D. 20 - Temporal aspects of penance

After the Master has examined penance and the power of the ministers to whom the administration of this sacrament belongs, here he examines certain things that come along with penance. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the time for penance; in the second, he determines certain things that belong to the effect of penance, at: and since it was asserted above with many authorities, that sins are remitted in true contrition of heart . . . it is asked, etc. (Sententiae IV, 22.1 (125). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first part, he shows that the time for penance lasts until the end of life; in the second, he raises certain questions that have arisen from what has been said, at: it is also usual to ask, etc. (Sent. IV, 21.1 (116). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first he shows that the time for penance lasts until the end of life; in the second he shows how it should be handled with those who repent at the end, at: it is also usual to ask whether the obligation of satisfaction is to be imposed on the dying. (Sent. IV, 20.4 (112). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first, he shows that those who repent at the end of their lives obtain the remission of sins, although they still must pay the temporal penalty which they will undergo in Purgatory. In the second, he shows that the same punishment is due to those who do not in some way fulfill adequate satisfaction in this life, etc. at: but if it is asked whether those who do not complete their penance in this life, etc. (Sent. IV, 20.2 (110). 1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows that there remains room for penance until the end of life; second, he objects to the contrary, at: and yet Augustine writes as follows concerning those who delay penance; (Sent. IV, 20.1 (109). 2.) third, he resolves it, at: but why did Augustine say this? (Sent. IV, 20.1 (109). 3.) There he shows from the words of Augustine why penance should not be delayed until the end of life, because of two things: first, because of the difficulty in repenting; second, because of the punishment of purgatory that remains, at: but if even one who is converted in this way shall live and not die, we do not promise that he will avoid every punishment. (Sent. IV, 20.1 (109). 5.)

But if it is asked whether those who do not complete their penance in this life . . . we say that the same is to be supposed concerning these as of those who repent at the end. (Sent. IV, 20.2 (110). 1.) Here he shows that the punishment of purgatory remains after this life for those who did not make sufficient satisfaction here; and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows this about those who do not fulfill the penance enjoined; second, he shows the same thing about those on whom an adequate satisfaction was not enjoined, at: but if it is asked concerning him who fulfilled the enjoined satisfaction, which was not sufficiently adequate to the sin because of the ignorance or negligence of the priest, whether in leaving this life he is free of all punishment, I answer the same. (Sent. IV, 20.3 (111). 1.)

It is also usual to ask whether the obligation of satisfaction is to be imposed on the dying. (Sent. IV, 20.4 (112). 1.) Here he shows how those who repent at the end should be handled, and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows this as to the imposition of satisfaction; second, as to reconciliation: it must also be known that in time of necessity, penance or reconciliation is not to be denied to penitents. (Sent. IV, 20.5 (113). 1.)

There he does two things: first, he shows that at the moment of final need reconciliation must not be refused to a penitent; second, he shows that at another time a simple priest cannot reconcile a penitent without consulting his bishop, at: and yet the priest ought not to reconcile the penitent without consulting the bishop, unless the final necessity compels. (Sent. IV, 20.6 (114). 1.)

Question 1

Repentance and punishment

Here five questions arise:

first, whether by repentance someone can obtain the forgiveness of sins at the end of life;

• second, concerning the punishment that the priest imposes as satisfaction;
• third, concerning the reduction of this punishment through indulgences;
• fourth, who can give indulgences;
• fifth, whom they benefit.
• Article 1

Repentance at the end of life

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that someone cannot repent at the end of his life. For in 2 Maccabees 9:13, it is said of Antiochus, then the abominable fellow prayed to the Lord, from whom he would not obtain mercy. But this was the end of his life. Therefore, it seems that those repenting at the end do not obtain forgiveness.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everyone who truly repents leaves sin. But the person who repents at the end of his life does not leave his sin, but is left by his sins; for he wants to do penance when he can no longer sin, as it says in the text. Therefore, it seems that he does not obtain forgiveness at that time.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, contrition, which is a part of penance, comes with the intention of confessing and doing satisfaction. But someone who repents at the end cannot have this intention, for no one intends what he knows is impossible for him. Therefore, he cannot have contrition, and so he does not obtain forgiveness.

On the contrary (1), the repentant thief found mercy at the end of his life when he heard, today you will be with me in Paradise (Luke 23:43).

Furthermore (2), God’s wisdom and mercy conquers human wickedness. But a man can sin until the last moments of his life. Therefore, he can obtain forgiveness for his sins through divine mercy until then.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a penitent at the end of his life cannot be absolved by just any priest whatsoever. (Parallels: above, d. 18, q. 2, a. 5, qa. 1; d. 19, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1.) For a certain jurisdiction is required for absolution, as has been said. (In the preceding distinction, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3.) But the priest does not acquire jurisdiction over someone who repents at the end. Therefore, he cannot absolve him at the end.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that person who receives the sacrament of baptism at the moment of death from someone other than his own priest does not have to be baptized again by his own priest. Therefore, if any priest could absolve anyone from sin at the moment of death, the penitent, if he survived, would not have to return to his own priest, which is false; for otherwise the priest would not have knowledge of the face of his flock.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as it is permitted for a different priest to baptize at the moment of death, so also a non-priest may. But a non-priest can never absolve someone in the penitential forum. Therefore, neither can a priest absolve someone who is not under him in the moment of death.

On the contrary (1), spiritual need is greater than physical. But someone in his final need can use the belongings of others, even against the owners’ wills, to supply his physical need. Therefore, also at the moment of death he can be absolved by a priest who is not his own to supply his spiritual need.

Furthermore (2), the authorities cited in the text say the same.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there is no punishment after death reserved for those who repent at the end. For God, who is consummately merciful, does not demand from man more than he can do. But anyone who repented at the end of his life would have time for nothing more than to have contrition and confess, which he has also done. Therefore, it seems that after this life nothing is required of him for the sins he has repented.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the punishment of purgatory surpasses all punishment in this world, as it says in the text. But the punishment that a penitent is obliged to after confession and absolution is not as great as the many just punishments of the other life. Therefore, it would be unjust to the penitent if after absolution he were punished in purgatory after this life.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is no sin so great that it cannot be completely expiated by punishments inflicted in this life, as long as someone endures them patiently. For tribulation causes purification, as is clear from Romans 5:4. But death is the greatest of punishments. Therefore, if a person patiently endures death out of contrition, no punishment remains to him after this life.

On the contrary (1), divine justice requires that sin be punished either by man or by God. But the sin that is repented in the end is punished neither by man nor by God in this life. Therefore, it must be punished after this life.

