Lecture 1 — Moral Virtue is Caused by Habit

Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. The intellectual is generated and fostered for the most part by teaching, and so requires time and experience. Moral virtue, however, is derived from mores, or customary action. Hence, by a slight variation of the original term, we have this name “moral.” [245]

From this it is clear that moral virtue is not instilled in us by nature, for nothing natural is changed by habit; thus a stone, which naturally gravitates downward, will never become accustomed to moving upward, not even if someone should continue to throw it into the air ten thousand times. Neither will fire become accustomed to tend downward, nor will anything else that naturally tends one way acquire the contrary custom. Therefore, the moral virtues are not in us by nature, nor are they in us contrary to nature. We do have a natural aptitude to acquire them, but we are perfected in these virtues by use. [248]

Again, in the things that come to us from nature, we first receive the potentialities, and afterward we put them into operation. This is obvious in the case of the senses, for we did not acquire our senses from seeing and hearing repeatedly, but on the contrary, we made use of the senses after we had them—we did not come into possession of them after we used them. Virtues, however, we acquire by previous activity, as happens in different arts, for the things we must learn how to make, we learn by making. Thus, men become builders by building and harpists by playing the harp. Likewise, we become just by doing just actions, we become temperate by doing temperate actions, and we become courageous by doing courageous actions. [250]

Our contention is verified by what is done in the state, for legislators make men good in accordance with political norms. Such is the aim of every legislator. In fact, he who does not succeed in this fails in lawmaking. It is precisely in this way that a good constitution differs from a bad one. [251]

Again, every virtue has both its origin and its deterioration from the same principles. A similar situation is found in any art, for it is from playing the harp that both good and bad harpists are made. Proportionately, this can be said of builders and of all the rest. Men become good builders from building well, but they become poor builders by building poorly. If this were not so, there would be no need of a teacher, but all would be born good or bad workmen. This is the case also with virtue. Of those who engage in transactions with their fellow men, some become just and others unjust. Of those exposed to dangers who habitually experience fear or confidence, some become brave and some cowardly. We may say the same of men in reference to concupiscence and anger, for some become temperate and mild, but others self-indulgent and irascible; some conduct themselves well in these matters, but others badly. We may then universally state in one sentence: like actions produce like habits. [252]

Therefore, we must cultivate actions of the right sort, because differences in actions are followed by differences in habits. It is not of small moment but it matters a great deal— more than anything else—whether one becomes promptly accustomed to good or bad habits from youth. [254]

245. Virtue is of two kinds. After the Philosopher has treated the questions introductory to virtue, he now begins the study of the virtues.

He divides the treatise into two parts.

In the first part, he treats the virtues themselves.

In the second, he examines certain things that follow or accompany the virtues. He does this in book 7, at now, making a new start, we must say (1145a15; [1292]).

The first part is subdivided into two sections.

In the first, he studies the moral virtues.

In the second, the intellectual virtues, in book 6, at but since we previously said (1138b18; [1109]). The reason for this order is that the moral virtues are more known, and through them we are prepared for a study of the intellectual virtues.

The first part is divided into two parts:

In the first part, he investigates the matter of the moral virtues in general.

In the second, he examines the moral virtues specifically, at we stated previously (1115a6; [528]).

This first is again subdivided into two parts.

In the first of these, he treats moral virtue in general.

In the second, he examines certain principles of moral actions. This is in book 3, beginning at since virtue is concerned with passions (1109b30; [382]).

This first has a threefold division.

In the first part, he is looking for the cause of moral virtue.

In the second, he seeks to find out what moral virtue is, at now we must search out the definition of virtue. (1105b20 (lec. 5).)

In the third part, he shows how a man may become virtuous, at a sufficient explanation has been given. (1109a19 (lec. 10).)

On the initial point, he does three things.

First, he shows that moral virtue is caused in us by actions.

Second, he shows by what actions it may be caused in us, at the present study (1103b26; [255]).

Third, he finds a particular problem in what was previously said, at someone may rightly ask (1105a17; [280]).

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows the cause of the formation of virtue;

second, what the cause of its destruction is, at again, every virtue (1103b6; [252]).

On the initial point, he does three things.

First, he proposes that moral virtue originates in us from the habit of acting.

Second, that moral virtue is not in us by nature, at from this it is clear (1103a18; [248]).

Third, he explains by a sign what he had said, at our contention is verified by what is done (1103b2; [251]).

246. He says first that virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral, and that the intellectual is both generated and increased for the most part by teaching. The reason is that intellectual virtue is ordered to knowledge which we acquire more readily from teaching than by discovery. More people can know the truth by learning from others than can by ascertaining it themselves. Everyone indeed who finds out from others will learn more than he can discover by himself. But because we cannot proceed to in the process of learning, men must learn many truths by discovery. Besides, since all our knowledge is derived from the senses, and the senses in turn very often beget experience, it follows that intellectual virtue may need long experience.

