Lecture 5 — The Definition of Virtue

Now we must determine the definition of virtue. Since there are three principles occurring in the soul—passions, powers, and habits—virtue will be one of these. [289]

By “passions,” I mean: concupiscence, anger, aggressiveness, envy, joy, love, hatred, desire, jealousy, pity, and all the movements followed by pleasure and sorrow. [291]

I call those principles “powers” in respect of which we are said to be capable of experiencing passions, for example, of becoming angry or being sad or having pity. [297]

I call those principles “habits” in respect of which we are well or badly disposed toward the passions. Thus, we are badly disposed in becoming angry in a violent or feeble way, but we are well disposed in doing so with moderation. The same applies to all habits and passions. [298]

Neither virtues nor vices, therefore, are passions, because we are not called good or evil by reason of the passions but by reason of virtue or vice. [299]

We are neither praised nor reproached for the passions. Now, a man is not praised or blamed for being afraid or angry simply, but in a particular way. We are, though, praised or blamed for virtues or vices. [300]

We become angry and are afraid without willing it, but the virtues are certain choices—or at least not without choice. [301]

We are said to be moved by the passions. However, we are not moved, but disposed in a certain way by the virtues and vices. [302]

For this reason also, the virtues are not powers, for we are not called good or evil simply because we are capable of being affected by the passions, nor are we praised or blamed. [303]

Furthermore, the powers are in us by nature, but we are not good or evil by nature, as we said above. [304]

If, then, virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits. We say, therefore, that habit is the genus of virtue. [305]

289. After the Philosopher has treated the cause of virtue, he now begins to investigate the definition of virtue.

He divides the investigation into two parts.

In the first, he shows what virtue is;

in the second, he ascertains the opposition of virtue to vice at there are three (1108b11; [358]).

The first part is treated under two headings.

In the first, he determines what virtue is in general.

In the second, he applies the adopted definition to particular virtues, at we must speak of virtue not only under its universal aspect (1107a28; [333]).

This first section is also twofold.

In the first of these, he investigates the definition of virtue.

In the second, he concludes the definition, at virtue, then, is a habit (1106b36–1107a2; [322–24]).

On the first point, he does two things.

First he investigates the genus of virtue;

second, its specific difference, at we must consider not only (1106a14; [306]).

He investigates the genus by parts. Hence, regarding the first he does three things.

First, he offers the division.

Second, at by “passions,” I mean (1105b21; [291]), he explains its parts.

Third, at **neither virtues nor vices **(1105b28; [299]), he argues from the accepted definition.

290. He says first that, to establish the definition of virtue, we have to take for granted three principles in the soul: passions, powers, and habits. Virtue must come under one of these, for he just said [282] that virtue is a principle of certain operations of the soul. Now no principle of operation is found in the soul outside these three. Sometimes a man seems to act from a passion, such as anger; sometimes from habit, as when he works by art; sometimes from mere potentiality, as when he begins a new activity. It is obvious that not absolutely everything in the soul is included under this division—the essence of the soul and the operation of the intellect do not belong here—but only the things that are principles of some operation are considered.

291. Then, at by “passions,” I mean (1105b21), he indicates the members of the division just mentioned.

First, he makes known those that are passions;

second, those that are powers, at I call those principles “powers” (1105b23; [297]);

third, those that are habits, at I call those principles “habits” (1105b25; [298]).

Regarding the first, we must consider that passions are not attributed to the vegetative soul, because the powers of this part of the soul are not passive, as they are in both the sensitive part and the intellective part, but active. The perceptive and appetitive powers, except the active intellect, are passive. Although feeling and understanding are in a way passions (that is, they suffer change), passions are properly denominated not because of the apprehension of sense or intellect, but only because of the appetite. The reason is that the operation of the perceptive power takes place according as the thing perceived is in the knower according to the state of the knower. Now the object perceived is, so to speak, drawn to the knower. But the operation of the appetitive power takes place according as the one desiring is inclined to the thing desired. Because it is characteristic of the recipient, or patient, that he be drawn by the agent, and not the converse, it follows that only the operations of the appetitive powers are called passions, not the operations of the perceptive powers.

292. Even among the appetitive powers, the operation of the intellective appetite is not properly called “passion.” It does not take place with a change of a bodily organ, which is necessary to the nature of a passion properly speaking. Also, in the operation of the intellective appetite, which is the will, man is not the passive recipient, but rather he directs himself as the master of his action. It remains, therefore, that operations of the sensitive appetite, which are accompanied by a change of a bodily organ and which in a way draw man, should be called passions in a strict sense.

293. The sensitive appetite is divided into two powers: the concupiscible, which concerns sensible good absolutely (namely, what is pleasurable to sense) and evil contrary to it, and the irascible, which concerns good under the aspect of a certain eminence. For example, victory is said to be a kind of good, although it is not accompanied by pleasure of sense.

