D. 18 - Power of the keys
After the Master has examined penance as a whole and in its parts, here he begins to determine the power of the ministers, to whom the administration of this sacrament was committed. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the power itself, which is called the Church’s keys; in the second, he considers those having these keys, at: after having shown what the apostolic keys are and what is their use, it remains to investigate when these keys are given and to whom (Dist. 19). (Sententiae IV, 19.1 (105).1.)
The first part is in two parts: in the first, he raises the question of the ministers’ power from what has been said; in the second, he examines it, showing that it is called the keys of the Church, and what it extends to, at: these keys are not corporal but spiritual. (Sent. IV, 18.2 (98).1.)
And this part is in two: in the first, he considers the power of the keys as ordered to the remission of sin; in the second, he considers those things arising from sin, by whose cleansing sin is said to be remitted: here it is asked, what is that stain and that inward darkness, from which God inwardly purges the soul. (Sent. IV, 18.8 (104).1.)
The first is in two parts: in the first, he considers the keys; in the second, their effect, at: but it is asked whether a priest can absolve from sin. (Sent. IV, 18.4 (100).1.)
Concerning this he does two things: first, he shows what the keys are; second, he shows what their use is, at: but the use of these keys is manifold. (Sent. IV, 18.3 (99).1.)
But it is asked whether a priest can absolve from sin. Here he inquires as to the effect of the keys. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt, for that belongs to God alone. In the second, he shows how priests are said to forgive sins, at: but we do not for this reason deny that the power of remitting and retaining sins was granted to priests. (Sent. IV, 18.5 (101).1.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he lays out the opinion of those who said that the power of the keys extends to the remission of eternal punishment, although it does not extend to the remission of guilt; second, he sets down another opinion, which says that it extends to neither of these, at: but others say that God alone, and not the priest, remits the debt of eternal death; (Sent. IV, 18.4 (100).3.) third, he confirms this second opionion, which he agrees with by reasons and authorities, at: this view is supported by reason and attested by authorities. (Sent. IV, 18.4 (100).3.)
But we do not for this reason deny that the power of remitting and retaining sins was granted to priests. Here he inquires how priests may be said to remit sins. And concerning this he does three things: first, he shows by authorities that priests do somehow remit sins; second, he shows that priests remit sins differently than God does, at: we may truly say and feel this; (Sent. IV, 18.5 (101).5.) third, he raises a certain doubt from the manners assigned, at: according to these manners of binding and loosing, how is that true which says, “whatever you shall loose on earth,” etc. (Sent. IV, 18.7 (103).1.)
Concerning the second he does three things: first, he shows how the priest is related to binding and loosing with respect to fault; second, how he is related with respect to punishment to be imposed in the forum of conscience, at: the priests also bind when they impose the satisfaction of penance upon those who confess; (Sent. IV, 18.6 (102).4.) third, as to the punishment of excommunication, which is inflicted in the external forum, at: there is another manner of binding and loosing. (Sent. IV, 18.6 (102). 6.)
Here there are two questions. First, about the keys. Second, about excommunication.
Question 1
The power of the keys
Concerning the first, three questions arise:
first, about the keys in themselves;
- second, about the remission of sins, to which the keys are ordered;
- third, the effect of the keys.
- Article 1
The power of the keys itself
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that the power of the keys should not exist in the Church. For keys are not required for entering one’s home when the gate is open. But it says, I saw and behold in heaven a door was open (Rev 4:1); which is Christ, who says of himself, I am the gate (John 10:7). Therefore, the Church does not need keys for entering heaven.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a key is for opening and closing. But this belongs to Christ alone, who opens, and no one shuts, and who shuts, and no one opens (Rev 3:7). Therefore, the Church in her ministers does not have the keys.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to anyone for whom heaven is closed, hell is open, and vice versa. Therefore, anyone who holds the keys of heaven holds the keys of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys to hell. Therefore, neither does she have the keys to heaven.
On the contrary (1), it says in Matthew 16:19: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven.
Furthermore (2), any steward has the keys of what he stewards. But the Church’s ministers are the stewards of divine mysteries, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 4:1. Therefore, they must have keys.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the keys are not the power of binding and loosing by which an ecclesiastical judge should accept those worthy, and exclude the unworthy from the kingdom, (Parallel: Super Matt. 16.) as is found in the text and Jerome’s Gloss on Matthew 16:19. (See PL 114:142.) For a spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is the same as a character, as was said above in Distinction 4. But keys and character do not seem to be the same thing, for by character a man is related to God, but by keys to those under him. Therefore, the keys are not a power.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one is called an ecclesiastical judge except the one who has jurisdiction, which is not given together with holy orders. But the keys are conferred in the reception of holy orders. Therefore, mention of the ecclesiastical judge should not be made in the definition of the keys.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, for what a person has from himself, he does not need any active power by which to be brought into act. But a person is admitted to the kingdom by the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore, it does not pertain to the power of the keys to admit those worthy to the kingdom.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners so that they might attain the kingdom. Therefore, she does not exclude the unworthy, but rather admits them as it is in itself.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, among all ordered agents the last end pertains to the principal agent, not to the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in man’s salvation is God. Therefore, it pertains to God to admit anyone into the kingdom, which is the last end, and not to the one having the keys, who is like an instrument or minister.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there are not two keys, but only one. (Parallels: SCG IV, ch. 72; Super Matt. 16.) For only one key is required for one lock. But the lock that the Church’s keys are ordered to removing is sin. Therefore, against sin alone the Church does not need two keys.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the keys are conferred in the conferral of holy orders. But knowledge is not always from infusion but sometimes from acquisition, nor is it possessed by every ordained person, and it is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore, knowledge is not a key; and so there is only one key, namely, the power of judging.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power that a priest has over the mystical body depends on the power that he has over the true body of Christ. But there is only one power of consecrating the true body of Christ. Therefore, there is only one key that is the power regarding the mystical body of Christ.
On the contrary (4), it seems that there are more than two keys. For just as power and knowledge are required for a human act, so is will. But knowledge for discerning is counted as a key, and likewise the power of judging. Therefore, the will to absolve should also be called a key.
Furthermore (5), the whole Trinity forgives sins. But the priest is the minister of the remission of sins. Therefore, he should have three keys, so that he may be configured to the Trinity.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that in physical things the instrument by which a gate is opened is called a key. But the gate of the kingdom is closed to us by sin, both in the stain and in the punishment to be served. And therefore the power by which such an obstacle to the kingdom is removed is called a key. But this power is indeed in the Most Holy Trinity in the manner of authority; and so it is said by some that it has the key of authority; but in Christ as man this power existed for removing the aforesaid obstacle by the merit of his Passion, which is also said to open the door. And so according to some people he is said to have the keys of excellence. But since from the side of the one sleeping on the Cross the sacraments flowed, from which the Church is fashioned, (Augustine on Romans 5:14, as given in the Glossa, PL 114:486.) this is why the efficacy of the Passion remains in the Church’s sacraments; and because of this also in the Church’s ministers, who are the stewards of the sacraments, a certain power abides for removing the obstacle mentioned, not by their own strength, but by divine power, and the Passion of Christ. And this power is metaphorically called the Church’s key, which is the key of its ministry.
Reply Obj. 1: The gate of heaven in itself is always open; but it is said to be closed to a certain person because of an impediment to entering heaven that exists in him. Now the impediment of all human nature consequent on the sin of the first man was removed by the Passion of Christ. And this is why John (Rev 4:1) saw the gate of heaven open after the Passion; but it still commonly remains closed to someone by the original sin that he contracts or by the actual sin that he commits. And because of this we need the sacraments, and the keys of the Church.
Reply Obj. 2: This is understood as referring to the closing by which he closes limbo, lest anyone else should descend into it, and the opening by which he opened paradise, by removing the impediment of nature through his own Passion.
Reply Obj. 3: The key that opens and closes hell is the power of conferring grace, by which hell is opened to man so that he may be led out of sin, which is the door to hell; and it is closed so that a man, supported by grace, does not slide further into sin. But conferring grace belongs to God alone, and therefore he alone has retained the key of hell. But the key of the kingdom is also a power for remitting the punishment one is sentenced to, by which a person is prohibited from the kingdom. And so the key of the kingdom can be given to a man more than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what has been said. For someone can be led out of hell by the remission of eternal punishment who is not led immediately into the kingdom because of the sentence of temporal punishment that remains. Or it could be said that, as some people say, the keys to heaven and hell are the same, for by the fact that one is opened to someone, the other is closed; but the name is taken from the nobler one.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415a18–20.) powers are defined by their acts. And therefore since the keys are a certain power, as was said, they must be defined by their act or use, and in the act must be expressed the object from which the act receives its species and the mode of acting, by which the power appears to be set in order. Now the act of a spiritual power is not that it opens heaven in an absolute sense, for it is already open, as was said; but that it opens it with respect to this person; which indeed cannot be done in an ordered way except by taking into account the suitability of the person to whom heaven is to be opened. And so in the definition of key mentioned above, the genus is included, namely, power, and the subject of the power, namely, ecclesiastical judge, and the act, namely, to exclude and receive according to the two acts of a material key, to open and to close; it refers to its object in saying, from the kingdom, while the mode is mentioned in the fact that worthiness and unworthiness is weighed in those over whom the act is exercised.
