Chapter I. Question 1 tue nature and extent of sacred doctrine

Tuts question contains ten articles. It treats (1) of the necessity of sacred doctrine, asking whether it is necessary; (2) of the nature of this sacred doctrine in three articles: whether it is a science; whether it is one science; whether it is speculative or practical; (3) of its excellence compared with the other sciences, in articles five and six; (4) of its subject or proper object; (5) of its method: whether it is a matter of argument, the intrinsic and extrinsic sources being discussed in a general way in this article; there is also an article on the use of metaphor, and the last article concerns the use which theology makes of Holy Scripture.

As to the arrangement of these articles, the objection might be raised that St. Thomas ought to have treated of the subject or object of sacred doctrine before he discussed its nature and excellence, because the nature of a science depends upon its object. In answer to this it must be said that from the very beginning of this question he supposes the nominal definition of sacred doctrine, in which the object of this latter is expressed at least in a confused manner. After this, gradually and methodically, he makes the transition from the nominal to the real and scientific definition, which is completed in the seventh article, in which he speaks explicitly of the proper subject of this science.

Concerning the nominal definition, or the meaning of the words “sacred doctrine,” there is a dispute as to what the holy Doctor implies by them. Does he mean faith? or theology? Or does he mean sacred doctrine in general according as it abstracts from faith and theology? Cajetan and several others hold this last view; but John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, and others contend that by these words St. Thomas means theology in the strict sense. This seems to be the true answer, although, of course, the first article is concerned more with sacred doctrine in general. But immediately from the second article it is strictly a discussion of sacred science as distinguished from faith. Gradually St. Thomas passes from the confused to the — distinct notion of this science.

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER BESIDES PHILOSOPHY ANY FURTHER DOCTRINE IS REQUIRED !

State of the question. Necessity is of many kinds. It is: (a) absolute; (b) hypothetical, which is either physical or moral.

It is a question of hypothetical necessity for the attainment of the end; but it is certainly not a question of absolute necessity that is presupposed by the very nature of the thing independently of the end to be attained, as when we say it is necessary for man to be a rational animal.

We must note that a thing is said to.be necessary for the end in two ways. First, as indispensable for the attainment of the end (ad esse simpliciter), and this is called physical necessity, as in the case of food for the preservation of human life. Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary for the convenient attainment of the end (ad bene esse), as in the case of a horse for a long journey; for otherwise there would be great difficulty in attaining the end, though it would not be a physical impossibility.

The difficulties placed at the beginning of the article by way of a statement of the question, are those which later on were proposed in another form by the positivists and the rationalists. These are: ¹ that man must not seek to know those things that are above reason; so say the positive agnostics; (2) now a certain part of philosophy treats of God; so say several rationalists, who seek to reduce theology to philosophy, and they propose a merely natural interpretation of the mysteries of faith, as Spinoza and afterward Hegel did.

In the body of the article there are two conclusions which may be briefly expressed as follows: (1) the divine revelation of supernatural truths is hypothetically necessary, but it is so indispensably (simpliciter) or physically; (2) the revelation of certain natural truths that pertain to religion was hypothetically necessary, conveniently so (ad bene esse) or morally speaking.

First conclusion. This is proved in the body of the article according to St. Thomas’ usual way by beginning with the minor, which is as follows: It is necessary that the end first be made known to men who are to direct their actions to the end. But according to revelation men are ordained to a supernatural end. Therefore it is necessary that the supernatural end first be made known to men by divine revelation.

It is evidently a question of hypothetical, but of indispensable

(simpliciter) or of physical necessity, because nothing is willed unless it is foreknown. The middle term of the demonstration is: the foreknowledge of the end.

In this argument the major is founded upon reason; the minor is revealed, for the Scripture says: “The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee.” ? In like manner we read: “But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.” * Hence the Vatican Council says that divine revelation is necessary “because God of His infinite goodness has ordained man to a supernatural end, to be a sharer of divine blessings which utterly exceed the intelligence of the human mind.” 4 This council likewise declared that the mysteries of faith transcend also the natural powers of the created intellect, which includes even the angelic.®

The second conclusion concerns the moral necessity for the revelation of certain truths of the natural order that pertain to religion, such as the existence of God the Author of nature, His universal providence that extends even to the least detail, creation from nothing, the personal immortality of the human soul.

St. Thomas gives the reason for this, namely, that otherwise few there are who would come to know these truths, and this only after a long time, and with a mixture of many errors. This reason is developed by St. Thomas in another of his works, and solemn utterance was given to it in the Vatican Council in the following words: “It is to be ascribed to this divine revelation, that such truths among things divine as of themselves are not beyond human reason can, even in the present condition of mankind, be known by everyone with facility, with firm assurance, and with no mixture of error.” 7

We have the confirmation of this in the history of philosophy, since the Greeks, who were particularly apt at speculation, having spent a long time in this pursuit, did not succeed in acquiring a clear idea of creation from nothing, and they had more or less doubts about the universal scope of Providence and the personal immortality of the soul. In this we clearly see how first of all revelation, even from the very opening words of Genesis in which it

4 Denz., no. 1786; see also canons of the same council, ibid., nos. 1807 Ê. 5 Ibid., no. 1796.

speaks of creation, emphatically confirms from on high the certain findings of philosophy, as evidently is the case in Christian philosophy. This latter surpasses the philosophy of the more profound Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, especially in two respects, namely, as regards the unwavering certainty concerning the most free creation of all things from nothing and the personal immortality of the soul. Thus philosophical speculation directed by faith reaches much loftier heights among the great Christian philosophers.

We have another confirmation of this from the history of modern philosophy, especially from the history of agnosticism, whether of the positivist or idealist type. A third confirmation is found in the history of religions, and of their fluctuating opinions about the great problems concerning God and the soul.

It is not as yet scientific theology but sacred doctrine according as it abstracts from faith and theology that is the subject matter of the body of the first article. There is also a reference to faith inasmuch as faith and not theology is necessary for salvation. Theolo as a science is not indeed necessary for any of the faithful, but for the Church collectively, at least according to the ordinary law, since the teaching Church must also make use of human means in the discharge of her office, having recourse to reason in defending what is of faith against the objections of the adversaries.

In the reply to the second objection we find the first mention of theology as distinct from faith. This reply states that there is no reason why theology, guided by the higher light of divine revelation, may not teach those truths which philosophy already teaches us by means of the natural light of reason.

The reason for this is that sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For it is not the material but the formal object that differentiates the sciences, according as the knowledge is obtained from a different source. Thus the astronomer and the geologist prove that the earth is round in different ways, the former by mathematics, the latter by physics. Thus the distinction between the sciences is the result of the different degrees of abstraction.

Scotus, as Cajetan remarks, attacks this first article since he has a different conception of the distinction between human nature and grace. For Scotus, our soul is by its very nature positively ordained for the beatific vision,* the desire for which would be natural and innate, although the soul cannot attain to jt without God's help, to which it is not entitled, and which depends upon

8 According to the theory of Scotus, if the soul saw itself directly, it would behold in itself this positive ordination to the immediate vision of God. Cf. Scotus in Quaestio la Prologi Primi Sententiarum.

God’s most free sanction.” This theory of Scotus is in harmony with his teaching on being which, he says, applies univocally to God and creatures, and thus the infinite distance between the divine and human natures is not sufficiently safeguarded, as we shall see in question thirteen.

The Vatican Council speaks according to the terminology of St. Thomas when it says: “The Catholic Church, with one consent, has also ever held, and does hold, that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object; in principle, because our knowledge in the one is by natural reason and in the other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known. . . . For the divine mysteries by their own nature [it does not say according to God’s free decree} so far transcend the created intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they remain covered with a veil of faith itself, and shrouded in a certain degree of darkness.” 1°

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A SCIENCE

State of the question. From this title we see that it is now not merely a question of sacred doctrine in general according as it abstracts from faith and theology, but it is a question of theology as a science.

The difficulty is that every science proceeds from principles directly known and evident, whereas sacred theology proceeds from principles of faith, which are obscure and not admitted by all. Moreover, science is not concerned with individual facts but with universal principles, whereas sacred doctrine treats of particulars, namely, of Christ, the apostles, the patriarchs, and the prophets.

The reply of St. Thomas is this: sacred doctrine, that is, sacred theology, is a science, but it is a science that is subordinated to a higher science possessed by God, and in a lesser degree by the blessed. It is proved to be a science in the counterargument from the authority of St. Augustine who says: “to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected,

9 Concerning this difficulty, see question twelve. In this question it will be necessary to show that the innate desire for the beatific vision would have to be efficacious, otherwise God as the Author of nature would have given a natural inclination to an end to which as Author of nature He could not bring the creature, and thus there would be no proportion between agent and end.

and strengthened.” 1! In this descriptive definition obtained from the effects, the divers functions of theology are already to some extent distinguished, for, as theology is somewhat apologetic, by means of it saving faith is begotten; afterward, by the theological explanation of sacred doctrine, faith is nourished and is defended against those denying it, and it is strengthened since the various points of faith are so arranged as to constitute one body of doctrine, and, like the setting of precious stones in a diadem, its value becomes increasingly apparent by this orderly arrangement.

Nevertheless the difficulty remains if we contend that theology is a science not only in the broad sense but in the strict sense; for science properly so called is certain knowledge of truth that is deduced by demonstration from true and certain principles. Moreover, the certitude of sciences has its foundation in the evidence of the principles, and, contrary to this, the principles of sacred theology are not evident.

To solve this difficulty, St. Thomas establishes the second part of the conclusion: that theology is a science subordinated to the higher science of God and the blessed. It is proved as follows:

A subordinate science proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, as the science of perspective (optics) proceeds from principles established by geometry. Now sacred theology proceeds from principles transmitted by God through revelation. Therefore sacred theology is a science subordinated to the science of God and the blessed. We say “of the blessed,” because they see God’s essence, although in a finite way, a point which we will discuss in question twelve.

Thus in the reply to the first objection the difficulty presented at the beginning is solved. For the principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident—and thus a science is not subordinated—or else they are reducible to the conclusions of a higher science. Hence, too, the conclusions of a subordinated science are reduced to self-evident principles, but through the intermediary of a subordinating science.

First corollary. The principles of a subordinated science can be known in two ways: either by faith and without evidence of reason, or by a higher science already acquired, and then there is evidence of reason.

Thus the optician, if he is not a geometer, believes the principles transmitted by geometry, and then his optics is truly a subordinated science, but as yet imperfect. If afterward this optician becomes a geometer, then his optics will be not only a truly subordinated science, but a perfect one. Likewise, the musician believes

the principles he receives from arithmetic, if he does not know arithmetic; but he can acquire this knowledge.

In the same manner, the theologian who is still a wayfarer, believes the principles transmitted by God revealing and proposed by the Church; and thus his theology is truly a subordinated science, but as yet imperfect. But when this theologian afterward attains to the beatific vision or comes into possession of it, then he not only believes but sees the principles transmitted to him by God through the beatific vision, or in the Word, and he still can, outside the Word, make use of his discursive theology, which then is truly not only a subordinated science, but a perfect one. Thus with the attainment of the beatific vision faith is made void, but not theology. St. Thomas’ conclusion concerns sacred theology as it is in itself, and this can be in the theologian either as wayfarer, or as one of the blessed or possessors of God.

Second corollary. The theologian will have the same theological habit in heaven as he now has on earth; just as the optician does not lose his science of optics when he becomes a geometer. So Christ when on earth had acquired knowledge as well as the beatific vision.

Third corrollary. Therefore what is substantially a true science is sometimes imperfect under certain conditions. ‘Thus in the theologian as wayfarer, theology is substantially a true science (and is neither opinion nor faith), because its conclusions are reducible to evident principles. But if, in fact, the reduction does not result in actual evidence, this is not owing directly to the defect of this science, but is, as it were, accidentally so, because of the defect in the person knowing, as in the case of the optician who would not know geometry. Hence the theology of the wayfarer is a true science, but it is imperfect as to its status.

In other words, a science that is imperfect, not in itself but because it is in the initial stage of its development, can still be called a science, because as such its conclusions are reducible to principles. The optician who is not a geometer has good grounds for thinking that his optics is a science and not merely an opinion.

It must be observed that this distinction between the essence of a science and its state, is of almost similar application in many other problems, and there is a most certain foundation for this. In fact, one as yet merely a boy or even an infant is, as regards his nature, a true human being, but he is in an imperfect state. In like manner, the acquired moral virtues in a sinner can be true virtues, but they are in an imperfect state as regards their disposition. Thus the acquired virtue of true temperance differs from the temperance of the miser which has not as yet reached the perfect state of a virtue that is practically stabilized, but is still in the imperfect state of a fickle disposition. .

