D. 25 - Conferral of holy orders

After the Master has considered the sacrament of holy orders, here he examines those conferring and receiving this sacrament. And it is divided into two parts; in the first, he considers those who confer it; in the second, those who receive it, at: the sacred canons have set forth that a subdeacon is not to be ordained before his fourteenth year, etc. (Sententiae IV, 25.7 (156). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first, he inquires about heretics, whether they can ordain; second, particularly about simoniacs, at: as to simoniacs, it is not to be doubted that they are heretics. (Sent. IV, 25.2 (151). 1.)

The first is in three parts; in the first, he gives the authoritative text for showing that heretics cannot confer this sacrament; in the second, he includes the authoritative texts to the contrary, at: but others, on the contrary, seem to feel that sacred orders; (Sent. IV, 25.1 (150). 7.) in the third, he resolves it, at: but some determine these words in this way. (Sent. IV, 25.1 (150). 13.) And he gives four resolutions of the differences, as is seen in the text.

As to simoniacs, it is not to be doubted that they are heretics. Here he inquires about simoniacs; and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows what simoniacs are; second, whether they can ordain, at: and yet there is a difference between those who are ordained by simoniacs knowingly, and those who do it in ignorance. (Sent. IV, 25.3 (152). 1.)

Here there are three questions. First, concerning those who ordain. Second, the ordained. Third, simoniacs.

Question 1

Those who ordain

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether only the bishop can confer the sacrament of holy orders;

• second, whether heretics or anyone cut off from the Church can.
• Article 1

Whether only the bishop can confer the sacrament of holy orders

Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2; In IV Sent. d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 3; d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 2.) It seems that not only a bishop confers the sacrament of holy orders. For the imposition of hands causes something at the consecration. But not only the bishop imposes his hands on the priests who are ordained, but also the other priests attending. Therefore, not only the bishop confers the sacrament of holy orders.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the power of holy orders is given to each one at the moment that he is presented with whatever pertains to his order’s act. But the cruet is given to the subdeacon with water, manili, and napkin by the archdeacon; the candelabra is similarly given to the acolyte with a candle and an empty cruet. Therefore, the bishop is not the only one who confers the sacrament of holy orders.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, those things that belong to holy orders cannot be committed to someone who does not have holy orders. But the conferral of minor orders is committed to those who are not bishops, like cardinal presbyters. Therefore, to confer holy orders does not belong to the episcopal order.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if what is principal is committed to someone, its accessories are as well. But the sacrament of holy orders is directed to the Eucharist as an accessory to what is principal. Therefore, since the priest consecrates the Eucharist, he could also confer holy orders.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, there is more difference between a priest and a deacon than between one bishop and another. But a bishop can consecrate a bishop. Therefore, a priest can also promote a deacon.

On the contrary (1), those in holy orders are employed in a nobler way for divine worship than sacred vessels. But the consecration of vessels pertains to a bishop alone. Therefore, much more does the consecration of ministers.

Furthermore (2), the sacrament of holy orders is more excellent than confirmation. But only the bishop confirms. Therefore, much more does he alone confer the sacrament of holy orders.

Furthermore (3), by their blessing, virgins are not established in any degree of spiritual power, as the ordained are established. But it belongs to bishops alone to consecrate virgins. Therefore, much more can he alone ordain others.

I answer that, episcopal power is related to the power of the lower orders as political power, which aims at the common good, is to lower arts and powers, which aim at some particular good, as is clear from what has been said. (In the last distinction, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 3.) Now politics, as it says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 1094a28.) establishes the law for lower arts, namely, what someone should practice, and how much, and how. And thus it pertains to the bishop to manage matters in all divine ministries. This is why he alone confirms, because those confirmed are established in a certain office of confessing the faith; therefore also he alone consecrates virgins, who bear the figure of Christ’s bride, the Church, whose care is principally committed to him. He also consecrates an order in ministers by ordaining, and he determines by their own consecration the vessels they must use, just as secular offices in states are also distributed by someone who has the most excellent power, like the king.

Reply Obj. 1: In the imposition of hands no character of priestly ordination is given, as is clear from what has been said, (In the last distinction, q. 2, a. 3.) but grace is given, according to which they are made fit for exercising holy orders. And since they need the most ample grace, therefore priests impose hands on those who are being ordained priests along with the bishop; but the bishop alone does this for deacons.

Reply Obj. 2: An archdeacon is like a chief minister; therefore all the things that pertain to ministry, he bestows, like the candle by which the acolyte serves the deacon by carrying it before the Gospel, and the cruet with which the subdeacon serves. And likewise he gives the subdeacon those things with which he serves the higher orders. And yet the act of the subdeacon does not consist principally in those things, but in what he does with the matter of the sacrament. And therefore he receives his character in being given the chalice by the bishop. But the acolyte receives a character from the words of the bishop when he receives the things mentioned from the archdeacon, and more in receiving the cruet than the candelabra. Therefore, it does not follow that the archdeacon confers his orders.

Reply Obj. 3: The pope, who has the fullness of pontifical power, can commit to a non-bishop things that pertain to episcopal dignity, as long as they do not have an immediate relation to the true body of Christ. And therefore by his commission some priest can simply confer minor orders and confirm, as was said above in Distinction 7, Question 1, Question 3, but he can not commission a non-priest. Nor again can a priest confer major orders, which have an immediate relation to the body of Christ, over whose consecration the pope does not have more power than a simple priest.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the sacrament of the Eucharist is the greatest sacrament in itself, nevertheless it does not manage any other office, like the sacrament of holy orders; and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 5: To share with someone what one has, not only proximity is required, but completeness of power. But because a priest does not have complete power in the hierarchical offices, as a bishop does, this is why it does not follow that he can create deacons, although that order is closer to him.

Article 2

Whether anyone cut off from the Church can confer holy orders

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 64, a. 9.) It seems that heretics and those cut off from the Church cannot confer holy orders. For it is a greater thing to promote someone to holy orders than to bind or loose. But heretics cannot bind and loose. Therefore, nor can they confer holy orders.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a priest separated from the Church can consecrate the Eucharist, because the character, by which he is able to do this, remains indelibly in him. But the bishop does not receive any character in his consecration as a bishop. Therefore, it is not necessary that episcopal power remain in him after his separation from the Church.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in no community can a person who is expelled from the community dispose of community offices. But holy orders are a certain office of the Church. Therefore, someone who is placed outside the Church cannot confer holy orders.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, sacraments have efficacy from Christ’s Passion. But a heretic is not connected with Christ’s Passion, whether by his own faith, since he is an unbeliever, nor by the faith of the Church, since he is separated from the Church. Therefore, he cannot confer the sacrament of holy orders.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a blessing is required in the conferral of holy orders. But a heretic cannot give a blessing; in fact, his blessing will turn into a curse, as is seen by the authorities cited in the text. Therefore, he cannot confer holy orders.

On the contrary (1), a bishop who has fallen into heresy is not re-consecrated when he is reconciled to the Church. Therefore, he has not lost any power that he had for conferring holy orders.

