Lecture 1

Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light.

And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have all things or nothing in common, or some things in common and some not.

That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a common place—one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city.

But should a well ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?

There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated.

I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, that the greater the unity of the state the better.

Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state? Since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance The usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained.

For they cannot an rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since it is better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same persons in power where this is possible, yet where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at the same time it is just that an should share in the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them.

Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

Quia considerare volumus decommunione politica, etc. After the philosopher has determined, in the first book, about those things that belong to the household, which are certain elements of the city, he here begins to determine about the city itself, after the method which he touched upon at the end of the first book, and also at the end of the tenth book of the Ethics.

For he first posits those things which have been said by others about the political union;

second, he begins to determine about those things according to his own thoughts in the third book, at et qui de politia considerat, etc..

About the first he does two things.

First, he says what his intention is.

Second, he carries out his intention, at principium autem primo faciendum, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he puts forward his intention.

Second, he offers an excuse for it, at adhhuc autem quaerere, etc.

He says first, therefore, that our governing intention is to consider the political communion, so that we may have scientific knowledge about what manner of political association is the best, and how to have all things so that men are able to live above of all as they would wish to. To pursue this, it is necessary to study the regimes, that is, the orderings of the city, that others have handed down; either those that some city uses which are praised because they are well ruled by laws; or also those that were handed down by philosophers and the wise, which seem well disposed. And it is necessary to study this so that it may be apparent what is correct and useful in the association and rule of the city. For by holding up many [regimes] next to each other, it can be more apparent what is better and more useful.

It should be noted, however, that he says it belongs to the best regime that men live most of all as they would wish to, that is, following the will of human beings; because the will of the human being is chiefly about the end of human life, to which the whole political association is ordered. And so what human beings assess about the association of the city follows upon what they diversely assess about the end of human life. For those who posit the end of human life as delights, power or honors, esteem that city to be the best arranged in which men are able to live delightfully, or to acquire much money, or to pursue great honors, or even to be master over many. But those who posit the end of this present life in the good that is the reward of virtue esteem that city to be best arranged in which men are most of all peaceful, and (can) live according to virtue. Whence, simply speaking, it is true that the best arrangement of the city is, in anyone’s opinion, that in the city man can live as he would wish to. It should also be noted that he says he will consider the regimes of communities which are said to be well ruled, and the orderings of the cities handed down by the wise, which seem to be well-disposed; because for the discovery of truth, the consideration of those things that are clearly false is not very beneficial, but rather, of those things that are spoken with probability.

Then he offers an excuse for his own intention; and he says that it is not necessary for someone to seem in this endeavor--which is, to seek after something else, in the orderings of the city, beyond those things that have been said by others--to proceed from this, that he (wants) to sophisize, that is, to show his own wisdom: but rather, he intersperses this art because those things which have been said by others seem, in many regards, not to be well disposed.

Then, where he says principium autem, etc., he pursues his intention by pursuing those things that have been said by others about the ordering of the city.

And first, he posits diverse orderings of the city handed down by diverse people.

Second, he shows who they were and of what sort who entered into things of this sort, at eorum autem qui pronutiaverunt, etc.

Now the first part is divided in two, after the diversity which was touched upon previously.

For in the first he posits the orderings of the city which are handed down by certain of the wise.

In the second, he posits those which were observed in certain cities that lived in an orderly way, at de ea autem quae Lacedaemoniorum, etc.

The first is divided in three parts.

First, he posits the ordering of the city that was handed down by Socrates, or Plato, his student, who brought the conversations of Socrates into his books.

In the second, he posits the ordering of the city handed down by a certain man called Felleas [Phaleas], at sunt autem quaedam, etc.

In the third, he posits the ordering of Hyppodamus, at Hyppodamus autem, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he investigates [pertractat] a certain question about a certain ordering which Plato called the most useful for the city [II.1-5].

Second, he pursues [Plato’s] ordering with regard to other things, at fere autem similiter et quae circa leges [II.6-7].

About the first he does two things.

First, he raises a question.

Second, he pursues it.

About the first he does three things.

First, he raises a certain three-part question.

Second, he rules out [excludit] one of the parts.

Third, he seeks after the other two.

Therefore, he says first that the beginning of this study ought to be made from what occurs according to the nature of the city. For since the city is a community, it is necessary to consider certain things: whether all citizens ought to commune in all things, in nothing, or in certain things but not in others.