Likewise the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas does not differ specifically, as regards its formal object, from Aristotle’s philosophy; but the difference consists in this, that in Aristotle the habit was imperfect, whereas in St. Thomas it was perfect. Thus Aristotle did not succeed in acquiring a clear idea of creation from nothing, nor of providence that extends even to the least detail, nor was he fully convinced of the personal immortality of the soul. His philosophy never penetrated to such depths as this. In our days some would wish to relegate Christian philosophy to Christian apologetics, which is sacred theology functioning by an appeal to reason. To be sure, the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas did not differ specifically from the philosophy of Aristotle except in its circumstances, because it was fortified from on high by divine revelation as its guiding star; because of this positive fortification and the perfection resulting therefrom, it is called Christian.

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

Durandus, Scotus, and Aureolus raised objections against the conclusion of St. Thomas. These objections are examined by Cajetan.

First objection. According to Aureolus, since the theologian does not have evidence of the truth of the conclusions, theology is the science of consequences or of logical inferences, but not of the conclusions themselves, or of actual facts. In other words, it would be but a good application of logic to matters of faith.

We reply with Cajetan that from this it follows that theology is a science in an imperfect state, but not that it is not a science. The theologian is not only a logician applying logic to matters of faith, but he must also be a metaphysician, and in addition to this a theologian in the strict sense of the term, treating not only of logical being, or merely of being purely as such, but of the mystery of God’s life.

Second objection. A subordinating science states the reason why the principles of a subordinated science are true. But it does not give the reason why the principles of faith are true.

Reply. Wayfarers do not see the reason for this; however there is such a reason. Thus there is a certain reason on account of which God is triune, for He is triune by reason of Himself. Likewise there is a certain reason for the free decree of the redemptive Incarnation.

Third objection. The object of a subordinated science is distinct from that of a subordinating science, as optics with reference to geometry. But theology and the beatific vision have the same object. Cajetan *? replies to this objection by the following distinction: that theology has the same object as it is an entity, this I concede; as it is an object, this I deny; for the object of the beatific vision is God clearly seen, whereas the object of theology is God as revealed, abstracting both from clarity and obscurity. But if, moreover, a subordinating science has a limited object, such as geometry, then the object of the subordinated science, such as optics, is also distinct as an entity.

This distinction between the object as an entity and the object as an object, is of great importance. Thus God, although He is most simple as an entity, is the object of several specifically distinct habits, namely, of the light of glory, of infused faith, of the gifts of understanding and wisdom, of sacred discursive theology (whether in the blessed or in wayfarers), and of natural theology. And these various habits remain specifically distinct by reason of their object, not as it is an entity, but as it is an object. Likewise man is the material object of various sciences, namely, of biology, psychology, metaphysics, and even theology.

In the reply to the second objection of this article, St. "Thomas remarks why sacred theology can treat of individual facts, although science treats of universals. In truth, it treats of these things, namely, of the deeds performed by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not as constituting the principal object but as they are examples, and to establish the authority of those through whom the divine revelation came down to us. But when it treats of Christ, it considers in Him what the redemptive Incarnation is, just as physics or astronomy treats of the sun, considering its influence in the solar system.

First doubt. For true theology is it enough for one to have a knowledge of supernatural things, not through infused faith but through faith acquired by human efforts, such as the formal heretic has? In other words, is infused faith necessary for theology, so that the loss of infused faith through heresy would mean the loss of theology? `

Vasquez replies that acquired faith suffices for theology: (1) because theology survives in the heretical theologian; (2) because theology is a naturally acquired habit and therefore does not necessarily depend upon any infused habit. It suffices that the principles of faith be believed by whatever kind of faith.

John of St. Thomas, on the contrary, justly replies that the op-

posite opinion must by all means be held; and he says that it is the one commonly held among theologians, especially the Thomists. This we deduce from the text of St. Thomas who, when comparing the certitude of theological science with other sciences, says: “whereas this derives its certitude from the light of the divine knowledge, which cannot be misled”;?3 and he shows that it is divine revelation which gives to theology its formal aspect."

Now the acquired faith of the formal heretic is uncertain, because he believes by an act of his own judgment and will those truths which he approves of, and rejects others that have been revealed, thus rejecting the formal motive of infused faith, which is the authority of God revealing as regards all revealed truths. Those which he retains are believed on grounds of human reason. Hence the faith of the formal heretic is some kind of opinion from which certainty of conclusions cannot be deduced.*5

Hence many ideas concerning matters of faith survive indeed materially in the theologian who becomes a formal heretic, but there is no longer the formal connection between these ideas, and in the conclusions deduced the word “is” implies an affirmation that is merely an opinion and not a certainty. Hence nothing is left but the corpse, as it were, of theological science in such a person. For science is a habit or simple quality together with subordination of ideas. But this simple quality is specified by the formal object, which in this case is God as made known to us by virtual revelation. Hence, when divine revelation is rejected by formal heresy, this simple quality or theological habit no longer remains, but in its place we have only ideas that are precariously connected under the dominance of a fickle opinion which is the result of the heretic's own judgment and volitional act. Thus the human body, when the soul has departed, is no longer truly a human body; for, lacking what formally connects the various parts, it is but a corpse in the process of corruption or disintegration. The habit of sacred theology implies the presence of a theological bent of mind, and this the heretic, such as Luther or Calvin, no longer possesses.

In reply to Vasquez, it must be said that theology, since it is acquired and not infused, is formally natural, though radically it is supernatural, in that it has its root in infused faith, as we shall state later on. Nor can anyone be said to have acquired a subordinated science who is not certain of having acquired a subordinating science; nor can such a science be acquired by one who accepts from a subordinating science what he approves of and noth-

ing else, as in the case of the optician who would accept from geometry only those things which he approved of; for he would be accepting these things not on scientific but aesthetic grounds.

Second doubt. With what theological conclusions is this article concerned? It is chiefly concerned with conclusions strictly so called, with those that are inferred by a discursive process which is not only explanatory but also objectively illative, and that establish a new truth which is deduced and distinct from the two truths enunciated in the premises. In other words, it is a new truth that is not formally but virtually revealed.

It must be noted that there can thus be several distinct truths of the same thing, even of the same divine reality; because, although God is most simple as an entity, yet He can be the object of different habits and even more so of different judgments or truths in the same science. Thus three distinct truths are enunciated in the following syllogisms: Every intellectual being is free. But God is intellectual. Therefore God is free.1* Being is consequent upon person. But in Christ there is only one person. ‘Therefore in Christ there is one being.**

These are examples of objectively illative reasoning by which we acquire a new truth. For to say that “God is intellectual,” and “God is free,” is to enunciate two distinct truths, two true judgments (truth is formally in the mind), although these are enunciated of the same divine reality. If this were not so, we should have to say with the nominalists that the divine names, such as mercy and justice, are synonymous.*® Father Marin Sola does not stress this point sufficiently in his new theory on the evolution of dogma,?® about which more will be said later on.

On the other hand, the theological conclusion improperly so called, which is obtained by an explicative process of reasoning is not a new truth but one that has already been revealed and is now more explicitly proposed. Thus the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra is the same truth as that revealed by Christ when He said: “Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will

19In L’Evolution homogène du dogme catholique (French tr., II, 333), we read: “Two propositions that have the same subject differ or are identical in meaning according to their predicates. If therefore the predicates are really identical, the meaning of the propositions will be also.” Although justice and mercy are really identical in God, and not really distinct, the meaning of these two truths is not the same: God is just, God is merciful. This point is of primary importance; if it is denied, we are led involuntarily to the admission of nominalism.

build My Church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” 2° In the explicative process of reasoning there may be some inference resulting therefrom which is merely of subjective import, or as far as we are concerned, but in itself it means no addition to knowledge. In this way there is no acquisition of a new truth, but the truth that was formally and implicitly revealed is expressed in another form and more explicitly.

On the contrary, in the objectively illative process a new truth is acquired, which is not formally but virtually revealed, and which is deduced from what has been revealed, as in the proposition: there is one being in Christ. In this we see the specific distinction between theology and faith, which latter is not a discursive science.

Third doubt. When is the discursive reasoning proper or truly illative? It is generally admitted that such is the case when the conclusion is contained in the premises, as the property is contained in the essence, or the effect in its cause. We have an example of this in the following syllogism: every man is free; but Christ is truly a man; therefore Christ has human liberty (which is distinct from His divine liberty). But this truth thus deduced is otherwise revealed in that it has been revealed that Christ freely obeyed and merited for us. Another example is the following: every man can acquire knowledge by experience and observation; but Christ was truly a man; therefore Christ had acquired knowledge (and not only infused knowledge and the beatific vision). A third example would be: it was fitting that Christ, like His apostles, should have the gift of tongues; but this gift presupposes infused knowledge; therefore Christ had infused knowledge.

On the contrary, we have the case of discursive reasoning improperly so called, if the conclusion is contained in the whole, or the singular in the universal, or the implicit in the explicit. The following is an example: all men have sinned in Adam; but Abraham was a man; therefore he sinned in Adam. Likewise in the following syllogism: Christ died for all men; but Abraham was a man; therefore Christ died for him. In the same way it is shown that Christ died for the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom He redeemed, but by preservative redemption.

Fourth doubt. What theological conclusions are definable by the Church as dogmas of faith, such that their contradictory propositions would not only be erroneous but heretical? All know the difference between these two terms: erroneous and heretical. A proposition is said to be erroneous when it is against a theologically certain conclusion, and heretical when it is against the faith.

In answer to this we say: ,

1. All theologians are agreed that the theological conclusion improperly so called is definable as a dogma. The reason is that it is not a question here of a new truth that has been deduced, but of a truth that has already been formally but confusedly or implicitly revealed, such as the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff when our Lord said: “Thou art Peter... .” Then the discursive reasoning is only explicative, or at most subjectively but not objectively illative. In this case the discursive method explains only the subject or predicate of the proposition that is expressly revealed. Thus it has been revealed that Christ is truly God and truly man. But for true humanity a rational soul is an essential requisite. Therefore Christ had a rational soul. This conclusion was defined against Apollinaris.”

For this same reason particular propositions included in an expressly revealed universal proposition are definable as dogmas of faith. Thus we conclude that Abraham contracted original sin, for the universal proposition that has been expressly revealed, “in whom (Adam) all have sinned,” * covers all particular cases. This assertion is generally admitted by theologians.

2. A conclusion deduced even by a truly illative process of reasoning from two principles that are of faith, is also definable as a dogma of faith.2* The reason is that, although the conclusion is reached by the illative process, yet specifically as such it is of faith. It is implicitly revealed, indeed, in the two revealed premises; for ` a new idea is not introduced, and the connection between predicate and subject can be affirmed by reason of the formal revelation. It is, as it were, the logical explanation of the two propositions taken together that are of faith.

3. A theological conclusion that is deduced by an objectively illative process of reasoning from one premise that is of faith, and another founded on reason, is not of faith in itself, nor can it be for us defined as a dogma of faith. The reason is that this conclusion is a new truth that is not simply revealed, but is simply deduced from revelation and is only virtually revealed.**

We have an example of this in the following syllogism: being is consequent upon person, so that there is only one substantial exist-

24 So say the Salmanticenses (ibid., no. 124), who quote for this same opinion such famous Thomists as Cajetan, Capreolus, Bannez, John of St. Thomas, against Vega, Vasquez, Suarez, and Lugo. Cf. Dictionnaire de théol. cath., art. “Explicite et implicite”; also art. “Dogme.”

ence for each person; but in Christ there is only one person; therefore in Christ there is only one being, namely, the one and only substantial existence for the two natures.?*

In this discursive method, the major is founded on reason, and the minor is of faith. Hence in the conclusion the connection between the predicate and the subject cannot be affirmed solely on account of the authority of God revealing, but partly because of the revelation contained in the minor, and partly on account of the light of natural reason, by which we are impelled to give our assent to the major premise. Therefore this conclusion belongs directly to theology and not to faith.

In other words, this conclusion is not simply revealed (not even implicitly), but it is simply deduced from revealed principles and is only virtually revealed. Hence if the Church were to propose it as a dogma of faith, the contradictory of which would be heresy, the Church would be uttering what is false, because it would propose as simply revealed and to be believed on the authority of God revealing, what is not simply revealed but merely deduced from what is revealed. But the Church can condemn infallibly as erroneous the denial of such a deduced conclusion.