Furthermore (2), negligence should not work to anyone’s advantage. But the one who delayed repentance until the end out of negligence, if he had repented immediately after his sin, would have suffered punishment. Therefore, much more is he liable to punishment when he has delayed repentance until the end of life.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that God, who gives abundantly to all, refuses grace to no one who does what is in him to prepare himself for grace. But, as it says above in Distinction 17, Question 1, Article 3, Subquestions 1, 2, 3, and 4, this preparation is done by the movement of the free will, and so as long as the use of the free will remains to a man in this life, when he cannot yet be confirmed in evil, he can prepare himself for grace by his sorrow for sins, and he obtains the grace of the remission of sins.

Reply Obj. 1: He would have obtained forgiveness if he had truly repented. But he did not have true repentance, for he was not sorry for his sins out of love of justice, but out of fear of the punishment that he expected or sorrow for the punishment that he was suffering. And this also happens to many people who repent at the end, for it is not easy to suddenly reverse affections that have inclined toward something for a man’s entire life. Nor, however, is it impossible, for free will is not compelled by acquired habit, nor can a limit be set to God’s providence, by which the movement of true repentance is sometimes inspired at the very end of life.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine shows in these words that the penance that someone does at the end of his life is not a certain sign of salvation, and not that it cannot be efficacious for salvation even at that moment. For when someone repents sin that he can no longer commit, it is unknown whether he has lost the will for sinning, because it is clearer in the case of someone who still has the ability to sin, if he repents, that he has changed his will. Nevertheless, even when someone can no longer sin, he can change his will so that he does not want to do what he previously did want to do, even if he could.

Reply Obj. 3: In contrition, the conditional intention of satisfaction and confession is enough, so that namely, he would do it if he could. And such an intention can also exist about the impossible.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that any priest, as someone with the power of the keys, has that power indifferently for all people and with regard to all sins. But the fact that he cannot absolve all people from all sins is because by the order of the Church he has limited jurisdiction, or none at all. But because necessity knows no law, in an emergency he is not prevented by the order of the Church from giving absolution by the fact that he also holds the keys sacramentally; and a person obtains as much from another’s absolution as if he were absolved by his own priest. Nor at that moment can he be absolved only from sin by any priest, but also from the excommunication imposed by anyone. For this absolution also pertains to jurisdiction, which is restricted by law by order of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1: Anyone can use the jurisdiction of another by that person’s will, for those things that belong to jurisdiction can be delegated. Therefore, since the Church accepts that any priest can give absolution at the moment of death, this very fact gives a person the use of jurisdiction when he lacks it.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that a person return to his own priest to be absolved again from the sins that were absolved when he was on the brink of death, but that he let his priest know that he was absolved. Likewise, neither is it necessary that someone released from excommunication go to the judge who would have otherwise released him in order to seek absolution, but rather to offer satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 3: Baptism has efficacy from the sanctification of the matter, and therefore a person receives the sacrament no matter who confers it. But the sacramental power of penance consists in the sanctification of the minister; and therefore although someone who confesses to a lay person has fulfilled his part of sacramental confession, nevertheless he does not obtain sacramental absolution. And therefore any reduction of the punishment that he receives happens by the merit and pain of his confession, but he does not receive the reduction of the punishment that comes from the power of the keys; and therefore it is necessary that he confess to a priest again. And someone who dies after making a confession like this is punished more after this life than if he had confessed to a priest.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that punishment is required after the remission of guilt so that the inequality of injustice committed may be brought back to equality. Now equality is consequent on quantity. And therefore as the ordering of guilt requires that punishment be imposed for guilt, so it is required that there be as much punishment as guilt. And therefore since sin cannot remain unordered, although the liability to punishment is diminished by contrition and confession and absolution, anyone who, repenting at the end, does not complete any satisfaction in this life, must be punished after this life, unless his contrition was so great that it completely purified him of punishment, which sometimes does happen, as was said above in Distinction 17, Article 5, Subquestion 2.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone who repents at the end of his life is not punished after this life because he did not make satisfaction when he could not, but because he sinned and neglected to make satisfaction when he could. Therefore, it does not follow that God requires more from a man than he can do.

Reply Obj. 2: Justice is likened to a measure, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129a34.) and so just as there are different measures in different lands for venial things, so also different punishments are imposed for the same sins according to justice. And similarly for the same fault someone is punished more severely in purgatory than in this life, because it is a different court. Nevertheless, that severity corresponds proportionally to the punishment that the man was liable to in this life, and a man should impute this to himself, because he reserved to himself the punishment to be received for his fault to that point.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural death is a punishment resulting from original sin, so that now it has in a sense been turned into nature, like original sin. And therefore no one is purified of actual sin by natural death, but he could be purified by an inflicted death. Therefore, if someone patiently bears a death inflicted on him, even if it is inflicted for his other crimes, it would work to the reduction of his punishment and his freeing from all punishment, according to the amount of his guilt and patience and contrition.

Article 2

The penalty imposed as satisfaction

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 105, a. 2, ad 9; Quodl. I, q. 9, a. 2.) It seems that the temporal punishment whose obligation remains after penance is not reckoned according to one’s guilt. For it is reckoned according to the quantity of pleasure that was taken in sin, as is clear from Revelation 18:7: as she glorified herself and lived in pleasures, so give her a like measure of torment and grief. But sometimes where there is more pleasure, there is less guilt: for according to Gregory, carnal sins, which contain more pleasure than spiritual ones, have less guilt. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143B), Bk. 33, par. 12.) Therefore, the punishment is not reckoned according to the amount of guilt.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a person is obliged to the moral precepts in the same way in the new law as in the old. But in the old law the penance due for sins was seven days, so that, namely, they were unclean for seven days. Therefore, since a seven-year punishment is imposed in the New Testament for one mortal sin, it seems that the amount of punishment does not have to do with the amount of guilt.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sin of murder is greater in a layman than the sin of fornication in a priest, for the circumstance that is taken from the sin’s species makes it more serious than the circumstance taken from the condition of the person. But a seven-year penance is imposed on a lay person for murder, while ten years is imposed on a priest for fornication, according to the canons. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 50, ch. 41 (PL 187:277); d. 82, ch. 5 (PL 187:398).) Therefore, punishment is not reckoned according to the amount of guilt.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the greatest sin is one committed against the body of Christ itself, for the greater the person who is sinned against, the more gravely someone sins. But for spilling the blood of Christ contained in the sacrament of the altar a penance of forty days is imposed, or even less; while for simple fornication a punishment of seven years is imposed, according to the canons. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 27 (PL 187:1732); and pt. 1, d. 82, ch. 5 (PL 187:398).) Therefore, the amount of punishment does not correspond to the amount of guilt.

