Lecture 3 — Signs of Virtue

We may understand pleasure or sorrow that follows activity as an indication of the habits that are present. Indeed, the man who avoids bodily pleasures is temperate if he is glad about it; intemperate, if sad about it. Likewise, the man who encounters dangers is brave if he rejoices or is not sad, but cowardly if he is saddened. Moral virtue, then, is concerned with pleasure and sorrows. [265]

We perform evil actions for the sake of pleasure and avoid good actions because of sadness. Therefore, as Plato says, (Laws 653.) we need some sort of training from our earliest years so that we may rejoice and be sorrowful about the right things, for proper instruction consists in this. [268]

Besides, if virtues are concerned with activities and passions, and pleasure and sorrow follow every act and passion, then certainly virtue will deal with pleasures and sorrows. [269]

Penalties inflicted because of pleasure and sorrow also prove our point, for penalties are, as it were, remedies. Remedies by their very nature work through contraries. [270]

Furthermore, as we said previously, every habit of the soul has a natural disposition to do and to be busied with those things by which it is made better or worse. Men become wicked by pursuing the pleasures (and avoiding the [converse] sorrows) that are wrong, or by doing this at the wrong time or in the wrong manner or in some other way that one may deviate from reason. Consequently, some define virtues as certain quiescent and emotionless dispositions. But they err in speaking absolutely and in not qualifying the passions as to manner, time, and so forth. We must suppose, therefore, that virtue is such that it works what is best regarding pleasures and sorrows, and vice does the contrary. [271]

Our contention will become evident from the following consideration. Three things fall under our choice: the good, the useful, and the pleasurable. We avoid three contrary things: the evil, the harmful, and the sorrowful. In regard to all these, the virtuous man disposes himself rightly and the vicious man badly. This is especially true in the matter of pleasure, which is common to animals and is found in all things obtained by choice, for the good and the useful seem also to be pleasurable. [273]

Pleasure, too, has grown up with all of us from childhood. Therefore, it is difficult to curb this passion, which is acquired with life itself. [276]

Some regulate their activities to a greater degree and others to a lesser degree by pleasure and sorrow. About these, then, our whole study must be concerned, for it is not a thing of small importance in human actions to take pleasure or sorrow in the right or wrong way. [277]

As Heraclitus says, it is even more difficult to fight against pleasure than anger. Now, the more difficult is always treated by art and virtue, which operate well and more efficiently in the face of difficulty. Hence, the whole business of virtue and of political science is occupied with pleasures and sorrows. Assuredly, he who uses these well will be virtuous, and he who uses them badly will be evil. [278]

It has been said that virtue treats of pleasures and sorrows; virtue is produced and increased by the same actions that, when done in a different way, also destroy virtue, and the same actions that produce virtue are in turn produced by virtue. [279]

265. We may understand pleasure or sorrow. After the Philosopher has shown what kind of activity produces virtue, he now explains how we may recognize virtue already produced.

On this point he does two things.

First, he presents what he intends to do;

second, at we perform evil actions (1104b9; [268]), he proves his proposition.

Regarding the first, we must consider that, when virtue produces actions similar to the actions that formed it, as was just noted [264], the performance of this action differs before and after virtue. Before virtue, man does a kind of violence to himself in operating this way. Such actions, therefore, have some admixture of sorrow. But after the habit of virtue has been formed, these actions are done with pleasure. The explanation is that a habit exists as a sort of nature, and that is pleasurable, which agrees with a thing according to nature.

266. He says that an indication that habits, good or bad, have already been formed is given by the pleasure or sorrow that follows the operations. He illustrates this by examples. The man who is glad that he has avoided bodily pleasures is temperate because he performs an action in keeping with the habit. Likewise, he who encounters dangers with pleasure, or at least without sorrow, is brave. Particularly in the act of fortitude, it is enough not to have sorrow, as will be explained in book 3 [584–5]. One who faces dangers with sorrow is cowardly. He then assigns the reason for what he has said from the fact that every moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows.

267. From this, we must not conclude that every moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows as its proper matter. The matter indeed of every moral virtue is that on which reason imposes a norm. Thus, justice treats of dealing with others; fortitude treats of fears and aggressiveness; temperance treats of certain pleasures. But pleasure is the principal end of all the moral virtues, as will be said in book 7 [1504–15]. In every moral virtue, it is requisite that a person have joy and sorrow in the things he ought. In keeping with this, he says that moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows because the purpose of any moral virtue is that a man be rightly ordered in his pleasures and sorrows.

268. Then, at we perform evil actions (1104b9), he proves his proposition:

first, by reasons taken from things belonging to virtue;

second, at our contention will (1104b29; [273]), by reasons on the part of the virtuous man himself.

He presents four reasons pertaining to the first point. The first reason is taken from the inclination of men intent on virtue. It was shown previously [264–5] that virtue is produced and destroyed by deeds of the same person done in a contrary way. Indeed, we see that virtue is destroyed by pleasure and sadness; we perform evil actions out of a desire for pleasure, we avoid good or virtuous works because of the sadness we fear in honest labor. Hence, as Plato said, one who is intent on virtue should have some sort of moral training from his earliest years, that he may rejoice and be sorrowful about the right things. This is proper instruction for youths so that they become accustomed to take pleasure in good works and be grieved in evil works. Therefore, teachers of youth compliment those who do good deeds and reprove those who do evil.