Whatever passions concern good or evil absolutely, therefore, are found in the concupiscible appetite. Certain of these—three in number—regard the good: love, which implies a certain connaturality of the appetite with the good loved; desire, which implies a movement of the appetite toward the good loved; and delight, which implies a repose of the appetite in the good loved. Opposed to these in respect to evil are: hatred, opposed to love; aversion or flight, opposed to desire; sadness, opposed to delight. But those passions that concern good or evil under the aspect of difficulty belong to the irascible, such as fear and boldness in regard to evil and hope and despair in regard to good. A fifth is anger, which is a composite passion and so has no opposite.

294. In enumerating the passions, therefore, he says they are: concupiscence (which we call desire), anger, fear, boldness, envy (which is contained under sadness), and joy (which is contained under pleasure, for this is a non-corporeal pleasure that consists in an interior perception of the good, and likewise a love, hatred, and desire of the same interior kind). Desire differs from concupiscence in that concupiscence pertains to bodily pleasure while desire concerns every pleasure without distinction.

295. He adds jealousy and pity, which are species of sadness. Pity is sadness at another’s misfortune, and jealousy is sadness because one lacks what others have.

296. He also adds that pleasure and sorrow universally follow the above-mentioned passions, because all others imply certain movements to good and evil, and these movements are accompanied by pleasure or sorrow. Hence, all other passions are terminated at pleasure and sorrow.

297. Then, at I call those principles “powers” (1105b23), he identifies the powers not in general, but as pertaining to moral study according as they differ from the passions. He affirms that powers are said to exist according as we are considered capable of experiencing these passions; that is, the powers are said to suffer or to receive these passions. Thus, the irascible power exists according as we are capable of becoming angry and the concupiscible power according as we are capable of becoming sad or showing pity.

298. Then, at I call those principles “habits” (1105b25), he identifies the habits. Likewise, this is not done in general, but in regard to those pertaining to moral study by comparison with the passions. Habits, he states, are said to exist according as we consistently use the passions well or badly. Now, a habit is a disposition determining a power in reference to something. When the determination is made conformable to the nature of the thing, there will be a good habit that disposes that a thing be done well; otherwise, there will be a bad habit according to which a thing will be done badly. He illustrates what we do according to habit through how we may be angry either wrongly—when this is done in a violent or weak manner, that is, according to excess or defect—or well if done with moderation.

299. Then, at neither virtues nor vices (1105b28), he argues from the division previously given.

First, he shows that virtues are not passions.

Second, at for this reason also (1106a6; [303]), he shows that they are not powers.

Third, at **if, then, virtues **(1106a10; [305]), he concludes they are habits.

For the first statement, he assigns four reasons.

The first is this. We are called good according to virtues and evil according to the opposite vices. But we are not called good or evil according to passions taken absolutely. Passions, therefore, are neither virtues nor vices.

300. He presents the second reason at we are neither (1105b31). It is taken from praise and reproach, which are kinds of attestation of goodness and evil. He says that we are praised for virtues and reproached for the opposite vices. But we are neither praised nor reproached for the passions taken absolutely. A man is not praised or blamed because he is simply afraid or angry, but only because he is afraid or angry in a particular way, that is, according to reason or contrary to reason. The same must be understood of the other passions of the soul. The passions of the soul, therefore, are neither virtues nor vices.

301. At we become angry (1106a2; [301]). he presents the third reason, which is taken from a virtuous manner of acting. Virtues are either choices or not without choice, for the very act of virtue can be called virtue. If we consider the principal acts of virtues, which are interior, virtue is choice; but if we consider the exterior acts, virtue is not without choice, because the exterior acts of virtue proceed from interior choice. If virtue be taken as the very habit of virtue, even in this sense, it does not lack choice, as a cause is not without its proper effect. The passions, however, come to us without choice because they precede the deliberations of the reason necessary for choice. This is what he means saying that we are angry and are afraid without willing it, that is, not by choice of the reason. The passions, therefore, are not virtues.

302. He presents the fourth reason at we are said (1106a4). This is taken from the very nature of virtue. The passions are movements according to which we are said to be moved. The virtues and vices are qualities according to which we are said not to be moved, but to be disposed in some way, whether well or badly, that our movement may ensue. The passions, therefore, are neither virtues nor vices.

303. Then, at for this reason (1106a6), he shows that virtues are not powers for two reasons.

The first of these is taken from the nature of good and evil, as has just been proved [299–300] about the passions. The reason is this. No one is called good or evil or praised or reproached because he is capable of being affected by some passion—for instance, that he is capable of becoming angry or being afraid. But we are called good or evil and are praised or reproached because of virtues and vices. Virtues and vices, therefore, are not powers.

304. He gives the second reason at furthermore, the powers (1106a9). It is taken on the part of the cause and is this. Powers are in us by nature, because they are natural characteristics of the soul. But virtues and vices by which we are called good or evil are not in us by nature, as was proved above [248–51]. Virtues and vices, therefore, are not powers.

305. Then, at **if, then, virtues **(1106a10), he concludes his proposition. If virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits according to the previously given division. Thus, he concludes that virtue with regard to its generic definition obviously is a habit.