On the contrary (1), in measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, I will judge it (Isa 27:8). Therefore, the amount of punishment adjudicated for a sin is according to the amount of guilt.

Furthermore (2), a man is brought back to the equality of justice by punishment inflicted. But this would not be the case if the amount of guilt and punishment did not correspond to each other. Therefore, one corresponds to the other.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the penitent does not have to pay a greater debt of punishment than what the priest has imposed on him. For the sacrament always accomplishes its own effect, unless there is a defect on the part of the one receiving or conferring it. But sometimes less penance is imposed than is befitting. And this is not a defect on the part of the recipient, for he was prepared to do any penance imposed on him; nor is it a defect on the part of the one conferring the sacrament, for he assigned the penance according to his conscience and discretion. Therefore, since the sacrament of penance is ordered toward the total destruction of sin, both as to fault and as to punishment, it seems that there is no punishment left to pay once the penance enjoined has been performed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is more likely to forgive punishment than to demand it. But if some priest had imposed a greater punishment in satisfaction, the penitent would be obliged to do it. Therefore, it seems that if he imposes insufficient punishment, nothing more will be demanded from the penitent.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in purgatory a person is punished more severely than in this life. Therefore, if after having performed the penance imposed by the priest, the punishment of purgatory still remains, it seems that the priest harms the penitent greatly by imposing a light penance. And so it seems that it is extremely dangerous to hear confessions, since the amount of punishment due to a sin cannot easily be known. Or rather, it is impossible, for a priest can know neither the amount of contrition nor the amount of affection that a sinner had in sinning.

On the contrary (1), the measure of blows should be according to the quantity of the offense, by the precept of the law (Deut 25:2). Therefore, if less is imposed, the remaining will be demanded from someone in purgatory.

Furthermore (2), the error of the priest cannot benefit the penitent. But it would benefit him, if he were not bound to more than was imposed on him by error. Therefore, it seems that he would still have more punishment to pay.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one person cannot fulfill the punishment satisfying for another. (Parallels: ST III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1; SCG III, ch. 158; SCG IV, ch. 55, n. 20; de Veritate, q. 29, a. 7.) For merit is required for satisfaction. But one person cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written: you will render to each according to his works (Ps 62:12). Therefore, one person cannot make satisfaction for another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, satisfaction is divided against contrition and confession. But one person cannot have contrition or make a confession for another. Therefore, neither can he make satisfaction.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one person praying for another also merits for himself. Therefore, if someone can do satisfaction for another, he does satisfaction for himself by doing satisfaction for another; and anyone who does satisfaction for another is not required to do any other satisfaction for his own sins.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if one person can make satisfaction for another, then as soon as one person takes on the debt of punishment, the other is immediately freed from this debt. Therefore, if he dies after the whole punishment due to him has been taken by another, he will go right to heaven; or if he is still punished, two punishments will be rendered for the same sin, namely, that of the person who began to make satisfaction, and that of the one who is punished in purgatory.

On the contrary (1), it is said, bear one another’s burdens (Gal 6:2). Therefore, it seems that one person can take on the burden of penance imposed on another.

Furthermore (2), charity is able to do more with God than among men. But among men, one man can pay the debt of another out of love. Therefore, much more can this happen in divine judgment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that punishment is required after faults are forgiven for two reasons, namely, to resolve a debt and to offer a remedy. Therefore, the reckoning of punishment is considered as to two things. First, as to the debt; and then the amount of the punishment fundamentally corresponds to the amount of guilt before any of it is forgiven. But nevertheless, what is forgiven by the first of those things that are apt to forgive punishment is more remitted according to this, that less remains to be remitted or to be loosed; for however much more of the penalty has been forgiven by contrition, that much less remains to be forgiven by confession. Second, as to the remedy either of the person who sinned or others; and this is how sometimes a greater penalty is imposed for a lesser sin, either because it can be more difficult to resist one person’s sin than another’s, as a greater penance is imposed on a young person for fornication than on an old person, although he may sin less; or because in one person, like a priest, a sin is more dangerous than in another. Or because the multitude tends more to that sin, and so by the punishment of one person, the others may be frightened away from it. Therefore, in the penitential forum punishment must be reckoned for both reasons. And so a greater penance is not always imposed for a greater sin. But the punishment of purgatory is only for paying the debt, for at that point there is no further room for sinning. And so that punishment is allotted only according to the quantity of sin, considering as well the quantity of contrition, and confession, and absolution. For by all these things some of the punishment is remitted. Therefore, these things must also be considered by a priest when imposing satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 1: In those words two things are touched upon on the side of guilt, namely, glorification and delight. The first of these pertains to the sinner’s hubris, by which he resists God; the second, to the pleasure he takes in sin. Now although sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, nevertheless there is always a greater hubris in it; and so the argument does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 2: That penalty of seven days was not expiative of the punishment due to sin; therefore, even if he died after those days, he would be punished in purgatory; but it was expiated of irregularity, from which all the sacrifices of the law expiated. Nevertheless, all other things being equal, man still sins more under the new law than in the old, because of the fuller sanctification by which he is sanctified in baptism, and because of the more powerful benefits God has shown to the human race. And this is clear from the fact that it says, how much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by those who spurn the Son of God and profaned the blood of the covenant in which they were sanctified? (Heb 10:29). Nor, however, is it universally true that seven years’ penance is required for any mortal sin; but this is like a certain general rule, as it applies in many cases, which nevertheless may be dismissed when the different circumstances of sins are considered.

Reply Obj. 3: When a bishop or priest sins there is more danger to himself and others, and therefore the canons are more concerned to withdraw him from sin than others, by imposing a greater penalty on him as a remedy, although sometimes he might not owe so much from his debt, which is why the whole of it is also not demanded of him in purgatory.

Reply Obj. 4: That punishment is to be understood when this happens against a priest’s will; but if he spilled it willingly, it would be deserving of a much greater punishment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, It should be said that the good or bad action of a minister makes no difference to the efficacy of the sacraments. Therefore, either a priest carries himself discerningly in the imposition of penance, or not; it makes no difference to the efficacy of the absolution and confession and contrition. And therefore whether he imposes a penance discerningly or not, the guilt always remains of the same amount for punishment. And therefore if the penitent does not fulfill this, it will be required of him in purgatory.

Reply Obj. 1: Whenever a smaller penance is imposed than is appropriate, it is a defect on the part of the one imposing it, or on the part of the recipient. But sometimes it can be without the fault of either one, as when the one imposing it applies due diligence, and the one receiving it is ready to fulfill it; and because of this it is not unfitting if is not completely freed from liability to punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: When a greater penance is enjoined than is appropriate, the penitent is bound to fulfill it by the injunction of the priest, who not only considers the debt of punishment but applies the remedy for sin. And therefore after this life the whole punishment will not be required, but only as much as suffices to pay the debt.