Another example: infused knowledge is necessary so that the human intellect may not remain imperfect but may know, for instance, various languages not known by one’s natural powers; but it was not to be thought of that Christ’s human intellect even in this life should be imperfect; therefore Christ even in this life had infused knowledge.” This conclusion is not of faith, nor is it definable as a dogma of faith.

In these truly illative processes of reasoning a new truth is inferred in that from the premise known by the natural power of reason (especially if this premise is the major), a new truth is introduced, and we have not merely an explanation of the subject or predicate of the revealed proposition. Such conclusions (if not otherwise equivalently revealed in Sacred Scripture or tradition) are not defined by the Church. But the Church sometimes condemns, and even infallibly, as erroneous, opinions that deny theologically certain conclusions.

For a more complete explanation of the conclusion just stated, we must add that, according to the Vatican Council, “all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God written or handed down, and which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal teaching, proposes for our belief as having been

divinely revealed.” ** This is the definition of dogma. But that which is only connected with what is revealed, cannot be said to be simply and strictly revealed, but is distinguished from what is revealed as being deduced from it.

Moreover, if the Church defined as a dogma such a conclusion, it would not only be infallibly guarding and explaining the deposit of the faith, but it would be perfecting the teaching that is of faith, and would be establishing new dogmas; for by this definition it would be declaring of faith what before was not of faith, either in itself or for us.

Finally, if the above-mentioned theological conclusions were definable as dogmas of faith, then all theologically certain conclusions, even those most remote, would be equally definable as dogmas, and all conclusions condemned as erroneous could be condemned as heretical in the strict sense of the term. Thus a great part of the Theological Summa and, especially so, practically the whole treatise on God and His attributes, rigorously deduced from revealed principles, could become dogmas of faith.

We must therefore carefully distinguish between a theological conclusion that is only virtually connected with what is revealed, and a truth that is formally and implicitly revealed. Yet in individual cases it is not always easy to make this distinction. For what seems to the majority virtually connected with that which is revealed, to one of prodigious and keener intellect appears to be formally and implicitly revealed. There are Thomists who see in the words of St. Paul, “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will,” ** a formally implicit revelation that grace is efficacious of itself and not because God foresees our consent. They come to the same conclusion from the following words of our Lord: “My sheep . . . shall not perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand... and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” ° In accordance with these texts, for many Thomists, an explicative process of reasoning, and one that is objectively illative, suffices to show that grace is of itself efficacious, because it concerns not a new truth that is deduced, but the same truth more explicitly formu- lated.°

30 As for the contrary opinion, namely, that the Church can define as a dogma of faith, theological conclusions in the strict sense of the term, those which are deduced by an objectively illative process of reasoning, cf. Vega, In Trident., Bk. IX, chap. 39; Suarez, De fide, disp. III, sect. 11; De Lugo, De fide, disp. I, nos. 268-77.

Objection. Father Marin Sola disagrees, saying that at least if it concerns God, a conclusion obtained by a truly illative process of reasoning from one premise that is founded on reason and another that is of faith, is revealed, because it concerns the same most simple divine reality.

We reply to this objection by appealing to the classical distinction given by Cajetan.** That the premises of faith and the abovementioned theological conclusion concern the same divine reality, as an entity, this I concede; as an object, this I deny. For the same divine reality specifies various specifically distinct habits, as it is variously presented to them as object, namely, as clearly seen, or as obscurely believed, or as the object of the gift of wisdom, or as the object of sacred theology, or as the object of natural theology. With greater reason it can be the object of several propositions in the same science, or of several judgments, which are different truths (truth is formally in the mind) of the same divine reality.

For it is evident that, if for the same divine reality there is only one truth for the divine intellect, which by one intuitive act knows the divine essence, for the created intellect, however, and especially for the human intellect, there are several true judgments and truths concerning the same divine reality, as, for example, God is intellectual, God is free, God 1s just, God is merciful. But it is now a question not of the divine intellect, but of the human intellect with reference to which a distinction must be made between truth that is revealed and truth that is deduced from what is revealed.

31 Cf. L’Evolution homogène du dogme catholique, II, 332f., where we read as follows: “Under pain of falling into nominalism or the subjective conceptualism of Ockham or Aureolus, we must admit that the validity of a proposition does not depend precisely upon the words but upon their objective meaning, the words being but the material element, whereas their signification constitutes the formal element. Two propositions about God, the predicates of which are identical, are really identical in meaning. Two propositions with the same subject (God), differ or are identical in meaning only by reason of their predicates. If therefore the predicates are really identical, the meaning will be, too, and likewise their doctrine.

Father Marin Sola does not take sufficiently into consideration the fact that in these two propositions, “God is intellectual, God is free,” and likewise in these two, “God is merciful, God is just,” the predicates are not really distinct, for there is only a virtual distinction between the divine attributes. Nevertheless these four propositions are not the same in meaning, nor do they enunciate the same truth, unless we admit the opinion of the nominalists, that the divine names are synonymous terms, such as Tullius and Cicero. This opinion is refuted by St. Thomas (cf. Summa, la, q.13, a.4: “Whether names applied to God are synonymous”). From such an admission it would follow that wherever we find “mercy” written, “justice” could be substituted for it, and we could rightly say that God punishes by reason of His mercy. Thus, though his intention is to avoid nominalism, the renowed objector falls into it.

Moreover, by this method, in seeking to avoid nominalism, the mind would revert to the same, according to the theory that claims divine names to be synonymous terms, a theory which is refuted by St. Thomas.** Thus divine mercy and justice would be synonymous and it could therefore be said that God punishes by means of His mercy.

Finally, if the above-mentioned opinion were true, then all conclusions in the treatise on God, even those most remote, provided they are metaphysically certain, could be defined as dogmas under pain not only of error, but of heresy in the strict sense. Thus merely one revealed truth concerning God, namely, that He is the selfsubsisting Being, would suffice to render all conclusions deduced from it such that they could be said to be strictly revealed, and to be believed on the authority of God revealing.

This seems to be an inadmissible exaggeration of the powers assigned to theology, or what is called theologism, and consequently it impairs the superiority of faith to theology.

Instance. For anything to be defined as a dogma of faith, it suffices that it is contained actually and implicitly in what is revealed; but any divine attribute whatever is contained actually and implicitly in the divine nature, since this is the self-subsisting Being (“I am who am”); èt therefore any divine attribute deduced from revelation is a dogma of faith.*®

Reply. I distinguish the major: provided it is the same truth, this I concede; even if it is a new truth that is deduced, this I deny. And this Father Marin Sola concedes.** I contradistinguish the minor: that every divine attribute is actually and implicitly contained in the divine nature, and that each is the same truth for the human intellect, this I deny;:that each is a new and deduced truth, this I concede.

Explanation. One divine attribute is actually and implicitly contained in another and in the divine nature, considered reduplicatively as a divine reality, this I concede; considered as an object, so that each is the same truth, again I distinguish: that it is so for the divine intellect, I concede; for the human intellect, this I deny.

Otherwise, as we said, all divine names, for instance, justice and mercy, would be synonymous terms, and it could be said that God punishes by means of His mercy. Moreover, the revelation of merely one proposition about God would be sufficient, namely, that He is the self-subsisting Being, so that from this all the deduced attrib-

35 So says Father Marin Sola, op. cit., Il, 342. 36 Ibid., p. 333- utes and all the metaphysically certain propositions in the treatise on God could be defined as of faith.

For a dogmatic definition it is necessary that the definition should be the expression of a truth that is the same with what has already been formally and explicitly revealed, and that is not explicitly proposed for our belief. Now even being in general contains actually and implicitly all the modes of being, for these are not outside of being; and yet, concerning these modes, namely, substance, quantity, and quality, new truths are enumerated.

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE 1S ONE SCIENCE

State of the question. The question is whether it is one science reduced to its ultimate species, or whether it is divided into several sciences, just as there are several mathematical sciences, namely, geometry, arithmetic, and several philosophical sciences, as logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics.

The difficulty is, as stated in the beginning of the article, that sacred theology treats not only of God, but also of created beings, namely, of angels, of man, or irrational creatures, as also of the morality of human acts. But these various subjects pertain to different philosophical sciences, namely, metaphysics and ethics. Hence it seems that dogmatic theology, which treats especially of God, is a science distinct from moral theology, which is concerned with the morality of human acts. Thus there seem to be several theological sciences, as, among the Scholastics, Vasquez thought subsequent to the time of such nominalists as Durandus and Gabriel Biel.

The answer of St. Thomas is that sacred doctrine is one science. This indeed is what its name, “sacred theology,” implies, for it is singular and not plural in form.

The conclusion is proved as follows: The unity of a faculty or habit is gauged by the unity of the formal aspect of its object; but sacred theology considers all things according as they are knowable by revelation; therefore sacred theology is one science reduced to its ultimate species.

The major is philosophically certain. Thus sight is specified by the colored object perceived by the light of the sensitive faculty, logic by being that is a creation of the mind, natural philosophy by mobile being perceived by the light of reason according to the first degree of abstraction, mathematics by quantitative being according to the second degree of abstraction, metaphysics by being as such perceived by the light of reason according to the third de- gree of abstraction, namely, as removed from all that is material, and ethics is specified by human acts.

The minor. But sacred theology considers everything as it is knowable by revelation. It thus includes all that is formally revealed and believed as of faith, and likewise all that is virtually revealed, which means all that can be deduced from revealed principles. These virtually revealed truths can be said to be, as stated in the body of this article, potentially revealed. They are known by the light not of formal but of virtual revelation. What is formally revealed is the formal motive of faith. But virtual revelation is the light or formal motive why we assent to theological conclusions.

Therefore everything that is considered in theology, namely, God, creatures, morality of human acts, come under the one formal aspect of the object, according as they are considered as included within the scope of virtual revelation, which is the objectum formale quo of sacred theology.**

1. This conclusion receives its confirmation from the reply to the first objection, which is as follows: “Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily; and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.”

This reply is concerned with the objectum formale quod?! of

37 By the objectumn formale quo, or the formal aspect under which or by means of which of any science, is meant in scholastic language, the light inherent in the first principles of such a science by which one is able to reach the conclusions pertaining strictly to such a science. It means the objective evidence of the conclusions borrowed from the first principles of such a science. In other words it is the objective evidence by which the conclusions of such a science are made known clearly to all. (Tr.)

38 A few words of explanation may again be of help to those not well versed in scholastic terminology. There is a distinction between the material and the formal object as such (objectum formale quod) of any science. By the material object are meant the realities or entities which constitute the subject matter of a science. The particular point of view from which the subject is discussed constitutes the formal object of that science. An example will help to make this clearer. Thus the extension or extended quantity of cosmic bodies constitutes the material object of geometry. The measure of this continuous extension constitutes its formal object (objectum formale quod); for it is the measure of the dimensions of these bodies which is particularly enunciated and considered in the theorems of geometry. Finally, the axiomatic principles of geometry are the source of light by which the theorems are made evident. These are called by the Scholastics the objectum formale quo or the ratio formalis sub qua of geometry. For these principles constitute formally or actually the object by which, or formally the reason by which, the theorems and conclusions of geometry are made evident. Yet it must be carefully noted that the objectum formale quo is what truly and adequately specifies a science, and not its objectum formale quod, for this latter may sometimes be the same in different sciences. Thus the measure of extended bodies sacred theology. This will be more explicitly determined in the seventh article in which the question will be taken up of the proper and formal subject of this science. But even from its nominal definition theology is evidently concerned principally with God and only secondarily with those things that proceed from God, namely, creatures, and the movement of the rational creature toward God. Thus the unity of the science is not impaired. And how this unity of sacred theology depends upon both formal objects, namely, quo and quod, will be more clearly seen from the explanation of the seventh article. For theology treats of God under the aspect of Deity, in so far as this comes within the scope of virtual revelation. Thus it is distinct from metaphysics, which treats of being as such, and of God as included in the notion of being, in so far as He is known by the light of natural reason.

It is, however, the common teaching in philosophy that the sciences derive their species and unity from the unity of both formal objects quo and quod. Thus the difference between physics, mathematics, and metaphysics consists in this, that physics treats of mobile being according to the first degree of abstraction; mathematics, of being according to the second degree of abstraction; metaphysics, of being as such according to the third degree of abstraction. Thus any science is specified by its object, not as this latter is an entity, but as it is formally an object, such being the means or precise reason why it can be known.

2. This conclusion is furthermore confirmed by the reply to the second objection, in which it is shown that although there are different philosophical sciences, yet theological science is specifically one. The reason is that the higher science considers its object in its more universal aspect, just as the common sense, which is the lowest of the internal senses and in which the five objects of the external senses are united, attains the visible, the audible, the tangible, and other objects according to the more common notion of the sensible.

