Chapter XII. Question 12 the knowability of God

AFTER speaking of “how God is not,” St. Thomas now treats the question, “How God is known by us,” as he had already announced.:

The importance of this question. It is of the greatest importance. Just as the second question, concerning God’s existence, is of fundamental importance as regards those truths that belong to natural theology, so this twelfth question is of fundamental importance as regards those truths that are of the supernatural order. For this question concerns the possibility of the rational creature being elevated to the order of grace and glory, namely, to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. It is, strictly speaking, a discussion of the essentially supernatural nature of this vision, which far surpasses the supernatural nature of miracle. For a miracle is supernatural only as regards the manner of its production. Thus by the resurrection the natural life, both vegetative and sensitive, is supernaturally restored to one who is dead; whereas, contrary to this, as we shall at once see, the immediate vision of the divine essence is intrinsically and essentially supernatural, for it is essentially supernatural life. Several theologians of more recent times, wishing to prove conclusively from reason alone the possibility of the beatific vision, because of the natural desire for this, forgot to take into account this distinction between the essentially supernatural nature of eternal life and the supernatural nature of miracle, the existence and possibility of which latter can be known in a natural way. We shall see that reason alone cannot prove apodictically either the existence or the possibility of the beatific vision; for the knowability of what is essentially supernatural is itself supernatural, inasmuch as truth and being are convertible. We shall see, however, that the possibility of the beatific vision cannot be disproved, that it is defended against those who deny it, that reason alone persuades us of this by means of a most profound argument of its fittingness, and that it is firmly held by faith. This is the common opinion of the theologians, and it is only by inadvertence that this can be denied.¹

Therefore in this question we already have the concept of the essentially supernatural life developed for us in its fundamental aspects, and completed in the treatises on happiness ? and on grace, inasmuch as grace is the seed of glory.*

St. Thomas in his treatise on happiness says: “Neither man nor any (angelic) creature can attain final happiness by his natural powers,” because “the vision of the divine essence (is of that) which infinitely surpasses all created substance,” * which means that it surpasses the natural powers and exigencies of such. It is likewise shown farther on that “without grace man cannot merit everlasting life” because “everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature,” ë and even of the angelic nature.®

The fundamental principles of all these truths are contained in this question, which is divided into three parts as follows: (1) God's knowability by direct vision is discussed in the first eleven articles; (2) God’s knowability by the abstractive method of reasoning from natural effects is discussed in the twelfth article; (3) God’s knowability by faith is the subject of the thirteenth article.

The first part of this question, which is the principal part, has four divisions: (1) the possibility of the beatific vision, or of our being elevated to the supernatural order of grace and glory (a. 1); (2) the intuitiveness of this vision; whether God is seen through some similitude or idea (a. 2); (3) the faculty and the light of glory by which the created intellect can see God (a. 3, 4, 5); (4) the remaining articles are concerned with the various modifying circumstances of this vision, inasmuch as there is difference of degree in this among the blessed, since it is not a comprehensive penetration of the divine essence, and inasmuch as these circumstances modify the state of blessedness.

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD

State of the question. It is a discussion not only of the human intellect, but of every created intellect, even that of the highest angel, and even of higher angels that could be created. The word can in the title is taken in the unrestricted sense, as referring either to the natural power of the created intellect or to the elevation of

² this power by God. The question is whether the vision of God is possible (or non-repugnant) for the created intellect. But the existence of this vision is of faith, and it is purely a gift. Lastly, to see God's essence means to know God's essence, not partially but completely, although it is stated in the seventh article that this knowledge is not comprehensive. This is what the Scholastics say is the abstractive but not the quiddative knowledge of God.

The intellect has no difficulty in understanding this terminology. The abstractive knowledge of God is incomplete and imperfect; for by it we acquire a knowledge of God by predicating, indeed, attributes that are esseutial but only analogically common to Him and to creatures. Thus God is known as the first Cause, the first Being, the self-subsisting Being, the infinite Being. ... On the contrary, the quiddative knowledge of God is complete and perfect, because by it we know God according to all His essential predicates, down to and including the ultimate difference, that is, to His Deity or intimate life. But the Deity as such contains formally, enimently, and explicitly all absolute perfections, which are intimately reconciled in His eminent Deity; in fact they are identified therein (without any real distinction between them), although without destroying one another. The Deity as such, however, is named by us wayfarers, but it is not known by its proper concept, because it is not naturally capable of being participated in by created natures from which by the abstractive method we get our ideas; these natures participate, indeed, in being, unity, truth, goodness, intelligence, and love, but not in the Deity, which can be participated in only by grace, which is strictly a participation of the divine nature, or of God’s intimate life.

Hence there is a great difference between knowing God abstractively, or, as it were, externally, in some created image, and knowing Him quiddatively, in His intimate life. Thus there is a great difference between knowing some man, for instance, the supreme pontiff, only according to his external characteristics and knowing him in his intimate life. This terminology, however, has its immediate foundation in Holy Scripture. Thus St. Paul says: “Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him. But to us God hath revealed them, by His Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God [that is, the intimate life of God, or the Deity as such]. For what man knoweth the things of a man [intimately] but the spirit of a man that is in him? So a things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit o :

St. Thomas has spoken in several other places of the distinction between the abstractive and intuitive or quiddative knowledge of God. This question has been discussed at length by us in another work,® and therefore we shall mention here only the principal points.

Let us see: (1) what is defined to be of faith about the beatific vision; (2) the errors of those who deny either the possibility of the beatific vision, or its supernatural character; (3) what Sacred Scripture and tradition have to say about it; (4) how St. Thomas defends the possibility of this vision in this article and in other places; (5) the terminology of later theologians on this point; (6) the various opinions; (7) the common opinion among the Thomists.

WHAT IS DEFINED TO BE OF FAITH ABOUT THE BEATIFIC VISION

We have the following definitions and declarations of the Church: 1° “Those who, having been baptized, die without any actual sin on their souls, go immediately to heaven, the state of grace being required for entrance therein; ™ heaven or beatitude is not a substantial transformation into God,'? but man is raised to supernatural happiness, and this cannot be found out by reason alone.” 14 It is also declared that this supernatural happiness cannot

14 Ibid., no. 1669. This declaration is directed against the semirationalism of Froschammer, who is condemned for having held the following; “Man’s supernatural end and all that pertains to this . . . come within the scope of human reason and philosophy, and reason can by its own natural strength and principles acquire the knowledge of these truths, provided they be proposed to it as its object” (Denz. 1669).

This declaration also states: “Therefore, according to this same author’s opinion, it can and must most certainly be concluded that reason is able of itself, not now as accepted on the principle of divine authority, but by its own natural powers and principles, acquire knowledge or certainty not only of the most abstruse inysteries of God’s wisdom and goodness but also of the free decrees of His will, although it is admitted that these have been revealed. No one with rudimentary or slight knowledge of Christian doctrine can fail to see and fully realize how false and erroneous is this teaching of the author.”

Those who seek to establish from reason alone not only persuasive but also apodictic arguments in proof of the possibility of the beatific vision do not sufficiently take into consideration what Pius IX wrote on this subject against the semirationalism of James Froschammer. The whole Letter of Pius IX, Gravissimas inter, must be read, or at least those parts of it quoted in Denzinger’s Enchiridion, be had in this life,t5 but in the future,!* and that it consists in seeing God immediately and intuitively face to face, and in the enjoyment of this vision.17

A special quotation must be given from the Constitution Benedictus Deus of Benedict XII, which states: “By apostolic authority we define that, according to God’s common ordination, the souls of all the saints . . . immediately after death and the aforesaid purgation of those who are in need of this even before their souls are again united to their bodies and the general judgment . . . see the divine essence by direct intuition and face to face, in such wise that nothing created intervenes as an object of vision, but the divine essence presents itself to their immediate gaze, unveiled, clearly and openly, and that in this vision they enjoy the divine essence. . . . Also in this vision and enjoyment of the divine essence, they do not make acts of either faith or hope in the same . . . and this vision and fruition will continue . . . forever.” 18

In this constitution emphasis must be placed on the words “nothing created intervening as an object of vision.” This does not mean, however, the condemnation of the opinion of those who maintain that there is a created impressed or expressed species in the beatific vision; for these do not say that such species intervenes as the object of vision, but only as that by which or in which the divine essence is seen, just as the angel sees his essence in some expressed intelligible species. In like manner the Council of Florence says: “The souls of the saints in heaven know by clear intuition the one and triune God as He is in Himself, yet one more perfectly than another according to the diversity of their merits.” 19

CONDEMNED ERRORS

As for the condemned errors on this subject, some recede from the true doctrine by denying the possibility of the beatific vision; others go to excess by saying that no absolutely gratuitous gift is required to make this vision possible.

Those who denied the possibility of the intuitive vision of God appealed to the arguments quoted by St. Thomas at the beginning of this article, namely, that there is no existing proportion between the created intellect and God, for there is an infinite distance be- nos. 1669-73. These refutations received their final formulation in the Vatican Council; see Denz., nos. 1795, 1796, 1816.

tween them. In fact, the Deity in a certain way transcends being, but the object of the intellect is being. Moreover, God can be seen only in a finite manner, and then His essence is not immediately seen.?° St. Gregory speaks of this error.24 Amalric, who lived during the pontificate of Innocent III, erred likewise on this point. But particularly the fourteenth century Palamites denied the possibility of the beatific vision, maintaining that the divine nature, as it is in itself, cannot be even supernaturally seen by the created intellect. Therefore the Palamites admitted that a certain uncreated light emanates from God, which can be seen by the bodily eye, such, they say, as the apostles saw on Mount Thabor, and it is this light which constitutes the enjoyment and happiness of the saints in heaven. The Greeks in four pseudo-synods accepted and confirmed this doctrine.”

Among modern philosophers, Rosmini seems to have denied the possibility of the absolutely immediate vision of God even with the help of the light of glory. The following propositions of Rosmini were condemned: “God is the object of the beatific vision inasmuch as He is the author of ad extra works.” “Since God cannot, even by the light of glory, entirely communicate Himself to finite beings, He could reveal and communicate His essence to the possessors only in that way which befits finite intelligences, namely, by manifesting Himself to them, inasmuch as He enters into relation with them as their creator, foreseer, redeemer, and sanctifier.” 24 These propositions seem to deny the immediate vision of God's essence, even with the help of the light of glory.

In contradistinction to these, the fourth century heretics, Eunomius, Aétius and the Anomoeans, attributed to the merely natural powers of the intellect not only the intuitive but also the comprehensive vision of God. They were most strenuously attacked by Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Epiphanius, and others

St. Thomas in the first objection of this article quotes a text from St. Chrysostom which suggests a difficulty, for he says: “Not only the prophets have not seen God, but neither have angels or

20 There is a tendency in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus to deny the possibility of the beatific vision, because it maintains that the supreme hypostasis, the One- Good, transcends Intelligibility and Intelligence, which is the second hypostasis. Hence the One-Good cannot be seen, but is known only by a certain mystical and obscure contact. Moreover, this pantheistic doctrine, according to which all things proceed from God by a necessary emanation, denies the possibility of our free elevation to the order of grace.

22 Cf, Dict théol., art. “Palamas.”

archangels.” ** A similar text is quoted from the works of Dionysius.?° St. Thomas replies: “Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension,” not of the merely intuitive vision. And he proves this by quoting what Chrysostom says farther on in this text about Dionysius; “He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son.” Indeed the words of Chrysostom here are directed against the Anomoeans, who said that they see God as God sees Himself.2¢

In the fourteenth century, the Beguines and Beghards likewise erred on this point, and were condemned in the ecumenical Council of Vienne. They asserted “that any intellectual nature whatever is naturally blessed in itself, and that the soul does not need the light of glory, elevating it to see God and to enjoy seeing Him in this blissful state.” 27 This means that the beatific vision is not only possible, but natural.

Later on Baius denied the gratuity of our elevation to the order of grace and glory, admitting a natural and efficacious desire in us for the beatific vision, as a gift due to our nature or as not being one to which we have no claim, and which is not gratuitous. He said: “The elevation and exaltation of human nature to a participation in the divine nature was due to it because of its original state of integrity; hence it must be declared natural and not supernatural.” 23 He likewise asserted that “the opinion of those is absurd, who say that in the beginning man was raised above his natural state by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, so that he might worship God by the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity.” 29

He also said: “That distinction between the two kinds of love, namely, the natural by which God is loved as the author of nature, and the gratuitous by which God is loved as the beatifier, is vain and false, its purpose being to ridicule Scripture and the very many testimonies of ancient writers.” ®° All these condemnations are of the greatest importance, for they are a condemnation of the natural and efficacious desire for the beatific vision. This desire is called efficacious, not that the beatific vision would exceed the exigencies, but only the powers, of our nature; for the beatific vision, like the elevation and exaltation of human nature to a participation in the

26 Consult the commentary of Francis Silvius on this article.

divine nature, would be due to this nature and not gratuitous. This means the denial of the gratuity of grace itself.