Reply Obj. 3: The priest imposing a less-fitting penance does not always sin, both because he cannot know determinately the amount of punishment owing, although he could determine something properly by considering the rules laid down by the fathers; or because sometimes also because, imposing a lesser penalty out of diligance, he benefits the penitent more than he hurts him, because perhaps he could be impeded from performing the penance by its quantity, because of the weakness of virtue still recovering in him. And so he disregards in a small loss so as to avoid a greater one. And again the divine love strengthened gradually in him will incite him to complete more works of penance of his own will than the priest could have imposed on him according to the quantity of his sins.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that satisfactory punishment is for two things; namely, the resolution of a debt, and a medicine for avoiding sin. To the extent, therefore, that it is a remedy for subsequent sin, the satisfaction of one person cannot benefit another; for one person’s fasting does not tame another’s flesh, nor from the acts of one person does another grow accustomed to acting well, except accidentally, to the extent that someone can, by his own good works, merit for another an increase of grace, which is the most efficacious remedy for avoiding sin. But this is more by the mode of merit than by the mode of satisfaction.

But as to the resolution of the debt, one person can make satisfaction for another, as long as it is in charity, so that his works may be satisfactory ones. Nor is it necessary that a greater punishment be imposed on someone who makes satisfaction for another than would be imposed on the main person, as some say, moved by the fact that one’s own punishment makes satisfaction more than someone else’s. But this is nothing, for punishment has the power of making satisfaction mostly by reason of the charity with which a man endures it. And since greater charity appears in someone’s making satisfaction for another than if he himself made satisfaction, therefore less punishment is required in the one who makes satisfaction for another than would be required in the main person. Therefore it is said in the Lives of the Fathers (Vitae Patrum, bk. 5, libell. 5, n. 27 (PL 73:880).) that because of the charity of one man, who out of charity for a brother did penance for a sin that he had not committed, the other was forgiven the sin that he had committed.

Nor is it required for the resolution of the debt that the person for whom one does satisfaction be powerless to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were capable, when another person satisfies for him he would be cleansed from his debt. But that a person undertake it himself is required for a satisfactory penalty as a remedy. This is why it should not be permitted that anyone do penance for another, unless some defect should appear in the penitent, whether physical, by which he is incapable of enduring it, or spiritual, by which he is not ready to bear the penalty.

Reply Obj. 1: The essential reward is granted according to a person’s disposition, for the fullness of divine vision will be according to the capacity of the ones seeing it. And therefore just as one person is not disposed by the act of another, so one does not merit for another the essential reward, unless his merit should have infinite efficacy, as Christ’s did, by whose merit alone baptized children attain eternal life. But temporal punishment for sin to be paid after the remission of guilt is not reckoned according to the disposition of the one to whom it is due, for sometimes someone who is better is liable to more punishment, and therefore as to the remission of punishment one person can merit for another, and the act of one person is done for another by means of charity, through which we are all one in Christ (Gal 3:28).

Reply Obj. 2: Contrition is directed against guilt, which pertains to a man’s disposition of goodness or wickedness. And so by one person’s contrition another is not freed from guilt. Likewise, by confession a man subjects himself to the Church’s sacraments. However, one person cannot receive a sacrament for another; for in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to anyone else. And therefore there is not the same understanding of satisfaction, contrition, and confession.

Reply Obj. 3: The amount of punishment is what matters for the resolution of the debt; but the root of charity is what matters in merit. And so someone who merits out of charity for another, at least by merit of congruity, also merits more for himself. But someone who makes satisfaction for another does not make satisfaction for himself, for that amount of punishment does not suffice for both sins. Nevertheless, he merits for himself something greater than the remission of punishment, namely, eternal life.

Reply Obj. 4: If he himself had obliged himself to a certain penance, he would not be cleansed from the debt until he had paid it. And so the one person will suffer punishment until the other person has made satisfaction for him; if he does not do so, then both will have to pay the debt of that punishment, one for what he committed, the other what he omitted. And so it does not follow that one sin would be punished twice.

Article 3

Indulgences

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: Orat. Dom. 6; Quodl. II, q. 8, a. 2.) It seems that none of the satisfactory punishment could be forgiven by an indulgence. For commenting on 2 Timothy 2:13: he cannot deny himself, the interlinear Gloss says, which he would do, if he did not fulfill his own words. But he himself said, the number of lashes shall be proportionate to the offense (Deut 25:2). Therefore, none of the punishment assigned as satisfaction according to the amount of guilt can be forgiven.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone of lower rank cannot release someone from what his superior obliged. But when God absolves a man from guilt, he binds him to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor says. (Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sentententiae, tract. 6, ch. 11 (PL 176:148).) Therefore, no man can absolve from that punishment by dismissing some of it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it belongs to the power of excellence to grant the effect of the sacraments without the sacraments. But no one has the power of excellence in the sacraments except Christ. Therefore, since satisfaction is a part of the sacrament working toward the remission of due punishment, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, power was granted to the Church’s ministers not for destruction, but for building up. But this pertains to destruction, if satisfaction is taken away, which was introduced for our benefit to furnish a remedy. Therefore, the power of the Church’s ministers does not extend to this.

On the contrary (1), commenting on 2 Corinthians 2:10: for what I have forgiven, if I have forgiven anything, I have done for your sakes in the person of Christ, the Gloss says, that is, as if Christ had also given it. But Christ could suspend the penalty for sin without any satisfaction, as is seen in John 8:11, with the adulterous woman. Therefore, Paul also could do this; therefore, the pope can as well, who does not have less power than Paul did.