So these things discussed by philosophical sciences, namely, by natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics, sacred theology can consider under one aspect, inasmuch as they are capable of being divinely revealed, or are virtually revealed, and according as all these are directed to God, as being the principle whom they manifest and the end to whom they tend.

We shall see in the sixth and seventh articles that God in His intimate life can be known only by divine revelation, and this ap-

(objectum formale quod) is what is formally considered both by geometry and hydrostatics, but the method of approach in each (objectum formale quo) is different. (Tr.)

plies equally to those things that participate in God’s intimate life, such as grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts. So we shall see that the formal object quod and the formal object quo in theology are interchangeable, as in the other sciences. The Deity and the divine light are interchangeable, just as being as such and the light of reason in the third degree of abstraction are, just as mathematical quantity and the light of reason in the second degree of abstraction are, just as the colored object and sense perception are.

First corollary. Positive theology and speculative theology are not two sciences, but they are, so to speak, the inductive and deductive parts of the same science. For positive theology brings together the revealed truths by the inductive method from Holy Scripture and tradition. After this, speculative theology takes up the analysis of the concepts of these truths, defending them against opponents by arguments drawn from the analogy of things known by the natural power of reason, and it deduces conclusions that are virtually contained in them.

Second corollary. Positive theology, since it is truly a part of theology, reaches its conclusions under the guidance of the light of revelation, and thus it is distinct from history; but it makes use of history, just as speculative theology makes use of metaphysics.

Third corollary. Specialization is a more difficult process in theology than the other sciences, and this because of its unity. The relationship between moral theology and grace, the infused virtues, the gifts, merit and demerit cannot be fully perceived without a profound knowledge of what dogmatic theology teaches about God's love for us, the divine motion, redemption and its application to us. Hence specialization in theology sometimes leads to a too material and superficial knowledge, which no longer penetrates to the very vitals of this corporate doctrine.

Sometimes specialists in this or that branch of theology have an insufficient knowledge of theology in general, and therefore of those things that are fundamental in theology, so that the branch in which they specialize, for instance, ascetic or mystic theology, is not properly understood by them. Doctors, too, must not be ignorant of the general principles of medical science, otherwise their knowledge of that in which they particularly specialize is deficient.

It is evident from St. Thomas’ reply to the second objection that sacred theology, even when discussing man and the morality of his acts, examines in them what is strictly divine, what can be known only by the light of virtual revelation, and what is related to God as such, that is, to His intimate life. In this we see the sublimity of theology, since it considers what is divine in all things by means of the divine light, namely, the various participations of God’s in- timate life—grace, the virtues, the gifts, their acts, the modalities of these acts, these being meritorious and their opposites demeritorious, in that contraries are governed by the same law.

Just as in the preaching about Christ no distinction is drawn between the dogmatic and the moral parts, but the kingdom of God is spoken of, or God’s life as it is in itself and as it is participated in by us, so sacred theology does not consist of two specifically distinct sciences, dogma and moral, but is only one scientific habit, which treats of God as knowable by revelation and of those things that refer to God. Therefore St. Thomas says at the end of the reply to the second objection: “So that in this way sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple yet extends to everything.” Hence dogmatic theology and moral theology are but branches of the same science, and this applies more so to soteriology, mariology, asceticism, and mysticism.

Fourth corollary. In the human sciences, metaphysics bears a certain relation to theology since it treats of being as such, that is, it treats of supreme generalities and higher principles. Thus it is one and yet it discusses all things from a higher point of view, according as they are reduced to being and to the first principles of being.

Sacred theology considers all things from a higher plane according as these are directed to God, and in this it is guided by the divine light. Hence the unity of this science is perfect, and it thus disposes one for the contemplation enjoyed by the blessed, which is a still more simplified process.

FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE 15 A PRACTICAL SCIENCE

State of the question. It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science, because its purpose is the regulation of action, namely, direction in the Christian life; and it explains both the Old Law and the New Law, which direct human acts. It is to be noted that according to Scotus, who wrote very extensively on this subject, theology is a practical science because its proper end is action, especially the love of God and one’s neighbor, since the whole law and the prophets depend upon these two precepts. Scotus inclines to this view because he thinks that the will is a higher faculty than the intellect, and that all knowledge, even the beatific vision, is ordained to love, as disposing one for a perfection of a higher order.

It must also be noted that we already detect this practical tendency in the writings of the Master of the Sentences, who divided his work, as to the acts of the will, into enjoyment and use, in the following manner:

1. The things to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

2. The things to be made use of for the attainment of eternal happiness are the world and created things.

3. The things to be enjoyed and made use of are the humanity of Christ, the angels, and the saints.

St. Bonaventure said * that sacred theology is an affective science, since it is intermediary between speculative theology and practical theology, because contemplation and the performance of good constitute the end in view. St. Albert the Great expresses a similar view at the beginning of his Summa. In his opinion sacred theology is an affective study since it is directed to God’s love. The nominalists along with Durandus admit that theology consists of two sciences, one of which is speculative and the other practical.

St. Thomas’ reply is that sacred doctrine, being one, is both eminently speculative and practical, but it is speculative rather than practical.

1. It is proved in the counterargument from the nominal definition of theology, because it is chiefly concerned with God, who does not come within the scope of things operable, but who is the Being to whom our intentions and actions must be directed.

2. The first part of the conclusion is proved from the intrinsic end of this science in the body of the article as follows: A science which considers things speculative and practical from the same formal point of view, is eminently speculative and practical; but sacred theology considers all things speculative and practical as virtually revealed and directed to God, the first truth and last end; therefore sacred theology is eminently speculative and practical.

The term eminently is taken in the sense of formal eminence and not merely of virtual eminence. This means that, just as the absolutely simple perfections are contained in God formally and eminently (which is more than virtually), just as the human soul is formally and eminently sensitive and vegetative, so also, as we shall state farther on, infused faith is eminently speculative and practical, since it is concerned with mysteries to be believed, the precepts, and the counsels.*° In various passages St. Thomas says

40 This distinction between formal and virtual eminence is of great importance. First of all, it must be observed that when we say a being contains some perfection eminently, this means that the being in question contains the perfection in a nobler way than it is contained in any being of a lower order. Thus sensation in man is nobler or more refined than in the irrational animals. But when a perfection is contained in a being formally and eminently, this means that the perfection denoted by the concept is contained actually in such a being, though in a nobler manner. Thus human wisdom is contained formally and that the same applies to the gifts of understanding and wisdom.‘

3. The second part of the conclusion is proved in the body of the article as follows: Sacred theology is more speculative than practical, because, as its name implies, it is more concerned with God than with human acts. God, however, is the object of speculation and contemplation, but He does not come within the scope of things operable, as in the case of ethics that is concerned with things capable of being done, and of the arts that are concerned with things capable of being made. Thus St. Thomas distinguishes better than St. Bonaventure does between theology, which is acquired by human effort, and infused contemplation. This latter is truly an affective and quasi-experimental knowledge that proceeds from the gift of wisdom.*?

But although theology, which is acquired by human effort, and the gift of wisdom are specifically distinct, yet they are most fittingly united, and this point is clearly exemplified in the great doctors of the Church, as in St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert, and others. In fact, the Church never declares any servant of God a doctor of the Church unless he has first been not only beatified but also canonized. This means that he must first have been of eminent sanctity, and hence that the gift of wisdom and acquired knowledge are each possessed in a high degree.

Concerning the doctrine of this article, it is important to note here that Scotus denies the possibility of one and the same science being both eminently speculative and practical. To this Cajetan 43 replies that the practical and the speculative are not essential differences of a science, as it is a science, but as it is finite. The divisions we find in things of the lower order, for instance, in the philosophical sciences, are found united in those of the higher order, as in the case of faith and the gifts of understanding and wisdom. Gonet, too, ably defends the doctrine of this article by considering the loftiness of both formal objects quod and quo of sacred theology. For the formal object quod of theology is not only something speculative, such as being inasmuch as being, nor is it something merely operable, such as human actions about which eminently in the natural wisdom of the angels. When a being possesses the active power that renders it capable of producing a perfection found in other beings, then this perfection is said to be contained in such a being virtually and eminently. Thus local motion .is contained virtually and eminently in the human soul, because through the will it commands the motion of hands or feet. (Tr.)

ethics is concerned, but its object is God considered under the aspect of the Deity, who is the first speculative truth and the last end to be attained and the first rule of our life

Likewise, the formal object quo or light of sacred theology is virtual revelation, but it is virtual revelation that has its foundation in both speculative and practical knowledge. Thus formal revelation is the formal motive of faith, which is both speculative or contemplative, and practical according as it is concerned with the belief of mysteries or the fulfillment of precepts. The formal objects quod and quo, however, are correlatives, in that the latter is the searchlight enabling one to know the former.

Objection. If theology were both speculative and practical, then many of its acts would be both speculative and practical, because of the formal aspect of this science. But this is false; for there are in theology merely speculative conclusions, such as the four relations in the divine Persons, and there are conclusions that are merely practical, such as a particular act to be avoided.

We reply to this by denying the major. Although it is true to say that the rational soul is eminently and formally both vegetative and sensitive, yet it does not follow that its every act must be both vegetative and sensitive. So also each and every act of any science does not extend to everything included in this science. It is not necessary that each and every act totally and adequately share in the formal aspect of a science. Although this latter is formally indivisible, nevertheless it is virtually multiple.

Hence some theologians, such as St. Thomas, excel in dogmatic theology, whereas others, such as St. Alphonsus Liguori, are conspicuous for their knowledge of moral theology. In like manner, although the gift of wisdom is formally and eminently both speculative and practical, some saints, such as St. John of the Cross, are prominent in contemplation; others, however, such as St. Vincent de Paul, distinguish themselves by the wisdom of their direction in works of mercy. In the two saints just mentioned we see the gift of wisdom operating in a high degree; but in the former it manifests itself more in contemplation, whereas in the latter it concentrates rather on those things that pertain to the active life. In the former it is like a searchlight, but in the latter it is like a glow in the heavens that illuminates all things from on high.

From this article as also from the preceding we see that the unity of sacred theology is of a higher order, since it is, as it were, a participation in the science of God and the blessed, a subordinate science, as it were, to this latter science or rather to this higher vision.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS NOBLER THAN THE OTHER SCIENCES

State of the question. Our contention so far is that sacred theology is a true science, and indeed one as such eminently speculative and practical. It is one and the same aspect in these three conclusions, namely, that sacred theology proceeds from principles that have been revealed by the higher science of God, a science that is not only most certain but also absolutely one and eminently speculative and practical. Our discussion now centers upon the nobility or excellence of sacred theology with reference to the other sciences, namely, as to the certitude and sublimity of the object. i

The difficulty about sacred theology is that it proceeds from principles that are not evident and that are doubted by some. Thus it seems to be inferior to the mathematical sciences. Moreover, theology draws upon the philosophical sciences. Therefore it seems to be inferior to them. St. Thomas accepted several principles from Aristotle.

St. Thomas replies to this, however, as follows: sacred theology transcends all other sciences both speculative and practical. He proves this:

1. By the argument from tradition, in which philosophy and the other human sciences are said to be handmaids of sacred doctrine. He also quotes the following text of Sacred Scripture in support of his doctrine: “Wisdom hath built herself a house .. . and hath sent her maids to invite to the tower, and to the walls of the city.” 4 The Supreme Pontiffs have often drawn attention to the dignity of sacred theology.*®

2. In the argumentative part of the article this twofold aspect of the conclusion is taken up in turn and proved theologically. Among the speculative sciences it is because of the certitude and dignity of the subject matter that one is nobler than the other. Now sacred theology excels the other speculative sciences in both respects. ‘Therefore it is nobler than the others.

The major is evident; for dignity is thus considered from both the objective and the subjective points of view. The minor is no less certain; for sacred theology derives its certitude not from the light of reason but from the light of the divine knowledge, from principles believed by divine faith. But faith in itself is more cer-

45 Cf. Syllabus of Pius IX, props. 8, 9, 11, 12, against semirationalism. Also especially Leo XIII in his encyclical Aeterni Patris.

tain than all the sciences on account of the authority of God revealing.** The object of theology has reference to those things which by reason of their loftiness transcend both human reason and the angelic intellect.

Likewise, sacred theology is nobler than ethics and all the practical sciences, because it ordains and directs to a higher end, namely, to the ultimate supernatural end, which is eternal life. Since this latter is essentially supernatural, it surpasses the future life about which the nobler minded among the ancient philosophers spoke.