It must be noticed that subsequently the ontologists expressed a preference for this error, as is evident from their condemned propositions, such as the following ones: “The immediate and at least habitual knowledge of God, is so essential to the human intellect that without it nothing can be known; it is indeed the very light of the intellect.” “That being, which is in all things and without which nothing is perceived by the intellect, is the divine being.” 31 If the beatific vision were such as just stated, then there would be no essential distinction between the formal object of this vision and that of natural knowledge; but the formal object of each would be the same, known confusedly at first and afterward distinctly, just as we say that the formal object of natural reason is specifically the same in the rustic and the great metaphysician, though known in a different way by each, since it is known vaguely by the former and clearly by the latter. This would do away with the essential distinction between the two orders of nature and grace,

Semirationalists, such as Frohschammer, said about the same.** Their doctrine was more explicitly condemned in the Vatican Council, which most clearly affirmed “that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object.” 33

Finally Pius X, in his Encyclical Pascendi, says against several modern apologists who stressed excessively our natural aspirations and came near teaching the error of Baius: “We cannot refrain from once more and very strongly deploring the fact that there are Catholics who, while repudiating immanence as a doctrine, nevertheless employ it as a system of apologetics; they do so, we may say, with such a lack of discretion that they seem to admit in human nature not only a capacity and fittingness for the supernatural order, both of which Catholic apologists, with due reservations, have always demonstrated, but they assert that it truly and vigorously demands the same. As we may more truly say, however, this need of the Catholic religion is attacked by the modernists, who seek to be looked upon as more moderate in their views. For those whom we may call integralists want it to be taken for a ‘demonstrated fact that there is this latent supernatural germ in the unbeliever, which was transmitted to mankind from the consciousness of Christ.” 3t

The second part of this encyclical rejects the opinion of those who wish to find in our nature (which for them is in a process of becoming) the germ of the Christian life, which thus would not be strictly supernatural. The first part rejects the natural desire that postulates the beatific vision, or proves effective of the same. This would be to revive the error of Baius, who said: “The exaltation of human nature to a participation in the divine nature, was due to it because of its original state of integrity; hence it must be declared natural and not supernatural.” 35

What we have said suffices concerning mutually conflicting errors, that is, those that are such either by defect or by excess. But from this we already have the beatific vision correctly explained, especially if these mutually conflicting errors are taken exactly into consideration. Similarly, in the question on grace, the doctrine that is of faith is already to a great extent explained by a careful consideration of the Pelagian and Semipelagian errors, and of Predestinationism, Protestantism, and Jansenism.

THE TESTIMONY OF SACRED SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION CONCERNING THE BEATIFIC VISION

The aforesaid definitions of the Church are more explicit propositions of the truth that is already contained in the deposit of revelation, namely, in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.

The principal texts of Sacred Scripture, as Tradition has interpreted them, must here be quoted.*¢

In St. Matthew’s Gospel we read: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” ** This text is explained by the following one: “See that you despise not one of these little ones; for I say to you, that their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father who is in heaven.” 38 These words refer of course to the angels; but from this text and several other texts of the Gospel it is clear that our heavenly happiness, as regards the object seen, does not differ from that of the angels.

Moreover, St. John says: “In that day you shall know that I am in My Father, and you in Me and I in you.” 3 “That they all may be

86 On this point consult Petavius, Dogmata theologica, Vol. 1, Bk. VII, chaps. 5, 6, p. 593; Rouet de Journel, S.J., Enchiridion Patristicum (theological index, nos. 105, 607).

one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us. . . . Father, I will that where I am, they also whom Thou hast given Me may be with Me; that they may see My glory which Thou hast given Me, because Thou hast loved Me before the creation of the world.” 4° The words “I will that where I am” are explained elsewhere by the Evangelist in these words: “We testify what we have seen. ... And no man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven.*

Similarly, in his first epistle St. John says: “Beloved, we are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” 42 However, if God's essence is not known by an intuitive vision, but by means of a created image, then this cannot be called “seeing Him as He is”; for a created image is something altogether imperfect with reference to God considered just as He is in Himself. This will be more fully explained in the following text.

Lastly St. Paul says: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known.” #

This means that we know God at present through a mirror, namely, the mirror of created things, even if it is a question of the knowledge acquired by faith which is a gift of God; for the mysteries of faith are expressed according to concepts, for instance, of nature and person, and these are obtained from created things. Likewise it is said that “we see in a dark manner” because of the obscurity in the mysteries of faith, which is not an immediate and clear knowledge of these just as they are in themselves, but a knowledge that rests solely on God’s testimony confirmed by divine signs. “But then face to face,” which means that God will be directly seen. And this is confirmed by the last words of the text, “as I am known.” But God’s knowledge of us is absolutely perfect, for the Scripture says: “All things are naked and open to His eyes.” **

There is, however, some difficulty about the expression “face to face,” for the Scripture says: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” ** It also says:

40 [bid., 17: 21-24. See also commentaries of St. Augustine and St. Thomas on St. John's Gospel. i

“And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face.” 4 In fact, we also read that after Jacob had seen the angels and heard God’s message, he said: “I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved.” #7 This text does not refer, however, to the immediate vision of God’s essence, because, as stated in this text, Jacob fought with the angel who appeared in a sensible form, and he received only God's blessing and had his name changed.

The reply to this difficulty is that the expression “face to face” in these passages from the Old Testament is materially the same as the text quoted from St. Paul’s epistle,** but the words of this text are to be taken in a more sublime sense, as is evident from the context: “Then I shall know even as I am known.”

St. Thomas explains these texts of the Old Testament farther on in this question. He says: “So when Jacob says, ‘I have seen God face to face,’ this does not mean the divine essence, but some figure representing God ..., or that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.” 49

It is no wonder, however, that this expression “face to face” is not used exactly in the same sense in the Old Testament and in the text just quoted from St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians; for the expression is analogical and metaphorical. Therefore God's appearance in some sensible form first suggests itself to us in this utterance; but it is afterward understood in a nobler sense of God's immediate manifestation without any intervening sensible image. Finally it must be said that not all the Fathers declared that this text of St. Paul refers strictly to the beatific vision. Nevertheless this is commonly admitted, because the text concerns our knowledge as it will be in heaven, which transcends faith and all the charismata.®° In the Old Testament there is veiled reference to the beatific vision, as in the following text: “I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear.” 51

As early as the second century we find the Fathers speaking of the beatific vision. Among them is St. Irenaeus, who says: “(God) grants this to those who love Him, namely, to see Him, which the prophets also prophesied. . . . For man does not see God by his own powers. But when He pleases He is seen by men, by whom He

50 Cf. Estius, In omnes canonicas apostolorum epistolas, Vol. 1, in ep. ad Cor., 13: 12.

wills, and when He wills, and as He wills.” 52 Likewise, too, St. Cyprian says: “What will be the glory and how great the joy, to be admitted to see God, to be honored with the companionship of Christ the Lord Thy God, and experience the joy of salvation and light eternal!” 5* Petavius ** quotes the principal texts from the Fathers, and explains several passages in the works of St. Chrysostom and St. Basil, who seem at first sight to deny the immediate vision of God, whereas from the context it is clear that these Fathers are speaking against the Anomoeans, who said that the merely natural power of the intellect is sufficient not only for the intuitive but also for the comprehensive vision of God, as St. Thomas remarks." Long before the scholastic period, even the Stoics knew that comprehension means complete perception; for Zeno distinguished between simple sensation and comprehensive perception, comparing the former to the unclenched hand, and the latter to the clenched hand, which grasps what it holds. Thus St. John Chrysostom defines the comprehensive vision as the adequate knowledge which the Father has of the Person of His Son.**

THE BEATIFIC VISION AND THE VIEWS OF NON-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS

As for the ancient philosophers, it must be noted that Plato spoke of the future life especially in his Phaedo, and in a mythical manner about the contemplation of the supreme Good. But in another of his works? he says that the Idea of the Good is the source of all truth and intelligence, so that it appears to transcend intelligible essence and intellection.

For Plotinus ** the supreme hypostasis, namely, the One-Good, transcends intelligence (the second hypostasis, which consists of a certain duality of subject and object), and therefore the supreme Good cannot be seen, but is known by a certain obscure and mystic contact.®®

Among modern philosophers, Spinoza ®© had a pantheistic conception of the vision of God. He held that there is but one substance, which is endowed with two attributes, namely, thought and

56 Hom. XIV. Consult also St. Augustine, De civil. Dei, XXII, 29, 30; Retractationes, Bk. I, chap. 13; De Trinitate, Bk. IX, chap. 11; Bk. XV, chap. 9.

extension; and just as our bodies are finite modes of infinite extension, so our intellect is a finite mode of divine thought. Among men, however, those are immortal who attain to the idea of God, which is an eternal and not a transitory mode of God. Thus there is a certain impersonal immortality, and beatitude consists in a certain knowledge of God from which proceeds the intellectual love of God. He says: “The intellectual love of the mind for God is the very love of God by which He loves Himself, or the intellectual love of the mind for God is a part of the infinite love by which God loves Himself.” *

All this results from the pantheistic definition of substance, in which abstract being is confused with the divine being, from which Spinoza seeks to deduce all things geometrically, according to the principles of absolute determinism. Thus the denial of God's liberty results in the denial of the possibility of supernatural revelation and of miracles. In fact, this means the absolute denial of everything supernatural even in God, because the divine naure is identified with our nature. Human nature cannot be elevated to the supernatural order, since there is now no real and essential distinction between it and the divine nature.*?

But it is quite clear that Spinoza was wrong, as stated above, ® in confusing abstract being with the divine being, by conceiving infinite extension as one of God’s attributes. He never did succeed in deducing from God the finite modes of extension and thought, for he considered the successive series of these as eternal.

Against this mental attitude toward God, it has already been established that He is the self-subsisting, absolutely simple and immutable Being, and thus He is really and essentially distinct from the changeable and composite world. There can be no finite modes in God, which could be considered as His accidents, because the self-subsisting Being is not capable of further determination. He is pure Act without any admixture of potency.

HOW DOES ST. THOMAS DEFEND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BEATIFIC VISION IN THIS ARTICLE AND IN PARALLEL PASSAGES?

This article consists of three parts: (1) the reason for doubting this vision; (2) the opinion of those heretics who deny this truth; (3) refutation of opinion because it is opposed to the faith and

62 The same, too, must be said of pantheistic Brahmanism from which Buddhism is derived.

because the denial of the possibility of the beatific vision is against reason.

In the first part it is proved that God is in Himself supremely knowable; because everything is knowable according as it is actual. But God is pure Act. Thus Aristotle said that the pure Act is both supreme intelligence and the supreme intelligible. But this in some measure is directed against Plotinus, who held that the first hypostasis, the One-Good, transcends intelligence (second hypostasis) and essence. Nevertheless Plotinus admitted a superintellection in the first hypostasis.

Furthermore St. Thomas remarks: “But what is supremely knowable in itself may not be knowable to a particular intellect on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun which is supremely visible cannot be seen by the bat on account of the excess of light.” 6 Aristotle had alluded to this.** Hence there is reason for doubting this vision, since the created intellect, not as an intellect, but as it is created and weak or deficient, is like the owl in this respect.

The second part of this article reports the opinion of those who “held that no created intellect can see the essence of God.” Thus several Neoplatonists, followers of Plotinus, said that finite intellects, even in a state of supreme ecstasy, cannot see God, or the first hypostasis, but are only in mystic and obscure contact with Him. Similarly, in the pontificate of Innocent III, as we remarked, the Amalricians denied the possibility of the immediate vision of God’s essence.

The third part of this article proves the falsity of denying the possibility of the beatific vision, both because that denial is “opposed to the faith” and because it is “against reason.”

It is said to be “opposed to the faith,” at least as an erroneous doctrine. In fact, St. Thomas says: “This point of view cannot be upheld, since it is heretical.” © Several definitions of the Church have made this increasingly clear, especially the definition of Benedict XI.%

St. Thomas shows that the opinion is opposed to faith, since it is of faith that our ultimate happiness is to be found in God. But, as Aristotle declares,“* man’s ultimate happiness consists in his highest operation, which is intellection. And any being whatever is perfect in so far as it attains to its principle, as even the Neoplatonists said.

There is still a difficulty concerning the natural premise which is here posited, for it must be proved that ultimate happiness does not consist in the abstract knowledge of God, but in the intuitive and absolutely direct knowledge of Him. It may be said, as John of St. Thomas observes, that a thing is perfect by the fact that it is united to its principle according to its capacity.

In reply to this we say that this immediateness is sufficiently established by the Scripture passages quoted above and from the definitions of the Church, and especially, since the time of St. Thomas, from the definition of Benedict XI.

Finally it is shown that the denial of the possibility of the beatific vision is against reason. This means that reason cannot demonstrate the impossibility of this vision, or the possibility of this vision cannot be proved false; moreover, it is reasonably defended against those who deny it.

A natural desire cannot be to no purpose. But every man naturally desires to know the cause when he sees the effect. ‘Therefore it is against reason to say that no created intellect can see God.

