Lecture 17 — Shame

Shame is not properly spoken of as a virtue because it is more like a passion than a habit. [867]

In any case, shame is defined as fear of disgrace. [868]

Like fear, shame is brought about by reason of danger, for people who feel ashamed blush, and those who fear death grow pale. Both qualities are in some measure modifications of the body, and so pertain rather to passion than to habit. [869]

This passion is not becoming to persons of every age, but only to the young. [870]

We are of the opinion that it is well for the young to feel shame because, living according to their emotions, many of them would fall into sin but are restrained by shame. Moreover, we are in the habit of praising youngsters who have a sense of shame. [872]

But no one praises an old man because he is shame-faced, for we think it unbecoming of him to commit acts giving rise to shame. [873]

Likewise, shame is not characteristic of a virtuous person, but follows evil actions such as must not be done. [874]

If some actions are shameful in fact and others only considered such, this does not matter, for neither kind should be done, and so should not be objects of shame. The wicked, however, perform disgraceful actions of this kind. [875]

It is unreasonable to hold that, if a man is so constituted that he is ashamed if he does a disgraceful action, he is considered virtuous on this account. Shame is felt because of acts voluntarily done, and no virtuous man voluntarily does evil. [877]

Shame will be a virtue resulting from the supposition of something else—if a man did such an act, he would be ashamed. But virtue does not work this way. [879]

But, if shamelessness and the absence of shame at doing dishonorable actions is evil, it is not on that account virtuous to be ashamed to do things of this kind. [880]

Likewise, continence is not a virtue, but has a mixture of virtue. Hence, we shall consider this in a later treatise, but now we must treat justice. [883]

867. Shame is not properly spoken of as a virtue. After the Philosopher has completed the treatise on the median qualities that are virtues, he now treats a median quality that is not a virtue, namely, shame.

First, he shows that shame is not a virtue.

Second, at likewise, continence is not (1128b33; [883]), he says a similar thing about continence, which, although laudable, is not a virtue.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he investigates the genus of shame;

second, at this passion is not (1128b15; [870]), he examines its subject.

He treats this first in a twofold manner.

First, he presents his proposition, saying that shame is not properly called a virtue. Shame is more like a passion than a habit, which is the genus of virtue.

868. Next, at in any case (1128b11), he proves his proposition in two ways.

He proves it first by means of a definition of shame. Shame is said to be fear of disgrace or confusion that is the opposite of glory. But fear is a certain passion. Consequently, shame belongs to the genus of passion.

869. Then, at like fear, he proves the same thing by the effect of shame. In this regard, we must consider that passions are movements of the sensitive appetite that uses bodily organs. Hence, all the passions are accompanied by some corporeal change. Shame and fear—which are concerned with the danger of death—have a general resemblance in that each passion is judged by a change in the color of the body.

870. But they have particular differences, since people who are ashamed blush, while those who fear death turn pale. The reason for this difference is that the spirit and the humors naturally rush to the place feeling the need. Now, the seat of life is the heart, and so when danger of death is feared, the spirit and the humors speed to the heart. Consequently, the surface of the body, being as it were deserted, grows pale. On the other hand, honor and confusion are numbered among external things. Therefore, since a man fears the loss of honor by shame, he blushes as the humors and spirits stream back to the surface. It is evident, then, that both shame and fear of death are certain alterations of the body, inasmuch as they are accompanied by a change. Because this apparently belongs rather to passion than habit, it is obvious that shame is not a virtue.

871. At this passion (1128b15), he discloses what is the fitting subject of shame.

First, he shows at what age it is becoming;

second, at likewise, shame is not (1128b21; [874]), for what condition.

He develops the first point in a threefold fashion.

First, he presents his proposition: it is not becoming to persons of every age, but to the young.

872. Then, at we are of the opinion (1128b16), he proves in two ways that shame is becoming to adolescence.

In one way, he shows this from the peculiar nature of youth: on account of the intense desires of their age, they live according to their emotions. For that reason, they are inclined to sin in various ways. But they are restrained from this because of shame, by which they fear disgrace. Therefore, shame is becoming to youth.