Furthermore (2), the general Church cannot err, for the one who was heard in everything because of his reverence (Heb 5:7) says to Peter, upon whose confession the Church was founded: I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail (Luke 22:32). But the general Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore, indulgences do accomplish something.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they are not worth as much as they are announced to be. (Parallel: Quodl. II, q. 8, a. 2.) For indulgences have no effect except by the power of the keys. But by the power of the keys, the person holding the keys can only remit a certain determinate amount of the punishment for sin, once he has considered the amount of the sin and the contrition of the penitent. Therefore, since indulgences are made at the will of the one establishing the indulgence, it seems that they are not worth as much as announced.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, by the debt of punishment a man is delayed from attaining glory, which he should desire above all else. But if indulgences were worth as much as they are announced to be, then by obtaining indulgences a person could quickly make himself free of all charge of temporal punishment. Therefore, it seems that a person would be obliged to devote himself to acquiring these, and abandon all his other works.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an indulgence is sometimes given because whoever gives help to any edifice to be built obtains the remission of a third of his sins. Therefore, if indulgences were worth as much as they were said to be, then anyone who gave one denarius, and a second, and later a third, would obtain full absolution from all punishment for sins, which seems absurd.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, sometimes an indulgence is given in such a way that whoever goes to a certain church obtains a remission of seven years. Therefore, if the indulgence were worth as much as it was said to be, someone who had his home next to this church, or the clerics of this church, who go there every day, would obtain as much as a person who came from distant places, which seems unjust. And again, as it seems, they would obtain several indulgences per day, if they went there several times.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems the same to remit someone’s punishment beyond the just reckoning as to remit it without reason, for what is excessive is not paid back. But someone who establishes an indulgence cannot forgive someone’s punishment in whole or in part without a reason, as if the pope said to someone: I forgive all the punishment you owe for sin. Therefore, it seems that neither could he forgive anything beyond the just reckoning. But indulgences are usually said to be beyond the just reckoning. Therefore, they are not worth as much as they are said to be.

On the contrary (1), has God ever needed your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for him? (Job 13:7). Therefore, in proclaiming indulgences, the Church does not lie; and so they are worth as much as they are said to be.

Furthermore (2), the Apostle says, if our proclamation is in vain, then our faith is also in vain (1 Cor 15:14). Therefore whoever says something false in preaching empties the faith of meaning, as far as in him lies, and so sins mortally. Therefore, if indulgences were not worth as much as they were proclaimed to be, all those proclaiming them would sin mortally, which is absurd.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that indulgences should not be done for temporal relief. For the remission of sins is something spiritual. But to give the spiritual in exchange for the temporal is simony. Therefore, it should not be done.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, spiritual help is more necessary than temporal help. But indulgences do not seem to be established for spiritual relief. Therefore, much less should they be done for temporal help.

On the contrary, is the common custom of the Church, which grants indulgences for making pilgrimages and giving alms.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that it is granted by everyone that indulgences are worth something, for it would be impious to say that the Church did something worthless.

But some people say that they do not avail to the forgiveness of the punishment that someone deserves in purgatory according to God’s judgment, but they do serve for the forgiveness from the obligation by which a priest obliges a penitent to some penalty, or that he is commanded to by the statutes of canon law. But this opinion does not seem true. First, because it is expressly against the privilege given to Peter that whatever he forgave on earth would be forgiven in heaven; and so the forgiveness that happens in the forum of the Church works also in the forum of God. And especially in establishing indulgences like this, the Church would harm more than help, for it would condemn someone to more serious penalties, namely, purgatory, by releasing him from the penances imposed.

And so it should be said instead that what works in the forum of the Church also serves in God’s judgment for the remission of the punishment remaining after contrition and absolution and confession, whether it is imposed or not. Now, the reason that they can work this way is the unity of the mystical body, in which many people have performed in works of penance above and beyond the measure of their own debts, and they have endured patiently many unjust tribulations, by which a multitude of punishments could have been expiated if they were owed. So great is the abundance of merits that they exceed every penalty owed now by the living, particularly because of the merit of Christ, which, even though it is also at work in the sacraments, nevertheless its efficacy is not exhausted by the sacraments but exceeds the efficacy of the sacraments by its own infinity.

Moreover, it was said above in Article 2, Subquestion 3, that one person can make satisfaction for another. Now, the saints, in whom this superabundance of satisfactory works is found, did not do works like this specifically for the person who needs forgiveness, otherwise he would have obtained forgiveness without any indulgence. But they did it for the Church as a whole, as the Apostle says he will fill up in his own body what is lacking from Christ’s Passion for the sake of the church (Col 1:24) to which he writes. And so the aforementioned merits are the common possession of the whole Church. Now, those things that are shared by any multitude are distributed to the multitude individually according to the decision of whoever is in charge of the multitude. Therefore, just as anyone may obtain forgiveness of punishment if another has made satisfaction for him, so also if the other person’s satisfaction were distributed to him by the one who had the power to do so.

Reply Obj. 1: The remission that happens through indulgences does not take away the amount of punishment for fault, since for the fault of one person another has willingly borne the penalty, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: Someone who receives indulgences is not absolved, simply speaking, from the debt of punishment; but he is given what will pay the debt.

Reply Obj. 3: The sacramental effect of absolution is the reduction of the sentence, and this effect is not brought about by indulgences. But someone giving indulgences for it pays the penalty that he owed from the shared goods of the Church, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: A greater remedy for avoiding sin is furnished by grace than by habituation to certain works. And since anyone who receives an indulgence conceives an affection for the cause that the indulgence is given for, he is disposed to grace by it. Therefore, by indulgences a remedy is also given for avoiding sin; and so granting indulgences does not work for destruction, unless they are given inordinately. Nevertheless, those who obtain indulgences should be counseled lest because of them they abstain from imposed works of penance, so that they may also obtain the remedy by these, even though they are free from the debt of punishment, and especially because sometimes they owe more than they realize.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that there are many opinions about this.

For some people say that indulgences like this are not worth as much as they are proclaimed to be, but for each person they are worth as much as his faith and devotion requires. But they say that the Church announces it to be for this so that it may lure men to do good by a certain pious deception, like a mother who promises an apple to her son to entice him to walk. But this seems extremely dangerous to say. For as Augustine says in Letter 8 to Jerome, if any falsity is detected in Sacred Scripture, the strength of Sacred Scripture’s authority perishes immediately. (Augustine, Letter 28, to Jerome, par. 3 (CSEL 34.1:107).) And likewise, if any falsity were detected in the Church’s pronouncements, the Church’s instruction would not have any authority for strengthening the faith.

And thus others said that they are worth as much as they were proclaimed to be according to a just estimate, but not of the person granting the indulgence, because perhaps he overestimates what he grants; nor according to the estimate of the one receiving it, who could underestimate what he is given; but according to the estimate that is just according to the judgment of goods, considering the person’s condition and the Church’s benefit and need. For at one time the Church needs more than at another. But this opinion also cannot stand, as it seems. First, because according to this indulgences would not work toward forgiveness, but rather for a certain commuting. And furthermore, the Church’s pronouncement would not be excused from lying, since sometimes an indulgence is preached far greater than a just estimation could require, all conditions considered; as when the pope grants that anyone who goes into a certain church should have seven years’ indulgence, which kind of indulgence was even established by blessed Gregory for the station churches of Rome.