Much has been written by the commentators of St. Thomas about this argument.®? We must first see how St. Thomas enunciates this argument in other parts of his works. ‘Thus in one passage he says: “The object of the intellect is what a thing is, that is, the essence of a thing, according to De anima, Bk. III. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection in so far as it knows the essence of a thing... . Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in man the desire to know about that cause, what it is. . . . Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the first Cause.” 1° Elsewhere he says: “This natural and imperfect knowledge the angels have of God does not set their natural desire to rest, but rather urges it on to see the divine substance.” 7

From these and other places the argument is thus better construed as follows: A natural desire cannot be void or tend to something that is impossible."? But there is in man a natural desire to know not only whether there is a cause, but also what it is in itself. Therefore to know the essence of the first cause, as it is in itself, does not seem impossible to man, that is, there does not seem to be

69 This has been more fully explained in another work. Cf. De revelatione, 1 376-403.

72 It is the possibility of the beatific vision rather than the fact of this vision that is defended by St. Thomas in this article. For our elevation to the supernatural order, as our Catholic faith teaches, depends on God's free will; in fact it is absolutely gratuitous since it is essentially supernatural.

any ineptitude in man for this possibility of being elevated; and therefore the denial of this possibility is “against reason.”

A doubt arises concerning the meaning and force of this argument. Several have objected that it proves too much or not enough.

It proves, of course, too much, if it is a question of a natural and efficacious desire, or of an exigency for the beatific vision; for, in such a case, this vision would be due to our nature and not gratuitous, as Baius and later on Jansenius said, who appealed to St. Thomas’ argument in defense of their opinion. Such an interpretation of this argument would evidently prove too much; for it would prove also the beatific vision itself and would lead to a confusion between the two orders of nature and grace.

It does not prove enough, however, if it is a question of a conditional and inefficacious natural desire, or of a velleity; for this velleity can be frustrated and be ineffective. In fact, perhaps it tends toward an impossibility, just as if anyone, thinking that the intuitive vision of God must be also comprehensive, were to desire conditionally and inefficaciously not only the intuitive but also the comprehensive vision of God, which latter is incommunicable. But to desire conditionally is to desire on condition that the thing desired be possible, as if, for instance, one were to desire to have wings on condition that such be possible.

Moreover, there is another difficulty, inasmuch as a perfect, abstractive knowledge of the essence of the first Cause is all that is required for the explanation of things in nature, because God is the cause of things not by reason of His essence, acting from a necessity of His nature, but by a most free intervention of His intellect and will. Therefore, to explain things in nature, it suffices for us to know that the first Cause is endowed with intellect and will. Contrary to this, for a perfect explanation of sanctifying grace, which is participation in the divine nature, we would have to see God’s essence.

The Thomists, especially those after the time of Baius, generally reply to this difficulty by observing that St. Thomas is certainly not speaking of an unconditional and efficacious natural desire or one of exigence. Therefore he has in mind a conditional and inefficacious desire, by reason of which we defend not the existence but the probability of the beatific vision, and are intimately persuaded of the same, although it is not conclusively proved. We have evidence of this from the following observations.

1. St. Thomas certainly is not speaking of a natural efficacious desire but of an inefficacious one. For, in his opinion, there is no natural efficacious and necessitating desire except with reference to good that is proportionate to and due to our nature. He says: “Everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to I Cor. 2: g: Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.” 13 Likewise, on the necessity of grace for the angels, he says: “To see God in His essence is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the motion of the will directed toward such beatitude unless it is moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace.” ™ Similarly when defining predestination, he says: “The end toward which created things are directed by God is twofold. One is that which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, which consists in seeing God, and this is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (q. 12, a.4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature.” 15 Elsewhere, too, he says: “Man’s ultimate end is twofold; one kind, the happiness to which philosophers refer, is proportionate to human nature; the other is a good that exceeds the proportion of human nature.” *¢

It is therefore certain that St. Thomas has not in mind in this article an unconditional and efficacious, or exigitive natural desire; for he most certainly holds that grace and glory are gratuitous gifts, which are in no way due either to our nature or to the angelic nature.

2. But if the natural desire here in question is not unconditional and efficacious, it must be conditional and inefficacious, This means that to see God’s essence would be supreme happiness, if God were freely to raise me so as to make this immediate vision possible.

74 Ibid., la, q.62, a.2. In the reply to the first objection of this article, St. Thomas says: “The angel naturally loves God, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.” It is this distinction which Francis Silvius (Ferrariensis) stresses, and rightly so, in his commentary on the Third Book of the Contra Genies, the fifty-first chapter. And so we find very many Thomists saying that there is in man not an innate, but a naturally elicited, conditional, and inefficacious desire to see God’s essence as He is the author of nature (but not the triune God, as He is the author of grace; for in this most sublime aspect,

God is not known in a natural way). So say John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Gotti, Billuart, and others.

76 [bid., la, q.23, a... 76 De verit, q.27, a.2. For this same doctrine, consult the treatises on grace: la Iae, q.109, a.5, 6; q.112, a.3; q.114, a.5; on the necessity of the theological virtues, Ia Iae, q.62, a.1 ad 1um et ad gum; on the necessity of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, Ia Hae, q.68, a.2.

One may raise the objection that the words “conditional” and “inefficacious,” in use among the Thomists, especially after the time of Baius, do not occur in the works of St. Thomas. We reply that it is certain from the passages quoted from the works of St. Thomas that this natural desire is not efficacious, and is therefore inefficacious. But the ineflicacious desire supposes a condition which, as a matter of fact, may not be realized.

A general explanation is given of this in the passage in which St. Thomas distinguishes between God’s will to save all mankind, which is conditional and efficacious, and His efficacious will to save the elect. In this passage St. Thomas shows that “a thing, taken in its primary sense, may be good,” 77 and desired (such as the salvation of all men), which, however, taking all things into consideration, is not absolutely or efficaciously but only conditionally willed. St. Thomas then goes on to say: “Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, namely, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will.” 78

Similarly, as regards ourselves, to see God's essence, on first consideration, is a good and one that is desired; but, taking all things into consideration, this vision does not appear to be naturally possible; it is made possible, however, only by a gratuitous elevation of our nature. Hence this desired good is not willed absolutely and efficaciously, but conditionally. Thus wings for flying would be good for us, if this were granted to us; and the same is to be said of even some better gift. To continue to live is a desirable good, but on condition that this privilege be granted by God as a preternatural gift.

Hence in this article St. Thomas, speaking of the natural desire of seeing God’s essence, has in mind a desire that is not efficacious, but inefficacious; and it is inefficacious because it is conditional, since it presupposes our free elevation to this order. Otherwise this elevation to grace would be due to our nature, which is a heresy that destroys the very notion of grace, and there is not the slightest doubt that St. Thomas most certainly held this doctrine, even before the Church condemned the heresy of Baius.

On the accepted terminology concerning the division of the appetite or of love

The division as commonly accepted among theologians may be clearly presented by the following schema: 7° of charity supernatural of hope : necessary Love innate o natural n efficacious elicited 4 free J conditional and inefficacious

Love is called natural when it proceeds from a natural principle, and not from grace. On the contrary, it is called supernatural when it proceeds from a supernatural principle, namely, from grace, or from charity, or hope, or even from actual grace that disposes one for habitual grace. Even “the pious impulse to believe,” 8° required for unformed faith, is supernatural, The following proposition of Baius is condemned: “That distinction between the two kinds of love, namely, the natural by which God is loved as the author of nature, and the gratuitous by which God is loved as the beatifier, is vain and lying, and is devised in ridicule of Sacred Scripture and the very many testimonies of the ancients.” $t This distinction is frequently formulated by St. Thomas, as when he says: “The angel does naturally love God, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.” 8?

Natural love is of two kinds, innate and elicited. The innate desire is, so to speak, a very tendency or natural inclination for good, before the good is apprehended. Thus the plant instinctively and of necessity seeks the light of the sun.** Similarly we speak of the sensitive appetite (concupiscible and irascible) and of the rational appetite, which are faculties of our soul. But all creatures,

79 See Cajetan’s Com. on Ta, q.19, a.1; also John of St. Thomas on Ia, q.12, 2.1. Also commentaries of Salmanticenses and Gonet on q.12, a.1. Against Baius and the Jansenists, consult Billuart, De gratia, diss. III, a.4.

82 Summa theol., Ia, q.62, a.2 ad 1um. Cf. Gardeil, O.P., Dictionaire de théologie catholique, art. “Appétit.”

each in its way, thus naturally love God, the author and preserver of nature.** Thus in the physical order it is natural for the part to love the whole more than itself, and so the hand is naturally exposed to ward off a blow on the body, and especially on the head; otherwise this would mean the perversion of a natural inclination.®*

The elicited love is that by which the knower, after apprehending the good, starts out in pursuit of it. And just as cognition, which directs this movement, is an act elicited by the cognitive faculty, so this is an act elicited by the appetitive faculty.

The elicited act is of two kinds. It is either necessary, or free and elective. The act is necessary when its object is universally good, so that all men necessarily (at least as regards the specification of the act) love happiness as such, or necessarily will to be happy, even when they do not as yet know in what true happiness consists in the concrete. The free or elective love is concerned with an object that is not universally good, or that is proposed as an object of indifferent judgment.*?

Lastly, love is said to be efficacious, or else it is conditional and inefficacious. The efficacious presupposes a judgment on the goodness and natural attainableness of the object desired. “The conditional and inefficacious love presupposes a judgment on the goodness and natural unattainableness of the object desired.** ‘Thus man would will not to die, and this would be good for him if such a preternatural gift were granted to him, as was granted to man in the state of innocence. This last mentioned appetite is a velleity. This good is most desirable, but it is naturally unattainable. I would wish it if God freely gave me the means for attaining it. What a happiness this would be! Lastly, this velleity is either explicit or implicit, according as the object desired and the presupposed condition are either clearly or confusedly known.

THE VARIOUS OPINIONS OF THE THEOLOGIANS

In the eighteenth century, the Augustinians Noris and Berti 8° were of the opinion that there is a natural and innate. desire in us for the intuitive vision of God. In a way this desire is efficacious, though not as Baius meant. For the intuitive vision of God con-

88 Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a.2, Solv. objectiones; also diss. IIl, a.4. 89 Berti opera, Bk. V, diss. II, chap. 1, nos. 1, 8.

stitutes our natural enG in the appetitive order, but it is our supernatural end as regards its attainment and the means for attaining it.

Criticism. This opinion scarcely differs from Baianism, since it does not uphold the absolute distinction prevailing between the natural and the supernatural orders. By way of retaining some semblance of a distinction, it denies the principle of finality. For God as the Author of nature would have given us an innate appetite (a sort of ponderousness of nature) for the end, toward which as the Author of nature He could not direct us. Thus there would be no relation between the efficient and final causes. This would mean the violation of the corollary to the principle of finality, that every agent acts for a proportionate end.

The view of Scotus °° is that we have a desire for the intuitive vision of God, which is both innate and natural, though inefficacious. The reason is that this most sublime happiness is the fitting and final end of all human beings, and therefore the innate appetite has its foundation therein. But it is not efficaciously desired, since not all have a knowledge of this happiness.

Criticism. The only conclusion we can draw from the reason given by Scotus is that we have a natural and innate appetite for happiness as such, but not for the beatific vision; for this vision is not so in agreement with our nature as to be proportionate to it.

Moreover, the general view taken by the Thomists % is that the desire of seeing God’s essence cannot be innate, and if it were innate then it would have to be efficacious. For the innate appetite, as distinct from the elicited, implies in the object desired a natural relation and positive fittingness, which have their foundation in the very nature of the one desiring, even before there is any knowledge of this desired good. Now there is not in our nature any natural relation and positive fittingness for an object that is essentiall supernatural, but only an obediential potency or possibility of being clevated to this order. Therefore our nature is not endowed with an innate and natural appetite, which would be a sort of ponderousness of nature for the immediate vision of God. In fact, if there were this appetite, it would be, for this very reason, efficacious; for, inasmuch as the desire is the result of a conditional judgment, it is inefficacious. Thus I would wish this naturally attainable good if God were freely to elevate me to this order. The innate appetite, however, is not the result of knowledge, but springs from nature itsclf and corresponds to the forces or at least the exigencies of

90 Cf. in Prol. Sent., q-1; in IV Sent., d.49, q- 10. 91 De veritate, q.22, a.7; q.14, a.2. 2 Sce John of St. Thomas, Com. in lam, q-12, disp. XII, a.3, no. 8.

nature; hence it is not concerned with that to which nature is not entitled, but with that to which it is entitled.

Furthermore, it must be said that if Scotus’ opinion were true, then God as the Author of nature would have given it an innate appetite, a ponderousness of nature, for an end to which He could not bring it as the Author of nature, as already stated against the Augustinians Berti and Noris. Thus there would be no relation between the efficient and final causes, as demanded by the principle of finality, which states that every agent acts for a proportionate end.

Lastly, this innate appetite which Scotus speaks of, would be both essentially natural as being a property of nature, and essentially supernatural inasmuch as its object of specification would be formally supernatural. Nor can it be said to be specified by an entitatively supernatural object, but by one that is naturally and, as it were, materially known; for this appetite, being innate, independently of any knowledge whatever would tend toward God as He is in Himself. Thus there would be a natural tendency in our nature toward something essentially supernatural, which is a contradiction in terms and which would end in the denial of the distinction between the two orders, as it would also mean the univocity of being, which, according to the doctrine of Scotus, is included in this opinion.

