D. 21 - On purgatory and confession
After the Master has examined the time for penance, here he raises some questions about the things he has determined, and he resolves them. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he raises the question about the time of penance; in the second, about the confession that is required from penitents, at: after these matters, it should be considered, etc. (Sententiae IV, 21.7 (122). 1.)
The first is in three parts: in the first, he raises a question concerning the things he has determined. For he had said that time for penance is given until the end of life; and since all sins are forgiven by penance in this life, he asks whether after this life any sins can be forgiven. Second, he determines the truth according to the authority of the saints, at: that some are remitted after this life, the Lord shows in the Gospel. (Sent. IV, 21.1 (116). 1.) In the third, he refutes certain people’s response to the authorities, at: but perhaps you will say that this is to be taken as regards the punishment of sin. (Sent. IV, 21.5 (120). 4.)
Concerning the second, he does two things: first, he determines the truth of the questions raised; second, from the truth determined, he raises a certain doubt, at: here it may be objected, if through the wood, etc. (Sent. IV, 21.4 (119). 2.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that after this life certain sins are forgiven in purgatory; second, he shows that some people are purified of sins there more slowly, at: but in that fire of purgation, some are purged more slowly, others more quickly. (Sent. IV, 21.3 (118). 1.)
After these matters it must be considered whether confession helps, etc. (Sent. IV, 21.7 (122). 1.) Here he raises questions concerning what was determined before about confession: first, on the part of the one confessing, second, on the part of the confessor who hears the confession, at: but let the priest beware lest he betray the sins of penitents to others. (Sent. IV, 21.9 (124). 1.)
Concerning the first he asks two things: first, whether someone must confess individual sins that he did commit; second, whether he should confess what he did not do, at: but just as a penitent must not hide a sin, because it is pride, so neither is one, by reason of humility, to profess himself guilty of that which he knows he has not committed. (Sent. IV, 21.8 (123). 1.)
But let the priest beware lest he betray the sins of penitents to others. Here he also determines two things on the part of the confessor: first, that he conceal the sin; second, that not every priest may hear the confession of anyone, at: but that which has been said, that a penitent should choose a priest who knows how to bind and loose, appears contrary to what is found in the Canons. (Sent. IV, 21.9 (124). 2.)
Here there are three questions. First, concerning purgatory. Second, concerning general confession. Third, the seal of confession by which sins are concealed.
Question 1
On purgatory
Concerning the first, three questions arise:
first, about purgatory itself;
- second, about the wood, hay, and straw that are purged in purgatory;
- third, about the effect of purgatory.
- Article 1
About purgatory itself
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: SCG IV, ch. 91; Contra errores Graec. pt. 2, ch. 40; Compendium 181–182; de Rationibus fidei, ch. 9.) It seems that there is no purgatory after this life: blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From now on, the Spirit says that they will rest from their labors (Rev 14:13). Therefore, there remains no purgatorial labor after this life for those who die in the Lord. Nor for those who do not die in the Lord, for they cannot be purified. Therefore, there is no purgatory after this life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, mortal sin is related to eternal suffering as charity is related to the eternal reward. But those who die in mortal sin are immediately carried to eternal punishment. Therefore, those who die in charity immediately go to their reward, and so they do not have any purgatory after this life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, God, who is consummately merciful, rewards good more than he punishes evil. But just as those who are in the state of charity do some evils that are not deserving of eternal punishment, so also those who are in mortal sin sometimes do some deeds that are good by their genus yet not deserving of eternal reward. Therefore, since those good deeds are not rewarded in the damned after this life, neither should the evils of the others be punished after this life; and so the same as before.
On the contrary (1), it says in 2 Maccabees 12:46: it is a holy and pious thought to pray for the dead, so that they may be loosed from their sins. But for the dead who are in paradise, no prayers need to be said, for they lack nothing. Nor again for those who are in hell, for they cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore, after this life there are some who are not yet loosed from sins, who can be. And these people have charity, without which no forgiveness of sins can take place, for charity covers all offenses (Prov 10:12). Therefore, they do not end in eternal death, for everyone who lives and believes in me will never die (John 11:26). Nor may they be led into glory until they are purified, for nothing unclean will appear before him, as is clear from Revelation 22:15. Therefore, a certain purification remains after this life.
Furthermore (2), Gregory of Nyssa says: if anyone consenting to Christ as his friend was able to purify his sins less in this life, after his passing from here, he is set free through kindling of the fire of purgatory. (In the Contra Errores Graecorum, pt. 2, ch. 40, this quotation is attributed to St. Gregory of Nyssa’s “Sermon on the dead” (sermo de defunctis). It is perhaps traceable to the saint’s de Mortuis (PG 46:521D-524B).) Therefore, after this life a certain purgation remains.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the place where souls are purified is not the same as where the damned are punished. For the punishment of the damned is eternal, as is clear in Matthew 25:46: these will go into everlasting fire. But the fire of purgatory is temporal, as the Master said above. Therefore, both cannot be punished together in the same fire, and so it is necessary that there be different places.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the punishment of hell is named by many names, as it says in Psalm 11(10):6: fire, brimstone, and storms of winds, etc. But the punishment of purgatory is only named with one name, namely, fire. Therefore, they are not punished in the same fire and in the same place.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says: it is probable they are punished in the places where they incurred guilt. (Hugh of St. Victor, de Sacramentis fidei, Bk. 2, pt. 16, ch. 4 (PL 176:586).) Gregory also tells in his Dialogues that bishop Germanus of Capua found Paschasius being purified in the baths. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 40.) Therefore, they are not purified in hell, but in this world.
On the contrary (1), Gregory says, that just as in the same fire gold is reddened while chaff turns to smoke, so in the same fire a sinner is reduced to ashes while one of the elect is purified. (In fact, Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 47), Bk. 1, ch. 8.) Therefore, the fire of purgatory and of hell is the same, and thus they are in the same place.
Furthermore (2), before the coming of Christ the holy patriarchs were in a worthier place than the place where the souls are purified after death, for there was no sensible pain there. But that place was either the same as hell or attached to it, otherwise Christ would not be said to have descended into hell when he descended to limbo. Therefore, purgatory is in the same place as, or connected with, hell.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the suffering of purgatory does not exceed all the temporal suffering of this life. For the more something is passive, the more it is afflicted, if it has the sensation of injury. But a body is more susceptible to being acted upon than a separated soul, both because it has a contrariety to the fire acting on it, and because it has matter that is susceptible to a quality acting on it, which cannot be said about a soul. Therefore, the pain that a body suffers in this world is greater than the suffering by which a soul is purified after this life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the punishment of purgatory is directly ordered against venial sin. But venial sins, since they are the lightest of sins, should have the lightest punishment, if the number of lashes are according to the measure of the offense (Deut 25:2). Therefore, the punishment of purgatory is very light.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, liability to punishment, since it is an effect of guilt, is not intensified unless the guilt is intensified. But in someone whose guilt is already forgiven, guilt cannot be intensified. Therefore, when someone has been forgiven for a mortal sin yet has not made full satisfaction for it, his liability to punishment does not grow after he has died. But in this life he was not liable to punishment with respect to the worst punishment. Therefore, the punishment that he will suffer after this life will not be worse than every suffering of this life.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in one of his sermons: (Among the works spuriously attributed to Augustine: Serm. suppos. 104 (PL 39:1947).) that fire of purgatory will be harsher than anything one can feel or see or think in this world of punishments.
