Lecture 9 — Virtues Regarding Honors

The mean in regard to honor and dishonor is magnanimity. But the excess is chaumotes, or presumption, and the defect is smallness of soul. [345]

As we pointed out, liberality that bestows small amounts differs from magnificence. So also there is a virtue concerned with ordinary honors that differs from magnanimity, whose province is great honors. A man can desire ordinary honors in the right way, more than he ought, and less than he ought. If he is excessive in the desire of honors, he is called ambitious; if deficient, he is said to be unambitious. But he who strikes a mean has no special name. Likewise, the habits are without names except for ambition, which we call the excessive love of honors. Hence, persons who are in the extremes argue about the location of the mean. Even we sometimes call the man possessing the mean ambitious, and sometimes we call him unambitious. Why we do this will be explained afterward, but for the present, we should refer to the remaining states in the way indicated. [346]

With respect to anger, we find an excess, a defect, and a mean. Although these are for the most part without names, the man following the mean is called meek and the mean is called meekness. In regard to the extremes, he who is excessive is called irascible, and his vice irascibility. But he who is deficient is said to be apathetic and to have the defect of apathy. [349]

There are three other means that are alike in one respect and different in another. They are all concerned with communicating what we say and do, but they differ because one of them refers to the truth, and the others to the pleasantness found in this communication. One of these latter concerns pleasantness in the things said and done in jest, and the others regard the things that belong to the usual manner of living. We must speak of these things so that we may better understand that the mean is always praiseworthy but that the extremes are neither right nor to be praised, but rather to be condemned. Many of these also are without special names, but (as we have done with the others) we shall try to invent names for them for the sake of the clarity and the good that results. [350]

In regard to truth, the mean is possessed by the man who is truthful and is called truthfulness. But pretension, which is the excess, is called boasting, and the pretender is known as a braggart. The defect, however, may be named dissimulation or irony, and the pretender a dissembler. [352]

In respect to pleasantness concerned with amusement, the man who observes the mean is called witty, and the disposition itself, wit. But the excess is designated as buffoonery, and the person who is excessive, a buffoon. If one falls short in this matter, he is said to be boorish and to have the quality of boorishness. [353]

In the remaining kind of pleasantness—that is, in life generally—the man who is pleasant as he should be is called affable, and the mean he attains is affability. But he who carries this too far merely for the sake of pleasing is called obsequious. If, however, he acts for his own utility, he is called a flatterer. One who falls short in this matter and is always difficult is termed contentious and perverse. [354]

Also, a mean exists in the passions and the things regarding the passions. Modesty, for example, is not a virtue, but it is praised, as is the modest person, for in this question, a mean is attainable. The person who exceeds the mean and is embarrassed at everything is bashful. But one who falls short—that is, blushes at nothing—is shameless, while the person who strikes a happy mean is called modest. [355]

Righteous indignation may be assigned as the mean between envy and epicacotharchiaor (rejoicing in evil). These are concerned with pleasure and sorrow over what happens to our neighbors. The righteously indignant person is saddened at the unmerited prosperity of the wicked. But the envious person goes far beyond this and eats his heart out over the success of everyone. The man called epicacotharchos is so deficient in sadness that he actually rejoices. However, there will be time to treat of these matters elsewhere. Because justice is understood in various ways, we shall later treat its parts, showing how the mean is constituted in them. Likewise, we shall discuss the intellectual virtues. [356]

345. The mean in regard to honor and dishonor. Having completed the virtues that concern riches, he now treats those dealing with honors.

First, he deals with the virtue referring to great honors;

second, with the virtue referring to ordinary honors, at as we pointed out (1107b23; [346]).

He says first that magnanimity is the mean between honor and dishonor. But the excess in following after the things belonging to great honors is a certain disposition that is called “chaumotes” because it blazes forth in things pertaining to the desire of honor. In Greek, “cauma” is fire, and “capnos” means smoke. If the word be written “chapnotes,” it can be translated “exhalation” or “presumption.” We are accustomed to say that they who breathe with great difficulty on climbing high altitudes are wheezing or puffing. But the defect opposed to magnanimity is faint-heartedness.

346. Then, at as we pointed out (1107b23), he proposes another virtue referring to ordinary honors. He says, as has been indicated [344], that liberality differs from magnificence because liberality bestows small amounts while magnificence bestows great sums. So, too, there is a virtue concerned with ordinary honors that differs from magnanimity, which is concerned with great honors. That, in this question, there should be some virtue consisting in a mean is made clear by his adding that ordinary honors are desired as they ought to be (this belongs to the mean of virtue), more than they ought to be (this belongs to excess), and less than they ought to be (this belongs to the defect). He who excessively desires honor is ambitious or a lover of honor. He who is deficient in the desire of honor is unambitious or without the desire of honor. But he who strikes the mean has no special name.

347. Likewise, the dispositions—that is, the habits of vice or the mean of virtue—are unnamed. However, we can invent names, calling the habit by which a person excessively loves honor “ambition,” and the habit by which a person is deficient in the love of honor, “unambitiousness.” But, because the mean has not been named, the persons who are in the extremes argue about the location of the mean. Both maintain that they possess the mean. He explains this by drawing a comparison to two states that are in the habit of bickering over their common border when the boundary has not been fixed. Both claim the intervening territory as their own. But it is fairly common to all the vices for each of the extremes to think they possess the mean and that the virtuous are in the other extreme: namely, the coward considers the brave man reckless; the reckless man says the brave man is a coward. Hence, Aristotle states what is proper to this matter, that not only do the vicious appropriate the name of virtue to themselves, but even the virtuous use the name of the vice as if it were a virtue because the mean has not been named.