It must be observed that the Thomists consider this final criticism a valid argument in refutation of the theory of an active obediential potentiality admitted by Suarez in his search of a via media between the view of Scotus and that of St. Thomas. This active obediential potentiality, as the Thomists generally admit,” would be both essentially natural, since it is a property of the nature, and essentially supernatural, since it is specified by an essentially supernatural object. Suarez admitted only a natural desire that is elicited and inefficacious, however, as regards the beatific vision, and in this he differed from Scotus.

In opposition to the view of Suarez, according to the view held by St. Thomas and the Thomists, the obediential potentiality is passive, and, as its name implies, refers directly to an agent of a higher order whom it obeys and from whom it receives this supernatural elevation and relation or positive fitness for this essentially supernatural object.” Hence for the Thomists the obediential potentiality is nothing else, as John of St. Thomas shows,” but a

93 Cf, ibid., q. 12, disp. XIV, a.2, no. 11; also Billuart, De Deo, diss. IV, a. 5, § 3.

94 Summa theol., Ula, q. 11, a. 1; q-1, a3 ad gum; Quaest. Disp., de virtutibus in communi, a. 10 ad gum et gum; Compendium theologiae, chap. 104.

potentiality that denotes a possibility of being elevated to the order of grace and glory.

Cajetan’s opinion. It differs radically from that held by Scotus. He says: “In convincing proof of what we have said, understand that the rational creature can be considered in two ways, either absolutely or as ordained to happiness. If the rational creature is considered absolutely, then the natural] desire is for that which is within the scope of the natural faculty; and thus I concede that there is no natural desire of seeing God absolutely as He is in Himself. But if the rational creature is considered in the second sense, then it naturally desires to see God, because, as such, it has knowledge of certain effects, namely, those of grace and glory, God being the cause of these, considered as He is absolutely in Himself and not as universal agent. But when the effects are known, then it is natural for any intellect whatever to desire to know the cause of these.” °° And Cajetan adds that St. Thomas is here speaking as a theologian; hence it is a question of the natural desire of the creature ordained by God to eternal life.”

Criticism. Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis) and several other Thomists have attacked this opinion of Cajetan in their commentaries. After quoting Cajetan’s opinion, Ferrariensis says: “But this does not seem to be the view of St. Thomas. . . . For the reason given by St. Thomas (Ia, q.12, a.1, and Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chap. 50) is not restricted to the knowledge of the effects of grace and glory, but is also concerned with knowledge of whatsoever effects and with knowledge of every cause. . . . (Moreover) it would then follow that only those who know the supernatural effects of grace and glory would have such a desire; but this conclusion is false, for, as St. Thomas says (Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chaps. 51, 57), every intellectual being has this desire.” ° Therefore it is not a question of a natural desire for eternal life. So writes Ferrariensis, and very many Thomists are of the same opinion, such as Bannez, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, Gotti, and others.®

It must furthermore be remarked that the desire which Cajetan speaks of, cannot be called natural, absolutely as such, but is natural only in a relative sense, or is connatural; and once the effects of grace are known, it is truly a supernatural and efficacious desire that proceeds either from infused hope or from charity. On the

97 Consult also Cajetan’s Opusc., III, tr. 7.

99 Consult their commentaries on the Summa theol., Ia, q-12, a.1; also their treatises De gratia: Whether the state of pure nature was possible.

contrary, St. Thomas is referring to an absolutely natural desire that originates from a knowledge of natural effects, as is evident especially from a passage in which he discusses this desire arising in the angels from their natural knowledge of God as mirrored in their essence.

In fact, we even find that this natural desire, which originates from a knowledge of natural effects, is truly and wonderfully described by Plato. For he teaches that, in accordance with the ascendant dialectic of love, we must first love beautiful bodies, sounds, colors, and then, in a loftier flight, proceed to love the beauty of the soul. But since the intrinsic worth of the soul consists in glorious actions which have their foundation in the best of precepts and maxims, we must love sublime teachings which are the rule of human actions. But the excellence of these teachings is derived from the extraordinary perfection of the supreme science, whose object is the self-subsisting Beauty and Goodness. Then he goes on to say: “This beauty, O Socrates, in the first place is eternal, neither coming into being nor perishing, never increasing or decreasing. . . . It is the absolute and eternal beauty, in which all other beauties participate, without inducing in it by their birth or destruction the least diminution or increase. But what a felicitous sight shall we not deem it to be, if one were to gaze upon the genuine, perfect, pure and simple beauty ... beholding that divine unvarying beauty . . . ? Do you not think that (a man who attains to this contemplation of God) acquires no longer the semblance of virtues but real virtues . . . , since by this he will be the friend of God and by all means will be immortal?” 1°

Hence Plato rises from the consideration of natural effects to the knowledge of the existence of the supremely Good and Beautiful. Expressing this as a velleity, he says: “What an immense happiness this would be for man if he could directly see this supreme Good!” Of course traditional religious beliefs contributed to this view of Plato, as did also his exaggerated realism; but even excluding these, it is possible to attain this end by the way of ascendant dialectic.1°

Lastly, we must say that even Cajetan seems in some measure to concede what Ferrariensis asserts, for, after repeating the reply quoted above from his commentary,” he says: “Yet in a special sense . . . it can be said that the human intellect, knowing of

102 For this desire of Plato and the Platonists, consult St. Augustine’s De civitate Dei, Bk. VIIL, chap. 8.

God’s existence and of His general attributes, naturally desires to know what He is, inasmuch as He is included in the category of causes, and not absolutely as He is, except as a certain consequence of this previous knowledge. And this is true, because we are naturally inclined, on seeing the effect, to desire to know the cause whatever this may be. Hence take note, thou beginner, that to know God's essence is the same as to see it. This point is made clear, of course, in the proof of the last article of this question.” 1°

THE MORE COMMON OPINION AMONG THE THOMISTS

This question was very much disputed in the schools during the time of Baius and Jansenius; then the Thomists, so as to avoid all equivocation, by more explicit definitions restricted the application of the terms used. But previous to this, Ferrariensis and Bannez had helped to solve the problem by introducing the finest of distincuions.

Ferrariensis said: “We naturally desire to see God in so far as He is the first Cause, but not as He is the object of supernatural happiness. For it can be known by the natural power of the intellect that God is the cause of other things, but it cannot be known in this way that He is the object of supernatural happiness.” 1° Thus the object of the aforesaid desire is clearly determined, but a certain difficulty remained about this desire subjectively considered.

However, Bannez offers the following explanation: “Man can have a natural appetite, that is, elicited by one’s natural powers, which is a certain conditional and inefficacious desire of seeing God... . For, if . . . St. Thomas were referring to the ponderousness of nature (or to an innate desire), then man would be inclined thereto even without having seen the effect. . . . I have said conditional, because by his natural powers man cannot be certain that such a good is possible. Thus man can desire and wish never to die, if this be possible. And although such a condition is not explicitly conceived by the mind, yet it is implicitly contained in the object, which is represented as good, and not as possible.” 196

Later on, many Thomists admit that man’s natural desire to see God's essence as He is the Author of nature, is not innate but elicited, conditional and ineflicacious,1°7 Furthermore, the Thomists

cs So say John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Gotti, Billuart, and others.

generally remark that this desire is also free, inasmuch as it is nota necessary act as regards the specification of the object.1°8

And so this desire is explained both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, a desire of seeing God’s essence as He is the Author of nature, but not as He is the triune God and the Author of grace; for this cannot be known in a natural way. Subjectively considered, this desire is said to be elicited, conditional and inefficacious.

It follows from this desire, as so conceived, that there is a natural knowledge of God’s natural effects and of His naturally knowable divine attributes. This natural knowledge, indeed, of God's attributes is imperfect, since the intimate reconciliations of several of these attributes is mysterious, for instance, the reconciliation of supreme immutability with supreme liberty, likewise of infinite and omnipotent goodness, with the permission of evil, or even of infinite mercy with infinite justice. Hence St. Thomas says: “Therefore this knowledge (so imperfect) does not set the natural desire to rest, but rather urges it on to see the divine substance,” 1° which means that the divine essence as constituting the foundation for the naturally knowable attributes, or God’s essence as He is the Author of nature, may clearly be known by the intellect. However, the essence is the same both in God as the Author of nature and in God as the Author of grace." Thus, therefore, the object of this natural desire is not formally supernatural, but only materially so, for it is by the natural light of reason that this object is known to be desirable or, as the Salmanticenses say, “the thing desired is materially supernatural, but not the reason for desiring it... ; for it is desired under the aspect of a certain maximum good.” 1

Thus there is an immense abyss between this natural desire and infused hope or charity. This distinction, which Baius eliminated, was long before expressed by St. Thomas when he wrote: “Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is

108 Cf Salianticenses, De Deo, tr. II, disp. I, dub. IV, no. 3. It is somewhat in disagreement with Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis), Suarez, Vasquez, and Valentia that the above statement is made.

110 As a matter of fact and righty so, there can be no immediate vision of God as He is the Author of nature without seeing Him as He is the Author of grace; for the Deity is the immediate object of this vision, which actually and implicidy contains both the naturally knowable attributes, and the divine subsistent relations by which the three divine Persons are constituted,

111 De Deo, tr. II, disp. I, dub. V, nos. 75, 77. Likewise John of St. Thomas, De gratia, disp. XX, a.1, Solv. obj., no. 5.

112 Denz., DO. 1034- the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God.” +38

Doubt. Can the possibility of this beatific vision be strictly demonstrated by the natural light of reason? In these latter days some have contended that from Cajetan’s time many of the great commentators of St. Thomas, including Bannez, John of St. Thomas, and the Salmanticenses, did not correctly interpret St. Thomas’ doctrine about the natural desire to see God's essence, because they did not properly distinguish between the order of possibility and the order of existence or, as we say, between the metaphysical order of intention and the physical order of execution." But having posited this distinction, we should have to say that from this natural desire, inasmuch as it arises from a knowledge of the natural effects of the first Cause, the possibility of the beatific vision can be strictly demonstrated by reason alone, and hence that there is an obediential capacity in our nature of being elevated to the order of grace. Yet this elevation and even the beatific vision must still be regarded as essentially supernatural, inasmuch as, in the order of existence, or in the physical order of execution, they are dependent on God's free and gratuitous good pleasure. And thus, as already stated, it is only in this latter order that this desire is conditional and inefficacious, although in the metaphysical order it is efficacious in demonstrating apodictically the possibility of the beatific vision.115

But is it true that from Cajetan’s time many commentators of St. Thomas did not correctly interpret his teaching about the natural desire, and that they erred in not admitting the metaphysical demonstrability by reason alone of the possibility of the beatific vision?

We have discussed this question at sufficient length in a recent book,!!® but it seems fitting at this point to explain briefly the fundamental reason for the traditional stand taken by the theologians. This reason may be regarded as the pith or germinal idea of an earlier work," though many of our readers are not sufficiently aware of this fact.

113 Summa theol., la Uae, q.109, a.g ad ium. See also Ia Ilae, q.26, a.3; De veritate, q.14, a.2; in I Cor., c. 13, lect. 4.

114 Cf. P. Mag. A. Fernandez, in the periodical Divus Thomas, nos. 1, 5, 6.

116 This last acceptation of the word “efficacious” does not seem to preserve the natural meaning of the words, because the desire is said to be efficacious as regards the attainment of the desired object and not as regards the demonstration of the possibility of this object.

116 Le Sens du mystère et le clair-obscur intellectuel, pp. 176-205.

The present problem resolves itself into this more general question, namely, whether the intrinsic possibility of essentially supernatural mysteries can be strictly demonstrated by reason alone.

1. The question is about their intrinsic possibility or their nonrepugnance objectively considered. ‘Thus we may ask whether the Trinity of divine Persons is really possible, extramentally, or really and in itself non-repugnant, and not merely so for us. What is for us non-repugnant, is something whose non-repugnance is urged and defended against those denying it, although it is not positively and apodictically demonstrated.

2. We are concerned here with essentially supernatural mysteries, those that are intrinsically supernatural and entitatively so as regards their substance or essence. Such are the Trinity, the Incarnation, grace and glory. We are not concerned with those that are supernatural only in the mode of their production, such as the resurrection of the dead in whom natural life is supernaturally restored.

3. The reference here is to a metaphysical or apodictic demonstration, and not merely to a very probable argument. The reference is also to a demonstration that is obtained solely by reasoning, or from the natural light alone of reason, which means that it is not dependent on revealed premises either explicitly or even implicitly presupposed. I say, even “implicitly” presupposed.

Moreover, it must be observed that very probable arguments, those proposed by the great doctors of the Church concerning divine truths, may be most profound or most sublime, without being apodictic. And the intellect, either human or angelic, can always continue to see more clearly the force of these arguments, which, however, may not be convincing. These great arguments of congruence compared with those that give us evidence and absolute certainty, are like polygons inscribed in a circle. The number of sides may be increased indefinitely, yet they will never be equal to and be identified with the circumference of the circle.

Such are the most profound arguments of congruence which, taken from the traditional teaching of the doctors of the Church, are advanced in defense of the possibility of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and other mysteries. In heaven we shall see how much truth there is in these arguments of congruence, which even the highest of the angels by his natural powers could always penetrate more deeply, and yet never acquire conviction of evidence in this state.