Furthermore (2), the more universal a punishment is, the greater it is. But the whole separated soul is punished, since it is simple; but it is not so with the body. Therefore, that punishment that belongs to the separated soul is greater than every suffering that the body suffers.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that that suffering is voluntary. For those who are in purgatory have upright hearts. But this is uprightness of heart, that someone conform his own will to the divine will, as Ambrose says. (In fact, Prosper of Aquitaine, de Vocatione omnium gentium, Bk. 2, ch. 2 (PL 51:649); a newer edition is available as CSEL 97.) Therefore, since God wills to punish them, they voluntarily endure that punishment.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every wise person wills whatever is necessary for attaining his intended end. But those who are in purgatory know that they cannot attain to glory unless they are first punished. Therefore, they will to be punished.
On the contrary, no one begs to be freed from suffering that he willingly endures. But those who are in purgatory beg to be freed, as is clear from many things narrated in the Dialogues. (See Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4, ch. 41.) Therefore, they do not endure that suffering willingly.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the souls in purgatory are punished by the demons. For as the Master says at the end of Distinction 47, they will have as torturers in their punishments those who were their provokers in sin. But the demons incite us not only to mortal sin, but also to venial sin, when they cannot do worse. Therefore, they also torture those souls who are in purgatory for venial sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, purification from sins applies to the just both in this life and after this life. But in this life they are purified through the sufferings inflicted by the devil, as is seen in the case of Job. Therefore those to be purified after this life are also punished by demons.
On the contrary, it is unjust that someone who has triumphed over another be subject to him after the triumph. But those who are in purgatory have triumphed over the demons by dying without mortal sin. Therefore, they will not be subject to them by being punished by them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that from the things that have been determined above, (See d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2.) it is clear enough that there is a purgatory after this life. For if after guilt is effaced through contrition, the debt of punishment is not entirely taken away, nor are venial sins always taken away when mortal ones are forgiven, and God’s justice requires that sin be ordered by due punishment, a person who dies after contrition and absolution for sin but before making the due satisfaction must be punished after this life. And therefore those who deny purgatory are speaking against divine justice. And because of this, it is erroneus and contrary to the faith. Therefore, Gregory of Nyssa adds after the words quoted, this we preach, preserving the dogma of truth, and so we believe. The universal Church also holds this when it prays for the dead that they be released from their sins, which can only be understood about those who are in purgatory. Now anyone who opposes the Church’s authority incurs heresy.
Reply Obj. 1: That text is speaking about the labor of working for meriting and not meriting, and not about the labor of suffering for purification.
Reply Obj. 2: Evil does not have a complete cause, but comes about from particular defects, whereas good arises from one complete cause, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) And so any defect prevents the perfection of the good, but not any good would prevent some consummation of an evil, for there is never an evil without some good. And therefore venial sin prevents someone who has charity from reaching the perfect good, namely, eternal life, until he is purified. But mortal sin cannot be prevented by having some good attached to it such that it would lead less directly to the last of evils.
Reply Obj. 3: The person who falls into mortal sin puts to death all his previous good acts, and those that he does while remaining in mortal sin are dead. For he who offends God deserves to lose all the goods that he has from God. Consequently, no reward remains after this life for someone who dies in mortal sin, the way that sometimes punishment remains for one who dies in charity, which does not always blot out every evil that it encounters, but only what is contrary to itself.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that concerning purgatory’s location, nothing specific is expressly found in Scripture, nor can one offer effective arguments about it. Yet probably, and according to what agrees most with the words of the saints and the revelation made to many, there are two places for purgatory. One, according to the general law, according to which purgatory’s location is a lower place connected with hell, so that it is the same fire that torments the damned in hell and purifies the just in purgatory; although the damned, as lower in merit, are also relegated to a lower place. There is another place for purgatory by special dispensation; and this is why it is read sometimes that certain people are punished in different places, whether for the instruction of the living, or for the assistance of the dead, so that by making their suffering known to the living, it might be reduced by the Church’s intercession. Some people say that according to the general law purgatory’s place is wherever a man sins, but this does not seem probable, since a man can be punished at the same time for sins that he committed in different places. Other people say that they are punished above us according to the general law, for they are in a middle place between us and God according to their state. But this is nothing, for they are not punished for being above us, but for what is lowest in them, namely, sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The fire of purgatory is eternal as to its substance, but temporal as to the effect of purification.
Reply Obj. 2: The punishment of hell exists for the sake of affliction, and so it is named from all those things that usually afflict us here. But the punishment of purgatory is chiefly for purifying the traces of sin, and so only the punishment of fire is attributed to purgatory, because fire has the capacity to purify and consume.
Reply Obj. 3: That argument proceeds according to a special dispensation, and not according to the general law.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in purgatory there are two punishments: one of loss, namely, inasmuch as souls are held back from the divine vision; the other, of sense, according as they are physically punished by fire. And in both, the least punishment of purgatory exceeds the greatest punishment of this life. For the more something is desired, the more troubling is its absence. And because the affection by which the highest good is desired in holy souls after this life is the most intense, since the affection is not held back by the weight of the body, and since the enjoyment of the highest good would have arrived by then had nothing impeded it; for these reasons they suffer extremely from this delay. Similarly, because sorrow is not so much due to an injury but to the sensation of the injury, the more sensitive someone is, the more he suffers from anything harmful, which is why the injuries that happen in the most sensitive places are the most painful. And since all the sensation of the body is from the soul, for this reason if anything injurious is at work in the soul itself, it necessarily must be most afflicted. Now, for the moment we will suppose that the soul suffers from a physical fire, for it will be discussed later, in Distinction 44, Question 3, Article 3, Subquestion 3. And therefore the punishment of purgatory in the suffering of loss and of sense exceeds every punishment of this life. Some people argue this conclusion from the fact that the whole soul is punished without the body. But there is nothing in this, for then the punishment of the damned would be less after the resurrection than before, which is false.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the soul is less susceptible to harm than the body, nevertheless it is more aware of suffering. And where there is greater sense of suffering there is greater pain, even if there is less harm.
Reply Obj. 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much from the amount of sin as from the disposition of the one punished, for the same sin is punished more heavily there than here; just as someone who has a finer complexion is punished more than another by the same lashes inflicted, and yet the judge, imposing the same number of lashes on both for the same faults, acts justly.
And by this the answer to the third objection is clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that something is called voluntary in two ways. In one way, by an absolute will, and no punishment is voluntary in this way, for the notion of punishment involves that it be contrary to the will. In another way, something is said to be voluntary by a conditional will, as burning is voluntary because of the health that will result; and in this way a punishment can be voluntary in two ways. In one way, because by this punishment we acquire some good, and so the will itself takes on a punishment, as is seen in the case of satisfaction; or also because someone accepts it willingly, and would not wish it not to be, as happens in martyrdom. In the other way, because although no good accrues to us by the punishment, nevertheless we cannot attain the good without the punishment, as is seen in the case of natural death. And then the will does not take on the punishment but wishes to be freed from it; and yet the will endures it, and to this extent it is said to be ‘voluntary.’ And this is how the punishment of purgatory is voluntary. Now some people say that it is not voluntary in any way, for the souls are so absorbed by their sufferings that they do not know they are being purified by them, but they believe themselves to be damned. But this is false: for unless they knew they would be freed, they would not beg for prayers, which they often do.