Reply Obj. 1: One power is ordered to two effects, of which one is the cause of the other; just as in fire, heat is ordered to heating and disintegrating. And since every grace and forgiveness in the mystical body comes forth from its head, for this reason the power by which a priest can consecrate and bind and loose, if he has jurisdiction, seems to be the same in essence. Nor is it different except in reason, according as it is related to the different effects; as also fire is said to be heating and liquefying according to different accounts. And since the character of priestly orders is nothing else than a power of exercising what the order of a priest is principally ordained for, granting it is necessary that it be the same as a spiritual power; therefore, the character, and the power of confecting, and the power of the keys, are one and the same in essence, but different in reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Every spiritual power is given with a certain consecration; and so the keys are given with holy orders. But the exercise of the keys requires the appropriate matter, which is the people subject by jurisdiction. And therefore before he has jurisdiction, he has the keys, but he does not have the act of the keys; and since the keys are defined by their act, therefore something is included in the definition of the keys that pertains to jurisdiction.
Reply Obj. 3: Someone can be worthy of something in two ways: either so that he has the right to have it, and in that way anyone worthy already has heaven open; or so that there is a certain congruity in him to be given it, and the power of the keys admits those who are worthy in this way, to whom heaven is not yet entirely open.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as God does not harden by imparting wickedness, but by not conferring grace, so the priest is said to exclude, not because he sets down an impediment to entering, but because he does not remove the impediment laid down. For he cannot remove it, unless God has removed it first. And so God is asked to absolve, so that the priest’s absolution may take place.
Reply Obj. 5: The priest does not act directly upon the kingdom, but upon the sacraments, by which a person attains the kingdom.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in every act that requires a fittingness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary for anyone who must exercise this act, namely, the judgment of the recipient’s fitness, and the completion of the act. And therefore also in an act of justice, by which a person is given what he is worthy of, there must be a judgment which discerns whether he is worthy, as well as the rendering itself; and for either of these a certain authority or power is required. For we can only give what we have in our power: nor can it be called judgment unless it has a coercive force, by the fact that the judgment is already determined to one thing. And in speculative things this determination indeed is made by the virtue of first principles which cannot be resisted; and in practical things by the commanding power existing in the judge. And since the act of a key requires a fitness in the thing in which it is exercised, because by the keys the ecclesiastical judge admits those who are worthy and excludes the unworthy, as is clear from the definition given, therefore he needs both discretion of judgment, by which he judges the fitness, and the very act of reception. And for both of these a certain power or authority is required, and accordingly two keys are distinguished, one of which pertains to the judgment of the fitness of the one to be absolved, and the other to the absolution itself; and these two keys are not distinguished in the essence of the authority, because both apply to someone by his office, but in relation to their acts, one of which presupposes the other.
Reply Obj. 1: One key is directly ordered to opening one lock, but it is not inappropriate that one key be ordered to the act of another, and such is the case here. For the second key, which is called the power of binding and loosing, is what directly opens the lock of sin, but the key that is called knowledge shows whom this lock should be opened for.
Reply Obj. 2: Concerning the key of knowledge there are two opinions. For some people said that knowledge is here called a key inasmuch as it is a habit acquired or infused, and that it is not the principal key, but it is called a key in relation to another key. And therefore when it exists without the other key, it is not called a key, as when it exists in a learned man who is not a priest. And likewise also sometimes certain priests lack this key, for they do not have knowledge, either acquired or infused, by which they might loose and bind. But sometimes they use natural industry for this, which according to them is called a “little key.” And this is how, although the key of knowledge is not bestowed with holy orders, nevertheless it is granted with holy orders that it be a key, which it was not before; and this seems to have been the opinion of the Master.
But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, which promise that keys will be given to Peter; and thus not only one but two are given in holy orders. And because of this, the other opinion is that the knowledge that is habit is not the key, but the authority of exercising the act of knowledge, which sometimes exists without knowledge, but sometimes knowledge exists without it, as is seen also in secular judgments. For there may be a certain judge possessing the authority to judge who does not have knowledge of the law, and conversely, another has knowledge of the law who does not have the authority. And since the act of judgment to which someone is obliged by receiving authority, but not by having knowledge, cannot be done well without both, therefore to the authority to judge, which is the key, cannot be taken without knowledge, or it is a sin. But knowledge without authority can be possessed without sin.
Reply Obj. 3: The power of consecrating is for only one act of another genus; and so it is not counted along with the keys, nor is it multiplied like the power of the keys, which is for different acts, even though it is one according to the essence of the authority, as was said.
Reply Obj. 4: Anyone is free to will something, and so no authority is required for willing; and because of this the will is not included as a key.
Reply Obj. 5: The whole Trinity forgives sins in the same way as if one person; and therefore it is not necessary that the priest, who is the minister of the Trinity, have three keys. And particularly since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, does not require a key, as was said.
Article 2
The stain of sin
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 86, a. 1; q. 89, a. 1.) It seems that the stain is something positively existing in the soul. For if it is a privation alone, it will only be a privation of whatever was taken away by sin. But this is grace. Therefore, since any sin takes away grace, there will be one stain for all sins; and so the second sin will add no stain to the soul beyond the stain of the first sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the privation that is left behind in the soul by sin is called blindness, or darkness, which pertains to the intellect. But this stain is not the same kind of thing, since it seems to pertain to the affections. Therefore, a stain is not only a privation, but it leaves something.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the stain that someone contracts by touching something unclean, which is called contagion, is a positively existing thing. But the stain of sin is also called contagion. Therefore, it is something positively existing.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, privation is a kind of punishment. But in sin the stain is divided against the punishment or the guilt. Therefore, the stain is not only a privation of grace; and so, the same as above.
On the contrary, nothing positively existing remains from sin in the soul, except a disposition or habit, which result from sin on the part of the act, and by which it leaves something. But the stain is not a disposition caused by an act, nor a habit: which is seen from the fact that a disposition and habit without grace can be destroyed by a contrary practice, which perhaps introduces the contrary vice’s habit that drives out its contrary habit and disposition; but a stain is not removed without grace. Therefore, the stain does not bring anything positively existing into the soul.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that sin can never be remitted as to the stain. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 2; ST I-II, q. 87, a. 6; ST III, q. 86, a. 4; Compendium 181.) For by the fact that someone sinned, he lost the beauty of innocence. But he cannot recover this beauty, unless it had happened to him not to have sinned. But since this is impossible in every way, it is impossible that sin be remitted as to the stain.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a man possesses a certain disgracefulness from the fact that he spent in sin the time he owed in service to his Creator. But that time that has already passed cannot be recovered. Therefore, neither can the stain be cleansed.
On the contrary, it is said in Ephesians 5:27, that Christ united himself to the Church, having neither stain nor wrinkle. But there are certain members of the Church who were stained at one time. Therefore, sin can be remitted as to the stain.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that if sin is remitted as to its stain, so is it remitted as to all of its penalty. (Parallels: SCG III, ch. 158; Super Rom. 11, lec. 14; above, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2; and the texts cited in the preceding qa.) For once the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the reason for which someone was liable to punishment is the stain of fault. Therefore, once the stain is removed, the punishment will be removed.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever is punished without possessing fault is punished unjustly. But someone in whom the stain of sin has been forgiven is without fault. Therefore, he is unjustly punished. And so it seems that he is not deserving of any punishment and the punishment that he is liable to is forgiven him.
On the contrary, sin is not punished by the fact that its stain has been remitted. But punishment is owing to every sin according to divine justice. Therefore, even after the remission of guilt some punishment can remain to be paid.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that something is said to be stained when it suffers the loss of its proper beauty. And this is why the stain as such does not instill anything, but by its relation to the loss of beauty that it causes, sometimes it is said to leave something behind, like something put on the face that covers or takes away the radiance of the face. Now, the beauty of a soul consists in its likeness to God, to whom it must be formed by the brightness of grace received by it. But just as our perception of the physical brightness from the sun is hindered by any obstacle placed between us and it, so also the brightness of grace is hindered from the soul by sin committed, which causes a division between us and God, as it says in Isaiah 59:2. And so the stain in itself does not include of its essence anything but the privation of grace, but it includes as its cause the obstacle of sin, which obstructs the reception of grace. And because of this the stain is also called ‘darkness’ by reason of the likeness mentioned.
Reply Obj. 1: Although as to the privation of grace itself, the stains of sins do not differ from each other, nevertheless they do differ as to the cause from which the stain results; and in accord with this any sin also adds one stain, inasmuch as it sets up a new obstacle to grace.