269. At besides, if (1104b13; [269]), he presents the second reason based on the matter of the moral virtue in the following way. Every moral virtue deals with actions (as justice, which treats of buying, selling, and other things of this kind), or with passions (as meekness, which treats of anger), and so with the other virtues. But pleasure or sorrow follows every passion that is nothing else but the motion of the appetitive power in pursuit of good or in flight from evil. When the good to which the appetite tends is forthcoming, therefore, or when the evil that it flees is avoided, pleasure follows. But when the contrary happens, sorrow follows. Thus, the angered man rejoices in getting revenge and likewise the cowardly man in avoiding dangers. But when the opposite is true, these persons are sorrowful. It remains, therefore, that every moral virtue regards pleasures and sorrows as having the aspect of ends.

270. The third reason presented, at penalties inflicted (1104b16; [270]), is taken from the idea of a remedy for the soul. As a medicine used for the restoration of health is a kind of disagreeable potion from which the sweetness has been removed, so a penalty used for the restoration of virtue is a kind of medicine, for a penalty consists in taking away certain pleasures or applying certain disagreeable things. The reason for this is that a medicine is naturally to be used as a contrary thing. Thus, in the case of fever, doctors apply cooling remedies. Hence, moral virtue also is concerned with certain pleasures and sorrows.

271. At furthermore (1104b18; [271]), he presents the fourth reason, which is taken from what is contrary to and destructive of virtue. Every habit, he says, has a disposition to do and to be busied with the things by which it is made worse and better, that is, by which the goodness of a good habit or the evil of a bad habit is increased. This can be understood likewise of the things by which the habit naturally becomes worse or better, that is, by which it naturally is formed or increased (which is to be made better), or destroyed or diminished (which is to be made worse). We see that men become evil through the deterioration of virtue from the fact that they pursue the pleasures and steer clear of the sorrows that they ought not, or when they ought not, or in some other way by which one may deviate from right reason.

272. The Stoics took occasion of this to say that virtues are certain quiescent and passionless dispositions. The reason was that they saw men become evil through pleasures and sorrows, and consequently they thought that virtue consists in the total cessation of the changes of the passions. But in this they erred, wishing to exclude entirely the passions of the soul from a virtuous man. It belongs, of course, to the good of reason to regulate the sensitive appetite—and the passions are movements of this appetite. Hence, it is not the business of virtue to exclude all, but only the inordinate passions, that is, those which are not as they ought to be and are not at the time they ought to be (he adds also all the other things belonging to the remaining circumstances). From this, he then concludes that we must suppose that virtue should work what is best regarding pleasures and sorrows, but vice, which is the habit opposed to virtue, should work what is evil.

273. Then, at our contention will (1104b29), he introduces to his proposition four other reasons taken on the part of men in whom virtue, pleasure, and sorrow are found. The first reason is derived from pleasures in general. He says that three things fall under human choice: the good or virtuous, the helpful or useful, and the pleasurable. Contrary to these are also three things: evil or vice as opposed to the virtuous, the harmful as opposed to the useful, and the sorrowful as opposed to the pleasurable. In regard to all these, the virtuous man disposes himself rightly but the vicious man badly, especially in the matter of pleasure, which is more common among the things mentioned, since it belongs to two of them.

274. First, in regard to the things partaking of pleasure. Pleasure is found in all animals, since it is not only in the intellectual power, but also in the sensitive power. The useful and the virtuous, however, pertain to the intellectual power alone. This is so because the virtuous act is performed in accord with reason while the useful implies an order of one to another, and to order is proper to reason.

275. Another common feature is on the part of the things themselves in which pleasure is gained. Pleasure, in fact, follows everything that falls under choice. Now, the virtuous is pleasurable to man because it is agreeable to reason, and the useful also gives pleasure by reason of the expected benefit. But, on the other hand, not every pleasurable action is useful or virtuous, as is obvious in the pleasures of sense.

276. At pleasure, too (1105a1), he presents the second reason, which is taken from an inherent characteristic of pleasure. Pleasure has grown up with us all alike from childhood, since a newborn child delights in his milk. Therefore, it is difficult for man to curb this passion acquired with life because it starts in man at the beginning of life. Hence, moral virtue is especially concerned with pleasure.

277. He assigns the third reason at some regulate (1105a3). This reason is derived from man’s inclination. All men regulate their activities by pleasure and sorrow. They are intent on activities they find pleasant, and they avoid activities they find distressing. Hence, the whole business of a moral virtue, which is ordered to good activity, must concern pleasure and sorrow. It is quite important to note what activities one finds pleasant or painful, whether rightly or wrongly so. The reason is that he who rejoices in good performs good actions, but he who rejoices in evil performs evil actions.

278. He assigns the fourth reason at as Heraclitus says (1105a7). This is taken from a comparison with anger. It is more difficult, as Heraclitus said, to fight against pleasure than against anger, even though it seems most difficult to fight against anger because of its vehemence. But the desire of pleasure is both more common and more natural, and besides, it lasts longer. Art and virtue, however, always treat of the more difficult, for anyone can operate well in the easier things. But it takes one skilled in virtue and art to operate well in difficult things. Thus, it is obvious, from what has been said, that the whole business of virtue and of political science or of public affairs is concerned with pleasures and sorrows. If a man uses these well, he will be virtuous, but if he uses them badly, he will be evil.

279. Then, at it has been said that (1105a13), he sums up in conclusion the points that have been made: virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows; virtue is produced and increased by the same actions that, when done in the opposite way, destroy virtue; the same actions producing virtue are in turn produced by virtue once formed.