I. To the question as thus stated we reply according to the traditional teaching of the theologians as follows:

What is supernatural not only as to the mode of its production but also as to its essence, or entitatively, is likewise supernatural as to its knowableness, because truth and being are convertible. This major is a fundamental principle throughout theology, and its denial means the denial of truth and of the supernatural. But the intrinsic possibility of the aforesaid mysteries is the intrinsic possibility of the essentially supernatural. Therefore this possibility is supernatural as to its knowableness, and hence it cannot be apodictically demonstrated by the natural powers alone of any created intellect, either human or angelic, or even any creatable intellect.

The major is evident, for it concerns the essentially supernatural, that which is “far removed from our knowledge” not only in its contingent aspect, like future contingent things of the natural order which depend on God’s most free good pleasure (for instance, the hour when this material world will come to an end), or even future miracles (such as the resurrection of the dead), but also in its aspect of intrinsic supernaturalness. There is no doubt that truth and being are convertible. As St. Thomas says: “The true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance (anything is knowable inasmuch as it has being); while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested.” 18 There must be, or course, a proportion between the manifestation and the manifested. Hence what is essentially supernatural can be known formally as such only in a supernatural way (clearly by the beatific vision, obscurely by infused faith, and as virtually revealed by sacred theology).1?

In other words, what is essentially supernatural cannot be known in a natural way, because there is no necessary and evident connection between it and things of the natural order. If it were so related, then it would become a philosophical truth, as is the case with natural truths about God as the Author of nature. The supernatural mysteries about God properly belong to the order of naturally unknowable truths, for there is no necessary and evident connection between them and things of the natural order. We must include among these not only the Trinity and the Incarnation, but also the mystery of God's eternal life, which is essentially supernatural, since it is a formal participation of His intimate life.

It is indeed true that supernatural mysteries can be known materially by a natural and certain knowledge derived from the signs of divine revelation. In this way the mysteries are known by an acquired faith, which is the way the devil knows them.2° But

118 Summa theol., Ia, q.16, a.g ad 1um. 119 See a.4 of this question; also Ila Iae, q-6, ar, 120 Įbid., Ia Iae, q.5, a2.

apart from revelation and its signs, the mysteries are materially known only as probable, for there is no necessary and evident connection between them and natural things that are naturally knowable.121

Neither can it be strictly demonstrated that anything essentially supernatural (such as the beatific vision) is really possible, abstracting from its supernatural formality. In a word, such an object is not necessarily and evidently connected with things of the natural order,122

The minor is equally certain, for intrinsic possibility is evidently of the same order as the thing itself that is said to be possible. It is its non-repugnance to existence, not only considered as such by us, but as it is really so in itself.

Therefore the conclusion is that this intrinsic possibility or real non-repugnance, cannot be naturally known, and that it cannot be apodictically proved solely by the natural light of the human intellect or even of the angelic intellect. But, after this truth has been revealed, we are persuaded of this intrinsic possibility, or real non-repugnance, by congruent and even most profound arguments, which can always penetrate more deeply into the mystery; yet the arguments are not such as to become convincing.

Thus Billuart expresses the common opinion among theologians when he says: “That a positive and evident proof can be given that no contradiction is implied in this mystery (of the Trinity), this I deny; that a negative and probable argument can be given, this I concede. This suffices, indeed, so that this mystery cannot be declared impossible, yet not so as to be known as evidently possible.” 128 In like manner St. Thomas had said: “We can make use of philosophy in sacred doctrine ... by defending the faith against those who attack it, either by showing that their statements are false or that they are not convincing.” 124 For theology shows that the objections proposed against the possibility of the Trinity, the Incarnation, life cternal, and other mysteries, are not convincing. Thus this possibility is neither disproved nor positively and apodictically proved, but we are reasonably persuaded of the same. This

121 It can indeed be demonstrated by reason alone that there is an order of supernatural truths in God; but then these truths are known only negatively, as naturally unknowable truths. But to prove that the beatific vision is possible (a positive predication), it would have to be positively known and demonstrated that the Deity or the intimate life of God can be directly seen by the created intellect. The subject of this proposition, however, is not positively known by reason alone.

122 See synopsis at the end of this doubt.

123 Cursus theol., De Trinitate, diss. prooem., a. 4.

possibility is defended against those who deny it, and it is firmly held by faith.

II. This fundamental reason is without difficulty elucidated by examples, if we may be permitted further comment on this disputed point.

1. If the intrinsic possibility of the Trinity were demonstrated by reason alone, then its existence would be apodictically demonstrated, for the Trinity is not a contingent but a necessary truth, and in necessary things from their real possibility the existence of the same is legitimately inferred. This would mean the revival of the error of the semirationalists and of Rosmini, who said: ‘‘Provided the mystery of the Trinity has been revealed, its existence can be demonstrated by merely speculative arguments, though they are negative and indirect, so that by such arguments this truth is classed among the philosophical subjects and, like the rest of them, becomes a scientific proposition. If it were denied, the theosophical doctrine of pure reason would remain not only incomplete, but also abounding in every respect with absurdities, which would mean its utter extinction.” 125

2. If the real and intrinsic possibility of the Incarnation were demonstrated apodictically by reason alone, then it would be only because of its contingency that the Incarnation would transcend our natural knowledge, as being a future contingent of the natural order that is dependent on God’s most free good pleasure, such as is the hour when this material world will come to an end, or even when it came into existence. The Incarnation would no longer be an essentially supernatural mystery; at most it would be a miracle supernatural as to its mode of production, as the resurrection from the dead is, the possibility of which can indeed be strictly demonstrated, inasmuch as God is evidently the Author and Lord of nature, and hence of natural life, which He can miraculously restore. But the Incarnation is concerned not only with the miraculous restitution of natural life, but also with the essentially supernatural life of the Word and the hypostatic union of the same with the human nature.

3. Likewise, if the real possibility of the mystery of eternal life or of the light of glory and of the beatific vision were apodictically demonstrated solely by the light of reason, then the beatific vision and the light of glory required for this would no longer be substantially supernatural, for that which is substantially or essentially supernatural is by this very fact supernaturally knowable inasmuch as truth and being are convertible. These principles are absolutely necessary and absolutely fundamental, and they are not even examined by several of the more modern theologians, who seek to depart from the traditional stand.

If the real possibility of the beatific vision were apodictically proved by the sole light of reason, then this vision and the light of glory would transcend our natural knowledge solely by reason of their contingency, inasmuch as they depend on God’s most free’ good pleasure, like contingent futures of the natural order (such as the last day of the material world); and at most they would be reduced to what is supernatural as to its mode of production, like the resurrection from the dead or the glorification of the body.

Even if, leaving the light of glory out of consideration, the real and intrinsic possibility of the beatific vision were apodictically demonstrated by reason alone, then it would follow necessarily from this that we could deduce the real and intrinsic possibility of the supernatural gifts required for this vision, namely, of those gifts now called by us habitual grace and the light of glory. But the intrinsic possibility of habitual grace cannot be proved by reason alone; for then grace would no longer be essentially supernatural, but only as to the mode of its production, as when the natural life is supernaturally restored to the corpse by the resurrection. That a participation in God’s intimate life is possible or that it is communicable by way of participation, cannot be proved by reason alone. The possibility of grace is beyond the scope of demonstration.

Therefore the arguments deduced from reason alone concerning the intrinsic possibility of the beatific vision are indeed very probable, and as such most profound. They can always be more deeply penetrated by the intellect, whether human or angelic, yet they are not convincing, and compared with those arguments that give us evidence and certainty of conviction, they are like the polygon inscribed in a circle, since the number of its sides can always be increased. In fact, if these arguments of congruence were proposed as apodictic, then they would lose their force, since they do not come within the scope of demonstrability, but transcend it. What we are here discussing is indemonstrable because of the excess and not because of the deficiency of its light.

Hence the great commentators of St. Thomas, those who came after Cajetan (such as Bannez, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses), did not have a false conception of St. Thomas’ argument, which is founded on the natural desire to see God’s essence. It is still true to say that the possibility of the mystery of eternal life is neither disproved nor apodictically proved, but we are reasonably persuaded of the same. It is defended against those who deny it, and it is firmly held by faith.1?¢

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THIS REPLY

1. In God, that is said to be essentially supernatural which cannot be known through creatures, because there is no evident and necessary connection between creatures and this object. In God this is “that which is known to Himself and revealed to others.” 127 God is not here considered under the aspect of being, but in what intimately and most properly belongs to the notion of the Deity. And St. Thomas shows that the Trinity pertains to this order because “the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity.” 128

2. In those things extrinsic to God, the essentially supernatural is defined as that which is a formal participation of the Deity or of God’s intimate life (such as grace, the infused virtues, the gifts, the light of glory), and there is no evident and necessary connection between creatures and this object. Hence this object cannot be formally known by the natural power of the intellect, but only materially and this in various ways, as is evident from the following synopsis.

126 Some object that from the natural desire of secing God, the possibility of the beatific vision is at least indirectly and extrinsically but apodictically proved; for this desire is in transcendental relation to the beatific vision.

Reply. This desire would be in transcendental relation to the beatific vision, if it were a desire resulting either from infused hope or from charity. In created things only the essentially supernatural is transcendentally related to God's intimate life. It is the very definition of the created substantially supernatural. If any natural entity were to be actually in such positive relation to God’s intimate life, then grace would not be absolutely necessary, but only required for the easier performance of supernatural acts, as the Pelagians said.

Indeed, this natural desire of seeing God does not terminate formally but only materially in what is objectively supernatural, as was stated above. Otherwise it would be both essentially natural (as originating from nature) and essentially supernatural (as specified by a supernatural object).

That this would mean that the possibility of the beatific vision would be apodictically demonstrated, if the desire were efficacious, let this pass without comment; but the desire (unless the doctrine of Baius be adinitted) is conditional and inefficacious. It presupposes two conditions that have not yet been proved, namely, if the elevation be possible and if God will to grant it to us. Therefore this desire, since it presupposes the uncertainty of the possibility of this vision, does not enable us to give an apodictic proof of the same, but it serves as the basis for a probable argument of greater cogency, to be sure, though it has not the force of a demonstration. Reason alone can penetrate the essentially supernatural only by means of probable arguments, for it is beyond the scope of demonstration.

127 Summa theol., Ia, q.1, a.6; also Vatican Council, Denz., no. 1816. 128 [bid., Ia, q.32, a.1.

perfectly comprehensively by God alone as to its not comprehensively by the formally as quiddity blessed supernatural by infused faith and the gifts imperfectly) by sacred theology under the 4 guidance of virtual revelation from the signs of revelation, and it is thus The essentially known by the devil with the certainty of supernatural is acquired faith known : . materially negatively, and thus is proved in a less the existence of naturally unfótmial knowable truths in God aspect not from positively, and thus we are per- revelation | suaded of the possibility of the beatific vision from the natural desire to see God, the | Author of nature

What has been said suffices for the solution of this problem.1?9

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD IS SEEN BY THE CREATED INTELLECT THROUGH AN IMAGE

State of the question. That the beatific vision is enjoyed by the blessed is now known to be a revealed fact, and we have defended the possibility of this truth. In this question an inquiry must be made into those things that of necessity concur or do not concur in this vision, on the part both of the object seen and of the seer. In other words, on the part of the object seen, is it necessary or at least possible to have a species or similitude of God’s essence, and then on the part of the seer, must there be an infused light that fortifies the created intellect?

As regards the similitude on the part of the object seen, St. Thomas, in stating the question at issue, recalls the following text from St. Augustine: “When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us.’ *8° And he also says that the intellect, like the sensitive faculty, in the act of knowing is informed with the like-

129 This has been fully explained by us elsewhere. Cf. Revue Thomiste, March- April, 1936, “La possibilité de la grace est-elle rigoureusement démonstrable?” pp- 194-218. See also Revue Thomiste, 1933, pp. 669-88, and Angelicum, April, 1936, pp. 241-48.

ness of the thing to be known. Thus Aristotle says that in sensible things the object of sense perception is potentially intelligible, then, through the light brought to bear upon it by the active intellect, it becomes actually intelligible in the impressed intelligible species, and finally it is actually understood in the expressed species, or in the word, which is the medium in which the nature of the thing understood is understood, such as the nature of a stone or of a plant.

Therefore the question is whether in the beatific vision there is an infused intelligible species in the intellect, and also an expressed species or a meutal word.

This was not a question of minor importance for St. Thomas. We read in his life that, when his confrater Aegidius Romanus, after dying, appeared to him by God’s permission, St. Thomas asked him the following question: “Do you see God directly?” He received this answer: “As we have heard, so do we see in the city of the Lord of hosts.” 1831 St. Thomas looked upon this answer as confirming what he considered to be the true interpretation of scriptural texts on this subject, and there is reference to this in the counterargument of this article.

It reads as follows: “On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin., Bk. XV, chap. g) that when the Apostle says, ‘We see now through a glass, in a dark manner,’ by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘in a dark manner’ certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God. But to see the essence of God,” as St. Thomas adds, “is not an enigmatic or speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.”

St. Thomas’ conclusion is: God’s essence cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is.

