; and she is not reproached for this, but praised. (St. Lucy is said to have spent her marriage dowry on the poor, even misleading her betrothed into thinking that she was investing in his future gain: see Jacobus de Voragine, The Golden Legend, ch. 4 (Ryan ed., 1:28).) Therefore, a wife can give alms without the counsel of her husband.
On the contrary, the man is the head of the woman (1 Cor 11:3). But the members cannot do anything without the head. Therefore, neither can the wife give alms without the husband.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a son can also give away his family’s things. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 8, ad 3.) For anyone can give what is his own to another. But the father’s things belong to the son of the family, for he is the heir. Therefore, he can make alms of these things.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the use of riches is praiseworthy if someone uses them for spiritual good rather than for physical good. But the son of a family can use his own inheritance for his bodily benefit. Therefore, much more can he for his spiritual good, which is by almsgiving.
On the contrary, no one can give anything that is not in his own power. But his inheritance is not in the power of the son of a family. Therefore, he cannot give alms from it.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a slave or servant can give alms from his or her master’s things. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 8, ad 4.) For one should assume the best of everyone, unless the opposite be proved. But to give alms is good. Therefore, it should be assumed that it would please the master; and so under the hope of his approval, one could give alms.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, almsgiving even done by servants works to the salvation of their masters, as is seen in the offerings for the dead. But a servant should procure not only his master’s physical good, but even more his spiritual good. Therefore, he can give alms from the master’s things.
On the contrary, no one should give alms from what belongs to another. But the master’s things do not belong to the servants. Therefore, the servants cannot give alms from them.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that monks can give alms without the permission of the abbot. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 8, ad 1.) For one good does not damage another. But religious life is a certain good. Therefore, it does not take precedence over alms, which are also a certain good, so that one cannot give them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, almsgiving is greatly commended in Scripture. Therefore, if monks cannot give alms, then they are in a worse condition than others.
On the contrary, alms must not be given except from what is one’s own. But a monk does not have anything of his own, because his vow of poverty prevents it. Therefore, a monk cannot give alms.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that to someone in extreme necessity, which makes everything common, any of the people mentioned can give alms, for one should presume that it would please his superior, since he himself would be bound to give, were he present. And even if he did prohibit it, it seems the same thing should be said as was said before about the illicit earnings that someone is bound to return.
But concerning the wife, a different distinction must be made; for if she has other things besides her dowry, or if she has her own money, then she can give such alms as do not impoverish her husband, even without seeking her husband’s agreement, as long as he does not forbid it. But if he has prohibited it in words, she can believe with some probability that he did not intend to prevent her from giving alms simply, but from excessive almsgiving, unless the contrary is clearly evident to her. But if the two conditions mentioned were lacking, she should not give alms without her husband’s consent, except certain little and common alms, which she can be relatively certain would have pleased her husband, if he had seen the needs of the poor.
Reply Obj. 1: Although a wife is taken into a partnership, and is an equal in the very act of marriage, nevertheless in those things that belong to the management of the household, the husband is the head of the wife; and so there is not the same rationale for both sides of the argument.
Reply Obj. 2: Blessed Lucy was only betrothed at that time, and her marriage had neither been ratified nor consummated. And so she could give alms by the consent of her mother, under whose care she remained.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the son of a family cannot give alms without the consent of his parents, unless it is bread and the like, which do not cause any noticeable loss, of which he can be sure enough that his parents would be pleased.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the son of the family is the heir, nevertheless he is not yet the master of the family’s things; and so he cannot give them away.
Reply Obj. 2: The parents are bound to his bodily nourishment, unless he excludes himself by his own fault; and so he can use his parents’ things for his own needs, but not give them to others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that for slaves as well as for servants, although they are of free condition, they cannot give alms from the belongings of their masters without their consent, except for bread and such, which, as was said, do no noticeable harm. For even if he is the steward of household goods, he was still not made steward as though having any power over the master’s things, but as though directing them to his master’s benefit. But it is clear that he can give alms from the wages for his service.
Reply Obj. 1: We do not need to presume every good about everyone, but that good to which someone is bound and whose omission would be a sin. For we should not believe any evil of anyone, unless his wickedness is clear to us. And thus a servant need not believe that something would please his master, except in that necessity of a poor man, in which the master would be necessarily bound.
Reply Obj. 2: Offerings done through others only benefit the dead to the extent they have merited to benefit from them, while they still lived, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (CCSL 46), ch. 29 (ch. 110 in some editions, cf. PL 40:283).) And thus those alms are in some way their own which are done on their behalf. And likewise it is necessary that the alms that are done on behalf of the living must be their own in order to benefit them, and this cannot be if it displeases them. And thus a servant should not give alms on behalf of his master from his master’s belongings, unless he is sure that it pleases him.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that a monk, if he has the management of the monastery’s things, can and should give alms from what is extra in the name of the chapter. But if he does not have the management, then he should not give without permission while he is in the monastery, except a little something in extreme need or when the abbot is absent under the hope of his approval. While he is outside the monastery, for example, for studies, he can give alms, since when he is given money for his expenses, its management is committed to him.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not unfitting for a perfect good to be opposed to an imperfect good, not indeed because of any contrariety to it, for good, as good, is not contrary to good, but because of contrariety to its imperfection.
Reply Obj. 2: A monk has not been placed in a worse condition by this, for the total abandonment of possessions is much more acceptable to God than a particular distribution of them, which is done through almsgiving.
Article 6
To whom alms should be given
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the sixth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 9, ad 3; Super Matt. 25; Super Rom. 12, lec. 2.) It seems that someone cannot give alms to himself. For almsgiving is an act of liberality or justice. But these virtues, because of the fact that they consist in communion, only exist toward another, as it says about justice in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129b32.) Therefore, alms cannot be given to oneself.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one gives except what he has; nor does anyone receive except what he does not have. But no one can both have and not have something at the same time. Therefore, no one can give alms to himself.
On the contrary, a man should love his neighbor as himself. But he ought so to love his neighbor in affection that he also benefits him in deed. Therefore, he should also do good to himself, and give himself alms.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that alms should not be given to the wicked, (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 9, ad 1.) by the fact that it says in Sirach 12:4, give to the merciful and do not receive sinners; and again, do good to the humble, and do not give to the ungodly (Sir 12:5).
Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone who supplied his lord’s enemy from things granted to him by his lord would be considered a traitor to his lord. But every sinner is an enemy of the Lord. Therefore, alms should not be given to him from the things that God has granted us.
On the contrary, be sons of your father who is in heaven, who makes his sun rise on the good and the bad (Matt 5:44). But this is not said for anything but imitation. Therefore, we must give to the good and to the bad.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the better person should always be helped more. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 10; q. 107, a. 1, ad 2; Super II Cor. 8, lec. 1.) For alms are given for God’s sake, as is evident from their definition. But the good man is closer to God than the wicked man. Therefore, alms are always to be given rather to the better man.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, almsgiving has its efficacy also on the part of the receiver, who is obliged to pray for the almsgiver. But the work of the good man is more efficacious for meriting. Therefore, alms should always be given more to the one who is more good.
On the contrary (3), almsgiving, since it is an act of mercy, regards wretchedness. But a bad man is more wretched than a good man. Therefore, alms should be given rather to the wicked than to the good.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that alms can be given in two ways, as is clear from what has been said: namely, by the conferral of a certain temporal thing, and in this way no one can give alms to himself; or by the exercise of a certain spiritual or physical act. And because by reason of the different parts in a man, a man can act as the soul moves the body, and one part of the soul moves another, and in like manner, one part of the body moves another, for this reason someone can give the second kind of alms to himself. But nature inclines one enough to help oneself in bodily things; and so it was not necessary to give any precept about this, but only about helping the soul, to which not many are so inclined; and that is why it says, have pity on your own soul, pleasing God (Sirach 30:24).
Reply Obj. 1: Liberality, as it consists in giving, cannot be toward oneself; but according as it consists in receiving, it can be toward oneself, just as so can illiberality. For some people are illiberal toward themselves, who deny themselves their own needs out of avarice for material things. But justice cannot be toward oneself in any way, for it contains the concept of equality, which must always be toward another.
The answer to the second objection is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that according to Augustine, men ought to be loved such that their errors are not loved. (In fact, Prosper of Aquitaine, Liber sententiarum (CCSL 68A), ch. 2; cf. PL 51:1859.) And since the kindness exhibited corresponds to the love, this is why a man should give alms to a sinner for his natural sustenance, if he is in need, since it is commanded to us to do good to friends and enemies; but we should not give them anything to further their wickedness. Hence, if it were clear that what is given to them they would squander in sin, then nothing should be given to them, unless extreme necessity demanded it; and this is how the authorities cited are to be understood.
And from this the answer to the first objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: A sinner, even if he is God’s enemy as to his fault, is nevertheless not as to his nature: for God hates nothing of the things that he made (Wis 11:25).
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that who should be most benefitted, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 2, 1165a2 et seq.) is not easy to determine because of the many differences of good and necessary. Nevertheless, it is to be held that what is owed is always more to be rendered than a benefit to be granted, as he says in the same place, unless on the other person’s side there is a greater goodness or need present. And thus to parents and neighbors and benefactors, and to those from whom we receive spiritual things, alms should rather be given, if they are in need, and all other things being equal, more to better people and more also to those who need more. And so according to these three conditions there must be degrees in almsgiving, namely, according to decency, need, and debt. Now to assign in individual cases when one person should be preferred to another, is impossible: for the particular conditions that need to be attended to are infinite, and they cannot be reduced to an art. But unction and the counsel of prudence teach us about these.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the better man is always closer to God, nevertheless he should not always be given more: for the bestowal of alms was divinely established for relieving the need of one’s neighbor. And this is why if the other’s need greatly surpasses, the intention of the one who established almsgiving will be more preserved than if they were given to the better man.
Reply Obj. 2: The efficacy of almsgiving is considered more principally on the part of the giver than the receiver; and so it should be an ordered giving on the part of the giver, which increases the efficacy of almsgiving.
Reply Obj. 3: Although a sinner is more wretched in spiritual matters, nevertheless, not in physical matters; and so he is not always to be more provided for by physical alms.
Question 3
On fasting
Next we ask about fasting. And concerning this, four questions arise:
first, what is fasting;
- second, who is bound to fast;
- third, the time for fasting;
- fourth, about breaking the fast.
- Article 1
What is fasting
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems that Isidore unfittingly defines fasting, by saying: fasting is a parsimony of diet, and an abstinence from food. (Isidore, Etymologiarum (OCT, ed. Lindsay), Bk. 6, ch. 19, par. 65.) For ‘parsimony’ comes from the past participle of the verb parco, to spare. For among the other meanings that it has, ‘to spare’ means the same thing as ‘to abstain.’ Therefore, it seems that ‘parsimony of diet’ and ‘abstinence from food’ are the same; and so the latter is superfluous.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, commenting on the text, this kind of demon can only be driven out by prayer and fasting, etc. (Matt 17:20), Jerome says, fasting is not only abstaining from meats, but from all allurements. (In fact, Bede the Venerable, Exposition on the Gospel of Mark (CCSL 120), Bk. 3, ch. 9, line 332: “Ieiunium autem generale est non solum ab escis sed et a cunctis illecebris abstinere carnalibus immo ab omnibus uitiorum continere passionibus.”) Therefore, since Isidore defines fasting only by abstinence from foods, it seems that his assignation is inadequate.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to the observation of fasting pertains not only abstinence from food, but also mourning and not using ointment, as is seen in Daniel 10:2: in those days I, Daniel, grieved for the days of three weeks. But no mention is made about these things in the assignation given. Therefore, it is insufficient.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, many people observe parsimony in diet and abstinence in food who nevertheless eat several times a day. But such people are not said to be fasting. Therefore, the definition given is not convertible with fasting.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one is fasting, unless by a fast, just as no one is white except by whiteness. But sometimes even someone who is fasting enjoys the food immoderately when he does eat. Therefore, the definition of fasting assigned does not apply to someone like this, and therefore it is inadequate.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that fasting is not an act of virtue. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3; q. 147, a. 1; de Perfectione, ch. 9; Quodl. V, q. 9, a. 2.) For just as virtue is corrupted by excess, so also by diminishment. But fasting conveys a diminishment of food, in which the mean of virtue can be preserved. Therefore, fasting is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every act of virtue is in doing something. But fasting denotes the cessation of an act. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, fasting consists not only of abstaining from excess food, for this is essential to virtue, but even from necessary food. But whoever denies himself necessary food risks his own death. But as Jerome says, it makes no difference whether you kill yourself over a great or a short time. (Cf. Gratian, Decretals, pt. 3, d. 5, can. 24.) Therefore, since no one is permitted to kill himself, it seems that no one is permitted to fast; and so fasting will not be an act of virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says in Book 10 of the Confessions, food should be taken as though it were the medicine for hunger. (Cf. Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 10, ch. 31: “Nam fames et sitis quidam dolores sunt, urunt et sicut febris necant, nisi alimentorum medicina succurrat. . . . Hoc me docuisti, ut quemadmodum medicamenta sic alimenta sumpturus accedam.”) But the sicker someone is, the less medicine should be denied him. Therefore, since in the original state, Adam would have sinned if he had abstained from food until he was gripped by hunger, as it says in Book II, Distinction 19, Question 1, Article 2, reply to Objection 3, it seems that even now a man sins by fasting, since human nature is weaker; and so fasting would not be an act of virtue.
On the contrary (1), Jerome says: fasting is not a perfect virtue, but the foundation of the rest of the virtues. (See Epistle 130, Ad Demetriadem, n. 11 (PL 22:1116); cf. Regul. Monachor. ch. 13 (PL 30:351).)
Furthermore (2), Isidore says that fasting is abstinence, as appears from the definition above. But abstinence is a virtue. Therefore, fasting is an act of virtue.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that fasting is not an act of temperance. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 3, a. 1; q. 147, a. 3.) For the Canon on Consecration, Distinction 5, says: lenten fasting is the tithe of the whole year. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 3, d. 5, ‘Quadragesima’ (PL 187:1860).) But to give a tithe is an act of justice. Therefore, so is fasting, and thus it does not belong to temperance.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it pertains to fortitude to endure annoyances. But this happens in fasting. Therefore, fasting is an act of fortitude, and therefore not of temperance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, caution is a part of prudence, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 1, Subquestion 3. But fasting leads to caution about sins of the flesh. Therefore, it is an act of prudence.
On the contrary (1), the proper matter of temperance is the pleasures of touch, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 10, 1118a23–26.) But fasting has to do with things like this because it is about food. Therefore, fasting is an act of temperance.
Furthermore (2), abstinence is a species of temperance. But fasting is abstinence. Therefore, it is an act of temperance.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that fasting does not fall under a precept. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 3.) For commenting on the text, all the glory of the king’s daughter is within (Ps 45[44]:13), the Gloss says that the glory of the Church consists in interior virtues, like faith, hope, and charity. But every precept of the Church is ordered to the glory of the Church. Therefore, there cannot be a precept about external fasting.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, those things that belong to supererogation pertain to counsel, to which no one is obligated except by a vow. But fasting is one of these. Therefore, no one is obligated to it by a precept.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever transgresses a precept sins mortally. Therefore, if the fasting instituted by the Church falls under precept, then if someone should break only one day of Lent, he would sin mortally; which seems a serious thing to say.
On the contrary (1), the statutes of the Church oblige by the mode of a precept, just like the precepts of God; for the Lord said to his disciples, whoever hears you, hears me (Luke 10:16). But we are obliged to fast by the statutes of the Church. Therefore, it does fall under a precept.