Furthermore (2), the power of conferring holy orders is greater than the power of holy orders. But the power of holy orders is not lost through heresy or anything like it. Therefore, neither is the power of conferring holy orders.

Furthermore (3), just as a person who baptizes presents only the outer ministry, so does the person who confers holy orders, while God works inwardly. But by no account would someone cut off from the Church lose the power of baptizing. Therefore, neither would he lose the power of conferring holy orders.

I answer that, concerning this four opinions are listed in the text.

For some people say that as long as heretics are tolerated by the Church, they have the power of conferring holy orders, but not after they have been cut off from the Church; and likewise, not those demoted or anyone like that; and this is the first opinion. But it cannot stand: for no power that is given with a certain consecration can be taken away by any contingent circumstance, just as neither can that consecration be annulled, for also once an altar or chrism has been consecrated, they remain perpetually consecrated. Therefore, since episcopal power is given with a certain consecration, it must remain perpetually, no matter how much a person sins or is cut off from the Church.

And therefore others have said that those cut off from the Church who had episcopal power in the Church retain the power to ordain and promote others, but those promoted by them do not have this; and this is the fourth opinion. But this also cannot be the case: for if those who were promoted within the Church retain the power that they received, it is clear that when they exercise their own power they do valid consecrations. And therefore they truly bestow all power that is given in consecration; and so those ordained or promoted by them have the same power that they themselves do.

And so others have said that even those cut off from the Church can confer holy orders and other sacraments as long as they preserve the due form and intention, both as to the first effect, which is the conferral of the sacrament, and as to the last, which is the conferral of grace; and this is the second opinion. But this also cannot stand: for by the fact that someone shares in sacraments with a heretic cut off from the Church, he sins; and so he receives the sacrament disingenuously, and cannot receive grace, except perhaps in an emergency baptism.

And therefore others say that they confer valid sacraments, but they do not give grace with them, not because of inefficacy in the sacraments, but because of the sin of those receiving the sacraments from them against the prohibition of the Church; and this is the third opinion, which is the true one.

Reply Obj. 1: The effect of absolution is nothing other than the remission of sins, which happens by grace. And therefore a heretic cannot absolve, as neither can he confer grace in the sacraments. And again, because jurisdiction is required for absolution, which someone cut off from the Church does not have.

Reply Obj. 2: In the promotion of a bishop, power is given to him that remains perpetually in him; although it cannot be called a character, for by it a man is not directly ordered to God, but to the mystical body of Christ. And nevertheless it remains indelibly like a character, for it is given through a consecration.

Reply Obj. 3: Although those who are promoted by heretics do receive holy orders, nevertheless they do not receive their exercise so that they can licitly minister in their degree of orders, for the reason that the objection refers to.

Reply Obj. 4: They are connected with the Passion of Christ through the Church’s faith, for although they are not in the Church themselves, they still are in it as to the form of the Church, which they observe.

Reply Obj. 5: This is to be referred to the last effect of the sacraments, as the third opinion says.

Question 2

Impediments to holy orders

Next, those ordained are considered; and concerning this, two questions arise:

first, whether anyone is impeded because of a defect of nature;

• second, whether anyone is impeded because of a condition of external fortune.
• Article 1

Whether anyone is impeded by a defect of nature

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallel: below, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 4.) It seems that the feminine sex does not impede the reception of holy orders. For the office of prophecy is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet is an intermediary between God and a priest, just as a priest is between God and the people. But the office of prophecy was sometimes granted to women, as is clear from 2 Kings 22:14. Therefore, the office of priest can also apply to them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as holy orders pertains to a certain perfection, so does the office of governance, and martyrdom, and religious life. But governance is committed to women in the New Testament, as is seen in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as is seen in Deborah who judged Israel, Judges 4:4; and martyrdom and religious life also apply to them. Therefore, so do the orders of the Church.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power of holy orders is based in the soul. But gender is not in the soul. Therefore, difference in gender does not cause a distinction in the reception of holy orders.

On the contrary (1), it is said in 1 Timothy 2:12: I do not permit a woman to teach in the Church, nor to rule over men.

Furthermore (2), the crown-shaped tonsure is required in those to be ordained, even though it is not necessary to the sacrament. But the crown and the tonsure do not befit women, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 11:6. Therefore, neither does the reception of holy orders.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that children and those who lack the use of reason cannot receive holy orders. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 7, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 2.) For as it says in the text, (Lombard, Chapter 7 of this distinction.) the sacred canons have determined a certain age for receiving holy orders. But this would not be the case if children could receive the sacrament of holy orders. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sacrament of holy orders is nobler than marriage. But children and others lacking the use of reason cannot contract marriage. Therefore, neither can they receive holy orders.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the one who has the power also has the act, according to the Philosopher in his book On Sleep and Wakefulness. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Wakefulness, ch. 1, 454a8.) But the act of holy orders requires the use of reason. Therefore, so does the power of holy orders.

On the contrary (1), it is sometimes granted to a person who is promoted to holy orders before the years of discretion to minister without his ordination being repeated, as is clear from the canons on clerics ordained by a leap. (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 5, tit. 29, ch. 1, ‘Tuae litterae’ (RF 2:833).) But this would not be the case if he had not received holy orders. Therefore, a child can receive holy orders.

Furthermore (2), children can receive other sacraments in which a character is imprinted, like baptism and confirmation. Therefore, by the same argument, holy orders.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that certain things are required in someone who receives a sacrament as necessary to the sacrament, and if they are missing, the person cannot receive the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. But some things are required not as necessary to the sacrament, but by the necessity of a precept for the fittingness of the sacrament; and without these things someone receives the sacrament but not the reality of the sacrament. Therefore it should be said that the male sex is required for receiving holy orders, not only in the second way, but also in the first. And so even if all the things were presented to a woman that are done in holy orders, she would not receive holy orders, for since the sacrament is a sign, in those things that are done in the sacrament there is required not only the reality but also the signification of the reality; as it was said that in extreme unction it is required that someone be sick, so that a person needing healing might be signified. (See d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1.) Therefore, since in the feminine sex no eminence of degree can be signified, for a woman, by the very fact that she is a woman, has a state of subjection, this is why she cannot receive the sacrament of holy orders. Now some have said that the male sex is necessary by precept, but not necessary to the sacrament, for also in the decrees a deaconess and a ‘presbytera’ are mentioned. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 27, q. 1, can. 23, ‘Diaconissam’; pt. 1, d. 32, can. 19, ‘Mulieres.’) But a woman who partakes in some act of a deacon, like reading a homily in the Church, is called a deaconess; (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 27, q. 1, can. 23, ‘Diaconissam.’) while a ‘presbytera’ means a widow, for a presbyter is the same thing as ‘elder’.

Reply Obj. 1: Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God; and so no signification is required, but only the reality. And since according to the reality, in those things that belong to the soul, a woman is no different from a man, since sometimes a woman is found to be better than many men with respect to her soul, this is why she can receive the gift of prophecy and others like it, but not the sacrament of holy orders.

