D. 19 - Use of the keys

After the Master has considered the keys in themselves, he begins to determine to whom it belongs to have the keys. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that it belongs to priests to have the keys; in the second, he raises certain doubts against these, at: but it does not seem that all, or only, priests have these keys. (Sententiae IV, 19.1 (105).1.)

And this part is divided into two: in the first, he raises doubt about the key of knowledge; in the second, about the key of power, at: since it is already clear that not all priests have both keys . . . it is asked concerning the other key . . . whether all priests have it. (Sent. IV, 19.1 (105).4.)

And this part is divided into two according to the two opinions which he touches upon in this doubt; the second begins at: but to others it seems . . . that this key is given to all priests. (Sent. IV, 19.1 (105).8.)

And this is divided into three: in the first, he sets forth the opinion; in the second, he confirms it, at: but that all priests have this power is attested by Jerome. (Sent. IV, 19.1 (105).9.) In the third, he removes certain things that seem to be contrary to this opinion, at: Hesychius appears to contradict this opinion of Augustine. (Sent. IV, 19.2 (106).2.)

And concerning this he does two things: first, he raises an objection, by which it seems to be shown that the use of the keys does not belong to priests alone; second, that it does not belong to bad priests; both of which are against the second opinion, which is true, at: but the previous opinion . . . seems to be contradicted by the threat which the Lord makes to bad priests through the prophet Malachi. (Sent. IV, 19.3 (107).1.)

And concerning this he does three things: first he lays down the objection; second, he sets down another solution at: some people refer that chapter, “I shall curse,” etc. to heretics. (Sent. IV, 19.3 (107).2.) Third, he assembles his own solution from what was said before, at: as for that text of Malachi, namely “I shall curse your blessings,” either it is taken to refer only to heretics and excommunicates, or to all priests presuming to bless though they are lacking in life and knowledge. (Sent. IV, 19.4 (108).4.)

Concerning the second he does two things: first, he gives a solution to the text cited from the prophet, which some people give; second, as an aside, how a person should be to rightly use the power of the keys, at: Augustine describes what kind of person one who is established as the judge of others ought to be. (Sent. IV, 19.4 (108).1.)

Here there are two questions. First, about those who have the keys. Second, about fraternal correction.

Question 1

Those who possess the power of the keys

Concerning the first, three questions arise:

first, to whom does it belong to have the keys;

• second, who can use the keys;
• third, on whom can a priest use the keys.
• Article 1

Who may possess the power of the keys

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems a priest of the law would have had the power of the keys. For the keys are an endowment of holy orders. But they had holy orders, which is why they were called priests. Therefore, the priests of the law had the power of the keys.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the Master said above, (At the start of dist. 18.) there are two keys, namely, the knowledge of discerning, and the power of judging. But the priests of the law had both authorities. Therefore, they had the power of the keys.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a priest of the law had a certain power over the rest of the people. It was not temporal, for then the royal power would not have been distinct from priestly power. Therefore, it was spiritual: and this is the power of the keys. Therefore, they had the power of the keys.

On the contrary (1), the keys are ordered toward opening the kingdom of heaven, which could not be opened before Christ’s Passion. Therefore, the priest of the law did not have the power of the keys.

Furthermore (2), the sacraments of the old law did not confer grace. But entrance to the kingdom of heaven can only be opened by grace. Therefore, it could not be opened by those sacraments, and so also a priest, who was the minister of them, did not have the keys of the kingdom of heaven.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that Christ did not have the keys. For the keys are consequent on the character received in holy orders, as was said before, Distinction 18, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 2, first response. But Christ did not have a character, as was said above in Distinction 4, Question 1, Article 3, Subquestion 5. Therefore, he did not have the power of the keys.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ had the power of excellence in the sacraments, so that he could confer the effect of the sacrament without sacramentals. But the keys are a kind of sacramental. Therefore, he did not need the keys; and so it would have been in vain for him to have had them.

On the contrary, it is said in Revelation 3:7: who has the key of David, etc.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not only priests have the power of the keys. (Parallels: above, d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 3; d. 18, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 1; below, d. 20, a. 3, qa. 2, ad 1; d. 20, a. 4, qa. 2; d. 21, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 3; Super Matt. 16, n. 2.) For Isidore says that the porter has the judgment between the good and the wicked; he receives the worthy, and those unworthy he rejects. (Isidore, Etymologies (OCT, ed. Lindsay), Bk. 7, ch. 12, par. 32: “Ipsi enim tenentes clauem omnia intus extra que custodiunt, atque inter bonos et malos habentes iudicium fideles recipiunt, respuunt infideles.”) But this is the definition of the keys, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, not only priests but also porters have the keys.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the keys are given to priests when they receive power from God by their anointing. But kings also have divinely granted power over the people of the faithful, and they are also consecrated by an anointing. Therefore, priests are not the only ones with the power of the keys.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the order of priests applies to one individual person. But sometimes an entire congregation seems to have the keys, for some chapters can impose excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore, not only priests have the power of the keys.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a woman is not able to receive priestly ordination, for it does not befit her to teach, according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 14:34. But some women seem to have the keys, like abbesses, who have spiritual power over those under them. Therefore, not only priests have the keys.

On the contrary (1), Ambrose says: this right, namely, of binding and loosing, was only granted to priests. (Ambrose, On Repentance (SC 179), Bk. 1, ch. 2: “ecclesiae autem utrumque licet, haeresi utrumque non licet; ius enim hoc solis permissum sacerdotibus est.”)

Furthermore (2), by the power of the keys a person is made into an intermediary between God and the people. But this only applies to priests, who are established in those matters that are toward God, so that they may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins, as it says in Hebrews 5:1. Therefore, only priests have the keys.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that some people have said that in the old law the priests had the power of the keys, for it had been committed to them to impose penalties for crime, as it says in Leviticus 5, which seems to pertain to the keys; but at that time it was incomplete, whereas now it has been perfected by Christ in the priests of the new law. But this seems to be against the Apostle’s intention in the Letter to the Hebrews 9, where Christ’s priesthood takes precedence over the priesthood of the law by the fact that Christ presides as pontiff of future goods, leading us by his own blood into the heavenly tabernacle, not made by hands, into which the priesthood of the old law entered by the blood of goats and bulls. And therefore it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not extend to heaven, but to the figures of heavenly things. And therefore according to others it should be said that they did not have the keys, but a prefigurement of the keys.

Reply Obj. 1: The keys of the kingdom of heaven are consequent on the priesthood by which a man is led into heavenly things. But this was not the case with the order of Levitical priests. And therefore they did not have the keys to heaven, but keys to the earthly tabernacle.

Reply Obj. 2: Priests of the old law had the authority of discerning and judging, but not so that a man judged by them could be admitted to heavenly things, but into the figures of heavenly things.

Reply Obj. 3: They had spiritual power by which they purified men through the sacraments of the law, not from guilt, but from irregularities, so that the entrance to the tabernacle made by hands would stand open to anyone purified by them.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the power of doing something does not exist in the same way in the instrument and in the agent who acts through himself, but exists more perfectly in the one who acts through himself. Now the power of the keys that we have, as well as the power of the other sacraments, is an instrumental power. But in Christ it is like an agent who acts through himself for our salvation: by authority, inasmuch as he is God, but by merit, inasmuch as he is man. But the keys, by their very notion, express the power of opening and shutting, whether someone opens as the principal agent, or as a minister. And therefore in Christ there must be the power of the keys, but in a different way than it exists in his ministers; and therefore it is said that he has the keys of excellence.

Reply Obj. 1: The character, by its very notion, means something derived from another. And therefore the power of the keys, which exists in us as derived from Christ, follows the character by which we are conformed to Christ. But in Christ it does not follow a character, but a principal form.

Reply Obj. 2: Those keys that Christ had were not sacramental, but the principle of the sacramental keys.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that there are two kinds of keys. One, which extends directly to heaven itself, by removing impediments to the entrance into heaven through the forgiveness of sins, is called the key of holy orders, and only priests have this key, for they alone are ordained for the people in those matters that directly pertain to God. There is another key that does not extend to heaven itself directly, but by means of the Church Militant through which a person comes to heaven, when someone is excluded or admitted through it to the association of the Church Militant by excommunication and absolution, and this is called the key of jurisdiction in the forum of cases. And therefore non-priests can also have this key, like archdeacons or clerics, and others who can excommunicate, as was said above in the preceding Distinction, Question 2, Article 2, Subquestion 2. But this is not properly called the key to the kingdom of heaven, but a certain disposition to it.