Furthermore (2), the new law is of greater perfection than the old law, and detaches one more from carnal desires. But fasting was under precept in the old law. Therefore, much more in the new law.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that fasting is not a satisfactory act. (Parallel: above, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 3.) For satisfaction is an act of justice, as was said before. But fasting is an act of temperance. Therefore, it is not satisfactory.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what we are bound to do by a precept is not a satisfactory act, but precedes satisfaction, as was said of almsgiving. But a certain fast falls under precept, as was said. Therefore, at least that fast is not an act of satisfaction.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, satisfaction must be made by the one who has sinned. But it is the soul that sins, while fasting is not of the soul but of the body. Therefore, it does not make satisfaction for sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as one might sin from an excess of food, so also from its withdrawal. But an abundance of food is not given as satisfaction against food having been taken away. Therefore, neither should the denial of food be given as a satisfactory act against an abundance of food.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, training of the body is little profitable (1 Tim 4:8). But this is what fasting is. Therefore, it is not an act of satisfaction for sins.
On the contrary (1), works of satisfaction must be penal. But fasting has more the character of penalty than almsgiving. Therefore, since almsgiving is a satisfactory work, as is clear from what was said, fasting must also be a satisfactory work.
Furthermore (2), to make satisfaction is to excise the causes of sin. But a person uproots the causes of sin by fasting, because the flesh, which incites us to sin, is most restrained by fasting. Therefore, etc.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that ‘fasting’ means two things; namely, the fasting of nature and the fasting of the Church. By the first fast anyone is said to be fasting before he takes food every day. But by the second someone is said to be fasting who observes abstinence for the sake of making satisfaction for sins as ordained by the Church. Now in satisfaction for sins it is not only necessary that a man abstain from those things that the law of virtue prohibits, but also from those that we may enjoy while preserving virtue. For anyone who has committed anything illicit must abstain from the licit things as well, as Augustine says. (In a work spuriously attributed to Augustine, de Vera et false poenitentia, ch. 15 (PL 40:1125).) And so the fasting instituted by the Church presupposes that abstinence that is for virtue, and it adds a certain abstinence from those things that do not corrupt the mean of virtue. And so Isidore includes these two things in the definition of fasting quoted; namely, abstinence from the things that corrupt virtue, in saying, parsimony of diet, and from those things that one would otherwise be allowed to enjoy while preserving virtue, in saying, and abstinence from food.
The response to the first objection is clear from what was said.
Reply Obj. 2: That definition of Jerome is understood about spiritual fasting, and not about physical fasting.
Reply Obj. 3: Fasting, by its very name, directly denotes abstinence in food; and so those observances that we read about the fathers observing when they fasted, are not of the essence of fasting, but pertain to a manner of fasting; and because of this it is not necessary that mention be made of them in the definition of fasting.
Reply Obj. 4: In the definition above it should be understood as an abstinence from food that is otherwise permitted but designated by the Church for those who are fasting; and so the objection ceases.
Reply Obj. 5: The definition given above is not about the fasting by which everyone is said to fast, but the fasting of the Church, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, as was said above, every act that includes in its description something that pertains to the manner of virtue can be called an act of virtue, as it is in itself; although it could be done both well and badly in the fact that it may not include in its description everything that is required for virtue. Now, since virtue aids the infirmity of our nature, which easily inclines to evil, and since sin happens especially from a superabundance of physical pleasures because of our connaturality with those pleasures, for this reason in the virtues that have to do with physical pleasures the mean is in withdrawing from them, as is seen in temperance, and in all the parts ascribed to it. Therefore, since in the name of fasting a certain act of ours is expressed in which a person withdraws himself from certain pleasures of touch, namely, food, it is evident that in its nature it includes a mode of virtue; and so it should be called an act of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: The mean of virtue is not a mean as being equidistant from the extremes, but it is taken according to right reason. And so it happens that what is too little for one is enough for another; just as what is too little food for a healthy person is enough for a sick person who must be cured by abstinence. Now the healing of spiritual sickness is more related to virtue than the healing of physical sickness; and so what would otherwise be a little or less than the due amount, to someone wishing to heal the wound of sin, is nevertheless enough. And so fasting does not corrupt the mean of virtue. Still, it should be known that the mean of virtue does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a certain span within which virtue is preserved, although the limits of that span, which may not be ventured beyond while preserving virtue, cannot be captured in a verbal formula. And so someone who gives up something that could licitly be enjoyed does not necessarily immediately depart from the mean of virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: The fast that someone is said to break at breakfast does not name a certain act, but the absence of food beforehand. And so according to this fast a person is not said to be fasting. But the fast of the Church names a certain act in which someone regulates his own consumption of food according to the statutes of the Church; and according to this someone is said to be fasting; and this fast can be an act of virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: What is necessary in food can be understood in two ways. The first is for the preservation of life; and this kind of necessity it is not permissible to deny by fasting, just as neither is it permitted to kill oneself. But this need is extremely small, for nature is content with very little. In another way we call ‘necessary’ what is needed for preserving the strength of the body, which indeed is taken in two different states. First, according to what is sufficient for those things that must be done as incumbent upon someone by his office or the society of those with whom he lives; and this kind of need too should not be denied, for it would be offering a fast from stolen goods if someone were impeded by his fasting from other works to which he was otherwise obligated. And so Jerome says: he offers a holocaust from stolen goods who afflicts his body immoderately, either by the extreme lack of food or by want of sleep or eating. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 3, d. 5, ‘Non mediocriter’ (PL 187:1862).) And if there should be so much abstinence that a man is impeded from useful works, although he is not bound to them out of necessity, his fast would show poor discretion, even if it were not illicit. And so Jerome says in the same place quoted above: a rational man loses his dignity, who prefers fasting to charity, or sleeplessness to the integrity of his senses. The second kind of need is taken as the body’s strength according to the body’s optimal condition; and because the flesh abiding in its strength is more difficult to subject to the spirit, therefore what is necessary for this kind of strength, even if it could be taken licitly, can nevertheless be denied laudably. And this kind of denial does not hasten death much, since the human body is more often found to incur deadly illnesses from excess than from lack. This is also why Galen says that the highest medicine is abstinence. Those who abstain are often found to live longer; and so this denial cannot be called the occasion of death, since it is related to both, namely, to lengthening life and to shortening it. However, the denial of what is not necessary either in this way or in the other way necessarily belongs to the virtue of temperance.
Reply Obj. 4: Although a man is weaker after the state of sin as to what his body can suffer, which is the cause of hunger, which is remedied through food, nevertheless on the other side there is a more serious and dangerous infirmity, which is remedied by fasting, namely, the disease of concupiscence, which did not exist in the state of innocence. And so one must attend more to uprooting this disease, just as also doctors are more concerned with treating the more dangerous ailment.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that although a certain act might proceed from several virtues, as commanding or leading to it, or in some way assisting it; nevertheless, the act is properly said to be of the virtue that elicits it, from which, namely, it proceeds formally in likeness of species, as it were, like heating comes from heat. But virtues as well as acts of virtues are distinguished by their objects; and so the act is elicited by that virtue that shares with it in the proper account of its object. And since fasting shares its object with temperance as to that part of temperance that is called abstinence, this is why fasting is properly its act; although it can also proceed from other virtues in the ways mentioned.
Reply Obj. 1: The act of justice is to render a debt. Now, it is not rendering a debt to give a tithe of one’s time, but rather to tithe in some way one’s possessions. However, a fast is said to be the tithe of the whole year by a certain adaptation, and so it is not necessary that it be an act of justice.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to fortitude to endure annoyances inflicted from without; but this is not the case with fasting.
Reply Obj. 3: In all the moral virtues, the act is directed by prudence, as was said in Book III, Distinction 38, Question 2, Article 5. And so the acts of the other virtues are also of prudence.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that there are two kinds of precept, namely, from natural law and from positive law. By a precept of natural law those things are prohibited that are evil in themselves; but by the precepts of positive law those things are prohibited that are occasions of evil; or certain ordinances are laid down toward a virtue that the lawgiver intends to promote. And because of this, positive law, as Cicero says, is derived from natural law; (See Cicero, de Inuentione (Teubner, ed. Stroebel), Bk. 2, ch. 22, par. 65, and ch. 53, par. 161.) which is why it pertains to positive law, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 9, 1179b30–35.) to order the fostering of the youth and the inventions of men, that is, works and studies, so that they may be protected from evils and led toward good things. Therefore, in fasting there is something that pertains to the precept of natural law; namely, to present so much abstinence to the flesh that it no longer rebels against the spirit. For temperance, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 11, 1119a16.) takes its measure from preserving bodily health; and so much more from preserving spiritual health. Now it pertains to natural law to not exceed the mean of temperance; but the determination of this kind of abstinence according to a determinate time and particular foods pertains to positive law, which moderates the acts of men; and in this way fasting falls under the precept of the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: The beauty of the Church consists principally in interior things, but external acts also pertain to the same beauty, inasmuch as they proceed from within, and inasmuch as they preserve interior beauty; and in this way fasting is ordered to the beauty of the Church.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of supererogation. One kind completely surpasses what is necessary for salvation, and this cannot fall under precept but under counsel: but I have no precept from the Lord concerning virgins, but I give counsel (1 Cor 7:25). Another kind is the supererogation that in some way pertains to what is necessary for salvation, although not in this or that way, as is clear from what has been said about fasting, and therefore the determination of the mode in such things can fall under the precept of the Church or her lawgivers.
Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of positive law oblige more by the intention of lawgivers than by the words themselves; and so someone is more to be considered a transgressor of a precept like this who goes against the intention of the lawgiver than who departs in some particular from the ordinance of the law. Now someone goes against the intention of the lawgiver who does not keep the law out of contempt or without another reasonable cause. But if in a certain case someone who can be probably believed does not keep the law, if the lawgiver is present and does not wish to hold him to the law, this person is not considered a transgressor of the precept. And thus it is not necessary that anyone who fails to fast on a certain day established by the Church sins mortally: for this can sometimes happen without any sin at all, sometimes without mortal sin but with venial sin, and sometimes even with mortal sin; and this is according to the different occasions that might lead a man to break his fast.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that fasting is an act of satisfaction: for it both compensates for the desire for past sin by the denial of pleasure, and adding affliction; and it hampers future sins by weakening concupiscence.
Reply Obj. 1: Although fasting, as elicited, is an act of temperance, nevertheless, it can be commanded by justice, and then it will be an act of satisfaction; just as also adultery has intemperance mixed in with injustice.
Reply Obj. 2: A precept of the law of nature is only about what is necessary to salvation; and so what falls under one of these precepts is not an act of satisfaction, but required for satisfaction; and it is this way with almsgiving, according as it falls under precept. But the precept of the Church can be ordered to the same things as satisfaction; and so the fasting which falls under Church precept can be an act of satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 3: Neither the body nor the soul sins, properly speaking, but the man; and therefore the one who sins is punished, whether it be by physical punishment or spiritual. Nevertheless, physical punishment also redounds to the soul, which feels it, just as it also enjoyed the illicit pleasure in sin through the body.
Reply Obj. 4: Superabundance of food does not have the character of punishment, and it is disordered; and so it cannot be an act of satisfaction like fasting.
Reply Obj. 5: Physical exercise is to be understood as being little beneficial in comparison with godliness: or because it is beneficial for one thing only, namely for subduing concupiscence.
Article 2
Who is bound to fast
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 4.) It seems that all are bound to the fast instituted by the Church without dispensation. For the precepts of the Church oblige like the precepts of God; and so it is said to the apostles, who hears you, hears me (Luke 10:16). But all are bound to God’s precepts without dispensation. Therefore, also to the precepts of the Church.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is decreed beneficially cannot be relaxed without harm. But the Church fast was not decreed without benefit. Therefore, it cannot be relaxed by dispensation without harm.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Bernard in his book On Dispensation and Precept, (Bernard of Clairvaux, de Dispensatione et praecepto, ch. 2, n. 3 (PL 182:862).) someone lower-ranking cannot give a dispensation from the precept of his superior. But any individual person is lower-ranking than the Church, which established the fast under precept, except perhaps the person who is the whole Church’s head, or in place of the head, namely, the Pope. Therefore, no other can dispense from fasting but the Pope.
On the contrary (1), Innocent III in a certain decretal, speaking of this very matter, says that necessity is not subject to the law. (Innocent III, extra. de Observ. jejun., ‘Consilium.’) Therefore, in imminent necessity someone can without sin forego the fast instituted by the Church through a dispensation.
Furthermore (2), the precepts of the natural law cannot be changed by any statute. But it is a precept of natural law that a man take food as necessary. Therefore, if necessity demands it, someone is able to not keep the abstinence of the fast.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the just are not bound to the Church’s fast: where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom (2 Cor 3:17). (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 5.) But the just are steeped in the Spirit of God. Therefore, they are free from the burdens of the Church’s statutes; and so they are not obliged to the fast instituted by the Church.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Lord says: the children cannot mourn while the bridegroom is with them (Matt 9:15). But fasting pertains to mourning. But Christ, the bridegroom of the Church, is spiritually with the just, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith (Eph 3:17). Therefore, since spiritual presence takes precedence over physical presence, it seems that just men are not bound to fast.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one is bound to make satisfaction who has not sinned. But fasting is a certain part of satisfaction. Therefore, if there are some just people who have never sinned, it seems that such people are not bound to fast.
On the contrary (1), the Apostle was perfectly just. But he chastened his body by fasting and other physical disciplines, as it says in 1 Corinthians 9:27: lest perhaps I myself should be made condemned. Therefore, the just must also fast.
Furthermore (2), the justice of a man does not subvert the ordering of the Church, but perfects it. But as long as the order remains, there remains the inferior’s obedience to the superior’s precepts: for this is owed to them. Therefore, by justice a man is not absolved from being held to fasting and from keeping all the other precepts of God and the Church.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also children are bound to fast. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 2.) For it says, sanctify a fast (Joel 2:15), and afterward follows, gather the children and those sucking at the breast (Joel 2:16). Therefore, children are bound to fast.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a child is closer to a precept than an animal. But in Jonah 3:7 it says: let no men or beasts . . . taste anything, nor drink any water. Therefore, much more are children bound to fast.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it would seem that children are more capable of fasting than those who are older, for they have more moisture. But whoever has more is bound to more. Therefore, children are more bound to fast than their elders.
On the contrary (1), the Church’s precept should not deny the need for food. But children need frequent food for they cannot all at once take food to last them the whole day without injury, because of the weakness of their nature. Therefore, they are not bound to fast.
Furthermore (2), fasting is ordered to making satisfaction and crushing concupiscence. But satisfaction for past sins does not pertain to children, for they live an innocent life, and they are called pueri from purity. In the same way neither is there rebellious concupiscence in them, even if the habit of it exists in them, as Augustine says. (Augustine, de Peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum (CSEL 60), Bk. 1, ch. 26.) Therefore, they are not bound to fast.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that those who are older and traveling are not excused from fasting because of a journey. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 3.) For what is not necessary should be abandoned so that what is necessary may be observed. But a journey is not necessary. Therefore, since fasting, by the Church’s institution, is necessary, for it falls under precept, it seems that it should not be suspended on account of a pilgrimage or journey.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems that neither is one excused by reason of poverty. For poverty itself leads one to fast. Therefore, it is not a reason that someone should not fast.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that neither should one be excused from fasting by reason of some servile work. For spiritual profit should outweigh physical profit. But this kind of work is ordered to temporal benefit, while fasting is ordered to spiritual benefit. Therefore, no one is to be released from fasting for this kind of work.
On the contrary, affliction must not be added to affliction. But all the things mentioned contain affliction in themselves. Therefore, they are excused somehow from the affliction of fasting.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that by the precepts of positive law, as was said, certain things are denied that are not bad in themselves and always; and so in certain cases what is prohibited by these precepts can be good and necessary. And so it was not the intention of the lawmaker that his precept should always be observed, except in those cases where the good of virtue can be preserved.
And therefore it should be said to the first question about natural and positive law, that positive law is said to proceed from natural law inasmuch as by positive law the mode of observing natural law is determined, for the intention of any lawgiver is to lead people to virtue, which belongs to natural law, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b3.) However, the mode of observing those things that are of natural law cannot be uniform in everything, because of the differences that arise in particulars, just as neither can the same mode of healing be applied to all who suffer under the same ailment. And therefore the lawgiver cannot establish any precept that is not able to be suspended in a certain case. But by considering what happens most often, he establishes the law, and in those cases in which the mode determined by the law does not apply, he reserves judgment to those who have this to define; and this is the dispensation granted by prelates from the fast instituted by the Church and in other Church precepts of this kind.
