Chapter V. Question 5 or goodness in general

THE attribute of goodness follows perfection, for, as will be said immediately, everything is good in so far as it is perfect. Therefore St. Thomas treats of God’s goodness before treating of His truth and unity, although unity and truth are predicated before goodness of being and the divine nature. St. Thomas inserts here the question of the divine goodness as being a part of the divine perfection. And he treats first of goodness in general.

The question is concerned with transcendental good, which is a property of being, and is being viewed as perfect and appetible. It is called transcendental, because it transcends all the categories of being, and is common to all of them, such as good substance, good quantity, good quality. . . . However, in this question, goodness is also divided into the pleasant, the useful, and the virtuous, and from this division we get the idea of moral goodness, which is discussed by St. Thomas in the moral part of his theology,: where he shows that moral goodness is virtuous goodness in so far as it is governed by the rules of moral actions and especially by the eternal law. Moral goodness is conformity of the object and the action with the rules of moral actions. But we are at present concerned with transcendental good.

There are three points of investigation in this fifth question: (1) The relation of goodness to being (a. 1-3); (2) of goodness in itself, considered under the aspect of end and order in goodness (a. 2-5); (3) the way goodness is divided (a.6). The explanation of these articles must be brief, for they pertain rather to metaphysics.

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER GOODNESS DIFFERS REALLY FROM BEING

Conclusion. Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea. The first part is proved as follows: That which is included in the idea of being is not really distinct from being; but goodness is included in the idea of being, for it is being considered

as perfect and desirable; therefore goodness is not really distinct from being.

The major is certain. Just as humanity, which contains in its connotation animality as genus, is not really distinct from animality, so that which in its connotation contains the idea of being is not really distinct from being. On the contrary, created essence, which in its connotation does not contain the idea of existence, is really distinct from it. Where we have two concepts irreducible to each other and to a third concept, there we have irreducibility of realities, in virtue of the objective validity of our intellect. But if two concepts are reduced to one concept, as animality and rationability are reduced to humanity, then there is no real distinction between them. Animality is included in the idea of humanity, although the latter includes something else, namely, rationality.

The minor. The idea of being is included in the idea of goodness. For goodness is that which is desirable; but it is desirable in so far as it is at least somehow perfect and perfective; therefore the idea of being is included in the idea of goodness, although it explicitly denotes something else.

Thus a fruit is good in so far as it is desirable. But for this it is necessary that the fruit be ripe, that in its species it be perfect and perfective, as a food that is preservative of life. And it would not be so unless it were actual being. Thus we speak proportionately of a good stone for the construction of a building, of a good horse for drawing a carriage, of a good sculptor or of a good painter. Hence it is clear that good is predicated of things by analogy of proportion, and is not really distinct from being.

The second part of the conclusion, namely, that goodness and being differ in idea, is easily proved; for “goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.” In other words, being contains the notion of goodness actually and implicitly, but not actually and explicitly. Something explicitly is declared in the notion of goodness, which is only implicitly declared in the notion of being. Thus there is no addition of any extrinsic difference to being, but of an explicitly signified mode of being.

It must be remembered with Cajetan, however, that desirableness does not constitute the idea of goodness, but presupposes it, as a property its essence. However, if the desirable is viewed not formally but fundamentally, then goodness is intrinsically desirable in so far as it is the foundation for desirableness. Hence many Thomists say: The formal notion of goodness consists in perfection as being the foundation for desirableness. And this foundation is not really distinct from the desirableness, because it is a relation, not indeed real but logical as regards the appetite. On the contrary, there is a real relation of the appetite to the appetible on which it depends. Thus there is a real relation of knowledge to the thing knowable, but not of this latter to knowledge.

Hence for goodness to be fundamentally desirable, it must be perfect and perfective and therefore actual being. As John of St. Thomas says against Durandus and Vasquez: If goodness were to consist formally in desirableness, it would not be anything real, but a logical relation.