And by this the answer is clear to the second and third objections. But concerning abbesses, it is said that they do not have ordinary governance, but governance as by commission because of the danger of cohabitation of men and women. But Deborah had governance in temporal matters, not priestly ones, just as now women can have temporal positions of rule.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that youth and other defects that take away the use of reason present impediments to acting, and so all the sacraments that require an act of the one receiving them, like penance, marriage, and the like, do not apply to such people. But infused powers come before acts, as is the case with natural powers, even though aquired powers are come after acts, Now, if what comes after is removed, what comes before is not taken away. Consequently, children and others who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which no act is required of the recipient as necessary to the sacrament, but a spiritual power is divinely given. This distinction being granted, however, the age of discretion is required in minor orders out of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not out of the necessity of a precept, nor as necessary to the sacrament.

Therefore some people, if there is a need and hope of their advancement, can be promoted to minor orders before the years of discretion without sin, and they do receive holy orders; for although they are not fit at that time for the offices that are committed to them, nevertheless they will be rendered fit by experience. But for major orders the use of reason is required, both out of respect and out of the necessity of a precept because of the vow of continence that is attached; and also because handling the sacraments is committed to them. But for the episcopate, where power is received over the mystical body, the act of the one receiving pastoral responsibility is required. And so it is also necessary to episcopal consecration that one have the use of reason. Now some people say that the use of reason is required for all orders as necessary to the sacrament; but their claim is not confirmed by reason or authoritative text.

Reply Obj. 1: Not all that comes from the necessity of a precept is necessary to the sacrament, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: Consent, which cannot exist without the use of reason, causes marriage. But in the reception of holy orders no act is required on the part of the recipient, which is clear from the fact that no act on their part is expressed in their consecration; and thus it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 3: Act and power belong to the same thing; but nevertheless sometimes power precedes, as free will precedes its use; and this is how it is in this case.

Article 2

Whether anyone is impeded because of a condition of external fortune

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that slavery does not impede anyone from receiving holy orders. For physical subjection is not opposed to spiritual eminence. But in a slave there is physical subjection. Therefore, it does not prevent one from receiving spiritual eminence, which is given in holy orders.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an occasion of humility should not prevent the reception of any sacrament. But this is what slavery is, which is why the Apostle counseled that if someone was able, he should make use of his slavery (1 Cor 7:21). Therefore, it should not prevent one’s promotion to holy orders.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to be sold into slavery than for a slave to be ordained a cleric. But a cleric may licitly be sold into slavery, for the bishop of Nola, namely, blessed Paulinus, sold himself into slavery, as we read in the Dialogues. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 260), Bk. 3, ch. 1.) Therefore, much more can a slave be ordained a cleric.

On the contrary (4), it seems that it would impede what is necessary to the sacrament. For a woman cannot receive this sacrament by reason of her subjection. But there is more subjection in a slave, for a woman is not given to a man as his slave, which is why she was not taken from his feet. Therefore, neither does a slave receive this sacrament.

Furthermore (5), by the fact that someone receives holy orders, he is bound to minister in his level of orders. But no one can minister to a physical master and in a spiritual ministry at the same time. Therefore, it seems that he cannot receive holy orders, because his master should suffer no loss of property.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a person should not be forbidden from sacred orders because of homicide. For our orders took their beginning from the offices of the Levites, as was said in the previous distinction. But the Levites consecrated their hands in shedding their brothers’ blood, as is seen in Exodus 32:26. Therefore, in the New Testament none should be prohibited from the reception of holy orders because of bloodshed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one should be impeded from this sacrament because of an act of virtue. But sometimes blood is shed by justice, like by a judge, and the person holding this office would sin if it were not shed. Therefore, he is not impeded because of this from the reception of the sacrament.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there should be no penalty unless there is fault. But sometimes someone commits homicide without fault, as by self-defense, or even by accident. Therefore, it should incur no penalty of irregularity.

On the contrary, are the many statutes of the canons, (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 50, can. 4, ‘Miror’; Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 5, tit. 12, ch. 8, ‘Continebatur.’) and the Church’s custom.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that those born illegitimately should not be impeded from the reception of holy orders. For a son should not bear the iniquity of his father. But he would bear it, if he were impeded from receiving holy orders for this. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone is more impeded because of his own defect than because of another’s. But a person is not always impeded from receiving holy orders because of his own fornication. Therefore, neither because of the fornication of his father.

On the contrary, it is said in Deuteronomy 23:2: a bastard, that is, one born of a harlot, shall not enter the church of God until the tenth generation. Therefore, much less should they be promoted to holy orders.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no one should be impeded because of a defect in his members. For affliction should not be added to affliction. Therefore, one should not be deprived of a degree of holy orders because of a penalty for bodily defect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, soundness of discretion is required more for an act of holy orders than soundness of body. But some can be ordained before years of discretion. Therefore also with a defect of body.

On the contrary, such people were prohibited from ministry by the old law. Therefore, much more should they be prohibited under the new law.

(Bigamy will be discussed in the treatise on marriage in Distinction 27.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that in receiving holy orders a man is dedicated to divine offices. And since no one can give another what is not his, this is why a slave, who does not have power over himself, cannot be promoted to holy orders; however, if he is promoted, he does receive holy orders, for freedom is not necessary to the sacrament, although it is of the necessity of precept, (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 54, can. 1, ‘Nullus episcoporum’; Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 17, ch. 1, ‘Ut filii’; tit. 18, ch. 5, ‘Consuluit’.) since it does not impede the power but only the act. And the argument is similar for all who are obliged to others, like those imprisoned for debts (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 19, ch. 1, ‘Magnus episcopus.’) and people like that.

Reply Obj. 1: In the reception of spiritual power there is a certain obligation also to things done physically; and so it is impeded by physical subjection.

Reply Obj. 2: From many other things that do not present an impediment to the exercise of holy orders, a person can take the occasion for humility. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: Blessed Paulinus did this act by the Spirit of God out of an abundance of charity, which the result of the matter proves, for by his slavery many of his flock were freed from slavery. And so no consequence should be drawn from it: for where the Lord’s Spirit is, there is freedom (2 Cor 3:17).

Reply Obj. 4: Sacramental signs represent by a natural resemblance. But a woman has subjection by nature, while a slave does not; and so it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 5: If he is ordained with his master’s knowledge and not objecting, he becomes free by this very fact. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 54, can. 20, ‘Si servus.’) But if the master does not know, then the bishop and the one who presented him are bound to the master for twice the price of the slave, if they knew he was a slave. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 54, can. 9, ‘Ex antiquis.’) Otherwise if a slave has a little money, he should buy his own freedom; (Ibid.) or else he should be returned to the service of his master, despite the fact that he cannot exercise his own orders.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that all orders are referred to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of peace worked for us by Christ’s blood poured out. And since homicide is most contrary to peace, and those who commit homicide are more like Christ’s killers than Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of that sacrament should be conformed, this is why it is commanded that no killer be promoted to holy orders by the necessity of a precept, although it is not necessary to the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: The old law imposed a penalty of blood, but the new law does not; and the ministers of the old law are not the same as those of the new law, which is an easy yoke and a light burden (Matt 11:30).