247. But moral virtue is derived from customary activity. Now moral virtue, found in the appetitive part, implies a certain inclination to something desirable. This inclination is either from nature, which tends to what is agreeable to itself, or from custom, which is transformed into nature. Hence, the name of moral virtue, differing somewhat from custom, is taken from it. In Greek, ethos spelled with an epsilon (a short “e”) means “habit” or “moral virtue,” while ethos spelled with an eta (a long “e”) signifies “custom.” With us, the name “moral” likewise sometimes means “custom” and other times is used in relation to vice or virtue.

248. Then, at from this it is clearly (1103a18; [248]), he proves from the premises that moral virtue is not produced by nature for two reasons.

The first is that none of the things from nature are changed by use. He illustrates this point by the example of a stone that, naturally tending downward, will never become accustomed to moving upward, no matter how often it is thrown into the air. The reason is that things which operate naturally either merely operate or both operate and are operated upon. If they merely operate, their principle of action is not changed. So long as the cause remains the same, the inclination to the same effect remains. If, however, they so operate as also to be operated upon—unless the passivity be such that it removes the principle of action—the natural tendency in them will not be destroyed. But if the passivity be such as to take away the principle of action, then it will not belong to the same nature. Thus, what was previously natural will cease to be natural. When a thing operates naturally, therefore, no change is effected regarding its action. The same is also true if the operation is contrary to nature unless perhaps the motion be such that it destroys nature. But, if the natural principle of the operation remains, there will always be the same action. Therefore, habit plays no part in the things that are according to nature and in the things that are contrary to nature.

249. The reason for this is that moral virtue pertains to the appetite that operates according as it is moved by the good apprehended. When the appetite operates often, therefore, it must be often moved by its object. In this, the appetite follows a certain tendency in accordance with the mode of nature, as many drops of water falling on a rock hollow it out. Thus, it is obvious that the moral virtues are not in us by nature, nor are they in us contrary to nature. We do have a natural aptitude to acquire them, inasmuch as the appetitive potency is naturally adapted to obey reason. But we are perfected in these virtues by use, for when we act repeatedly according to reason, a modification is impressed in the appetite by the power of reason. This impression is nothing else but moral virtue.

250. He presents the second reason at again, in the things (1103a26). In all the things with which nature has endowed us, potency is previous to operation. This is obvious in the senses. We did not receive the sense of sight and hearing from seeing and hearing repeatedly. On the contrary, from the fact that we had these senses, we began to use them. It did not happen that we came into possession of the senses from the fact that we used them. But we have acquired the virtues by acting according to virtue, as happens in the operative arts, in which men learn by making the things that are to be made after they have mastered the skill. In this way, men become builders by building and harpists by playing the harp. Likewise, men become just or temperate or courageous by doing just actions or temperate actions or courageous actions. Therefore, virtues of this kind are not in us by nature.

251. Then, at our contention is verified (1103b2), he makes known what he had said by a sign. He says the statement just made—that by performing actions we become virtuous—is verified by what is done in the state. Legislators make men virtuous by habituating them to virtuous works by means of statutes, rewards, and punishment. Such ought to be the aim of every legislator—in fact, he who does not succeed in this fails in lawmaking. It is precisely in this way that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

252. Then, at again, every virtue (1103b6), he shows that virtue is produced and destroyed by identical works.

First, he explains his proposition;

second, he infers a corollary from what has been said, at therefore, we must (1103b22; [254]).

He says first that the production and the destruction of virtue have their source in the same principles taken in a different way. The same is true in any art. He shows this first from activities, because men become both good and bad harpists—understanding this proportionately—from the way they play the harp. A similar reason holds for builders and all other workmen. Men become good builders by building well repeatedly; they become poor builders by building poorly. If this were not so, men would not need to learn arts of this kind from some master workman who would direct their actions, but there would be good and bad workmen in all the arts no matter how they would be practiced. As it is in the arts, so also in the virtues.

253. Those who act well in their dealings with their fellow men become just, and those who act in an evil way become unjust. Likewise, those faced with danger who accustom themselves to fear and confidence in the right way become courageous; in the wrong way, cowardly. This is true also of temperance and meekness in the matter of concupiscence and anger. We may then universally sum up in one sentence: like actions produce like habits.

254. Then, at therefore, we must (1103b22), he affirms that a person must give careful attention to the performance of such actions because differences in actions are followed by differences in habits. He concludes, therefore, that it is not of small moment that one becomes accustomed to perform either good or evil actions from earliest youth, but it makes a great difference—indeed, everything depends on it—for we retain longer the things impressed on us as children.