Reply Obj. 1: The precepts of God are about what is necessary for salvation in itself, and so they must be observed in every case. But the precepts of the Church, although they have the force of obligating by the act of those who established them, nevertheless do not always obligate, because of the matter about which they are decreed.
Reply Obj. 2: Precepts like this are instituted usefully according to the usefulness that is most often the case; but because of necessity arising in a certain case they can be usefully suspended.
Reply Obj. 3: Someone lower-ranking can give a dispensation from the precept of a superior when dispensations have been left to him by those higher-ranking.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that one is not obliged to observe a precept decreed by a lawmaker only at that time when observing it would go against or impede the lawgiver’s intention, which intends to lead men to virtue or to the good condition of those for whom he laid down the law. Now when justice does not impede the effect of the fast that the lawgiver intends, but increases it, because it becomes more meritorious by the fact that someone is just, then he is not absolved from observing the fasts.
Reply Obj. 1: The freedom that the Spirit of God brings is the freedom of justice, which is opposed to the slavery of sin, but united with slavery to God; and so one is obligated to obedience to his commands, and the commands of those who act in his place on earth.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of fasting, the fast of mourning, and the fast of exultation; and that is called a fast of mourning which is borne with bitterness for our sins or present misery. But it is a fast of exultation when one is lifted out of bodily concerns by spiritual joy, for having once savored the Spirit, all flesh seems insipid to the just. Therefore, the Bridegroom is always spiritually present habitually, but not always actually; in fact, sometimes he is present to them as judge, when they think on their sins, either that they have committed or that they could fall into unless they curb the flesh; and then it is appropriate for them to fast in grief. But sometimes he is present to them actually, as Bridegroom, when they enjoy his sweetness to the full: and then it is appropriate for them to fast in exultation, and not grief.
Reply Obj. 3: Fasting is not introduced solely for past sins, but also to preserve one from future sins; and thus among those who have not sinned, it is applied as a preventive remedy. Yet the present life cannot be lived without any sin at all, however much someone refrains from crimes, as Augustine says in On Penance; (See Sermon 393, PL 39:1713.) and so, just as penance applies to all dwelling in this life, so does fasting.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that children need a lot of food, because they not only need food for the nutritive act, but also for the act of growing in strength, for what is left from nutrition becomes growth. And since the strength of nature has not yet reached its fullness in them, they cannot take a lot of food at one time, for their natural strength cannot process it; and so they need to consume food frequently; and because of this fasting does not apply to them while they are growing. For the time of growth, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 7, ch. 1, 582a27.) is until the end of the twenty-first year, for the most part, since natural things do not always progress in the same way, but with a certain frequency. And thus before this time children are not bound to observe all the Church fasts. But since the closer they come to the end of the period mentioned, the more their natural strength is fortified, and growth proceeds more slowly, since in the first five years a child attains half of his final growth, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Politics, Bk. 7, ch. 17, 1336a23–26.) therefore, according to this, the closer they come to the end of the time, the more they are to be held to the fasts.
Reply Obj. 1: He is speaking in that situation when a great tribulation is imminent, so greater affliction should be taken on to placate God.
And the answer to the second objection is the same.
Reply Obj. 3: Although children have more moisture than their elders, nevertheless, because what is less thick can be consumed by heat faster, for this reason they need refreshment more frequently.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that, as has been said, the intention of the lawgiver is to preserve people and lead them to the good state of virtue, which indeed consists in the preservation of life, and sufficient strength for the work that each one must do. However, by his precept he does not require from a man all that he can do, since he does not intend to order the state of man for one day, or a short period of time, but for his whole life, and he would fail in this if a man did once all that he could do. And this is why either in impending sickness, or the trials of a journey, or anything else with which the state mentioned could not be preserved together with the fast, one is not bound by the precept to fast. But according to the dispensation of the superior, as was said above, the fast can be suspended.
Reply Obj. 1: If the pilgrimage is such that it can be deferred without detriment, one should defer the pilgrimage, if he cannot fast at the same time with it. But if the pilgrimage cannot be conveniently deferred, either because the time of fasting comes upon someone while he is on the road, or because a holy day is soon approaching, until which the person longs to continue out of devotion, or because a delay in his penance has spiritual or physical danger, he can make the pilgrimage and be released from the fast according to the dispensation of his superior, who has weighed all the factors mentioned. However, this is understood about those people who are so afflicted by the trials of the journey that they cannot travel at the same time as fasting. Nor does it matter that the precept should be placed before the counsel, for the intention of the one giving a precept like this is not to exclude other devout and more necessary causes. But it is different with the precepts of natural law, which prohibit what is evil in itself and at all times.
Reply Obj. 2: Poverty does not always excuse one from fasting, but only in that case where one cannot have enough at the hour of eating that the sustenance will suffice for the whole day, as often happens with the needy, who beg alms in a piecemeal fashion; or also when they are so weak from previous famishment that they cannot endure a fast.
Reply Obj. 3: It seems that a distinction must be made about workers; for if while fasting they can have adequate sustenance for their person, and for the family whose care they bear (whether because they are otherwise wealthy or because from what is done with less labor, which can endure the fasting along with it, they can earn enough) they are not excused from fasting. But if they cannot otherwise work so much that they acquire enough to live on, except by breaking their fast, they can be released from fasting by their priest’s dispensation, and work. From this it is clear that the intention of greater earnings that are not necessary does not excuse them from sin, if they break the fast; nor again are they exempt from sin who refuse to hire workers unless they have agreed to break the fast, unless perhaps there is a necessary cause, which requires haste in the work they are doing.
Article 3
The time for fasting
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 5.) It seems that such times should not be determined for fasting as those established by the Church. For just as fasting is a part of satisfaction, so also is almsgiving. But the time for almsgiving is not determined. Therefore, neither should fasting be.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the lawgiver of the New Testament, namely, Christ, fasted for forty days, so did the lawgiver of the Old Testament, namely, Moses. But forty days of fast was not prescribed for the people of the Old Testament. Therefore, neither should it be prescribed for the people of the New Testament.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ is read to have begun a fast in the desert immediately after his baptism (Matt 4). If, therefore, we should be like Christ in our actions, we should begin the Lenten fast immediately after Epiphany, when the baptism of Christ is celebrated.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the Old Testament they had a fast in the fourth month, and fifth, and seventh, and tenth, which were not distinguished by the four seasons. Therefore, it seems that neither should we distinguish our fasts by the four seasons of the year.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, fasting does not belong to the time for rejoicing, which is why also in Eastertide the fast for the vigil of the apostles Philip and James is interrupted, and at Christmas time, the fast for the vigil of St. John the Evangelist is interrupted. But the joy of the Easter feast lasts until the end of the octave of Pentecost. Therefore, a fast should not be observed then.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, in the solemnities of the saints we reflect on the glory to which they have passed over. But fasting is not appropriate for the state of glory, for they will no longer hunger nor thirst (Rev 7:16). Therefore, fasting is not appropriate on the vigils of solemnities.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that at a certain time fasting is forbidden, (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 5, ad 2.) in accord with which Gregory in Book 2 of the Dialogues tells that a certain priest sent by God to St. Benedict said: it is the day of the Resurrection: you are not permitted to fast today. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SChr 260), Bk. 2, ch. 1: “Venerabilis autem presbiter rursus adseruit, dicens: ueraciter hodie resurrectionis dominicae paschalis dies est. Abstinere tibi minime congruit, quia et ego ad hoc missus sum, ut dona omnipotentis domini pariter sumamus.”) Therefore, it seems that on solemnities it is illicit to fast.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it says in Nehemiah 8:9, this day is holy to the Lord, do not mourn or weep, and it adds later, eat the fat, etc. (Neh 8:10). Therefore, it seems that on the days of solemnities it is not permitted to fast.
On the contrary, Honorius III says in a certain decretal (Honorius III, extra. de Obser. jejun., ‘Explicari.’) that those who wish to fast out of devotion are not prohibited from the sixth day after Christmas.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the ninth hour should not be the time determined for eating on fasting days. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 7.) For circumstances are determined according to the condition of the persons. But not all those for whom fasting is prescribed are of the same condition as to their power of abstaining. Therefore, there should not be one hour determined for everyone.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the state of the New Testament is more perfect than the state of the Old Testament. But in the Old Testament they fasted until evening. Therefore, nowadays a man should also defer eating until evening on fast days.
On the contrary, is the custom.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that it pertains to the lawgiver to order by law those things that are necessary for human life in such a way that they can be most suitably accomplished. And thus, when a certain time is more suitable than another for fasting, the determined time for fasts is appropriately established by the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: Almsgiving is ordered to assisting the lacks of others; and so the time for almsgiving cannot be determined, just as neither can the needs that must be assisted. But fasting was instituted to curb the concupiscence of the flesh, and to make satisfaction for past sins; and since fasting curbs concupiscence even after it is done, the effect remains in the one who fasted, and so there can be a time fixed beforehand for fasting.
Reply Obj. 2: Moses was the lawgiver, not as lord of the law, but as servant; but Christ was as the Lord. And so the old law did not lead people to likeness with Moses, as the new law leads to likeness with Christ, for even the intention of the angels, who are not lords but servants, is not to lead people to themselves, but to God, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:178).)
Reply Obj. 3: Christ did not fast as though he needed to fast, but so that he might prepare us for receiving his grace by the example of his fasting. And so after his baptism, in which the fullness of his grace was declared by the testimony of the Father and the Holy Spirit, and also John, it was fitting that he set forth the example of his fasting for us. Now fasting is appropriate for us so that we are prepared to receive his grace; and since the sacraments of grace are especially recommended around the feast of Easter, the Lenten fast is fulfilled immediately before the Easter solemnities; and also because the springtime, which begins then, is extremely prone to concupiscence; and because it signifies that we arrive at the glory of the Resurrection by the tribulations of the present life, as Christ did by his Passion.
Reply Obj. 4: According to Jerome, the Jews had special reasons to observe those fasts. (Jerome, Commentary on Zachariah, 8:21 (PL 25:1476).) For in July, which is the fourth month from April, which was the first month for them, they fasted, because on the seventh day of that month Moses, coming down from the mountain, broke the tablets of the law because of the sin of the molten calf, and in the same month the walls of Jerusalem were destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar. But in the fifth month, that is, August, it is because of the sin of murmuring that arose at the words of the scouts in that month; and because in the same month the temple was burned down by Nebuchadnezzar, and afterward also by Titus. Now in the seventh month it is because of the slaying of Gedaliah, under whom the remnant of the people was kept intact, as is clear from Jeremiah 41. Now in the tenth month it is in memorial of the dead whom the Lord struck in the desert. But besides the Lenten fast, in which we make something like a tithe of all our days, three days of fast in each quarter of the year have been established for us, which are counted like a first-fruits offering, as well as for the expiation of sins from each quarter.
Reply Obj. 5: As Pope Leo says: after the holy days of rejoicing, which we practice in honor of the Lord’s rising and ascension into heaven, and after having received the gift of the Holy Spirit, the custom of fasting has been ordained wholesomely and by necessity, so that if perhaps someone was negligent and presumed a certain immoderate freedom and licence among those joys of festivity, the censure of abstinence may correct this. (Leo the Great, Tractatus septem et nonaginta (CCSL 138A), tract. 78, line 35.) Nevertheless, there is also the fast of exultation, which belongs to those who have received the Holy Spirit: for bodily affliction is also compatible with spiritual joy, and then a genuflection is not done, and the alleluia is sung, which is not observed in other fasts.
Reply Obj. 6: We fast on the vigils of particular solemnities, so that we may be more prepared for the devotion of the feast, and so that eternal joy, which is signified by temporal solemnities, is shown to follow upon the tribulations of the present life, which the saints have suffered.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that fasting in itself is not prohibited at any time. Therefore, as Isidore says, (Isidore, de Ecclesiasticis officiis (CCSL 113), Bk. 1, ch. 43: “Post pascha autem usque ad pentecosten, licet traditio ecclesiarum abstinentiae rigorem prandiis relaxauerit, tamen siquis monachorum uel clericorum ieiunare cupiunt non sunt prohibendi, quia et Antonius et Paulus et ceteri patres antiqui etiam his diebus in heremo leguntur abstinuisse neque soluisse abstinentiam nisi tantum die dominico.”) the holy fathers in the desert fasted at Eastertide, with the exception of Easter day, when it does not seem appropriate to fast, by the fact that the whole Church is celebrating a feast of joy. Therefore, it is not fitting that someone should undertake works of affliction on that day, for any part that does not fit with its whole is disgraceful, as Augustine says in his Confessions 3. (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 3, ch. 8: “turpis enim omnis pars uniuerso suo non congruens.”) But someone’s fast could be incidentally illicit on a feast day, if he held to his fast so obstinately that he did not believe the benefit of the fast could be outweighed by the devotion of the feast.
Reply Obj. 1: The day of the Resurrection, as was said, is wholly for joy. This is also why it is sung: this is the day that the Lord has made, let us rejoice and be glad in it (Ps 118:24); (This verse is used in the Gradual of the Mass of Easter Sunday and the Gradual of every day of the Octave, as well as in the Divine Office.) and thus on that day above all others it is not fitting to show signs of sadness. And since every Sunday a memorial of the Resurrection is enacted, for this reason fasting is not done on Sundays according to the Church’s common custom.
Reply Obj. 2: Since those people had been sunk in great sadness because of the tribulations threatening from every side, therefore, they were withdrawn from those things that can add to the sadness, so that they might rejoice in the hope of divine help.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the appropriate hour for eating on a day of fast is the ninth hour, and this has been established by the Church and generally observed; for according to the common course of things the hour for dining is the sixth hour. For food should not be set out as long as nature is still occupied with the previous food. But it is occupied in taking food in two ways. First, by digesting it, and since digestion happens through heat, this is why the proper time for digestion is when natural heat is drawn into the body, namely night, because of the removal of the sun’s rays, and because of sleep, when the natural powers are extended. Second, by carrying the food once broken down through the members, by which it must be assimilated; and for this it is required that the heat carrying the nutrients to the outermost parts of the body be drawn out. Now the sun’s heat draws the natural heat outward, and so when the sun’s ascent is finished (which happens at the sixth hour, for then it is about the middle of the sky), then its work is finished. And therefore the time for eating food is generally then. And since the Church’s fast must be penal and satisfactory, therefore something is added above this, but not so much that the internal fluids from food consumed have completely dried up, or that natural strength is weakened; and so once the time remaining has been divided, the ninth hour falls in the middle, when food should be taken on fast days according to the Church’s decree.
Reply Obj. 1: The lawgiver establishing a general law considers those things that happen for the most part; but he leaves the adaptation to particular situations to those who are appointed to give dispensations from the law.
Reply Obj. 2: By our fast we are conformed to the New Man, who by his Passion called us back from the old ways and from darkness. And so we are first released from fasting at that time when Christ finished his Passion, namely, the ninth hour. But before this renewal, the evening time was appropriate for those who were fasting to eat, in order to signify that by the old man’s food he was cast into the darkness of sin and death, from which they were not rescued even after the tribulations of the present life, for in death they descended into Limbo, which was the place of shadows.
Article 4
Breaking the fast
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 8, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 2, ad 2; ST II-II, q. 147, a. 6.) It seems that the fast is not broken after one meal. For fasting is determined to the denial of nourishment. But we are not only nourished by food, but also by drink. Since, therefore, taking drinks apart from meals does not break the fast decreed by the Church, it seems that neither does the taking of food twice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, drinking water prevents receiving the Eucharist, just as so does the taking of other food; for it breaks the fast of nature, which is required in those receiving the Eucharist, just as any other food would. Therefore, if drinking water does not break the Church’s fast, it seems that neither would taking any other food.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, electuaries or medicines also are a kind of food. But their consumption does not break the fast, which is clear from the common custom of many people, who eat electuaries in large amount even on fasting days, without consciousness of breaking the fast. Therefore, neither does the repeated consumption of other food break the fast.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, aromas do not break the fast. But some people are refreshed by odors, just as also by food. Therefore, neither does food break the fast.