Reply Obj. 2: Irregularity is not incurred because of sin alone, but principally because of the unsuitability of a person to administer the sacrament of the Eucharist. And so a judge, and all who partake with him in a trial of blood, are irregular, (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, c. 50, can. 8, ‘Si quid viduam’; see Glossa ordin. in Decretum, at this place (1:226b).) because the shedding of blood does not befit ministers of the sacrament mentioned.

Reply Obj. 3: No one does anything but what has its cause in the willing of a man; and therefore that person who unknowingly kills a man by accidental homicide is not called a man-slayer, nor does he incur irregularity: unless he were paying attention to some illicit thing, or unless he had neglected due diligence, (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 5, tit. 12, ch. 7, ‘Presbyterum.’) for then it becomes voluntary in a certain way. Nor is it because he is without fault, because irregularity is also incurred without fault. And this is why even a person who, defending himself in a some situation, does not sin by committing homicide, nevertheless is irregular. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 50, can. 6, ‘De his clericis.’)

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that those ordained are constituted in a certain dignity above others, and so a certain prominence is required in them out of a kind of respect, not as necessary to the sacrament, but of the necessity of a precept: namely, that they be of good reputation, endowed with good morals, not publicly doing penance. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 55, can. 1, ‘Priscis’; can. 3, ‘Poenitentes.’) And since the prominence of a man is darkened by a sinful origin, this is why those born from an illegitimate bed are excluded from receiving holy orders, (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 17, ch. 1, ‘Ut filii’; tit. 18, ch. 5, ‘Consuluit.’) unless they are granted a dispensation; and the more base their origin, the more difficult the dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1: Irregularity is not a penalty due for wickedness, and thus it is clear that those born illegitimately do not carry the iniquity of their fathers by the fact that they are irregular.

Reply Obj. 2: Those things that are committed by an act can be abolished by penance and a contrary act, but not those things that are from nature; and therefore a vicious act and a vicious origin are not the same.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that, as is clear from what has been said, someone becomes unsuitable for the reception of holy orders either because of an impediment to the act or because of an impediment to the person’s prominence. And therefore those suffering a defect in their members are impeded from the reception of holy orders, if there were such a defect that it left a noticeable mark by which the prominence of the person would be obscured, like having one’s nose cut off, or if it could endanger the exercise of holy orders; otherwise, they would not be impeded. But this integrity is required from the necessity of precept, (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 36, can. 1, ‘Illiteratos.’) not as necessary to the sacrament.

And by this the answer to the objections is clear.

Question 3

On simony

Next simony is considered; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, what it is;

• second, in whom it happens;
• third, how it happens.
• Article 1

What simony is

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 100, a. 2; Quodl. V, q. 11, a. 3; Quodl. VIII, q. 6, a. 1.) It seems that the definition given for simony is inadequate, namely: simony is the determined will to buy or sell any spiritual thing or anything connected with a spiritual thing. For by simony a person is made irregular. But no one becomes irregular for his willing alone. Therefore simony does not consist in willing alone.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, only those sins are committed with determination that are committed with the clarity of malice. But simony is not always committed out of the clarity of malice, but sometimes from infirmity or ignorance. Therefore, in its definition, determined should not be included.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all sin consists chiefly in choice. But the will does not choose impossible things, as it says in the Ethics 3, Chapter 4 or 5. (In Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 3, Aristotle lays out how deliberation only extends to things within our power, and then argues that choice, following upon deliberation, is no different (1112b24–1113a14). Ch. 5 is also pertinent.) Since buying spiritual things is impossible, for the gift of God is not possessed by money, as it says in Acts 8:20, therefore in the definition of the sin of simony, the will to buy something spiritual should not be included. (Indeed, as the next objection recalls, “simony” is named after the sorcerer Simon who appears in this chapter of the Acts of the Apostles and who attempts to buy the Holy Spirit from Peter and John.)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, simony is named from Simon Magus. But he did not will to sell spiritual things, but to buy them. Therefore, selling should not be included in the definition of simony.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, we should use temporal things for the sake of spiritual things. Therefore, if simony consists in buying things attached to spiritual things, every buying or selling will be simony, which is false.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that simony is a heresy. For in his register of letters, Gregory says: let none of the faithful be unaware that to buy and sell an altar, tithes, and the Holy Spirit, is the simoniac heresy. (This is rather from Pope Gregory VII. See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 1, q. 1, ch. 3, ‘Presbyter’ (PL 187:480).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no sin is more serious than unbelief. But simony is more serious: for it says in the Decretals, Case 1, Question 2, that the wicked heresy of Macedonius, and of those who are around him, is more tolerable than simony. Therefore, simony is a heresy. (Ibid., ch. 21, ‘Eos’ (PL 187:489).)

On the contrary, all heresies are against a certain article of the faith, about which an incorrect opinion is held. But a simoniac can have a right opinion of every article of the faith. Therefore, it is not a heresy.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a simoniac does not lose the exercise of his orders. For in someone’s ordination it might happen simony is committed without his knowing it. But accidental homicide committed out of ignorance does not cause irregularity. Therefore, it is also the same with someone who is ordained in simony.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one should receive a sacrament from someone who does not have exercise of his orders. But from someone whom I know to be a simoniac, I should receive holy orders if it is commanded of me, or I would be disobedient. Therefore, one does not lose the exercise of his orders.

On the contrary (3), it seems that a simoniac would not even receive holy orders. For a defect of intention does away with the sacrament. But someone who intends to acquire something for a price in receiving holy orders does not intend to receive what the Church confers, for it does not fall under a price. Therefore, he does not receive holy orders.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that the matter of moral virtues is divided into passions and actions, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33. Now just as there can be a sin in the passions by the fact that it concerns something it should not, whether how much or in what way, and so on with the other circumstances, so also in actions. And therefore in selling and buying, which are kinds of actions, there can be sin either in what is done or in how much. If it is in how much, then it is injustice; as when someone buys or sells at an unjust price. But if it is in what, as when someone buys or sells what does not fall under a price, then it is the sin of simony. And since every sin consists in an act of the will, this is why these three things are included in the definition of simony; and first is the act of the will, in the fact that it says, determined will; second, the proximate matter of this sin, namely, buying and selling, at: to buy or sell; third, the remote matter, namely, the object of the action mentioned, at: spiritual thing, or anything attached to a spiritual thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Men judge those things that appear outside, but God searches the heart, as it says in 1 Sam 16:7, and thus in simony and in all other sins, a person becomes a sinner by his will alone according to the liability to punishment that pertains to the judgment of God, but not according to the liability to punishment that pertains to the judgment of the Church. This is why homicide in the will incurs the debt of eternal punishment, but not irregularity or excommunication, or anything of that sort; and the same thing should be said about simony.

Reply Obj. 2: Each thing should be defined according to its complete being. Now that which completes sin and virtue consists in choice; and so choice is included in the definition of virtue and in the definition of sin; and a determined will conveys this choice.

Reply Obj. 3: Something is called a spiritual thing in two ways. In one way by essence, like grace and virtues; and those things cannot be sold in any way, nor can a deliberate will to buy encompass these things. In another way something is said to be spiritual by its cause, like the sacraments, which are the cause of grace; and these things, inasmuch as they are certain physical things, have an outward appearance that can be sold, although they are not spiritual in this respect; and this is how simony is committed in them.