The argumentative part of the article presents no difficulty about what is meant. The formal aspect is clearly set forth, and is the same as in the preceding articles, namely, that sacred theology proceeds under the guidance of the divine light, and treats of the loftiest object that is both the supreme truth and the ultimate end.

There remains but the difficulty presented in the first objection, namely, that sacred theology, since it argues from principles that are not evident to reason, seems to be less certain than metaphysics, mathematics, and physics.

In the reply to the first objection it is stated that sacred theology is more certain than the other sciences in itself, but not to us. It is more certain in itself on account of its formal motive being higher, for this is virtual divine revelation. It is, however, less certain to us on account of the weakness of our intelligence, “which confronted by the light of those things more intelligible in themselves is as dazzled as the owl is by the light of the sun.” 4” Yet, as Aristotle says, “the slightest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things.” 4 Why is this? It is for the reason that, since knowledge is specified by its object, its worth is estimated more from the object known than from the way in which it is known. Thus the argument of the fittingness about the possibility of the Trinity is of a higher order than the rigorous demonstration of any property of the triangle.

Concerning the distinction made in this reply to the first objection between what is more certain in itself and not to us, and between what is more certain to us and not in itself, we must recall what Aristotle says on several occasions in his Metaphysics, namely, that those things which are more intelligible in themselves, as God, the pure Act, His immutable eternity, are less intelligible to us because they are most remote from the senses; for our human knowledge originates from the senses. On the contrary, motion and time,

46 Summa theol., Ila Iae, q.4, a.8. 47 Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. II, chap. 1. 48 Cf, De animalibus, Bk. I, chap. 5.

which are to us more intelligible than immobile eternity, are less intelligible in themselves. Eternity is most lucid in itself, for it is the measure of the subsistent Intelligence or of the pure Act, who is pure intellection.

First doubt. Does the greater degree of objective certainty though not of subjective certainty enjoyed by sacred theology over the other sciences apply to this same theology as possessed by us as wayfarers? We answer in the affirmative to this with the Thomists.*®

Proof. It is repugnant for a formal cause to inform a subject and not give it its formal effect. Thus infused faith by the very fact that it is received in our intellect, notwithstanding the obscurity of the mysteries, imparts to our intellect a firmness or a greater certainty than that enjoyed by any natural science. St. Augustine says: “It would be easier for me to doubt that I am living than to doubt what I have heard (from God) to be true.” °° What indeed Christ says, “Heaven and earth shall pass away; but My word shall not pass away,” 5! is therefore most firmly to be held as true. Hence St. Paul says: “But though we, or an angel from heaven preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema.” 5 Hence, according to the teaching of St. Thomas,** infused faith, not only as it is in itself, and as if it were in the air, external to us, but as it is in us, is more certain than the first principles of reason, because its formal motive, namely, the authority of God revealing, surpasses in validity the evidence of reason, or the power of the light of reason. But sacred theology, since its motive is virtual revelation, though it is inferior to faith, shares in this certitude of faith which we truly possess.

Nevertheless faith and theology are less certain to us because an obscure object but partially dispels the doubt arising in our mind, but imperfectly corresponds to the connatural mode of knowing by our intellect.®* St. Thomas says: ‘‘Certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause (in itself); and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues (i.e. all natural knowledge); because it is founded on the divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject (for us), and thus the more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way faith is less certain” than the evidence of natural

49 Cf. Gonet, Clypeus theol. thomist., I, commentary on this article.

54 Consult the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and Gonet.

knowledge, because our intellect does not so connaturally and fully attain an obscure as an evident object. Obscure objects do not give us that pleasure and fruition which evident ones do. But St. ‘Thomas goes on to say: “Each thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject; hence faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e., for us.” * But theology, since the source from which it argues is infused faith, shares in the certitude of faith.

So “we have this treasure (of faith) in earthen vessels,” 5 but we have it. It is in us. This means that faith and also theology are more certain in themselves and in us than any natural knowledge whatever, although they are not so to us. Hence, if doubts suddenly arise on account of the obscurity of the object, these are merely subjective, resulting from the weakness of our intellect, but not from the formal motive of the habits of either faith or theology.

In this matter we must therefore take care to distinguish between the two expressions in us and to us. We have an example of this in the principle of finality. That every agent acts for an end is more certain in itself and in us than the objective existence of colors. Yet this existence of colors is to us (at least for many, for the majority of mankind) more certain than the principle of finality. All see colors by the sense of sight, but all do not perceive intellectually the absolute necessity and universality of the principle of finality. So, in like manner, faith in the Trinity is more certain in itself and in us than the existence of colors, but it is less certain to us. The reason is that the Trinity is the object most removed from the senses, from which our knowledge originates.

On the contrary, some cling most tenaciously to improbable opinions, for example, to political opinions. The formal] heretic persists obstinately in his error, which is not in itself anything certain but is something stubbornly inhering in this badly disposed subject. Some do not firmly assent to truths that in themselves are most certain, and others cling most tenaciously either to the poorest of opinions, or to errors. Thus it is quite clear that there is a distinction between what is certain in itself and what is certain for us.

Therefore sacred theology is nobler than all the other sciences. It is so objectively because of the dignity of the object, and subjectively because of the greater certitude accruing to it from the divine light.

Second doubt. How is it that sacred theology is nobler than the sciences from which it accepts anything? It accepts a number of

principles from metaphysics and therefore seems to be inferior to it; as optics, accepting something from geometry, is inferior to this latter, as being a subalternate science.

In the reply to the second objection it is stated that sacred theology does not accept its principles from other sciences, for these principles are revealed by God; but it accepts from them a certain means for the better manifestation of revealed truths, and thus it makes use of these sciences as being inferior to it and ancillary. It makes use of them, indeed, not because of any defect on its part but on that of our intellect, which is more easily led by means of natural things to acquire a certain understanding of supernatural truths.

This reply is profound and contains several points worthy of note. If sacred theology were to accept its principles from metaphysics, it would be subordinated to this latter, as optics is to geometry. But it accepts them only as the means for the greater manifestation of the revealed truths.

Thus sacred theology makes use of the natural sciences in accordance with the proper meaning of the word “use.” In the strict sense of the term, only the superior makes use of the inferior, that is, ordains the action of the inferior in co-operating with the superior’s action, which is ordained to a higher end. Thus the writer uses his pen, the painter his brush, the general of the army his soldiers, the finer arts the inferior, as the art of navigation avails itself of the constructive art of shipbuilding. In like manner sacred theology, as the superior science, makes use of metaphysics as the inferior and the handmaid. ‘Thus metaphysics, for instance, the metaphysics of Aristotle, serves a much higher end. The Aristotelian notion of predicamental relation, for instance, is for us instrumental in acquiring a certain knowledge of the Trinity. Aristotle could not foresee so great an honor and glory for his metaphysics that it would serve the uses of the higher science of God. Thus metaphysics is not despised but is honored, just as that citizen is honored who is at the king’s immediate disposal; for it is better to obey a king than to rule over a household, and this because of the high end in view for the attainment of which this collaboration is given.

Hence, as John of St. Thomas correctly observes, when sacred theology makes use of natural premises, a metaphysical truth, for example, it makes use of this as a means. But a means, such as a pen or brush, acts in virtue of the power transmitted to it by another, and is at the same time applied to its act and elevated by the motion of the principal agent, so as to produce an effect that transcends its own power. Thus by means of the motion imparted to the pen by the writer, it not only deposits the ink on the paper, but it writes something intelligible; and the brush not only puts the colors on the canvas, but arranges them most beautifully and artistically. In like manner, according to the navigator’s instructions, the shipwright constructs a vessel that is seaworthy. So also sacred theology uses the natural premise taken, for instance, from metaphysics. It first approves of the premise for this purpose under the guidance of the divine light of revelation, at least negatively, according as this natural premise is not in opposition to what has been revealed. Then it makes use of this premise not only by a motion that applies the same to act but also by a motion that is instrumental in the attainment of its higher end. This end is a certain understanding of the supernatural mysteries either in themselves (if it is a case of an explicative process of reasoning), or as regards their consequences, corollaries (if it is a case of an illative process of reasoning). Therefore the theological conclusion thus obtained, although it has less certainty than a proposition of the faith, has more certainty than a natural premise as such, because it is deduced from this premise which has been elevated and clarified by a higher light. Thus also in this case, the instrument produces an effect that transcends its own power and it operates by way of disposing for the effect of the principal agent.

It must be noted that great doctors, such as St. Augustine, produced even with a most imperfect instrument, for instance, with Neoplatonic philosophy, a wonderful theological work. It was in this way that St. Augustine wrote his books on the Trinity. Thus great painters sometimes paint a beautiful picture with a most imperfect brush. And besides, in these great doctors, faith, illuminated by the gifts of understanding and wisdom, makes up for the deficiency of the instrument, or of philosophy.**

The philosophy, however, to which St. Thomas had recourse was more exact because Aristotle enunciated with great precision the philosophical notions and metaphysical principles, as Euclid did the elements of geometry. Thus St. Thomas excels in both kinds of wisdom, namely, acquired wisdom which is the result of the perfect functigning of reason, and infused wisdom which proceeds according to a connaturalness of judgment with things divine under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost.**

In other words, a natural premise is in some way elevated so as to manifest the supernatural order, and it receives a somewhat greater certitude than it would have in its own right; for it is judged by faith and theology, corrected (if it needs to be) and approved by them. Thus St. Thomas in his treatise on the Trinity

57 Cf. J. Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, Part II, chap. 7. 58 Summa theol., Ila Iae, q.45, a.1 f.

approves of and in some measure corrects the Aristotelian distinction between principle and cause, by showing that in the divine Persons the Father is the principle of the Son but not the cause. We have some evidence of this from experience. We are conscious of assenting with greater certainty to natural truths discovered by us, when we see that they have the approval of the leading doctors, especially when we see that they have divine confirmation and approval.

Even a natural premise which in itself would be only probable would not become certain by reason of its connection with a principle that is of faith, nor would it lead to a theologically certain conclusion; it would only be probable. But if it is certain in itself, it becomes more certain in proportion as it is clarified by a higher light. Thus the philosopher who already has metaphysical certainty of God’s existence before he receives infused faith, is after its reception more certain of this truth, since infused faith confirms from on high this metaphysical certitude. These statements are true even for the strictly illative process of reasoning, and more so for the explicative process.

From what has been said it is evident that sacred theology is a science subordinated not to metaphysics but solely to the science possessed by God, and by the blessed; for, as regards its own intrinsic principles, it depends solely upon divine revelation. But theology from its exalted position makes use of natural principles as strangers to it, and it makes use of them not because of any deficiency in itself, but because of the deficiency of our intellect, which is incapable of knowing the truths that are implicitly and virtually contained in the revealed principles solely by the light of faith, Now the angelic intellect, since it is not discursive, does not thus stand in need of this additional natural knowledge so that it may have a certain understanding of supernatural mysteries. For the angel immediately sees the conclusion contained in the principles, the properties in the essence, and thus it immediately knows all the properties of man from the very concept of the human nature. Hence the angel, without any discursive process, immediately understands in this revealed truth, “The Word was made flesh,” 5 what we deduce only by a slow process of reasoning.

It follows from this that the certitude of a strictly theological conclusion is less than the certitude of infused faith, but it is greater than the certitude of the natural sciences, even of metaphysics. The certitude of the theological conclusion improperly so called, of the conclusion that is obtained by the explicative process of reasoning, is less than the certitude of faith; but it acquires the certitude of faith, if by the special assistance of the Holy Spirit it is defined by the Church. Then it must be firmly accepted not because it has been proved by an explicative process of reasoning, but because “it hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost.” %

Objection. The conclusion in a syllogism follows from the weaker premise. But the theological conclusion often results from a premise that is only naturally certain. Therefore then the conclusion is only naturally certain, for it follows from the weaker premise.

We reply with Gonet by distinguishing the major. If the premises equally influence the conclusion, then I concede the major; if one is the instrument of the other under the guidance of a higher light, then I deny it. I contradistinguish the minor: that the theological conclusion often results from a natural premise which is the instrument of another premise that is of, faith, under the guidance of a higher light, this I concede; that this natural premise equally influences the conclusion, this I deny. And I deny the consequent and the consequence. Nevertheless, we may still say that the aforesaid logical axiom is in some manner verified since the theological conclusion is not so certain as the premise that is of faith. For to a theological conclusion strictly so called we cannot firmly assent solely on the authority of God revealing, but we assent to it partly on the evidence of reason; although faith makes use of reason in the deduction of this new truth that is only virtually contained in revelation. Such is the case if the natural premise is the major rather than the minor.