On the contrary, this is how those who fast are distinguished from those who do not, that they eat only once. Therefore, if a second meal did not break the fast, there would be no difference between those who fast and those who do not.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that eating meats does not break the fast. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 8.) For the fast is instituted to curb concupiscence. But wine inflames concupiscence more than meat does. Therefore, since drinking wine does not break the fast, neither does eating meat.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, legumes cause gas, and so they provoke one to riotous living. But eating them does not break the fast. Therefore, neither does eating meat.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, certain fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. But no eating of fish meat breaks the fast. Therefore, neither does flesh of birds or quadrupeds.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as one abstains from meat during Lent, so also from eggs and dairy. But on some fasting days eggs and dairy are used. Therefore, meats can also be used without breaking the fast.
On the contrary, is the Church’s general custom, which forbids the use of meat by those who are fasting.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that eating earlier does not break the fast. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 147, a. 7, ad 3.) For just as someone who eats later does not keep the time appointed by the Church, so neither does the person who eats early. But the person who eats later does not break the fast instituted by the Church. Therefore, neither does the one who eats earlier.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, fasting is an act of abstinence. But abstinence is hampered not only by eating earlier than meal time, but also by other circumstances, which are contained in this verse: too hastily, too sumptuously, too much, greedily, fussily. Therefore, since eating too much as to amount does not break the fast, nor too greedily as to appetite, nor sumptuously, as to the luxury that is looked for in the food, nor fussily, as to an exquisite way of preparing ingredients (otherwise they would have sinned mortally who did this on a day of fasting, as transgressors of the Church’s precepts; which is a hard thing to say): it seems that neither does taking one’s meal early, that is, anticipating the time, break the fast.
On the contrary, the Cabilonese Council says: in Lent those who have eaten before they have celebrated the evening office, are in no way to be believed to be fasting. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 3, d. 1, ch. 15 (PL 187:1721).) Therefore, eating ahead of time breaks the fast.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer by saying that a fast can be broken in two ways. In one way as to its merit, so that a person either does not merit, or merits less; and this is not the kind of breaking a fast that we are talking about at present, for the conditions that increase or diminish the merit of someone’s act are indeterminate, by the fact that sometimes they are incidentally related to a meritorious act. In another way a fast might be broken, according to how it is established by the Church; and by breaking it in this way a person is made transgressor of the Church’s decrees about the keeping of fasts (or at least not someone who observes them, if he is released by a dispensation or legitimate reason); and this is the kind of breaking of fasts that we are now inquiring about. However, for this it is especially important to consider the intentions of the one making the decree. Now the Church intends to decree a certain mode of eating, so that, namely, someone fasting should eat once a day. And thus if taking certain things in the way that one usually eats, is repeated, this kind of fast will be broken. But if something is taken that is not in itself related to eating, but to another use, which use is commonly not called eating, taking that kind of food or drink apart from the one meal, whether before or after, does not count as a second meal; and so taking something like this does not break the fast.
Reply Obj. 1: Although a drink nourishes in some way, nevertheless it is not ordered in itself to nourishment, but rather to the good disposition of those things that do nourish, so that, namely, they are drawn through the members and not consumed in the stomach. And so the taking of drink is not called eating: and thus someone who drinks outside the time of his one meal, is not said to eat twice; and because of this neither does he break the Church’s law, unless he does some trickery: for anyone who does something to cheat the law violates the law.
Reply Obj. 2: Even if water breaks the fast of nature, for it does nourish in some way, nevertheless it does not break the Church’s fast. For in its statutes the Church does not attend to what can nourish in any way, but to what is principally ordered to nourishment.
Reply Obj. 3: Some people say that if electuaries are taken for the pleasure, they do break the fast; but if they are taken as medicine they do not break the fast. But the statutes of positive law do not attend to the intention of the one observing the fast, but to his act, by the fact that the manner of virtue does not fall under precept, but is the end of the precept, but by someone’s intention he can merit or lose merit. And so it should be said that even if electuaries nourish in some way, nevertheless this is not their principal use; and so neither are they usually consumed in the same place as meals. And thus their consumption does not break the Church’s fast, although a man can completely or partially lose the merit of his fast, or even sin mortally, if there is immoderate desire. Nevertheless, he is not a transgressor of the Church’s precept unless he takes it deceitfully, or if he were using it like other foods to quench his hunger.
Reply Obj. 4: Aromas do not nourish, as is clear from the Philosopher in his book On Sense and Sensibilia, (Aristotle, On Sense and Sensibilia, ch. 5, 445a16–31.) but they strengthen in some way; and so they do not break either the fast of nature or of the Church.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that a person is said to break the Church’s fast who does not keep the manner of abstaining established by the Church. However, since the Church established the fast for making satisfaction and for the repression of concupiscence, just as it has determined the abstinence of the fast as to its number, namely, so that someone fasting only eats once for the affliction of his flesh for the sake of satisfaction, so also it has judged that one must abstain from meat, for by this kind of food concupiscence is particularly incited and strengthened; and so eating meat breaks the fast established by the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: Wine incites concupiscence by inflaming it by the mode of changing; and such changes do not last long, so that a drink of wine does not work so effectively for inciting concupiscence as eating meat, in which the matter of concupiscence is particularly supplied, and natural heat is strengthened from the root. And on the other hand, taking away wine weakens one’s nature too much because it hampers digestion.
Reply Obj. 2: And the same thing should be said to the second objection about the gas caused by legumes, which is an incidental cause of provoking concupiscence, and passes quickly.
Reply Obj. 3: Fish are naturally colder than meats, nor do they offer nutrients as suited to the body as other meats; and so there was not so great a necessity in forbidding fish as meat.
Reply Obj. 4: The Lenten fast is more strictly observed than other fasts, for in it we imitate the fast of Christ according to our own manner; and so although the use of cheese and eggs in Lent is generally forbidden, nevertheless in other fasts there are different practices of abstinence about these foods among different people.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that, as has been said, a person breaks the fast who does not keep the Church’s determination. Hence when the Church has established a certain time for eating among those fasting, someone who anticipates the time too noticeably breaks the fast. For the Church does not intend to restrict people by an exact inspection of the time; nor is it necessary to consult an astrolabe to know the hour for the meal. Hence it is enough if around the hour that the Church appointed, those fasting should take food, even if it be a little early because of some necessity.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not permitted to disregard the Church’s precept, but to go beyond it is permitted; and so since delaying the hour increases the penal character of fasting, it is permitted to delay the hour, but not to anticipate it.
Reply Obj. 2: Those things in which a certain measure cannot be taken do not fall under the determination of the lawgiver. And since a certain measure cannot be taken in the amount of food or other conditions mentioned, as it can in the time, for this reason the other four conditions do not fall under the determination of the Church’s precept. So although someone would sin by the disorder surrounding those circumstances, and would lose the merit of fasting either wholly or in part, nevertheless he would not transgress the Church’s statute; and so he does not break the fast.
Question 4
On prayer
Next prayer is considered; and concerning this, seven questions arise:
first, what is prayer;
- second, the mode of praying;
- third, the species of prayer;
- fourth, what should be asked for in prayer;
- fifth, whom can we pray to;
- sixth, to whom does prayer apply;
- seventh, of the efficacy of prayer.
- Article 1
What is prayer
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 1.) It seems that prayer is an act of one of the affective parts. First, by Augustine, who defines prayer like this: prayer is the pure affection of the mind directed to God. (In fact, Alcher of Clairvauxm, de Spiritu et anima, ch. 50 (PL 40:816).)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says that prayer is a certain devotion proceeding from remorse. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Modo orandi, ch. 1 (PL 176:979).) But devotion pertains to the affections. Therefore, so does prayer.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, command and prayer only differ by the relation of the superior to the inferior, according as the inferior is commanded or the superior is prayed to. But it is the will that commands all the other powers. Therefore, it also belongs to it to pray and ask.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, outward prayer reveals the inner longing of the one praying. But it is inner prayer that is made known by the outward prayer. Therefore, inner prayer is nothing other than inner longing; and so it pertains to the affective.
On the contrary (1), commenting on the text, hear, O God, my prayer, etc. (Ps 64[63]:1), the Gloss says that prayer is when we display our wishes to God. But to display, or to demonstrate, is an act of reason. Therefore, so also is praying.
Furthermore (2), according to Damascene, prayer is the petition of fitting things from God. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 3, ch. 24 (PG 94:1090).) But fittingness implies an order of one thing to another. Therefore, since ordering belongs to reason, prayer will also belong to reason.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is an act of a gift of the Holy Spirit, and not of a virtue. For according to Hugh of St. Victor, as quoted above, prayer is a part of contemplation. But contemplation pertains to wisdom, for the higher part of reason is perfected by it, which clings to those eternal things to be contemplated, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50A), Bk. 13, ch. 1.) Therefore, prayer is an act of wisdom.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Damascene says, prayer is the ascent of the mind to God. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 3, ch. 24 (PG 94:1090).) But to ascend belongs to to the gift of understanding; hence the sixth beatitude in which it is said, blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God (Matt 5:8), is attributed to the gift of understanding, as is clear from the Gloss. Therefore, prayer is an act of the gift of understanding.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Gregory says: to pray is to utter bitter groans of remorse. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143B), Bk. 33, par. 23: “Veraciter namque orare, est amaros in compunctione gemitus, et non composita uerba resonare.”) But to groan is an act of the gift of knowledge; for the third beatitude, in which it is said, blessed are they who mourn (Matt 5:4), is reducible to the gift of knowledge, according to the Gloss on Matthew 5 and Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 2. (See Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 2, ch. 7, n. 10 (PL 34:39); On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Bk. 1, ch. 4, n. 11 (PL 34:1234).) Therefore, prayer is an act of a gift.
On the contrary (1), it seems that it is the act of a virtue: but ask in faith, never doubting (Jas 1:6). But faith is a virtue. Therefore, prayer is a request, which is an act of virtue.
Furthermore (2), Augustine says, faith believes, hope and charity pray, and by asking they obtain. (Augustine, Epistle 130, ch. 8 (PL 33:499).) But hope and charity are virtues. Therefore, prayer is an act of virtue.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that prayer is not an act that falls under a precept. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 2; SCG III, chs. 95–96; Compendium II, ch. 2; Super Matt. 6.) For what belongs to the will is not of necessity. But prayer belongs to the will the most, for it is a certain asking for what one wants. Therefore, it is not of necessity; and so it does not fall under a precept.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a petition does not seem to be anything else but for us to make our desires known to another. But it is superfluous to explain to someone what he knows. Therefore, since the Christian religion does not contain any superfluous precepts, otherwise it would be a superstition, it seems that it cannot fall under a precept to pray to God, to whom all our desires are known.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, God gives his gifts most liberally. But what is given without entreaty is given more liberally, for as Seneca says, no thing is bought more dearly than what is bought with entreaties. (Seneca, de Beneficiis (Teubner, ed. Hosius), Bk. 2, ch. 1, par. 4.) Therefore, he should not require by precept entreaties about what he wills to give; nor again about what he does not will to give, for what God does not will, we should not will, so that there may be a conformity of our wills to God; and what we should not will, we should not ask. Therefore, in no way does prayer fall under precept.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Luke 18: 1: one must pray always, etc., Chrysostom says: when he says ‘one must,’ he names a necessity. But necessity like this cannot exist except by a precept. Therefore, prayer falls under the precept.
Furthermore (2), prayer is divided against fasting and almsgiving. But both of these are under precept. Therefore, so is prayer.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, it should be said to the first question that, as Cassiodorus comments on Psalm 85, prayer, oratio, means, as it were, ‘reason of the mouth.’ (Cassiodorus, Exposition of the Psalms (CCSL 98), Psalm 85, line 1.) And so by its very name, prayer means the expression of a certain act of reason through the mouth’s execution. But reason has two acts, even according as it is speculative. First is to compose and divide, and this act of reason is expressed by the mouth through oratio or verbal utterance, which the Philosopher describes in On Interpretation 1. (Aristotle, On Interpretation, ch. 4, 16b26.) The second act of reason is to move from one thing to another to make known its causes; and according to this a syllogism is called a kind of oratio. And since the expressions of rhetoric, which are called speeches, contain arguments aimed at persuading, this is why they are also called ‘orations,’ and rhetoricians are called ‘orators.’ And since these orations, particularly as to the genus of causes that is called judicial, are directed to asking something from a judge, this is why also in court the pleas are called requests; and so this word has been transferred further to mean the petition that someone makes to God as the judge, who has care of our acts; and this is how Damascene defines prayer: prayer is a petition of fitting things from God. For this is how he speaks of prayer here; and thus whatever has petition as its act also has prayer as its act.
Therefore, it should be known that man differs from the other animals, as far as what pertains to the motive power, in two ways. First, in what is willed or desired, which indeed is determined for the other animals by nature, but not for man. Second, as to his pursuit of what is willed or desired: for other animals have determinate ways and tools by which they fill their desires, and so as soon as the movement of desire arises in them, the members immediately engage in action, unless something prevents them by violence. But a man does not have determined ways and tools, and so his reason comes to his aid in these two areas. For it both searches out the proper and determinate good that should be desired, and it determines the right instruments for the work in pursuit of the desired object. And so in us the act of reason both precedes and follows the act of the will. Indeed, it precedes, finding through counsel what must be chosen by the will; but it follows through command, by directing each instrument to what it must do; and the imperative mood expresses this act of reason in words.
Now the instruments that reason employs by its command for the pursuit or obtainment of a desired object are not only the powers of the soul and the members of the body, but also men outside, for what is done by friends in a certain way is done by us, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 3, 1112b27–28.) But external friends are also not in our power, like the members of our bodies and the powers of the soul. And thus this applying of the things that are outside us for the obtainment of the desired object is sometimes called command or precept, namely when those people are in our power. But sometimes it is called petition, when they are not in our power as subject to us, or even entreaty, if they are above us. And therefore just as command is an act of reason, so also is petition and entreaty; and this is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 13, 1102b15.) who says that reason entreats for the best thing. And so consequently prayer is also an act of reason, of applying the will’s desired object to that which is not under our power, but above us, namely, God. And thus Damascene’s definition: prayer is the petition of fitting things from God, declares most truly of all the essence of prayer.
Reply Obj. 1: To direct the affections of the mind to God happens in two ways. In one way, as toward an object; and in this way the affections directed to God are the love of God; and so this is not what Augustine speaks about here. In another way, the affections are directed toward God as the one in whom the affection of the desiring mind is fulfilled; and this directing of the affections to God is done by reason in the way explained, by attributing to him what the affection longs for. And this very direction of the affections toward God is prayer. And so that definition is material, according as the direction itself is signified by the thing directed; just as also sometimes by faith we mean the thing believed. And a similar way of speaking is when we say that prayer is the desire of the good, as in the Gloss on 1 Thessalonians 5, for this very desire is the thing we pray to be fulfilled.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as in outward petition something can be called a petition in two ways, namely, literally, as when we say, give me this, and by a certain interpretation, as when someone reaches out his hand, or explains his need: so also an interior prayer which is made to God is indeed according to the truth of the matter an act of reason striking God in a certain way, as was said. But reflecting on one’s own needs and raising hope to God are a kind of prayer by a certain interpretation; and so devotion is also called prayer by Hugh of St. Victor, in the definition quoted above.
Reply Obj. 3: Someone who asks or commands or beseeches, calls for something for the obtainment of an end or the pursuit of an intention. But this does not belong to the will, for it is simply and absolutely borne toward its own object, which is its end. Rather this belongs to reason, which orders one thing to another; and so command properly taken does not belong to the will. But there are two ways that the will is said to command. In one way by a certain interpretation or equivalent; for since the person commanding moves another by his command, therefore the act of the soul which is immediately followed by the motion is called command, and since, movement immediately follows in bodily organs if the appetitive act is complete, therefore appetitive powers are said to be the ones commanding the movement. In another way as a principle of command is in the will. For calling for something for one’s end, which pertains to command, presupposes the appetite for the end, and it is a kind of pursuit of it; and because of this powers or operative skills or habits that concern the end are said to command the means to the end; and according to this the will, which has the end for its object, is said to command, inasmuch as command, which is an act of reason, begins in the will, which the desire for the end pertains to.