And by this the answers to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that just as after the day of judgment divine justice will set a fire in which the damned will be punished for eternity, so also now the elect are purified after this life only by divine justice, not by the ministry of demons over whom they have arisen as victors, nor by the ministry of angels, for fellow citizens would not afflict their own so forcefully. But nevertheless it is possible that they lead them to places of suffering, and that even the demons themselves, who rejoice in the sufferings of men, accompany them and attend those to be purified, both so that they might be sated by their sufferings, and so that at their departure from the body, they might seize upon something of their own there. But in this world, while it is still the place of battle, men are punished both by bad angels as enemies, as is seen in Job, (Chapters 1 and 2.) and by good ones, as is seen in the case of Jacob, (Genesis 32:25.) whose femoral nerve withered from the angel’s striking it. And Dionysius also says explicitly, in On the Divine Names 4, that good angels sometimes punish. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 22 (PG 3:723).)
And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.
Article 2
The purging of “wood, hay, and straw” in purgatory
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 46, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 3, ad 3; ST I-II, q. 89, a. 2; Super I Cor. 3, lec. 2.) It seems that the wood, hay, and straw that are said to be built upon the foundation that has been laid (cf. 1 Cor 3:12), are not venial sins. For nothing can be built upon what is highest. But the foundation of the spiritual edifice is in the highest, as the Gloss says. Therefore, nothing can be built upon it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the building is supported by the foundation. But venial sins are not supported by the spiritual foundation, which is faith working through love. Therefore, the wood, hay, and straw that are built upon it are not venial sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, commenting on Isaiah 5:8, woe to you who join house to house, Jerome says, heretics join dogmas with dogmas, and those who should have built on the foundation with gold, silver, and precious stones build with wood, hay, and straw. (Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah (CCSL 73), Bk. 2, par. 8.) But heretics who fabricate false dogmas do not sin venially, but mortally. Therefore, wood, hay, and straw are not venial sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Ambrose, (In the commentary on 1 Corinthians that was once attributed to Ambrose; here, on chapter 3 (PL 17:197ff.).) apostolic doctrine is the foundation; but the one who comes after the apostles and teaches, whether he be good or bad, builds on that foundation. But those who come after the apostles and teach well build with gold, silver, and precious stones, which represent clear teaching, while the wicked build with wood, hay, and straw, in whom the vain and frivolous doctrine is a mortal sin. Therefore, by wood, hay, and straw, mortal sins are understood, and not venial ones.
On the contrary, is what is said in the text by the words of Augustine.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the ones who build upon both are the same. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 89, a. 2; Super I Cor. 3, lec. 2.) For according to Augustine, (As cited in the text of Lombard; cf. Glossa ordinaria on 1 Corinthians 3:12.) by gold is signified the contemplation of God, by silver, love of neighbors, by precious stones, good works. But those who have disordered affections for temporal things, who are said to build up wood, hay, and straw, sometimes contemplate God and love their neighbor and do some good works. Therefore, the same people build both.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the text, those people build with gold, silver, and precious stones who think that they belong to God; they do please God in some way. But as is clear from 1 John 1:8, such people also commit venial sins, which are understood by wood, hay, and straw. Therefore, the same people build upon both.
On the contrary, Augustine says, that those who build with gold, silver, and precious stones are secure, (Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms (CCSL 38), Ps 37:2, par. 3.) but those who build with wood, hay, and straw, are not secure. Therefore, the same people do not build with both.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the venial sins that are joined to mortal sins are also the wood, hay, and straw, so that not even in the damned would they be punished eternally, but only temporally. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 89, a. 2; Super I Cor. 3, lec. 2.) For the extremity of punishments should be according to the extremity of guilt. But mortal guilt exceeds venial guilt infinitely. Therefore, so does mortal punishment exceed venial punishment. But this cannot be in severity, for the severity of either punishment is finite. Therefore, it must be according to duration, which would not be the case if venial sin were punished eternally.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is no respecter of persons (Rom 2:11). But he would be if he punished one person more than another for the same fault. Therefore, since a just man is punished temporally for his venial sin, neither should the damned be punished eternally but temporally.
On the contrary, you will never get out until you have paid the last penny, that is, the tiniest sin (Matt 5:26). But someone who dies in mortal sin can pay nothing. Therefore, he will pay for venial sins eternally.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that venial sins joined with charity can be consumed by any punishment, which is why they are appropriately signified according to metaphor as those things that are consumed by fire. And since the more serious a sin is, the more difficult it is to purify, but among venial sins one is more serious than another, for this reason their diversity is appropriately signified by the diversity of things that are consumed by fire more quickly and more slowly. And since the perfection of any quantity is comprehended in three aspects, because of principle, means, and end, this is why a threefold difference is set down. Since certain sins are more serious in the genus of venial sins, and more difficult to purify, these are signified by wood; certain ones are slight, which are signified by straw; some are medium, which are signified by hay.
Reply Obj. 1: As a foundation is applied to spiritual things by reason of priority, and not due to being lower, so those things are said to be built up not because of being higher but because of being later.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the foundation as though having stability from their foundation. Something is said to be set upon a foundation in three ways. In one way, by being directly situated on it, because it is established on the foundation; and in this way only the good works of formed faith, which is called the foundation, can be built upon the foundation. In another way what is beside is said to be upon, as seen in Psalm 136:1: upon the waters of Babylon, we sat; and in this way venial sins are built upon the foundation, for they do not destroy the foundation, but they are together with the foundation. In another way what comes after is said to be upon, as Ezekiel 48:3: upon the border of Asher, i.e., after, as the Gloss says; and in this way even mortal sins, which destroy the foundation, can be built upon the foundation. Or, according to some people, by wood, hay, and straw are understood not venial sins themselves, but good works with which some movements of venial sin are mixed; and these things can be built upon the foundation as to what is good in them, and not according as they are venial sins. But this does not seem to in accord with the intention of the Apostle and Augustine; for then there would be no distinction between wood, hay, and straw, and gold, silver, and precious stones.
Reply Obj. 3: In Sacred Scripture, beyond the principal sense that the author intends, other meanings can not unfitingly be adapted. And this is how Jerome speaks, by a certain adaptation, and not according to the Apostle’s intention.
Reply Obj. 4: Some people who teach badly do not always sin mortally but venially, as when they teach useless things, or some motion of vainglory springs up in them. Or it could be said that he speaks according to the same manner as Jerome.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that gold, silver, and precious stones, and wood, hay, and straw, can be explained in two ways. In one way such that any good works may be called gold, silver, and precious stones, and any venial sins may be called wood, hay, and straw. And in this way there is no doubt that the same people can build both; but certain people are said to build the former and certain people the latter according to what they most pursue, just as also the active are distinguished from contemplatives although the contemplative sometimes does something, and the active sometimes contemplates something. In another way, such that by gold, silver, and precious stones only works of perfection are understood; and by wood, hay, and straw may be understood the venial sins that are built up by those who are concerned with temporal things, not being free for God alone. And then it is clear that the same people do not build with both, for even if the imperfect do good works, nevertheless they are soiled by the concerns of this world, so that they do not have the gleam of gold and silver and precious stones. And likewise even if the perfect have certain venial sins, nevertheless they are consumed by the fervor of charity in them, and by the continual concern that they have for their own purification. And this is why they are not said to build upon them, for they do not remain in them habitually; and such as these are secure, for nothing purifiable exists in them.