Reply Obj. 1: The porter has the key for guarding those things that are contained in a material temple, and they have the discretion to exclude or admit to that kind of temple, but not as though judging by their own authority who is worthy or unworthy, but as carrying out the judgment of the priest, so that in this way they seem to be the ones somehow putting into effect the sacerdotal power.

Reply Obj. 2: Kings do not have any power in spiritual matters, and so do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom, but only in temporal matters, which can also only be from God, as is clear in Romans 13:1. Nor by their anointing are they consecrated in any sacred order, but it signifies that the excellence of their power comes down to them from Christ, so that they too reign under Christ over the Christian people.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in political matters sometimes a judge has all power, like a king in his kingdom, but sometimes many people are established in different offices or even on equal footing, as is clear from the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 10, 1161a1ff.; cf. Politics, Bk. 5, ch. 11, 1313b34.) so also spiritual jurisdiction can be held by one person alone, like the bishop, and by several together, like a chapter. And thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but all of them together do not have the key of holy orders.

Reply Obj. 4: A woman, according to the Apostle, (See 1 Timothy 2:11; Titus 2:5.) is in a state of subjection; and therefore she cannot have any spiritual jurisdiction, for also according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 8, corruption accompanies sophistication, when rule comes to a woman. And therefore a woman does not have the key of orders, nor the key of jurisdiction. But a certain use of the keys is committed to a woman in order to have the correction of the women under her, because there might be a risk of danger if men lived with women.

Article 2

Who can use the keys

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that holy men who are not priests also have the use of the keys. For the binding and loosing that is done through the keys has its efficacy from the merit of Christ’s Passion. But they, who follow the suffering Christ through patience and other virtues, are conformed the most to Christ’s Passion. Therefore, it seems that even if they do not have priestly orders, they can bind and loose.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Hebrews 7:7 it says, it is beyond dispute that the inferior is blessed by the superior. But in spiritual matters, according to Augustine, the greater is that which is better. (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 6, ch. 8: “in his enim quae non mole magna sunt hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse.”) Therefore, our betters, namely, those who have more charity, can bless others by absolving; and so the same as before.

On the contrary, the action belongs to whoever has the power, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Wakefulness, ch. 1, 454a8.) But the key, which is a spiritual power, only belongs to priests. Therefore, its use can also only apply to priests.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that wicked priests do not have the use of the keys. (Parallel: Super Ioan. 20, lec. 4.) For in John 20:22–23, where the use of the keys is handed over to the Apostles, the gift of the Holy Spirit is granted first. But the wicked do not have the Holy Spirit. Therefore, they do not have the use of the keys.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no wise king commits the stewardship of his treasury to his enemy. But the use of the keys consists in the stewardship of the treasury of the king of heaven, who is wisdom itself. Therefore, the wicked, who are his enemies through sin, do not have the use of the keys.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says that God gives the sacrament of grace also through the wicked; but grace itself comes only through him, or through his saints; and therefore he effects the remission of sins through himself, or through the members of the Dove himself. (Augustine, On Baptism against the Donatists, Bk. 5, ch. 21, par. 29 (CSEL 51:287).) But the remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not members of the Dove, do not have the use of the keys.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the intercession of bad priests does not have any effectiveness in reconciling. For according to Gregory, when someone who displeases is sent to intercede, the spirit of anger is provoked to worse things. (Gregory the Great, Regula pastoralis (CCSL 141), pt. 1, ch. 10.) But the use of the keys happens by a certain intercession, as is clear in the form of absolution, as will be said below in Distinction 22, Question 2, Article 2, Subquestion 3. Therefore, they do not have the efficacious use of the keys.

On the contrary (1), no one can know whether another person is in a state of salvation. Therefore, if no one could use the power of the keys for absolving unless he were in a state of salvation, no one would know whether he had been absolved, which is extremely unfitting.

Furthermore (2), the iniquity of the minister cannot take away the generosity of his master. But the priest is only a minister. Therefore, his own wickedness cannot take away the gift passed from God to us through him.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that schismatics and heretics, the excommunicated, the suspended, and the demoted, have the use of the keys. For just as the power of the keys depends on holy orders, so does the power of consecrating. But they cannot lose the power of consecrating, for if they consecrate the Eucharist, it is consecrated, although they sin by consecrating it, as was said above in Distinction 13, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 3 and 4. Therefore, neither can they lose the use of the keys.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every spiritual power active in someone who has the use of free will results in an act whenever he wills. But the power of the keys still remains in those mentioned, for since it is only given in holy orders, it would be necessary to re-ordain them when they returned to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise its act whenever they wish.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, spiritual grace is more impeded by guilt than by punishment. But excommunication and suspension and demotion are kinds of punishment. Therefore, since a person does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that neither does he lose it on account of these.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says that the Church’s charity forgives sins. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 121, par. 4: “ecclesiae caritas quae per spiritum sanctum diffunditur in cordibus nostris, participum suorum peccata dimittit; eorum autem qui non sunt eius participes, tenet.”) But charity is what causes the union of the Church. Therefore, since those people mentioned are divided from union with the Church, it seems that they do not have the use of the keys for forgiving sins.

Furthermore (2), no one is absolved from sin while he is sinning. But someone seeking absolution for sin from one of those mentioned sins against the Church’s precept by doing so. Therefore, he cannot be absolved from sin by them; and so the same as before.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that acting through oneself and acting instrumentally differ in the fact that an instrumental agent does not bring about an effect in his own likeness, but in the likeness of the principal agent. But the principal agent brings about his own likeness, and therefore the principal agent is established in the fact that he has a certain form that can be transferred to another. But the instrumental agent is not constituted this way, but by the fact that he is employed by the principal agent to bring about the effect. Therefore, since the principal agent in the act of the keys is Christ, as God by authority, and as man by merit, from the very fullness of divine goodness in him and from his perfection of grace it results that he has power in the act of the keys. But another man does not have power in the act of the keys as an agent who acts through himself, for neither can he of himself give another the grace by which sins are forgiven, nor sufficiently merit. And therefore he can only be an instrumental agent. And this is why someone who obtains the effect of the keys is not likened to the person using the keys, but to Christ; and because of this no matter how much grace someone has, it cannot amount to the effect of the keys, unless it is applied for this as a minister by the reception of holy orders.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as no likeness is required between an instrument and an effect according to sharing in form, but according to the proportion of the instrument to the effect, neither is a likeness required between the instrument and the principal agent. But in holy men this kind of likeness to the suffering Christ does exist, and this kind of likeness does not confer on them the use of the keys.

Reply Obj. 2: Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another condignly, nevertheless the merit of one person can cooperate toward the salvation of another; and therefore there are two kinds of blessing. One is from the mere man himself, as from one who merits by his own act. And this kind can be done by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by grace; and this requires superiority in goodness, at least to the extent that he merits such things. The other is the blessing by which a man blesses, as the one instrumentally applying to another the blessing that is from Christ’s merits; and for this the superiority of orders is required, not of virtue.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that just as participation in the form that is introduced into the effect does not make an instrument, so neither does the removal of the form take away the use of the instrument. And therefore since a man is only an instrumental agent in the use of the keys, no matter how much sin has deprived him of the grace by which the forgiveness of sins occurs, he is still not at all deprived of the use of the keys.

Reply Obj. 1: The gift of the Holy Spirit is required for the use of the keys, not such that without it, it cannot happen, but because without it, it happens inappropriately on the part of the one using it, although the person subjecting himself to the keys obtains their effect.

Reply Obj. 2: An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in his treasury, and this is why he does not commit its dispensation to his enemy. But the king of heaven cannot be cheated, for he grants everything to his own honor, even that some may use the keys badly: for he knows how to draw good things from bad people, and also to do many good things through bad people; and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks about the forgiveness of sins, according as holy men cooperate with it not by the power of the keys, but by their congruent merit. And therefore he says that also through wicked men he administers the sacraments; and among the other sacraments absolution, which is the use of the keys, should also be counted. But by members of the Dove, that is, by holy people, he causes the remission of sins inasmuch as he grants the remission of sins by their intercessions. Or it could be said that members of the Dove refer to all who are not cut off from the Church. For those who receive the sacraments from them obtain grace, but not those who receive them from people cut off from the Church, for they sin by that very fact, except in baptism, which in the case of necessity it is permissible to receive even from an excommunicated person.

Reply Obj. 4: The intercession that a wicked priest makes from his own person does not have efficacy; but the intercession he makes as minister of the Church has efficacy from the merit of Christ. However, in either way the priest’s intercession should benefit the people subject to him.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that in all those mentioned the power of the keys remains in its essence; but its use is impeded by a defect of matter. For since the use of the keys requires eminence in the user in relation to the one it is used for, as was said above, the proper matter over which the use of the keys is exercised is the man who is subject. And since one man is subject to another by the Church’s ordination, therefore also someone’s subjects can be taken away from him by the Church’s prelates. And therefore since the Church deprives heretics and schismatics and others like them by taking away their subjects, either simply, or in a certain respect, therefore with respect to whatever they have been deprived of they cannot have the use of the keys.