The reply to the first objection confirms this: Although goodness and being are not really distinct, for what is simply being (which a thing has through substantial being) is not simply goodness (which a thing has through some superadded perfection). Thus a barren tree is simply a being in so far as it has substantial being, but it is not something simply good in its species, because it is barren. The same applies to an unripe or overripe fruit, as also to a young or old carriage horse.

Hence what is simply being is good relatively, for example, a young horse not yet fully grown is, however, truly a horse and not a mule. Thus it has relative goodness of its species, although it has not as yet attained its due perfection. The same may be said of wine that has not much body to it, which, however, is truly wine and not vinegar.

Conversely, that by reason of which something is good simply, is being relatively, since it is an accidental perfection superadded to substance, as ripeness in fruit.

It must be observed that according to Scotus? the properties of being, such as goodness, are distinct from being by a distinction that is formal and actual on the part of the thing. In reply to this we say that such distinction posits an impossible intermediary between the real distinction and the logical distinction that has its foundation in the object; for a distinction exists either before or not before the mind’s consideration; if before, it is real: if not, it is logical. In the present case, however, there can be no real distinction, because then goodness would be outside being; it would not be being, and thus would be nothing. Being is included in all its modes, which are still being,

Consequently there is only a virtual distinction between being and goodness; in fact, a virtual minor distinction, since being includes goodness actually and implicitly, but not explicitly. In other words, the mode of goodness is not an extrinsic difference with reference to being, as rationability is with reference to animality,

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER GOODNESS IS PRIOR IN IDEA TO BEING

State of the question. The Platonists taught that goodness is prior to being. For Plato the supreme reality is the separate Idea of Good.? Likewise, Plotinus held that the supreme hypostasis is the One-Good, the super-Intelligence.* According to this tendency some, such as Scotus, said that the will, which is specified by good, is simply superior to the intellect, which is specified by being.

St. Thomas, by way of a difficulty he puts to himself in the beginning of the article, refers to the opinion of the Platonists in the words of Dionysius who, among other names, assigned the first place to good rather than to being. Likewise, in the counterargument the Neoplatonist Proclus is quoted, the author of the book De causis.

Plato and Plotinus placed good above being and essence, because every essence is intelligible, and the intelligible is the correlative of intellect, and is distinct from it. Hence above the duality of intellect and intelligible, there must be a higher and ineffable, a most perfect unity, from which all things proceed, namely, the One- Good.’ But the divine causality is explained by the Platonists independently of the divine liberty, in that good is essentially diffusive of itself. We already find this principle admitted by Plato, who does not sufficiently distinguish between final causality and efficient causality. It is also admitted by Plotinus, who held that the supreme Good is essentially, or by a necessity of nature, diffusive of itself, and not because of a most free creative act.

Contrary to this, St. Thomas, following Aristotle, correctly distinguishes between the final cause and the efficient cause, and he maintains that good is diffusive of itself as the end which attracts the agent to act. St. Thomas adds that in accordance with the dogma of creation the supreme agent is absolutely free since He already contains within Himself infinite goodness, and is not in

3 See Plato’s Republic, Bk. VII, 517, D; “In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and when seen is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and good, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual world.”

5 The Neoplatonists speak of the One-Good, which transcends being, somewhat as subsequently Catholic theologians say that the Deity in some way transcends all absolutely simple perfections, which are contained in it eminently. But for the theologians, the Deity contains formally being, the one, the good; whereas, contrary to this, the One of the Platonists virtually contained the inferior notes, which necessarily proceeded from it.

6 Summa theol., Ia, q.5, a.4; Ia Hae, q.1, a.4 ad 1; Ila, q.1, a.1; Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 11.

need of created goods, which cannot increase His perfection and happiness.” The conclusion of St. Thomas is: In idea being is prior to goodness.

This had been already proved by him,’ in that the idea of being is included, as presupposed, in the idea of goodness, which is perfect and desirable being. In this article, however, the same argument is proposed as follows: That is prior in idea which is first conceived by the intellect; but the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.

