Lecture 10 — Opposition among the Virtues and Vices

There are three dispositions, of which two are vices: one by excess, the other by defect. The third is virtue and consists in the mean. Every one of these is opposed in some way to every other one, because not only are the extremes opposed to one another and to the mean, but the mean is opposed to the extremes. [358]

As the average is greater compared with the less and less compared with the greater, so mean habits are in excess compared with the defect and in defect compared with excess. This is true both in the passions and in actions. The brave man seems reckless compared with the coward but cowardly compared with the reckless. Likewise, the moderate man seems self-indulgent compared with the insensible man but insensible compared with the self-indulgent. Also, the generous person is a spendthrift in comparison with the miser but a miser in comparison with the spendthrift. [359]

For this reason, the extremes tend to throw the mean toward one another. The coward calls the brave man reckless, and the reckless man calls him a coward. A similar tendency is found in other extremes. [362]

These things are mutually opposed in such a way that there is a greater opposition of the extremes among themselves than to the mean. The reason is that the extremes are more removed from one another than from the mean, as great is more removed from small and small from great than either is from the average. [363]

Moreover, there seems to be a similarity between some extremes and the mean—for example, between rashness and fortitude, or between extravagance and generosity. But, between the extremes themselves, a complete dissimilarity exists. Now, the things that are farthest removed from one another are said to be contraries. Therefore, the things most removed from one another are more contrary. [364]

In some cases, it is the defect that is more opposed to the mean, but in other cases it is the excess. Thus, it is not rashness but cowardice, the defect, that is more opposed to fortitude. On the contrary, however, it is not insensibility (the defect) but self-indulgence (the excess) that is more opposed to temperance. [365]

This happens for two reasons, one of which is drawn from the very thing itself. It is not the extreme that is nearer and more like the mean, but its contrary that is more opposed to the mean. Thus, since rashness seems nearer and more like fortitude, it is cowardice, having less likeness, that is more opposed to fortitude. Things that are more removed from the mean seem to be more opposed to it. This first reason, then, comes from the thing itself. [366]

But the other reason arises on our part. Those vices that are somewhat innate in us seem in a way to be more opposed to the mean. For example, we more naturally follow pleasure, and so we are more easily moved to self-indulgence than to temperance. Therefore, we say that the vices that more readily increase are more opposed to virtue. For this reason, self-indulgence (which is an excess) is more opposed to temperance. [368]

358. There are three dispositions. After the Philosopher has shown in general what virtue is and has applied the definition to particular virtues, he treats the opposition of virtues and vices.

Regarding this question, he does three things.

First, he shows that there is a twofold opposition among these habits: one, of the vices among themselves; the other, of the vices to the virtues.

Second, he shows that the opposition among the vices themselves is the greater, at these things are mutually opposed (1108b26; [363]).

Last, he shows how one of the extremes is more opposed to virtue than the other, at in some cases (1108b35; [365]).

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he states his proposal.

Second, he proves the proposition, at as the average (1108b15; [359]).

Third, he deduces a corollary from what has been said, at for this reason, the extremes tend to throw (1108b23; [362]).

He says first that there are three dispositions, of which two are vices: one by excess, the other by defect. The third is according to virtue, which consists in a mean. Every one of these is opposed in some way to every other one, because not only are the extremes opposed to one another, but also the mean to the extremes.

359. Then, at as the average (1108b15), he proves what he had said. It was unnecessary to prove that two vices that are compared with one another as excess and defect are opposed, since they are far removed from one another. But it will seem doubtful that virtue is opposed to vices, as was just said [358]. Since virtue holds a middle place between the vices, virtue is not very far removed from either of them, while opposition is farthest apart, as stated in the Metaphysics. (Metaphysics 10.4.1055a4–32; see Aquinas, In X metaph., lec. 5 [2023–35].) Therefore, the Philosopher here makes a special point that virtue is opposed to both extremes.

360. On this subject, we must consider that the mean partakes to some extent of both extremes. Precisely as it partakes of one of them, it is contrary to the other, as the average—a mean between the great and small—is small compared with the great, but great compared with the small. Therefore, the average is opposed both to the great, by reason of the small, and to the small by reason of the great. Because of this, there is a motion of the contrary against the mean as against a contrary, as is explained in the Physics. (Physics 5.1.224b30–35; see Aquinas, In V phys., lec. 1, n. 476.)