Then, where he says nullo quidem igitur, etc., he rules out one of the three parts. For it is impossible to say that the citizens commune in nothing: which he proves in two ways.

First, indeed, because the city is a certain union. Whence, it would be against the rationale [ratio] of the city if the citizens should commune in nothing.

Second, because it is clear that all citizens necessarily commune, at least in place, because the place of one city is one. And they are called “co-citizens” who are companions [socii] in one city: whence it is necessary that they commune in place.

Then, where he says sed utrum quibuscumque, he abandons the two other parts under a doubt: namely, whether it is better that the city, which ought to be well-associated [bene conversari], should commune in whatever it happens that some commune in, or should commune in some of them, and not in others. For there are some things in which it does not happen in any manner that men commune; such as in all personal things, like the limbs of the body. But in children and wives and possessions, it happens that citizens commune with each other, as was handed down in Plato’s Republic: for there, Socrates said that it is necessary, for the best city, that the possessions of all citizens should be common, and the wives common: and thus, that all would approach all without difference; and as a result, it would follow that the sons would be common because of the uncertainty of sons: and this is touched upon at the beginning of the Timaeus. We must pursue, therefore, whether it is better for the political association to be disposed as it is now, or following the law which Socrates wrote in his Republic.

Then, where he says habet itaque difficultates, etc, he inquires into the aforementioned question.

And first, he shows the unfitness of the aforementioned position about the community of wives and possessions.

Second, he shows their insufficiency, at causa autem deviationis, [II.5.1] etc.

About the first he does three things.

First, he disproves the law of Socrates with reference to the community of wives and sons.

Second, with reference to the community of possessions, at habitum autem his est, [II.4.1] etc.

Third, commonly, with reference to both, at et ad hoc interimunt, [II.4.9] etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he proposes those things following which it can be evident that the position of Socrates about the community of wives is unfitting.

Second, he pursues it, at dico autem unam esse civitatem, etc.

About the first he posits four things:

of which the first is that this ordering, about the community of women, has many other difficulties beyond those unfitting things that should immediately be touched on.

The second is that the cause on account of which Socrates said it was necessary for this law to be ordered does not seem to be reasonable.

The third is that through this law it would not be possible to arrive at the end, namely, what is useful for the city, which Socrates was assessing.

The fourth is that it is insufficiently handed down: for since common things are not able to be applied to an individual except by a certain method of distribution, though he would make women common, he did not teach the method in which they should be divided individually for use.

Then he pursues three of those things that he had said: for the fourth, about insufficiency, is clear through itself.

For he first shows the cause of this ordering assigned by Socrates to be irrational [II.1.11].

Second, he shows that through this law, the city could not pursue the end that Socrates was intending, at at vero neque si hoc optimum, [II.2.1] etc.

Third, he shows that this law has many difficulties, at adhuc autem et tales difficultates, [II.3.1] etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he proposes the cause of the law that Socrates indicated.

Second, he disproves it.

He says first, therefore, that Socrates supposed this as if it were a principle: that it would be best for the city that it should be one as much as possible. For because of this, he wanted all things to be common, even sons and wives, so that to the utmost extent, the citizens should be united with each other.

Then, where he says quamvis manifestum sit, etc., he disproves the aforementioned cause with three rationales:

about the first of these he says that it is clear that the unity of the city could proceed to so much greater a degree than it ought that it would not remain a city. For it was said above that the city is naturally a certain multitude: but a multitude is opposed to unity. Hence, if the city were more one than it ought to be, it would not now be a city, but from a city, would have been made into a household: and then, if the household were united more than it ought to be, from the household nothing would remain except one man. For no one doubts that even one household is more one than a city, and a man is more one than a household. Hence, even if someone were able to make it that in the whole city there should be as much unity as in one household, they ought not to make this happen, because they would destroy the city.

But because someone might be able to say that Socrates did not mean to understand a unity that excludes a multitude of persons, but a unity that excludes dissimilarity; he therefore adds that the city not only ought to be [made] out of many men, but it is also necessary that it be from those different in kind [species], that is, from men of diverse conditions. For a city is not made out of men who are wholly similar following their condition. And this is clear in three ways.

First, indeed, because the city is something other than a multitude flocked together simultaneously for fighting. Because a multitude flocked together at the same time for fighting is useful from numerical quantity alone, even if they are all of the same condition; because such a multitude is united on account of aid, just as it happens among those who desire to drag some weight, that a greater multitude of men drags a greater weight; thus also, a greater multitude of similar soldiers are a greater help for victory.