The major is not concerned with the order of time and investigation, according to which we first have a knowledge of sensible things; it concerns, however, the order of nature and of formal concepts or notions. But the notion of being is the first of all notions. Why is this? It is because everything is intelligible inasmuch as it is actual. Thus the proper object of the intellect, as such, and not as it is human, is intelligible being,’ just as color is the first thing visible, and sound the first thing audible. Hence every formal concept or notion, for it to be intelligible, presupposes the concept or notion of being.'®

As Bannez remarks, St. Thomas is speaking of goodness in general. From this it follows that, both in God and in created beings, being is prior in idea to goodness. Being is included implicitly in goodness, and it implicitly includes goodness, as its transcendent mode.

St. Thomas deduces from this the following corollary: “If therefore the intellect and will are considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects. For the object of the intellect (namely, intelligible being) is simpler and more absolute than the object of the will (which is goodness). Now the simpler and the more abstract (and more universal) a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself (at least as an object). . . . Thus the intellect is absolutely higher and nobler than the will.” 1 Therefore it directs the will, knowing the very concept of good in the good willed.

®The proper object of the human intellect as such is the nature of sensible things, or intelligible being of sensible things in the mirror of sensible things.

10 Thus the notion of being is not in generation and time prior to that of goodness, but it is prior simply, in the order of nature, just as essence is prior to its properties. The reason for this priority is the principle already admitted by Plato and Plotinus, that “the simpler and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself” (Summa theol., Ia, q.82, a.3).

Thus the idea of being, while it is included in the idea of goodness, is some- how already limited and contracted, because it can be found also in the ideas of truth and unity.

_ Second conclusion. We discover this in the reply to the first objection, which states that goodness is relatively prior to being, that is, as a cause, as the end is prior to the form. This is goodness considered not in itself, but with respect to something else.

To the Platonists and Neoplatonists, and particularly to Dionysius, St. Thomas makes the concession that, “among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being.” The reason is that, in the order of causality, goodness conveys the idea of end; but the end is the first in the order of causes, since it attracts the agent to act, and by the agent the matter is prepared to receive the form. Thus in this order of causality God is called the supreme Good, or the good God.

Yet, absolutely speaking, it is still true to say that in idea being is prior to goodness. By simpliciter is meant, if the essence of the thing in question is discussed; but by secundum quid is meant, if something secondary in this thing is considered. Thus a wise man is simpliciter better than unwise Hercules; but as regards physical strength, Hercules is better secundum quid. Simpliciter loquendo means about the same as “absolutely speaking” or “in its primary aspect,” whereas secundum quid means “in some secondary aspect.”

Thus being, “relatively” considered with respect to the four causes, and not in itself, corresponds to the formal cause; for being is predicated of a thing in so far as it is in actuality by reason of its form, as in stone, wood, animal, or man. But the form, in the order of causes, is posterior to the end and the agent, because it is produced by the agent operating in view of the end. Thus it must be conceded to the Platonists that the supreme Good is prior to created being, which is produced in manifestation of divine goodness. Likewise the supreme Good is prior to finite intelligence, the object of which is finite good, in which God is known as in a mirror.

It may be asked whether St. Thomas gives us a correct statement of Plato’s doctrine. It must be said that Plato, in calling God (or the supreme reality) the supreme Good, considered God with reference to inferior realities, which He produces by a diffusion of Himself, to be the sun from which emanate light and heat. Hence Plato said: Since God is good, He produced the world. Yet Plato and Plotinus seem to hold also that good is absolutely prior to being.??

12 Plato and Plotinus seem to admit that the One is indivisible, whereas being is divided; and they identify the One with the Good. Thus they solve the arguments of Parmenides by positing “the One-Good” above being, and explaining causality, which Parmenides denied, in that good is essentially diffusive of itself.

On the contrary, St. Thomas and Aristotle solve the arguments of Parmenides against multiplicity in being and motion by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality. They also hold that unity, by the very fact that it is convertible with being, is divided, like being, into potentiality and actuality.