And according to this the solutions to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that since no fault can be ordered except by punishment, and since God leaves nothing disordered, therefore no fault is remitted without penalty. But among those who are damned, no fault can be remitted, nor can anyone’s debt of punishment be taken away, since they lack charity, by which both guilt is purified and debt of punishment is taken away. And for this reason venial guilt or its liability to punishment always remains in them, even if, before their mortal sin, their venial sin had been forgiven as to guilt, but the debt of punishment remained. And because of this the damned will be punished eternally for their venial sins.
Reply Obj. 1: Mortal sin deserves eternal punishment inasmuch as it takes away grace and separates us eternally from God; and this is how it is infinitely removed from venial sin. Therefore, in someone who lacks grace and has been separated from God forever, the eternal punishment that is owed to mortal sin per se is owed to venial sin incidentally, by reason of the subject.
Reply Obj. 2: There is no respect of persons there, for in a just man there is grace, by virtue of which his fault or guilt is purified. The damned lack this, and that is why their fault and guilt cannot be expiated by suffering. And so it is clear that venial sins joined to mortal ones in the damned do not count as wood, hay, or straw, for an incidental reason.
Article 3
The effects of purgatory
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2; Compendium 182; Super Matt. 12.) It seems that by the punishment of purgatory venial sin is not expiated as to fault. For commenting on 1 John 5:6: there is a sin that is mortal, etc., the interlinear Gloss says: for what is not corrected in this life, forgiveness is sought in vain after death. (The Gloss is quoting from Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 16, par. 68.) Therefore, no sin is remitted as to its fault after this life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is the same faculty that falls into sin and is freed from sin. But the soul cannot sin venially after death. Therefore, neither can it be absolved.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 41: “Ex quibus nimirum sententiis constat quia qualis hinc quisque egreditur, talis in iudicio praesentatur.”) that everyone will be at the judgment just as he left the body; for where the tree falls, there it will lie (Eccl 11:3). Therefore, if someone departed this life with venial sin, he will come to the judgment with venial sin, and so no one is expiated from fault by purgatory.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it was said above in Distinction 17, Question 2, Article 2, Subquestion 3, that actual fault is not effaced by anything but contrition. But after this life there will be no contrition, which is a meritorious act, for then there will be neither merit nor demerit, since according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 9:878).) as the fall was to the angels, so is death to humans. Therefore, after this life, no venial sin is forgiven as to its fault in purgatory.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, venial sin is only in us by reason of the fomes, which is why in the first state of man Adam would not have sinned venially, as was said in Book III, Distinction 21, Question 2, Article 3. But after this life in purgatory there will be no sensuality provoked by corrupt fomes in the separated soul, for the fomes is called the law of the flesh (cf. Romans 7:22). Therefore, there will be no venial sin there; and so it cannot be expiated by the fire of purgatory.
On the contrary (1), Gregory says in his Dialogues 4, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 41.) and Augustine says in On True Repentance, (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 17, n. 33 (PL 40:1127).) that certain light faults are forgiven in the future. Nor can this be understood as referring to the punishment, for as to the debt of punishment, every fault, no matter how serious, is expiated by the fire of purgatory. Therefore, as to their guilt, venial sins are purified by the fire of purgatory.
Furthermore (2), by wood, hay, and straw, venial sins are understood (cf. 1 Cor 3:12), as was said. But wood, hay, and straw are consumed by purgatory. Therefore, venial sins themselves are remitted after this life.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that purgatorial fire does not free one from the obligation to punishment. (Parallel: Compendium 181.) For every purification has to do with foulness. But punishment does not imply any foulness. Therefore, the purgatorial fire does not free from punishment.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a contrary is not purged by anything but its own contrary. But punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore, by the punishment of purgatory no one is purified of the obligation to punishment.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, commenting on 1 Cor 3: the builder will be saved, but only as through fire, the Gloss says: that fire is the temptation of tribulation, about which it is written, “the kiln tests the potter’s vessels” (Sir 27:5). Therefore, a man is expiated from every punishment through the punishments of this world, at any rate through death, which is the greatest of punishments, and not by purgatorial fire.
On the contrary, the punishment of purgatory is more severe than any punishment of this world, as was said above. But by satisfactory punishment which someone endures in this life, he is expiated from the debt of punishment. Therefore, much more by the punishment of purgatory.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that from that punishment one person is not freed more quickly than another. (Parallel: below, d. 46, q. 1. a. 3.) For the more serious the fault is and the greater the obligation to punishment, the more severe the punishment that is imposed in purgatory. But the proportion of the more severe punishment to the more serious fault is the same as the proportion of the lighter punishment to the lighter fault. Therefore, one person is freed from that punishment as quickly as another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, equal retributions are rendered for unequal merits, both in heaven and in hell, as to duration. Therefore, it seems to be the same in purgatory.
On the contrary, is the Apostle’s similitude (1 Cor 3:18), which represented different venial sins by wood, hay, and straw. But it is clear that wood lasts longer in fire than hay and straw. Therefore, one venial sin is punished longer in purgatory than another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that some people have said that after this life no sin is remitted as to its fault, and if someone dies with mortal sin, he is damned and has no capacity for forgiveness; but it cannot be that he died with venial sin but without mortal sin, for the final grace itself purifies venial fault. For venial sin happens when someone who has Christ as foundation loves something temporal too much, an excess that indeed happens from the corruption of concupiscence. And therefore if grace entirely conquers the corruption of concupiscence, as was the case in the Blessed Virgin, there remains no room for venial sin. And so since in death that concupiscence is entirely diminished and annihilated, the powers of the soul are completely subjected to grace, and venial sin is expelled.
But this opinion is worthless both in itself and in the argument for it. In itself, indeed, because it is contrary to the statements of the saints and the Gospel, which cannot be explained about the remission of venial sins as to punishment, as the Master says in the text; for then both light and serious sins would be forgiven in the future. But Gregory holds that light sins alone will be remitted after this life. (See Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 41.) Nor does it suffice that they say that here specifically light sins are spoken of, lest it be thought that we will suffer nothing serious for them, for the remission of punishment removes more gravity from the punishment than it brings.
Now as to the argument for this opinion, its worthlessness is apparent, for bodily defect, such as there is at the end of life, does not remove or diminish the corruption of concupiscence as to its root, but as to its act, as is seen even in those who are extremely weakened. Nor again does it calm the powers of the soul, so that they are subject to grace, for the tranquillity of the powers and their subjection to grace is when the lower powers obey the higher ones that delight in the law of God (Rom 7:22); which cannot exist in that state, since the act of either one is impeded; unless tranquillity means the absence of fighting, as happens even in those who sleep. Nor, however, is sleep said to diminish concupiscence because of this, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to subdue them to grace.
And furthermore, if it were granted that that defect would diminish concupiscence at its root, and the powers of the soul would be subject to grace, this would still not suffice for the purification of venial sin already committed, although it would suffice for its future avoidance; for actual fault, even venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition, no matter how much grace is habitually intended, as was said above in Distinction 16, Question 1, Article 2, Subquestion 3. Now it sometimes happens that someone dies in his sleep while in a state of grace, who fell asleep with some venial sin; and a person like this cannot have an act of contrition for venial sin before his death.