Reply Obj. 2: Grace is in the essence of the soul from which the cognitive and affective powers proceed, and so the light of grace both directs the intellect and moves the affections. But sin introduces a defect into both of these: the intellect, because every sin is from error, according to Ambrose, (See Ambrose, de Apologia Dauid ad Theodosium Augustum, ch. 6 (SC 239:313 et seq.).) and according to the Philosopher every bad man is ignorant; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1110b28.) and the affections principally, because every sin is in the will. And therefore the stain, both as to its privation and as to its cause, namely, sin, has to do with both the intellect and the affections, but more principally the affections. And so it is not inappropriate if the stain is called both ‘blindness’ and ‘darkness.’
Reply Obj. 3: The stain is called a contagion, not as to the privation, but as to the cause of the privation; for by the very fact that sin in a certain way touches through the affections, the aforesaid privation results in them.
Reply Obj. 4: As to its cause the stain is divided from every punishment; but as to the privation itself, it is divided from punishment that has been inflicted, but not from punishment that is concomitant with sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the stain of darkening caused by the interposition of something cannot be taken away unless the obstacle interposed is removed. But sin, which was the obstacle interposed that prevents the clarity of grace, cannot be removed so that it did not exist, but so that it does not have the effect of turning away God from us, who remained turned away from us because of our turning from him in sin. And therefore according to the fact that he turns to us in his kindness, he is said to forgive our sins, just as we forgive the offense of someone when we no longer keep bad will against him because of his past offense, which indeed are to be taken in God according to the effect, as was said in Book III, Distinction 32. And because of this God is also said to cover sin when he forgives it, as though not looking at past sin, such that he would deny his grace to us for that reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the beauty of the soul is not repaired as to a certain accident, which was the dignity of innocence, nevertheless it is repaired as to the comeliness of grace which is restored.
And the second should be answered in the same way: for a man does not always recover all the losses he has suffered either of time or other things, but he recovers his lost beauty as regards the essence of comeliness.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in sin there are two things, namely, turning toward a changeable good, and turning from the unchangeable good. And according to this there are two effects of sin. One is God’s indignation at us corresponding to the turning away in sin; the other is the punishment ordering the disorder of turning to something else. And since on our part the first thing in sin is our turning toward something else, and what is first in generation is last in destruction, therefore on God’s part the first thing is his reconciliation with us, and according to this there is freedom from the punishment owed. But there are two kinds of punishment: namely, the banishment of an enemy, and that punishment is removed by this reconciliation; but the other punishment is what corrects a citizen or a son or a friend, and this debt can remain once the reconciliation is done. And therefore at the same time that the sin is forgiven as to the stain, it is forgiven as to eternal punishment, which is the banishment, but not as to temporal punishment, which is the correcting.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the act occurring beforehand was the cause of the stain, but once the act passes the stain does not pass, so the act, by means of the stain, was the cause of the debt. And therefore it is not necessary that when the stain ceases the debt of punishment should cease, for when the first effect ceases it is not necessary that the second one cease.
Reply Obj. 2: That person to whom sin is forgiven as to the stain deserves to suffer punishment because of the act he committed; although he does not deserve to be alienated from God.
Article 3
The effect of the power of the keys
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 17, q. 3, a. 5, qa. 1; SCG IV, ch. 72; de Forma absol. 2; Quodl. IV, q. 7, a. 1; Super Matt. 16; Super Ioan. 20, lec. 4.) It seems that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it is said to the disciples (John 20:23), whose sins you forgive are forgiven them. But this is not said about the manifestation only, as the Master says in the text, because then the New Testament priest would have no greater power than the priest of the Old Testament. Therefore, he exercises his power in the remission of guilt.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in penance grace is given for the remission of sins. But the minister of this sacrament is the priest by the power of the keys. Therefore, since grace is not opposed to sin on the part of the punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest works the remission of guilt by the power of the keys.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the priest receives greater power from his own consecration than the water of baptism receives by its sanctification. But the water of baptism receives this force, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart, according to Augustine. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 80, par. 3.) Therefore, much more does the priest receive the power in his own consecration that he can cleanse the heart from the stain of guilt.
On the contrary (1), the Master said above that God did not confer this power on the minister, that he cooperate with him in the interior cleansing. But if he remitted sins as to fault, he would cooperate with God in the interior cleansing. Therefore, the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of fault.
Furthermore (2), sin is only forgiven by the Holy Spirit. But to give the Holy Spirit does not belong to any man, as the Master said in Book I, Distinction 14. Therefore, neither does the forgiveness of sins as to the guilt.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that he cannot remit sins as to the punishment. (Parallel: SCG IV, ch. 72.) For eternal punishment and temporal punishment are due to sin. But even after the priest’s absolution, the penitent remains obliged to do temporal punishment in purgatory or in this world. Therefore, he does not remit punishment in any way.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the priest cannot work to the detriment of divine justice. But by divine justice a punishment is allotted to the penitent that he must undergo. Therefore, the priest cannot remit any of it.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the person who has committed a little sin is not less susceptive of the effect of the keys than the one who has committed a greater sin. But if through the priest’s office some of the punishment for a greater sin is remitted, it is possible for there to be some small sin for which no more punishment is due than what was forgiven for a greater sin. Therefore, he would be able to forgive the whole punishment for that small sin; which is false.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, all the temporal punishment for sin is owed for the same reason. Therefore, if by the first absolution some of the punishment is forgiven, then by the second absolution as well some of the same sin could be forgiven, and so absolution could be multiplied so much that the whole punishment were taken away by the power of the keys, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than the first, in this way sin will remain entirely unpunished, which is unfitting.
On the contrary (1), the power of the keys is for binding and loosing. But a priest can bind one to temporal punishment. Therefore, he can also absolve from punishment.
Furthermore (2), a priest cannot forgive sin as to guilt, as it says in the text, nor as to eternal punishment for the same reason. Therefore, if he cannot forgive it as to temporal punishment, he would not be able to forgive anything about it, which is entirely contrary to what is said in the Gospel.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a priest cannot bind by the power of the keys. For sacramental powers are directed against sin like a medicine. But to bind is not a medicine for sin, but rather an aggravation of a disease, as it seems. Therefore, the priest cannot bind by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as absolving or opening is removing an obstacle, in the same way binding is placing an obstacle. But the obstacle to the kingdom is sin, which cannot be imposed on us from without, for sin is only from the will. Therefore, a priest cannot bind.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the keys have their efficacy from the Passion of Christ. But to bind is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore, a priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.
On the contrary (1), Matthew 16:19 says: whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven.
Furthermore (2), Rational powers are for opposite things. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 9, ch. 2, 1046b5.) But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discernment joined to it. Therefore, it is related to opposite things. Therefore, if it can loose then it can also bind.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome says: the canons do not so fix the measure of time in doing penance openly for each crime that they say how each individual sin may be amended for; but rather they rule that it is to be left to the judgment of an understanding priest. (See Gratian’s Decretals, Part 2, De poenitentia, d. 1, cause 33, q. 3, ch. 84 (PL 187:1554).) Therefore it seems that according to his own judgment he can bind and loose.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the master praised the steward of iniquity for acting prudently (Luke 16:5) because he generously forgave his master’s debtors. But God is more prone to have mercy than any temporal lord. Therefore, it seems that someone is to be praised more who has forgiven more punishment.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every one of Christ’s actions is for our instruction. But he imposed no punishment on some sinners, but only the amendment of their lives, as is seen in the case of the adulterous woman (John 8:11). Therefore, it seems that a priest, who is the vicar of Christ, can also forgive all or part of the punishment at his own discretion.
On the contrary (1) Gregory says, we call it a false penance which is not imposed according to the authority of the holy fathers for the kind of crime. (Referring to Pope Gregory VII. See Gratian’s Decretals, Part 2, de Poenitentia, d. 5, cause 33, q. 3, ch. 6 (PL 187:1636).) Therefore, it seems that it is not entirely at the priest’s discretion.
Furthermore (2), discernment is required for the act of the keys. But if it were entirely in the will of the priest to forgive, and to impose as much punishment as he wished, no discernment would be necessary: for in that case a lack of discernment would never happen. Therefore, it is not entirely at the discretion of the priest.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that according to Hugh, (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) the sacraments contain grace by an invisible sanctification. But this sanctification is required as necessary for the sacrament sometimes as much in the matter as in the minister, as is seen in confirmation. And then the sacramental power resides in both united. But sometimes only the sanctification of the matter is required as necessary to the sacrament, as is the case in baptism, for it does not have a specific minister necessary to it, and then the whole sacramental power consists in the matter. But sometimes the consecration or sanctification of the minister is required as necessary to the sacrament, without any sanctification of matter; and then the whole sacramental power consists in the minister, as it is in penance.