And therefore others say that the amount of remission in indulgences is not measured according to the devotion of the one receiving, as the first opinion said, nor according to the amount of what is given, as the second one said, but according to the reason for which the indulgence is given, by which it is considered fitting that someone obtain such indulgence. And according as it approaches to that cause, it obtains the remission of indulgence, in whole or in part. But this again cannot save the Church’s custom, which sometimes gives a greater indulgence and sometimes a smaller one for the same reason, as, with everything else remaining equal, sometimes one year is given to those visiting a single church, sometimes forty days, depending on what the pope establishing the indulgence wanted to make the grace. And so the amount of remission is not measured by the reason that makes the indulgence fitting.

And so it should be said instead that the amount of the effect is consequent on the amount of its cause. Now, the cause of the remission of punishment in indulgences is nothing but the abundance of the Church’s merits, which is sufficient to expiating all punishment. However, the effective cause of remission is either the devotion or the labor or the gift of the one receiving the indulgence, or the reason for which the indulgence is made. This is why it is not necessary for any of these to be proportionate to the amount of remission, but to the merits of the Church, which are always superabundant. And therefore according as they are applied to anyone, he obtains forgiveness. Now, for them to be applied to someone, the authority to dispense a treasure like this is required; as well as the union of the person to whom they are dispensed with the one who did the meriting, which happens through charity; and the reason for this dispensing, which preserves the intention of those who did the meritorious works, for they did it for the honor of God and the benefit of the Church at large. And so any cause that tends to the benefit of the Church and the honor of God is a sufficient reason for establishing indulgences.

And therefore in accord with others it should be said that indulgences are simply worth the amount they are proclaimed to be, as long as there is authority on the part of the one giving them, charity on the part of the one receiving them, and piety on the part of the cause, which includes the honor of God and the benefit of neighbor. Nor in this is too great a forum given to God’s mercy, as some people say, nor is divine justice detracted from. For none of the punishment is dismissed, but the punishment of one person is counted for another.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said above, (In dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.) the power of the keys is two-fold: namely, of holy orders and of jurisdiction. The key of holy orders is a kind of sacramental. And since the effects of the sacraments are not determined by man but by God, in the forum of confession a priest cannot decide by the power of the keys how much of the due punishment he will dismiss, but only as much as God ordains is dismissed. But the key of jurisdiction is not anything sacramental, and its effect is subject to man’s discretion. And the effect of this key is the remission that comes through indulgences, since this remission does not pertain to the administration of the sacraments, but to the administration of the Church’s shared goods. And this is why even envoys who are not priests can establish indulgences. Therefore, it is in the discretion of the one giving the indulgence to fix how much of the penalty is remitted by the indulgence. However, if it is remitted inordinately, such that people are distracted from works of penance for nothing, then the person granting such indulgences sins; nevertheless, anyone obtains the full indulgence.

Reply Obj. 2: Although indulgences like this are worth a great deal toward the remission of punishment, nevertheless other works of satisfaction are more meritorious with respect to the essential reward, which is infinitely better than the dismissal of temporal punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: When an indulgence is indeterminately given, e.g., whoever gives help to the building of this church, such help is understood as is appropriate to the one who gives the help. And according to this one obtains more or less of the indulgence. And therefore also any poor person giving one coin obtains the whole indulgence, but not a rich man, whom it does not befit to give such a small amount to a work so pious and fruitful; just as a king would not be said to give aid to any man if he gave him a small coin.

Reply Obj. 4: Someone who lives close to the church and even priests and clerics obtain as much indulgence as those who come from a thousand miles away. For forgiveness is not proportionate to the work, as was said, but to the merits that are dispensed, as was said. But that person who worked more would acquire more merit. But this should be understood when the indulgence is given vaguely. For sometimes a distinction is made, as in the general absolutions when the pope gives five years to those who cross the sea; to others, who cross mountains, three years; to others, one year; nor would someone obtain an indulgence as many times as one went in the church during the time of the indulgence. Sometimes it is given for a determinate time; as when it is said, whoever goes to such-and-such a church until such-and-such a time, will have so much indulgence; and this is understood to be once only. But if there is a perennial indulgence in a certain church, as in St. Peter’s Basilica, of forty days, then as many times as someone goes, he receives the whole indulgence.

Reply Obj. 5: The cause is not required for the measure of the remission of punishment, but for the intention of those who merited to be communicated to the one it may come to. Now the good of one person is extended to another in two ways. One way is by charity; and thus even without indulgences someone is a partaker of all goods that occur, if he is in charity. In another way by the intention of the one doing it; and this is how, if there is a legitimate cause for the indulgence, then by it the intention of the one who worked for the benefit of the Church is extended to another.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that temporal things are ordered to spiritual things, because we should use temporal things for the sake of spiritual things. And thus simply speaking, indulgences cannot be established for temporal things, but for temporal things ordered to spiritual things, like the repression of the Church’s enemies who disturb the Church’s peace, the construction of churches and bridges, and the collection of other kinds of alms. And by this it is clear that no simony is taking place there, for a spiritual good is not being given for a temporal one, but for a spiritual one.

Therefore, the solution to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: Indulgences can be established for purely spiritual things as well, and sometimes this happens; as whoever prays for the king of France will have ten days’ indulgence from Pope Innocent IV. And likewise sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those preaching a crusade as to those undertaking one.

Article 4

Who can give indulgences

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. It seems that any parish priest may give an indulgence. For an indulgence has efficacy from the abundance of the Church’s merits. But there is no congregation in which there is not some abundance of merits. Therefore, any priest can establish indulgences, if he has people subject to him; and likewise any prelate priest.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, anyone with people under him bears the person of the whole multitude, as one man bears his own person. But anyone can share his own goods with another to make satisfaction for another. Therefore, anyone with people in his charge can share the goods of the multitude committed to him; and so it seems that he can establish indulgences.

On the contrary, it is a smaller thing to excommunicate than to establish indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do this. Therefore, neither can he do the latter.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that neither a deacon nor anyone else but a priest can establish indulgences. (Parallel: Quodl. II, q. 8, a. 2, ad 2.) For the remission of sins is an effect of the keys. But no one has the keys but a priest. Therefore, he is the only one who can establish indulgences.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is a greater remission of punishment in indulgences than in the penitential forum. But only a priest has power there. Therefore, also in the other.

On the contrary, the dispensation of the treasures of the Church is conferred on the same person to whom the management of the Church is committed. But sometimes this is committed to someone who is not a priest. Therefore, he can establish indulgences, which have efficacy from the dispensation of the Church’s treasures.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not even a bishop can establish an indulgence. (Parallel: Quodl. II, q. 8, a. 2.) For the Church’s treasury is shared by the whole Church. But what is common to the whole Church can only be dispensed by the one who is in charge of the whole Church. Therefore, only the pope can establish indulgences.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one can forgive the penalties determined by law unless he has the power of establishing law. But satisfactory penalties for sins are determined in the law. Therefore, to forgive penalties like this can only be done by the pope, who is the law-maker.

