Lecture 6 — Virtue Is a Kind of Habit

We must consider not only that virtue is a habit, but also what kind of habit. [306]

We must explain, therefore, that virtue perfects everything of which it is the virtue, rendering both the possessor good and his work good. Thus, the virtue or power of the eye makes good both the eye and its operation, for it is by the power of the eye that we see well. Likewise, the virtue or excellence of a horse makes the horse good and also makes him good for running, riding, and awaiting the enemy. If this be true in all other things, then human virtue will be a habit making man good and rendering his work good. [307]

How this takes place has already been described. [309]

But it will become still clearer if we study the nature of virtue. In all continuous and divisible matter, we can take the more, the less, and the equal amount. These are understood either in regard to the thing or in regard to us. But the equal is a mean between excess and defect. [310]

By “the mean on the part of the thing,” I understand that which is equally distant from both extremes and is one and the same for everybody. By “the mean in regard to us,” I understand that which is neither in excess nor in defect. This, however, is not one and the same for everybody. [311]

For example, if ten be taken as many and two as few, then six will be the mean on the part of the thing, because six both exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount. This mean is according to arithmetic proportion. [312]

But the mean in regard to us is not to be taken in this way. A trainer will not order six pounds of food for someone simply because eating ten pounds is a great deal and eating two pounds is a small amount. This may be much or little for the person eating. For Milo, it would certainly be little, but it would be much for a champion in gymnastics; and the same holds true in running and wrestling. Thus, everyone who is wise avoids excess and wants to find the mean not on the part of the thing, but in regard to us. [313]

Every practical science, then, perfects its work by keeping in view the mean and executing the work according to the mean. Hence, it is customary to tell a man who has done a good piece of work that nothing is to be added or taken away, meaning that excess and defect disfigure a work but the mean preserves it. As we have said, good workmen work with an eye on the mean. But virtue, like nature, is more certain and better than art. Virtue, then, will aim at the mean. [315]

I am speaking of moral virtue, for it treats of passions and operations in which we find excess, defect, and the mean. Thus, aggressiveness, fear, concupiscence, aversion, anger, pity, and pleasure and sorrow in general take place with excess and defect. Both of these are evil; but to experience these passions at the right time, for the right objects, toward the right persons, with the right motive, and in the right way is the mean and the highest good of virtue. Similarly, excess, defect, and the mean are to be found in actions. Now moral virtue is concerned with passions and operations in which excess is vicious, defect is reproachable, and the mean receives praise and shows the right path. These two (praise and righteousness) pertain to virtue. Moral virtue, therefore, is a kind of middle course and aims at the mean. [317]

306. We must consider not only that virtue is a habit. After the Philosopher has explained the genus of virtue, he now begins an inquiry into the specific difference of virtue.

First, he presents his proposition. He says that, in order to know what virtue is, we must consider not only that it is a habit—thus the genus is understood—but what kind of habit, for thus the specific difference is indicated.

307. Second, at we must explain, therefore (1106a15), he makes known the proposition. On this point he does two things.

First, he manifests a certain common quality of virtue.

Second, from this quality of virtue, he explains its specific difference, at **how this takes place **(1106a24; [309]).

He says first that every virtue makes its possessor good and his work good. Thus, the virtue or power of the eye makes the eye good and gives us good sight, which is the proper function of the eye. Likewise, the virtue or excellence of a horse makes a horse good and makes it operate well—that is, run fast, ride easily, and fearlessly await the enemy.

308. The reason is that the virtue or power of a thing is judged by the best it can do. For example, the power of one who can carry a hundred pounds is determined by his actual carrying of this weight, as is said in De caelo, (De caelo 1.2.281a8; see Aquinas, In I de cael., lec. 25, no. 249.) and not by the fact that he carries fifty pounds. Now the utmost or best to which the power of anything extends is called its excellent operation. It belongs to the virtue of every thing, therefore, to render an excellent operation. Because a perfect operation proceeds only from a perfect agent, it follows that everything is both good and operates well according to its own virtue. If this be true in all other things—and such was already apparent from our examples—human virtue must be a kind of habit, as was mentioned above [305]. From this habit, man becomes good formally speaking (as one becomes white by whiteness) and operates well.

309. Then, at how this takes place (1106a24), he investigates the specific difference of virtue according to the quality of virtue previously indicated. He does this under three headings:

first, according to the property of the operations;

second, according to the nature of virtue, at but it will become still clearer (1106a24; [310]);

third, according to the special character of good or evil, at moreover, there are many (1106b28; [319]).

He says first that the way in which a man may become good and do good has been treated already [257]. It was noted also [260–4] that we are made good in every virtue by operations according to the mean. Then, having become good, we perform good actions. It remains, therefore, that, if virtue makes a man good and his work good, it will consist in the mean.

310. Then, at but it will become (1106a24), he proves the same by the nature of virtue. Regarding this, he does three things.

First, he introduces certain preliminaries necessary to explain his proposition.

Second, he concludes his proposition at every practical science, then (1106b8; [315]).

Third, he explains an inference at I am speaking of moral virtue (1106b16; [317).

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he proposes the things necessary to elucidate the proposition.