Reply Obj. 1: The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist over which a priest exercises his own power is not a man, but wheaten bread, and in baptism it is simply a man. And therefore just as if wheaten bread were taken away from a heretic he could not consecrate, so neither could he absolve if his eminence were taken away. He could still baptize and consecrate the Eucharist, although to his own damnation.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds true when the matter is not lacking, as it is in the case proposed.

Reply Obj. 3: The matter is not taken away by the fault itself, as by a certain punishment; and therefore the punishment does not impede by being contrary to the effect to be brought about, but by the reason given.

Article 3

On whom can a priest use the keys

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 4; below, d. 20, a. 1, qa. 2; d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 1; SCG IV, ch. 72; Quodl. XII, q. 19.) It seems that a priest could use the key that he has for anyone. For the power of the keys in priests comes to them from the Lord’s authoritative statement, in which he said: receive the Holy Spirit: if you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them (John 20:22). But he said this indeterminately about all people. Therefore, whoever has the keys can use them indeterminately for anyone.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a physical key that opens one lock opens all others of the same kind. But every sin of any person has the same nature as an obstacle to entering heaven. Therefore, if a priest can absolve one man by the keys that he holds, he can also absolve others.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old. But the priest of the Old Testament could use the power that he possessed of discerning among lepers with everyone indifferently (Deut 18:8). Therefore, much more can a priest of the Gospel use his power for everyone.

On the contary (1), it is said in the Decretals, Cause 16, Question 1: no priest is permitted to absolve or bind the parishioner of another priest. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 16, qu. 1, ch. 19, ‘Adjicimus’ (PL 187:996).) Therefore not just anyone can absolve just anyone.

Furthermore (2), spiritual judgment should be more ordered than temporal. But in temporal judgment, not just any judge can judge any given person. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, a priest cannot use his own power of keys over just anyone whatsoever.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a priest cannot always absolve those under him. For as Augustine says in the text, no one should enjoy the office of a priest unless he is exempt from those things that he judges in others. (Pseudo-Augustine, On true and false repentance, ch. 20 (PL 40:1129).) But sometimes it happens that a priest is a participant in a crime that one of his subjects committed, like when he has known a woman subject to him. Therefore, it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys for his subjects.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, by the power of the keys a man is cured of all defects. But sometimes there is a defect of irregularity attached to the sin, or a sentence of excommunication from which a simple priest cannot free him. Therefore, it seems that he cannot use the power of the keys for those who are entangled in these kinds of things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power and judgment of our priesthood was prefigured by the judgment of the old priesthood. But according to the law it did not befit lesser judges to discuss all things, but they had recourse to their superiors, as it says in Exodus 24:14: if any question should arise among you, refer it to them. Therefore, it seems that neither may a priest absolve his own subject of the more serious sins, but he should send him to his superior.

On the contrary (1), anyone to whom the most important thing is committed, is also entrusted with what is accessory to it. (Ch. ‘Prudentiam tuam’, de Offic. et Potest. jud. deleg.) But it is committed to priests to administer the Eucharist to their subjects, which is what absolution from sins is ordered toward. Therefore, a priest can absolve his own subjects from all their sins, as far lies within the power of the keys.

Furthermore (2), grace takes away all sin, no matter how little of it there is. But a priest administers the sacraments in which grace is given. Therefore, as far as it lies within the power of the keys, he can absolve all sins.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no one can use the keys over his own superior. (Parallel: above, d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3.) For any sacramental act requires the proper matter. But the proper matter of the use of the keys is a person subject to the possessor, as was said. Therefore, for someone who is not under him, a priest cannot use the keys.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Church Militant imitates the Church Triumphant. But in the heavenly Church, a lower angel never purifies or illuminates or perfects a higher one. Therefore, neither can any lower priest use the hierarchical action that exists through absolution for his superior.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the judgment of conscience should be more ordered than the judgment of an external court. But in the external forum a lower party cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, it seems that neither can it happen in the penitential forum.

On the contrary (1), a higher prelate is also beset by infirmity (Heb 5:2) and sin befalls him. But the remedy against sin is the power of the keys. Therefore, since he could not use the keys for himself, because no one can be judge and accused at the same time, it seems that someone below him can use the keys over him.

Furthermore (2), absolution, which happens by the power of the keys, is ordered to the reception of the Eucharist. But someone lower can administer the Eucharist to his superior, if he asks. Therefore, he can also use the power of the keys for him, if he will subject himself to him.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that those things that must work on particulars do not apply to all things in the same way. Therefore, just as after the general precepts of medicine, doctors must be summoned, by whom the universal precepts of medicine may be adapted to the individual sick men as needed, so also, in any leadership apart from him who hands down all precepts of law, it is necessary to have certain ones who adapt things to individuals as needed. And because of this also in the heavenly hierarchy under the powers, who are indistinctly at the head, are set the principalities, who are distributed to individual provinces. And under these are the angels who are assigned to the care of individual people, as is clear from what was said in Book 2, Distinction 20. And so it ought also to be this way in the hierarchy of the Church Militant, that some one person whould have eminence indistinctly over all, and under this would be others who would receive distinct power over different people. And because the use of the keys requires a certain power of eminence by which the person for whom the use of the keys is employed becomes the proper matter of that act, therefore the person who has indistinct power over all can use the keys on behalf of anyone. But those who receive distinct powers under this person cannot use the keys for everyone, but only for those who fall under their care, unless it is an emergency, when no one should be refused the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 1: Two powers are required for the absolution of sin, namely, the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction. Now the first power exists equally in all priests, but not the second; and therefore where the Lord (John 20:22) gave commonly to all his apostles the power of forgiving sins, it is understood as a power that follows holy orders; and therefore these words are also said to priests when they are ordained. But to Peter he gave, in a singular manner, the power of forgiving sins (Matt 16:19), so that it may be understood that he had the power of jurisdiction over all the others. Now the power of holy orders, in itself, extends to absolving all people; and this is why the Lord said indeterminately, if you forgive anyone’s sins; nevertheless understanding what the use of that power would have to be, and presupposing the power conferred on Peter in accord with his ordination.

Reply Obj. 2: Even a material key can only open its proper lock, nor can any active power act on anything but its proper matter. Now, someone becomes the proper matter of the power of holy orders by jurisdiction; and therefore no one can use the power of the keys for someone over whom he is not given jurisdiction.

Reply Obj. 3: The people of Israel was one people, and had only one temple. And therefore it was not necessary for the priests’ jurisdiction to be distinguished, as in the Church, in which diverse peoples and nations are brought together.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the power of holy orders, as it is in itself, extends to the forgiveness of all sins, but because jurisdiction, which comes to the lower parties from the greater ones, is required for the use of this power, as was said, for this reason a superior can reserve certain things to himself whose judgment he does not commit to his inferior. Otherwise a simple priest having jurisdiction is able to absolve any sin. But there are five cases in which it is necessary that a simple priest send the penitent to his superior. The first is when a solemn penance is to be imposed, because the proper minister of this is the bishop, as was said above in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 5, Subquestion 3, response to the third objection. The second regards those who have been excommunicated, when a lower priest cannot give absolution. The third is when he finds that an irregularity has been contracted, for whose dispensation he must send to his superior. The fourth is for arsonists. The fifth is when it is the custom in a certain diocese that the most egregious crimes inciting panic are reserved to the bishop: for custom gives or takes away the power in such matters.

Reply Obj. 1: In such a case the priest should not hear the confession of the woman with whom he sinned concerning that sin, but should send her to another; nor should that woman confess to him, but she should seek permission to go to another, or have recourse to his superior, if he refuses her permission, both because of the danger and because there is less shame. Nevertheless, if he should give her absolution, she would be absolved. For Augustine’s saying, that he should not be involved in the same crime, is to be understood according to appropriateness, not according to the essence of the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2: Penance frees from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment: for even after completing the penance for homicide, a person still remains irregular. Therefore, a priest can give absolution for the crime, and send the person to his superior to remove the punishment, except in excommunication, for the release from that must precede the absolution from sin: because as long as someone is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument has to do with those matters in which superiors reserve the powers of jurisdiction to themselves.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the power of the keys, as it exists in itself, extends to all, as has been said. But it happens that a priest cannot use the power of the keys for a certain person because his power is specifically limited to certain people. Therefore, whoever limited it can extend it to whomever he wished; and because of this he can also give him power over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys for himself, for the power of the keys requires a someone subjected as its matter, and thus, someone else; for a person cannot subjected to himself.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the bishop who is absolved by a simple priest is his superior simply speaking, nevertheless he is his inferior inasmuch as he subjects himself to the priest as a sinner.

