Lecture 4 — Comparison Between Virtue and Art

Someone may rightly ask how we can say that man must become just by doing just actions, and temperate by doing temperate actions. If people perform just and temperate works, they are already just and temperate, as those who produce grammatical or musical works are already grammarians or musicians. [280]

But this is not true in the arts. A man may at times produce something grammatical by chance or with the help of another. He will therefore be a grammarian only if he produces a grammatical work in a grammatical way, that is, in accordance with the science of grammar that he possesses. [281]

Another dissimilarity between the arts and virtues is that works of art have their perfection in themselves. It is enough, then, that these be made with certain qualities. Yet works of virtue are not justly and temperately performed if they merely have certain qualities; the agent performing them must fulfill the following conditions. First, he must know what he is doing. Then, he must choose the virtuous works for their own sakes. Third, he must possess the disposition and operate according to it resolutely and with stability. Except for knowledge, these conditions are not required in the other arts. Mere knowledge, however, has little or no importance for the virtues, but what occurs from the frequent performance of just and temperate actions is all-important. [284]

Works, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as a just and temperate man will do. Now, a just and temperate man is not simply one who performs these actions, but one who performs them as the just and temperate perform them. [285]

It has been well said, therefore, that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions. Anyone who does not perform these actions has not the slightest interest in becoming virtuous. [287]

Many, however, fail to do good actions, but taking refuge in theory, think that by philosophizing they will become virtuous. They act like the sick who listen carefully to the doctor but do nothing he prescribes. Hence, just as those who take care of themselves in this way will never have a healthy body, so those who merely philosophize will not have a healthy soul. [288]

280. Someone may rightly ask. After the Philosopher has shown that virtues are caused by actions, he now raises a doubt about this assertion.

Regarding it, he does three things.

First, he presents a problem.

Second, at but this is not true (1105a21; [281]), he solves it.

Third, from the discussion of the question he comes to the conclusion principally intended, at it has been well said, therefore (1105b9; [287]).

The doubt that he first raises is this. What is true of virtue is true of art. But in art, it is true that no one produces a work of art except one who possesses the art, as no one produces anything grammatical unless he is a grammarian, nor anything musical unless he be a musician. It will be true in virtue, therefore, that whoever performs just works is already just and whoever performs temperate works is already temperate. Hence, our previous contention [164] does not seem to be true, that men become just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions.

281. Then, at but this is not (1105a21), he solves this doubt:

first, by rejecting what was assumed about art;

second, by disproving the likeness said to exist between virtue and art, at another dissimilarity (1105a26; [284]).

He says first that it is not true in art, as was assumed, that whoever produces a grammatical work is already a grammarian. It happens sometimes that an ignoramus pronounces a word correctly by chance. Sometimes this happens with the help of another whose example is followed—for instance, a mimic imitates the correct pronunciation given by a grammarian. But a man is to be judged a grammarian only when he produces a grammatical work and in a grammatical way, that is, in accord with the science of grammar that he possesses.

282. Then, at another dissimilarity (1105a26), he gives the second solution, in two steps.

First, he eliminates the likeness between art and virtue.

Second, he concludes the solution at works, then, are called just (1105b7; [285]).

He says first that there is no similarity between art and virtue, since works of art have in themselves what belongs to the perfection of the art. The explanation is that art is the right plan of making things, as will be said in book 6 [1153, 1160, 1166]. Making is an operation that passes to external matter, and an operation of this kind is a perfection of the thing made. Hence, in such actions, the good consists in the object made. It is enough for the good of art, therefore, that the things made be good. But virtues are principles of actions that do not go out into external matter, but remain in the agents. Hence, actions of this kind are perfections of the agents. So, the good of these actions is identical with the agents themselves.

283. He says, therefore, in order that actions be justly and temperately performed, it is not enough that the things done be good, but the agent must work in a proper manner.

Regarding this manner, he says we must pay attention to three things.

The first, pertaining to the intellect or reason, is that one who performs a virtuous action should not act in ignorance or by chance, but should know what he is doing.

The second is taken on the part of the appetitive power. Here two things are noted. One is that the action be not done out of passion, as happens when a person performs a virtuous deed because of fear; the other is that the action should be done by a choice that is not made for the sake of something else, as happens when a person performs a good action for money or vainglory. The actions should be done for the sake of the virtuous work itself that, as something agreeable, is inherently pleasing to him who has the habit of virtue.

The third, taken from the nature of a habit, is that a person should possess a virtuous choice and operate according to it resolutely—that is, consistently on his part—and with stability so as not to be moved by any external thing.

284. Only the first of these, knowledge, is required in the arts. A man can be a good artist even if he never chooses to work according to art and does not persevere in his work. But knowledge has little or no importance in a person being virtuous, but his goodness consists entirely in other things that take place within him by frequent actions, and thus he becomes stable.

285. Then, at works, then (1105b7), he concludes the solution of the above-mentioned doubt. He states that things done are called just and temperate because they are similar to the things that a just and temperate man does. Whoever performs these actions need not necessarily be just and temperate, but he who performs them as just and temperate men perform them according to the three conditions just laid down is said to be just and temperate. Men, therefore, first perform just and temperate actions—not in the same way as the just and temperate do—and such actions in their turn produce the habit.

286. If it should be asked how this is possible, since nothing can move itself from potency to act, we must answer that the perfection of moral virtue, which we are treating, consists in reason’s control of the appetite. Now, the first principles of reason, no less in moral than in speculative matters, have been given by nature. Therefore, just as by means of previously known principles a man makes himself actually understand by personal effort of discovery, so also, by acting according to the principles of practical reason, a man makes himself actually virtuous.

287. Then, at it has been well said, therefore (1105b9), he comes to the conclusion principally intended.

First, he brings his proposition to an end;

and second, at many, however, fail (1105b12; [288]), he discredits a false opinion of certain persons.

He concludes that it has been well said above [264, 280] that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions. But he who does not perform actions or develop his disposition will never become virtuous.

288. Then, at many, however, fail (1105b12), he discredits the false opinion of certain persons who do not perform works of virtues but, by taking refuge in the discussion of virtues, think they can become virtuous by philosophizing. Such people, he says, are like the sick who carefully listen to what the doctor has to say but do nothing about carrying out his prescriptions. Thus, philosophy is to the cure of the soul what medicine is to the cure of the body. Hence, as those who listen to the advice of doctors and disregard it will never have a well-regulated body, so those who listen to the warnings of moral philosophers and do not heed them will never have a well-regulated soul.