And the power of the keys that is in the priest is related in the same way to the effect of the sacrament of penance as the power that is in the water is related to the effect of baptism. Now baptism and the sacrament of penance share to some extent in effect, for both are directly ordered against guilt, which is not the case with the other sacraments. But they differ in that the sacrament of penance, because the acts of the person receiving it are like the matter, can only be given to adults, in whom the preparation for receiving the effect of the sacraments is required. But baptism is sometimes given to adults, and sometimes to children, and to others lacking the use of reason.
And therefore grace and the remission of sins is given to children through baptism without any of preceding preparation on their part, but not to adults, in whom there is required a preparation that removes pretense. And indeed sometimes this preparation is sufficient for receiving grace before baptism is actually received, but not before the desire for baptism, after the time of manifested truth. Now, sometimes this kind of preparation does not precede in time, but it is simultaneous with the reception of baptism; and then by the reception of baptism the grace for the remission of sin is conferred. But by the sacrament of penance grace is never given except where the preparation is present or has already occurred. And therefore the power of the keys works to the remission of sin either when it exists in the desire or when it exercises itself in act, just as water does in baptism.
But just as baptism does not act as a principal agent but as an instrument, not indeed extending to causing the very reception of grace even instrumentally, but disposing for the grace by which the remission of guilt is done, so it is with the power of the keys. And thus God alone forgives guilt through himself, and both baptism, as an inanimate instrument, and the priest as an animate instrument, act instrumentally in his power, which the slave is said to do in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 11, 1161b4.) according to the Philosopher. And therefore the priest acts as a minister. And thus it is clear that the power of the keys is ordered in a certain way to the remission of sin, not as though causing it, but as disposing toward it. And therefore if someone were not perfectly disposed to receiving grace before the absolution, in his confession itself and in the sacramental absolution he would obtain grace, if he did not place any obstacle to it. For if the keys were in no way ordered to the remission of sin, but only to the remission of punishment, as some people say, the desire of receiving the effect of the keys for the remission of guilt would not be required, but this desire is not required to receive the other sacraments that are not ordered toward guilt but against punishment. But this makes it seem as though it is not ordered to the remission of guilt, for in order to have an effect, the use of the keys requires preparation on the part of the one receiving the sacrament; and the same thing would appear to be the case in baptism if it were only ever given to adults.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Master says in the text, the power of forgiving sins was committed to priests, not so that they could forgive by their own power, for this belongs to God, but so that they might display the working of the forgiving God as his ministers. But this happens in three ways. In one way, such that they display it as not present, but they promise a future forgiveness without doing anything toward it. And this is how the sacraments of the old law signified the working of God, and therefore the priest of the old law also only displayed, and worked nothing. In another way, so that they signify a present forgiveness and work nothing toward it; and this is how some people say the sacraments of the new law signify the conferral of grace, which God gives in the very conferral of the sacraments, without their being in the sacraments any power working for grace. And according to this opinion, which was touched upon in Distinction 1, even the power of the keys would only be for showing the divine working for the remission of sins accomplished during the actual conferring of the sacrament. The third way is that they signify the divine working present for the forgiveness of sin, and they work something dispositively and instrumentally toward this effect. And thus according to the other opinion, which is more commonly held, the sacraments of the new law display the divinely accomplished cleansing, and this is also how the priest of the New Testament displays those absolved from guilt, for it is necessary to speak of the sacraments and the power of the ministers proportionally. Nor does the fact that the guilt is already forgiven prevent the Church’s keys from disposing one to the remission of guilt, just as neither is it a problem that baptism, in itself, disposes to the forgiveness of sin someone who is already sanctified.
Reply Obj. 2: Neither the sacrament of penance nor the sacrament of baptism extend to working directly for grace, nor for the remission of sin; but they work dispositively.
And from this the response to the third objection is also evident.
The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not work directly for the remission of sin, which must be granted.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the effect that actually exercising the power of the keys fulfills in someone in whom contrition preceded in time is judged to be the same as the effect of the baptism that is given to someone who already has grace. For a person has obtained the grace of the remission of sins as to fault by his faith and contrition before baptism; but when he actually receives baptism afterward, the grace is increased, and he is completely absolved from all punishment by the fact that he is made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. And likewise that person who has, by his contrition, obtained the forgiveness of sins as to fault and consequently as to eternal punishment that is forgiven together with the fault, receives an increase of grace by the power of the keys which have efficacy from the Passion of Christ. The temporal punishment that still remained after the remission of guilt is also forgiven, although not all of it, as in baptism, but a part of it. For by the fact that in baptism a man is regenerated and configured to the Passion of Christ, he receives in himself completely the efficacy of the Passion of Christ, which is enough to efface all punishment, so that nothing of the previous punishment for actual sin remains. For it should not be imputed to anyone for punishment unless he himself did it.
Now in baptism a man who receives a new life becomes a new man by baptismal grace; and so he is no longer liable to punishment from his preceding sin. But in penance a man is not changed into a new life, for it is not a regeneration, but a certain healing. Therefore, by the power of the keys that works in the sacrament of penance the whole punishment is not forgiven, but something of the temporal punishment, whose liability could still remain after absolution from eternal punishment, as was said. Nor only from that punishment that the penitent has in confessing, as some people say (for then confession and priestly absolution would be nothing except a burden, which is not befitting to the sacraments of the new law), but also from the punishment that is due in purgatory something is forgiven, so that someone who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction will be punished less in purgatory than if he had died before absolution.
Reply Obj. 1: He does not forgive all temporal punishment, but part; and therefore one still remains obliged to a penal satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 2: The Passion of Christ sufficiently satisfied for the sins of the whole world (1 John 2:2); and therefore some of the punishment owed to someone can be forgiven without detriment to divine justice, according as the effect of the Passion extends to it through the sacraments.
Reply Obj. 3: For any sin a certain satisfactory punishment must remain, by which a medicine is supplied against sin; and therefore, although a certain quantity of punishment due may be forgiven by the power of absolution for any great sin, it is not necessary that the same amount of the punishment be forgiven with respect to every sin, for then some sin would remain entirely without punishment. But by the power of the keys something of the punishment for individual sins is forgiven proportionally.
Reply Obj. 4: Some people say that in the first absolution as much is forgiven by the power of the keys as can be forgiven, but a second confession is still worthwhile both for the sake of instruction and greater certainty, and the confessor’s intercession, and for the sake of merit from the shame. But this does not seem to be true, for even if this were the reason for repeated confession, nevertheless it is not the reason for repeated absolution, particularly in someone who does not have any cause to doubt the previous absolution (for then he could doubt after the second absolution just as after the first), just as we see that the sacrament of extreme unction is not repeated over the same illness, because all that could be done by the sacrament was done the first time. And furthermore in the second confession it would not be required for the one who hears the confession to have the keys if the power of the keys did nothing there. And therefore they say that also in the second absolution some punishment is forgiven by the power of the keys, for in the second absolution an increase of grace is conferred; and the more grace is received, the less of the preceding sin’s impurity remains; and so less purifying punishment is due. And therefore also in the first absolution more and less of the punishment is forgiven someone by the power of the keys according as he disposes himself more to grace; and his disposition can be so great that the whole punishment is taken away by the force of his contrition, as was said above in Distinction 17, Question 3, Article 3, Subquestion 2. Therefore, it is also not unfitting if by frequent confession even the whole punishment is taken away, so that sin remains entirely unpunished, for which the suffering of Christ made satisfaction.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that a priest’s work in the use of the keys is conformed to God’s work, whose minister he is. Now God works regarding both guilt and punishment; but regarding guilt his work regards loosing directly, while it regards binding indirectly, inasmuch as it is called hardening one’s heart when grace is not bestowed. But in punishment his work directly regards both, for he both spares punishment and inflicts punishment. Therefore, it is the same with the priest, even if in absolving by the power of the keys he should have some work directed to the remission of guilt in the way already mentioned, yet in binding does not have any work directed toward guilt; unless to bind were said about when he does not absolve, but shows those who are bound. But regarding punishment he has the power of both binding and loosing, for he looses from the punishment that he forgives, but he binds to the punishment that remains. But to bind to this is said in two ways. In one way by considering the quantity of punishment in general; and then he only binds inasmuch as he does not loose, but shows those who are bound. In another way, by considering this or that punishment specifically, and then he binds to punishment by imposing it.
Reply Obj. 1: That remainder of punishment to which he obliges is the medicine purging the sin of impurity.
Reply Obj. 2: The obstacle to the kingdom is not only sin, but also punishment, and how the priest imposes this was said.