Reply Obj. 2: No defect can occur in the angels by reason of which they are subject to their own inferiors, as happens among men. And therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 3: Outward judgment is according to men, but the judgment of confession is directed to God, before whom a person is rendered less by the fact that he sins, but not among the rankings of men. And therefore in outward judgment just as no one can give the sentence of excommunication to himself, so neither can he commit it to another, nor excommunicate himself. But in the forum of conscience he can commit his own absolution to another, which he cannot use for himself. Or it could be said that absolution in the forum of confession is chiefly of the power of the keys, and it has to do with jurisdiction as a consequence. But excommunication has to do with jurisdiction entirely. However, as to the power of orders, all priests are equal, but not as to jurisdiction; and therefore it is not the same.

Question 2

Fraternal chastisement

Next, fraternal chastisement should be considered; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, what it is;

• second, to whom it pertains;
• third, of its manner and order.
• Article 1

What it is

Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 32, a. 2, ad 3; q. 33, a. 1 and a. 3.) It seems that a certain definition of fraternal chastisement is badly formulated: fraternal chastisement is the admonition of a brother about the amendment of his misdeeds in fraternal charity. For admonishing seems to be the same as reminding, and so it is only for things that have been forgotten. But fraternal chastisement is not only about forgotten sins. Therefore, admonition is wrongly included in its definition.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, chastisement suggests a certain violence, for corripere seems to mean rapere at once. (The verb corripere (to chastice) seems to be a combination of the prefix co- (together, at once) and the verb rapere (to seize).) Therefore, since admonition conveys a certain gentleness, it seems that chastisement is not admonition.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, chastising someone seems to be for his correction. But this belongs to God alone, since to correct, corrigere, means to rule together, (That is, the verb corrigere seems to be a combination of the prefix co- (together, at once) and the verb regere (to rule).) which belongs to God alone, as is clear from Proverbs 16, 1 and 9: the plans of the mind belong to man . . . but God directs his steps. Therefore, it should not say that it is of a brother.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, admonition seems to pertain to something to be done or avoided. But the amendment of misdeeds pertains to something already done or omitted. Therefore, it seems that chastisement cannot be an admonition about the amendment of misdeeds.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, things that are more serious stand in more need of amendment. But transgressions are more serious than omissions, generally speaking. Therefore since omission is suggested in the word ‘misdeed,’ while transgression is implied more in the word ‘sin’, as was said in Book II, Distinction 42, (Question 2, Article 2, Subquestion 3, argument 3.) it seems that it should be called the amendment of sins rather than of misdeeds.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, fraternal chastisement seems to be a work of justice, as is seen in the Gloss of Rabanus (See Glossa, PL 114:146.) on Matthew 18:15: if another member of the Church sins against you, etc. For he says, let us correct the sinner with the zeal of justice and open the depths of mercy to the penitent. Therefore it should say proceeding from justice rather than from charity.

I answer that, that a man may tread rightly on the way of salvation, the person who has care of him has three responsibilities toward him. The first is that he be directed to the right end; and as to this the superior is said to direct someone entrusted to him. The second, that he employ caution, lest he depart from the path leading to the end; and as to this one is said to rule him. Third, that if it should happen that he depart, he should be brought back to the right path; and as to this one is said to correct him: sometimes, indeed, so that the rectitude of justice be done by him, namely, when the person who failed is amended by the task imposed on him. But sometimes so that the rectitude of justice concerning him be accomplished through the penalties inflicted, even if he were not corrected on his side.

But someone who departs from the path of rectitude can be led back to the path of rectitude in two ways according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 9, 1179b11.) In one way by the fear or hatred of shame; as when someone abominates the baseness of sin and the shame resulting from it. In another way by the fear and hatred of sadness; as when someone shrinks from sin because of the punishments suffered for sin, or that he fears will be inflicted. And since that second way involves a certain violence, it is therefore called correction, as something that induces one to rectitude. But the first way is properly called chastisement or correptio. For those things are said to be seized (rapi) that are suddenly carried off; which is why a syllable is said to be chastised (corripi) which is pronounced hurriedly and quickly. And because of this when a man returns on his own to the way of rectitude by the mere fact that the shamefulness of sin has been shown to him and someone urges him to better things, he is said to be chastened. By this it is clear that the second way only applies to prelates, whose words have a compelling force by the infliction of punishments. But the first way does not require the order of prelate, although the order of prelate also requires it; for the second way should only be applied where the first cannot take place, even by prelates.

And therefore when chastisement happens outside the order of prelates, it is called fraternal, which is denoted by three things included in the definition given above: namely, the act itself, when it says, the admonition of a brother; the end, when it says, the amendment of misdeeds; and the principle, when it says, proceeding from fraternal charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone can be led back to his own mind in two ways. In one way, as to speculative knowledge, and then a person is admonished about things he has forgotten or of which he was ignorant; in another way as to practical knowledge, which is forestalled by the ignorance of choice. (The “ignorance of choice” is when a person does not know in the particular what he knows in the universal.) And thus there are two ways a person is led back to his mind. In one way, by some kind of compulsion, whether by actions, as when someone is punished, or by words having compelling force, as when someone is commanded to do something; and this pertains to correction. In another way, only by words that have no compulsive force; and such words are called admonitory. And therefore since this way pertains to the one chastising, chastisement is nothing other than admonition; and admonition is an act of the same power as command.

Reply Obj. 2: Chastisement is named from seizing insofar as plundering is something suddenly and immediately accomplished, but not as it contains anything of violence, except as to the fact that someone who chastises strives to wrench a sinner from his own will by which he has sinned. And so there is something in it like violence, according as what is contrary to the will is called violent.

Reply Obj. 3: It is already clear from what has been said that a person can chastise who does not have the power to correct. But anyone who can correct can also direct, if indeed direct means only someone’s ordering to an end. But if it means bringing someone through to the end, then only God can direct, for only he can remove impediments, so that someone may arrive at the end unimpeded.

Reply Obj. 4: A certain present or future act can regard past sin: and therefore, although amendment concerns past sin, nonetheless sometimes the admonition itself cannot be directed to this past sin; and therefore admonition can concern the amending itself, inasmuch as amendment can be called the sinner’s return to the state of right action, which is the aim of chastisement.

Reply Obj. 5: No one is moved by hatred or fear of shame except someone who already has in some way the desire for the good and beautiful. And therefore since chastisement proceeds by this path, as was said, to be chastised properly applies to that person who does have the aim of the good, from which, however, he has been turned, either because of ignorance or because of some other slackness. And therefore it more properly has to do with omission, which can also be considered in a transgression, than with the perversity of transgression. And for this reason it more appropriately says misdeeds than sins.

Reply Obj. 6: When someone sins, justice is injured and the sinner is injured. And accordingly, the one who confronts the sinner can be attending to two things: namely, to the injury of justice (but this properly belongs to the one to whom is committed the protection of justice, which is the common good, namely, the prelate, who is a public person); and again, to the injury of the sinner; and this properly belongs to whoever has the care of his defects. And since this is proper to friendship, which does more to help out a friend in the loss of virtue than in the loss of outward things, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 3, 1165b19.) for this reason it directly pertains to charity. So although correction is an act of justice, nevertheless, chastisement is an act of charity or mercy. Nonetheless, since the private good should be ordered to the public good as its end, even someone who chastises out of charity looks to the injury of justice in some way; and the Gloss quoted should be understood accordingly.

Article 2

Who may chastise another

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 33, a. 2; de Virtutibus, q. 3, a. 1.) It seems that not everyone is bound to fraternal chastisement by precept. For Jerome says: let priests strive to fulfill that Gospel command: if your brother has sinned against you, etc. (In fact, Origen, Homily 7 on Joshua, n. 6 (PG 12:861).) Therefore, it seems that only priests are bound to this.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever chastises someone bears the care of him. But only prelates are bound by precept to have care of those under them. Therefore, they alone are bound to chastise by precept.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, precepts always oblige, while counsels only oblige in a certain special case. But a person is not obliged to chastise except in case of necessity; otherwise a person would have to leave all his affairs to pursue chastisement, since things to be chastised happen every day. Therefore, fraternal chastisement does not fall under precept but under counsel.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a person is not released from God’s precepts because of a religious vow. Therefore, if every person were bound to chastise his brother by precept, it seems that religious would have to go out of their cloisters to rebuke wrongdoers in the world; which is false, for then the observance of religious life would perish.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a person should not incite his neighbor to hate him. For Gregory says: it should not be feared that someone who is charged with abuses may not listen, but it should be feared lest he should be dragged deeper into hatred. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 8, par. 52.) But often hatred is provoked by chastisement, for truth begets hatred. Therefore, no man is bound to chastise.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, a man should chastise where he has judgment, as commenting on the text, if your brother should sin against you, etc. (Matt 18:15), the Gloss says: for if he has sinned against God, it is not for our judgment. (Glossa, PL 114:146.) Therefore, since every sin is against God, we cannot chastise anyone for sin.