On the contrary, according to the Church’s custom, bishops give indulgences.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone who is in mortal sin cannot establish indulgences. For the stream that no spring flows into cannot flow onward. But the font of grace, namely, of the Holy Spirit, does not flow into a prelate who is stuck in mortal sin. Therefore, he cannot pour it forth into others by establishing indulgences.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But someone who is in mortal sin does not receive one, as will be said. Therefore, he cannot establish one either.

On the contrary, indulgences are established by the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. But mortal sin does not take away power, but rather goodness. Therefore, someone in mortal sin can establish indulgences.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that indulgences have their effect according as one person’s works of satisfaction are counted for another, not only by the force of charity, but by the intention of the one doing it directed in some way toward him.

But the one person’s intention can be directed to another in three ways: either specifically, or in general, or individually. Individually, as when someone satisfies determinately for someone else; and in this way anyone can share his works with another. But specifically, as when someone prays for his own community and household and benefactors, and also directs his works of satisfaction toward this; and in this way, the person in charge of the community can share those works with another by applying the intention of those people who are of his community to someone determinately. But in general, as when someone directs his works to the good of the Church in general; and then the one who has charge of the Church in general can share those works by applying his own intention to this person or that one. And since a person is part of a community, and a community is part of the Church, the intention of the good of the community and the good of the whole Church is included in the intention of his private good. And thus someone who has charge of the Church can share those things that belong to the community and to this particular man; and someone who has charge of a community can share what belongs to this person, but not vice versa.

But neither the first kind of sharing nor the second is called an indulgence, but only the third, for two reasons. First, because although a person is released from the debt of punishment before God by those shared goods, nevertheless he is not released from the debt of doing the satisfaction imposed on him, to which he is obligated by the precept of the Church. But by the third kind of sharing a person is also absolved from this debt. Second, because in one person or in one community there is not such a boundlessness of merits that it can apply to all others. And so a person is not absolved from due punishment entirely, unless as much was done specifically for him as was owed. But in the Church as a whole, there is a boundlessness of merits especially because of Christ’s merit; and so only someone who is set over the Church can bestow an indulgence.

But although the Church is the community of the faithful, nevertheless there are two kinds of communities of men, namely, economic, like those who belong to one family; and political, like those who belong to one people. The Church is like a political community, for the people itself is called the Church. But different convents or parishes in one diocese are likened to the community in different families or in different offices. And therefore only the bishop is properly called the prelate of the Church, and therefore he alone receives the Church’s ring like a bridegroom, and so he alone has the full power in administering the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the Church courts as a public person; while others have this according as it is committed to them by him. But priests who have been set over a people are not prelates simply speaking, but more like assistants. And this is why in the consecration of priests, the bishop says: the more fragile we are, the more we need these helps. And this is also why they do not administer all the sacraments. Therefore, parish priests, or abbots, or other prelates like them cannot establish indulgences.

And by this the answers to the objections are clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as was said above. And since deacons and other non-priests can have jurisdiction either committed to them, like envoys, or ordinarily, like bishops-elect, therefore they are able to make indulgences even though they are not priests; although they cannot absolve in the penitential forum, which belongs to holy orders.

And by this the solution to the objections is clear. For making indulgences pertains to the key of jurisdiction, not to the key of holy orders.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the pope has the fullness of pontifical power, like a king in his kingdom, but bishops are taken up into part of this concern, like judges set over individual cities. This is also why he calls them alone brothers in his letters, but he calls all those remaining sons. And therefore the power of establishing indulgences resides fully in the pope, for he can do as he wishes, with a legitimate reason arising, of course. But among the bishops it is fixed according to the pope’s direction; and therefore they can establish them to the extent that it is allotted to them, and not more.

And by this the answers to the objections are clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that to establish indulgences pertains to jurisdiction. But by sin a man does not lose jurisdiction; and so the indulgences are equally valid if they are established by someone who is in mortal sin as if they were established by the holiest person, since he does not remit punishment by the force of his own merits, but by the force of the merits locked in the treasury of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1: The prelate who establishes indulgences while in mortal sin does not pour out anything from himself; and therefore it is not required that he receive an influx from the font for his indulgences to be valid.

Reply Obj. 2: It is a greater thing to establish indulgences than to receive them, as concerns power; but it is a lesser thing as concerns one’s own benefit.

Article 5

Who can benefit from indulgences

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. (Parallel: Quodl. II, q. 8, a. 2.) It seems that an indulgence would work for those abiding in mortal sin. For anyone can merit grace for another, even someone abiding in mortal sin, as well as many other goods. But indulgences have efficacy from the merits of the saints being applied to someone. Therefore, they have their effect among those who are in mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, where there is greater need, there is greater room for mercy. But someone who is in mortal sin needs it the most. Therefore, the greatest mercy should be shown to him by indulgences.

On the contrary, dead members do not receive an influx from the other, living, members. But someone who is in mortal sin is like a dead member. Therefore, he does not receive any influx from the merits of the living members by indulgences.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seeems that indulgences are not valid for those in religious life. For it is not fitting to supply those from whose superabundance others are supplied. But from the superabundance of works of satisfaction that are among religious, indulgences are supplied to others. Therefore, it is not appropriate for religious to be supplied by indulgences.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Church nothing should be done that would lead to the dissolution of religious life. But if indulgences could benefit religious, it would be an occasion for the dissolution of the discipline of the rule, for religious would spend all their time on indulgences like this and would neglect the penances imposed in their chapter. Therefore, they do not benefit religious.

On the contrary, no one suffers a loss from something good. But religious life is something good. Therefore, religious should not suffer this loss, that indulgences not work for them.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a person who does not do what the indulgence is given for could sometimes be given an indulgence. For when someone cannot do a deed, the will to do it is counted in its place. But sometimes indulgences are granted to those who give a certain amount in alms, which some poor man cannot do, and yet he would gladly do it. Therefore, the indulgence is valid for him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one person can make satisfaction for another. But an indulgence works toward the remission of punishment, just as satisfaction does. Therefore, one person can receive an indulgence for another, and so the one obtains the indulgence who did not do what the indulgence is given for.

On the contrary, when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. Therefore, if someone does not do what the indulgence is given for, which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not obtain the indulgence.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an indulgence is not valid for the one who establishes it. For to establish indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But no one can exercise over himself those things that belong to jurisdiction, as, for example, no one can excommunicate himself. Therefore, no one can be a partaker of an indulgence established by himself.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to this, the one who establishes an indulgence could remit the punishment for all his own sins by some little tiny deed, and thus he could sin with impunity; which seems absurd.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power for establishing indulgences is the same as the power to excommunicate. But someone cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore, neither can he be a partaker of the indulgence that he grants.