Reply Obj. 4: A word outwardly uttered is a sign of something in two ways. In one way, immediately, namely, to signify what it was principally brought forth for, like the noun ‘fire’ signifies a certain element. In another way, mediately, namely, when the very thing that is first signified is taken as a sign of another thing, as fire signifies charity because of the aptitude that this thing has for signifying charity by a certain likeness. Therefore, outward vocal prayer signifies immediately the act of reason asking, if also the outward prayer is brought forth by the mode of reason, as when it says, give me wisdom that sits by thy throne (Wis 9:4). But by a mediate signification, it expresses the desire itself, as the principle from which it proceeds, as is clear from what has been said; and this is how the foregoing description of prayer, that prayer is when we display our wishes to God, should be understood.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that prayer is a certain act. Now we call a certain act an act of virtue if in its description it includes anything that pertains to the order of a virtue, even if it does not contain everything that is required for virtue. And so the act must be defined as springing from that virtue that possesses the condition that gives it the order of virtue.
Now prayer does not imply any character of virtue by the genus of its act, which is the genus of petition, but it represents purely the act of a power when clothed with no circumstance, whether in good or evil. Now two differences are added by Damascene, in the definition quoted above, which represent the ordering of virtue, namely, of fitting things, and from God; which is asking what is fitting, and from whom it is fitting. But the first condition does not complete the definition of prayer, since if we asked for fitting things from a man, such a petition would not be called prayer; nor also is it of the essence of prayer, for even if someone asked unfitting things from God, he is still praying, but he is praying in a fleshly way. And so that condition pertains more to what it means to pray well than to the definition of its species. Therefore, it remains that prayer draws its species, and is drawn into the character of virtue, by the fact that it is a petitioning of God.
Now when a petition or a request that is made to a superior has reverence attached to it by which one strives to obtain what one intends, then it is clear that prayer has efficacy for obtaining whatever one prays for from the fact that one shows reverence to God. And so since showing reverence to God is an act of worship, as was said in Book III, Distinction 9, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 1, reply to the third objection, prayer will be an act elicited by worship.
Nor does it matter that worship is in the will, not in the reason, where the act of prayer comes from. For worship is a part of justice, which uses materially acts of every power, as it renders to each what is its own. And so it restrains the act of the concupiscible appetite, so that a person does not commit adultery, as well as the act of the irascible appetite, so that he does not kill; and likewise, it uses the act of reason, so that one shows reverence to God. And since worship is a virtue, and not a gift, as was said in Book III, Distinction 34, Question 1, Article 1, this is why prayer will be the act of a virtue and not of a gift.
Reply Obj. 1: Contemplation is sometimes taken strictly as the act of an intellect meditating on divine things. And then contemplation is an act of wisdom. In another way, it is taken more generally as every act in which someone having sequestered himself from outward affairs frees himself for God alone: which indeed happens in two ways; either when a man hears God speaking to him in the Scriptures, which happens by reading; or when he speaks to God, which happens by prayer. Now meditation is related to both as a medium between the two, for by the fact that he speaks to us in the Scriptures, we are presented to him by the meditation of the intellect and affections; and so, presented to him, or holding him present, we can speak to him by prayer; and therefore Hugh, in the definition above, set down three parts of contemplation: first, reading; second, meditation; third, prayer. But it is not necessary that prayer be an act of wisdom elicited by it, although wisdom prepares the path of prayer through meditation.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two varieties of the intellect’s ascent toward God. One in which it ascends to him by understanding; and this kind of ascent pertains to the gift of understanding. But this is not what Damascene is speaking about. The other is an ascent to God as when someone seeks help in him, as it says in Psalm 122:1: to you I have lifted up my eyes, you who dwell in heaven; and this ascent is prayer. And so it does not follow that it is an act of the gift of understanding; but it can presuppose one, as the second ascent presupposes the first.
Reply Obj. 3: Groans or weeping are not prayer by its essence, but like a foundation for prayer. For petition seems superfluous where there is no need; and so the recognition of one’s misery, by which someone sees himself as needy and unable to help himself, which causes groans in his affections, is considered like a prayer to God. And because of this Augustine says that the business of prayer has more to do with groans than with words, and more with tears than speech. (Augustine, Epistle 130, de Orando Deum, ch. 10 (PL 33:501).)
To those things that are objected to the contrary it should be said that faith, hope, and charity are presupposed in worship, as was said in Book III, Distinction 9, and this, too, is how an act of prayer is attributed to them. Nevertheless they also share a certain amount with prayer according to the character of its proper species, and they are prerequisite to it. For petition is directed in vain to someone, unless it is believed that what is asked for can be supplied, and hoped that he will want it, and it is a presumptuous petition unless it is done to someone who is in some way united with the one asking, but charity causes this union.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that prayer falls under a precept both determinately and indeterminately. Determinately, indeed, those people are bound to certain prayers by a precept who are intermediaries between God and people by their office, as are the ministers of the Church. And so by their office it falls to them to pour out prayers to God in the person of the whole Church. And so they are bound by the Church’s statutes to say the canonical hours. But indeterminately, anyone is bound to pray by the fact that he is bound to procure for himself spiritual goods, which can only be given by God. And therefore they cannot be procured in any way except as they are asked for from him. And even by the very fact that one is bound to love his neighbor as himself, he is bound to do good for him when he is in need, not only by physical alms, but also by spiritual ones, of which prayer is one, as was said before. But even for all those who do not discharge Church ministry, there seems to be a determinate time decreed by the Church for praying, since they are bound by canonical statute to take part in divine services on feast days, so that they conform their intention to that of the ministers praying for the people.
Reply Obj. 1: By the fact that something comes from the will, absolute necessity or coercion is excluded, but not the conditional necessity dictated by the end; for love, which is the most voluntary thing, is necessary, if someone wishes to attain the end of salvation. And in this way, too, prayer is necessary, and falls under a precept with regard to those things about which the will falls under the kind of necessity mentioned.
Reply Obj. 2: We are commanded to extend our wishes to God by prayer, not to teach him what we desire, but to direct our mind and affections toward him.
Reply Obj. 3: God receives prayers both about what he wishes to give, and sometimes about what he does not wish to give. Concerning what he wishes to give, indeed, so that we may be capable of receiving from him; which we would not be if we did not hope from him what we desire. Nor should it be hard for man to subject himself to God by prayer, as it is to subject himself to another man by entreaty: for our whole good consists in our being subject to God, but not in being subject to a man. But concerning what he does not wish to give, because he wills lovingly to wish what he justly does not will to give us, as was said in the end of Book I. (See In I Sent., d. 48, a. 4.)
Article 2
The mode of praying
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: In III Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, ad 2; ST II-II, q. 83, a. 12.) It seems that prayer should not be vocal, but only mental. For prayer should be secret, and for God alone, for it is the petition of fitting things from God; hence it says in Matthew 6:6: but you, when you pray, go into your room and close the door, and pray to your Father. But vocal prayer is not secret, nor does it seem to be only for God, for God looks to the heart, not the voice. Therefore, prayer should be unvoiced.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, prayer is a part of contemplation. But contemplation does not exist in any external act, but only in an inner one. Therefore, prayer should not be done with an external voice.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the understanding should ascend to God by prayer, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 3, ch. 24 (PG 64:1090).) and the affections should be directed to him, according to Augustine. (As stated immediately above in a. 1, obj. 1.) But the soul’s occupation with physical acts drags down the ascent of the intellect and the affections from divine things, for the soul cannot be intensely occupied with different things. Therefore, prayer must exist only in the heart, without the voice.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Psalm 142:1: with my voice I have cried to the Lord.
Furthermore (2), prayer is an act of worship, as was said. But an act of worship consists not only in interior acts, but also in external ones. Therefore, prayer should not only be in the heart but also in the voice.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that prayer should not last a long time: but when you are praying do not speak much (Matt 6:7). (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 14; SCG III, ch. 96; Super Rom. 1, lec. 5; Super Col. 1, lec. 2; Super 1 Thes. 5, lec. 2.) But whoever prays vocally for a long time speaks much. Therefore, at least vocal prayer should not last a long time.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a divine precept is not to be trespassed. But the Lord commanded those who pray to pray like this: Our Father, etc. Therefore, it seems that it is not necessary to add other prayers.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, prayer must be poured out to God with trust: but ask in faith, never doubting (Jas 1:6). But a petition’s wordiness is a sign of diffidence in petitions that are directed to men; and so the words are multiplied to deflect the anger of the one to whom the petition is directed. Therefore, long prayers should not be directed to God.
On the contrary (1), the real widow, left alone . . . continues in prayers night and day (1 Tim 5:5). Therefore, prayer should last long.
Furthermore (2), All of Christ’s actions are for our instruction. But Christ is read to have prayed for a long time, as is seen in Luke 22:43. Therefore, our prayer must be long-lasting.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone should never stop praying: but Jesus told them a parable about their need to pray always and never lose heart (Luke 18:1).
Obj. 2: And furthermore, pray without ceasing (1 Thess 5:17).
Obj. 3: Furthermore, prayer is a certain annunciation of our desire to him through who we anticipate that our desires will be fulfilled. But man should always desire what should be prayed for, namely, spiritual goods. Therefore, prayer should be always.
On the contrary (1), when a man prays he cannot be available for works of mercy. But sometimes he is bound to be available for them. Therefore, a man should not pray always.
Furthermore (2), prayer, according to Hugh, is a part of contemplation. (See above, a. 1, obj. 2.) But a man does not always have to be free for contemplation, but sometimes must apply himself to action. Therefore, he should not always pray.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that actual attention is necessary to prayer. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 13; Super I Cor. 14, lec. 3.) For as Gregory says, God does not hear the prayer of someone who does not attend to what he prays. (In fact, Hugh, On the Rule of St. Augustine, ch. 3 (PL 176:891).) But a prayer is made so that God will listen. Therefore, if a prayer is made without attention, it is pointless.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says, when we pour out prayers, if we dwell on anything in our hearts, even if it is something good, we are not free from fault. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Modo orandi (PL 176:979).) But prayer that has fault attached to it does not have its efficacy. Therefore, actual attention is required for prayer.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, prayer is the ascent of the intellect to God, according to Damascene, as given above. But when attention is lacking, the mind does not ascend to God. Therefore, it is not prayer.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every work of virtue must proceed from choice. But prayer is a work of virtue. Therefore, it should be with attention, without which there is no choice.
On the contrary (1), no one is held to the impossible. But it is impossible for the mind to be held intent on something for a long time without being suddenly swept away to other things. Therefore, it is not necessary to prayer that attention always accompany it.
Furthermore (2), in other meritorious works, it is not required that there always be actual attention; just as it is not necessary that someone who goes on a pilgrimage think on his pilgrimage at all times. Therefore, it seems that neither is it necessary in prayer.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that attention harms prayer. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 13.) For, as Hugh of St. Victor says, prayer is pure when the mind is so enflamed by an abundance of devotion that when it turns to God, about to ask for something, it has even forgotten its own petitions. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Modo orandi, ch. 2 (PL 176:980).) But whoever forgets his own petitions does not seem to be attending to his prayer. Therefore, since prayer should be outstandingly pure, it seems that prayer is impeded by attention.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as intention directs prayer, it also directs external acts. But it would greatly harm most other external acts if the actual intention were always present; for the best harpist would become the worst, as Avicenna says. Therefore, attention harms if it is continually focused on prayer.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the human mind cannot pay attention to several things at once. But sometimes it is necessary for the person praying to be attentive to the end that he intends, or to thinking about God, to whom the prayer is poured out, for omitting this would harm the prayer. Therefore it is harmful to the one praying if he is always attentive to the prayer that he is making.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in his rule: when you pray to God with psalms and hymns, what is uttered in the mouth should be turned over in the heart. (Augustine, Epistle 211, par. 7 (CSEL 57:361); cf. Regula, n. 3 (PL 32:1379).)
Furthermore (2), God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and in truth (John 4:24). Therefore, the attention that makes one pray in spirit does not harm prayer.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that there are two kinds of prayer, namely, private, which each person does for himself, and public, which it falls to the Church ministers to do, as has been said. And since this public prayer is not done by one person praying by himself, but before others, this is why it should not be only mental, but also vocal, as others are aroused to devotion and to unite their own intention with those praying by prayer vocally expressed. And because of this singing has also been established by the Church. Hence Augustine says (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 9, ch. 6, line 23.) about himself that he wept copiously at the Church’s sweet singing of hymns and songs, and that those voices influenced his ears, and the truth was distilled in his heart.
Now prayer is private when someone does it by himself; and this indeed can be done vocally or silently, as it appeals more to the soul of the one praying.
But the voice is still added to prayer for four reasons. First, so that a man may arouse himself to pray more devotedly by his words. Second, so that he can keep his intention from wandering, for he is more held to one thing if words are united to the affections of the one praying. Third, the voice follows from the vehemence of devotion in the one praying, for the movement of the higher powers, if it is strong, also overflows into the lower powers, and so when the mind of the one praying is set on fire by devotion, it breaks forth heedlessly in weeping and sighs and shouts of joy and speech. Fourth, because of what is due in justice; for God, to whom reverence must be shown, should not only be served with our minds, but also with our bodies.
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Bk. 1, hom. 11, par. 1 (CCSL 141:74).) this is how a good work should be done in public, namely, for edification, so that the intention always remains in secret; and therefore the person who prays publicly, if he is outwardly not seeking man’s glory, but only God’s, his intention remains secret, and he prays to God alone by his intention, even if his prayer becomes known to his neighbor for his edification.
Reply Obj. 2: Acts immediately directed toward God, even if they are external, pertain to the contemplative life and are parts of contemplation, taken broadly; although they are not if contemplation is taken strictly for the meditation of wisdom itself, as was said. And so also reading, which is immediately ordered to meditation on divine things and is sometimes done with the voice, is considered a part of contemplation.
Reply Obj. 3: When two powers are ordered to the same thing, one does not impede the other in its act, but rather helps it, as the senses help the imagination, when both are ordered to the same thing. And so expressing one’s intention by voice does not impede the intellect’s ascent to God, unless it is done with too much care in uttering the words, like those who labor to utter words carefully composed in their prayers.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that what is principally expected in prayer is the devotion of the one praying. And so prayer should only be lengthened when the devotion of the one praying can be preserved; and so if devotion can be preserved for a long time, the prayer should be long-lasting and extensive. But if the extensiveness produces aversion or boredom, prayer should not be drawn out for a long time. And therefore Augustine, in his book On Praying to God, says: brothers in Egypt are said to have prayers crowded with words, but these are belted out so quickly and hurriedly, lest that intention alertly raised up, which is most necessary to the one praying, may fade and be blunted by the habit of going on for a prolonged time. And those men show by this that just as this intention should not be blunted if it cannot last, so also, if it does endure, it should not be broken. (Augustine, Epistle 130 (CSEL 44:62), par. 10; cf. de Orando Deum (PL 33:501).)
Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine in the same text, Let much speech be far from prayer, but let much entreaty not be lacking, if the intention continues to burn; for to speak much in praying is to do something necessary with unnecessary words; but to beseech much is to strike the one whom we beseech with a lengthy and devout exercise of the heart.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same book, it is permitted to use other words, namely, to say the same things in essence that we ask for in the Lord’s Prayer when we pray, but it should not be permitted to say other things, in essence, when praying. (See ch. 12.) And so the Lord’s command does not oblige us to those words, but only to asking those things of God, for as Augustine says in the same book, whatever other words we say, which the affections of the one praying either form by preceding so that they are clear, or by following ignite, so that they grow, we say nothing else than what is set down in the Lord’s Prayer, if we pray rightly and appropriately. (Ibid.)
