Lecture 8 — Explanation of the Definition in Detail

Not only must we must speak of virtue under its universal aspect, but we must apply the doctrine to individual cases. In discussions that treat of actions, universals are not of much utility and particulars are more accurate, for actions are concerned with singulars. It is fitting, then, that discussions be in harmony with particulars. Therefore, our teaching must be based on the explanation of individual virtues. [333]

In actions concerned with fear and daring, the mean is fortitude. Here an excess in fearlessness lacks an applicable name (many things indeed are unnamed). But the man who is extreme in daring is called foolhardy, while the man who fears excessively and lacks daring is a coward. [335]

With regard to pleasures and pains—but not all of them—the mean is temperance (which is less concerned with pains). Excess in these things is called intemperance, but the defect does not often occur. Hence, persons lacking a sense of pleasure are unnamed, although they may be called insensible. [342]

In respect to the giving and receiving of money, the mean is liberality. The excess and defect are found in extravagance and stinginess, which in opposite ways do too much and too little. The spendthrift overdoes the giving and falls short in the acquisition, but the miser, on the contrary, is excessive in acquiring and deficient in giving. For the present, we are content to discuss these matters in outline and as contained under headings; later, we shall treat them more in detail. [343]

Having to do with the use of money are other habits, the mean of which is magnificence. The magnificent or princely person, as concerned with bestowing great sums, differs from the liberal person who gives small amounts. Excess in magnificence is called “apyrocalia” (vulgar display) and “banausia,” but the defect, meanness. These extremes differ from the extremes opposed to liberality, but the manner of the difference will be treated later. [344]

333. We must speak of virtue not only. After the Philosopher has explained what virtue is in a general way, he now applies the definition in a special way to each virtue.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows the necessity of this procedure.

Second, he carries out his proposal at in actions concerned with fear (1107a33; [335]).

He says first that not only must we speak of the essence of virtue not only in its universal aspect, but the general doctrine must be applied to each case in a special way. The reason he gives is that, in discussions concerned with actions, universals are not of much utility and particulars are more accurate because actions pertain to singulars. Fittingly, then, discussions about actions should be in harmony with particulars.

334. If, then, our study be about actions considered only universally, it will be futile both because it does not accomplish its purpose, which is the direction of individual actions, and because a study from a universal viewpoint—where deficiencies in particulars may not occur—cannot be made in these things by reason of the changeableness of the matter, as was said before [32–6]. But the study of particulars is more effective, being suitable to control actions, and also more accurate because particulars are understood to the extent that the universal is verified in them. What was said [289–332], therefore, about virtue in general must have been based upon the explanation of individual virtues.

335. Then, at in actions concerned with (1107a33), he carries out his proposal, showing by particular cases that the mean is good and praiseworthy but the extreme is evil and blameworthy.

First, he shows this in the virtues;

second, in the passions, at also in the passions (1108a30; [355]).

Regarding the first point, we must consider that virtues have been distinguished in two ways. Some observe the distinction of virtues according to certain general modes that are four in number. The root of virtue consists in the rectitude of reason, according to which we must direct our actions and passions. Actions, however, are to be directed in a way different from the passions, for actions in themselves do not resist reason, as buying, selling, and so forth. Consequently, for such things, reason need only establish a certain equality of rectitude. But the passions indicate a kind of inclination that can be contrary to reason in a twofold way.

336. In one way, it draws reason to something else, as is evident in all passions that deal with following the appetite—for example, concupiscence, hope, anger, and others of this kind. For these passions, reason must establish a rectitude in suppressing and restraining them.

In another way, passion shrinks from what is according to reason, as in all passions that denote flight of the appetite—for example, fear, hatred, and the like. In passions of this kind, reason must establish a rectitude by stabilizing the soul in what is conformable to reason. According to this, we designate four virtues, which some men call principal. Rectitude of reason itself pertains to prudence; equality is established in operations to justice; constancy of soul to fortitude; and moderation of the passions—as the words indicate—to temperance.

337. Some, therefore, have understood these virtues in a general way, thinking that all knowledge of truth belongs to prudence, the equality of all actions to justice, all constancy of soul to fortitude, and all curbing and moderation of the passions to temperance. Cicero, Seneca, and others spoke of these virtues in this way. They considered such to be general virtues and called all other virtues species of these.

338. But this distinction does not seem to be appropriate.

This is first because the above-mentioned virtues are of such a nature that, without them, there can be no virtue. Hence, the species of virtue cannot be differentiated by this.

