Lecture 2 — Virtue and Action

The present study is not pursued for the sake of contemplation, like other studies. We seek the definition of virtue not in order to know, but in order to become virtuous; otherwise, it would have no utility. We must, then, thoroughly investigate what concerns actions and how they are to be performed, for actions control the formation of habits, as we have pointed out. [255]

To be in accord with right reason is a quality common to these actions and should be taken for granted. Later, we will discuss the question both as to the definition of right reason and as to how right reason is related to the other virtues. [257]

It must be presupposed that any discussion concerning actions to be performed ought to be given in a general way and not definitively. We remarked in the beginning that discussions must be pursued according to the nature of the subject matter. Now, things pertaining to actions, and relevant considerations, do not have anything fixed about them any more than the things that concern health. If this be true in the general treatment, still more uncertainty will be found in the consideration of particular cases. Indeed, this study does not fall under either art or tradition. But those who perform moral actions must always pay attention to what is appropriate to the occasion, as is done in medicine and navigation. Although this is the situation, we ought to try to be of assistance to others in the present study. [258]

We must, then, first consider that moral matters are of such a nature as to be destroyed by defect and excess. To prove such notions that are not readily manifest, we must use obvious signs and evidence such as we have in the case of bodily strength and health. An excessive amount of exercise impairs health no less than does a lack of it. Likewise, eating and drinking either too much or too little causes damage to health. But health is produced, increased, and preserved by eating and drinking in moderation. It is the same, then, with temperance and fortitude and the other virtues. The man who is afraid of everything, who runs away, and who will endure nothing becomes a coward. On the other hand, the man who fears absolutely nothing and wades into every danger becomes reckless. Likewise, a man who tastes every pleasure and passes up none becomes intemperate, while he who seeks to avoid all pleasures like a boor becomes, as it were, insensible. Temperance and fortitude are destroyed by excess and defect but are preserved by the golden mean. [260]

Not only do the production, increase, and destruction of virtues have identical sources and causes, but the actions themselves also have the same sources and causes. We see this in the more obvious actions like bodily strength. A man becomes strong from taking abundant nourishment and from hard work. Then, when he is strong, he will be more able to do these things. We find the same thing in the virtues, since we become temperate by giving up pleasures, and having become temperate we can very easily give up pleasures. The same is true of the virtue of fortitude. We become brave by accustoming ourselves to despise and endure terrors, and having become brave we are very capable of enduring terrors. [264]

255. The present study is not pursued. After the Philosopher has shown that virtues are caused in us by actions, he now inquires how this is done.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows what are the actions that cause virtue in us.

Second, at we may understand (1104b3; [265]), he shows what is the sign of virtue already produced in us.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows the necessity of the present investigation.

Second, at it must be presupposed (1103b34; [258]), he treats the method of investigation.

Third, he shows actions as causes of virtue.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he presents the necessity itself.

Second, at to be in accord with right reason (1103b31; [257]), he shows what we must suppose here.

Regarding the first, we must consider that, in the speculative sciences, where we seek only the knowledge of the truth, it is sufficient to know what is the cause of a determined effect. But in the practical sciences, whose end is action, we must know by what activities or operations a determined effect follows from a determined cause.

256. He says, then, that the present study, moral philosophy, is not pursued for the sake of the contemplation of truth, like the other studies of the speculative sciences, but for the sake of action. In this science, we seek a definition of virtue not only to know its truth, but to become good by acquiring virtue. The reason he assigns is that, if the investigation of this science were for the knowledge of truth alone, it would have little utility. It is not of great importance, nor does it contribute much to the perfection of the intellect, that a man should know the changeable truth about contingent actions with which virtue is concerned. This being the case, he concludes that we must thoroughly inquire about the actions we ought to perform because, as we have already observed [248–53], actions have influence and control over the formation of good and bad habits in us.

257. Then, at to be in accord with right (1103b31), he shows it should be taken for granted that actions causing virtue possess the common quality of being in accord with right reason. This happens because the good of everything consists in the fact that its operation is suited to its form. Now, the distinctive form of man is that which makes him a rational animal. Hence, man’s action must be good precisely because it harmonizes with right reason, for perversity of reason is repugnant to its nature. Later, in book 6 [1109], we shall ascertain what is right reason, which belongs to the intellectual virtues, and how it pertains to the other virtues, which are the moral.