Reply Obj. 3: The Passion of Christ also obliges us to a certain punishment, by which we may be conformed to him.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that in the use of the keys the priest works like an instrument and minister of God. For no instrument has an efficacious act except as it is moved by the principal agent. And this is why Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, pt. 3, n. 7 (PG 3:563).) that priests must employ hierarchical powers as the divinity has moved them; and a sign of this is that before the power of the keys was granted to Peter mention is made of the revelation of divinity made to him (Matt 16:17); and before the power of forgiveness the gift of the Holy Spirit is given to the apostles (John 20:22), for by it they act as sons of God (Rom 8:14). And therefore if anyone should presume to use his power outside the divine impulse, it would not obtain its effect, as Dionysius says, (Ibid.) and besides this, it would be turned away from the divine ordering, and thus it would incur fault. And since satisfactory punishments are to be imposed as medicines, just as particular medicines in the art of medicine do not apply to everyone, but must be varied according to the judgment of the doctor, not following his own will, but the science of medicine, in the same way particular satisfactory punishments in the canon do not apply to everyone, but must be varied according to the judgment of the priest regulated by divine impulse. Now just as sometimes a doctor prudently does not give medicine so effective that it suffices for the cure of the disease, lest because of the weakness of nature a greater danger should arise; so also a priest moved by divine impulse does not always enjoin the whole punishment that is due to one sin, lest a weak person should despair from the magnitude of the penalty, and should withdraw entirely from penance.
Reply Obj. 1: That judgment must be regulated by by the divine impulse.
Reply Obj. 2: The steward is also praised about the fact that he acted prudently, and therefore discretion must be applied in the remission of due punishment.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ had the power of excellence in the sacraments; and therefore by his own authority he could forgive all or part of the punishment as he wished. But it is not the same with those who act only as ministers.
Question 2
On excommunication
Next excommunication should be asked about; and concerning this, five questions arise:
first, about excommunication itself;
- second, who may excommunicate;
- third, concerning the manner of excommunication;
- fourth, about communicating with those who have been excommunicated;
- fifth, about being absolved from excommunication.
- Article 1
Excommunication itself
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: Super I Cor. 5, lec. 1 and 3; Super I Tim. 1, lec. 4.) It seems that this definition of excommunication set down by certain people is inadequate: excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church in regard to its fruit and general intercession. For the intercessory prayers of the Church benefit those for whom they are made. But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, like heretics and pagans. Therefore, also for the excommunicated who are outside the Church; and thus the Church’s intercessory prayers benefit them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one loses the Church’s intercession except by fault. But excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore, by excommunication a person is not separated from the Church’s general intercession.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Church’s fruit seems to be nothing other than its intercessory prayers, for it cannot be understood as being the fruit of temporal goods, for these things are not taken away from those excommunicated. Therefore, both are included unfittingly.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, minor excommunication is a kind of excommunication. But by it a person does not lose the intercession of the Church. Therefore, the definition is not general.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the Church should not excommunicate anyone. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 39, a. 4.) For excommunication is a kind of malediction or curse. But we are forbidden to curse by Romans 12:14. Therefore, the Church should not excommunicate.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. But it is read in the letter of Jude: when Michael fought with the devil for the body of Moses, he did not dare bring a condemnation of blasphemy against him, but said, “may the Lord rebuke you” (Jude 1:9). Therefore, neither should the Church Militant impose a judgment of curse or excommunication on anyone.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one should be handed over to the enemy unless he is despaired of in every way. But by excommunication a person is handed over to the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 5:5. Therefore, since no one should be despaired of while in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.
On the contrary (1), the Apostle commands that someone be excommunicated (1 Cor 5:5).
Furthermore (2), it is said about anyone who scorns to hear the Church, let such a one be to you as a Gentile or a tax collector (Matt 18:17). But the Gentiles are outside the Church. Therefore, those who scorn to hear the Church are also to be placed outside the Church by excommunication.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no one should be excommunicated for any temporal injury. (Parallels: Quodl. I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1; Super Matt. 18; Super I Cor. 5, lec. 3.) For the punishment should not exceed the fault. But the penalty of excommunication is the deprivation of a certain spiritual good, which matters more than any temporal good. Therefore, no one should be excommunicated for temporal things.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, we should not render evil for evil, according to the command of the Apostle (Rom 12:17). But it would be rendering evil for evil if anyone were excommunicated for an injury like this. Therefore, it should not be done at all.
On the contrary, Peter condemned Ananias and Sapphira to death for fraud regarding the price of a field (cf. Acts 5:1–11). Therefore, the Church is also permitted to excommunicate for temporal damages.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that excommunication unjustly imposed has no effect whatsoever. For by excommunication the protection and grace of God are withdrawn, which cannot be withdrawn unjustly. Therefore, unjustly imposed excommunication does not have an effect.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Jerome says that it belongs to the arrogance of the Pharisees to judge someone bound or loosed who is unjustly bound or loosed. (Jerome, Commentary on Matthew (CCSL 77), BK. 1, ch. 16, line 1308.) But their arrogance was prideful and wrong. Therefore, unjust excommunication has no effect.
On the contrary, according to Gregory, the commands of a pastor, whether just or unjust, are to be feared. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Bk. 2, hom. 26, par. 6 (CCSL 141:222).) But they would not be to be feared unless they also inflicted harm even when unjust. Therefore, etc.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the person who is brought into the Church by baptism is enrolled in two things, namely, the society of the faithful, and the partaking of the sacraments. And the second presupposes the first, for the faithful also share in the sacraments to be partaken. And therefore someone can end up outside the Church by excommunication in two ways. In one way, so that he is only separated from partaking of the sacraments; and this would be minor excommunication. In another way such that he would be excluded from both, and then it would be major excommunication, which is what is being defined here. But there cannot be a third way, namely, that one be excluded from the communion of the faithful and not from the partaking of the sacraments, for the reason already stated: namely, because the faithful share in the sacraments.
But there are two things that the faithful share in. They share in spiritual things, like mutual prayers and coming together to receive sacred things; and in legal bodily actions, which legal acts and licit communion are contained in these verses: if for his crimes anyone is made anathema, he is denied mouth, prayer, farewell, communion, table. He is denied mouth, namely, he may not be given a kiss of peace; prayer, lest we pray with those excommunicated; farewell, lest they be greeted; communion, namely so that no one shares with them in the sacraments; table, lest anyone eat with them. Therefore, the definition above conveys separation from the sacraments in saying, as to the fruit; and from the communion of the faithful in spiritual things, by saying, and the general intercessions of the Church. But another definition is found that is given according to the separation from both actions, which goes thus: excommunication is the separation from any licit communion or legitimate act.
Reply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are prayed for, but they do not receive the fruit of that prayer unless they are converted to the faith. Likewise, those excommunicated can be prayed for, although they are not among the prayers that are made for the members of the Church; and nevertheless they do not partake of the fruit as long as they remain under excommunication. But we pray that they may be given the spirit of repentance, so that they may be released from excommunication.
Reply Obj. 2: Anyone’s intercessory prayers benefit another according as they reach him. But there are two ways that one person’s action can reach another. In one way by the power of charity, which links together all the faithful, so that they are one in God, as it says in Psalm 119(118):63: I am a companion of all who fear you. And excommunication does not interrupt this contact, for someone can only be justly excommunicated for mortal sin, by which he has already been divided from charity, even if he were not excommunicated. But an unjust excommunication cannot take away anyone’s charity, since it has to do with the greatest goods, which cannot be taken from anyone against his will. The other way, by the intention of the one making the intercessory prayers, which is directed toward the person for whom they are done; and excommunication does interrupt this contact, for by the sentence of excommunication the Church separates the excommunicated from the community of the faithful, for whom she makes intercession. And this is why the Church’s intercessory prayers that are made for the whole Church do not benefit him; nor can prayer be made for them in the person of the Church among the members of the Church, although any private person can direct the intention of some prayer to his conversion.
Reply Obj. 3: The Church’s spiritual fruit is not only from her intercessory prayers, but also from the reception of the sacraments and the faithfuls’ life together.
Reply Obj. 4: Minor excommunication does not have the full account of excommunication, but it partakes of something of it. And therefore it is not necessary that the definition of excommunication completely apply to it, but only in certain respects.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now, God punishes sinners in many ways in order to draw them to the good. One way is by chastening with scourges. In another way, by leaving man to himself so that when his help is taken away that protected him from evil, he may know his weakness and turn back in humility to God, from whom the proud withdraw. And as to either of these the Church imitates divine judgment in its sentence of excommunication; for inasmuch as it separates him from the communion of the faithful in order to shame him, it imitates the divine judgment that chastises by scourges; but inasmuch as it separates him from her intercessory prayers and other spiritual goods, it imitates the divine judgment that leaves man to himself, so that knowing himself through humility he may return to God.
Reply Obj. 1: A malediction or curse can happen in two ways. In one way such that its intention stops at the evil it imposes or says; and this kind of malediction is prohibited in every way. In another way such that the evil that is indeed invoked by the malediction is ordered to the good of the one who is cursed. And this kind of malediction is sometimes permitted and salvific, just as a doctor inflicts some harm on an ill person, like an incision, by which he may be freed from the infirmity.