All the disciples of St. Thomas unhesitatingly accept this conclusion, saying that there can be no question either of an impressed or expressed species in the clear vision of God. Or else they say that, according to the imperfect way we conceive it and speak of it, the divine essence takes the place of both the impressed and the expressed species. This terminology is interpreted in a benign sense by the Thomists, but it is faulty; for the impressed and expressed species take, so to speak, the place of the object, as representing it. And therefore to say that the divine essence takes the place of the species, is to say that it acts as substitute for the same. However, this terminology is permissible according to our imperfect mode

181 Ps. 47:8. The above words are but a slight variation of this text in the Book of Psalms.

of conceiving it, just as we say that God enters into logical relations with creatures.

But St. Thomas’ conclusion is not admitted by all theologians. Several, such as Aureolus, Suarez, Vasquez and Valentia, are of the opinion that there is nothing derogatory in admitting the presence of an impressed species in the beatific vision, although such is not actually the case. In fact, Suarez affirms the impossibility of the beatific vision without the utterance of the mental word or the expressed species. A comparison of these opinions with that held by St. Thomas most clearly shows what an exalted notion the Angelic Doctor had of this mystery.

Although St. Thomas’ opinion is not de fide, it appears to be more in harmony with the definition given by Benedict XII, who declared: “The blessed . . . see the divine essence by direct intuition and face to face, in such wise that nothing created intervenes as an object of vision, but the divine essence presents itself to their immediate gaze, unveiled, clearly, and openly.” 1%?

This definition does not exclude a created species, because a created species does not function as an object of vision, but is the medium by which or in which the thing seen is reflected. Nevertheless, the concluding words of this definition emphasize the immediateness of this vision.

The question is freely disputed, and it can be solved only in a speculative way. First of all, it must be said that intuitive vision in general does not exclude either an impressed or an expressed species. Thus the sense perception of color is obtained through the impressed species (although St. Thomas differs from Suarez in that he does not admit such through the expressed species). But St. Thomas maintains that the intuitive vision which the angel has of his own essence is obtained through the expressed species or the mental word. This is clearly enough affirmed by him in the following passage: “(The angel) knows itself by itself. Yet the life of angels does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same thing.” 133 This means to say that the angel’s essence is indeed of itself intelligible, not merely potentially (like the essence of a stone), but actually, and so it is understood without an impressed species. However, it is not actually understood, because the angel’s essence is not its act of understanding, and hence not itself understood. On the contrary, God’s essence is His existence, and Himself understood, and is of Himself actually understood. Hence, to know

Himself, as will be stated farther on,?** God is not in need, like the angel, of the accidental mental word. But from revelation it is known for certain that God the Father, not as denoting indigence, but by reason of His infinite fecundity, generates the Word that is not accidental, but substantial.

This substantial Word is not only “God understood” but “true God” of true God, “because the natural being of God is not distinct from His act of understanding (and its being understood). Hence it is said (John 1:1): The Word was God. . . . (Thus) this shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species, as our word is, but that it is, indeed, a real and subsistent being. On the contrary, man’s word (concept of himself) cannot be called a man simply, but only with a qualification; namely, a man understood. Hence this statement is false: The word is a man; whereas this is rue: The Word was God,” 135 as St. Thomas very well explains in this passage.

Thus the state of the question clearly is this: by divine revelation we know indeed that the beatific vision terminates in the substantial Word, who is “the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance.” 186€ But the question is whether there is or can be an accidental word in this vision.

It must be observed that the accidental word is not excluded from the intuitive vision, inasmuch as it is intuitive; for the angel’s knowledge of himself is not abstractive but intuitive, and yet it is acquired by means of the accidental word, which is immediately received from the presence of the thing known. Neither is the impressed species excluded from intuitive vision, inasmuch as it is intuitive; for I intuitively see the flower, through the impressed species; but intuitive knowledge postulates that the species is immediately received from the presence of the thing known.

On the contrary, in the case of abstractive knowledge the species is not immediately received from the thing known, but from something resulting from it. Thus we have abstractive knowledge of God as reflected in creatures, and also of the essences of sensible things from the likeness of sensible qualities. Thus we have descriptive knowledge of the essence of the lion, the rose, or the lily, but we do not directly see the specific difference of the lion through the species that would be immediately received in the intellect from the very essence of the lion. The state of the question being thus precisely determined, let us see what St. Thomas says in the argumentative part of the article.

136 Heb. 1: 3. Thus the general saying among theologians that the blessed see all things in the Word.

It consists of three parts: (1) it determines what is required both for sensible and for intellectual vision; (g) it establishes that a similitude is required on the part of the visual faculty for the vision of God, namely, a reinforcing light; (3) it is proved that God’s essence cannot be seen by any created similitude on the part of the object seen.

1. Two things are required for sensible and for intellectual vision, namely, power of sight and union of the thing seen with the sight. Thus the similitude of the soul is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual. But, as will be stated farther on,!** the angel sees himself through his essence, without an impressed species.

2. To see God there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty. Now indeed, the intellective power is a certain intelligible light that is derived from God, the first intellect; but in addition to this, an infused light is required that reinforces the intellect, and this is called the light of glory, as will be more clearly explained in the fifth article, Mention of this is made here to explain St. John’s statement quoted in the first difficulty: “We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” 188 As it is said in the reply to this first objection, “that authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.” The light of glory is analogically called a light inasmuch as it serves to show the reinforced light given to the intellect.

3. On the part of the object seen, God's essence cannot be seen by any created similitude. Three proofs are given for this principal conclusion: (1) in that God is of a higher order of immateriality; (2) in that God both entitatively and intellectually is His own existence; (3) in that the Deity is uncircumscribed.

First reason. It is reduced to this: The difference between the created and the uncreated is greater than that between the divers orders of created things. But the reality of a higher order, for example, the angelic nature, is not seen as it is in itself by a similitude of a lower order, for example, by a sensible species, nor even by an intelligible species abstracted from sensible things. Therefore much less can God’s essence be seen by any created species whatever?”

It must be observed that in the minor there is no mention of an inferior species, but of a species of an inferior order; for the lower

189 This is unhesitatingly affirmed by St. Thomas, whereas, on the contrary, several theologians of later times, as we shall see, say that the created species is possible in the beatific vision, though it is superfluous. In fact, the wish of Suarez is that there actually be such a species. St. Thomas clearly excludes it.

angel is able to see the higher angel by an inferior species of the same order. Yet in this case his knowledge of the higher is incomplete.

The second reason is that God’s essence is His own very existence.#° But no created form can be its own existence. Therefore no created form can be the similitude representing God's essence, as it is in itself. As will at once be stated in the solution of the objections, the major is to be understood as meaning that God alone is His existence both entitatively and intellectually. In other words, God alone is pure act in every respect; hence He alone is His intellection. On the contrary, the representative created species, however perfect it may be, cannot be its own subsistent intellection, because it is intelligible by participation.**?

The third reason is that the Deity is uncircumscribed, containing supereminently in itself whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect, namely, all absolutely simple perfections. But every created form (or idea) is determined according to some aspect of wisdom or of power or of being itself. Therefore God cannot be seen as He really is by any created species.

This third reason shows pre-eminently that the Deity in a certain way transcends being, unity, truth... , in that it contains formally and eminently all absolutely simple perfections, which are naturally participable. But the Deity as such, or God's intimate life, is not naturally participable, nor is it naturally knowable; for it is participated in only by grace, which is properly defined as the participation of the divine nature according to the following text: “He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature.” 142

In the reply to the third objection it is said that “the divine essence is existence itself . . . and is united to the created intellect (not only as the object actually intelligible, but as) actually understood, making (our) intellect in act by and of itself.” This is practically what the Thomists mean when they state that the divine essence takes the place of the impressed and expressed species. But, as we have observed, this statement is to be accepted in accordance with our imperfect mode of understanding and speech; for the species substitutes for the object, and the Deity, strictly speaking, does not function as its substitute. It is, however, truer to Say that the vicarious similitude of the object is neither necessary nor even possible when the object is present not only as actually intelligible,

but as actually understood. Thus God is clearly seen, inasmuch as He Himself alone is His intellection and Himself as understood.

Aureolus objected to the aforesaid reasons, and said that all are at fault since they do not distinguish between the species as an entity and the species as a representation. But, although the species as an entity is but a finite accident, why as a representation could it not intentionally manifest God's essence as it really is? In fact, the species of the stone, although it is an accident, represents the substance of the stone; likewise the species of the angel represents the substance of the angel.

In reply to this we say with Cajetan that it is a question of the species formally as such, namely, according to its intentional or representative existence, but not materially, according to its entitative existence. It is for this reason that St. Thomas calls it a similitude. Therefore it is correctly affirmed in the first reason that a thing of the higher order (for example, the angelic nature) cannot be seen as it really is by a species or similitude of a lower order (for example, by an idea abstracted from sensible things). Hence the infused created species, which is not of the same degree of immateriality or of actuality in intelligible being as the Deity itself, cannot be represented as it really is by such species.

The affirmation in the second reason is likewise correct, when it is stated that the divine essence is its existence, not only in the entitative order but also in the intelligible order, for it is only God who is His intellection and Himself as understood. But no created similitude, however perfect it may be, is its own intellection; but every similitude is intelligible by limited participation. Only God is His own subsistent intellection, an eternally existing, so to speak, intellectual flash. Therefore no infused created similitude can be God either entitatively or intelligibly. By the beatific vision, however, the intellect of the blessed in a certain way, namely, intentionally, becomes God, as Cajetan says, and it cannot become so by any created species.

‘This means to say that there is no distinction between the real and the ideal order in the Deity. Only in God are these two orders identical, since He alone is pure act both entitatively and intellectually. But the purpose of Hegel’s idealism was to identify these two orders, inasmuch as he said that “everything intelligible is real,” which is panlogism. In truth, this identification is to be found only in God, not in possible things that are known only as possible in God without actually existing as realities, and not in existing creatures, which truly are actually existing realities, though they are not their own intellection, nor themselves understood. Thus the essence of a stone or of wood is only potentially intelligible in itself, and the essence of the angel is indeed actually intelligible in itself, yet it is not of itself actually understood; it alone is its substantial intellection and itself understood.

Wherefore St. Thomas rejects St. Anselm’s argument, saying: “God is His own existence. Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us though less known in their nature, namely, by effects.” 148 On the contrary, the blessed, in knowing God's essence, see that God necessarily and actively exists. We see a priori only this, namely, that, if God exists, He is self-existent; but the blessed see that God necessarily exists, and that the denial of His actual existence would be the denial of the Deity itself. Hence the proposition “God is,” is selfevident to them since the transition from ideal being to real being is unwarranted.

Therefore the aforesaid Thomistic refutation of St. Anselm’s argument is worthless if we admit the presence of a created species in the beatific vision. For St. ‘Thomas holds that if one were to admit the presence of this created species, God would, indeed, be known as in fact actually existing, just as the archangel Michael clearly seen would be known as actually existing, but by this species it would not be known that God necessarily and actually exists. St. Thomas holds that, for this proposition to be self-evident to us, our intellect must have immediate knowledge of the Deity without the intervention of a created species. In other words, all that the created species would represent to us would be either that God is self-existent if He exists, or that God in fact exists, but not that God is actually self-existent.

As Cajetan remarks," the expressed species is excluded for the same reason. For just as the impressed species acts as the means by which, namely, as the principle determining the intellect to elicit the act of understanding some particular object, so the expressed species or the mental word is that in which we understand the nature of the thing understood. Because of the reasons just given, no created species can thus represent the self-subsisting Intellection as it really is; for every created species is intelligible by participation, and the difference between it and the self-subsistent intellection is far greater than that between the sun and its ray; and just

as he who would see only the sun’s ray would not see the sun itself, so he who would see only that which is expressed in the highest infused species, would not in the strict sense see God.

Corollary. Wherefore it is commonly held that the extraordinary intellectual visions of the most Holy Trinity still pertain to the order of faith; for they do not give intrinsic evidence of the mystery of the Trinity, and it is not sufficiently clear that God would cease to be such if He were not the triune God. On the contrary, this would be made manifest if one were to receive the beatific vision by way of a transient act, which St. Augustine and St. Thomas believed that St. Paul received when rapt in ecstasy.

All that is expressed by these above-mentioned intellectual visions of the most Holy Trinity is the idea of the fittingness of this mystery, inasmuch as, for instance, good is essentially diffusive of itself; and the higher the nature, the more intimate and more complete is this self-diffusiveness, so that the Father communicates to the Son and to the Holy Spirit the whole of His nature without any division or multiplication of the same.

Suarez proposes another objection. It is his opinion that, just as there can be a similitude on the part of the seer, namely, the light of glory, reinforcing the intellect, so also there can be a similitude on the part of the object seen, consisting in the expressed word.

We reply with John of St. Thomas that the light reinforcing the intellect of the seer is a similitude by way of a tendency, and that which tends is not actually that toward which it tends; whereas, contrary to this, the objective species must actually have the form of the thing represented; in fact, it must be in its representative existence, the object itself. Therefore, to represent the object as this really is, it must be of the same order of immateriality and of the same actuality in the intelligible order. For this reason, as already stated, the species abstracted from sensible things cannot manifest the angel as he really is, nor can the created species represent the Deity as it really is. Thus the negative conclusion is established, namely, that there can be neither an impressed nor an expressed species in the beatific vision, because the created species, however perfect it may be, cannot represent God or the self-subsisting Intellection as He really is.