Nor can it be said, as they say, that if he did not repent in act or intention in a general or specific way, it would be turned into mortal sin, because venial sin becomes mortal when it pleases the one doing it; for not just any pleasure makes a venial sin mortal (otherwise every venial sin would be mortal, for every venial sin pleases, since it is voluntary); but the kind of pleasure that has to do with the enjoyment in which every human perversity consists, when we enjoy the things that should be used, as Augustine says. (See Augustine, de Diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (CCSL 44A), Qu. 30.) And thus that pleasure that makes a sin mortal is actual pleasure, for every mortal sin consists in an act.
However, it can happen that after someone has committed a venial sin, he will not actually think anything about abandoning the sin or holding to it, but he thinks perhaps that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; and in this thought he falls asleep and dies. Therefore, it is clear that this opinion is entirely irrational.
And therefore it should be said with others that venial sin in someone who dies with grace is remitted after this life by the fire of purgatory, for that punishment, which is voluntary in a certain way, will have the power by virtue of grace of expiating every fault that can exist together with grace.
Reply Obj. 1: The Gloss is speaking of mortal sin. Or it could be said that although it is not corrected in itself in this life, it is, however, corrected in merit, for a man has merited here so that there his suffering may be meritorious to him.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin arises from the corruption of the fomes, which will not exist in a separated soul existing in purgatory. And therefore it could not sin venially, but the remission of venial guilt is from the grace informing it, which will exist in purgatory in a separated soul; and therefore it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 3: Venial sins do not change a man’s state, for they neither take away nor diminish charity, according to which the soul’s amount of gratuitous goodness is measured. And therefore when venial sins are remitted, the soul remains as before.
Reply Obj. 4: After this life there cannot be merit with regard to the essential reward, but with regard to some extra reward there can be, as long as a person remains in the state of a wayfarer in some way. And therefore in purgatory there can be a meritorious act as to the remission of venial guilt.
Reply Obj. 5: Although venial sin arises from the tendency of the fomes, nevertheless guilt is contracted in the mind. And therefore even once the fomes are destroyed, guilt still remains.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that anyone who owes something is absolved from the debt when he pays it; and because the obligation incurred by guilt is nothing other than the debt of punishment, by the fact that someone endures a punishment that he was owing, he is absolved of his obligation; and in accord with this the punishment of purgatory purifies from the obligation incurred by guilt.
Reply Obj. 1: The obligation to punishment, although it does not carry any foulness in itself, nevertheless is related to foulness by its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Although punishment is not contrary to punishment, nevertheless it is contrary to the obligation to punishment, for the obligation to punishment remains as long as someone has not undergone the punishment that he was owing.
Reply Obj. 3: Many layers of meaning are hidden in the same words of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, that fire can also be understood as the present tribulation or as the punishment to come; and by either one venial sins can be purified. But natural death is not enough for this, as was said above, Distinction 20, Article 1, Question 3, reply to the third objection.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some venial sins adhere more than others, according as the affections are more inclined to them and are fixed upon them more strongly. And because the ones that adhere more take longer to purify, for this reason some people are tormented in purgatory longer than others, according as their affections were more steeped in venial sins.
Reply Obj. 1: The harshness of the penalty properly corresponds to the quantity of fault, but the duration corresponds to how rooted the fault was in the subject. Therefore, it can happen that someone lingers longer in purgatory who is less afflicted, and vice versa.
Reply Obj. 2: Mortal sin, which deserves the suffering of hell, and charity, which deserves the reward of paradise after this life, are immoveably rooted in the subject. And therefore the same unending duration results for both of them for all people. But it is different with venial sin, which is punished in purgatory, as is clear from what has been said.
Question 2
On generic confession
Next a general confession is asked about; and concerning this, three questions arise:
first, whether venial sins are blotted out as to fault by the power of a generic confession;
- second, whether forgotten mortal sins are;
- third, whether someone can licitly confess sins that he has not done.
- Article 1
Whether venial sins are blotted out by a generic confession
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that by the generic confession that is made at Compline and Prime, venial sins are not forgiven. For the confession by which sins are forgiven is something sacramental. But that generic confession is not sacramental, for it can be made even to someone who is not a priest. Therefore, it is not valid for the forgiveness of sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, confession is ordered to the remission of sins by the fact that the sins of the one confessing are made known. But after a generic confession the sins of the one confessing remain just as hidden from the one the confession is made to as before, both because sometimes the one to whom this confession is made cannot distinguish the voices of individuals when many people make a generic confession at the same time, and because there is no one who does not sin in those general ways that are said in a generic confession. Therefore, the generic confession does not work to the remission of sins.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, contrition is more directly ordered to the remission of fault than confession. But general contrition does not suffice for the remission of venial sins, for sometimes a habitual pleasure in venial sin can coexist with a general contrition. Therefore, much less does a generic confession efface venial sins as to their fault.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, as it says in 1 John 1:8. But some who have no mortal sins make a generic confession often. Therefore, if such a confession suffices for effacing venial sins, they are without sin often; which seems to go against the authority cited.
On the contrary (1), nothing in the Church is done in vain. But after a generic confession according to the custom of the Church, a prayer follows, in which the priest asks for the remission of sins of those who confessed. Therefore, the generic confession is valid for the remission of venial sins at least.
Furthermore (2), a priest about to celebrate Mass makes a generic confession, so that he may celebrate it with more purity. But this would not be the case if such a confession did not purify. Therefore, it purifies at least from venial sins.
I answer that, the reason why venial sins are not forgiven by the infusion of grace and charity is that they are not opposed to the habit of charity, but rather to its act, which they impede and retard. And therefore when an act of charity is directed against venial sins, it destroys them as though they were its contrary. Nor is it necessary that an act of charity be directed against each individual one to efface them, for none of them have a specific account by which they are contrary to charity in some way, as is the case with mortal sins. But all of them dispose one to the contrary of charity according to the same account, inasmuch as one clings too much to temporal things. Therefore, since generic confession is an act proceeding from charity in someone who has charity, and directed against venial sins, it is clear that it works to the remission of venial sins as to their fault, and sometimes as to their punishment, so great can the devotion of the person confessing be.
Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes a generic confession is sacramental, and sometimes it is not. It is sacramental when someone confesses in private to a priest certain things that he remembers, and other venial sins generically; and then that generic confession contains four things that work toward the remission of venial sins both as to fault and punishment, whether in part or entirely: namely, from the contrition of the one confessing; from the humility of the confession; from the prayer of the priest as a certain person; and from the power of the keys. But when it is done in public, before many people and along with many people in the church, it is not sacramental. Therefore, it then has efficacy from three of the things mentioned, and not four: and because of this also no absolution is attached to it at Prime and Compline, nor is satisfaction imposed, but only the prayer Misereatur. (The prayer to which St. Thomas is referring: “Misereatur nostri omnipotens Deus et dimissis peccatis nostris, perducat nos ad vitam aeternam.”)
Reply Obj. 2: That argument applies to sacramental confession, which depends on the judgment of the priest, which is why making one’s sins known in some way is required.
Reply Obj. 3: Generic contrition suffices for the remission of venial sins in their fault, but what is habitually retained in the affections is excluded from that generalization. Therefore, it is not effaced by this kind of contrition, nor by generic confession.
Reply Obj. 4: It was not the Apostle’s intention to say that there is no moment in which a man is not without sin with respect to fault, but that no one spends this life without sin, and that sometimes even with sins forgiven, some obligation to punishment remains.