Reply Obj. 3: A petition is made to a man to make known to him the desire of the one asking in order to persuade him with words. But we pour out prayer to God so that we may train our desire; and so it is useful to pray for a long time, if by lengthy practice our desire might grow.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that any act can be said to last a long time in two ways: either essentially, or according to its power or effect; just as the motion of someone who throws a stone lasts by the essence of the act as long as he applies his hand to moving the stone, but the power of the movement remains as long as the stone is moved by the force of the first propulsion. In the same way I also say that the length of a prayer can be considered in two ways: either according to the essence of the act; and then someone does not have to pray continuously, or always, because sometimes one must be occupied with other things; or according to power, and so the power of it, particularly as to its beginning, remains in all other works that we do in an ordered way, for we should order all things to attaining eternal life. And so the desire for eternal life, which is the principle of prayer, remains in all good works according to power. And because of this, the Gloss on 1 Thessalonians 5:17 says: he does not cease to pray who does not cease to act well. (PL 114:620.) And just as the power of a first movement is continually weakened, so that eventually the stone that is thrown comes to rest, or is moved in the opposite direction, unless it is thrown again, so also, as Augustine says: by the cares of life desire somehow grows tepid; and so we recall our minds to the business of praying at certain hours, lest our desire, which is beginning to grow lukewarm, become entirely cold. (In the work cited above, ch. 9.)
Reply Obj. 1: By the fact that the Lord said that we should pray always, he did not intend that the act of praying should be never interrupted, but that it should not be interrupted as though never to be resumed; which indeed they do who stop praying if they are not heard immediately. For by the length of one’s praying, one obtains what one asks, as the Lord shows by his parable.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says, to pray without ceasing is nothing other than desiring the blessed life without ceasing. (Ibid.) Or it could be said that the Apostle takes praying without ceasing there as not failing to pray at the established hours; or that by benefits shown to the poor, we make their prayers our own, even when we ourselves stop praying, as some saint explains in the Lives of the Fathers. (See Vitae Patrum, Bk. 3, n. 212 (PL 73:807) and Bk. 5, libell. 12, n. 9 (PL 73:942).)
The answer to the third objection is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that actual attention is required for prayer in a certain way, either to avoid transgressing, which is by that prayer that is under precept, or to merit by that prayer that is not under precept; but not in every way. For, as was said, a certain act remains by its essence and its virtue for some time; but eventually the act has passed yet it remains in virtue, as was seen in the example of throwing the stone; and so for an act to remain in virtue is a certain middle way between its being habitually and actually. For what exists habitually exists neither by the virtue nor by the essence of the act. According to this, therefore, I say that attention in prayer must always remain according to virtue, but it is not required to remain always by the essence of the act. Now it remains according to virtue when someone turns to prayer with the intention of obtaining something, or of rendering the service that is due to God, even if in the course of the prayer his mind is swept away to other things, unless so much wandering happens that he has completely lost the force of his first intention. And so a man must frequently recall his heart back to himself.
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory’s words are to be understood about when one’s attention is in no way joined to one’s prayer.
Reply Obj. 2: Hugh’s words are to be understood about when someone pulls his mind away from his purpose to other things while praying, for then he is not without fault, particularly if he deliberately occupies himself with other things that distract his mind, like external works. And if the mind should wander to the contrary it will even be a mortal sin. But if without one noticing, the mind wanders to other things, either he will be without fault, or the fault will be extremely small; unless he is said to be in fault from his previous thought out of which the wandering happened.
Reply Obj. 3: The intellect ascends to God when the prayer is directed to God, and the virtue of that ascent remains in the whole prayer.
Reply Obj. 4: In works of virtue it is not necessary that there always be an actual choice, just as it is not necessary that the person who gives alms always think about almsgiving; but it suffices to have thought of it once, when one was disposed to give alms; unless the previous intention is interrupted by an opposite thought.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that attention in praying can be said in three ways: for the first is attention to the words by which we ask; then to the petition itself; and to those things surrounding the petition, such as the need for which it is asked, God who is called upon, and other things of that sort. And if our attention is present for any of these, it is not considered an inattentive prayer. And therefore even those who do not understand the words of the petition are able to be attentive to the prayer. But still the last attention is more praiseworthy than the second, and the second more praiseworthy than the first. And since the soul cannot pay close attention to different things, this is how the first attention can do harm, so that the prayer is less fruitful, if the second one disappears, or the second one, if the third is completely destroyed; but the reverse is not true. Nevertheless attention, taken commonly, does not do any harm, but much good, as appears from the words quoted from Augustine.
Reply Obj. 1: When the mind is so caught up in love for God that it forgets its petitions, it is attentive to its prayer, as was said, although not according to the second kind of attention or the first, but the third.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument is based on the first kind of attention, which, if it is too much, makes a clumsy interruption, namely, if a man wants to think about how individual words should be formed; sometimes he will even make a mistake, because the words occur less to someone thinking in this way. But the attention is enough that suffices for the full pronunciation of the words.
Reply Obj. 3: Those things that have an ordering to each other can be understood together as such; for to the extent that they are considered ordered to each other, the intellect in understanding their order makes them one thing. And therefore the intellect can be directed toward prayer and prayer’s end. Nevertheless, whatever it is directed to, due attention to the prayer should not be lacking.
Article 3
The species of prayer
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 17; Super Phil. 4, lec. 1; Super I Tim. 2, lec. 1.) It seems that the species of prayer are unfittingly distinguished: I beseech, he says, first of all that supplications, prayers, requests, and thanksgivings be made for all (1 Tim 2:1). For supplications are adjurations for difficult things, as the Gloss says about the same text; but an adjuration almost conveys a certain coercion; and so it diminishes the reverence due to the prayer. Therefore, supplication is not a species of prayer.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the whole cannot be the same as the part. But these things are assigned as parts of prayer. Therefore, prayer should not also be assigned as one of the parts.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a request is the same thing as a petition. But a petition is the genus of prayer, as was said. Therefore, requests should not be included as a part of prayer.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every prayer is the petition of fitting things from God, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 3, ch. 24 (PG 94:1090).) But thanksgiving is not a petition, for it is about something already received. Therefore, it is not a species of prayer.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it also seems that the distinction of the parts of prayer that Ambrose gives is inadequate. (Ambrose, On the Sacraments, Bk. 6, ch. 5, par. 22 (CSEL 73:82).) For he says that prayer is divided into praise of God, supplication and request, and thanksgiving. For nothing is praised but what is ordered to another, as is clear from the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 12, 1101b21–23.) But God is not something ordered to another, but all others are ordered to him. Therefore, he should not be praised, but rather honored; and so the praise of God is not a part of prayer.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, praise, properly speaking, is done by announcing something about someone. But prayer is not done by the indicative mood, in which we announce things, but rather in the imperative mood. Therefore, praise is not a part of prayer.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, all supplication is a kind of request. Therefore, the one should not be divided against the other.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that even the parts that Hugh of St. Victor assigns (Hugh of St. Victor, de Modo orandi Deum, ch. 2 (PL 176:970).) are inappropriately set down. For he says that there are three parts of prayer, namely, supplication, request, and insinuation. For insinuation, as Cicero says, is a certain kind of persuasive preface. (Cf. Cicero, De inuentione (Teubner, ed. Stroebel), Bk. 1, ch. 15, par. 20: “insinuatio est oratio quadam dissimulatione et circumitione obscure subiens auditoris animum.”) But those approaching God do not need a persuasive preface, for he is not influenced by words. Therefore, insinuation is not a part of prayer.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the persuasive preface precedes all the other parts of a rhetorical speech. Therefore, if parts are assigned to prayer to God by their likeness to it, it seems that insinuation is the first part of prayer, not the last.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, supplication seems to add over and above request a humble manner making the request. But what is related to something by addition comes after it. Therefore, supplication should be listed after requesting.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Lord seems to set down three parts to prayer, saying: ask and you shall receive, seek and you shall find, knock and the door shall be opened unto you (Matt 7:7). Therefore, since these parts are omitted in all the divisions mentioned, it seems that all of them are insufficient.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the parts of prayer can be taken in two ways: namely, in the manner of integral parts, and in the manner of subjective parts. Now the integral parts of prayer are distinguished by the things that are required for a complete prayer; but the subjective parts are distinguished either according to the diversity of what is asked for, or according to the different ways of asking. Therefore, the parts of prayer that the Apostle assigns have both distinctions attached to them. For since what we ask from God we do not presume to obtain by our own merits, and the person who does not give thanks for what he has received closes the path to obtaining, therefore for the fullness of prayer, the first thing required is a commemoration of sacred things, by whose power all difficult things are obtained; and this is done by obsecration. Therefore, the Gloss says (PL 114:627.) that this has to do with difficult things, like the conversion of unbelievers. Second is petition itself, which is either about the things that are ordered to what we chiefly ask for; and so it is prayer, which is said with regard to the goods of the earthly journey; or else it is about the things we chiefly ask for, like the goods of the heavenly homeland; and with regard to these there are requests. But thanksgiving follows, in which prayer is consummated, so that the approach to subsequent prayer will be open.
And in accord with this, as the Gloss says in the same place, (Ibid.) the parts of the Mass are distinguished, for those things that are said before the consecration are like a kind of obsecration, by the fact that the commemoration is made of Christ and his teaching and that of his saints. But those things that are said in the consecration are called prayers, for the sacrament that is consecrated by those words helps us on our earthly journey; and this is why it is called viaticum, way-bread. But those things that are added afterward are requests, for eternal goods are requested for the living and the dead; while what is said after communion is thanksgiving.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as in an oath the divine truth is taken as something stronger for testifying to the truth spoken by us, so also in an adjuration one takes up a stronger power for obtaining what we cannot obtain by our weakness. And therefore the one adjuring always declares the defect in himself. But sometimes the power we adjure is taken up in order to induce by violence, as when the saints adjure the demons that they depart from the bodies of the possessed. But sometimes it is taken up in order to incline by benevolence, and this is how we adjure God by his Son, or by his saints, who have been more acceptable to him than we ourselves; and so reverence is not diminished by obsecration.
Reply Obj. 2: It is customary that the general name is given to that species that adds nothing in dignity, or less than the other species, above the general name, as the name ‘angels,’ which is common to all the orders of angels, is attributed to the lowest order. And similarly, the name ‘prayer’ is given according to a certain appropriation, to that species that has less dignity, namely, the one that asks for the good of the earthly journey.
Reply Obj. 3: ‘Request’ conveys a certain extending of one’s desire toward what one asks for: and since what is principally and per se desired is the end, for this reason a request properly adds above the commonly said petition something determinate that is asked for, namely, the end.
Reply Obj. 4: Thanksgiving is not listed as a part of prayer like a species of it, and so it is not necessary that the definition of prayer apply to it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that just as rhetorical orations have an ingratiating introduction as part of them, so does a prayer poured out to God; which is also why the Introit is sung in the Mass. But the difference is this, that in rhetorical orations the introduction is included for the sake of those to whom the speech is made, to make them benevolent, docile, or attentive. But in the kind of prayer that we are speaking of, the introduction is required sometimes to excite the desire to ask devoutly in the one praying. But in a persuasive preface that is introduced to capture good-will, it proceeds in four ways, according to Cicero. For either the good will of the person of the judge is secured, when he is praised; or of the matter, when its worth is demonstrated; or of the person petitioning, as when he shows his merit toward those whom he addresses; or of the persons of his adversaries, when the rhetorician stirs up the feelings of the audience against them. Now in the prayer that we pour out to God, we plead only for ourselves, not so that others will be charged with an offense. Also, the matter for which we pray is God himself, to whom all our desires should be directed. And therefore the feelings of the one praying are excited to devotion by something like an opening argument in two ways, namely, on the part of God, when we praise him; and on our part, when we meditate on our own weakness. And as to the first, Ambrose includes praise of God as a part of prayer; but as to the second supplication, which is a humble and devout entreaty, in which also can be included the matter for which we pray, inasmuch as by the necessity which impels us to pray, our spirit is humbled. Now request pertains to the process of prayer, but thanksgiving pertains to its end result, as was said before.
Reply Obj. 1: Praise is taken in a broad way according as it is generally related to praise and honor. Or it could be said that although God is not ordered to anything, nevertheless, he orders all things directly to himself; and this is how the definition of praise applies to him.
Reply Obj. 2: Praise is not included as a subjective part, but an integral part, and as it pertains to the full being of prayer.
Reply Obj. 3: Supplication is not included here in the same way as request and petition, but as to the mode of asking that it conveys. It can also be said that Ambrose’s parts can be reduced to the Apostle’s parts, so that praise of God is thus called obsecration, for we adjure him by those things that pertain to his praise. But supplication is the same as prayer, for both convey a certain reverence; while the other things are the same even in name.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the parts set down by Hugh are subjective parts and are distinguished according to their different modes; for every petition is determined by its narration, and the narration itself is a certain interpretive prayer. In this way, therefore, both can coincide in a prayer, and then it is called a request; and therefore he says that a request is a narration inserted into a determinate petition: or only one of the two; and so either it is an undetermined petition without narration, and then it is a supplication, which is why he says that supplication is a humble and devout entreaty, without the determination of a petition; or it is narration without petition, and then it is an insinuation, which, according to him, is a signification of the will made without petition by narration alone.
To the first objection, then, the answer is clear from what was said about the second question.
Reply Obj. 2: Insinuation differs from a persuasive preface according to Cicero in the place mentioned above, in that a persuasive preface explicitly seizes the good will or docility or attention; but insinuation does the same thing secretly, and in a certain roundabout way. And therefore insinuation is properly when one thing is said and another thing is intended; and therefore, Hugh calls this mode of prayer in which narration is put forth and petition is intended, insinuation. And so it is not meant for a persuasive preface, but for that mode of petition that bears a resemblance to a certain kind of ingratiating preface.
Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from what has been said, request is a middle ground between insinuation and supplication; and so it is listed in the middle according to its order from the others.
Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount (CCSL 35), Bk. 2, par. 71.) these three are distinguished according to what is necessary to wayfarers. First, that they have the strength for walking through health; and as to this it is said, ask and you shall receive. Second, that they have knowledge for guidance, lest they be ignorant of the way; and as to this it is said, seek and you shall find. Third, that they have the ability to arrive, and as to this it is said, knock and the door shall be opened to you. And so it is clear that the different subjective parts of prayer are distinguished according to the diversity of the things asked for; and so the prayer that is listed in the Apostle’s definition includes petition and seeking; but request corresponds to knocking, while thanksgiving and obsecration are not subjective parts in this way according to the distinct differences among the things asked for.
Article 4
What should be asked for in prayer
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 5.) It seems that a man should not ask for anything specific in prayer. For it is dangerous to ask for what is not fitting to ask for. But we do not know what to pray for (Rom 8:26). Therefore, we should not ask for anything specific.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in prayer a man should cast his hope on God, as it says in Psalm 55:22: cast your care upon the Lord, and he will sustain you. But the man who specifies something in prayer does not seem to cast his cares entirely on the Lord. Therefore, a prayer like that is reprehensible.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, specification of a petition only happens to make known what is desired. But God, whom we pray to, knows our desires better than we do. Therefore, we should not ask for anything specific in our prayers.
On the contrary (1), the Lord gave us the appropriate form for praying. But in the Lord’s Prayer, there are specific petitions. Therefore, we should ask for something specific.
Furthermore (2), request is a part of prayer. But it contains a specific petition, as Hugh says, in the text quoted above. Therefore, something specific should be asked for.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in prayer we should not ask for temporal things. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 6; Super Matt. 6.) For commenting on Matthew 6:33: seek first the kingdom of God, and all these things will be given to you as well, the interlineal Gloss says: it should not be understood that after the kingdom, these things should be sought. (PL 114:107.) Therefore, it is not permitted to seek temporal things in any way by praying.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever prays for something is anxious about it. But we should not be anxious about even necessary temporal things, as is clear from Matthew 6:25: do not be anxious about what you will eat. Therefore, temporal things are not to be asked in prayer.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, we should not ask for anything in prayer but what is our good. But temporal things are not our goods, as is clear from Augustine in the Gloss on Matthew 6:33: seek first the kingdom of God. (PL 114:207.) Therefore, temporal things are not to be asked in prayer.