If such is the case, then St. Thomas on this point separates from them. Hence we conclude that in idea being is prior to goodness absolutely, but posterior to it relatively, namely, in causation.

Corollary to the second conclusion. The will is relatively prior to the intellect (namely, in moving to the exercise of the act). Thus the intellect in the exercise of its act, or attention to its object, is moved by the will. Thus at the end of deliberation it is the will that causes the final judgment to be final. Likewise, as stated by St. Thomas,’ in this life “the love of God is better than the knowledge of God,” because, whereas the intellect draws God to itself, to its imperfect conception of Him, the will is drawn to God, since goodness is in things and not in the mind. So also, though seeing is absolutely nobler than hearing, yet the hearing of a beautiful symphony is nobler. than the seeing of something mediocre.

It must be observed that St. Thomas, at the end of the reply to the first objection, gives us a good explanation why the Platonists held that goodness applies to more things than being does. The reason is that in their opinion being does not apply to matter, which they thought to be a privation and non-being. Yet they said: Matter manifests its appetency for good.

On the contrary, St. Thomas and Aristotle, distinguishing matter from privation or non-being, declare it to be, indeed, a real potency or a real capacity for receiving a form, and thus matter is being in potentiality, for example, it is in potentiality to receive the form of either air, wood, or animal. Hence being is just as extensive in application as goodness; in fact, it is more universal than goodness, for not every being is perfect and appetible.**

The following objection may be raised against the first conclusion: Goodness is absolutely more perfect than being because it includes being and its perfection.

Reply. It is true to say this of the suppositum or subject, about which good is predicated; but it is not true to say this of the formal concept of goodness. This means that the suppositum, which is said to be absolutely good, such as wine of the best vintage, is more perfect than the suppositum which is only being, such as wine not of the best vintage. But the formal concept of goodness is by nature posterior to the formal concept of being, which is simpler, more abstract and more universal, and thus more perfect as an object.

_ But I insist. Although animality is simpler than humanity, yet it is more imperfect.

Reply. It is simpler logically, since it is the genus of humanity; but it is not so really, because it is derived from matter, which has not the unity, simplicity, and perfection of a form, especially of man’s form, which is the intellectual soul.

This article, however, is concerned with being and goodness, not only in their logical aspect, but as they are realities. It must be conceded that only the concrete suppositum which is good, is a more perfect suppositum than if it were not good. But St. Thomas is not speaking in this article of the good as suppositum, but of the idea of goodness, which is viewed, however, ontologically and not merely logically. Being, which is prior to goodness, derives its name from existence, namely, from its ultimate actuality. This must be our reply to the Neoplatonists and also to Scotus.

Thus the intellect truly is absolutely nobler than the will. because it is specified by being (that is, the faculty is specified by the object, and not by the suppositum), so that the will is specified by this object that is good, viewed as such, but it is not specified by the good as suppositum.

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER EVERY BEING IS GOOD

State of the question. It seems that not every being is good, for good adds perfection and desirableness to being. Matter, however, is being, but it has not the aspect of desirableness. Likewise Aristotle says: “In mathematics goodness does not exist.” 15

The conclusion, however, is: Every being, as being, is good.

This doctrine is of faith against the Manichaeans, who said that some beings are good, and some are evil, in accordance with their error of a twofold principle. The Scripture says: “And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” +°

The conclusion is proved from reason as follows:

Perfect presents the aspect of what is desirable and good; " but every being, inasmuch as it is being, is actual and in some way perfect; therefore every being, inasmuch as it is being, is good.

This means to say, as remarked above,'* that every being is such simply and good relatively, in that it has at least its essence and existence, even though it is not good simply. Thus every wine, pro-

vided it still is wine and not vinegar, can be said to be good, or not corrupt, although it is not the best of wine. `

Reply to first objection. Good does not contract being to any of the predicamental modes, that is, it does not limit being to any category, such as substance, quantity . . . ; however, goodness is a transcendental mode of being that is not so universal as being itself. For being applies also to unity and truth.