First doubt. Does the divine essence take the place of the impressed and expressed species in the divine essence?

The Thomists reply in the affirmative, although this is but an imperfect way of expressing it, and is not strictly applicable. For, if we take care to note that the species substitutes for the object, then the Deity cannot properly be said to take the place of this substitute. But the theologians speak in this way according to the imperfect manner of our intellectual perception, just as we speak of God's relation to creatures, which is not a real but a logical relation.

This commonly held opinion among the Thomists is equivalently expressed in many passages of St. Thomas’ works. Thus, in this question he says: “When any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect.” 14° Similarly he says: “The divine essence must be united to the created intellect as an intelligible species,” 148 so, then, instead of the impressed species. In this article, however, he says: “The divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.” #47 This means instead of the expressed species. The reasons for this assertion are those given in the body of the article to show that God cannot be seen as He really is by a. created species.

Moreover, it must be noted that several doctors, who see no repugnance in admitting a created species for the beatific vision, yet maintain that de facto it is not present, because it is superfluous. And it is thus proved to be superfluous for both the impressed and the expressed species.

1. The impressed species is required either when the object is absent, or when it is not directly present to the intellect or is not sufficiently intelligible because of its immateriality. But the object of the beatific vision, namely, God, essentially exists, is already intimately present to any created intellect whatever, as preserving it in being, and is the maximum in intelligibility, because it is the maximum in immateriality. Therefore at least the impressed species is superfluous. It suffices that the created intellect be elevated and strengthened by the light of glory to see God's essence, which is already intimately present to it as preserving it in being. Just as the bat cannot see the sun, so in our present state we cannot see God because of His dazzling brilliance. We have a confirmation of this in the angel, who intuitively sees his own essence without an impressed species, for the reason that his essence exists, is in him, and is of itself actually intelligible.

2. The expressed species is required so that the object may be actually understood and be present in the intellect in its representative form. But the divine essence is most pure act in the intelligible order, i.e., it is not only actually intelligible, but actually understood, and, as St. Thomas says, “is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood making the intellect in

act by and of itself.” 18 It is also intimately present in it. Therefore the expressed species is at least superfluous. Thus there ‘will be an immediate and complete transforming union; and so it is apparent that the inchoate union of which the mystics speak, accompanied by the ardent desire for the beatific vision, is the normal way that leads to eternal life.

But Suarez objects that there must be a created species, because there must be a terminus assigned to the vision produced by it.

In reply to this the Thomists say that the concept of an immanent act does not include that it should produce its effect, although this may often be the case. But the beatific vision is an immanent act. Therefore it is not of the essence of the beatific vision that it should produce its effect. This reply has its foundation in the distinction between immanent and transitive actions. The transitive action, indeed, which properly belongs to the category of action, of which passion is the counterpart, is for the perfection of the patient, and thus it necessarily produces the terminus as its effect. Contrary to this, the immanent action is for the perfection of the agent in which it remains, and it formally belongs to the category of quality, not of action.

Therefore, when we contemplate the nature of anything already expressed in the word, this is purely intellection and is no longer a case of the utterance or production of the word. Similarly, in the Trinity the three Persons understand by one and the same essential intellection; only the Father utters, or generates the Word. Hence the created accidental word is at least superfluous in the beatific vision. The beatific vision terminates in the uncreated substantial Word, and thus the blessed are said to see all things in the Word.

Not only is the created accidental word superfluous, but, as we have stated, it is also repugnant. For, if there can be no impressed species of such perfection and immateriality as to represent God as He really is, then a fortiori there can be no created expressed species, since this must be more perfect than the impressed species, for in the expressed species the object must be present not only as actually intelligible, but as actually understood.

Second doubt. How can the divine essence, without denoting imperfection, take the place of the impressed and expressed species?

The difficulty is that this seems to imply imperfection, and for two reasons. (1) For the created intellect must be informed by the impressed species so as to enable it to elicit the determinate act of seeing such object. But the divine essence cannot be the informing form, since thus the divine essence would form a compound with the other, as being a part; and the part is less perfect than the whole. (2) Because if the divine essence were to contribute to this act of seeing as the impressed species, then 1t would be subordinated to the created intellective faculty, from which this very act derives its being and vitality. Moreover, if the divine essence were to take the place of the impressed species, it would be of the nature of a first act, which is less perfect than the second act.

In reply to this first difficulty we say with Cajetan and John of St. Thomas that the species, taken not in its material sense as an inhering accident, but formally as a species, or as a similitude of the object, does not inform the intellect by inhering in it, does not inform the intellective faculty by constituting with it some third entity in the physical order; but this species informs the faculty objectively, so that the faculty becomes intentionally | the object itself in first actuality. For as Aristotle says: “The soul is in a sense all things,” ° which means that the knower is in a sense the thing known, or what is other than itself. Hence Averroes was right in furthermore remarking that “a greater unity is effected between the knower and the known than between matter and form”; for matter is not form, but receives this as its own, and constitutes with it a third entity, namely, a composite, which is more perfect than its essential parts. On the other hand, the knower is intentionally the thing known, or is the form of the thing known, for it does not receive this form as its own but as the form of the other, as will be stated farther on.*% Therefore the divine essence can function as the impressed species. To do so it does not have to inform the created intellect entitatively, constituting with it a third entity or a composite. All that is needed is for it to draw the created intellect into a participation of its intelligible being, and thus its function is not to inform but to terminate, somewhat as in the substantial order the incarnate Word terminates the human nature of Christ, which it does not inform, For just as in the incarnation the Word does not constitute with the human nature a third entity or a more perfect compound; that is, just as the Word is not a part of any composite and hence something less perfect, so the clear vision of God’s essence does not constitute a third entity or compound with the created intellect, but only terminates it and by so doing gives it the greatest of perfection without being itself perfected. Just as the human nature in Christ is drawn into a close union with the divine being, so in the beatific vision the created intellect is attracted to the divine object.

We detect another remote analogy to this union inasmuch as number is terminated by the last unit, or inasmuch as two lines

mutually terminate in the apex of the triangle. Cajetan remarks: “We must preserve intact the principle that God is by nature prior to the intellect when it sees God, and yet it is not that the intellect knows God intentionally and afterward sees Him.” 151 What he means is this: The intellect must of necessity be God intentionally but not indeed entitatively, just as the knower is the thing known in first actuality, before it is known in second actuality. Such is the common opinion among the Thomists. This is the complete transforming union.1*

Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis), as Billuart observes,!58 does not admit that the intellect is God intentionally in the order of intelligible being; his contention is that the union of the object with the intellect results in a third entity distinct from each. But this opinion of Francis Silvester seems to be not so profound a view, and to be less in agreement with the teaching of Aristotle and St. ‘Thomas. Moreover, it does not appear to be a sufficient answer to the objection.

Cajetan seems to give a more profound explanation of the intimate union of the created intellect with God clearly seen in the intelligible order, without any pantheistic confusion resulting therefrom, since he appeals to the infinite distinction between the two in the entitative order. In fact, this infinite distinction persists between the two natures that are most intimately united in the one Person of Christ.

Nevertheless, as we stated in the commentary on the first article, as reason cannot prove conclusively the possibility of the Incarnation, so it cannot prove the possibility of the beatific vision. This means that it cannot be conclusively proved by reason that no imperfection is implied for the divine essence to perfect the created intellect by actually terminating it. We are indeed most profoundly persuaded of this, but it cannot be conclusively proved. For the supernatural mysteries are neither proved nor disproved, but they are defended; and there are solid grounds persuading us of their fitness, and either their existence or their possibility is firmly held by faith, which is essentially supernatural. What is essentially supernatural is supernaturally knowable, because truth and being are convertible. This point was not so clearly presented in the first article of this question.

152 Thus we have absolute confirmation of the thesis that the spiritual marriage or the inchoated transforming union is in this life the culmination of the normal way leading to eternal life, and that it likewise includes an ardent desire of seeing God's essence. Evidently this ardent desire is a prerequisite for this vision, either here on earth or in purgatory. 153 Art. VII, Solv. obj.

As to this second difficulty, however, it must be said that the impressed species concurs with the faculty in the eliciting of the act, but it is not subordinated to the faculty, because it is not related to the faculty as an inferior instrument to the principal cause, but the purpose of this species is to give greater perfection to the faculty and determine it to elicit its act; hence it is truer to say that the species subordinates the faculty to itself. Thus the divine essence can take the place of the impressed species.

Finally, in this process the divine essence is not of the nature of a first actuality, which is less perfect than the second actuality, for it concurs as the principle by means of which the vision is effected, to the exclusion of all imperfections, as Cajetan observes. It constitutes, indeed, the created intellect in first actuality, but it is not itself of the nature of a first actuality. In other words, the pure act supplies the formality of the impressed species, but not its potentiality, because it supplies to the exclusion of all imperfections. Hence it is not subordinated either to the created intellect or to the created intellection.

Contrary to this, the divine essence can in no way take the place of the light of glory, because this latter functions on the part of the intellective faculty, informing it and constituting with it a third entity, or a composite that is more perfect than its parts. Unjustifiable, therefore, was the assertion of some, such as Master Francis of Good Hope and John of Ripa, who said that the blessed see God by His uncreated vision that is communicated to them. This cannot be, because the beatific vision is a vital act, and every vital act comes essentially from an intrinsic principle of the living being.

Thus we have sufficiently explained why there can be no created species in the beatific vision, and why the divine essence takes the place of both the impressed and the expressed species.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD CAN BE SEEN WITH BODILY EYES

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to explain certain metaphorical expressions of Holy Scripture, such as: “In my flesh I shall see . . . God.” 1% It was formerly said by some Catholics that God can be seen not by the bodily eye, but by the spiritualized

eye in its glorified state. So said Master Francis of Good Hope. Valentia considered this a probable opinion.

St. Thomas replies to this as follows: “It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight or by any other faculty of the sensitive power.” This opinion thus formulated by St. Thomas is the common one.

Although this conclusion is not explicitly defined to be of faith, yet it is a most certain truth; for its contradictory implies an error that is repugnant to the faith since it means that God is corporeal. There is foundation for this in several passages of Holy Scripture. ‘Thus we read that “God inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen nor can see.” 155 Thus God is declared to be “invisible.” 158 Also we have: “No man hath seen God at any time.” 157

The argument from reason is as follows: The act of any sensitive faculty, since it is the act of a corporeal organ, cannot go beyond corporeal things; but God is incorporeal; therefore He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. Hence when Holy Scripture says that God is seen, this means that He is seen by the eye of the mind, but not of the body.158

Reply to second objection. If it is stated that we see the life of another living person, this is because life is accidentally sensible, and the object of sense perception is apprehended by the intellect immediately on its being presented. Hence St. Thomas says at the end of this reply: “But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of corporeal things and through them, happens from two causes, namely, from the perspicacity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation.”

Reply to third objection. “The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude.”

In fact, it is impossible for the sensitive faculty to be elevated to see God, for it is impossible for any faculty to be referred to what is beyond the scope or extent of its adequate object. But God, since He is a pure spirit, is not included within the scope and extent of the adequate object of the sensitive faculty, for this object is something corporeal and sensible, such as color, sound, smell.

To deny this is to confound the sensitive faculty with the intellective. If the created intellect can be elevated to see God, this is

because God, although He transcends its proportionate object (which for our intellect is the essence of material things), does not transcend its adequate object, which is being according to all that is implied by the term. The Deity is eminently and formally being, and being in all its purity exists only in the Deity, and cannot be seen without the Deity itself being seen.

From this it is clear that there is a vast difference between intellect and sense. And thus it is evident that the more material a faculty is the more restricted is its range, because it is limited by matter. It is only the intellect, at least as such if not as human, which by reason of its absolute immateriality can be directed to intelligible being of any kind. We are at least persuaded of this, and it cannot be disproved.

Objection. Natural water in baptism, spiritually elevated as it is, produces grace. Therefore the sense of sight can in like manner be raised to see God.

Reply. There is no comparison. For water is merely the efficient instrument, which acts through the power transmitted to it by the principal agent, who is God. On the contrary, sight is the vital and principal cause of seeing, and the faculty elicits the act of seeing by its own power. Hence its act cannot go beyond the scope of its adequate object.

Nor can the bodily eye see God by a spiritual vision that is imparted to it, because seeing, since it is a vital act, must of necessity come from an intrinsic principle. But spiritual sight is intellection, and this cannot proceed from the eye as from an intrinsic principle. Hence this intellectual sight would be a sort of extrinsic addition, and the eye itself would not see by it; for the corporeal eye can no more understand than can a stone or a piece of wood.

Final objection. There is a greater difference between the angel and God than between the corporeal eye and the angel. But the angel can see God supernaturally. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the pure spirit supernaturally,

Reply. I distinguish the major. That there is a greater difference entitatively between the angel and God than between the corporeal eye and the angel, this I concede; that the difference is greater objectively, this I deny; or, in the order of being, I concede the major; in the cognitive order, I deny the major; for, since God is true and intelligible being, He is included in the adequate object of both the angelic and the human intellects. But the angel, being immaterial, cannot be included in the object of sense perception.15?