Second, he clarifies what he has said, at **by "the mean on the part" **(1106a29; [311]).

He says first that the manner in which we become good and perform good acts will be clearer still if we consider the nature of virtue. For an understanding of this, we must take for granted beforehand that virtue treats three things: the more, the less, and the equal. Virtue treats these both in continuous, contingent matters and even in any other divisible matter, whether it be numerically divided, as all discrete things, or divided incidentally—for example, by intensity and indistinctness of a quality in a subject. These three are so arranged that the equal holds a middle place between the more, which pertains to excess, and the less, which pertains to defect. This can be understood in two ways: one according to absolute quantity in something; the other in relation to us.

311. Then, at by "the mean on the part of the thing"(1106a29), he clarifies what he said about the difference on the part of the thing (objective) and in regard to us (relative):

first, by means of reason;

second, by way of example at **for example, if **(1106a33; [312]).

He says first that the objective mean is the point equidistant from both extremes. It is the same for all because it is understood according to the absolute quantity of the thing. But the mean is relative in regard to us inasmuch as it neither exceeds nor falls short of a proportion suitable to us. Hence, this mean is not the same for all. If we apply the relative mean to a shoe, it will not be more than the length of the foot, nor less. It will not be the same for all, because not all have the same size foot.

312. Then, at for example, if (1106a33), he clarifies what he has said by way of example.

First, he does it regarding the objective mean which is equally distant from the extremes. Thus, six is the mean between ten (which is the more) and two (which is the less) because six is less than ten and more than two by the same amount, four. The mean that is taken in numbers from the equal distance between two extremes is said to be according to arithmetic proportion, which considers numerical quantity. But the mean that is taken from the equality of proportion in regard to us is said to be according to the geometric proportion, as will be made clear afterwards in book 5 [944, 949, 950, 972].

313. Second, at but the mean in regard to us (1106a36), he gives examples of the mean. He says that the mean that is understood in comparison with us is not to be taken according to equal distance between extremes. This is sufficiently clear in the previous example of the shoe. If a shoe of twenty fingers’ breadth is long and a shoe of four fingers’ breadth is short it does not necessarily follow that one of twelve fingers’ breadth will be the right fit. Perhaps it will be large compared to the foot of one person and small compared to the foot of another. He also exemplifies this mean in food. If eating ten pounds, or ten portions, is much and eating two pounds is little, a trainer—whose duty it is to make out someone’s diet—should not for this reason prescribe six pounds, since even this is much for one person and little for another.

314. This would indeed be little for a man called Milo, who, according to Solinus, ate a whole cow in a day. But it would be much for a champion in gymnastics, who has to excel in sports—in which men used to contend naked—and must eat lightly to be in better condition. The same is true of those who run at the stadium and of those who take up wrestling—a sport engaged in by the Greeks for exercise. So it is also in every operative science. The wise man avoids excess and defect, and wants to find the mean not objectively, but relative to us.

315. Then, at every practical science (1106b8; [315]), he argues from the premises in this way. Every operative science perfects its work in this: in planning it aims for the mean, and in execution it carries out its work in accord with the mean. Indications of this can be had from the fact that men are in the habit of saying, when a work is well done, that nothing is to be added or taken away. Thus, they give us to understand that excess and defect spoil a work that is preserved by the mean. Hence, good workmen, as has been pointed out [313–14], work with an eye on the mean. But virtue, like nature, is more certain and even better than any art. Moral virtue operates by inclining in a determined way to one thing, as nature does. Indeed, custom becomes nature. But art, which operates according to reason, is indifferent to various objects. Hence, like nature, it is more certain than art.

316. Likewise, virtue is better than art because, by art, a man is capable of doing a good work, but art does not cause him to do the good work. He can do a bad work, because art does not incline to the good use of art; a grammarian, for example, can speak incorrectly. But, by virtue, a man not only is capable of operating, but actually performs the action, because virtue (like nature) inclines to a good operation. Art alone gives only the knowledge of the operation. Consequently, even for this secondary reason, virtue, which is better than art, aims at the mean.

317. Then, at **I am speaking **(1106b16), he explains a further conclusion. He affirms that what has been said [256–63] ought to be understood of moral virtue that concerns passions and operations to which belong excess, defect and mean.

He gives an example first from the passions, saying that fear, aggressiveness, concupiscence, aversion (which is a fleeing from something), anger, pity, and any pleasure and sorrow may happen in greater and lesser degree than they ought. Both the excess and the defect are evil. But, if a man should fear and dare (and thus with the other passions) what he ought, in the things he ought, in regard to the persons he ought, for the motive he ought, and in the way he ought, this will be a mean for the passions. It will be also the highest good of virtue.

Similarly, excess, defect, and mean are found in actions. Moral virtue treats of passions and actions as its proper matter, such that, in them, excess is vicious and defect worthy of reproach but the mean receives praise and shows the right path. These two pertain to virtue: righteousness (which is opposed to vicious perverseness) and praise (which is opposed to reproach). This and vicious perverseness follow from the first two (excess and defect).

318. Thus, he concludes that moral virtue considered in itself is a kind of middle course and is an indicator of the mean inasmuch as it aims at the mean and accomplishes it.