Reply Obj. 2: The devil is incorrigible; and therefore he is not capable of receiving any good by the punishment of excommunication.
Reply Obj. 3: From the very fact that someone is deprived of the prayers of the Church, three disadvantages occur through their opposition to the three goods that someone obtains by the prayers of the Church. For they work to the increase of grace for those who have it, or to meriting it for those who do not; and as to this, the Master says in the text that the grace of God is withdrawn through excommunication. They also benefit for the guarding of virtue; and as to this he says that this protection is withdrawn; not that a person is entirely excluded from the providence of God, but from that protection with which he especially guards the sons of the Church. They benefit in defending from the enemy; and as to this he says that the devil has more power to rage in him both spiritually and physically. And therefore in the early Church when it was necessary to attract people to the faith by signs, as the gift of the Holy Spirit was manifest in a visible sign, so excommunication was recognized then in the physical harassment of the devil. Nor is it unfitting if someone who is not despaired of is given to the enemy; for he is not handed over as if to be damned, but as if to be corrected, since it is in the Church’s power to wrench him from the devil’s hand when she wishes.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that by excommunication an ecclesiastical judge does exclude the excommunicated from the kingdom in a certain way. And since he should only exclude those who are unworthy, as is clear from the definition of the power of the keys, nor is anyone rendered unworthy unless by mortal sin he has lost charity, which is the way leading to the kingdom; therefore, no one should be excommunicated except for mortal sin. And since a person sins mortally and acts against charity by injuring someone physically or in temporal things, that is why the Church can excommunicate someone for inflicting temporal damage. But because excommunication is the most serious punishment, and punishments are medicine, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b17.) while it belongs to the wise doctor to begin from the lighter and less dangerous medicines, therefore excommunication should also not be inflicted for mortal sin unless it was done in defiance, either by not coming to the court hearing, or leaving without permission before the end of the trial, or by the decision to not comply. For then, after he has been warned, if he scorns to obey he is considered defiant, and should be excommunicated since the judge no longer can do anything else against him.
Reply Obj. 1: The amount of guilt is not measured from the harm that someone does, but from the will by which he does it when he acts against charity. And therefore although the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm, nevertheless it does not exceed the amount of guilt.
Reply Obj. 2: When someone is corrected by a certain penalty, evil is not rendered to him but good: for punishments are medicines, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that there are two ways an excommunication can be said to be unjust. One is on the part of the person excommunicating, as when he excommunicates someone out of hatred or anger. And then the excommunication nevertheless has its effect, although the one who excommunicates him sins, for although he acts unjustly, the other suffers justly. The other way is on the part of the excommunication itself: either because the reason for the excommunication is not right, or because the sentence is imposed without the due process of law. And then, if the error on the part of the sentence is such that it makes the sentence null, it has no effect, for it is not an excommunication. But if it does not annul the sentence, it does have its effect, and the excommunicated should humbly obey, and it will be meritorious for him either to ask absolution from the one who excommunicated him, or to resort to a higher judge. But if he should scorn the ruling, he would sin mortally by that very fact. Now it sometimes happens that there is due cause on the part of the one excommunicating which is not due on the part of the one excommunicated, as when someone is excommunicated for a crime falsely proven in court; and then if he humbly endures, the merit of his humility will make up for the injury of the excommunication.
Reply Obj. 1: Although a man cannot lose the grace of God unjustly, he can nevertheless unjustly lose those things that are from our side that dispose to the grace of God, as is seen if the word of teaching is taken away from someone who should have it. And this is how excommunication is said to take away the grace of God, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Jerome speaks about faults and not punishments, which can be inflicted even unjustly by the rulers of the Church.
Article 2
Who may excommunicate
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. It seems that any priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the power of the keys. Therefore, every priest can excommunicate.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is greater to loose and bind in the forum of penance than in the legal forum. But any priest can loose and bind those under him in the penitential forum. Therefore, any priest can also excommunicate those under him.
On the contrary, those things in which there is great risk of danger are reserved to superiors. But the punishment of excommunication is extremely dangerous unless it is done with control. Therefore, it should not be entrusted to just any priest whatsoever.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj 1: Moreover, it seems that non-priests cannot excommunicate. (Parallel: below, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.) For excommunication is an act of the keys, as it says in the text. But non-priests do not have the keys. Therefore, they cannot excommunicate.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the penitential forum. But a non-priest cannot absolve in the forum of penance. Therefore, neither can he impose excommunication.
On the contrary, archdeacons, legates, and elect (Presumably, this means bishops-elect.) who are sometimes not priests do excommunicate. Therefore, not only priests can excommunicate.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an excommunicated or suspended person can excommunicate. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 39, a. 3.) For someone who is excommunicated or suspended loses neither his holy orders nor his jurisdiction, for when he is absolved, he is neither re-ordained nor is his post committed to him again. But excommunication only requires holy orders or jurisdiction. Therefore, an excommunicated and suspended priest can also excommunicate.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But excommunicated priests can consecrate, as was said above in Distinction 13. Therefore, they can excommunicate.
On the contrary, someone who is physically bound cannot bind anyone else. But a spiritual binding is stronger than a physical one. Therefore, someone who has been excommunicated cannot excommunicate, since excommunication is a spiritual bond.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that in the forum of conscience the case is between man and God; but in the forum of external judgment the case is between man and man. And therefore the binding and loosing that obligates one man to God alone pertains to the forum of penance. But the binding and loosing that obligates a man in relation to other men pertains to the public form of external judgment. And since by excommunication a man is separated from the community of the faithful, this is why excommunication pertains to the external forum, and so, only those people can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the juridical forum. And because of this only bishops by their proper authority, and greater prelates, according to the more common opinion, can excommunicate. But parish priests cannot, except by a commission given to them or in certain cases, like in theft and rape and things like this, in which it is granted to them by the law that they can excommunicate. Now others have said that parish priests can also excommunicate. But the opinion above is more reasonable.
Reply Obj. 1: Excommunication is not an act of the keys directly, but rather an act of jurisdiction with respect to the external court. But the sentence of excommunication, although it is promulgated in external court, nevertheless in a certain way pertains to entrance to the kingdom according as the Church Militant is the path to the Church Triumphant; therefore also the jurisdiction by which a man is able to excommunicate can be called the power of the keys. And accordingly the power of the keys that all priests have is distinguished by some people from the keys of jurisdiction in the juridical forum, which only judges of the external forum have. However, God conferred both on Peter (Matt 16:19); and it was passed down from him to the others who have both.
Reply Obj. 2: Parish priests have indeed jurisdiction over those under them in the forum of conscience, but not as to the juridical forum, for they cannot be brought before them in litigation. And therefore they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve in the penitential forum; and although the penitential forum is nobler, nevertheless greater solemnity is required in the juridical forum, for in it satisfaction must be made not only to God but also to man.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that it pertains to priests alone to dispense the sacraments, in which grace is conferred. And therefore only they can bind and loose in the penitential forum. But excommunication does not regard grace directly, but consequently, inasmuch as a man is deprived of the intercession of the Church, which disposes us toward grace, or preserves us in grace. And therefore also non-priests, as long as they have jurisdiction in the trial courts, can excommunicate.
Reply Obj. 1: Although they do not have the key of holy orders, nevertheless they do have the key of jurisdiction.
Reply Obj. 2: Those two things are related as the things that exceed and those that have been exceeded; and therefore one can apply to someone without the other applying.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the use of jurisdiction is in relation to another person, and therefore since every excommunicated person is separated from the communion of the faithful, every excommunicated person is deprived of the use of his jurisdiction. And since excommunication is a privation of jurisdiction, an excommunicated person cannot excommunicate; and the same reasoning applies to someone suspended from jurisdiction. For if he were only suspended from holy orders, then he cannot do those things that belong to holy orders, but he can do what belongs to jurisdiction. And vice versa, if he is suspended from jurisdiction and not from holy orders; but if from both, then he can do neither.
Reply Obj. 1: Although he does not lose his jurisdiction, nevertheless he loses the use of his jurisdiction.
Reply Obj. 2: To consecrate follows on the power of the character, which is indelible. And therefore by the fact that a man has the character of Holy Orders, he can always consecrate, although he may not always be allowed to. But it is different with excommunication, which follows on jurisdiction, which can be taken away and bound.
Article 3
The manner of excommunication
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, corp.; d. 20, a. 5, qa. 4, ad 3.) It seems that someone can excommunicate himself or his equal or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul: the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he, namely, the one than whom no one born of women is greater (Matt 11:11) But Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven, as is clear from Galatians 1:8. Therefore, a man can excommunicate his superior.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a priest sometimes establishes a general excommunication for theft, or something of this sort. But it could happen that he himself does it, or his superior, or his equal. Therefore, a person can excommunicate himself, or his superior, or his equal.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, someone can absolve his superior or his equal in the penitential forum, like when bishops confess to their subjects, and when one priest confesses his venial sins to another. Therefore, it seems that a person could also excommunicate his superior or his equal.