On the contrary (1), commenting on Matthew 18:15, if your brother should sin against you, etc., the Gloss (Ibid.) says: someone who sees his brother sin and is silent sins like one who is not kind to a penitent. But all are bound to be kind to sinners by the precept of charity. Therefore also to chastise wrongdoers.

Furthermore (2), spiritual alms are more necessary than physical ones. But physical alms are under precept, as was said above in Distinction 15, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 4. Therefore, also the chastisement of sinners, since it is a spiritual almsgiving, as was said there.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a sinner who chastises does not sin: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves (1 John 1:8). (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 33, a. 5; q. 60, a. 2, ad 3; de Virtutibus, q. 3, a. 1, ad 15–16; Super Ioan. 8, lec. 1; Super Rom. 2, lec. 1.) Therefore, if it does not belong to sinners to chastise, no one can chastise another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one is excused from observing a precept because of sin. Therefore, a sinner is bound to chastise, since it is under precept; and if he does not chastise, he sins. Therefore, if he chastised by committing a sin, he would be entrapped, which is unfitting.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, physical almsgiving is less necessary than spiritual. But a sinner does not sin by giving physical alms. Therefore, neither would he by chastisement, for chastisement is a spiritual almsgiving, as was said.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is a greater thing to teach Sacred Scripture than to admonish any individual, for anyone can do the latter, but not the former. But some people say that the person teaching Sacred Scripture does not sin by doing so, even if he is in sin at the time. Therefore, much less would someone sin who chastised his brother, although he himself was in sin at that time.

On the contrary (5), whoever chastises another judges him in some way. But anyone who judges another about what he has committed, condemns himself, as is clear from Romans 2:1. Therefore, a sinner sins by rebuking another.

Furthermore (6), the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 1, 1172a34-b8.) that when speeches that are about morals are at odds with the things seen in the person saying them, they are condemned and extinguish the truth. But in a sinner who rebukes another about sin, what is seen in him by the senses is at odds with his words. Therefore, as far as in him lies, he extinguishes the truth. But this is a sin. Therefore, such a person sins by chastising.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone is not bound to chastise his own prelate. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 33, a. 4; de Virtutibus, q. 3, a. 1, ad 18.) For commenting on Galatians 2:11, I opposed him to his face, the Gloss says, as an equal. (Glossa, PL 114:574; PL 192:108.) Therefore, if Paul had not been Peter’s equal, he could not have rebuked him, and so it seems that fraternal chastisement does not extend to prelates.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in his letters (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 3 and 4 (PG 3:1091).) Dionysius blames the Demophilus for rebuking a priest, because the priest was his superior. Therefore, fraternal chastisement does not extend to superiors.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in 2 Samuel 6:7, Uzzah is read to have been struck by the Lord, because he touched the Ark. But the prelate is signified by the Ark, and the subject by Uzzah. Therefore, a subject sins by chastising his prelate.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in his Pastoral Rule, Gregory says: subjects should be admonished lest they rashly judge the lives of those set over them, if by chance they see them act reprehensibly. (Gregory the Great, Regula pastoralis (CCSL 141), pt. 3, ch. 4.) Therefore, it seems that it would be temerity to accuse a prelate who commits an offense.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Gregory says: let no one presume to correct the lives of the holy ones, except someone who perceives that he is better. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 5, par. 11: “Sed perdit uitam qui arcam dei tumide subleuat, quia nequaquam quis sanctorum corrigere recta praesumeret nisi de se prius meliora sensisset.”) But this seems to be presumption if a man should perceive better things about himself than his prelate. Therefore, they are not to be chastised.

On the contrary (1), since fraternal chastisement is spiritual almsgiving, it is a work of mercy. But mercy is owed to one’s prelate most of all, for he stands in the greatest danger. And this is why Augustine says in his rule: but have mercy not only on yourselves, but also him, namely, the prelate, for the greater a place he holds among you, the greater the danger that he dwells in. (Augustine, Regula, n. 11 (PL 32:1384); cf. Epistle 211 (PL 33:965).) Therefore, fraternal chastisement also extends to prelates.

Furthermore (2), it says in Ecclesiastes 17:14 that God gave commandment to each of them concerning the neighbor. But our prelate is our neighbor. Therefore, we should rebuke him if he commits an offense.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that people are sufficiently ordered in this life by the precepts of divine law. But like in an army, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 11, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 12, ch. 10, 1075a12ff.) there are two orderings: one by which the whole army is ordered to the commander; and another by which individuals are ordered to each other. Likewise, in living out of this life there are two orderings of all those who are brought together in any community: one to a prelate, another of individuals to each other. Therefore, both orderings must be instituted by the precept of divine law. Now, the ordering of the prelate to his subject consists in the fact that all his subjects tend toward the common good, which the prelate should intend, and in the fact that the prelate directs them to this. Now, the ordering of individuals to each other is that each one supplies help to the others for obtaining his good; and so just as it falls to prelates by precept to bear the care of their subjects, and to subjects to obey their prelates, so also it is the responsibility of those who are equals to give assistance to each other not only in physical things but even more in spiritual things. And therefore since the greatest help is given to a man by chastisement in spiritual matters, the precept of divine law must extend to this.

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome speaks of the chastisement that is joined to correction, which is clear from the fact that he adds, for what is the mercy in sparing one person and plunging all into crisis? (Again, Origen, as cited in Decretals, pt. 1, d. 45, ch. 17 (PL 187:241).) And this kind of chastisement only belongs to prelates.

Reply Obj. 2: A person can have the care of another simply or in a certain respect. The person to whose management the whole direction of someone’s life has been committed is the one who has care of him simply; for providing and care have to do with the order to the end, toward which a man tends through his whole life. And so no one but the prelate has the care of another, for the sake of which he has power over his subject. But a person has care in a certain respect with regard to one thing, as anyone has the care of another to help him in some particular case, for God gave the command to each concerning his neighbor (Sirach 17:14); and according to the Apostle, the members may have the same care for one another (1 Cor 12:25).

Reply Obj. 3: Affirmative precepts also do not oblige one to act at all times, although they always oblige. And thus what we are obliged to in one case and not in another is not a counsel, but a precept; for a counsel never obliges unless it changes into a precept by something incidental. Now, the time at which it obliges is when the offending person meets him, and he can be chastened in a suitable way, and his amendment is hoped for, and there is no other to whom it falls by office to chastise him; or if the person who has the responsibility appears negligent in correcting him. For if no amendment were hoped for, but rather his worsening out of impatience with being chastised, one would be excused from the precept. Likewise if the prelate appeared diligent about correcting his subject.

Reply Obj. 4: Some people say that the monk should not leave his cloister to chastise the offender, for his time is devoted to a better work, namely, contemplation. But this does not seem true; for someone must leave even his contemplation in order to be of assistance in the salvation of his neighbors. And therefore it should be said that if the opportunity of chastising was presented to a monk, he too would be bound to chastise. But he is not bound to leave his cloister to seek offenders, or to break the statutes of his order, lest he himself should fall into the danger from which he is bound to free another.

Reply Obj. 5: We should always avoid hatred resulting from chastisement by our fault, namely, from an indiscrete chastisement. But if someone were provoked to hatred by what should have incited him to love, it is not to be worried about, particularly when his sin tends to injuring others, or the resulting damage or the sin itself is worse than the hatred that we excite against ourselves; or when we hope that the hatred will gradually cool, and correction may nevertheless follow in the end. For, as Chrysostom says, better is hatred on account of God than friendship on account of God. For when we are loved because of him, we are debtors to God; but when we endure hatred because of him, we make him our debtor. (John Chrysostom, On the Second Epistle to Timothy, hom. 7, n. 2 (PG 62:639).)