On the contrary (1), in the Lord’s Prayer is contained, give us this day our daily bread, in which not only spiritual but also physical bread is asked for, as is clear from the Gloss on Luke 11. Therefore, it is permitted to pray for temporal things.
Furthermore (2), Bernard says: temporal things are to be asked for as much as necessity demands. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones de diuersis, Sermon 25, par. 5: “At vero temporalia, si defuerint, petenda quidem sunt quantum necessitas humana requirit; sed, iuxta beati Gregorii sententiam, non sunt haec nimie requirenda” (Bernardi Opera 6.1:191).)
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a man should not pray for the good of a stranger. First, by the fact that it says in Jeremiah 7:16: therefore, do not you pray for this people.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is presumptuous for a man to pile on himself those things that are above him. But the overflow of grace from one person to another pertains to the excellence of fullness that was in Christ according as he is our head. Therefore, someone should not usurp this to himself by praying for another.
On the contrary, it says in Matthew 5:44: pray for those who persecute and calumniate you.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the specification of what is to be asked in prayer benefits us in three ways. First, because the attention of the one praying is determined to something, which is most necessary in prayer. Second, so that our desire may be made known to us and how much we have advanced in it. Third, so that we may ask more fervently, for the more particularly goods are examined, the more fervently they are desired, as the Philosopher says about physical pleasures in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 12, 1119a31–32.) And therefore Augustine in his book On Praying to God says: therefore, for a certain interval we pray to God himself also with specific words, so that we might admonish ourselves by these signs of things, as to the first, and how much we have advanced in that desire itself, we make known to ourselves, as to the second; and for doing this we excite ourselves more keenly, as to the third. (Augustine, Epistle 130 (CSEL 44), par. 9; cf. de Orando Deum (PL 33:501).)
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine answered about the same text, the Apostle says this because of temporal tribulations, which are often sent for our progress, and nevertheless we ask to be freed from all of them, for they are evil in themselves, although in a certain respect they are good; but we know well about some things that we must ask for them, as well as desire them.
Reply Obj. 2: A man in doubt about this should cast his care on God, so that if something other than what is asked is more expedient, it will be left to divine judgment. And the Lord gave us this form of praying by his own example when he said, not as I will, but as you will (Matt 26:39). But in those things that God wishes us to want, we must cast our care on him about this so that we may expect his help in obtaining them.
The answer to the third objection is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, I answer that prayer is a way of carrying out desire. And so what is permitted to desire, it is permitted to ask in prayer in that way in which it is permitted to desire it. But among those things that are desired, two distinctions must be kept in mind: the first is that some things are desired because of themselves, some things for the sake of something else. The second is that certain things cannot be desired too much, like virtues; but other things can, like pleasures, riches, and things like that. Now temporal goods are to be desired both for the sake of something else and with a certain measure, namely, according as they are necessary to leading the present life. And therefore this is also how they can be prayed for.
Reply Obj. 1: Temporal goods should be sought neither first nor second, as though principally desired. But they can be sought as desired for the sake of something else: which desire indeed belongs to choice, not properly to the will, for the will has to do with the end.
Reply Obj. 2: Excess concern is forbidden by these words, but not necessary concern.
Reply Obj. 3: Temporal things are not our goods in themselves, but according as they are ordered to other things, and so they take on the character of a useful good. And this is how one can pray for them, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5: it is not necessary to pray for these things, namely temporal goods, but that a man use them well. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129b5–6.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that since by the precept of charity a man should love his neighbor as himself, he should wish the same things for him as for himself; and therefore, he can also ask in prayer for the same things for another that he would ask in prayer for himself.
Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is speaking about the things that were impediments for that people as the reason the prayer of the prophet would not be heard, namely, their uncorrected error, and final unrepentance, as the Gloss says about the same text. (Cf. PL 24:732, citing Jerome.)
Reply Obj. 2: The person who prays does not strive to obtain what he asks for by his own power, but by the power of the one he prays to. And this is why when someone prays for another, he does not usurp to himself the grace of fullness, but he attributes it to the one he prays to, from whom he asks the grace to be given to his neighbor.
Article 5
Whom can we pray to
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 4.) It seems that God alone should be prayed to, by the definition of prayer: for Damascene says that prayer is the ascent of the intellect toward God.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, prayer is an act of worship, as was said. But worship should be toward God alone. Therefore, also prayer.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power of prayer consists more in the affections than in the voice: for it is about this, as Augustine says, more than groans or words. (Augustine, Epistle 130 (CSEL 44:62), par. 10; cf. de Orando Deum (PL 33:501).) But it belongs to God alone to perceive the thoughts and affections of the heart. Therefore, prayer is made to him alone.
On the contrary (4), it is said in Job 5:1: call, therefore, if there is someone who will answer you, and turn to one of the saints. Therefore, prayer can be made to the saints of God, not only to God.
Furthermore (5), supplication is a species of prayer. But supplication can be made to a man. Therefore, so can prayer.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that prayer can also be directed to one of the saints not dwelling in heaven. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 4, ad 3.) For we only pour out prayer to saints according as they are closer to God than to us; for God by those things that are nearer to him emits the rays of his goodness to the ones that are far, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 1 (PG 3:693).) But the saints even existing in this world are above us. Therefore, we should pray to them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, those who are now in purgatory are certain of their salvation. Therefore, they are in a better state than we are. Therefore, we can pray to them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the Dialogues it is read that Paschasius, who worked a miracle even after his death, was revealed to blessed Bishop Germanus of Capua to be in purgatory. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SChr 265), Bk. 4, ch. 42, line 17.) Therefore, it seems that, by the same rationale, prayer can be directed to those who are not in heaven.
On the contrary (1), the same person cannot be prayed to and prayed for. But the saints who are on earth or in purgatory are prayed for. Therefore, they should not be prayed to.
Furthermore (2), saints are only prayed to inasmuch as they are in full participation of divinity. But they do not partake fully of divinity except as they partake of beatitude, as Boethius proves in On the Consolation of Philosophy 3. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy (CCSL 94), Bk. 3, prose 10.) Therefore, only saints who are in beatitude should be prayed to.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that prayer is not made to God by reason of his essence, but rather by reason of his person. For we should pray in the way Christ taught us. But he taught us to direct our prayer to the person of the Father: but whatever you ask of the Father in my name, he will give to you (John 16:23). Therefore, prayer is made to God by reason of his person.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is attributed to God by reason of his divine nature applies to the whole Trinity, and to each person. But the Church does not direct any prayer to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, God should not be prayed to by reason of his nature, but by reason of his person.
Obj. 3: But to the contrary, someone is prayed to according as he can communicate his goods. But to communicate himself belongs to God as good. Therefore, since goodness is an essential attribute, it seems that prayer is directed to God by reason of his nature.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that what we ask when we pray is blessed life, as Augustine says: (Augustine, Epistle 130, par. 13 (CSEL 44:67); cf. de Orando Deum, ch. 4, n. 9 (PL 33:497).) for all the other things that we ask for, we only ask according as they are ordered to this. Now, only God gives the blessed life directly. But nevertheless the saints also cooperate with us so that we obtain the blessed life; and therefore prayer is directly and properly made toward God as the one from whom we expect what we ask for in prayer. But nevertheless the intention of the one praying can be turned toward the saints, as those from whom he obtains help from God. And so Cassiodorus says that prayer is properly made to God, but entreaty to the saints. (Cassiodorus, Exposition of the Psalms (CCSL 97), Psalm 60:1; cf. John Cassian, Collation 4, chs. 12–13 (PL 49:783–85).)
Reply Obj. 1: In a definition should be included the things that are per se. Now, although in a certain way prayer can be made to the saints, as to intercessors for us, nevertheless, properly and per se, prayer is directed to God.
Reply Obj. 2: Prayer is an act of worship; however, when the saints are prayed to, worship is not shown to them, but to him by whom the one praying hopes his petition will be fulfilled.
Reply Obj. 3: The saints discern in a word all those things that pertain to their glory. And since it is to their great glory that they can help others, acting as cooperators with God, this is why they see immediately in a word the wishes of those who utter them.
Reply Obj. 4: He teaches us to turn to one of the saints as to a mediator of prayer, not the one to whom the prayer is principally directed.
Reply Obj. 5: Prayer here is taken for its resemblance to a rhetorical oration, as is clear from what has been said, and so just as that is done for a judge alone, although also supplications or some petitions can be made to other people of rank, so also, prayer is directed directly to God alone, but supplication can also be directed directly to others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that nothing is asked from someone who does not have it; and therefore when blessed life is what is asked for in prayer, it can be directed only to those saints who already have the blessed life, but not to those who are in the world, nor to those who are in purgatory; although to those who are in the world some supplication and petition can be made.
Reply Obj. 1: Although saints existing in the world are above us, and can pray for us, nevertheless, they have not attained that state of superiority, namely, beatitude, so that they have what we do not have.
Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are in purgatory are in greater certainty than we are, nevertheless they are in greater affliction. And again, they are not in the state of meriting, and so they need us to pray for them more than they can pray for us.
Reply Obj. 3: The faith and devotion of the one praying is particularly important in miracles. And this is why the Lord also said to the woman whom he healed, your faith has healed you (Matt 9:22). And since that person was believed to be in heaven because of the excellence of his merits he was prayed to for this reason. And this kind of prayer was heard then because of the faith of the ones praying, and so that his life could be approved—not because he would pray for others while still in purgatory.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that God is particularly prayed to, inasmuch as he is blessed, and the source granting beatitude to all others. And because this belongs to him by reason of his essence, therefore he is prayed to by reason of his essential attributes.
Reply Obj. 1: Those things that belong to the essence are in the other persons from the Father; and so a certain reduction is made from the other persons back to the Father, as is clear from Hilary. (See Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity (CCSL 62A), Bk. 8, ch. 20.) And because of this the Father is also called the principle of the whole deity. And this is why Christ, referring us to the Father as to a principle not from a principle, taught us to direct our prayer to the Father through the Son.
Reply Obj. 2: The Holy Spirit stands as gift by his personal properties; and so it is more fitting that he be asked for than that something be asked for from him; although the Church also directs certain prayers to the Holy Spirit, and hymns, which are recited in the place of prayers in the Church, as is seen in Come Holy Spirit Who Ever One, and Come Holy Spirit, Creator Blest, and the like.
Article 6
Who can pray
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the sixth question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 10.) It seems that it belongs to a divine person to pray. For it belongs to someone to pray if it belongs to him to receive. But it belongs to a person of God, like the Son and the Holy Spirit, to receive from another. Therefore, it belongs to them to pray.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, I will ask the Father and he will give you another Paraclete (John 14:16); and these are the words of the Son. Therefore, it belongs to the Son to pray.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says in Romans 8:26, the Spirit asks on our behalf with unspeakable groanings. But the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity. Therefore, it belongs to a divine person to pray.
On the contrary (1), to pray implies a lack of power in the one praying. But this does not apply to a divine Person. Therefore, prayer does not belong to a divine Person.
Furthermore (2), praying is an act of worship, which is called the service of God. But to serve does not belong to divine Persons. Therefore, neither does prayer.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that neither does it belong to the saints who are in heaven to pray. (Parallels: below, d. 45, q. 3, a. 3; ST II-II, q. 83, a. 11.) For the saints who are in heaven are conformed to Christ as man. But it does not belong to Christ as man to pray; otherwise we would say, Christ, pray for us. Therefore, it also does not belong to the saints to pray either.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the saints in heaven are equal to the angels of God (cf. Matt 22:30). But it does not belong to the angels to pray: for prayer, as was said, is an act of reason, which does not exist in the angels, since it arises in the shadow of intelligence, as Isaac says. (J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli Liber de definicionibus," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 (1937‒38): 299–340; here, 313.) Therefore, it also does not belong to the other saints who are in heaven to pray.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, anyone who prays for another merits for the other. But the saints who are in heaven are not in a state of meriting. Therefore, neither are they in a state of praying.
On the contrary (1), we say, Saint Peter, pray for us.
Furthermore (2), saints burn more with charity in heaven than they did as wayfarers. But charity causes saints who are wayfaring to pray for others. Therefore, much more do they pray for us in heaven.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it also belongs to brute animals to pray. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 10, ad 3.) For it says in Psalm 146:9: who gives food to beasts, and to the young ravens who invoke him. But to invoke God is to pray to him. Therefore, animals also pray.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, prayer is indicative of desire. But brute animals desire the divine good in their own way. Therefore, they pray.
On the contrary, prayer is only made to God. But God cannot be known by anything but the intellect, which the brutes lack. Therefore, it does not belong to them to pray.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that prayer requires the distinction of the one praying from the one who is prayed to: for no one asks anything from himself. But prayer is made to God by reason of his essential attributes, in which the Persons are not distinguished; and so it does not befit one Person to pray to another.
Reply Obj. 1: That receiving in which one Person receives from another is by natural fruitfulness, and not by gratuitous conferral, which prayer is poured out in the hope of obtaining.
Reply Obj. 2: The Son says this about himself, not by reason of his person, but by reason of his assumed nature.
Reply Obj. 3: The Spirit is said to ask inasmuch as he makes us ask.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that certain heretics have said that the saints cannot help us by praying for us, since each one receives according to what he does. But this is against an article of faith, which is the communion of saints, which arises from charity; and therefore, since also among the saints who are in heaven there is the most perfect charity, it befits them to pray for us; but not for themselves, since all things proceed for them according to their wishes.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ, as man, prays for us; but we do not therefore say, Christ, pray for us, for Christ exists as an eternal suppositum, whose role is not to pray, but to help. And so we say, Christ, hear us, or have mercy on us; and in this we also avoid the heresies of Arius and Nestorius.
Reply Obj. 2: What belongs to reason exists even more nobly in an intellect, for what a lower power can do, the higher power can as well. And so angels, in whom there is an intellect, are able to pray.
Reply Obj. 3: Some people say that they are not in the state of meriting as to the essential reward, but as to an incidental reward; and so they can also merit for others. But since merit is only for wayfarers, therefore it should be said that obtaining is one thing, and meriting is another, as will be said. And therefore the saints, if they cannot merit, can nevertheless obtain something for us by their own prayers.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that it in no way belongs to brute animals to pray, both because they are not partakers of the blessed life, which is the chief thing asked for in prayer; and because they also do not apprehend God, to whom prayer is offered; and also because asking is an act of reason, since it implies a certain ordering, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as brute animals, according to Augustine in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, (See Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 9, ch. 14, nn. 24–25.) are said to obey the commands of God not as perceiving his order, but inasmuch as they are moved by it by natural instinct, so also they are said figuratively to invoke God, insofar by a natural desire they desire something which they obtain from God.
Reply Obj. 2: Appetite, as was said, denotes a simple motion toward the appetible. But prayer, or petition, denotes a certain order, which belongs to reason. And so appetite can belong to brute animals, but not petition or prayer.
Article 7
The efficacy of prayer
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the seventh question we proceed thus. (Parallel: above, d. 15, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 3.) It seems that prayer is not an act of satisfaction. For every prayer is either vocal or mental. But mental prayer is not an act of satisfaction, for it does not have any penalty, but agreeableness; nor again is vocal prayer, for, as Isidore says, it is not the sound of the voice that reconciles us to God, but a pure and simple intention of the mind. (Cf. Isidore, Sententiae (CCSL 111), Bk. 3, ch. 7, sent. 29: “Neque enim conciliat eum multiplex orantis sermo, sed pura sincera que orationis intentio.”) Therefore, prayer is not a part of satisfaction.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was said in the main argument of the previous distinction, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 5, worship is divided against the virtue of repentance. But satisfaction is an act of the virtue of repentance, while prayer is an act of worship. Therefore, prayer is not satisfactory.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, satisfaction is made to reconcile the one who is offended. But prayer follows reconciliation, for it seems presumptuous to ask from someone whom we have offended. Therefore, prayer is not satisfactory.
On the contrary (1), Jerome says, the diseases of the mind are healed by prayer, just as the diseases of the body are healed by fasting. (Jerome, On Mark, ch. 9 (PL 30:616).) But fasting is an act of satisfaction. Therefore, so is prayer.