It follows, through this, that the city insofar as it is constituted out of the dissimilar, differs from a tribe in which a multitude is not divided by the dwelling of diverse cities or villages, but each one dwells separately, on his own, as happened among the Arcadians. For Arcadia is a certain province in Greece in which each one dwells on his own: and thus, in a certain manner, all are equal and similar.

Third, he shows the same thing through this: that those from which it is necessary that one perfect thing be made differ in kind: hence, every perfect whole in natural affairs is found to be constituted from parts that are diverse following their kind; as man [is made] from flesh, and bones, and nerves. But a whole that is put together from parts of the same kind is imperfect in the genus of nature, like air and water and the other unensouled bodies. Hence, it it clear that, since the city is a certain perfect whole, it is necessary that it be constituted from parts that are dissimilar in kind.

And therefore, it was said in Ethics V that the city is preserved through a reciprocal equality, that is, through that which retributes each one proportionally for what he has done, because this is necessarily what is among the free and equal. For if things are not retributed to someone according to what he has done, it would be a sort of slavery, as he said in the same place. Now this retribution, which is here called “reciprocal” is done according to equality of quantity among those who are equal in quantity, so that as much as someone gave, so much does he receive: as much as he does, so much does he undergo. But among those who are not equals following quantity, but following proportion, equality of proportion is also preserved: since by however much he who does the injury is lesser, in the same proportion is he more punished. For it is a greater crime that someone should strike a more worthy person than an inferior. Thus it is clear that, since it is in the city’s rationale that the city is constituted out of the dissimilar, what Socrates thought is not true--that it is necessary for the city to be most of all one; because if the dissimilarity of the citizens is taken away, there will no longer be a city. And this dissimilarity seems most of all taken away by making possessions and women and children common.

He posits a second rationale, at simul autem, etc., which is introduced in order to show that it is necessary that there be some difference among the citizens. For it is necessary that some of them govern and that some be subject. For it is not possible that all at the same time govern: but if this came to be, it would be necessary that this should be by turn, thus that each one in his own year would govern, or at whatever other determined time, such as a month, or a day, or also following whatever other order, such as that governors be chosen by lot: and following this manner of taking the government in turn, it happens that all would govern at diverse times, as if in some city, the same men were not always tanners or builders, but that it followed by turn that all citizens would become tanners and builders.

But he adds that it is better that the political city be disposed thus, if possible: that the same men always govern. For he says that this is possible when in a certain city are found certain men who are much more excellent than the others, through whom it will be best that the city always be ruled. But when this is not possible through this, that all the citizens are almost equal following natural industry and virtue, then it is just that all participate in the government, whether to govern is a certain good, or evil; because it is just that those who are equals in the city should equally participate in both common goods and common burdens. Therefore, it would be just, if it were possible, that all should govern at the same time: but because this is not possible, as an imitation of this justice, it is observed that those who are equals in part yield to each other the position, although from the principle [of their rule] they were similar: because while some of them govern, and some are subject, in a certain manner they are made dissimilar and diverse through the degree of dignity. And thus also a certain diversity is among them that govern at the same time, so long as diverse [men] hold diverse governments or offices. And thus it is clear that for a city, a diversity of governors and of subjects is required, either simply, or following a certain time. So, therefore, it is clear from what has been said that the city is not thus born [so as to be one] as some say, that all may be similar. And that which is said to be the greatest good in cities, namely, the greatest unity, destroys the city. Hence, it cannot be the good of the city, because each thing is preserved through that which, for it, is good.

He posits a third rationale, at est autem et per alium modum, etc., and this rationale proceeds in a different manner from the things previously advanced: for the first rationale was taken up from the dissimilar parts out of which it is necessary for the city to be constituted: but this rationale is taken up from the end of the city, which is the sufficiency of life. And this is what he says, that through another manner it can be clarified that it is not better that man strongly seek to unify the city; for through this is taken away the sufficiency of life. For it is clear that one household or whole family is more greatly sufficient for life than one man; and the city is more greatly sufficient than the household. For it ought to be a city when the community of the multitude is sufficient through itself for life. If, therefore, what is less one is more sufficient through itself, as the household is than a man, and the city than a household, it clearly follows that the more choiceworthy in the city is what is less one, regarding the distinction of the citizens, than what is more one. For by however much a greater diversity of men is found in it, by so much will it be more sufficient unto itself. Hence, what Socrates called the best thing for the city—to be maximally one—is obviously false.