Article 2
Whether generic confession effaces forgotten mortal sins
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that generic confession does not suffice for effacing forgotten mortal sins. For sin that is effaced by confession need not be confessed again. Therefore, if forgotten sins were forgiven by a generic confession, it would not be necessary that when they returned to a person’s awareness, he should confess them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever is not conscious to himself of any sin either has no sin or has forgotten his sin. Therefore, if forgotten mortal sins are forgiven by a generic confession being made, anyone who is not conscious of mortal sin when he makes a generic confession can be certain that he is free of mortal sin, which is against what the Apostle says, I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby justified (1 Cor 4:4).
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one reaps benefit from negligence. But no one can forget a mortal sin before it is forgiven without negligence. Therefore, someone like this should not benefit from it so that the sin is forgiven him without being specifically confessed.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is entirely unknown is farther from the awareness of the person confessing than what he has forgotten. But generic confessions do not efface sins committed through ignorance, for then heretics who do not know that certain sins that are in them are sins, as well as simpletons, would be absolved by the generic confession; which is false. Therefore, a generic confession does not take away forgotten sins.
On the contrary (1), approach him and be enlightened and your faces shall never blush with shame (Ps 34[33]:5). But someone who confesses everything that he knows, approaches God as much as he can; and more cannot be required of him. Therefore, he does not blush with shame, so that he suffers rebuff, but he obtains forgiveness.
Furthermore (2), someone who confesses obtains forgiveness, unless he does it under false pretences. But someone who confesses all the sins that he has in his memory, and has forgotten some, is not pretending, for he suffers ignorance of what he does, which excuses from sin. Therefore, he obtains forgiveness, and in this way the forgotten sins are loosed, since it is impious to hope for half-forgiveness from God, as the Master said above in Distinction 15.
I answer that, confession’s working presupposes contrition, which does efface fault, and thus confession is directly ordered to the remission of punishment, which indeed it causes both by the shame that it contains and by the power of the keys, to which the person confessing subjects himself. Now it can happen sometimes that by prior contrition a certain sin is wiped away as to its fault whether in general, if it is not present to the memory at that moment, or specifically; and still, before confession someone has forgotten that sin, and then the general sacramental confession works to the remission of punishment from the power of the keys, to which the person confessing subjects himself by placing no obstacle as far as in him lies. But on the part of the shame of confessing the sin that diminished the punishment, the punishment of that sin that the person was never specifically ashamed of before a priest is not diminished.
Reply Obj. 1: In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but the priest’s judgment for imposing satisfaction is expected, and therefore although a person has discharged his duty of seeking absolution, he is still bound to go to confession so that what was lacking from a sacramental confession may be supplied.
Reply Obj. 2: Confession only works on the presupposition of contrition, as was said. And a person cannot know when contrition is true, just as neither can he know whether he has grace for certain. And therefore he cannot know for certain whether his forgotten sins have been forgiven by a generic confession, although he can make a guess based on certain indications, which were mentioned above in Distinction 9.
Reply Obj. 3: Someone in this situation does not benefit from his negligence, for he did not receive as complete forgiveness as he would have received otherwise, nor does he merit as much. And again, he is bound to confess when the sin shall have returned to his memory.
Reply Obj. 4: Ignorance of the law does not excuse, for it is a sin itself; but ignorance of what one has done does excuse. Therefore, when someone does not confess the sins that he does not know are sins because of ignorance of divine law, he is not excused from false pretense. But he would be excused if he did not know them to be sins because of ignorance of the particular circumstances, as if he knew another woman whom he believed to be his wife. But forgetting an act of sin contains ignorance of what one has done, and therefore it excuses from the sin of falsity in confession, which impedes the fruit of absolution and confession.
Article 3
Whether someone can licitly confess sins that he has not done
Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. It seems that someone can licitly confess a sin that he does not have. For as Gregory says, it belongs to good minds to recognize fault where no fault is. (Gregory the Great (?), Epistles, Bk. 11, ep. 64, to Augustine, Bishop of the English (PL 77:1195); cf. Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 5, can. 4. This letter is not found in many ancient manuscripts of Gregory’s letters and has been excluded from the CCSL edition (see vols. 140 and 140A).) Therefore, it pertains to the good mind to accuse itself of faults that it has not committed.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, through humility someone considers himself worse than one who is an obvious sinner, and in this he is to be commended. But what someone judges in this heart, he may confess with his mouth. Therefore, he can licitly confess himself to have worse sins than he has.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sometimes a person wonders about a certain sin, whether it is venial or mortal, and such a person should, as it seems, confess it as though it were mortal. Therefore, a person should confess some sins that he does not have.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, satisfaction is ordained by confession. But a person can make satisfaction for a sin he did not commit. Therefore, he can also confess a sin that he did not do.
On the contrary (1), anyone who says he has done something that he has not done, lies. But no one should lie in confession, since every lie is a sin. Therefore, no one should confess a sin that he did not do.
Furthermore (2), in the external court no crime should be charged to anyone that cannot be proved by suitable witnesses. But the witness in the penitential forum is the conscience. Therefore, no one should accuse himself of a sin that his conscience does not hold.
I answer that, by confession a penitent should expose himself to his confessor. Therefore, someone who tells something to his priest about himself other than what his conscience holds, whether good or evil, does not expose himself to his priest, but rather conceals. And therefore it is not a suitable confession. But for it to be suitable it is required that the mouth agree with the heart, so that the mouth’s only accusations are what the conscience holds.
Reply Obj. 1: There are two ways to recognize fault where it is not. In one way so that it is understood as to the substance of the act, and then it is not true, for it does not pertain to a good mind but to an erring one that it acknowledge a certain act to have been committed by itself which it did not commit. In another way, as to the condition of the act; and this is how what Gregory said is true, for the just man fears in an act that seems good in itself lest any defect should be from his part; and this is what Job says: I feared all my works (Job 9:28). And therefore it also pertains to the good mind that his tongue charge him with this fear that he holds in his heart.
And by this the answer to the second objection is clear; for the just man who is truly humble does not consider himself to be worse as to the perpetration of an act that is worse in kind; but he fears lest in those things that he seems to do well, he should fail more seriously through pride.
Reply Obj. 3: When someone has doubt about whether a certain sin is mortal, he is bound to confess it while remaining in doubt, for someone who commits or omits something but is in doubt about whether it is a mortal sin, sins mortally by taking a chance on it. And likewise, a person puts himself in danger if he neglects to confess something because he is unsure whether it is mortal. Nor, however, should he assert that it was mortal, but speak from his doubt, and await the judgment of the priest, to whom it belongs to discern between one kind of leprosy and another (Deut 17:8).
Reply Obj. 4: By making satisfaction for a sin that he did not commit, a man does not incur a lie, as when someone confesses a sin that he does not believe he has done. For if he said a sin that he had not done, but believed that he had, it is not lying. And therefore he does not sin if he speaks in the way that it is in his heart.
Question 3
The seal of the confessional
Next the seal of the confessional is asked about; and concerning this, three questions arise:
first, whether in every case a man is bound to conceal the things that he knows under the seal of the confessional;
- second, whether he could reveal to another with the permission of the one confessing;
- third, whether he is bound to conceal these things, even if he knows them by other means.