Reply Obj. 6: This Gloss is to be understood as speaking of when God has been sinned against, i.e., when only he knows. Or it speaks not about chastisement but the forgiveness that follows; for what is on our side, we can forgive, but not what is on God’s side.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that there are two opinions about this. For some say that someone who is in a similar sin, or a greater one, cannot chastise another, whether his sin is notorious or secret, because the one judging another passes sentence upon himself. But others say that if the sin is secret, he can chastise without sinning, but not if it is notorious. Now both opinions are true in a certain respect. For there are two ways that someone can chastise. In one way, by office, as prelates chastise; and this is how the first opinion contains truth, for whenever someone employs his office unworthily, he sins. But someone who is in mortal sin, even secretly, unworthily employs the office of rulership. Therefore, he sins by chastising or anything else of his proper office that he exercises. In the other way, a person chastises out of the zeal of charity, not as a minister of the Church; and then in chastisement there cannot be sin, unless by reason of scandal, which does not arise unless there is a notorious sin; and this is how the second opinion has truth. Therefore, if a prelate or his subject, abiding in notorious sin, should see someone sin, he can admonish him not in the manner of one rebuking, but in the manner of one beseeching, so that the other may not be incited to evil by his own example.

Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin does not render anyone unworthy to exercise a sacred office, like mortal sin does; thus neither is it bound to scandalize, for no one is found immune to venial sins. And therefore someone in venial sin does not sin even if he rebukes someone about the same thing, unless it seems likely that scandal will follow from the chastisement: and the authority quoted is speaking about this kind of sin, namely, venial.

Reply Obj. 2: A sinner is not entrapped; nor, however, is he absolved from the command to chastise. For he can forgive sins or resign his office or even, while humbly admitting his own sin, admonish another by beseeching; and then he does not sin.

Reply Obj. 3: In physical almsgiving, no one is found in conflict with the life he lives in sin, as was said about chastisement; and therefore a sinner giving alms does not scandalize as someone generates scandal by chastising.

Reply Obj. 4: Teaching Sacred Scripture happens in two ways. In one way by the office of prelate, as the one who preaches, teaches; for it is not permitted to anyone to preach unless he holds eminence of office, or has this eminence by someone’s authority: how will they preach unless they are sent? (Rom 10:15). In another way, by the office of teacher, as teachers of theology teach. Therefore some people say that someone who teaches in the first way sins mortally if he is in notorious mortal sin, but not someone who teaches in the second way. But this is false; for those who teach Sacred Scripture have the same aim as those who wrote that Scripture; therefore, since the writing of Scripture is ordered to leading a man to eternal life, as is clear from John 20:31, whoever impedes the aim of this teaching, sins by teaching it. But anyone who teaches Sacred Scripture while in sin impedes the aim of this teaching, for he professes to know God with his mouth, but denies him by his deeds. And it should be said that anyone who is in notorious sin, sins whether he teaches in this way or the other; but the person who is in secret sin, sins if he teaches in the first way, but not in the second.

Reply Obj. 5: And since the other arguments seem to conclude that in no way is it permitted for someone in sin to chastise, therefore it should be said to the fifth objection that by the very fact that someone judges another in rebuking him, if he is in the same sin, he condemns himself, i.e., he shows himself to be condemnable, but he does not always add a new reason for damnation.

Reply Obj. 6: That argument applies to a case of obvious sin.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that some people say that fraternal chastisement does not extend to prelates; both because a man should not set his mouth toward heaven, and because prelates can be easily scandalized if they are chastised by their subjects. But this is nothing; for prelates, insofar as they sin, are not heaven, and accordingly rebuke is owed to them. Nor again does someone who chastises them charitably set his mouth toward them, that is, against them, but for them, for he admonishes them for their benefit. Nor again should anyone presume of his prelate that he will be unjustly scandalized, unless the contrary is evident, for they are in the state of perfection, while passive scandal does not happen to the perfect, but to little ones.

And therefore it should be said that although a prelate is a public person, and holds the place of God over his subjects, he does not lose those things that are proper to an individual person. And therefore all those things that are due to a person from fraternal affection, which should be had for all men, are also due to the prelate, just as he too owes to others those things that the affection of charity demands. Nor is he excused from these things by reason of his eminence. And therefore according to others, the precept of fraternal chastisement also extends to prelates, so that they are to be chastised by their subjects; and just as a prelate must bear those things that belong to charity toward his subjects in such a way that no detriment is produced to his authority, lest when humility is too much preserved, the authority of ruling might be weakened, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Regula, n. 10 (PL 32:1384); cf. Epistle 211 (PL 33:965).) so the rebuking of prelates must be done in such a way that nothing of reverence is diminished; and therefore it says, do not rebuke an older man, but entreat him as a father (1 Tim 5:1).

Reply Obj. 1: Paul opposed Peter to his face before everyone, as it says in the same place. But this went beyond the manner of fraternal chastisement due to prelates from their subjects. For prelates are not to be chastised by their subjects before the multitude, but humbly in private, unless there is an imminent threat to the faith. For then a prelate becomes the lesser one, if he falls into infidelity, and his faithful subject becomes the greater.

Reply Obj. 2: That monk is blamed for unjustly chastising a priest acting rightly, and for extending his rebuke to correction by imposing a punishment, for he struck the priest and ejected him from the church. Now, although prelates are chastised by their subjects, nevertheless it is not theirs to inflict penalties, but to resort to the prelate’s superior by denouncing him, or if he does not have a superior, to resort to God, who may correct him or take him out of their midst.

Reply Obj. 3: Touching the ark was not for Levites, but for priests; and therefore Uzzah was struck, because he usurped the office of his superior. But fraternal chastisement does not follow office, but the affection of charity. And therefore the argument does not conclude about fraternal chastisement, but about the correction that is applied by prelates, which a subject cannot apply to his prelate.

Reply Obj. 4: Gregory forbids the judgment of temerity, lest namely someone should easily change the prelates’ deeds into evil, or speak badly about them before others; but he does not forbid the judgment of fraternal chastisement when it is done with reverence.

Reply Obj. 5: Although it is presumptuous if someone simply sets himself above another in goodness, particularly a holy man, nevertheless, it is not presumptuous to consider oneself better with respect to a certain deed, if a prelate did not do it.

Article 3

The manner and order of fraternal chastisement

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 33, a. 7; de Virtutibus, q. 3, aa. 1–2; Quodl. I, q. 8, a. 2; Quodl. XI, q. 10, aa. 1–2; Super Matt. 18.) It seems that it is not necessary for fraternal admonition to precede the denunciation made to the Church. For according to Augustine in his book On Lying, from the deeds of the saints we gather what we should understand in the Scriptures. (Augustine, On Lying, ch. 15, par. 26: “his ergo exceptis ea, quae in nouo testamento a sanctis facta sunt, ubi morum imitandorum euidentissima commendatio est, ualeant ad exempla intellegendarum scripturarum, quae in praeceptis digesta sunt” (CSEL 41:447).) But Christ denounced Judas to the disciples before making any admonition to him, as is clear from John 13:26. Likewise, Peter condemned Ananias and Sapphira before any admonition, as is clear from Acts 5. Similarly, Paul rebuked Peter before everyone, without any previous private warning. Therefore, it seems that fraternal admonition should not always precede the denunciation to be made to the Church.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a man should do more to prevent greater danger. But sometimes there is a greater risk if a sin is not made public than the evil that is the defamation of one man; for a hidden sinner can corrupt many in faith or morals, which he could not do if his sin were brought out into the open; or the multitude is also defamed, if one of the multitude committed the sin; nor is such disrepute erased except by the punishment of the sin, which cannot be imposed unless the sin is brought out into the open. Therefore, admonition should not precede denunciation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to accuse someone in a chapter meeting is to speak to the Church. But religious often accuse each other in chapter meetings without any previous admonition. Therefore, it is not necessary for the admonition to always precede the denunciation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if a crime is prosecuted by accusation or even by inquisition, it is a more serious way of prosecuting than by denunciation; for greater punishment is also inflicted. But someone can proceed to accusation without an admonition beforehand, once an inquisition has been made, as Innocent III says in the Decretals. (Qualiter, Extra. de Accusationibus.) Therefore, neither is it necessary that admonition come before denunciation.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one is bound to obey another against divine precept. But if a prelate commanded someone who knew the crime of his brother to tell him, he would be bound to speak before giving an admonition. And it would be the same if he commanded someone who had committed a crime, although the prelate would sin by asking, for according to the order of the law an oath concerning the truth to be spoken is asked for also in a criminal case from the person who is accused. Therefore, it seems that it is not required by precept that an admonition precede denunciation.

On the contrary (1), commenting on this text: if a brother sins against you (Matt 18:15), the Gloss says: by this order we must avoid scandals. (Glossa, PL 114:146.) But what ‘must be done’ is from a precept that obligates. Therefore, the order of admonishment is under precept.

