Lecture 7 — Conclusion of the Definition

Moreover, there are many ways of sinning (for, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, evil partakes of the unlimited, and good partakes of the limited). However, there is only one way of doing what is right. It is easy to sin, therefore, but difficult to do what is right. It is easy indeed to miss a bull’s eye but difficult to hit it. For this reason, then, defect and excess pertain to vice but the mean to virtue. Men are good in but one way but evil in many ways. [319]

Virtue, then, is a habit that chooses the mean in regard to us, as that mean is determined by reason and understood by a wise man. [322]

Virtue is a mean between two vices: of that which is according to excess and of that which is according to defect. [324]

In regard to this mean, some vices fall short but others exceed what is right both in the passions and in actions. Virtue, however, discovers and chooses the mean. [325]

For this reason, according to its essence and definition, virtue is a mean. But it is also an extreme as having the nature of what is best and right. [326]

Not every action or passion of the soul admits a mean. [328]

Certain ones imply vice by their very name: passions such as ill-will, shamelessness, and envy and actions such as adultery, theft, and murder. All these and their ilk are said to be evil in themselves and not only in their excess or defect. Neither do we have the option of acting well or badly in an action like adultery, as though it could be considered proper in itself, or done in a fitting manner, or at a right time, or in due circumstances, but to do any of them is sinful without any qualification. [329]

To seek a mean in these matters would be like assigning a mean to excess and defect in unjust, cowardly, or lustful actions. Thus, there would be a mean of an excess and of a defect, and an excess of an excess and a defect of a defect. [330]

An excess and defect are not found in temperance and fortitude because a mean is in no way an extreme, so excess or defect cannot be the mean of vice, but what is done is vicious. As a consequence, there cannot be a mean in any excess or defect, nor can there be excess or defect in any mean. [331]

319. Moreover, there are many ways of sinning. After giving the two previous reasons, the Philosopher now adds a third based upon the nature of good and evil. Accepting the Pythagorean view, he says that there are many ways of sinning because evil, which is included in the nature of sin, partakes of the unlimited, but good partakes of the limited. We must understand then, on the contrary, that there is only one way of doing what is right.

320. The reason for this can be found in the statement of Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, that good results from a united and complete cause but evil from any single defect, as is evident in physical goodness and badness. Ugliness, which is a defect of physical beauty, results from any member being unsightly. But beauty arises only when all the members are well proportioned and of a healthy hue. Likewise sickness, a defect in the constitution of the body, happens from a single disorder of any humor. But health is dependent on the proper proportion of all the humors. Likewise, sin is committed in human action from any circumstance being inordinate in any way either by excess or defect. But goodness will be present only when all the circumstances are rightly ordered. As health or beauty comes about in a single way, but sickness and ugliness in many or even in an unlimited number of ways, so also moral goodness happens in only one way but the act of sin takes place in countless ways. Hence, it is easy to sin because sin can happen in a variety of modes, but it is difficult to do what is right because rectitude happens only in one way.

321. He gives as an example that it is easy to miss the bull’s eye, that is, the center of the target, because a miss can happen in numerous ways. But to hit the center spot is difficult because a hit happens in only one way. Now, it is obvious that excess and defect take place in various ways, but the mean in a single way. Hence, excess and defect manifestly pertain to vice but the mean to virtue, because men are good simply, that is, in one way, but evil at sundry times, that is, in many ways, as has just been stated [320].

322. Then, at virtue, then, is (1106b36), he infers the definition of virtue from the premises.

First, he presents the definition;

second, he explains it, at virtue is a mean between two (1107a2; [324]);

third, he rejects an error, at not every action (1107a8; [328]).

In the definition of virtue, he treats four points.

The first of these is the genus, which he touches on when he says that virtue is a habit [305].

The second is the act of the moral virtue, for the habit must be defined by the act. This he mentions by the word chooses, that is, acts according to choice, for the principal act of virtue is choice—he will discuss this later [432].

Third, since the act must be determined by the object, he refers to the object or the term of the action at the mean in regard to us. It was shown above [314] that virtue seeks out and uses the mean not of the thing, but in regard to us. Similarly, it has been said [257] that moral virtue is in the appetite, which participates in reason.

He had to add, therefore, a fourth notion, which refers to the cause of goodness in virtue, by the words determined by reason. It is good to seek the mean only insofar as it is determined by reason, but because reason can be right or erring, we must perform virtue according to right reason, as was ascertained previously [257].