- Article 1 Whether a man is bound to conceal what he knows under the seal of the confessional
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2; Quodl. V, q. 7, a. 1; Quodl. XII, q. 11, a. 2.) It seems that a priest is not bound in every case to conceal the sins that he knows under the seal of the confessional. For as Bernard says, what was instituted for charity, does not militate against charity. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 2, par. 5: “Sicut e regione iniquum procul dubio foret, si statuta pro sola caritate, contra caritatem tenerentur” (Bernardi opera, ed. Leclerq, 3:257).) But keeping a confession secret would militate against charity in some cases, as when someone in confession knows another person to be a heretic, whom he cannot induce to stop corrupting the people; and likewise for someone who knows through confession that there is an affinity between two people who wish to contract a marriage. Therefore, someone in a situation like this should reveal the confession.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what someone is obliged to do from the Church’s precept alone need not be observed when the Church makes a command to the contrary. But the secrecy of confessions was introduced by the Church’s statute alone. Therefore, if it is commanded by the Church that anyone who knows something about a certain sin should tell, then whoever knows through confession should tell.
Obj 3: Furthermore, a person should rather preserve his conscience than the reputation of another, for there is an order in charity. But sometimes someone concealing a sin incurs injury to his own conscience, as when he is brought in as a witness to that sin, and forced to swear to tell the truth; or when an abbot knows from the confession of some prior subject to him about a sin, the occasion of which leads him to ruin, if he leaves him in the position of prior. Therefore, he is bound to remove him out of his obligation for pastoral care, but removing him seems to make his confession public.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, by hearing someone’s confession, a priest can become conscious of something that would make him unfit for authority. But a person is bound to speak against the promotion of someone unworthy, if it is his business. Therefore, since speaking against the appointment would seem to provoke suspicion of the sin, and so to reveal the confession in a certain way, it seems that sometimes it would be necessary to reveal a confession.
On the contrary (1), the Decretal On Penance and the Remission of Sins says: let the priest take care lest by word or sign or anything else at all he expose the sinner to any extent. (Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council, Omnis utriusque sexus.)
Furthermore (2), the priest should conform to God, whose minister he is. But God never reveals the sins displayed in confession, but rather covers them. Therefore, neither should a priest reveal them.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the seal of the confessional extends to other things than what belongs to a confession. For nothing but sins belong to a confession. But sometimes along with his sins a person tells many other things that do not pertain to confession. Therefore, since those things are said to the priest as to God, it seems that the seal of the confessional extends to them as well.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sometimes someone tells someone else a secret and he receives it under the seal of the confessional. Therefore, the seal of the confessional extends to those things that do not belong to confession.
On the contrary, the seal of the confessional is something joined to sacramental confession. But those things that are joined to a certain sacrament do not extend beyond that sacrament. Therefore, the seal of the confessional does not extend to anything but what sacramental confession concerns.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not only a priest is under the seal of the confessional. For sometimes in an emergency a person confesses to a priest through an interpreter. But the interpreter, as it seems, is also bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore, a non-priest also has something under the seal of the confessional.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sometimes someone can confess to a layperson in a case of necessity. But he is bound to keep the sins secret, since they are said to him as to God. Therefore, a priest is not the only one under the seal of the confessional.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sometimes someone pretends to be a priest so that he might probe someone else’s conscience by this deception; and this person, as it seems, also sins, if he reveals the confession. Therefore, not only a priest is under the seal of the confessional.
On the contrary (1), the priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of the confessional is joined to the sacrament. Therefore, only a priest is under the seal of the confessional.
Furthermore (2), a person is bound to keep secret whatever he hears in confession because he does not know it as man, but as God. But only the priest is the minister of God. Therefore, he alone is bound to keep secret.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the things that are done outwardly in the sacraments are signs of the things that happen interiorly. And therefore the confession by which someone subjects himself to a priest is a sign of the interior confession in which he subjects himself to God. Now God covers the sin of the person who subjects himself to him by penance; therefore, this too must be signified in the sacrament of penance. And this is why it is necessary to the sacrament that a person keep the confession secret, and anyone who reveals it sins as a violator of the sacrament. And besides this there are other benefits to this secrecy, for people are more attracted to confession by it, and confess their sins more simply.
Reply Obj. 1: Some people say that a priest is only bound to preserve the seal of the confessional for sins that the penitent promises to amend; otherwise, he can tell them to someone who can be helpful, not harmful. But this opinion seems erroneous, since it is against the truth of the sacrament. For just as baptism is a sacrament even if someone receives it under false pretenses, nor should anything essential to the sacrament be changed for this, so also confession does not cease to be sacramental even if the person confessing does not intend to amend; and therefore the confessor is nevertheless to be bound to secrecy. Nor, however, does the seal of the confessional militate against charity, for charity does not require that a man apply a remedy to sin he does not know about. But what is known under confession is like something unknown, since the confessor does not know it as man, but as God. Nevertheless, he can apply as much of a remedy as is possible in the cases mentioned without revealing the confession, as by warning the ones who confess, and by applying diligence to the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate that he should watch over his flock more diligently; such that nevertheless he does not say anything by word or nod through which he would expose the person confessing.
Reply Obj. 2: The command about preserving confession follows from the sacrament itself; and therefore just as a precept about making a sacramental confession is from divine law, and a man cannot be absolved from it by any human dispensation or command, so no one can be forced or given permission by a man to reveal a confession. Therefore, if it is commanded under pain of automatic excommunication to tell if one knows anything about a sin, he may not tell; for he should guess that the intention of the one giving the command is if he knows as a man. But even if he is expressly interrogated concerning the confession, he should not tell, nor would he incur excommunication, for he is only subject to his own superior as a man, but he does not know this as a man, but as God.
Reply Obj. 3: A man is only summoned in witness as a man; and therefore without injury to his conscience he can swear that he does not know what he knows only as God. In the same way, however, without injury to his conscience a prelate can dismiss a sin that he knows as God unpunished or without any remedy. For he is not bound to apply a remedy except in the manner in which it falls to him. Therefore, in those things that are brought to him in the penitential forum, the remedy must be applied as much as possible in the same forum, so that in the case mentioned the abbot might admonish the man that he should resign from his position as prior. Or if he does not wish to, he can release him from the care of the priory on another pretext, so that all suspicion is avoided of a confession having been revealed.
Reply Obj. 4: A person is rendered unfit for a position of authority by many causes other than sin, like a defect of knowledge or age or something like that. And therefore someone can speak against it without raising suspicion of the crime, nor revealing the confession.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the seal of the confessional does not directly extend to anything but what falls under sacramental confession. But indirectly what does not fall under sacramental confession pertains to the seal of the confessional, like those things by which the sinner or the sin could be detected. Nevertheless, other things also should be kept secret with the greatest attention, both because of scandal, and because of the greater tendency that could arise from the habit.
And by this the response to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: A man should not easily receive anything in this way, but if he does receive it, he is bound by his promise to keep the secret as if he had learned it in confession, although it would not be under the seal of the confessional.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the seal of the confessional applies to the priest as the minister of this sacrament, for it is nothing but the duty of keeping a confession secret; just as the power of the keys is the power of absolving. Nevertheless, as someone who is not a priest partakes somewhat in the act of the keys in certain cases when he hears a confession because of necessity, so also he participates in the act of the seal of the confessional, and is bound to keep silent; although, properly speaking, he would not have the seal of the confessional.
And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.