On the contrary, he would be in a worse condition than others if he could not enjoy the treasury of the Church, which he dispenses to others.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that some people say that indulgences are also valid for those abiding in mortal sin, not, of course, for the remission of their punishment, for no one can have his punishment forgiven unless his fault is already forgiven, for whoever has not obtained the forgiveness of sin by God’s working cannot obtain the remission of punishment by the ministry of the Church, whether in indulgences or in the penitential forum; yet it it is valid for them for acquiring grace. But this does not seem to be true. For although those merits that are shared through indulgences could work toward meriting grace, nevertheless they are not administered for this reason, but specifically for the remission of punishment. And therefore they are not valid for those still in mortal sin; and therefore in every indulgence mention is made of those who are truly contrite and have confessed. If, however, the sharing happened by this mode: I become a partaker of the merits of the whole Church or of one community or of one specific person, then it could be valid for meriting something for someone who is in mortal sin, as the previous opinion says.

And by this the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: Although someone in mortal sin needs it more, nevertheless he is less able to receive it.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that indulgences work just as well for religious as for those in the world, as long as they are in charity and carry out those things that are appointed for the indulgence. For religious are not less able to be helped by the merits of others than those in the world.

Reply Obj. 1: Although someone in religious life is in a state of perfection, nevertheless he cannot live without sinning. And therefore if sometimes because of some sin committed he were liable to a certain punishment, he can be expiated from this by an indulgence. Nor is it unfitting, if a person who has a superabundance simply speaking should be needful at a certain time and in a certain respect. And so he needs the reinforcements by which he is supported, as it says in Galatians 6:2, bear one another’s burdens.

Reply Obj. 2: Observance of the rule should not be slackened because of indulgences, for religious merit more toward the reward of eternal life by keeping their religious life than by seeking out indulgences; although they merit less toward the remission of punishment, which is a lesser good. Nor again are the penances imposed by the chapter dismissed by indulgences, for in the chapter it is treated almost like a judiciary forum rather than a penitential one. And so even non-priests hold the chapter. But one is absolved from imposed penance or the penance due for sin in the penitential forum.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that one does not obtain what is given under a condition without fulfilling the condition. This is why, since an indulgence is given under the condition that someone do or give something, if he does not accomplish that, he does not obtain the indulgence.

Reply Obj. 1: This is understood as to the essential reward, but not as to accidental rewards, like the remission of punishment or things like that.

Reply Obj. 2: Someone can apply his own work by his intention to anyone he wishes. And therefore he can make satisfaction for anyone he wants. But an indulgence cannot be applied to anyone except by the intention of the one who gives the indulgence. And therefore since he applies it to anyone who does or gives this or that, the one who does this cannot transfer this intention to another. Nevertheless, if an indulgence were established this way: the one who does this, or on whose behalf he does it, has this great an indulgence—then it be valid for the one on whose behalf it is done. But then the one who does the work would not give the indulgence to another, but the one who establishes the form of the indulgence.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that an indulgence should be given for some cause so that a person may be provoked to a certain act by the indulgence, which would be directed to the Church’s benefit and the honor of God. Now a prelate, to whom the task of extending the Church’s benefit and increasing the divine honor has been committed, has no reason to provoke himself to this. And so he cannot establish an indulgence for himself alone, but he can make use of an indulgence that he has established for others, since his reason for establishing it is founded in others.

Reply Obj. 1: A person cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction over himself, but a prelate can also make use of those things that are given by the authority of jurisdiction to others both in temporal matters and in spiritual ones; as a priest also takes for himself the Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop can also receive the intercessions of the Church that he dispenses to others, whose immediate effect is the remission of punishment by indulgences and not of jurisdiction.

Reply Obj. 2: The answer to the second objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Excommunication is uttered in the manner of a sentence, which no one can impose upon himself, because in a court case, the same person cannot be judge and accused. But an indulgence is not given in the manner of a sentence, but in the manner of dispensing something, which a man can do for himself.

Exposition of the Text

Hold on to what is certain. (Sententiae IV, 20.1 (109). 2.) He speaks about the certainty of a guess, not the certainty of knowledge; for no one knows whether he is deserving of hate or love (Eccl. 9:1).

Blotting out what one has committed requires freedom of will, (Sent. IV, 20.1 (109). 4.) that is, free choice, so that, namely, a man does not abandon sin because he can no longer sin, but because he does not want to offend God, even if he were able. And this also happens sometimes among those who repent late in life, as was said.

It is an awful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. (Sent. IV, 20.2 (110). 1.) This is true as to the state of future life, where justice will chiefly take place; for in this life, where there is space for mercy, what is said in 2 Sam 24:14 is true: it seems better to me to fall into the hands of God . . . than into the hands of man.

For if he were to live forever, he would sin forever, (Sent. IV, 20.2 (110). 3.) that is, he would remain in sin forever, for he could not be freed from sin by himself, since there is the spirit going but not returning (Ps 78:39); not that he would always be committing an act of sin.

Who merited to enter paradise as soon as he was converted. (Sent. IV, 20.3 (111). 1.) This is not to be understood about the earthly paradise, as some people say, for Christ’s Passion does not lead to that paradise, but to the heavenly one; which paradise, indeed, can be taken in two ways, namely, according to the glory of enjoyment, and in this way when he died he was in paradise immediately; or as to the appropriate place of glory, and in this way no one entered before the Ascension.

The amount of penance is not to be imposed on them, but it is to be made known to them. (Sent. IV, 20.4 (112). 1.) It is not to be imposed for this reason, that when a certain penance is imposed on someone, he is obliged to do it. But no one should be obliged to anything that he cannot do. But it is made known to a person, so that he might manage to be expiated through friends and almsgiving, and so that he might have the intention of completing it, if he survives. Nevertheless, he must be strengthened by divine mercy, lest he fall into despair.

And yet the priest ought not to reconcile the penitent without consulting the bishop. (Sent. IV, 20.6 (114). 1.) This is to be understood about a bond from the bishop by excommunication, or about someone doing a solemn penance.

But the consecration of girls may be done by a priest if the bishop has been consulted. (Sent. IV, 20.6 (114). 3.) This is not from common law, for it belongs only to bishops, who bear the place of the Bridegroom, to espouse, and that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ as one husband (cf. 2 Cor 11:2). Therefore, this does not take place now but was from a certain dispensation made in a certain place. Or it speaks about the blessing of widows, which can be done by priests.