Reply to second objection. Evil is the privation of any good that is due to any subject.

Reply to third objection. Prime matter is being in potentiality and good in potentiality. Moreover, it implies goodness for the composite to have its matter, which cannot exist without it.

Reply to fourth objection. “In mathematics goodness does not exist,” because it abstracts from motion and end. Wherefore Spinoza, who sought to proceed geometrically in metaphysics, excluded the efficient and final causes from the subject matter of metaphysics. He wanted to deduce everything from God, just as the properties of a triangle are deduced from its nature.

Thus the foregoing consideration sufficiently explains goodness with reference to being, which does not differ really but logically from being, and which is absolutely posterior to being. Every being is good at least relatively, although it frequently is lacking in that perfection by which it could be said to be good absolutely. In the two following articles goodness is considered, not in its relation to being, but as it is in itself.

FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOODNESS HAS THE ASPECT OF A FINAL CAUSE

State of the question. The difficulty is that Dionysius often says that goodness is self-diffusive.’° But to be diffusive implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Also St. Augustine says: “We exist, because God is good.” 2°

The conclusion, however, is: Goodness has the aspect of a final cause.

1. It is proved on the authority of Aristotle, for he thus defines the end and the good as “that for the sake of which something is done.” 21

2. It is proved by reason as follows: The desirable has the aspect of an end; but goodness is desirable; therefore goodness has the aspect of an end, at least as regards the act of the one desiring; and

it can be desirable either because it is pleasant (as a fruit), or because it is useful (as a bitter medicine), or because it is virtuous.??

There is furthermore another conclusion in the body of the article, which may be enunciated as follows: Goodness is the first in causation and the last in being, because the end is the first in causation, in the order of intention, since it attracts the agent to act; and the end is the last in being, or in the order of execution. Thus the generator tends to reproduce its form, for instance, fire tends to reproduce the form of fire, the ox the form of an ox, and the form of the thing generated terminates the passive generation, and afterward what is generated is made perfect. ‘Thus when the animal acquires its complete development, then it is perfectly like the one generating.

Reply to first objection. Goodness and beauty differ logically, for goodness relates to the appetite, whereas beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for things are said to be beautiful that please the eye.2> Thus beauty is the splendor of form in material things, as in the rose or the lily; but if it is a case of intellectual beauty, then it is the splendor of truth or the irradiation of some principle in the many conclusions deduced from it. In like manner the splendor manifesting itself in a life of heroic moral acts constitutes moral beauty; transcending all, we have the sublime, when there is the greatest of diversity in the closest of unity, as in Holy Communion: O wonderful thing, he that is poor, and a servant, and lowly, eateth the Lord.

Beauty seems to be a transcendental property of being, for everything produced by the divine artist is beautiful; but every being is produced by the divine artist as the author of nature; therefore every being is beautiful, at least according to its nature or essence, for it conveys to us some idea of God. But integral beauty, as seen in God, in Christ, in the Blessed Virgin Mary, is splendor of being according to unity, truth, and goodness, that is, splendor and harmony of all the properties of being.

Reply to second objection. There is a brief solution of the difficulty arising from the Platonist conception, that goodness is selfdiffusive: and this pertains to the efficient cause. St. Thomas replies: “Goodness is described as self-diffusive, as being the end,” namely, in that it attracts the agent to act, and the appetite to desire. But as remarked farther on,** by way of a logical sequence, goodness is an active diffusion inasmuch as the agent operates effectively be-

23 Ibid., q.39, a-8, where it is stated that three conditions are required for the pleasing effect of beauty, namely, integrity, due proportion, and clarity.

cause of the end intended, and this either by a necessity of nature, as the ox generates an ox, or else freely, as when man communicates his knowledge to others or exhorts them to good.