On the contrary, excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no one has jurisdiction over himself, because no one can be both judge and accused in the same matter; nor again can this happen with a superior or an equal. Therefore, a person cannot excommunicate his superior or his equal, or himself.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a sentence of excommunication may be handed down against a community. (Parallel: Quodl. X, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.) For it happens that a certain community may be united in wickedness. But for wickedness in which someone has proven himself defiant, excommunication should be imposed. Therefore, an excommunication may be imposed on a community.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is most serious in excommunication is the separation from the Church’s sacraments. But sometimes the whole city is placed under interdict from divine things. Therefore, too, a community can be excommunicated.
On the contrary, Augustine’s gloss on Matthew 13 says that the leader and the multitude may not be excommunicated. (See Glossa, PL 114:132.)
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that anyone who has been excommunicated once cannot be excommunicated further, for the Apostle says, what have I to do with judging those who are outside? (1 Cor 5:12). But the excommunicated are already outside the Church. Therefore, the Church does not have authority upon them, such that it could excommunicate them again.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, excommunication is a certain separation from divine things and from the communion of the faithful. But after a person has been deprived of something, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore, once a person has been excommunicated, he cannot be excommunicated again.
On the contrary, excommunication is a kind of punishment and medicinal remedy. But punishments and medicines are repeatable, when the cause requires it. Therefore, excommunication can also be repeated.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that since someone is established by jurisdiction in a degree of superiority with respect to the one over whom he has jurisdiction, since he is his judge, for this reason no one has jurisdiction over himself or his superior or his equal. As a result, no one can excommunicate himself or his superior or his equal.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks under hypothesis, i.e., if it were supposed that an angel could sin; for then he would not be superior to an apostle, but inferior. Nor is it unfitting that under conditional statements whose antecedents are impossible, the conclusions should also be impossible.
Reply Obj. 2: In such a case no one is excommunicated, for an equal has no power over his equal. (From the Pandects of Justinian, ch. ‘Innotuit, de electione.’)
Reply Obj. 3: Loosing and binding in the forum of confession is toward God alone, before whom a person becomes inferior to another by his sin. But excommunication exists in an outward judgment, in which someone does not lose his superiority by the fact that he has sinned. And so the account is not the same for both forums. Nevertheless, in the forum of confession a person cannot absolve himself, nor his superior or his equal, of mortal sin, unless he has been commissioned to. But he can in venial matters, because venial sins are remitted by any sacraments conferring grace; and therefore remission of venial sins follows the power of holy orders.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that someone should not be excommunicated for anything but a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act, while an act typically does not belong to a community but to individual persons. And therefore individuals can be excommunicated from a community, but a community itself cannot. And if sometimes also an act should belong to a certain multitude as a whole, as when many men row a ship, which no one could row alone, it is nevertheless not probable that any community as a whole should consent to evil such that none of them are dissenting. And since it does not pertain to God, who judges every land, to condemn the just man with the impious, as is seen in Genesis 18:25, therefore the Church, who must imitate God’s judgment, has decreed with considerable insight that a whole community may not be excommunicated, lest when the weeds are pulled up, the wheat should also be uprooted (cf. Matt 13:29).
The solution to the first is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, for those who have been suspended are not deprived of the Church’s prayers like the excommunicated. And therefore also someone may be suspended without his own proper sin, just as an entire kingdom may be placed under interdict for the sin of the king; and therefore it is not the same with excommunication as with suspension.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the person who is excommunicated by one excommunication can be excommunicated again, either by a repeat of the same excommunication for greater shame, so that he may shrink back from sin, or for other reasons. And in that case the principal excommunications are as many as the reasons for which a person is excommunicated.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking about pagans and infidels, who do not have a character by which they are counted among the people of God. But because the baptismal character by which someone is counted among the people of God is indelible, a baptized person therefore always remains of the Church in some way. And thus the Church can always judge him.
Reply Obj. 2: Although privation in itself does not admit of less and more, it does however admit of less and more according to its cause. And according to this excommunication can be repeated. And someone who has been excommunicated several times is more estranged from the Church’s prayers than someone who has only been excommunicated once.
Article 4
Interacting with those who have been excommunicated
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 31, a. 2, ad 3; q. 39, a. 4, ad 2.) It seems that it is permitted for someone excommunicated to share in purely physical things. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore, by excommunication it is not prohibited for one person to share in physical things with another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is instituted by charity does not oppose charity. But we are bound by the precept of charity to take care of our enemies, which cannot be done without a certain sharing. Therefore, it is permitted for a person to share in physical things with someone who has been excommunicated.
On the contrary, it is said in 1 Corinthians 5:11: do not even eat with such a one.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone who shares with an excommunicated person is not excommunicated. For a gentile is more separated from the Church than someone who has been excommunicated. But that person who shares with a gentile or Jew is not excommunicated. Therefore, neither is that person who shares with an excommunicated Christian.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the person who shares with some excommunicated person is excommunicated himself, then by the same argument any one who shares with the one sharing will be excommunicated, and it will go on thus ad infinitum: which seems absurd. (The Moos ed. has here “et sic in finitum procedet,” but this does not make sense in the context.) Therefore, the person who shares with someone excommunicated is not excommunicated himself.
On the contrary, an excommunicated person is placed outside communion. Therefore, whoever communicates with him withdraws from the communion of the Church; and thus it seems that he is excommunicated.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that to share with someone excommunicated in cases when it has not been granted is always a mortal sin. (Parallel: Quodl. XI, q. 8, a. 2.) For a certain decretal (Chapter ‘Sacris de his quae vi metusque causa.’) answers that no one should communicate with an excommunicated person because of the fear of death: for someone should undergo death rather than sin mortally. But this reason would be null unless sharing with an excommunicated person were a mortal sin. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, to act against a command of the Church is a mortal sin. But the Church commands that no one communicate with someone excommunicated. Therefore, to partake with an excommunicated person is a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one is restricted from receiving the Eucharist on account of venial sin. But someone who shares with an excommunicated person in instances that have not been granted is restricted from receiving the Eucharist, for he incurs minor excommunication. Therefore, anyone sharing with an excommunicated person in instances that have not been granted, sins mortally.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one should be excommunicated by major excommunication except for a mortal sin. But according to the laws someone can be excommunicated by major excommunication for partaking with an excommunicated person. Therefore, to partake with an excommunicated person is a mortal sin.
On the contrary (1), no one can absolve another from mortal sin unless he has jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve someone from partaking in excommunication. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.
Furthermore (2), the mode of the penance should be for the measure of the sin. But the penalty imposed for partaking of excommunication, according to the common custom, is not the kind due to mortal sin, but rather to venial sin. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that, as was said before, there are two kinds of excommunication. One is minor, which separates one only from partaking of the sacraments, but not from the communion of the faithful; and thus it is permitted to communicate with someone under this kind of excommunication, but it is not permitted to confer on him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication, and this separates a man from the Church’s sacraments and from the communion of the faithful; and therefore it is not permitted to communicate with someone under this kind of excommunication.
But since the Church introduces excommunication for curing, and not for destruction, certain people are excepted from this general rule, with whom it is permitted to communicate precisely in those things that pertain to salvation. For a man may licitly speak with an excommunicated person about such things, and intersperse other words, so that they may more easily receive words of salvation out of familiarity. Certain persons are also excepted to whom it especially pertains to provide for the excommunicated, namely, his wife, servant, son, worker, and anyone serving him. But this is to be understood of sons who have not reached majority; otherwise they would be bound to avoid their father. As for the others, it is to be understood that it is permitted to communicate with the excommunicated person if they were subject to him before his excommunication, but not if afterward. However, certain people understand the reverse; namely, that superiors can licitly communicate with those under them.
But others say the opposite. Yet they should at least communicate with them in matters in which they are obligated, for just as inferiors are obliged to the service of their superiors, so superiors are obliged to provide for their inferiors. Certain cases are also excepted, like when the excommunication is unknown, and when certain people are pilgrims or travelers in the land of the excommunicated, who can licitly buy from them or even accept alms from them. And likewise if someone sees an excommunicated person in need: for then he is bound to provide for him by the precept of charity And these are contained in this verse: utility, law, humble, thing unknown, need, so that utility refers to the words of greeting, law to marriage, humble to subjection; and the others are clear.
Reply Obj. 1: Physical things are ordered to spiritual ones; and therefore the power that extends to spiritual things can also extend to physical ones; just as the art that is about the end commands those that are for the end.