323. To explain this, he adds as understood by a wise man. Wise here does not refer to one who is wise simply, knowing the ultimate causes of the whole universe, but rather to one who is prudent, that is, wise in human affairs, but this he will discuss in book 6 [1163]. Certainly the making of what is good in the art of building is determined by the judgment of one wise in that art, and the same is true in all the other arts.

324. Then, at virtue is a mean (1107a2), he explains the previously given definition in regard to his saying that virtue consists in the mean. On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows between what things there is a mean;

second, in reference to what thing this mean may be considered, at in regard to this (1107a3; [325]);

third, he deduces a corollary at for this reason (1107a6; [326]).

He says first that virtue itself is a kind of middle course between two vices and between two vicious habits: one by way of excess and the other by way of defect. Thus, liberality is the middle course between extravagance tending toward excess and miserliness tending toward avarice.

325. Then, at **in regard to this **(1107a3), he shows in reference to what norm we are to judge excess, defect, and mean. He says we must further consider that some vices fall short of what is right but others exceed it, both in the passions and in actions. In regard to this, some are deficient and others are in excess. But virtue, precisely as it observes what it ought, is said to discover the mean by reason and to choose it by the will. Thus, it is evident that virtue itself is a middle course but also, on the other hand, employs the mean. It is indeed the middle course between two habits, but it uses the mean in actions and passions.

326. Then, at for this reason (1107a6), he draws a further conclusion from his remarks: virtue in its essence and definition is a mean. But, precisely as it possesses the character of the best and as it acts or guides well in a determined genus, it is an extreme. For an understanding of this, we must consider, as has been pointed out [322], that the entire goodness of moral virtue depends on the rectitude of the reason. Hence, good is in harmony with moral virtue according as it follows right reason, but evil has a reference to each vice—namely, excess and defect, inasmuch as both depart from right reason. Therefore, according to the nature of goodness and evil, both vices are in one extreme, that is, in evil, which is thus shown to be a deviation from reason. Virtue, however, is in the other extreme, that is, in good which is characterized as a following of reason.

327. By reason of this, virtue and the contrary vices do not follow the species indicated by the definition, because right reason is the motive and the extrinsic norm for the right appetite. But an evil appetite does not intend by vice to deviate from right reason—this is contrary to its intention—for it directly intends that object in which excess or defect is present. What is contrary to its intention is incidental. Now, the incidental and the extrinsic do not constitute a species, but the species of a habit is taken from the object to which the habit tends. But, according to objects, the mean belongs to virtue and the extremes to vices. He says, therefore, that, according to the nature of good, virtue lies in the extreme, but according to the essential species, in the mean.

328. Then, at not every action (1107a8), he rejects an erroneous view. Because virtue can occupy the middle course and vice the extremes in actions and in passions, someone might think that this would happen in all actions and passions. But he rejects this by saying that not every action or passion of the soul admits a mean in the context of virtue.

329. He explains this first from reason, at certain ones (1107a9). Certain actions and passions imply vice by their very name: passions such as ill-will, shamelessness, and envy and actions such as adultery, theft, and murder. All of these and their like are evil in themselves and not only in their excess or defect. Hence, in such things, a person cannot be virtuous no matter how he acts, but he always sins in doing them. In explaining this, he adds that right or wrong in actions like adultery does not arise from the fact that a person does the act as he ought or when he ought, so that then the act becomes good, but on the other hand evil when not done as it ought. Without qualification, sin is present whenever any of these is present, for each of them implies an act opposed to what is right.

330. Second, he gives some examples by way of proof in the matter of vice, at to seek a mean (1107a18). He says that, because such things imply evil in themselves, seeking a mean and extremes in them is like attributing a mean to excess and defect, whether it be in acting unjustly, or cowardly, or lewdly—this would certainly be unfitting. Since these actions imply excess and defect, it follows that excess and defect would be a mean (which is a contradiction) and that we would have to find the excess of the excess and the defect of the defect, which could go on forever.

331. Third, he explains the same thing by example in the matter of virtue, at an excess (1107a22). Because temperance and fortitude imply a mean of themselves, they do not admit excess and defect in the sense that a man can be temperate or courageous in an excessive or defective manner. Likewise, the mean of those things that of themselves imply extremes cannot be excess and defect. But no matter how any one of them is done, it is vicious.

332. Last, he concludes that there cannot be a mean of any excess or defect, nor can there be an excess or defect of any mean.