Lecture 11 — Ways of Becoming Virtuous

A sufficient explanation has been given to show that moral virtue is a mean, how it is a mean, that it is a mean between two vices—one by excess and the other by defect—and that it aims at the mean both in the passions and operations. [369]

It is not easy to be virtuous, because in every case it is difficult to discover the mean. Thus, not every one can locate the center of a circle—it takes a person who knows. Likewise, it is easy for anyone to become angry, or to hand out money and waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right purpose, in the right manner. All this pertains to virtuous giving, which is rare, praiseworthy, and good. [370]

For this reason, he who aims at the mean must first avoid the extreme that is more opposed to the mean. Circe used to give this warning: keep your ship beyond spray and rolling billow. (Homer, Odyssey 12.219.) One of the extremes, indeed, is a greater sin and the other a lesser sin. Therefore, since it is exceedingly difficult to reach the mean, we must choose the lesser of the evils, as they say in navigation. This will be done best in the way we are going to point out. [371]

We must take into account the things to which we are easily inclined. Some of us are more prone by nature to one thing than another. Our natural inclination will be made known from the pleasure or sorrow we experience. We must, then, draw ourselves to the opposite, for by leading ourselves far away from sin, we shall arrive at the mean. A similar thing is done by nurserymen who straighten crooked saplings. [374]

Everyone ought to be on guard especially against the pleasurable thing and pleasure, for we cannot judge them without being unduly influenced by them. What the elders of the people felt toward Helen we ought to feel toward pleasure, and in all that concerns pleasure, repeat their words. (Homer, Iliad 3.156–60.) Rejecting pleasure in this way, we will fall into sin less frequently. Those who do as we have suggested under this heading will be quite able to acquire the mean. [377]

This is perhaps difficult in individual cases. It is not easy to determine in what manner we should be angry, in regard to what persons we should be angry, in what type of things we should be angry, and for how long a time we should be angry. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in becoming angry and call them meek; sometimes we praise the irascible and call them manly. [379]

One who deviates a little from what is virtuous is not censured, whether it be in excess or in defect. But one who deviates much is blameworthy, for his deviation is not hidden. [380]

It cannot easily be determined, in so many words, at what point and how much a person is censurable. Neither is any other thing perceived by the senses determined in this way, for these are particular things and judgment of them is in the sensitive part of the soul. This much, then, shows that the mean habit is praiseworthy in all instances. However, sometimes we must incline toward excess and sometimes toward defect. Thus, we shall easily reach the mean and what is virtuous. [381]

369. A sufficient explanation has been given. After the Philosopher has treated the nature of virtue, he shows here how a person can acquire virtue. He does this because, as was indicated before [351], the purpose of this teaching is not that men may know the truth. but that they may become good.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows that it is difficult for man to become virtuous.

Second, he shows how man may attain this, at for this reason he who aims (1109a30; [371]).

The first notion calls for a twofold procedure.

First, he reviews what has been said. It has been sufficiently explained before [310, 316], he states, that moral virtue is a mean, how it is a mean (not objectively but relative to us), and between what things it is the mean—namely, between two vices, one by excess, the other by defect. It has also been explained [317–18] why virtue is a middle course, namely, because it aims at the mean; virtue searches out and chooses the mean both in the passions and in actions.

370. Second, at it is not easy (1109a24), he concludes from the premises that it is difficult to be studious or virtuous, because we see that, in every case, it is difficult to discover the mean, but easy to deviate from the mean. Thus, not everyone—only one who knows, like a geometrician—can find the center of a circle. On the other hand, anyone can easily deviate from the center. Likewise, anyone can hand out money and waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right purpose, in the right manner—all of which belongs to virtuous giving. Indeed, because of the difficulty, it is a rare and difficult thing, but praiseworthy and virtuous precisely as conforming to reason.

371. Then, at for this reason (1109a30), he shows the ways in which a person may become virtuous. On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows how a person can discover the mean.

Second, he treats the discovery of the mean, at **this is perhaps difficult **(1109b14; [379]).

In regard to the first, he gives three admonitions.

One of these is taken from the nature of the thing. He states that it is difficult to become virtuous and to discover the mean. Therefore, one who aims at the mean (namely, he who intends to attain the mean) must strive principally to avoid the extreme more opposed to the virtue. Thus, if someone wishes to arrive at the mean of fortitude, he ought to direct his principal efforts to avoiding cowardice, which is more opposed to fortitude than rashness is, as has been explained [365].

372. He gives an example of a certain Circe, who used to warn sailors to beware chiefly of the greatest dangers from the sea, which are waves sinking the ship and mist obscuring the vision of the sailors—keep your ship beyond spray and rolling billow—as if to say, so guard your ship that you may escape spray and waves.