Article 2
Whether something could be revealed by permission of the one confessing
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that a priest cannot reveal a sin that he has under the seal of the confessional to another with the permission of the penitent. For what a superior cannot do, someone of lower rank cannot do. But the pope cannot give anyone permission to tell another what he knows from the confessional. Therefore, neither can the person who confesses give him permission.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what was instituted because of the common good cannot be changed by one person’s decision. But keeping a confession secret was instituted for the good of the whole Church, so that people would go to confession with more confidence. Therefore, the person confessing cannot give permission to the priest to tell.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if a priest could be permitted, it would seem that a cover for malice would be given to bad priests, for they could pretend to have been given permission, and then sin with impunity; which is unfitting. Therefore, it seems that he cannot be given permission by the person who confessed.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, anyone to whom this priest reveals a confession will not be under the seal of the confessional; and then a sin that has already been erased could be made public, which is not fitting. Therefore, he cannot be given permission.
On the contrary (1), a superior can forgive a sinner with a letter to a lower-ranking priest about his desire. Therefore, by the desire of the one who confessed he can reveal his sin to another.
Furthermore (2), anyone who can do something by himself can also do it by another. But a person who confesses can by himself reveal his own sin which he did. Therefore, he can make a priest his intermediary.
I answer that, there are two things because of which a priest is bound to conceal a sin. First and most importantly, because this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, inasmuch as he knows it as God, whose place he bears in confession. In another way, for the sake of avoiding scandal. Now a penitent can make it so that what the priest knew as God, he also knows as man, which he does by giving him permission to tell; and thus if he told, he would not break the seal of the confessional. Nevertheless, he must be careful of scandal in telling, lest he gain a reputation for breaking the seal of the confessional.
Reply Obj. 1: The pope cannot give him permission to tell, for he cannot make him know as man, which the person who confesses can do.
Reply Obj. 2: What was instituted for the sake of the common good is not destroyed, for the seal of the confessional is not broken, for what is known by another means is what is said.
Reply Obj. 3: No impunity is given to bad priests by this, for a test is at hand, if they are accused, as to whether they revealed by the permission of the person who confessed.
Reply Obj. 4: Someone who arrives at knowledge of sin by means of a priest at the will of the one who confessed, partakes in the act of the priest in a certain way; and thus there is a similarity between him and an interpreter, unless perhaps the sinner wanted him to know absolutely and freely.
Article 3
Whether one is bound to conceal even what he knows by other means
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. It seems that someone can in no way reveal what he knows both through confession and in another way. For the seal of the confessional is only broken when the sin that was heard in confession is revealed. Therefore, if someone reveals a sin that he heard in confession, however else he knows about it, the seal of the confessional seems to be broken.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everyone who hears someone’s confession is obliged to not reveal his sins. But if someone promised another to keep private what was said to him, no matter how much he learned afterward, he ought to keep it private. Therefore, what someone hears in confession, no matter how else it is known, must be held private.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more powerful of two things draws the other to itself. But the knowledge by which someone knows a sin as God is more powerful and nobler than that by which he knows as a man. Therefore, it draws it to itself; and so it could not be revealed, according as the knowledge by which he knows it as God demands.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the secrecy of the confessional was instituted to avoid scandal, and so that people would not draw away from confession. But if someone could tell what he had heard in the confessional, even if he knew it another way, scandal would still follow. Therefore, he can in no way say it.
On the contrary (1), no one can obligate another to what he was not obliged unless he is his own superior, who obliges him by his command. But someone who knew another’s sin by seeing it was not obliged to keep it secret. Therefore, anyone who confesses to him, since he is not his superior, cannot oblige him to keep secret what he confesses to him.
Furthermore (2), the Church’s justice could be impeded, if in order to evade the sentence of excommunication which was to be imposed on someone because of a certain sin he was convicted of, he confessed to the person who must sentence him. But the execution of justice is under precept. Therefore, one is not bound to keep secret a sin that one has heard in confession if he knows about it in another way.
I answer that, concerning this there are three opinions. For some people say that what someone hears in confession, he cannot tell in any way if he knew it by other means, whether before or afterward. But some people say that by confession the way is closed to someone so that he cannot tell anything that he knew before, but that he is not unable to tell if he knows it afterward in another way. But both opinions, while attributing too much to the seal of the confessional, do detriment to the truth and the preservation of justice. For someone would be more inclined to sin if he did not fear being accused by someone because he had confessed to him, if he were to repeat the sin before him. Likewise also much justice could perish if someone could not bear witness about what he had seen because of a confession made to him. Nor does it matter that some people say that he should protest that he will not keep this private, for he could only make this protest after the sin has been told to him, and then any priest could, if he wanted, reveal a sin by making such a protest, if this made him free to reveal it. And therefore there is another, truer opinion, that what a man knows by other means, whether before confession, or afterward, he is not bound to keep secret as something he knows as a man. For he can say, I know this, for I have seen it; but he is still bound to keep it secret to the extent he knows it as God. For he cannot say, I heard this in confession. Nevertheless, for the sake of avoiding scandal he should abstain from saying anything about it unless necessity compels him.
Reply Obj. 1: When someone says that he has seen something, which thing he heard in confession, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, except incidentally, just as someone who knows by hearing and seeing does not reveal what he sees, speaking per se, if he says that he heard it, but incidentally, for he says what he heard, which happens to be what he saw. And so this does not break the seal of the confessional.
Reply Obj. 2: Someone who hears a confession is not obliged simply not to reveal the sin, but not to reveal it as it was heard in confession. For in no instance should he say he heard it in confession.
Reply Obj. 3: This is to be understood of two things that are in opposition. But the knowledge by which someone knows a sin as God does, and that by which he knows it as a man, are not opposed; and so the argument does not proceed.
Reply Obj. 4: Sin should be so avoided on the one side that justice remains on the other, for truth is not to be abandoned for the sake of scandal. And therefore when there is a risk to justice and truth, the revelation of what someone heard in confession, if he knows by any other means, should not be foregone because of scandal; while nevertheless he should strive to avoid scandal, as far as in him lies.
Exposition of the Text
I do not contradict this view, because perhaps it is true. (Sententiae IV, 21.2 (117). 1.) Augustine does not say this as though doubting whether purgatory exists, but whether the Apostle understands it to be this fire.
That it is necessary to confess all criminal sins at least once in confession. (Sent. IV, 21.7 (122). 1.) To the contrary, it is not necessary that contrition be for each sin individually. Therefore, nor must confession. And it should be said that contrition is in the sight of God who sees all things by one glance; but confession is made to a man, to whom it is necessary that everything be set forth individually. And furthermore, it is necessary to have sorrow individually for every mortal sin that occurs to the memory, as has been said.
Unless some of them are frequently repeated. (Sent. IV, 21.7 (122). 1.) To the contrary, repeating it does not draw them out of the genus of venial sins. And it should be said that he speaks as to disposition, for the frequent repetition of venial sins disposes one to that pleasure in venial sins that mortal sin consists in; for as a habit is generated and increased by a custom, the delight and inclination grows.
But it is one thing to despise one’s own priest for favor or hate, which the Canons forbid; it is another to avoid a blind one, which Urban admonishes us to do. (Sent. IV, 21.9 (124). 2.) To the contrary, therefore according to this it seems that someone could confess to whomever he wishes, when he has a priest who does not know. And it should be said that this is to be understood when the priest’s ignorance could lead a man into error; for then he should ask the permission of the priest or his superior to go to someone else more prudent. However, there are five cases in which it is permitted to confess to someone other than one’s own priest without this permission. The first is if one is a transient; second, if one has moved house; third, if the offense is committed in a different parish; fourth, because of wickedness of the priest, if he reveals confessions or incites people to wrongdoing; fifth, in an emergency.
Chapter 157 of 186