258. Then, at it must be (1103b34), he explains the method of investigating matters of this kind. We must presume, he says, that any discussion concerned, like this, with actions to be performed ought to be given in a general way, that is, as a precedent or as likely, but not definitively. This was pointed out in the introduction to the whole work [24]. The reason is that the discussions are to be carried on according to the nature of the subject matter, as was noted in the same place [32]. We see that things pertaining to moral actions and materials useful to them, like external goods, do not have in themselves anything fixed by way of necessity, but rather everything is contingent and changeable. The same occurs in works relating to medicine, which are concerned with health, because the disposition of the body to be cured and the remedies used to effect a cure are changeable in many ways.

259. The teaching on matters of morals even in their general aspects is uncertain and variable. But still more uncertainty is found when we come down to the solution of particular cases. This study does not fall under either art or tradition, because the causes of individual actions are infinitely diversified. Hence, judgment of particular cases is left to the prudence of each one. He who acts prudently must attentively consider the things to be done at the present time after all the particular circumstances have been taken into consideration. In this way, a doctor must act in bringing about a cure and a captain in steering a ship. Although this doctrine is such as to be uncertain in its general aspects and incapable of precision in particular cases, we ought to study it so that, in these matters, we may be of some assistance to men in directing their actions.

260. Then, at we must, then, first (1104a11), he shows what are the operations that may cause virtue.

On this point he does two things.

First, he shows by what actions virtue is caused.

Second, at not only the production (1104a27; [264]), he shows that virtue already formed produces in turn like actions.

He says first we must consider before anything else that virtues or operations causing virtues are of such a nature as to be destroyed by excess and defect. To prove this, we must use certain more obvious signs and evidence, that is, the things happening in regard to the powers of the body that are more manifest than the capacities of the soul.

261. We see that bodily strength is impaired by immoderate games—that is, certain bodily exercises in which the contestants do battle naked—because the natural power of the body is weakened by excessive exertion. Likewise, the lack of exercise destroys bodily strength because, when not exercised, the members remain flabby and incapable of work. A similar comment may be made about health. If someone takes either too much food or drink or less than he needs, his health is impaired. But if a man uses exercise, food, and drink in moderation, he will become physically strong and his health will be improved and preserved.

262. It is the same with the virtues of the soul, such as fortitude, temperance, and the other virtues. A person who fears everything, takes to flight, and never faces anything terrifying becomes a coward. Likewise, he who fears nothing and wades into every danger thoughtlessly becomes rash. The same is true of temperance. He who tastes every pleasure and avoids none becomes intemperate. But he who avoids all pleasures as a boor does, without any reason, becomes as it were insensible.

263. However, we are not to conclude from this that virginity, which abstains from all venereal pleasure, is a vice. The reason is that virginity does not abstain from all pleasures, and that it abstains from particular pleasures according to right reason. Similarly, it is not a vice for some soldiers to refrain from all venereal pleasure in order to devote themselves more fully to fighting. Now these things have been said because temperance and fortitude are destroyed by excess and defect but are preserved by the golden mean, which is understood not according to quantity, but according to right reason.

264. Then, at not only (1104a27), he shows that virtue produces actions similar to the actions that caused it. He says that the same kinds of activity cause both the production and the increase of virtue, and also its destruction if they are taken in a contrary way. Likewise, the operations of the virtues already produced consist in these same works. This is obvious in bodily actions, which are more manifest. As bodily strength is caused from the fact that a man can take abundant nourishment and can work hard, and when he has become strong, he will be more able to do these things, so also it is with the virtues of the soul. From the fact that we give up pleasures, we become temperate; and when we have become temperate, we can very easily give up pleasures. It is the same with the virtue of fortitude. We become brave by accustoming ourselves to despise and endure terrors, and having become brave, we are very capable of enduring terrors. So also fire once kindled from generated heat can give off intense heat.