Reply Obj. 4: Simon Magus wanted to buy spiritual things and afterward sell them. And therefore in their buying, their selling was also implicitly contained; and because of this, according to the common use of speech both the buyer and the seller are called simoniacs. But nevertheless, if we speak technically, those who buy are called simoniacs, and those who sell are called Gehazites, for Gehazi wanted to sell spiritual things, as is seen in 2 Kings 5:20–27.

Reply Obj. 5: In the definition given, as has been said, spiritual things are taken for those things that are a cause of spiritual grace, like sacraments. But things connected with spiritual things are taken for those things which are assigned to their use, like chalices and ecclesiastical goods, which are set aside for the use of the ministers. But things that can be used in spiritual matters are not said to be connected with spiritual goods if they are not specially assigned to this.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that something can be attributed to someone in two ways. In one way, simply; in another way, because of the likeness in his act, as the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 4, 1148a13.) that sometimes the incontinent are called intemperate, for they do what the intemperate do, but not in the same way; as he also says that Milesians are not stupid, but they act stupid. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 8, 1151a9–10.) And according to this it should be said that simoniacs are not heretics, speaking properly and per se, since they do not hold any false opinion; but they are called heretics because of the likeness of their act, for they act as if they thought the gift of the Holy Spirit could be possessed with money, which belief would be heretical. This is why Gregory says in his Register, since all avarice is slavery to idols, whoever does not guard against this in giving ecclesiastical dignities, is subjected to the perdition of unbelief, even if he seems to hold the faith that he has neglected. (Gregory the Great, Register of Epistles, Bk. 9, Epist. indict. 4, Epist. 53, to Theodoric, as cited in Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 1, q. 1, ch. 20, ‘Quum omnis’ (PL 187:488).)

And by this the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: By reason of a false belief that the simoniac demonstrates in his actions, simony is said to be more serious than the heresy of Macedonius, who claimed the Holy Spirit was the slave of the Father and Son. Now simoniacs show by their actions that they consider him to be the slave of men, if he can be bought and sold by men. Or it could be said that it is called a more serious sin because of the tendency to it from human cupidity, and because of the greater harm, for it perverts all the holy orders of the Church.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the efficacy of the sacraments is not from human merit; and thus a sacrament is not impeded because of a man’s sin. Therefore, the sin of simony neither impedes the reception of the sacrament nor takes it away when it has been received. However, it can impede the ultimate reality of the sacrament, if there is a sin on the part of the one receiving it. But nevertheless by simony a person is suspended from the exercise of holy orders or his office. But in this a distinction must be made. For if someone were called a simoniac from receiving holy orders through simony, he would not receive the exercise of them, and by the law he would be automatically suspended both in regard to himself and others; and he would be further punished by being deposed when it was established as a juridical crime. However, if he were called a simoniac because someone conferred his orders in simony, or because he gave or received benefices in simony, or because he was the intermediary in some simoniac deal, if it were secret, he is suspended with regard to himself; but if it is manifest then he is suspended both with regard to himself and with regard to others. And again someone who receives benefices by simony is held to restitution of all the profits he received and to renounce the benefice.

Reply Obj. 1: No defect occurs in an ordination itself because of homicide, but only in the person ordained, and therefore it suffices that the ordained be free from homicide. But by simony a defect occurs in the ordination itself. And so even if he himself is free from it, nevertheless, he is suspended once it has come to his awareness.

Reply Obj. 2: When the crime of simony is made public, the person loses the exercise of orders at that time, and he is suspended with regard to himself and others; but when it is secret, then he is suspended with regard to himself alone. And therefore if it were publicly known, according as something is said to be manifest in the law, then in no way should anyone be obedient or receive orders from that person. But if it were not publicly known, and it cannot be evaded, one should obey, even if one knows that the one who celebrates the orders is a simoniac.

Reply Obj. 3: No one intends to buy something that is spiritual in itself, like a character, but the operation of a minister, which is physical, and the sacramental cause of a spiritual reality.

Article 2

What simony involves

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 5, ad 2.) It seems that the sacraments can be bought and sold without simony. For the end of all sacraments is the kingdom of heaven, and the remission of sins. But the kingdom of heaven is bought, as Gregory says: the kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you have; (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospel, Bk. 1, Hom. 5, pt. 2 (CCSL 141:34).) and it says in Daniel 4:24, redeem your sins with almsgiving. Therefore, much more can sacraments be bought without the vice of simony.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, marriage is one of the sacraments. But marriage is sometimes contracted by a pact agreeing on a certain amount of money to be paid, and without sin. Therefore, sacraments can licitly be bought.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, baptism is the first sacrament. But in a certain case, namely, when the priest refuses to baptize a child without a fee, someone can buy baptism without the sin of simony, lest the child perish eternally by dying without baptism. Therefore, the sacraments can be bought without sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in Mass the Eucharist is consecrated, which is the sacrament of sacraments. But it is permitted to sing a Mass for a certain fee, for no one doing military service should pay his own expenses, as it says in 1 Corinthians 9:7. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it says in the Extravagantes de Praebend. (Chapter ‘Significatum est.’) that certain canonical priests gave a prebend in the Church to someone so that he would celebrate the Mass of the Blessed Virgin every day; and the pope confirmed that agreement. Therefore, the same as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, absolution is a sacramental. But some accept money to absolve someone from excommunication. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, episcopal power, although it is not holy orders, nevertheless is a certain sacramental. But it is permitted in certain case to give money so that someone may attain the episcopate, as when someone maliciously impedes it, so that he will cease from blocking it. Therefore, sacramentals can licitly be sold.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also in the buying and selling of other spiritual goods, no simony is committed. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 20, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3.) For every ecclesiastical office is a spiritual thing. But some people receive fixed revenues to celebrate their anniversary. Therefore, spiritual things can be bought and sold without simony.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, prayer is the most spiritual thing. But someone can give money to good men so they will pray for him, according to what is said in Luke 16:9: make friends for yourselves with the mammon of iniquity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said of Saul (1 Sam 9:7–8) and of the wife of Jeroboam (1 Kings 14) that they offered a price to the holy prophets. But prophecy is a spiritual gift of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the same as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, preaching is a spiritual thing. But Paul preached for temporal goods, so that contributions might be made to the poor, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 16:1–4. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is permitted to preachers to receive stipends for their preaching, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 9. (See also 2 Corinthians 11; 1 Timothy 5:17–18.) But the Apostle calls stipends all those temporal goods that are owed to preachers. Therefore, it is permitted to accept temporal goods for spiritual ones.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, correction is something spiritual, as is visitation. But prelates accept temporal goods for their visitations; for money, some also hide the sins that they are bound to expose. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the state of religious life is a spiritual good. But in certain monasteries, particularly of nuns, something is required from those who must be received there. Therefore, it is permitted to give spiritual things for temporal ones.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, knowledge is a certain spiritual good. But it is permitted to masters of arts to receive something for their teaching. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, judgment is a spiritual good; likewise legal defense in trials, and bearing testimony. But for all these things a person can accept money or a gift. Therefore, etc.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that simony is also not committed in the buying and selling of things connected with spiritual things. For nothing is more connected with spiritual things than sacred vessels. But those can be licitly sold in a case of necessity. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the right of burial is something connected with spiritual matters. But Abraham bought from Hamor two caves for his tomb. (Thomas seems to be confusing the story of Abraham’s purchase from Ephron (Gen 23) with Jacob’s purchase from Hamor (Gen 33:19), although Acts 7:16 would explain the connection.) Therefore without simony something connected with spiritual things can be bought.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the right of patronage is something connected with spiritual goods. But it can be sold without simony, for it is transferred with the whole area, as the Decretals state, (Alexander III, Extra. de jurepat.) and can be granted as a fief. Therefore, what is connected with spiritual things can be licitly sold.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, tithes are connected with spiritual things. But it is permitted to buy them, for they can be granted to lay-people as a fief, and bought back from them. Therefore, things connected with spiritual goods can be bought and sold.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the right of primogeniture seems to be connected with spiritual things; and thus before the era of the law, the first-born sons used to be engaged in the office of priest. But Jacob bought his birth-right from Esau (Gen 25). Therefore, the same as before.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that since sacraments contain and cause grace, they cannot licitly be sold or bought for three reasons. First, because the one dispensing the sacraments is not the Lord, but the minister; but the sale of a thing should only be done by its lord. Second, because the price of a sale is set as a measure proportionate to what is bought, which is why the word for coin, ‘numisma,’ is from measuring, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5, 1133a20. At 1133a30–31, however, Aristotle derives numisma from nomos because money’s value is by convention.) But no physical good can be commensurate with grace, which is why anyone who buys or sells the sacraments of grace does an injury to grace. Third, because grace takes its name from being given gratis, or freely; and therefore someone who treats the sacraments of grace like things for sale acts against the notion of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Those statements are metaphorical, and speaking by a resemblance to buying, they call merit itself a ‘buying’; which indeed is not a buying, for nothing accrues to God by our merit, nor is our merit equivalent to the reward.

Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is not only a sacrament, but also an office of nature; and therefore on the part of its being a sacrament, distributed by the Church’s ministers, it does not fall under buying. This is why, according to the canons, anyone who requires money for blessing nuptials commits simony. But on the part of its being an office of nature, nothing prevents someone from accepting a price for marriage, or laying down a condition of receiving temporal things, just as also not in other civil or physical offices.

Reply Obj. 3: In that case someone should buy water from the priest and baptize the child himself, for in a case of necessity even a woman is allowed to baptize; nor should one give any money at all to a priest for the baptism itself. And it is the same with an adult, unless it can be delayed long enough to have recourse to the superior, so that baptism might be received from him, who is able to give it by his office.

Reply Obj. 4: To make a bargain about celebrating Mass is always simony. If, however, one has no other means of living, and is not bound to sing the Mass by one’s office, he can accept a small amount, as hired priests do, not as the price of the Mass, but for their sustenance.

Reply Obj. 5: That was not a business deal, but the duty of singing such a Mass was attached to the prebend.

Reply Obj. 6: Money should not be required for absolution, but nevertheless, a monetary penalty can be imposed on the person who is absolved. Therefore, it is not permitted to require something as the price of absolution, but as a penalty for the sin. Still, care must be taken lest this exaction be ascribed more to greed than to correction.

Reply Obj. 7: Here a distinction must be made: for if he did not have the right of acquisition through election, in no way can money be given to his opponent so that he desists; but if he had the right of acquisition, something can be given, not as a price of the prelature, but as redemption from his personal harrassment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that an act can be called spiritual either as to its principle, which belongs to someone from some spiritual gift or office; or as to its end, as when something spiritual is attained by its act. Therefore, in acts that are spiritual in the first way, since they are spiritual on the part of the agent, in no way can anyone contract to receive something for his acts without simony; but he can receive something for the sustenance of his life. But in the second kind of acts, because their spirituality is not on the part of the agent, he can even buy or sell his works; but not sell the spiritual thing that is acquired by his act.

Reply Obj. 1: To celebrate an anniversary is a spiritual act in the first way; and so in no way is it permitted to enter negotiations for its celebration. Nevertheless, if something is given to the Church with devotion, the Church is bound to celebrate for those for whom it was requested.

Reply Obj. 2: Prayer is spiritual in the first and second ways, because it has efficacy from spiritual devotion, and something spiritual must be done in it. Therefore, in no way should a price be placed on it. But those who give money to the poor so that they will pray for them do not buy prayer, but encourage the souls of the poor to pray for them, and make them their debtors.

Reply Obj. 3: As Jerome says in his Commentary on Micah, (Jerome, Commentary on Micah (CCSL 76), Bk. 1, ch. 2.) such gifts were presented to prophets more for their sustenance, so that they would be free for spiritual things, than to buy the offices of prophecy; for acts of prophecy are spiritual in the first way.

Reply Obj. 4: To preach for money can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that the money is the price of the preaching, and this is in no way allowed; in another way, such that the giving of money is one of the things preached, and then someone can preach for money, just as for other meritorious works, inasmuch as the one who gives, merits, and alleviates the lack of the recipient. And this is how the Apostle preached for contributions to be made, but the aim of the preaching is not to be placed in the bestowal of money.

Reply Obj. 5: Stipends are owed to the preachers for their provisions, lest they be forced to abandon the word of God and occupy themselves with procuring their necessities. But they are not due them as the price of preaching.

Reply Obj. 6: Correction or visitation is a spiritual act in the first way, for it belongs to someone by a spiritual office. Therefore, he commits simony who accepts money so that the sin that he is bound to reveal or punish, he does not reveal or punish. Nor again is a procurement to be accepted for making a visitation as though it were the price of the visitation, but as though due by the Church’s order for his sustenance. And it is similar with the moderate procurement that bishops receive in the consecration of churches according to the Church’s determination.

Reply Obj. 7: When the possessions of some religious place are not sufficient for supporting many people, then it can be required from someone who wishes to serve God in that place, not as a price on the religious life, but so that the monastery may have enough to provide for her. And therefore simony is not being committed. But if she can be received without a great burden to the Church, it is simony to exact anything for her reception.

Reply Obj. 8: To teach the liberal arts is a spiritual act in the second way; and so it is permitted for masters of arts to sell their labors, but not knowledge or truth, which are spiritual. Therefore it says, do not sell knowledge and instruction and glory (Prov 23:23).