361. Therefore, the habits of the mean, in regard both to the passions and to actions, appear excessive to one who is in defect and deficient to one who is in excess. Thus, a brave man compared with a coward is reckless, but compared with a reckless man, a brave man is a coward. Likewise, a moderate man compared with an insensible man is self-indulgent, but compared with the self-indulgent, the moderate man is insensible. The same may be said of the generous man, who is a spendthrift in comparison with the miser, but a miser in comparison with the spendthrift. It is evident, then, that virtue is opposed to the extremes.

362. Then, at for this reason (1108b23), he deduces a corollary from what was said. Because the mean habit is constituted by comparison of one extreme with the nature of the other, the extremes tend to throw the mean toward one another. In other words, both extremes consider the mean as an extreme opposed to them. Thus, the coward calls the brave man reckless and the reckless man calls him a coward. This is an indication of what we just stated [359, 361], that virtue is opposed to both extremes.

363. Then, at these things are mutually opposed,(1108b26; [363]), he shows there is greater opposition of the vices among themselves than to virtue for two reasons.

The first reason is that, the more removed things are from one another, the more opposed they are, because opposition is a kind of distance. But the extremes are more removed from one another than from the mean, as great and small are more removed from one another than from the average, which is a mean between them, Therefore, vices are more opposed to one another than to virtue. We must consider that Aristotle speaks here about the opposition of virtue to vices not according to good and evil—in this way, both vices come under one extreme—but according as virtue, by reason of its own species, is a mean between two vices.

364. He states the second reason at moreover, there seems (1108b30; [364]). It is this. There is some similarity between virtue and one extreme—for instance, between fortitude and rashness, and between generosity and prodigality. But there is complete dissimilarity between the two extremes or vices. Therefore, they are opposed to one another in the greatest degree because their opposition denotes the greatest distance, as was indicated [359].

365. Then, at in some cases (1108b35), he shows that one extreme is more opposed to virtue than the other.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he states his proposal.

Second, he assigns the reasons, at **this happens for two reasons **(1109a5; [366]).

He says first that, in some cases, it is the defect that is more opposed to the mean of the virtue, but in other cases, it is the excess. Thus, not rashness, which certainly pertains to the excess, but cowardice, which pertains to the defect, is most opposed to fortitude. On the contrary, however, it is not insensibility (to which lack and defect belong), but self-indulgence (to which excess pertains), that is most opposed to temperance.

366. Then, at this happens for two reasons (1109a5), he assigns two reasons for what he said. One is taken from the thing itself, that is, from the very nature of the virtues and vices. It was just stated [364] that one extreme has a similarity to the mean of virtue. From the very fact that one extreme is nearer and more like the mean of virtue than the other, it follows that not the one more similar to the mean, but the one contrary to it, is more opposed to the virtue. Thus, if rashness is nearer and more like fortitude, it follows that cowardice is more unlike, and consequently more opposed to, fortitude. The reason is that the habits more removed from the mean seem to be more opposed to it. But the explanation of these things must be taken from the nature of the passions.

367. What Aristotle says here touches on the moral virtues concerned with the passions. To these virtues it belongs to preserve the good of reason against the movement of the passions. Now, passion can destroy the good of reason in two ways.

First, its vehemence can incite to greater activity than reason prescribes, especially in the desire of pleasure and in the other passions pertaining to the following of the appetite. Hence, the virtue that touches the passions of this kind aims principally at restraining these passions. For this reason, the vice referring to the defect is more like the virtue, and the vice referring to the excess is more opposed to it, as is evident in temperance.

But other passions destroy the good by withdrawing to something less than what is according to reason, as is evident in the case of fear and other passions having to do with flight. Hence, the virtue concerned with such passions strives as much as possible to strengthen man against defect in the good of reason. On this account the vice of defect is more opposed to the virtue, as is clear concerning fortitude.

368. Then, at but the other (1109a12), he assigns another reason on our part. Since virtue ought to restrain vices, the aim of virtue is to curb more effectively those vices to which we have a stronger inclination. For this reason, those vices which are in any way somewhat innate in us are more opposed to virtue. As from birth we more readily follow pleasures than flee from them, we are very early moved to self-indulgence, which implies an excess of pleasure. Therefore, we say that those vices that rather naturally tend to increase in us because we are by nature inclined to them are more opposed to virtue. For this reason, self-indulgence, to which excess of pleasure pertains, is more opposed to temperance than insensibility is, as has been observed [365].