Furthermore (2), Fraternal admonishment is under precept so that a man may rescue his brother from sin. But sometimes it might give the occasion of sin to the brother, if he was suddenly exposed in public. Therefore, the Gloss says in the same place: admonish him between yourself and him alone, lest someone publicly rebuked should lose shame, and once having lost it, he should remain in sin. Therefore, according to the necessity of precept, a private admonition should precede a denunciation.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the calling of witnesses is unfittingly placed in the order of chastisement. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 33, a. 8; de Virtutibus, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2, ad 24–26; Quodl. XI, q. 10, a. 1; Super Matt. 18.) For this order of chastisement is either understood of public sin, or of secret sin. If it is about public sin, it is not necessary to bring in witnesses, for it is evident. If it is about secret sin, it is not necessary to make it known to those who do not know about it, for then a man would be the informer of a crime. Therefore, it seems that in no way is the presenting of witnesses required.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in his rule, where he sets down the order of fraternal correction, that the sin of a brother is demonstrated by others (namely, witnesses), through whom he may be convicted, if he denies it. (Augustine, Regula, n. 7 (PL 32:1381).) But someone cannot be convicted by one witness, for in the mouth of two or three witnesses must every word stand (Matt 18:16). Therefore, it is said unfittingly that one witness or two may be brought forth; for there must always be at least two.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, chastisement should also be done for a sin committed only once. But for what has already happened, witnesses cannot be brought forth, so that those who did not see may see: sometimes it may also not be easily repeated; or if it is repeated, the sinner guards himself against the one chastising, so that he may not even see him sinning, let alone bring others to see. Nor again should the one who knows the sin of his brother give him any occasion to repeat the sin, so that he might apprehend him in it, for this would be to be an accomplice in the sin. Therefore, it seems that bringing in witnesses is not required for admonishment.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to speak to the prelate is to speak to the Church. But Augustine says in his rule (Ibid.) that before proving it by others, through whom he is to be convicted if he denied it, it must first be shown to the one in charge, if the person admonished had neglected to be corrected. Therefore, it seems that the presenting of witnesses should not precede denunciation, but should follow it.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that chastisement as a private warning should be harsh. For in Matthew 3:7 and Luke 3:7, John the Baptist said, you brood of vipers, which was a most harsh chastisement. Therefore, it seems that one should correct another harshly.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it says in Titus 1:13, rebuke them sharply.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, anger through zeal incites one to fraternal chastisement. But anger contains harshness. Therefore, a person should be corrected harshly.

On the contrary (1), you, who are spiritual, instruct such a person in a spirit of gentleness (Gal 6:1). Therefore, it seems that he should not be rebuked sharply.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says: let the just man admonish and rebuke in mercy. (Augustine, Contra epistulam Parmeniani, Bk. 2, ch. 21, par. 41 (CSEL 51:96); cf. Expositions of the Psalms, Ps. 140, n. 5.) Therefore, it should be a gentle admonishment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 3, 1131b20–23.) a lesser evil, when it is chosen in preference to a greater evil, takes on the character of a greater good. And for this reason if a medical doctor can, he frees a man entirely from illness, but if he cannot, he neglects the lesser evil, in order to counter greater evil; just as he amputates one member, lest the whole body be infected. And the Lord commanded that this order be kept when we spiritually medicate sinners by rebuking them. But a sinner incurs two evils by his sin: the loss of his innocence, and the expense of his reputation. And therefore the first thing to be attempted is that that innocence be restored in such a way that the reputation is also preserved.

But if, on the contrary, the reputation must be disregarded so that conscience may be revived, the loss of reputation should be minimized as much as possible, if it cannot be done otherwise, so that namely the crime is exposed to few people at first and afterward to many.

And therefore the Lord established this order of chastisement, that first a brother is chastised in private, so that then he may recover his innocence and not lose his reputation. Then, if this medicine was not effective, he should be exposed to few people, so that his reputation is not entirely lost. And then if he is not chastened, his reputation must be entirely disregarded, and he must be exposed in public, because if even public chastisement and admonition did not benefit him, he must be entirely cut off by the judgment of the Church, so that he may be like the heathen and the publican (Matt 18:17). And therefore it should be said that just as fraternal chastisement falls under precept, so does the order of chastisement.

Reply Obj. 1: In the observation of precepts the intention of the lawgiver and the reason for the precept should always be attended to. But the Lord commanded that a private admonishment should precede public denunciation, so that an amendment of life might be hoped for, and the sinner’s reputation might be spared. And because the Lord knew that Judas would not be corrected if he chastised him, but rather exacerbated, for it is not probable that words would move someone who was not moved by seeing so many miracles, this is why he did not admonish him; and because he also knew perhaps that he would be much exacerbated, and become much worse. Nevertheless, it is not the same with him as with us: for he knew the secrets of the heart, and future events, but we do not. And so, unless someone’s incorrigibility and his future exacerbation appear by the most certain signs, fraternal chastisement should not be omitted. But concerning Peter it must be said that perhaps their sin was public or was about to be made public; or perhaps he knew that rebuking them would do no good; or he even did it by the counsel of the Holy Spirit to alarm, since this was needed by the condition of the early Church, lest its authority should come into contempt. But concerning Paul the answer is clear. For Peter sinned before everyone, and therefore he had to be confronted before everyone. But this order should be followed in the case of hidden sins; and this is why it says, if your brother has sinned against you, that is, with only you knowing.

Reply Obj. 2: In sins one must consider whether the sin is entirely secret, or whether it has come to the knowledge of others, or whether it is visible so that it does. For if the sin has already come to others’ notice, then the sinner must be denounced to someone who has the power of correcting him, so that those who have been scandalized by his fault may be edified by his punishment. But if it has not yet come out into public, but is in the process of doing so, then he should also be denounced, so that future scandal may be countered.

But if it is entirely secret, then one should consider whether the amendment of the sinner can be probably hoped for or not, which one can easily notice if one considers whether he sinned by his choice or by a passion, or out of malice or weakness, which is the same thing. Indeed, this can be assessed by the condition of the sinner, and the repetition of the act. For if someone has fallen into a certain sin often and unchecked by any restraint, it is a sign that he sins from malice or choice, and he will not easily be amended. But if once, when the occasion of sinning was presented, he slipped into sin and afterward showed sadness and shame for his sin, it is a sign that the sin is from passion or weakness, and that he will be amended more easily.

Therefore, if amendment is hoped for, admonition should precede, and denunciation should be deferred until it is seen that the sinner has not amended, unless perhaps there is a risk of a similar occasion of falling into sin, which the one warned would still not wish to turn aside from. For then he should denounce the sinner to the prelate, lest he should fall over the edge. But if no amendment is hoped for, then it should be considered whether that sin is infective of other people, like heresy or fornication, or others like these, or also if it results in some injury to another, like theft or murder, and the like.

For if it does not result in injury to another, nor is it an infective sin, then the denunciation can be deferred until the effect of the admonishment is seen, particularly if it promises amendment. But if it is infective of others, it should be denounced to the prelate, so that he may guard his flock. For as Jerome says, what mercy is it to spare one and lead the many into crisis? (In fact, Origen, Homily 7 on Joshua, n. 6 (PG 12:861).) A people is corrupted by one sinner, just as an entire flock is by one sick sheep. For the good of the many should always be preferred to the good of the one. And this, too, is why the reputation of one should be neglected so that the innocence or reputation of the multitude may be preserved. But if it inclines to physical injury of another, one should compare this injury to the loss of the other person’s reputation, and whichever loss weighs more should rather be prevented.

Reply Obj. 3: Disrepute and scandal do not arise from the lighter sins, and therefore there is no force regarding these, if someone were accused in a chapter meeting without having been admonished first; unless perhaps it can be probably believed that the person who is corrected will grow worse from such an accusation. And it is also not much benefit to the company, whose good is always to be put before the good of one person. Therefore sometimes too, even if the amendment of the sinner is not hoped for, someone can be accused before the multitude, if it is believed to be of benefit to the multitude. But a person should not be accused in public of the sins that can lead to disrepute, unless with other preliminaries that the order of fraternal chastisement requires. And a person accusing another would sin gravely, as one defaming his brother.

Reply Obj. 4: Some people say that according to the forum of conscience one should not even proceed to accusation without a prior warning or an expected amendment, unless perhaps it seems that a greater danger must be prevented, or the sin is public. Even so, according to the forum of cases it is not required that an admonition precede accusation, but only inscription. But inquisition is not to be made except for a notorious sin, for a loud insinuation must precede an inquisition; and this is why a private admonition is not absolutely required. Or it could be said according to others, that in accusation it is not about the sinner’s amendment, but the common good, namely, preserving justice by the punishment of delinquents. And therefore accusation can be made in good conscience in court, even if an admonition has not preceded, nor is it against the precept of the Lord, which is understood to be about a sinner’s amendment.