Reply Obj. 2: In that case in which someone is bound by a precept of charity to communicate, communion is not prohibited, as is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that excommunication can be imposed on someone in two ways. Either such that he is excommunicated along with everyone who shares with him, and then there is no doubt that whoever partakes with him is excommunicated by major excommunication; or such that he is simply excommunicated, and then either someone participates with him in his crime, by providing him with counsel, assistance, and favor, and such a one is again excommunicated by major excommunication; or he shares with him in other things, like in words or kisses or meals; and such a person is excommunicated by minor excommunication.
Reply Obj. 1: The Church does not intend to correct unbelievers like believers, whose care she bears; and therefore she does not restrict from communion with unbelievers as she restricts from communion with the faithful whom she excommunicates, over whom she has a certain power.
Reply Obj. 2: It is permitted to communicate with someone excommunicated by minor excommunication; and this is how excommunication does not pass to a third person.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some people say that whenever a person shares with an excommunicated person, whether by word or any kind of speech in which he is not allowed to communicate with him, he sins mortally, aside from cases excepted by law. But since it seems too grave that a man should sin mortally by a passing word that he speaks to someone excommunicated, and the excommunicated would act as a trap of damnation for many, which would reflect back on them, therefore it seems more probable to others that one would not always sin mortally, but only when one participates with the excommunicated in crime, or in divine matters, or in contempt for the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: That decree speaks about partaking in divine things. Or it could be said that there is the same reason for mortal as for venial sin here: for just as mortal sin cannot be done well, so neither can venial sin; and so, just as a man should rather endure death than sin mortally, he should also avoid venial sin by that proper behavior rather than sin venially.
Reply Obj. 2: The Church’s precept directly regards spiritual things, and as a result legal acts; and therefore, whoever shares with him in divine matters acts against the precept and sins mortally. But whoever partakes with him in other things acts outside the precept, and sins venially.
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a person is also closed off from the Eucharist without fault, as is evident in the case of those suspended or under interdict; for punishments like this are sometimes imposed on someone for the fault of another, who is being punished in them.
Reply Obj. 4: Although to partake with an excommunicated person is a venial sin, nevertheless to partake with him obstinately is a mortal sin; and by this someone can be excommunicated according to the laws.
Article 5
Being absolved from excommunication
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question we proceed thus. It seems that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the bond of sin is greater than that of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subjects from sin. Therefore, much more from excommunication.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is mortal sin. Therefore, since any priest can give absolution from that mortal sin, he could likewise from excommunication.
On the contrary, it takes the same power to excommunicate and to release from excommunication. But lower priests cannot excommunicate their subjects. Therefore, neither can they release their excommunication.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no one can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his will. But absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore, it cannot be bestowed against one’s will.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the reason for excommunication is defiance. But when someone does not wish to be absolved, holding his excommunication in contempt, then he is extremely defiant. Therefore, he cannot be absolved.
On the contrary, excommunication can be imposed against someone’s will. But what occurs against the will can also be removed against the will, as is clear regarding fortune’s goods. Therefore, excommunication can be removed from someone against his will.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone cannot be absolved from one excommunication unless he is absolved from all. For the effect must be proportionate to its causes. But the cause of excommunication is sin. Therefore, since someone cannot be absolved from one sin without being absolved from all, neither could this happen in excommunication.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, absolution from excommunication happens in the Church. But the person who is entangled in one excommunication is outside the Church. Therefore, as long as one remains, he cannot be absolved from another.
On the contrary, excommunication is a kind of punishment. But someone may be freed from one punishment while another remains. Therefore, someone can be released from one excommunication while another remains.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of partaking in it. But if it is major excommunication, then either it is imposed by a judge, and so the one who imposed it or his superior can release it; or it is imposed by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can release it, except in six cases, which the law-giver, namely, the Pope, has reserved to himself. The first is when someone raises his hand against a cleric or religious. The second is anyone who sets fire to a church and is apprehended. The third is someone who destroys a church and is apprehended. Fourth is someone who deliberately shares divine things with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name. Fifth is someone who falsifies a letter from the Apostolic See. The sixth is anyone who shares in the crime of the excommunicated, for he should not be absolved except by the person who imposed the excommunication, even if he is not subject to him, unless because of the difficulty of being present he must be absolved by his bishop, or by his own priest, after having sworn a precautionary oath that he would obey the mandate of that judge who sentenced him.
Now, in the first case there are eight exceptions. The first is in the moment of death, in which a person can be released from any excommunication by any priest. Second, if the porter of some powerful person struck the blow, and not out of hatred or deliberately. Third, if the one striking is a woman. Fourth, if it is a servant, and the master, who is not at fault, would suffer from his absence. Fifth, if one religious struck another member of his order, unless it were unusually egregious. Sixth, if he is a poor man. Seventh, if he is below the age of puberty, or elderly, or feeble. Eighth, if he has deadly hostilities.
However, there are another seven cases in which the person striking the cleric does not incur excommunication. First, if for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or superior might strike someone. Second, if it was done mildly as a joke. Third, if he had found him acting shamefully with his wife or mother or sister or daughter. Fourth, if he was suddenly fending off force. Fifth, if he did not know the other was a cleric. Sixth, if he discovered him in apostasy after three admonitions. Seventh, if the cleric transferred himself to a completely contrary act so that for example he became a soldier, or enters into a second marriage.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the bond of sin is greater simply speaking than excommunication, nevertheless, the bond of excommunication is greater in this respect, that it does not only oblige before God but also in the face of the Church. And therefore jurisdiction is required in absolving from excommunication in the external forum, but not in absolution from sin. Nor is the precaution of an oath required, as is required in absolution from excommunication. For by an oath the disputes that happen among men are ended, according to the Apostle (Heb 6:16).
Reply Obj. 2: Since someone excommunicated is not a partaker of the sacraments of the Church, the priest cannot free the excommunicated from guilt, unles he is first released from his excommunication.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the evil of guilt and punishment differ in this, that the principle of guilt is in us, since every sin is voluntary, while the principle of punishment is sometimes outside us. Now, it is not required for punishment to be voluntary; on the contrary, being against the will is more the nature of punishment. And therefore just as sins are not committed except by will, so they are not forgiven against one’s will. But just as excommunication can be imposed on someone against his will, so he could also be released from it involuntarily.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument holds true for those spiritual goods that consist in our will, like the virtues, which cannot be lost by those who do not wish it; for although knowledge is a spiritual good, nevertheless it can also be lost unwillingly through weakness; and thus the argument does not apply to this case.
Reply Obj. 2: Someone can lift the justly imposed excommunication even of one who remains obstinate if it seems expedient to the salvation of the one on whom excommunication was imposed as a medicine.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that excommunications are not interdependent on each other; and therefore it is possible that someone be absolved from one and remain under another. But concerning this it should be known that someone is sometimes excommunicated with many excommunications from the same judge, and then, when he is released from one, he is understood to be released from all, unless the contrary is expressed, or except in the case in which someone obtains absolution from only one cause of excommunication, since he is excommunicated for many reasons. Sometimes he is excommunicated by different judges, and then when he is absolved from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from another, unless all the others have confirmed his absolution at his request, or unless all commit absolution to one.
Reply Obj. 1: All sins are interdependent in the will’s turning away from God, and forgiveness of sins cannot co-exist with this. And therefore one sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications do not have any interdependence of this kind; nor again is release from excommunication impeded because of the will’s contrariety, as was said. And therefore the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as someone was outside the Church for many reasons, so it is possible that that separation be removed as to one reason and remain as to another.
Exposition of the Text
Heresy has neither of them; (Sententiae IV, 18.2 (98).2 citing Ambrose, De poenitentia, Bk. 1, ch. 2, n7.) for even if they had holy orders, they would still lose jurisdiction when they were cut off from the Church.
The Word of God remits sins, (Sent. IV, 18.4 (100).7 citing Ambrose, De Cain et Abel, Bk. 2, ch. 4, n. 15.) namely, by authority; but the priest, inasmuch as he provides the sacrament by his ministry; but inasmuch as he imposes punishment, he himself is called the judge.
The priest fulfills his office but does not exercise the rights of any power, (Sent. IV, 18.4 (100).7 citing Ambrose, De Spiritu sancto, Bk. 3, ch. 18, n. 137.) namely, such that his action should extend to cleansing interior stains.
The Church’s charity . . . remits the sins of all who are partakers of it. (Sent. IV, 18.5 (101).1 citing Augustine, In Ioannem, tr. 121 n4.) This does not seem to have to do with the question at hand, for this is not about the remission of sins by the mode of merit, but the remission by the mode of sacrament. And it should be said that the Church’s merit is under the administration of the keys; and therefore the Church’s keys have efficacy both from the merit of Christ and from the others who belong to the Church.
Sin is called darkness, because the intellect . . . is darkened. (Sent. IV, 18.8 (104).2.) On the contrary, many sinners are found who have the finest intellect for grasping things. And it should be said that he speaks of the darkening of the practical intellect, according to which every bad man is an ignorant one, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 1110b28.) and not about a darkening of the speculative intellect.
Chapter 154 of 186