348. This is what he refers to when he adds that even we (speaking correctly, too) sometimes call a man who possesses the mean ambitious, and other times, unambitious. Also at times we praise a person because he is ambitious. We are accustomed to say in commending a person that he is solicitous about his honor, and thus we call the man who loves honor virtuous. On the other hand, we sometimes praise an unambitious man, saying in his praise that he does not care about the esteem of men, but about the truth. So we call the unambitious man virtuous. Why we do this will be explained afterward in book 4 [794–95]. But for the present, we should continue with the remaining mediums in the way designated, that is, as conforming to a pattern.

349. Then, at with respect to anger (1108a4), he proposes the virtue concerning external evils by which man is provoked to anger. He says that, in regard to anger, there is an excess, a defect, and a mean. Although all these for the most part are without names, we are accustomed to call the man following the mean meek, and the mean itself meekness. But he who is excessive in this passion we call irascible, and we say he has the quality of irascibility. The man, however, who is deficient we call apathetic and say he has the defect of apathy.

350. Then, at there are (1108a9), he proposes the virtues that concern human actions.

First, he shows their variety;

second, he gives examples of these, at **in regard to truth **(1108a19; [352]).

He says first that three means are alike in one respect and different in another. They are alike in that all refer to words and deeds in which men communicate among themselves. They are different in that, while one of them refers to the truth of such words and deeds, the others refer to pleasantness in these words and deeds, with one of those regarding pleasantness in the things that are said or done in jest and the others regarding what belongs to the usual manner of living, that is, serious matters.

351. We must speak of these things so it will become more apparent that the mean is always praiseworthy and the extremes are not to be praised, but rather condemned. Many of these are without special names, but as we have done with the others, we shall try to invent names to clarify what is said for the sake of the good that will ensue. The reason is that the purpose of this science is not the manifestation of truth, but virtuous activity.

352. Then, at in regard to truth (1108a19), he gives examples of these virtues, and first of that which concerns truth.

He says that, in regard to truth, the mean is had by the man who is called truthful, and the mean itself is called truthfulness. But pretension, which is the excess (when a person pretends greater things about himself than are true), is called boasting, and the pretender is called a braggart. But dissembling, which is the defect (when a person makes pretense of certain contemptible things about himself), is called dissimulation or irony. Such a pretender is called a dissembler.

353. Second, at in respect to pleasantness (1108a23), he gives an example of the virtue concerned with amusement. He says, regarding pleasantness in amusement, that the man who observes the mean is called “witty” (eutrapelos), giving as it were a pleasant turn to every incident. The disposition itself is called “wit” (eutrapelia). But the man who is guilty of excess is called a “buffoon” or bomolochus (from “bomo,” meaning “altar,” and “lochos,” meaning “plundering”). He is said to be like the bird of prey that always flew near the sacrificial altars to snatch some food. In a similar way, the man who is excessive in amusement always insists on snatching a word or action of someone to give it a comic turn. The disposition, however, is called “buffoonery.” But the man who is deficient is said to be “boorish” and to have the quality of “boorishness.”

354. Third, at in the remaining (1108a26), he exemplifies the third of these virtues, saying that, in the remaining pleasantness, which is in life, touching on our serious actions, the mean is struck by the friendly person—not so designated from the effect of friendship, but from amicable conversation. Such a one we term affable. The mean itself is called “friendliness,” or affability. But one who overdoes this merely for the purpose of pleasing is called “obsequious.” If he acts for his own utility—for example, his profit—he is called a **“**sycophant” or a “flatterer.” One who falls short in this matter and does not fear to sadden those he lives with is called “contentious” and “perverse.”

355. Then, at also, a mean exists (1108a30), he gives an example of certain laudable passions.

First, of modesty. He says that a mean is found even in the passions and their phases. Modesty, for instance, is not a virtue, as will be explained in the book 4 [867–82]. The modest person is praised because a mean can be taken in such matters. One who goes to excess so that he blushes at everything is called “cataplex,” a bashful person. But he who falls short, blushing at nothing, is called “shameless.”

356. Second, at **righteous indignation **(1108a35), he discusses another passion called “nemesis” or righteous indignation, which is a mean between envy and epicacotharchia, or rejoicing over evil (“tharcus” meaning “rejoicing,” “kakos” meaning “evil,” and “epi” meaning “over”). These are dispositions concerned with pleasure and sorrow over what happens to our neighbors. The righteously indignant person or the fair critic is saddened at the prosperity of the wicked. But the envious person goes to excess in grieving over all—both good and bad—who prosper. The person, however, called “epicotharchos,” is so deficient in sadness that he actually rejoices over the wicked who are successful in their wickedness. But these topics are treated elsewhere, in the Rhetoric. (Rhetoric 2.10.)

357. Last, because justice has various parts in which the mean is differently understood, justice will be treated in book 5 [885–1108], together with the manner in which the parts consist in the mean. Likewise, the rational or intellectual virtues will be discussed later in book 6 [1109–291].