Reply Obj. 5: A precept given to someone by his prelate about making another’s sin public in a case in which it should not be made public, can happen either in court or out of court. If outside of court, the one giving the command sins, nor is the one commanded bound to obey. But if in court by the order required of law, the judge should command someone to confess his own sin or another’s, he does not sin by commanding this, for he himself is not requiring it, but the accuser to whom the judge must render his right. And then a person is bound to confess his own or another person’s sin at the command of the judge; or to appeal, if he is commanded against the order of law. And then the person making public a secret sin avoids a greater evil, namely, the weakening of the law’s discipline. However, a judge should keep the secret as much as he can, lest he give such a command in spite of the order of law, and particularly in a chapter meeting, where things should proceed more according to equity than strictly according to the rigor of the law.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that when a mild medicine, with which one must begin, does not accomplish anything, then the doctor must apply a more effective medicine, though not the most effective right away, but he must proceed gradually, so that the one we want to cure is taxed as little as possible.

And therefore if the first medicine, namely, the prior private admonition, does not help, for it seems the sin will be repeated, then one must proceed to the next medicine, so that it is displayed to a few people, and to such people as can help, and who will not damage the situation by making it known. And these people are chiefly involved so that they may admonish; second, so that they may be made witnesses of the admonition; third, so that they may convict the person denying the charge before the Church. Hence Augustine says in his Rule: nevertheless, beforehand, namely, before it is brought to light in public, it is demonstrated to a second or third person, so that he may be convicted by the mouth of two or three. (Augustine, Regula, n. 7 (PL 32:1581).)

Reply Obj. 1: Some people say that that mode of chastising must be preserved when sin is not entirely public nor entirely secret, but known by certain people. For this reason, they say that others cannot be called in, except those who know, to whom the chastisement pertains. For they explain it in this way: if your brother has sinned against you, that is, with you alone knowing, rebuke him between yourself and him alone. If he will hear you, you have gained your brother. If he will not hear you, and no other knows of it, you should not proceed further. But if others know anything, take with you one or two more. But this does not seem to be according to the intention of the Gospel; for if those who are brought along had known otherwise, it would not be necessary to bring them along to see, but he could be immediately convicted by them. And furthermore, Jerome says that it is not mercy to spare one and lead the others into crisis, which would happen if a sin that is harmful to others were not made public for rebuke. And therefore it is clear that if a sin tends to the detriment of others, it must be told to others, no matter how hidden it is; and even if it does not tend to the detriment of another except the one who sins, as is clear according to Augustine’s rule, where it says, you are not innocent if your brothers, whom you have the power to correct by judging, you permit to perish by your silence. (Ibid.) Nor does anyone become the exposer of a crime by this, for one does not manifest the crime for the sake of defaming, but for correcting.

Reply Obj. 2: One witness is brought in to admonish, but two to convict. Or it could be said that the one denouncing with one witness suffices for the denunciation, because by this the judge arrives at a certain presumption; but for deciding the case two witnesses are required.

Reply Obj. 3: One can only know that someone was not amended by a previous warning by the fact that he repeats the act; and this is why witnesses must be brought in, so that they see the act has been repeated, as is clear from Augustine, who says: it is demonstrated to a second or third person, (Ibid.) namely, the sinful act. Nevertheless, one must not present an occasion for the sin to be repeated with the intention of convicting him, for evils must not be done so that goods will follow (cf. Rom 3:8). Nonetheless, if repeated acts cannot be shown to witnesses, they should still be brought along, so that the sinner may admit before them, or at least so that they may admonish, so that the reproach of many may correct him, as the same Gloss says. And when it comments on take with you two or three, the interlinear Gloss touches on these two reasons from Jerome in the same place, namely, in the spirit of correcting or convicting.

Reply Obj. 4: A prelate can be considered in two ways, either as the one who presides over a trial, and then to tell the prelate is to tell the Church; and then witnesses should be brought before it is told to the prelate; or as he is outside the court, and then to tell the prelate is not the same as telling the Church, but a person who can help and not hurt, for no one can help more than the prelate, and according to this it should be told to the prelate before being shown to other witnesses, so that it may be made known as little as possible. And then the prelate is brought forth as one of the witnesses.

For the order of fraternal chastisement, which Augustine gives in his Rule, should be such that when someone notices immodesty or any other sin in his brother, he should admonish him right away, so that the things he has begun should not progress, but be corrected concerning his neighbor. Because if after admonition he is seen to do it again or a third time, then it should be exposed like a wound to be healed. But before it is brought into the view of the public, which happens when it is said to the Church, first it should be demonstrated to a second or third person, which is to take along one or two witnesses; and among those to whom it must be revealed, before it is shown to others, by whom he is to be convicted, if he denied it, first after his admonition it must be shown to the person over him, so that he may be chastised more secretly without coming to the notice of others. And so first he should be admonished; second, he should be shown to the prelate; third, witnesses must be brought in; fourth, the one to be convicted must be brought forth in public, if he denies it. But the Lord included the two middle steps as one.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that according to Gregory in his Pastoral Rule: many sins may be gently corrected. For when one fails not from malice, but from ignorance alone or weakness, it is necessary that the very rebuke of the misdeed be tempered with great delicacy . . . But many must be vehemently rebuked, so that when the author is not aware how weighty is his fault, it may be perceived from the mouth of the rebuker; and when someone makes light of the evil he has perpetrated, he may become deeply afraid by the harshness of the one rebuking him so severely. (Gregory the Great, Regula pastoralis (CCSL 141), pt. 2, ch. 10. The first line of the quotation is very different in the original: “Nonnulla autem sunt leniter arguenda.” The remainder is more accurate.) And although he is speaking of the chastisement proper to bishops, nevertheless this should also be observed; although fraternal chastisement should always tend toward gentleness, for it is displayed not from official authority, but out of the affection of charity.

And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.

Exposition of the Text

It was said by the Lord to the priests Moses and Aaron. (Sententiae IV, 19.2 (106).1 citing Ambrosiaster, Quaestiones verteries et novi Testamenti, q11.) Moses is called a priest not by the office of offering sacrifices, but because he was the first to give to the people sacred things directly received from God: Moses and Aaron were among his priests (Ps 99:6).

He prophesied because he was high priest of that year. (Sent. IV, 19.2 (106).1 citing Jn. 11, 51.) It should be known that there were four things in the words of Caiaphas. First, the inspiration sent, by which the benefit of Christ’s Passion was inspired in his heart by the Holy Spirit; second, the understanding that he took from this inspiration; third, the intention of expressing his understanding to bring about its effect; fourth, the words themselves uttered. The first was indeed a certain participation in prophecy; the second was a false understanding from himself; the third was a wicked intention; the fourth was a true utterance, although not according to his understanding; and therefore the first was from the Holy Spirit, but not the second or the third; but the fourth was in a certain way from the Holy Spirit governing his words so that they would correspond to the inspiration made by it.

No one ought to exercise the office of priest, unless he is free of those things which he judges in others. (Sent. IV, 19.3 (107).2.) This should be understood of mortal sins, for a priest can absolve people of venial sins that exist in him, without sinning himself, because he is not rendered unworthy of exercising his office by these.

It was in this way that Christ freed the woman caught in sin, because there was no one who could justly cast a stone. (Sent. IV, 19.4 (108).1.) That is, he took the occasion of her liberation from this.

And so let the diligent investigator wisely ask the sinner what the latter perhaps is ignorant of, or perhaps wants to hide in shame. (Sent. IV, 19.4 (108). 2.) But to the contrary, those who search after inquities have failed in their searching, as it says in Psalm 64:7. Therefore, it seems that a priest should not scrutinize the conscience of those under him. And it should be said that a priest should scrutinize the conscience of a sinner in confession as a doctor examines a wound, and a judge a case. For often what the person confessing does not say out of shame, he will reveal when he is questioned. But three things must still be attended to in posing these questions. First, that every sinner be questioned about the sins that are usually common in men of his condition. For it is not necessary that a soldier be asked about the sin of a religious or cleric, or vice versa. Second, that no explicit interrogation about sins be made, except the ones that are obvious to everyone; but concerning the other discoveries of sins the questioning should be made so obliquely that if the person has committed it, he would say, and if he has not committed it, he would not learn any more about it. Third, that especially concerning sins of the flesh, one should not descend too much into the particular circumstances; for the more these pleasures are dwelt upon specifically, the more they are bound to arouse the concupiscence, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 12, 1119a31–32.) And therefore it can happen that the confessor inquiring about these things may harm himself and the person confessing; and so sometimes those who search after iniquities have failed in their searching.

I shall curse your blessings, (Sent. IV, 19.4 (108).4 citing Mal. 2:2.) namely, the ones that are so much yours that they are not God’s.