Hence St. Thomas says: “It belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others. Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by . . . (the incarnation of the Word).” Thus self-diffusion primarily belongs to the end as attracting, and afterward to the agent. But God is not necessitated, however, in His external operations, but is absolutely free, for He is in no need of finite goods,” and He operates to manifest His goodness, as will be stated farther on.

Therefore, when the Neoplatonists said: “Goodness is essentially self-diffusive,” they did not sufficiently distinguish between the agent and the end, and so they unwarrantably asserted that God operates externally by a necessity of His nature, as the sun diffuses heat and light in the air. The consequence of this was pantheistic emanatism, which is contrary to the dogma of an absolutely free creation.

Reply to third objection. The saying of St. Augustine, “We exist, because God is good,” refers to the final cause. This means that we exist because God willed to manifest His goodness in loving and creating us; thus we receive a certain participation of the divine goodness. ‘Therefore goodness has the aspects of an end.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN MODE, SPECIES, AND ORDER

State of the question. It is concerned with causated good, as Cajetan says, and this is manifest from the counterargument, which quotes the following definition of goodness given by St. Augustine, as consisting “in everything which God has made.”

The reply in the affirmative is thus presented: “For a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form together with all that precedes and follows upon that form,” for everything is what it is by its form. But the form is itself signified by the species, that which is prerequired for it by the mode, and that which follows upon it by the order. Thus the form of a fruit constitutes it in a certain species; but this presupposes the mode of commensuration of the material and efficient principles, for instance, of the

earth and the sun, so that the fruit may attain its ripeness. Finally, in the fruit there is order toward an end, for instance, the preservation of life in man. Likewise these three conditions are required so that one may be a good painter, a good sculptor, or a good musician. The mode is required for the acquisition of the art, and its order for the end. Thus goodness demands the congruent concurrence of the four causes, because the end is last in the order of execution. Thus the reason is assigned for this descriptive definition given by St. Augustine.

WHETHER GOODNESS IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO THE VIRTUOUS, THE USEFUL, AND THE PLEASANT

State of the question. This question is concerned with transcendental goodness, but in the formal and not in the material sense of the term. Good in the material sense, subjectively considered, is divided into the ten categories. Thus we speak of a good substance, a good quantity, a good quality. . . . Goodness in the formal sense, however, is divided according to the idea of goodness, namely as it is something perfect and desirable. But this division is the foundation for the notion of moral goodness, which is virtuous goodness that is in conformity with the rules of moral action, that is, with the eternal law and right reason.??

Certain difficulties are raised against this division. (1) It seems better to divide transcendental goodness by the ten categories in which it is found. (2) This division is not made by members that are opposites to one another, for some thing, for instance, a virtue, | is both objectively good and pleasant. (3) There is the aspect of end in goodness, but there is no such aspect in the useful.

The conclusion, however, is affirmative.

1. It is proved on the authority of St. Ambrose,’ who gives the aforesaid division, which he found in Cicero’s works. It was already given by Aristotle.2® Thus Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of friendship, in so far as it is the foundation for goodness that is either useful, or pleasant, or virtuous. This last kind is friendship among the virtuous. This classical division is found in the writings of St. Augustine and Dionysius. The Master of the Sentences divided the subject matter of theology, according as some parts are useful, but as other parts are virtuous and capable of being enjoyed by us.

This classical division, however, is not retained by the Epicureans who, like all materialists and sensualists, belittle virtuous good, and consider that goodness consists only in what ts useful and pleasant. Thus they recommend a virtuous life only as a means of avoiding the inconveniences of vices that are in opposition to one another, and not because the object of virtue demands our love.