Third doubt. Is theology an essentially supernatural habit? It is the common teaching of the Thomists that sacred theology is essentially or intrinsically a natural habit; infused faith, this being however, its extrinsic root, is essentially supernatural. Contenson disagreed with them on this point.

The reason is that theology is a habit acquired by human effort, that is, by natural acts of understanding which are acquired and not infused.*t Moreover, the formal object quod of theology, which is God, specifies it only in that it underlies the formal object quo. And this formal object quo, or light, is not formal but virtual revelation, which means that it is the light of reason deducing from revelation the conclusions virtually contained in this latter. The object of theology is God not formally revealed but virtually revealed. Nevertheless the extrinsic root of theology is infused faith, and this is essentially supernatural as regards both formal objects quod and quo; so that, as we said, with the removal of faith by formal heresy, we no longer have theology but merely its corpse,

because there is wanting that formal connection between the ideas effected by the principles of faith.

Hence there are some theologians, like St. Bernard, who excel in faith, this being of a higher order and intense, and these are holier. Others, like Abélard, excel in dialectic, or in reason or the instrument of faith. There are some saints who have no knowledge of theology but they have great faith, which means that their lives are spent in a most profound contemplation of the mysteries of Christ; the faith of these is most intense and deep. On the other hand, there are many theologians whose faith is not so intense and profound, but they have a more extensive knowledge of what has been defined by the Church and of very many theological conclusions. The intensive increase of faith, however, is of more importance than its extensive increase.

SIXTH ARTICLE WHETHER SACRED THEOLOGY IS THE SAME AS WISDOM

State of the question. We have seen that sacred theology is a science subordinated to the science possessed by God, that it is eminently speculative and practical. The question is whether it is worthy of the name of wisdom, as is the case with metaphysics or first philosophy among the sciences of the natural order.

The difficulty is that: (1) sacred theology borrows its principles from a higher science, and therefore is subordinate to this science, whereas “it is for the wise man to direct,” ® and not to be directed; (2) sacred theology does not prove or defend from on high the principles of the other sciences, as metaphysics, which treats of being, does by defending the principles invoked by the other sciences; (3) sacred theology does not seem to be supernatural wisdom, because this latter is infused, and is not acquired by human effort.

The reply, however, to this is that sacred theology is wisdom above all other human wisdom. Sacred doctrine is often called wisdom in Holy Scripture.** St. Paul, comparing God’s wisdom with the wisdom of this world, says: “Howbeit we speak wisdom among the perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, neither of the princes of this world that come to naught. But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden. . . . For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.” * St. Paul speaks in

82 Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. I.

68 Cf. Deut. 6:6, quoted by St. Thomas in this article; and especially Wis., chaps. 5-7.

this text, indeed, of revealed sacred doctrine, of faith illuminated by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. But sacred theology, which is acquired by human effort, proceeds from this faith, and thus it participates in the perfection of wisdom.

In the body of the article St. Thomas has recourse to the philosophical notion of wisdom as determined by Aristotle,** who shows that metaphysics is not only a science, but wisdom, or the highest of sciences, because it is the knowledge of things acquired not only through their causes, but through the highest of causes. St. Thomas retains this notion of wisdom in the present article and in other parts of the Swmma.**

The doctrine of the article is briefly expressed as follows: Wisdom is the knowledge of things through their highest cause. But sacred theology essentially treats of God, the highest cause, also so far as He is known to Himself alone and to others by revelation. Therefore sacred theology is first of all wisdom, and more so than metaphysics.

The major is the very definition of wisdom established by Aristotle.*7 In this article St. Thomas briefly shows the validity of this real definition, beginning with the nominal. For, according to the nominal definition, wisdom is something of eminence in the cognitive order; thus we have the common saying that it is for the wise man to direct and judge. But a scientific judgment about a thing is obtained through its causes, inquiring what the thing is in itself, what are its efficient and final causes. The highest judgment is therefore obtained through the highest of causes. Thus wisdom surpasses the sciences, since science pure and simple is knowledge through proximate causes, but wisdom is knowledge through the highest of causes. Thus metaphysics treats of being as such through its highest causes, and it therefore does not reach perfection unless it acquires a definite idea of creation or of the production of the totality of finite being from nothing, and of the end of creation, which is the manifestation of God’s goodness. Aristotle did not acquire this definite idea that can be known by the natural power of reason, and which, moreover, is equivalently expressed in the first words of the Bible: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” 6°

The nominal definition of sacred theology and the preceding remarks establish the evidence of the minor. For theology is the knowledge of God derived from revelation. Hence “it essentially

66 Cf. Summa theol., Ia, q.14, a.1 ad 2um; Ia Ilae, q.57, a.2 ad 1um. 67 Metaph., Bk. I, chaps, 1 f.

treats of God viewed as the highest cause,” 6 and not only as He is the cause of the being as such of created things, but as He is the cause of grace and glory, that is, as He is the Author of salvation. The reason is that it treats of God not only so far as He can be known naturally from creatures, but also so far as He is known to Himself alone and made known to others through revelation.

In other words, sacred theology not only treats of God as He is the first Being, the self-subsisting Being, and the cause of beings as such, but it treats of God in His intimate life or under the aspect of the Deity. This is what St. Paul said: “But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God,” *° or God’s intimate life. That is, the object expressed in this utterance is God under the aspect of the Deity, because the Deity contains formally and eminently all absolutely simple perfections such as being, unity, truth, goodness .. . , in which creatures are naturally capable of participation; whereas the Deity is not capable of participation except by grace, which makes us “partakers of the divine nature.” 7! Thus the Deity in a certain manner transcends being and the one, since it contains all these perfections formally and eminently in its higher eminence. It contains them more so than whiteness contains the seven colors of the rainbow, which are included in it not formally and eminently but only virtually and eminently.7?

Hence sacred theology is especially wisdom because it treats essentially of God, the highest cause, in His intimate life. Nevertheless theology, especially that of the wayfarer, does not attain to a quiddative knowledge of God as He is in Himself; it does not see the Deity, but reaches this in the midst of faith, especially when it discusses the mystery of the Trinity. Thus sacred theology can from on high judge of all created things and of human life, namely, through the highest cause of being and of grace, and through the ultimate end not only natural but also supernatural.

In the reply to the first objection it is stated that sacred theology derives its principles not from any human knowledge but from the divine science, and thus it remains wisdom. Its principles are especially the fourteen articles of faith from which also the other articles of faith can be deduced.

First doubt. How does sacred theology judge of other sciences?

In his reply to the second objection St. Thomas Says that:

1. “Theology is not concerned with proving the principles of

other sciences,” because its proper sphere of action extends to what has been supernaturally revealed, and the principles of the natural sciences are either directly known or are proved in a subalternating science, as geometry proves the principles of optics. In like manner metaphysics defends the first principles of reason.

2. Sacred theology judges, however, of the other sciences, and this in two ways. It judges negatively, because “whatever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false.’ Thus many hypotheses that have not been scientifically proved, from the very fact that they are contrary to divine revelation are repudiated by theology. But it positively approves of a certain proposition of metaphysics or of natural philosophy or of ethics, according as it is otherwise revealed, or at least is in conformity with revelation. Thus it approves of propositions about the immortality of the soul or the foundation of moral obligation or the distinction between virtuous, pleasant, and useful good.

Corollary. Thus the legitimate and relative autonomy of the natural sciences is preserved intact according as they proceed from their own naturally known principles and make use of their own method, as the Vatican Council states.” But they cannot affirm as a scientific certainty what is contrary to revealed truth, because truth does not contradict itself.74 Hencé the rationalist assertion of the absolute autonomy of reason was condemned by the Vatican Council in the following words: “If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be enjoined upon it by God, let him be anathema.” *

Thus there are several declarations of the Church about the benefits of revelation. By means of it reason is freed from error, enlightened and confirmed in truth.** It upholds the certainty and purity of natural knowledge; %7 it is the infallible guide of philosophy,?® and its indispensable norm; *® not only the philosopher but even philosophy is subject to its teaching authority. In the Syllabus of Pius IX the following proposition is condemned against moderate rationalism: “As the philosopher is one thing, and philosophy another, so it is the right and duty of the philosopher to subject himself to the authority which he shall have proved to be true; but philosophy neither can nor ought to submit to any

such authority.” §' This is practically the same assertion as that condemned as heretical by the Vatican Council, which reads: “Human reason is so independent that faith cannot be enjoined upon it by God.” 8&2 This latter assertion is tantamount to saying that the formal motive of a philosophical admission does not come within the scope of the formal motive of infused faith, namely, the authority of God revealing, and thus in the final analysis the certitude of infused faith would rest not only materially and extrinsically but even formally and intrinsically upon the natural evidence of the signs of revelation. Thus human reason would remain the supreme judge of truth and falsehood. This was the semi-rationalist error of Gunther, Hermes, and the Modernists.

Second doubt. How does theological wisdom differ from the gift of wisdom? St. Thomas answers this question in his reply to the third objection of this article, and more explicitly when he discusses the gift of wisdom.®* Theological wisdom, which is acquired by human effort guided by the light of divine revelation, judges according to the perfect use of reason, namely, by analyzing the concepts of the principles of faith or of the enunciation of the mysteries, and by deducing the conclusions contained in these principles. Contrary to this, the infused gift of wisdom, under the special inspiration of the Holy Ghost, transcending the discursive method, judges of divine things by way of an inclination or connaturalness for them, and it has its foundation in charity. This connaturalness arising from charity, is a loving sympathy, and by means of this quality the revealed mysteries manifest themselves not only as true, as revealed by God, but as most good since they admirably correspond to our higher aspirations.

So also in the natural order, there are two ways of judging, for instance, in questions of morality. It is accomplished either by way of scientific knowledge, as he judges who is well versed in moral science even though he is not virtuous; or it is accomplished by way of an inclination, as he who is virtuous, who is chaste, for instance, even though he has no knowledge of moral science, judges well of those things that pertain to chastity, because these are in conformity with his virtuous inclination. According to each one’s inclination or affection, so does he see the fitness of the end, said Aristotle. Wherefore the prudent judgment is said to be practically true by reason of its conformity with a right appetite, that is, with an upright intention, even though it is speculatively false because of an

81 Ibid., no. 1710. 82 Ibid., no. 1810. 88 Cf. Summa theol., Ila Mae, q.45, a.2.

involuntary error.^t Thus prudence presupposes all the moral virtues and without it they cannot be virtues. In like manner, knowledge that is the fruit of the gift of wisdom, presupposes charity, whereas acquired theology remains in a theologian who is in a state of mortal sin.

The reply to the third objection of this article must be carefully read and compared with what St. Thomas has to say later on about this subject. Some who read these passages superficially, see in the knowledge resulting from the gift of wisdom but a loving connaturalness for divine things (and this is already present in the act of living faith that is informed by charity, even without the special inspiration of the Holy Ghost). What others perceive is this special inspiration, but they do not sufficiently advert to the fact that the Holy Spirit by means of this special inspiration makes use of the aforesaid loving connaturalness to manifest how excellent are the mysteries of faith, in that they admirably satisfy our nobler aspirations: “O taste and see that the Lord is sweet.” 8 If this special inspiration of the Holy Ghost is not considered, one fails to understand why Hierotheus is said “to be patient of divine things.”

Great theologians excel in both kinds of wisdom. Thus knowledge that is not discursive and that is the result of the gift of wisdom, illustrates and confirms from on high the discursive knowledge of acquired theology. This is clearly seen in the writings of St. Augustine and not infrequently this reinforcement from on high in some way makes up for the imperfection that is of philosophical formation.

Another corollary. Apologetics is not a science specifically distinct from sacred theology, but it is theology functioning according to the principles of reason, and pertains to it, inasmuch as theology is wisdom and inasmuch as it defends the principles of faith and adheres to the same against those denying them. This has been more fully explained in another of our works.§? It will be made clearer in the eighth article, in which it is said that theology defends its principles against those who deny them, and it does not leave this defense to another science, because it is wisdom or the highest of the acquired sciences. But in this rational or apologetic function of theology, it makes use of history and philosophy.

SEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE

State of the question. At first sight is seems that this article comes rather late in the discussion, because a science is specified by its proper object or subject, and from this its definition is derived, its properties are deduced, and its relations are established to the other sciences cither inferior or superior.

Nevertheless, if the difficulties propounded at the beginning of this article are carefully considered, we see that it is in the right place here as being a recapitulation of the preceding articles and the goal of the hunt or search for the real scientific definition of sacred theology. The nominal definition of sacred theology, that it is the science of God derived from revelation, sufficed for the preceding articles.