Reply Obj. 9: By his office, a judge is bound to render judgment; similarly everyone is bound by the fact that he is summoned to court to render a true testimony. But an advocate is not bound to present his own defense of the case, nor is the expert bound to give legal counsel. And therefore as Augustine says to Macedonius, (Augustine, Epistle 153, to Macedonius, par. 6 (CSEL 44:423).) the judge must not sell true judgment, nor the witness sell true testimony, since the advocate sells just legal defense, and the legal expert true counsel. For an advocate selling just legal defense is not selling justice, which is a spiritual thing, but his own act; and the same should be said of the expert’s legal counsel. But the judge commits simony by selling true judgment, if he is a spiritual judge; otherwise he does not commit simony, but does sin gravely; and the same thing is to be said of the witness.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that, as is clear from what has been said, there are two kinds of spiritual things that should have no price set upon them: namely, the sacred thing itself, like sacraments; and the act belonging to someone by a sacred office. And in accord with this there are also two ways of being connected with spiritual things: for some things are connected with the sacraments themselves, like sacred vessels and things like that; while others are connected with sacred offices, like tithes, and the right of patronage, according as the right of patronage is the power of presenting a cleric with an ecclesiastical benefice; and in both simony is committed as to what it contains of the spiritual.

Reply Obj. 1: Sacred vessels should in no way be sold by reason of their consecration, so that, namely, something more is required for their being consecrated; nevertheless, in a case of a church’s necessity, they can be sold on the part of what is not spiritual in them, namely, the gold material. And then if they are sold to an ecclesiastical person, they can be sold whole, but if they are sold to others, not for a church’s use, they should be shattered with the prescribed prayer, lest holy things be handled by others than the Church’s ministers.

Reply Obj. 2: The sale of a tomb can be understood in two ways. In one way, that sacred land is sold for burial; and concerning this there is the same argument as for the sale of sacred vessels, for a consecrated cemetery can be sold by reason of the land in the Church’s need, as a chalice can by reason of its material. But it cannot be sold by reason of its consecration, so that, namely, someone is buried there for money. Now Abraham did not sin by buying two caves, for that cave was not consecrated for burial; or if it had been consecrated, its possession would have passed in jurisdiction together with the area of the field. But Hamor is reproached, for he fell away from the good intention that he had before, when he wanted to give the land for free, since afterward he sold it at a very high price. Or, as some people say, Abraham did not sin by buying the right that he possessed of burying the dead, which although Hamor did not deny him, nevertheless Abraham knew that he would make trouble unless he were given his price. But the first explanation seems better. In the other way, a tomb is sold if something is required for the office of funeral rites that is said by the priests at a grave, and this is not permitted, as is clear from what has been said. Nevertheless, if the custom is that something be given, correction can be applied through the superior to those who refuse to give what custom demands.

Reply Obj. 3: The right of patronage cannot be sold in itself, nor given as a fief. But if an estate that has a right of patronage attached is sold and given as a fief, it is transferred with the whole property to the one to whom the estate is given, or to the one who buys it, but not as though the right of patronage were up for sale.

Reply Obj. 4: The right of receiving tithes follows spiritual office, for it is owed to the Church’s ministers; nor can lay people have a right like this, although sometimes for a period the fruits of tithes are granted to laymen because of some necessity of a church; and then in this way that they can be given to laymen, they can be redeemed from them by the authority of the bishop. Nevertheless, one church cannot buy the right of receiving tithes from another.

Reply Obj. 5: The right of primogeniture was due to Jacob by divine institution, and so he did not sin by buying it, but he redeemed his own trouble. But Esau sinned by selling it.

Article 3

How simony happens

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 100, a. 5; de Malo, q. 13, a. 4, obj. 13 and ad 13.) It seems that simony is not committed in those three ways that Pope Urban determined, (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 1, q. 3, ch. 8, ‘Salvator’ (PL 187:549).) when he said, whoever is granted or gains ecclesiastical possessions not for what they were instituted for, but for his own profit, by gifts of the tongue or undue service or money, is a simoniac. For, as was said above, a spiritual judge is a simoniac if he sells his judgment. But it is permitted for a spiritual judge to accept some gift of money, or something like it, as is said in the Extravagantes on Simony, Chapter “And if questions.” (Extra. De simonia, ch. ‘Etsi quaestiones.’) Therefore, simony is not always committed by bribes from the hand.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the pope can also receive a gift from the hand for something spiritual. But, as some people say, the pope cannot commit simony, especially with any ecclesiastical person; for the possessions of the Church are his. Therefore, simony is not always committed by gifts from the hand.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Gregory says: it is fitting to rejoice in the ecclesiastical remuneration of those ecclesiastics who serve the needs of the Church. (Gregory the Great, Registry of Epistles, Bk. 3, Epist. 18.) Therefore, if some prebend is given to someone for services rendered, it is not simony.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, anyone can ask licitly for what is due to him by right. But the one who ordains someone is bound by law to provide for the one he ordained, if he does not have an adequate benefice. Therefore, he does not sin if he asks for a benefice; and this is called the gift of the tongue, namely, rogation.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if prayers are made for a worthy cause, simony is not committed thereby. But prayers are a gift of the tongue, whether they are made for a worthy cause or for someone unworthy. Therefore, a gift by the tongue does not always make for simony.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, hypocrites do spiritual good works for the praise of men, and yet they are not called simoniacs. Therefore, a gift by the tongue does not make for simony.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, just as love of money is cupidity, so love of one’s kinsmen is carnality. But if out of regard for money a prebend is given to someone, it is simony. Therefore, it is similar if it is given to someone out of regard for consanguinity. And yet this is not one of the ways listed; therefore, the list is insufficient.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, simony is also committed in exchanges of dignities or ecclesiastical benefices. But there is no bribe there. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, some prelates receive the fruits of pastorless churches, and afterward they confer them, holding back for themselves a part of the revenues. There seems to be no bribe in this, and yet it is simony. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, simony, as was said, consists in the selling and buying of spiritual things, or of those things connected with them. For buying and selling consists not only in the giving and receiving of money, but of all those things whose price can be measured in coin: for liberality consists in these, according to the Philosopher. Now it is evident that liberal giving and selling, which is contrary to it, exist in the same things. Now the price of every temporal commodity can be measured in coin; and so whoever gives something spiritual or one of its accessories, for some temporal commodity, commits simony. Now the temporal good that one person can expect from another is either on the part of the soul, like friendship or some favor, and as to this it is the gift of the tongue; or on the part of the body, like the execution of a certain physical act or service rendered, and as to that it is a gift of service; or it is some external good, and this is a gift from the hand, which consists in external goods. As to the first, simony is committed by the gift of the tongue, because the tongue expresses opinions and favor; as to the second, by a gift of service; as to the third, by a gift from the hand.

Reply Obj. 1: The judgment of the Church regards external things, and since it is not probable that the mind of a spiritual judge would be turned to doing something by a small gift, this is why it does not consider small gifts given to a judge to be simony. But with God, who sees the heart, simony exists in gifts small and large, if the mind of the judge is turned by them.

Reply Obj. 2: That opinion is erroneous. For if the pope received a bribe for any spiritual thing, he would have committed simony just as much as any other man: for under Peter, to whom the pope is the successor, the vice of simony led to damnation in the New Testament. And although the Church’s possessions in a certain way belong to the pope, nevertheless, they are not his in every way of possessing, like something that he has in his hands. Now there is no doubt that he would commit simony if someone gave something spiritual to his debtor so that he could recover what was his; and so even in the case proposed the pope would not be excused from simony if (God forbid) he gave the belongings of the churches for temporal goods.