2. The genuineness of this classical division is proved from reason, for it applies, as St. Thomas says, not only to human goodness, but to goodness as such. A good division has its foundation in the formal] aspect of the whole that is to be divided, and so it is with this division. For goodness, inasmuch as it is desirable, terminates the movement of the appetite. But this terminus is either the means (and thus it is called the useful), or it is the ultimate end, as the thing desired for its own sake (and thus it is called the virtuous), or else it is the ultimate end in the form of rest in the thing (and thus it is called the pleasant). This division properly has its foundation in the formal aspect of the whole that is to be divided, and it is effected by parts that are opposites to one another. Thus the division is not accidental, but essential and adequate. :

We must particularly insist on the definition of virtuous good. It is that good which is desired for its own sake, as stated in the body of this article, and the reply to the second objection says that “the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves,” that is, regardless of any pleasure or usefulness resulting from it, as in the case of telling the truth even though death or martyrdom may be the result of this. As St. Thomas says elsewhere,*° honest means the same as worthy of honor, and is indeed the object of virtue, and the source of spiritual elegance and beauty. It is also called rational or moral goodness, in so far as it is in conformity with right reason, as the object of the upright will.

Reply to first objection. This division is derived formally in accordance with the formal aspect of goodness, and not materially according as the subject serves as the foundation for this.

Reply to second objection. “This division is not by opposite things but by opposite aspects.” Therefore the same thing, such as a virtue, can be both virtuous and pleasant, and even useful as regards the ultimate end.

However, those things are properly called pleasant that are only pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Likewise those things are properly called useful that are only useful, as money and bitter medicine. St. Thomas shows elsewhere 81 that the virtuous is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite; that

80 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.145, a.1, 2; Ia Iae, q-39, a.2. 81 Ibid., Ila lae, q.145, a.3.

the pleasant is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite, and that nothing repugnant to virtuous good is absolutely and truly useful, but relatively so.

Reply to third objection. Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal, but as something analogical; and it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous, secondly of the pleasant, and lastly of the useful.

First corollary. In this division we have the principle for the refutation of hedonism and utilitarianism, namely, of the false ethics that has its foundation in the pleasant and the useful, but not in the virtuous good. But the sensualists cannot truly preserve in their system the idea of virtuous good, which is good as such, regardless of the pleasure and usefulness resulting from it, as in the case of suffering martyrdom for the love of divine truth.

Second corollary. The first principle of ethics is: “We must do good and avoid evil.” The reference here is to virtuous good toward which our rational nature is inclined by its Author.’? Hence when a person comes fully to the use of reason, such person must love efficaciously the virtuous good for its own sake, and this more than himself. But this implies that confusedly or implicitly, though efficaciously, God, the author of nature and the supreme good, is loved more than oneself. But since this efficacious love, in the state of fallen nature, is impossible without a healing grace, which is also elevating,’ St. Thomas, speaking of the age of reason, concludes: “If he (the child) then directs himself to the due end, he will by means of grace receive the remission of original sin,” 34 namely, by baptism of desire. ‘This remark alone suffices now, so as to show clearly how virtuous good transcends the pleasant and useful.

Doubt. It may be asked whether the brute beast tends at least materially toward the virtuous good that is proportionate to its natural inclination, although it has no knowledge of the end or of the virtuous as such.

We reply in the affirmative with St. Thomas, who says: “Everything (whatsoever creature) naturally loves God more than itself . » . Since each part (in the universe of created things) naturally loves the whole more than itself. And each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good.” 35 Thus the malice of onanism is clearly seen, for it is against the good of the species and of its preservation. In like manner St. Thomas in commenting on these words of Christ, “How often

35 Ibid., la, q.60, a.5 ad 1um; see also Ia, q-6, a.1 ad gum; Ha Hae, q-26, a.3.

would I have gathered thy children together as the hen gathers her young under her wings, but thou wouldst not!” has this to say: “The hen, feeling concerned about her young, defends them, and gathers them under her wings. So also Christ takes pity on us, and truly bore our infirmities.” ** From this we clearly see how sublime is virtuous good, which is already materially present in the nobler actions of animals, so that Christ speaking of generosity could appeal to this example of the lower order, an example that is known to all.

And so with this we bring to a close the question of goodness in general.

This question gives us the nominal definition of goodness (that which all things desire), its real definition (perfect and desirable being), its relation to being and to causality, and also its division into the virtuous, the pleasant, and the useful.