It is now formally and explicitly determined why the subject of sacred theology is not, as some said, either Christ the mediator, or the sacraments, or the public worship due to God, or supernatural being in general, but God Himself in His intimate life.

The difficulty, however, is that every science knows what its subject is by means of the definition of the same, and from this it deduces the properties. Thus mathematics knows what is quantity, either continuous or discrete, namely, magnitude and number. Likewise natural philosophy knows what is mobile being, and metaphysics what is being as such. Contrary to this, sacred theology does not know properly or quiddatively what God is. As Damascene says: “It is impossible to say what God is.” 88 To say what the Deity is we should have to see it; the beatific vision, however, is not given to one in this life. Moreover, sacred theology treats not only of God, but also of creatures and of human acts.

The reply, however, is that God is the subject of sacred theology.

1. This is already evident from the nominal definition of theology, since the term implies a discussion about God.

2. The direct proof is as follows: The object of a faculty or the subject of a science is that under the aspect of which all things are referred to the faculty or the science; but all things are considered in sacred theology with reference to God under the aspect of God; therefore God under the aspect of God is the subject of this science.

The major distinguishes to some extent between object and subject. The object is that which is presented to the faculty, and is that which the faculty directly and immediately attains, and hence

that under the aspect of which it attains all other things. Thus the object of sight is the colored object seen by sense perception; the object of the intellect is being, but the proper object of the human intellect is intelligible being of sensible things. With reference to science, which demonstrates conclusions about some subject (properties of man, for instance, about man), its object is the demonstrated conclusion or conclusions, but its subject is that which is the subject of the conclusions, or that about which the properties are demonstrated. Object and subject are commonly accepted for the same thing. But, strictly speaking, the subject of metaphysics is being as such, because metaphysics demonstrates the properties of being. The subject of natural philosophy is mobile being, and the subject of psychology is the soul. Hence, if metaphysics treats of God in natural theology, it does not discuss Him as the proper subject but as He is the cause of the being as such of various things.

Likewise the subject of medicine is the human body viewed under the aspect of health; and medicine considers all other things as remedies—salts, for instance, medicinal herbs, and such like—and so far as these have reference to the health of the human body. So also psychology considers the various manifestations of the life of the soul, languages, for instance, so far as these refer to the soul. It does not treat of these as the linguist does. Hence, although the object of a faculty may be something common to many sciences, the subject of a science may be something that is restricted.

The minor is: In sacred theology all things are considered with reference to God under the aspect of God. By logical induction this is evident; for it treats either of God Himself, or of those things that refer to Him as the beginning and end of all things Thus sacred theology in the treatises on God as one, as triune, as creator, as Word made flesh, treats of God as the proper subjéct, not as metaphysics does, which treats of God as He is the cause of the being as such of various things. Moreover, sacred theology treats of God under the aspect of God or of the Deity, and not only as He is the first Being, which metaphysics does. This means that it treats of God in His intimate life, and it is concerned with the “deep things of God.” 8° Therefore all the conclusions of sacred theology are derived from a certainty of knowledge of the Deity transmitted through revelation and directed to a greater knowledge of this Deity, just as all the conclusions of metaphysics presuppose the notion of being and are directed to a more profound knowledge of being, and just as all the conclusions of psychology tend to a greater knowledge of the soul.®°

As long as sacred theology treats of creatures it considers them as they refer to God under the aspect of the Deity, just as medicine considers mineral remedies or medicinal herbs so far as they refer to man’s health. This means that sacred theology treats of creatures, in that they are vestiges or images of God, and in that the nobler creatures have been admitted to participate in God’s intimate life by grace, and are ordained to see God and love Him above all things.” Thus God under the aspect of God is the proper subject of theology; or He is the formal object quod of theology made known by the light of virtual revelation. St. Thomas had said in the preceding article that it is “God so far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others.”

This is confirmed by the following argument: A science and its principles have the same subject, since the whole science is virtually contained in its principles; but God under the aspect of the Deity is the subject of the principles of this science, which are the articles of faith; therefore God is the subject of this science.

St. Thomas enumerates the articles of faith.** Four of them concern the one and triune God; three refer to Him as He is the cause of creatures, as also of grace and glory; the rest are about the Word made flesh. All the other truths of faith are referred to these articles of faith. As theology is a science deriving its principles from faith, its object is the same as that of faith, though this object is perceived not by the light of formal but of virtual revelation.

We have as yet to consider the difficulty posited at the beginning of this article, which is to the effect that in this life we cannot know what God is or know His essence. The Deity as such or the divine essence is known through the beatific vision. How can it be said, therefore, that sacred theology is the science that treats of God under the aspect of the Deity?

St. Thomas replies to the first objection by saying that, “although we cannot know what constitutes the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition.” Thus we say that sacred theology treats of God as the Author of grace, and this means a formal participation in the Deity. We also know the infinite fecundity within the Deity, in that it is manifested to us through the revealed mystery of the Trinity. Thus we have analogical knowledge of the divine Paternity, the divine Filiation, and the divine Spiration.

As Cajetan remarks, God can be considered: (1) under the

91 See reply to the second objection of this article. 92 Summa theol., Ila Lae, q.1, a.8. 93 See his commentary on this article, no. 1.

the scope of virtual revelation. But if we distinguish between its object and subject, then the conclusions about God or those things that are directed to Him constitute its object.

First corollary. Even when sacred theology treats of creatures, of the morality of human acts, God is always its subject, that is, God the Creator or God the ultimate end. On the other hand, the subject of ethics is human action. Thus ethics is specifically distinct from moral theology, just as acquired prudence, described by Aristotle’ as “the right ordering of things to be done,” differs from infused prudence spoken of in the Gospels.*

Second corollary. Among the various theological systems, that one approaches closer to the perfection of a theological science which has as its germinating idea and, as it were, as its golden key, the exalted notion of God the Author of grace and salvation, rather than the notion of the created will. The reason is that in theology the idea of God is, as it were, the sun illuminating all things, just as in metaphysics this role belongs to the idea of being as such.

Third corollary. From the fact that God is the proper object of theology, this science begins by treating of God as He is in Himself, then of the procession of creatures from God, and finally of the ordaining of created things to God as to their end. Such is the method employed in the Theological Summa.” It is the synthetic method of descent from God and a return to Him.

Contrary to this, metaphysics is the science of being as such, of being as previously known by us in sensible things, and it begins to treat of the knowableness of extramental being,®* of being as divided into substance and accident, potency and act, and it discusses God only at the end of the treatise.” Moreover, metaphysics, as a general rule, comes after natural philosophy, since the being of sensible things is what is first known by our intellect. The method in philosophy is analytico-synthetic; it ascends to God, and afterward judges of creatures from its lofty standpoint of reference to the first cause.

This difference must be carefully noted. St. Thomas says: “In the doctrine of philosophy . . . the discussion is first about creatures and finally about God; in the doctrine of faith, which discusses creatures only as they refer to God, God is its first consideration, and then creatures; thus it is more perfect, as being more like God's knowledge.” 1° Wherefore the philosophical treatise on the

97 See also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 3, 9; Bk. II, chaps. 4, 46. 98 Metaph., Bk. IV.

soul begins by discussing the vegetative and sensitive faculties of the soul and ends by discussing the intellective faculties, the spirituality and immortality of which it finally proves; whereas from the very start the treatise on man,’ ‘considering the soul as coming from God, treats almost immediately of its incorruptibility and its difference from the angelic nature.

EIGHTH ARTICLE WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A MATTER OF ARGUMENT

State of the question. The meaning of the title is: Have those things which sacred doctrine teaches the force of conviction? The difficulty is that what is transmitted to us in theology is believed rather than proved. In fact, it seems that proof would lessen the merit of faith. The reply, however, is that sacred theology is a matter of argument, and this for three reasons:

1. That it may prove, not its principles, but the conclusions to be deduced from them.

2. That it may defend its principles from the revealed truths admitted by the opponent.

3. That it may defend its principles by solving the objections of opponents, if they concede nothing at all of divine revelation.

As regards the proof of conclusions, sacred theology is in this respect like all the sciences. As for the defense of its principles, in this it does not differ from metaphysics which, since it is wisdom, defends its own principles against those denying them, solving their objections at any rate, and proving them to be false or at least not convincing.

Thus Aristotle 1°? defends the real validity of the first principle of reason, that is, of the principle of contradiction, and also the validity of reason itself. In this process metaphysics, to be sure, makes use of logic, but it does not leave the defense of its principles to logic, for these are concerned not only with logical being but also with real being. It is the privilege of wisdom as such to defend its principles by the analysis of their concepts and the solution of objections, before it proceeds to the deduction of conclusions. So also sacred theology, inasmuch as it is wisdom, before deducing conclusions analyzes the principles of faith, and defends these principles against those who deny them and, by positive and speculative arguments drawn from revelation, solves the objections. In doing so, sacred theology makes use of history and philosophy.

As St. Thomas says: “It refutes those things that are said against the faith by showing that they are false or of no consequence,” 1° that is, not convincing. Cajetan admirably says: “There is a difference between the solution of an objection and the proof of a thesis. For a proof is drawn from the evidence of argument... ; a solution, however, does not require evidence, but simply that the intellect be not compelled. . . . A solution is also obtained from what does not seem to be false, though it may not be known to be true,” 104

We have an example of this in the case of the Trinity. If it is objected that one and the same nature does not belong numerically to several persons, the theologian replies: that this can be said of a finite nature, I concede; of an, infinite nature, that I deny. It is not that the theologian positively knows that the infinite nature pertains to several persons; this he believes and consequently maintains that there is no means of proving the impossibility of this in an infinite nature. Thus the possibility of essentially supernatural mysteries is neither proved nor disproved. But we are reasonably persuaded of the same; it is defended against those denying and it is firmly believed. St. Thomas says: “Therefore what is of faith can be proved by authority alone to those who accept the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.” 1°° John of St. Thomas says: “It is not evident to reason that a proposition contradictory to the faith is in itself false, but simply that the arguments by which it is proved are not cogent.” 106

Essentially supernatural mysteries are, of course, likewise supernatural as to their knowableness, for being and truth are one and the same. Therefore not only the existence of mysteries but even their intrinsic possibility is neither proved nor disproved, but we are reasonably persuaded of the same (by an argument of congruence), and it is firmly believed. If, indeed, it were positively proved, for instance, that the Trinity is really possible, then the fact of its existence would be proved because, in necessary things, what is really possible demands of necessity the existence of the same. And if it were positively proved that the beatific vision or eternal life is really possible, this mystery would transcend our naturally acquired knowledge, not because of its essentially supernatural nature but

105 Summa theol., Ia, q.32, a.1; also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 8. Such is the common teaching of the theologians. Thus Billuart (De Deo trino, diss. prooem, a.4) says: “The possibility of the Trinity is not proved by a positive and evident argument, but by a negative and probable proof.”

because of its contingency, in that it is a contingent future of the natural order which depends upon God’s most free good pleasure, just as the last day of this material world does.

From the privilege sacred theology enjoys as wisdom, it follows, as we already remarked, that apologetics is not a specifically distinct science from sacred theology, but is the same science functioning rationally for the defense of the credibility of the mysteries of faith. Just as the critical part of metaphysics defends the real validity of the first principles of reason and of intellectual evidence, and in this it makes use of logic, so sacred theology defends the credibility of the mysteries of faith, and in this it makes use of history and philosophy, presenting from its lofty standpoint, under the direction of faith, arguments drawn from reason as to the demonstrative force, for instance, of miracles and other signs, so that unbelievers may know from these signs that revelation is a fact and may so present unto God “a reasonable service.” 107

What is the mode of argumentation that is pre-eminently proper to sacred theology?

In the reply to the second objection it is stated that the argumentation is from divine authority, for sacred theology proceeds under the guidance of the light of revelation or of the authority of God revealing.

In this reply to the second objection we have the germ, as it were, of the treatise on the theological sources. Melchior Cano, O.P., was the first in this field. The theological sources are divided as follows:

Sacred Scripture Divine tradition

Apodictic Authority of the hs ordinary magisterium and Catholic Church of ecumenical councils

Authority of the Roman Pontiff

Proper

Authority of holy Fathers Probable i i Authority of scholastic theologians

The natural power of reason Apodictic and history as we can rely on its certainty

Theological sources

Extrinsic

Probable {The authority of philosophers

Cajetan points out ?* that sacred theology makes use of natural or metaphysical reasons, as extrinsic or probable arguments, if these reasons are absolutely considered; it makes use of them as proper and sometimes necessary arguments, if these are considered as ministering to theology, that is, as helping in the deduction of the theological conclusion. But if we use these reasons as persuasive arguments in favor of the possibility of mysteries, then they furnish us with only a probable argument or with one of fitness that may be, however, most profound and always to be examined, but that is not apodictic.