373. He gives the reason for this admonition, saying that one of the extremes—that which is more opposed to the virtue—is a greater sin, but that the extreme that is less opposed to the virtue is a lesser sin. Therefore, since it is exceedingly difficult to reach the mean of virtue, a man ought to try to avoid at least the greater dangers that are more opposed to virtue. Thus, sailors say that, after the best voyage on which a man is exposed to no dangers, the next best is to choose the least of the dangers. A similar thing happens to a man’s life in the way that was explained [371], that he may chiefly avoid the vices that are opposed to virtue.

374. He gives the second admonition at we must take into account (1109b1). It is taken from our part, as far as concerns the things proper to each of us. One who wishes to be virtuous, he says, must take into account that to which his appetite is naturally inclined. Different people are more inclined by nature to one thing than another. Each one can know what he is naturally inclined to from the pleasure and sorrow he experiences, because what is agreeable to each according to his nature is pleasurable.

375. Hence, if someone takes pleasure in a particular action or passion, this is a sign that he is naturally inclined to it. But men vehemently tend to the things to which they are naturally inclined, and so easily exceed the mean in this matter. We therefore must draw ourselves as much as possible to the opposite. The reason is that, when we make an effort to recede from sin, to which we are prone, we will finally with difficulty arrive at the mean. He makes a comparison with nurserymen who straighten crooked saplings. These men, wishing to make trees straight, force them the opposite way and so bring them to the middle.

376. Here we must consider that this way of acquiring virtues is most effective: a man should strive for the opposite of that to which he is inclined either by nature or habit. However, the way advocated by the Stoics is easier: a man should little by little withdraw from those things to which he is inclined, as Cicero relates in his work Questiones Tusculanae. (4.31–35 [65–76].) The way that Aristotle lays down is suitable for those who strongly desire to withdraw from vice and to attain virtue. But the way of the Stoics is more appropriate to those who have weak and halfhearted wills.

377. He lays down the third admonition at everyone ought to be (1109b7). This is also understood to be on our part, not in the sense that it is proper to every individual, as has been said [374–6] of the second admonition, but precisely as it is common to all. All are naturally inclined to pleasure. Therefore, he says that everyone without exception who aims at virtue ought to be on his guard especially against pleasures. Because men are very inclined to pleasure, pleasurable objects apprehended easily move their appetite. Hence, he notes that we cannot easily judge pleasure by dwelling on its consideration without the appetite accepting it and bursting forth in desire for it. What the Trojan elders felt toward Helen when they decided that she must depart we ought to feel toward pleasure; in all that concerns pleasure we ought to echo their words in order that we may reject bodily pleasures. Rejecting pleasures in this way, we will fall into sin less frequently, since the desire of pleasure leads men to many sins.

378. He concludes, then, that those who do what has been suggested under this heading—that is, summarily—will be quite able to acquire the mean of virtue.

379. Then, at this is perhaps difficult (1109b14), he shows how the mean of virtue must be determined. On this point, he does three things.

First, he indicates the difficulty of this.

Second, he shows what suffices to determine the mean, at one who deviates a little (1109b18; [380]).

Third, he answers a latent question, at it cannot easily be determined (1109b20; [381]).

He says first that it is difficult to discover the mean especially when we consider the particular circumstances in individual actions. The reason is that it is not easy to determine how a thing is to be done and in regard to what persons, and in what type of things, and how long a time one should be angry. He gives a sign of this difficulty: those who are deficient in getting angry, for instance, are sometimes praised by us and called meek, while those who are rather irascible in inflicting punishment or making resistance are sometimes praised by us and called manly.

380. Then, at one who (1109b18), he indicates what suffices for the mean of virtue. He says that one who deviates a little from what is done well according to virtue is not censured, whether he inclines to excess or defect. The reason is that a slight departure from the mean of virtue is hidden on account of the difficulty with the mean. But one who deviates greatly is censured because the deviation is not hidden.

381. Then, at it cannot easily (1109b20), he answers a latent question. Someone could ask how much departure from the mean should be censured and how much should not. He himself answers that it cannot easily be determined, in so many words, at what point and how much a person departing from the mean should be blamed. Likewise, no other sensible thing, which is judged rather by sense than by reason, can easily be determined. Things of this kind, belonging to the operations of the virtues, are individual cases. For this reason, judgment about them exists in the sensitive part of the soul—even if not in the external, at least in the internal sense, by which a person judges well about singulars and to which belongs the judgment of prudence, as will be said in book 6 [1215, 1249]. But this much suffices here to show that the mean habit in all cases is rather praiseworthy. However, we must sometimes incline toward excess and sometimes toward defect, either on account of the nature of virtue or on account of our inclination, as is clear from what was explained above [369–78]. Thus, the mean according to which a thing is done well will be easily discovered. So ends book 2.