Furthermore (2), in prayer we ask for our debts to be forgiven, and not in vain, since it was instituted by the Lord. But the forgiveness of debts happens by repentance. Therefore, prayer pertains to some part of penance, which part could only be satisfaction; therefore, prayer is an act of satisfaction.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that prayer is not meritorious. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2; a. 15.) For a meritorious work directs its intention only toward God; for the intention of a reward destroys the virtue of merit. But a person praying does not only have an eye to God, but also to his own needs, which he is asking to be met. Therefore, it is not a meritorious work.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if prayer is meritorious, it most of all merits what it asks for. But prayer does not merit what it asks for, because sometimes it is not heard, even if it is offered by someone in charity. Therefore, prayer is not meritorious.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nature does not do through two things what it can do through one: for nothing wasted is found among the works of nature, and much less among the works of grace. But works are sufficiently ordered to meriting. Therefore, it seems that prayer is not meritorious.
On the contrary (1), every work of virtue can be meritorious. But prayer is a work of virtue, as was said. Therefore, it is meritorious.
Furthermore (2), it says in Psalm 35(34):13: my prayer shall turn over in my bosom. Therefore, by prayer something grows in the one praying; and so it seems to be meritorious.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the conditions that confer efficacy on prayer are inappropriately assigned. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 83, a. 15.) For it says in the Gloss on the parable in Luke 11:5, which of you shall have a friend, and go to him at midnight, that four conditions are required for a prayer to be efficacious: namely, that it is asked for piously, and for oneself, and perseveringly, and for salvation. For someone who is in sin does not have the virtue of piety. But the prayer of sinners is sometimes heard, for miracles can even be worked by sinners. Therefore, it is not necessary that it be piously asked for in order to be an efficacious prayer.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, prayer that is done out of charity always has efficacy: if you remain in me, and my words remain in you, whatsoever you wish, ask for, and it will be done for you (John 15:7). Now charity makes one remain in God, as is clear from 1 John 4:16. Now every prayer that is piously made proceeds from charity. Therefore, it has efficacy: and so it is not necessary to add other conditions.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the greater charity is, the more efficacy it has for meriting. But charity is greater the more people it is extended to. Therefore, it seems that the more efficacious prayer is the one proceeding from charity, which is made on behalf of others, rather than one that is made on behalf of the one praying; and so it is not required that it be done for oneself.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, prayer has the same efficacy for meriting, namely, from charity, as a work does. But a work proceeding from charity is meritorious, even if it is not done perseveringly. Therefore, it is not required for the efficacy of a prayer that it be done perseveringly.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, those things that are desired or asked for as pertaining to salvation do not provoke God’s anger. But sometimes God grants certain things whose asking has angered him: as when he granted a king in indignation at the request of the sons of Israel. Therefore, it is not necessary that what is asked for be for salvation in order that the prayer be efficacious.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems that many other conditions are required: namely, that it is asked faithfully and trustfully: but ask in faith, never doubting (Jas 1:6); and that the prayer be humble: he has regarded the prayer of the humble, and did not scorn their petition (Ps 102:17). The poverty, too, of the one asking makes a prayer efficacious: the Lord has heard the desire of the poor (Ps 10:17). Also the fervor of his devotion, which is why Augustine also says in his letter to Proba on prayer, Chapter 9: a nobler effect follows when a more fervent affection precedes. (Augustine, Epistle 130 (CSEL 44:62), par. 9; cf. de Orando Deum (PL 33:501).) Therefore, the four conditions are insufficiently enumerated.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that satisfaction regards both past fault, for which offense one makes recompense; and future fault, against which it is a healing medicine. And these two things belong to prayer. For the root and source of sin is pride (Sir 10:15), and so by the fact that a man humbly subjects his spirit to God in prayer, he both makes recompense for the pride of his previous offense, and cuts off access to future fault, by pulling up its root; and so prayer fully possesses the character of making satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 1: Mental and vocal prayer is an act of satisfaction if it is done in charity. Vocal prayer, indeed, since it has an outward work, and thus a certain penalty; and inasmuch as in it the virtue of the previous intention remains, it also has the character of meriting good, which are the two things required for a work of satisfaction. And thus it is clear that the text of Isidore should be answered in a certain way, for the sound of the voice does not in itself reconcile to God, but as the pure efficacy of the intention remains in it. Likewise, mental prayer is also an act of satisfaction: for although it has agreeablenesss, it still has penalty mixed in, for Gregory says, to pray is to resound with bitter groans in remorse, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (SL 143B), Bk. 33, par. 23, line 49.) whether for one’s sins, or for the lack of heaven. And furthermore, the very elevation of the mind is an affliction to the flesh, as was said above; and affliction of the flesh overflows into the mind, since they are united, and also into the proud spirit, whose wound prayer heals; and on that account, humble prayer cannot be without penalty.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting for the act of one virtue to be commanded by a virtue that is divided against it, just as sometimes fortitude commands an act of temperance. And so penance can also command an act of worship, and so it will be satisfactory; just as sacrifices were also done for sins under the old law, and are done now.
Reply Obj. 3: By the fact that someone humbly asks forgiveness from a man, he appeases the soul of the offended man, and much more of the merciful God.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the character of merit in all our acts is from charity; and therefore, since it happens sometimes that prayer is done out of charity, it is clear that it can be a meritorious act by the same reason that other works done out of charity are meritorious.
Reply Obj. 1: To have one’s eye on something other than God as principal end removes the character of merit; but not if it regards something like a way to reach God sooner; and in this way prayer has to do with revealing one’s own needs.
Reply Obj. 2: Merit in the acts of the other virtues is from the power of charity. And since charity has for its object what others have for their end, this is why merit in acts of the other virtues is not only the object of those acts, but the end sought by the one who prays. However, what is asked for in prayer is not the end sought by the one praying, but the object of the act; and so it is not necessary that merit be present by reason of that.
Reply Obj. 3: Our works are not sufficient of themselves for obtaining all that we need; and so it is necessary that what is lacking to us be supplied by divine mercy; and this is what prayer knocks at. And so the merit of prayer is required for supplying the lack of all our other merits. And so Gregory says in his Moralia: these things are much fitted to each person by God as most highly necessary to them, so that both operation is supported by prayer, and prayer by operation. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 5, line 16.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that prayer is ordered to two things, namely, to the proper object and to the end. And according to this it has two efficacies: namely, the efficacy of meriting by reason of the end, which is eternal life, to which all merits are ordered; and the efficacy of obtaining what is asked, which is the object of the prayer. And between these two things, there is this difference: that merit conveys an order to justice for a reward, which pertains to the justice of the one rendering so that he will render a reward to the one meriting. But obtaining conveys an order to the mercy or generosity on the part of the one giving. Consequently, merit attains the reward by what it has in itself, but prayer to obtain something by someone who wants it does not obtain it by what it has in itself, but by the plan or the generosity of the giver. Therefore, it is clear that prayer always has efficacy for meriting from charity, but it does not always have efficacy in obtaining: for there are some things that are incompatible with obtaining the providence of God, to whom we pray.
And to remove these impediments, the four conditions above are listed, by which prayer always has efficacy of obtaining. Therefore, there can be an impediment to prayer on the part of the one praying. If it is uttered inordinately, and to prevent this it says, piously, which conveys the manner or worship, which is called piety by another name, and which should give prayer a due measure. Or from what is asked, for sometimes it is not beneficial to the one praying, and so it says, for salvation. Or on the part of the one for whom it is asked, and this impediment either is at the time that the prayer is made, which cannot be when prayer is made by someone for himself, if he asks piously, but when it is made for another; and so another condition is added, that it be made for oneself. Or it can be after a delay between the prayer and the attainment of what is asked, and this is excluded by saying, perseveringly.
Reply Obj. 1: These conditions are not required for efficacy of obtaining as though nothing could be obtained without them (for sometimes someone is also heard when he prays for another); but because when these things are included prayer always has efficacy for obtaining, since the power of obtaining is more from the plan of the one who is prayed to than from the merit of the one praying. And so, too, sometimes sinners are heard, when their prayer agrees with the divine plan. Nevertheless, it should be known that sometimes someone prays piously who does not have the virtue of piety; just as someone sometimes does just things who does not have the habit of justice; and so also sinners can sometimes pray piously.
Reply Obj. 2: The will is more about the end than about what is asked for the sake of the end. And thus when God sees that what is asked does not agree with the end for which someone piously prays, he hears his desire more by not doing what he is asked than if he had done it. And so with respect to the end is how one should take what he says: whatever you wish for, ask, etc. But the end of our asking is our salvation, and the glory of God. However, it would be against the glory of God if he saved unrepentant sinners; and it would be against our salvation if something contrary to one’s salvation were given to one. And so the desire is heard but what is asked for is still not obtained, when someone asks without perseverance, or for another, or for things contrary to salvation.
Reply Obj. 3: Prayer that is made out of charity for another always has the effect of meriting for the one who prays; but now we are speaking about efficacy in obtaining.
Reply Obj. 4: Obtaining means the attainment of what is asked for; but merit does not mean attaining something, but the order of justice toward attainment. And so an impediment that arises from instability takes away the character of obtaining, for it takes away attainment. But it does not take away the order to attainment, and so it does not destroy merit. And therefore someone who does not persevere does merit, but he does not obtain unless he perseveres.
Reply Obj. 5: All men have beatitude as the end of their desires, which they desire the most. And so he hears more those to whom he does not give what they ask, if giving it to them would hinder them from beatitude. Hence the kind of answering prayers that stems from God’s anger is not called obtainment, properly speaking.
Reply Obj. 7: All those conditions that are required on the part of the one praying are included in the word piously, which includes all the circumstances of virtue, by which the acts are ordered on the part of the one doing them.
Exposition of the Text
There shall not arise a double tribulation. (Sententiae IV, 15.1 (79). 2 citing Nahum 1, 9, according to Septuagint and Vulgate.) To the contrary, Jeremiah 17:18: destroy them with double destruction. And it should be said that tribulation, if it is taken as commensurate with sin, does not arise double, for God does not punish beyond what is deserved. But if it is taken for punishment in an absolute sense, then a double punishment is due, either according to the two parts of the sinner, punishment of soul and of body, or according to the two things that exist in sin, namely, turning away from God and turning to something else, it could be punishment of the senses and punishment of loss; or according to the two roots of sin, which are love and anger, it could be fire and ice. Or according to the two states, present punishment and future punishment.
Either one falls short of what is befitting, and particularly if they are taken separately. Nevertheless, present and future punishment constitute one punishment in someone who is not corrected; which is why Gregory says in his Moralia: here their smiting was begun, there it is completed, so that there is one scourge for the unreformed which begins here in time, but it is consummated in eternal suffering. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 22, line 43.)
For scourges befall in five ways. (Sent. IV, 15.2 (80). 1 citing Pseudo-Bede, In Matthaeum 9,4.) But to the contrary, Jerome says, whatever we suffer, our sins have earned it. (This is not found in the works of Jerome.) Therefore, all are for our punishment. Furthermore, Augustine says, whatever God permits us to suffer, know it to be a scourge of correction. (Cf. Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 7, par. 7: “quod te permiserit pati, flagellum corrigentis est, non poena damnantis.”) Therefore, all other ways are superfluous. Furthermore, it seems to be a wicked thing to harm another, so that someone would have glory from ceasing to do harm, and the same for works of the demons, as is clear from the life of Blessed Bartholomew. (See Jacobus de Voragine, The Golden Legend, ch. 123: “Batholomew the apostle went to India, which is at the end of the earth, entered a temple where there was an idol named Astaroth, and began to stay there like a pilgrim. In this idol there dwelt a demon who said that he cured the sick, though he did not really cure them but merely stopped hurting them” (Ryan ed., 2:110).) Furthermore, for many other things, scourges are read to be commanded in scripture as a test, or an example of God’s just judgment, and other things like that.
And it should be said that those five ways are distinguished according to the goods that result from punishments inflicted by God, which goods are intended by God. Now this good is either in another person, and then it is the fourth way; or it is in the one who is punished, and then it is the order of justice, which is always connected with a divine scourge, for all his punishment is just. And in the fifth way we have this with the removal of the other things: either it is beneficial for this scourge to occur, either in the withdrawal from evil, and then it is the third way; or in order to preserve the good, and then it is the second way; or else to build up, and that is the first way.
Therefore, to the first objection it should be said that punishment always precedes sin in nature, but not always in the person being punished. To the second, it should be said that a scourge in itself is always corrective; but by the failings of the recipient sometimes it does not accomplish this effect. To the third it should be said that it would be a wicked thing if punishment were not just. Still, God does not wish his glory to be revealed for his benefit, but for ours. To the fourth it should be said that all the rest can be reduced to these: for testing is for an increased merit, and the example of God’s just judgment is for the glory of God, and so on with the others.
And that the judge’s sentence is not prevented: (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 3 citing Jerome, In Nahum 1, 9.) for even if the preceding sentences of men do not agree with God’s sentence, God’s sentence still remains. But if it does agree, then it is God’s sentence.
For a light fault is compensated for by a light pain. (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 3.) For the suffering of present death is said to be light in comparison with future suffering: and the faults mentioned are called light in comparison with greater faults, which sometimes are punished by lesser temporal sufferings.
From the font of God’s grace it is instilled in the heart either that he come gradually to penance in this way, or that he be punished by God less. (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 7.) He is not speaking here of sanctifying grace; for this is not given before perfect penance; but of gratuitous goods, like unformed faith, and servile fear, and things like that.
For if because of the mercilessness by which one has no mercy on one’s neighbor, even the sins that had been remitted return in punishment, much more are those which are not yet remitted shown to be reserved for punishment because of hatred for one’s brother. (Sent. IV, 15.3 (81). 7.) This he says according to a certain opinion, which is discussed later in Distinction 21, Question 1, Article 3, Subquestion 1.
He who loves iniquity hates his own soul, (Sent. IV, 15.5 (83). 1.) not affectively, but effectively.
To the unclean nothing is clean: (Sent. IV, 15.5 (83). 2.) for they do not receive the cleanness of those things, like sacraments, that are clean in themselves.
“It does a man no good to fast and pray, and to do other good works, unless he recalls his mind from iniquity;” (Sent. IV, 15.6 (84). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, dist. 14 c3 n2.) namely, to obtaining eternal life.
“The Lord never healed anyone, whom he did not free entirely.” (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 4 citing Augustine, Sermo 393.) To the contrary, the Gloss on John 9:7 says: it is asked how Christ sometimes illuminated someone without faith. Therefore, that man did not have faith, and so he was not entirely cured. And it should be said that anyone Christ cured, he cured completely, both in mind and body as to all his physical infirmities; and that person received faith first, but indistinctly. However, the Gloss resolves it differently, that, namely, this is to be understood about those who incur an ailment because of sin.
For it is an impiety of faithlessness to hope for half a forgiveness from him who is just and justice itself. (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 4 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, cc. 9–10.) For it would follow that either God did not know all sins, or he did not abhor all sins, or that he could not forgive all sins.
For true penance strives to lead to the purity of baptism: (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 4 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, cc. 9–10.) as to the removal of all fault.
The truly penitent must at least wash away with the tears of his mind, (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 4 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, cc. 9–10.) that is, inner sorrow, which outward tears signify, and this is a metaphor.
Let him know himself to be culpably hard, (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 4 citing Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, cc. 9–10.) if namely the lack of outward tears happens from a lack of sorrow, so that a man grieves less for sin than for temporal losses. But sometimes the abundance of sorrow dries up one’s tears because of the heat unleashed; still other times a man contains himself so that he might grieve only before God; sometimes it is due to a hard disposition that a man cannot weep physically for his sins, even if he weeps for the death of a friend, because that sorrow is more sensible, and so closer to the body’s release in tears.
He was unable to correct his wickedness, (Sent. IV, 15.7 (85). 8 citing Jerome, In Matthaeum 27, 5.) namely, while he remained in that state; otherwise it would not be imputed to him.
Chapter 151 of 186