Melchior Cano 1% in treating of history as an extrinsic theological source, holds that, if all the approved and weighty historians concur in admitting the same historical fact, then we have an argument of certainty on their authority.

Hence sacred theology first of all appeals to the argument from authority, and then has recourse to reason for the explanation, defense, right ordering of the authorities, and for the deduction of the conclusions from them.

The method of procedure in sacred theology is explained in the treatise on the theological sources, especially as regards the positive part. It lays down rules for discerning the literal sense of Sacred Scripture, for the discernment of divine tradition, as also for the correct interpretation of the definitions of the solemn utterances of the Church and for the validity of the other decisions. It also decides the doctrinal authority of the Fathers and theologians. It is likewise concerned with the appeal to reason and history.

But as to the speculative part of theology, the fundamentals of the analogical method are explained by St. Thomas when he discusses the divine names; *!° for our knowledge of God and of the supernatural gifts is but analogical, derived by means of a comparison with things in nature.

NINTH ARTICLE WHETHER HOLY SCRIPTURE SHOULD USE METAPHORS

State of the question. The reason for this inquiry is that the theologian must carefully distinguish in Sacred Scripture between the literal sense according to the proper signification of the words, and the metaphorical sense, according to some similitude, as when it is said that “our God is a consuming fire.” 1 Hence the question

109 De locis theologicis, XI, 4.

is: Why does Sacred Scripture sometimes have recourse to metaphorical language?

The difficulty is: (1) that metaphor fittingly pertains to poetry, not to the proposition of some truth; and thus it is not allowed in the sciences; ©? (2) that by metaphors the truth is obscured; (3) that metaphors taken from corporeal creatures cannot at all represent the purely spiritual life of God.

The answer, however, is: It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths metaphorically by means of comparisons with material things. This is proved in two ways: (1) because it is natural for man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, and God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature; (2) because many are unable of themselves to grasp intellectual things, and Sacred Scripture is proposed to all. Hence Christ our Lord spoke to the multitude in parables.

Does Sacred Scripture make use of metaphors in the way poetry does? In the reply to the first objection it is stated that poetry makes use of metaphors on account of the pleasure derived from representation, but Sacred Scripture on account of its usefulness. Farther on,1!8 St. Thomas states in substance that poetry makes use of metaphors because of the lack of appeal on the part of the object extolled, but theology because of the preponderance of the divine reality, which cannot be expressed except by way of analogy.

God, however, is analogically made known to us in two ways, either by proper analogy, as when it is said that God is just; or by metaphorical analogy, as when it is said that God is angry."

In the reply to the second objection it is pointed out that “those things which are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly.” Moreover, “the hiding of truth in figures is useful as a defense against the ridicule of the impious.”

Commenting on the reply to the third objection, regarding metaphors taken from corporeal things, as when it is said that God is a consuming fire, we say that these are more fitting, in this sense that they do not permit us to rest the merits of our case in the similitudes, because God is not a material fire and because this is said only by way of similitude. On the other hand, when we speak of the divine perfections in the strict sense, it may be that some judge of these perfections as being formally and actually distinct in God as they are in our mind. This would be to detract from God’s absolute simplicity and loftiness of life.

WHETHER IN HOLY SCRIPTURE A WORD MAY HAVE SEVERAL SENSES

State of the question. The special purpose of this article is to distinguish between the literal sense and the spiritual sense in Holy Scripture. The difficulty in admitting several senses is: (1) that many different senses in one text produce confusion; (2) that authors are not fully in agreement about the names to be given to these various senses.

The reply is, however, that in Holy Scripture a word can be used both in the literal or historical sense and in the spiritual sense, which latter is either allegorical or moral or analogical, in accordance with the traditional terminology.

A profound reason is given for this first distinction, namely, that “the Author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning not by- words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves.” But what is signified by the words belongs to the literal sense, whereas the signification by which things signified by words have themselves also a signification belongs to the spiritual sense. Thus Job is the figure of Christ suffering, the paschal lamb is the figure of the Lamb who taketh away the sins of the world. Therefore these two senses are fittingly distinguished.

But the spiritual sense (1) is called allegorical so far as the things of the Old Law signify in figure the things of the New Law; (2) it is called moral according as the things done in Christ are types of what we ought to do; (3) it is called anagogical, as the New Law is itself a figure of future glory, as Dionysius says.115

So far there is no special difficulty, but St. Thomas furthermore says in the last paragraph of the body of the article: ‘Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says," if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.” This statement has been and still is a subject of controversy, namely, whether a word can have several senses. St. Thomas seems to affirm this in the passage quoted above, 11° and his leading commentators are generally of the same opinion. Many modern exegetes, however, such as Patrizzi and Cornely, take the opposite view. This question of the many different literal senses in Holy

Scripture is explained at length by Father P. V. Zapletal, O.P.1 When it is said, for instance, “God created heaven and earth,” 119 the word “heaven” would mean, so says St. Augustine,!° both the material heaven and the angels. Or again, when it is said: “Give us this day our daily bread,” this would mean both the ordinary bread and the supersubstantial bread, explicitly so named in the Gospel.!! Let us see first the replies to the objections that are advanced in argument by those who deny the many different literal senses in Holy Scripture.

In the reply to the first objection it is stated that: “The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation . . . seeing that these senses (namely, these about which the objection is concerned, the literal sense, and the threefold division of the spiritual sense) are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things.”

Some say that in this passage St. Thomas seems to deny the multiplicity of the literal sense. Many Thomists reply that such is not the case, because St. Thomas would then contradict himself. He is now speaking, they say, only of the quadruple sense about which the objection was concerned, the literal sense, namely, and the threefold spiritual sense.

In the same reply to the first objection it is furthermore remarked that: “In Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one (the literal) from which alone can any argument be drawn . . . and nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.”

In the reply to the second objection, St. Augustine’s terminology is explained, who called the spiritual sense, for instance, allegorical.

In the reply to the third objection it is stated that the literal sense is either proper or parabolical, that is, metaphorical. Thus when God’s arm is mentioned, the literal sense is to be taken metaphorically as expressing God's power.

There is still a doubt whether there are not several literal senses in some texts of Holy Scripture.'#? St. Augustine answers in the affirmative. Summing up the question, he writes: “When it is said ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth,’ it is revealed that God did not create from eternity and at one and the same time

go THE ONE GOD both the material heaven and the angels, both visible and invisible things; for this truth is afterward held as certainly revealed.” 123 St. Augustine remarks that if we perceive this twofold sense, why is it that Moses, guided by the light of inspiration, did not perceive it? St. Gregory the Great says the same.**#

St. Thomas, says Father Zapletal, frequently speaks of the literal sense in a favorable manner, as he so does at the end of the argumentative part of this article. Likewise in another of his works he writes: “It is not incredible that Moses and other authors were granted by God knowledge of various truths capable of perception by man, and that the one statement of words denotes these truths, so that any one of them may be the meaning intended by the author.” 175

Thus it is not incredible that Moses, inspired to write: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” understood not only the material and visible heaven, but also the invisible angels, as Augustine says.1 In like manner, our Lord Jesus, saying that thus we must pray: “Father . . . give us this day our daily bread,” 17 could have had in mind both the ordinary bread and supersubstantial bread. The opponents say that this second sense is not literal but spiritual. But it is evidently not so, for the actual words of the first Evangelist are: “Give us this day our supersubstantial bread.” 128 Perhaps Jesus said to the multitude “daily bread,” and to the apostles “supersubstantial bread.”

St. Thomas, who is conservative in his statement, writes: “it is not incredible. . . .” 128 He would have more to say if it were a question only of the spiritual sense, because this latter is quite evident. Hence he is speaking of the twofold literal sense. The majority of the commentators of St. Thomas, as Father Zapletal points out, admitted the multiplicity of the literal sense. Among these are Cajetan, Cano,!* Bannez, Sylvius, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart.*!

Against this multiplicity of senses are quoted, among the earlier

123 St, Augustine, loc, cit.

126 St. Augustine, loc. cit.

180 De locis theol., Bk. IJ, chap. 11 ad zum, arg. ad gam rationem,

131 Many of them, such as Bannez, quote as example the following verse: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” They say that the words “in the beginning” mean: (1) in the beginning of time, so that the world is not eternal;

before the material world. Billuart discusses this point in his treatise De regulis fidei, diss. Ia, a.8. i² theologians, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and St. Albert the Great who said: “Theology gives one meaning to a word.” 1:2 Of the same opinion are most of the modern exegetes, who bring forward the objection that, if there were several literal senses, the result would be confusion and equivocation. This is their chief reason.

In reply to this we say that if the names used were equivocal, as in the case of dog used to denote the terrestrial animal and the heavenly constellation, then I concede the assertion; but if the names are analogous, then I deny it. Thus heaven denotes both the starry firmament and the angels, and bread is understood in the ordinary sense of the term and it also means the Holy Eucharist. But if it is a case of two subordinated analogates, or of two that are co-ordinated under a higher, and if no false sense arises from this, then there is no equivocation.**

It is still a disputed question. The following argument may be advanced in favor of those who admit a twofold literal sense. If men can utter words that have a twofold literal sense and that are most intelligible to an intelligent hearer, much more so can God do this, who is the author of Holy Scripture. But intelligent men frequently utter words that have a twofold literal sense and that can easily be understood. Thus at a certain banquet a prelate who was a moderate Thomist said to another prelate who was of the rigid type: “Do you want a little water in your wine?” The rigid Thomist perceived quite well the twofold literal sense in the words, the first being a reference to the mixing of water with the wine, the other to the moderation of Thomism. His answer therefore was: “I admit only one drop of water in the wine of the Mass.” There was likewise in these words a twofold literal sense: (1) the obvious sense; (2) the metaphorical literal sense, the one however primarily meant, namely, that there must be no mitigation in the soundest of doctrine. Thus it is said that W. Goethe sometimes assigned a twofold literal sense to his verses, so that at least the more intelligent readers might perceive this second sense. This frequently is the case when persons of great culture converse.

183 John of St. Thomas (in Jam, disp. 12, a.12) says: “Nor does it follow that there is equivocation or confusion from such plurality of senses, and this for two reasons: (1) because there is often a certain similarity or order among these senses, for where there is order, there is no equivocation; (2) because a multiplicity of senses results in equivocation when it is the occasion of deception, or when there is a possibility of falsity in the other sense. But when each sense is true, as must be the case by the very fact that it is said of God in the literal sense, then there is no occasion either for equivocation or deception. It is due, however, to the element of mystery and the excellence of the speaker that he can in one utterance include and denote several senses.”

But if men can so express themselves, why could not God, and even Moses, have attached a twofold sense to the words: “In the beginning God created heaven” (namely, the material heaven and the angels). And why could not these words, “Give us this day our daily bread,” have a twofold literal sense, the one referring to ordinary bread and the other to supersubstantial bread?

But the opponents would say that in these examples one of the senses is literal (as in the case of ordinary bread and the material heaven), whereas the other sense is spiritual, since bread in the usual sense of the term is the symbol of the other kind, and since the material heaven is the quasi abode of the angels. Hence it is not quite clear that there are two literal senses; but neither is the contention of the opponents an established fact. It is therefore a probable opinion, if the question concerns the presence of a twofold literal sense in certain texts, and a more than probable opinion if it is a question of the possibility of these two senses.

As for the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” it is not quite clear that there are two literal senses. However, the Fourth Lateran Council discovers two truths in this text, namely, that God did not create the world from eternity, and that “He created out of nothing, from the beginning of time, both the spiritual and corporeal creature, to wit, the angelic and the mundane,” 184 which means that the angels were not created before corporeal creatures. Hence this council seems to understand, as St. Augustine did, that the words, “In the beginning God created heaven,’ mean that He created at one and the same time, the heavenly bodies and the angels.

We must conclude that the possibility of a word having two literal senses appears to be a certainty, but that there are actually two senses is but a probability. Therefore St. Thomas says: “It is not incredible that Moses and other authors were granted by God knowledge of various truths capable of perception by man, and that one statement of words denotes these truths, so that any one of them may be the meaning intended by the author.” 135

Thus we bring to an end the question on sacred doctrine, a question in which the holy Doctor determined the nature and dignity of sacred theology, eflecting this by an examination of its object and of the light from which it proceeds. He also determined its method of argumentation and the various senses of Holy Scripture.

Footnotes

1. See also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 4, 6. ↩

2. it was created before all things, which means that the angels were not created ↩