Second, virtues and vices are not specified by reason but by their object, as was said above [322].

339. Aristotle then distinguishes virtues more fittingly according to their objects or matter. Thus, the previously mentioned four virtues are not called “principal” because they are general, but because their species are taken according to certain important notions, as prudence is not concerned with all knowledge of the truth, but especially with the act of reason that is command. Justice is not concerned with equality of all actions, but only of those referring to another, where the better thing is the establishment of equality. Fortitude is not concerned with every kind of constancy, but only that which arises at the fear of the danger of death. Temperance is not concerned with all restraint, but only with that of the desires and pleasures of touch. The other virtues, however, are, as it were, secondary. They can be reduced, therefore, to the previously mentioned virtues not as species to genus, but as secondary to principal virtues.

340. Since, then, these things have been taken for granted, we must know that the Philosopher does not treat justice and prudence here, but later on in book 5 [885–1108] and book 6 [1161–73]. He does treat here, however, temperance, fortitude, and certain other secondary virtues, all of which are concerned with some of the passions. But all passions regard some object that pertains to the bodily life of man, external goods, or human acts.

Therefore, he first mentions the virtues touching on the passions with objects that pertain to bodily life;

second, he mentions those pertaining to external goods, at in respect to the giving and receiving of money (1107b8; [343]);

third, those regarding exterior acts at there are three other means (1108a9; [350]).

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he speaks of fortitude, which regards dangers destructive of life.

Second, he speaks of temperance, which regards things useful for the preservation of life, such as food, by which life is preserved in the individual, and sex, by which life is preserved in the species, at with regard to pleasures and pains (1107b4; [342]).

341. He says first that fortitude is a mean concerned with fear and daring as regarding the danger of death. But of those sinning by excess, the state of the man who is excessive in being fearless and also deficient in fearing is not given any special name because this rarely happens. Likewise, many things are without a name because men do not advert to them ordinarily such that they would give them a name. But he who is extreme in daring is called rash. Such a one differs from the fearless man who is so called from the lack of fear, but the rash man is so called from an excess of daring. He who fears excessively and lacks daring is called a coward.

342. Then, at with regard to pleasures (1107b4), he discusses temperance. He says that temperance is a mean not for all pleasures and pains, but for those of touch, pertaining to food and sex. It is less concerned with pains than with pleasures, for pains of this kind are caused only from the absence of pleasures. Excess in such things is called intemperance, but the defect does not often occur, because everyone naturally desires pleasure. Hence, this defect is unnamed. He himself, however, invents a name and calls “insensible” those who do not feel pleasures of this kind. One who, contrary to right reason, avoids such pleasures is appropriately called insensible.

343. Then, at in respect to the giving (1107b8), he introduces the virtues that regard external things.

First, he treats those virtues concerned with the desire of external goods;

second, those that regard external evils, at with respect to anger (1108a4; [349]).

External goods are riches and honors.

First, then, he presents the virtues regulating riches;

second, those referring to honors, at the mean in regard to honor (1107b21; [345]).

Regarding the first, he does two things.

First, he treats liberality, which is concerned with moderate riches;

second, magnificence, which is concerned with great riches, at having to do with the use of money (1107b16; [344]).

He says first that liberality is a mean between the giving and receiving of money. But extravagance and stinginess constitute, in an opposite way, excess and defect. The spendthrift overdoes the giving and falls short in the acquisition, but the miser, on the contrary, is excessive in acquiring and deficient in giving. These matters are here discussed in outline or as conforming to a pattern and as falling under headings or summarily. Later he will treat more accurately both these and other matters [528–94; 595–648]; 658–706].

344. Then, at **having to do with the use of money **(1107b16), he introduces magnificence. He says that, besides the above-mentioned habits (liberality and the opposed vices), there are also other virtues concerned with money, for which even magnificence is a kind of mean. The princely or magnificent person, as engaged in expending great sums, differs from the generous person who gives small amounts. Excess in respect to magnificence is called “apyrocalia”—from “a,” meaning “without,” and “pyros,” meaning “practice,” and “kalos,” meaning “good”—that is, without the practice of what is good. Thus, those who spend a great deal care little about how they bestow their goods. This excess is also called “banausia”—from “banos,” meaning “furnace,” because, like a furnace, the squanderer consumes everything. The defect, however, is called “meanness.” These extremes in fact differ from those that are opposed to liberality, but the way they differ will be treated subsequently in book 4 [707–34].