Reply Obj. 3: Service is either honorable or dishonorable. If it is indeed honest service, by the service itself a man is sometimes rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice, just as also by other good works; and then if there are no business dealings in the meantime, the one who did the service can be given an ecclesiastical benefice without simony, as the eye is directed not principally to the service, but to the dignity of the person; and this is what Gregory is saying. But if it is dishonorable, then it is entirely simony.

Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of gifts of the tongue, either what consists in the very act of the tongue, like praise; or what takes its beginning from the tongue, like when someone expects favor from the fact that he makes satisfaction with his prayers for another. For there is no doubt that the one who gives something spiritual for acquiring praise or favor commits simony. Therefore, when prayers are made for something unworthy, it is apparent enough that the only motive is to curry favor, or avoid danger, for the absence of evil is also a kind of good, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129b8–9.)

And therefore when prayers are made for something unworthy or for some powerful person who is making threats, which are called defensive prayers, obviously simony is committed, if ecclesiastical benefices are given for this. But if they are made for something worthy in the judgment of men, it is probable that the one giving is more moved by regard for the dignity of the person than the favor of the prayers, and so it is not considered simony.

However, if he is principally moved by the favor of the prayers, or by fear of the one demanding, then in divine judgment both commit simony, both the one who is asked and the one who demands, if he intends this, whether someone else demands for him or he does it for another. For someone can seek an ecclesiastical benefice that does not include the care of souls for himself, if he is worthy, and if he needs it; but not if it does include the care of souls, for that would be presumption. Nor, however, is it simony except for as much as he is made unworthy by this very presumption, and then by the very fact that he makes this demand, his prayers become unworthy.

And by this the solution to the fifth objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 6: The buying and selling that simony consists in are voluntary transactions, for they are made by the consent of both parties. But a hypocrite by what he does seizes human favor for himself in the manner of a thief, which is an involuntary transaction; and so, properly speaking, he does not commit simony.

Reply Obj. 7: The person who gives a prebend to another chiefly by reason of consanguinity either intends the temporal good of the one to whom it is given and not another; and then he sins gravely, but does not commit simony because he does not sell, since he does not receive anything. Or he intends some good to redound to his own benefit, so that he will be increased by this, and his house ennobled, or that he will become more powerful among his kinsmen, and then he does hope to receive something for the spiritual things he gives, and he does commit simony. And it is reducible to that gift in which the commodity is contained that he hopes for from this bestowal.

Reply Obj. 8: In such an exchange there is simony, if either one or the other makes such a transfer for any earthly advantage. But if for something spiritual, as, for example, because one could serve God better in that place, it is not simony. For this reason a transfer can be made by the authority of the diocesan bishop.

Reply Obj. 9: In this a distinction must be made, for if before the granting of a prebend’s revenues, he receives something for a just cause, and he has no agreement with the one he is disposed to give it to, it is not simony. But if he makes a business deal regarding these goods before or after the conferral, then it is simony.

Exposition of the Text

Nor is any of these to be received into a clerical honor, even the least: (Sententiae IV, 25.1 (150). 2.) not that he would not have received holy orders, but that he was wrongly ordained; which happens in two ways.

In one way, on the part of the one ordaining, either when he is a heretic or a simoniac or in any other way separated from the Church, and this is the case in the situation proposed; or when he is ordained by someone other than his own bishop without the permission and authority of his proper bishop; and then he should be deposed unless the bishop puts hope in the approval of the other bishop, as we read in the letter from blessed Epiphanius; or when he is ordained by a bishop who has renounced his office and see. For if he has retained his office while renouncing his see, he can confer minor orders and also major orders by the permission of the other bishop.

In another way, someone is wrongly ordained because he is not ordained as he should be, which can happen in two ways. First, if he received orders underhandedly, as when one receives two degrees of holy orders in one day, or each one without the bishop’s permission; and the penalty for people like this is being deposed, and then if automatic excommunication were upon him, only the pope can give him a dispensation; but if it were not, a bishop can also give a dispensation, particularly in the minor orders, or if he entered a cloistered monastery. Second, if he omitted some degree of orders, and then, if he did it out of malice, he should be deposed, although he does receive the character; but if he did it ignorantly, a penalty should be imposed on him by the bishop, and in the meantime he would not have the exercise of his holy orders until he received the orders he missed.

Whoever sells one of two things, without which the other cannot be had, does not thereby cease to sell both. (Sent. IV, 25.4 (153). 1 citing Urban II, Council of Piacenza (1095), can. 4 and 3.) This is to be understood of those things of which the one that is sold is ordered to another, on which no price can be placed. This is how ecclesiastical benefices are ordered to the sustenance of the Church’s ministers, and so it cannot be established concerning the right of patronage that it is not sold in itself, although it passes over with the sale of the estate, for the ownership of an estate is not ordered to the right of patronage.

There is a three-fold distinction of the simoniacal heresy. (Sent. IV, 25.5 (154). 1.) Someone is properly called a simoniac who is guilty of this sin, whether by giving or receiving any sacred thing for a price. Now it sometimes happens that in the actual giving, simony may be involved through intermediaries, with one or the other not knowing about it; and then the ordination happens simoniacally, even though the one who ordains or is ordained is not a simoniac. Sometimes it can also happen that someone is a simoniac from another cause, and no vice occurs from the actual giving of spiritual things; and then the person is not ordained simoniacally, although the one who ordained him or who is ordained is a simoniac; and this is how the ways set down in the text are distinguished.

The sacred canons have set forth that a subdeacon is not to be ordained before his fourteenth year, etc. (Sent. IV, 25.7 (156). 1.) Here note that three times are to be observed in holy orders.

The first is the time of age for ordaining. Concerning this it should be known that according to ancient laws, from the seventh through the twelfth year one can receive all minor orders; from the twelfth through the twenty-first, the state of acolyte and the subdiaconate, so that in the twenty-first year one receives the subdiaconate; in the twenty-sixth year one can receive the diaconate, and in the thirtieth year, the presbyterate, and afterward one can be made a bishop. But now the time is shortened: for one can receive the subdiaconate when he reaches the age of discretion, so that he can understand the vow of continence, and can be made a priest in the twenty-fifth year; and the diaconate around the twenty-first year (particularly in religious life), but a bishop in the thirtieth year.

The second time to be considered is the specific time of year in which holy orders is conferred. Concerning this it should be known that major orders can be celebrated in six times of the year, namely: in four Saturdays of the four seasons, and on the Saturday before Palm Sunday, and at the Easter vigil. However, the pope confers the subdiaconate on Sundays and special feasts, and on those days on which the bishop can confer minor orders. But bishops can be consecrated on Sundays.

The third time is the period between receiving the various orders. Concerning this it should be known that someone can receive all minor orders in one day, but not one of the minor orders with the subdiaconate, nor two of the major orders together. Still, on a Sunday someone can be consecrated a bishop who was a priest the day before. But concerning those who progress to the clerical state by degrees, it should be known that they can receive all the orders in eight years, so that in the first two years they receive minor orders, and in the other five years they receive the three major orders. However, a monk can receive all of them over a year; and through a dispensation, others can as well for the sake of the Church’s need.