In the other way, he gives evidence of the same thing from usage. We are accustomed to praise young people who have a sense of shame.

873. Third, at but no one praises (1128b19), he explains that shame is not becoming to another period of life—namely, old age—saying that no one praises an old man for feeling shame. The reason is that we think it unbecoming of him to do any shameful deed from which shame usually arises. Besides, we think both that old men have been proved by their years and that they ought not to do any shameful act from passion after the fire of youth has subsided.

874. Next, at likewise, shame is not (1128b21), he shows to what condition shame is or is not becoming.

He handles this point under two headings.

First, he explains that it is not becoming to the virtuous person.

Second, at if some actions (1128b23; [875]), he answers certain frivolous objections against his thesis.

First, he says that shame does not belong to the man of virtue, for it occurs in regard to evil deeds. But the virtuous man does not do wicked actions, because virtue is a quality that makes good both its possessor and his work. Therefore, shame is not becoming to a virtuous person.

875. Then, at if some actions (1128b23), he answers three objections dealing with what has just been said.

The first is that someone might say that shame arises not only from truly disgraceful acts, which are contrary to virtue, but also from actions believed to be disgraceful.

876. But Aristotle says that it does not make any difference for our thesis, since the morally good man must not do things shameful according either to truth or to opinion, and so is not in danger of being ashamed of anything. But the wicked person characteristically is of the sort who perform acts certainly disgraceful or held to be such.

877. He introduces a second objection at it is unreasonable (1128b25). A person could say that, although the man of virtue does not have anything to be ashamed of, nevertheless he is so disposed that, if he did something of the kind, he would be ashamed of it. Therefore, in case anyone should think on this account that shame belongs to the virtuous person, he proves in two ways that this is untenable.

878. First, he says that shame, strictly speaking, regards only voluntary failings for which blame is due. But it is inconsistent with virtue that someone should voluntarily do evil. Therefore, for the reasons just given, shame does not belong to virtue. The case would be otherwise if shame were among the things that can happen involuntarily like sickness. Hence, it can be proper for the virtuous man, even when well, to be solicitous about a doctor on account of the sickness that can happen.

879. Second, he excludes the preceding objection at shame will be (1128b29). He says that, if the objection were valid, shame would be a certain conditional virtuous state, for the virtuous man would be ashamed if he were to do wrong. But a conditional state (that a man would be ashamed) is not one of the qualities that properly belong to virtuous people. Rather, it belongs to them absolutely, as is the case of all the virtues. We must conclude, then, that shame is not a special quality in a virtuous person.

880. At but, if shamelessness (1128b31), he gives a third objection. Someone could draw the conclusion that, because shamelessness and the absence of shame concerning a disreputable operation is an evil thing, for this reason, shame is virtuous.

881. But Aristotle says that this is not a necessary inference, because both shame and shamelessness suppose a dishonorable act that is not attributable to a morally good man. On this basis, it is more reasonable that a man should reject the disgraceful operation by reason of shame than not care about it by reason of shamelessness. From this it is clear also that shame is not a virtue, for if it were a virtue, it would exist in a virtuous person.

882. We must take into account that the Philosopher previously [356] treated the praiseworthy passion of righteous indignation (or “nemesis”), and that here he does not mention it because it is not his intention to treat these passions on this occasion. This matter pertains rather to rhetoric, as is clear from Rhetoric 2. (Rhetoric 2.9.1386b9) Hence, neither does he here consider shame, except to show that it is not a virtue. He leaves the same thing to be understood about righteous indignation.

883. Then, at likewise, continence (1128b33), he introduces something similar concerning continence, which, although laudable, is not a virtue, but has an admixture of virtue. Certainly, the continent man follows right reason, and this pertains to virtue. Nevertheless, he suffers vehement and evil desires, and this pertains to lack of virtue. We will discuss these subjects afterward in book 7 [1435–54]. It is enough that he brings out in a fitting manner shame’s resemblance to continence, since shame is especially necessary where evil passions abound, as they do in continent people. We have already remarked this [873].

884. Finally, he makes a connection with what follows, saying that we must next discuss justice. With this, the teaching of book 4 comes to an end.