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT BY ITS NATURAL POWERS CAN SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE

State of the question. In the title “by its natural powers” denotes the sufficient cause. But nature is the radical and essential principle of operation. Therefore the question concerns the possibility of the created intellect’s seeing God by its real and natural power, without being supernaturally elevated for this end. It is supposed from the first article that the created intellect can be raised to see the divine essence.

The principal difficulty is declared in the beginning of the article in the third objection, which is as follows: corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, because such understanding is above its nature. Therefore, if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can be elevated for this vision.

The answer is: It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God, unless the intellect is supernaturally elevated for the vision.

1. This conclusion is de fide, and is defined as such in the Council of Vienne, in which the following proposition of the Beghards was condemned: “The soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God and enjoy Him in this blessed state.” 1° This was, indeed, already implicitly defined against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, against whom the Church on several occasions asserted than man cannot by his natural powers merit eternal life, which is supernatural,**

The same was declared against Baius.1®? Likewise the Vatican Council declared: “If anyone shall say that man cannot be raised by divine power to a higher than natural knowledge and perfection, but can and should, by a continuous progress, attain at length of himself to the possession of all that is true and good; let him be anathema.” 188 The Council also says: “There is a ‘twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object... ; in object because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known. . .. For the

160 Denz., no. 475- 161 Jbid., nos. 176-200. 162 Jbid., no. 1021. 163 Jbid., no. 1808.

divine mysteries by their own nature so far transcend the created intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they remain covered with a veil of faith itself, and shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, not yet with God.” 164

From this definition it is clear that the supernatural mysteries transcend the created intellect, not only because of God’s free decree, but by their very nature; that is, they are essentially supernatural, and not only de facto supernatural. But the contrary would be the case if God could give the light of glory to the created intellect as a natural property.

The following condemned proposition of Rosmini must also be noted: “God is the object of the beatific vision inasmuch as He is the author of ad extra works.” 165 The ontologists likewise were condemned, because they did not sufficiently maintain the distinction between the two orders, for they said: “The immediate and at least habitual knowledge of God is so essential to the human intellect, that without it nothing can be known.” 168

This truth of the faith is equivalently expressed, although not so clearly, in several texts of Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “No one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him.” *** But if the created intellect by its natural powers could see God’s essence, it could also see His paternity and filiation, which are not really distinct from it. St. Paul also says: “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.” 168 In like manner he says: “The grace of God, life everlasting.” 16° But eternal life is the vision itself of God in accordance with the following text: “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.” 17° The Greek and Latin Fathers, commenting on the aforesaid texts of Holy Scripture, on several occasions affirmed the impossibility of any creature’s seeing God by its natural powers.171

2. Proof from reason. A careful reading of the argumentative part of this article of St. Thomas enables us to distinguish with Cajetan five consequences. But his argument can be expressed more

171 Cf. Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion patristicum, no, 105; also nos. 236, 451 f 747» 913, 986, 1075, 1106, 1123, 1126, 1161, 2150, i simply by the following syllogism: Since the norm for knowledge is that it be according as the thing known is in the knower, according to the mode of immateriality of the nature of the knower, then the object whose mode of immateriality exceeds the mode of immateriality of the nature of the created intellect cannot be naturally known as it really is by this intellect; but God is such an object; therefore God cannot be naturally known as He really is by the created intellect, but only as it is elevated by grace.

The major has its foundation in the principle that knowledge is according as the thing known is present immaterially in the knower, according to the nature of the knower. But the more immaterial a cognitive faculty is the more universal is its knowledge.” This is evident by inductive reasoning in the cases of sensation and intellection. Whereas plants, because of their materiality, do not know, color is known by the sense of sight inasmuch as the similitude of color is in some way immaterially present in the sense of sight; 17° for, as Aristotle says, the sense is cognitive because it is capable of receiving species separated from matter.!™ But the intellect is all the more cognitive, because it is more separated from matter. Thus it knows not only sensible qualities, but the nature of sensible things. Hence the object, whose mode of immateriality exceeds the immaterial mode of the nature of the knower, cannot be known as this really is by it. Thus it is natural for our intellect, united as it is with the body, to see intelligible things only in the mirror of sensible things.

The minor is proved, because God is not only absolutely immaterial, but is His own existence, that is, He is pure act both in the existential and in the intellectual orders, is the self-subsisting Being. This will be more clearly explained in a subsequent article.17° On the other hand, our intellect, although immaterial, is directly united to the body, because it is the lowest type of intellect, whose proportionate object is the least in the intelligible order, namely, the intelligible being of sensible things, and for this knowledge it has need of the senses. Thus, as will be more clearly stated farther on," it is because of its debility that our intellect needs the aid of the senses.

But it is the merely immaterial essence of the angel, which is not his existence, that constitutes the proportionate object of the angelic

17a However, the soul of the irrational animal and its sensitive faculties, although they are not its body, intrinsically depend on the body, and the visual faculty depends on its organ of sight.

intellect. Therefore the mode of immateriality of the created and creatable intellect is a mode of essence that is not its own existence or its own intellection. Only God is in the highest degree of immateriality, and He thus absolutely transcends the mode of immateriality of any created intellect whatever. Hence God cannot be naturally known by the intellect as He really is.

The doctrine of this article may be expressed as follows: the object of the intellect is being, and the intellect is predicated analogically of the created intellect and of the uncreated intellect, just as being is so predicated of created being and of the uncreated being. Thus we may write:

divine; its proper object: divine essence angelic; its proper object: angelic essence human; its proper object: essence of material things

Intellect being

This means that the proper object of our intellect is the essence of material things. Thus it knows spiritual things in the mirror of sensible things. However, its correspondingly adequate object, not as it is strictly a human intellect, but as it is an intellect, is being in the widest sense of the term. This point will become increasingly evident from the explanation of the reply to the third objection,

Objection. Absolute immateriality does not admit of different degrees; but every intellect, even the human intellect, is as such absolutely immaterial; therefore there is no foundation for the above assertion.

Reply. That the exclusion of matter does not admit of different degrees, this I concede; that there are not different degrees of immateriality with reference to pure act, this I deny. Thus all the degrees of certitude exclude the fear of error, and yet there is certainly a distinction between these degrees as regards the firmness of assent, according as they are immediately referred back to first principles, that is, according as they are either without or with the intermediary of the senses and the testimony of men. Thus there is a distinction between metaphysical, physical, and moral certitudes. .

Reply to first objection. The angel has a natural knowledge of God as mirrored in his essence; but he has not immediate knowledge of God as He really is.

Reply to second objection. Thus the angel, although he is a pure spirit, is most defective compared with God, because he is not his own existence.

THE ADEQUATE OBJECT OF OUR INTELLECT

The reply to the third objection solves the principal difficulty already presented in the beginning of the article, for it states: “The sense of sight, as being altogether material (being intrinsically dependent on the organism), cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter (since it is not intrinsically dependent on a corporeal organism), can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace.” This means that it can be elevated to know any intelligible being whatever, even the highest. At least this cannot be disproved. In fact, there is proof of the possibility of this elevation, and this proof confirms what was said in the first article concerning the natural and inefficacious desire of seeing the essence of God.

St. Thomas says in this same reply: “The proof is, that the created intellect, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still is able to separate that existence by its intellect, since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another, . . . (This proves) that it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance (as this really is).”

In other words, our intellect not only knows the nature of sensible things, and spiritual things in the mirror of sensible things, but it knows being itself as such. Therefore we can distinguish between its proper object, which is the essence of material things, and its adequate and extensive object, which is being in the widest sense of the term.

But God clearly seen comes under being in the widest sense of the term, because being in the most pure state of pure act is found only in the Deity, and cannot be seen in this most pure state, without the Deity itself being seen, in which it is found formally and eminently.

But it must be observed that sometimes the formulation of this adequate object of the human intellect is inexact; this object applies to it, not strictly as it is a human intellect, but as it is an intellect. This adequate object is not only being as such, which is the object of metaphysics; for metaphysics is still a human science, which knows its object in the mirror of sensible things. If the adequate object of our intellect were nothing else, then the possibility of metaphysics would be all that could be proved from this against positivism and Kantianism.

Indeed, the adequate object of our intellect is being in the widest sense of the term (a commonly accepted expression); so that noth- ing transcends it, which means that it includes the triune God as He really is, or as He is clearly seen. We cannot, of course, prove conclusively by reason alone that this is the adequate object of our intellect; but it cannot be disproved. In fact, we are persuaded that it is not repugnant for our intellect to be informed by any intelligible being, however perfect it may be, inasmuch as our intellect is absolutely immaterial, or is intrinsically independent of the organ of sight.‘77 As St. Thomas says: “The soul is naturally capable of grace since, from its having been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace.” 178 But the soul is made to God’s image, inasmuch as it is made like to Him not only in existence and life, but also in intelligence. This means that it is absolutely immaterial or intrinsically independent of the body." On the other hand, although the soul of the irrational animal has that measure of immateriality required for sensitive knowledge,1® yet it is intrinsically dependent on the body and perishes with it; for it is then reduced to the potentiality of the matter in which it was first potentially. But the rational soul was not in the potentiality of matter, for it is created by God, and is intrinsically independent of the body in becoming, in being, and in operation. And the proof of this is that its intellect can be informed by any intelligible being whatever, even the most perfect.15!

This means that the passive capacity of our intellect is greater than its active power; neither of itself is it limited to some order of intelligible beings; whereas, on the contrary, its active power extends only to what is knowable from sensible things. Indeed, every creature can receive from God more than it can effect; hence it is not surprising that there should be in our nature a passive capacity, and that there is nothing of repugnance for this nature to be raised to the knowledge of the most perfect intelligible being that transcends the mirror of creatures. This capacity for being elevated is called an obediential capacity.18?

Hence it is only in a spiritual way, as transcending everything material, that the intelligible object, however perfect it may be,

177 This has been more fully explained by us elsewhere. Cf. De revelatione, I 380-84.

180 Ibid., q.14, a.1. ato dip. XIV, a. ow. 24521; E dee bie S, pas: S. 11, 21; a.6, no. 6. also his Cursus phil., de anima,

182 And as i j iential” indi its i ; ; the essentially supernatural object to be known, but te diae oee is Ot to

, preme agent whom it obeys, and from whom it gratuitously receives the positive direction both as to the eliciting of the supernatural act and as to the object of this act.

informs the intellective faculty. Consequently this does not appear to be beyond the elevatable or obediential capacity of our nature.

Thus we are persuaded of the existence of this obediential or elevatable capacity for the beatific vision. However, as the Thomists generally admit,?** this argument is not conclusive, but only very probable and indeed most profound in this order. Neither can the possibility of the light of glory be proved solely by the powers of reasoning, because it is the possibility of what is essentially supernatural, and hence of what is supernaturally knowable, inasmuch as being and truth are convertible.

Therefore St. Thomas presents this argument only as a “sign,” and he often distinguishes between the demonstrative argument and the sign.*** The possibility of essentially supernatural mysteries is neither proved nor disproved, but is defended, urged upon us, and held firmly by faith.185

Doubt. Is it possible for God by His absolute power to create an intellect that by its own natural powers can see God as He really is? Further, can a supernatural substance be created, such that the light of glory would be connatural to it, as a property of its nature?

The theologians, especially the Thomists, generally answer in the negative to each. As Gonet says, these two negative conclusions are now commonly held “against Durandus, Molina, Ripalda, Arriaga . . . whose opinion Vasquez calls absurd, Nazarius looks upon as temerarious, and Bannez as extraordinary ignorance.” 18°

Scotus and the Nominalists prior to Molina had defended a similar opinion, denying the absolute necessity of the light of glory so as to see God."*?

Cajetan says that the condemnation of the Beghards in the Council of Vienne makes this view of Scotus no longer tenable. He writes: “Note well that this opinion of Scotus and his followers can no longer be maintained; for the encyclical of Pope Clement V, Ad nostrum, de haereticis, condemns as positively erroneous the assertion of those who say that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God. In this you perceive that the Church, accepting the teaching of St. Thomas, definitely decided not only as to the need of the light of glory, but as to the cause of this, since the soul needs to be elevated for such vision, as stated in the en-

183 Cf, Salmanticenses, Com. in Iam, q.12, disp. I, dub. HI, §§ 2 and 3, nos. 44-47.

185 Consult St. Thomas’ commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, q.2, 2.3, in which it is shown that theology solves the objections against the mysteries, either as being evidently false, or as not necessary, or as not convincing.

186 Clypeus thomisticus, tr. II, De possibilitate visionis Dei, disp. I, a.1, § 3.

187 Cf. in II Sent, d.14, q.1; IV Sent, d.49, q.11; also Z Sent., d.3, q.3, nos.

cyclical.” 188 Gonet likewise contradicts Scotus on this point.1®?

According to the teaching of Scotus +% and the Nominalists, the distinction between the natural order and the supernatural order of sanctifying grace is not one of necessity, as resulting from the very transcendence of God's essence over every created intellect; but the distinction is one of contingency, the result of God’s free decree appointing angels and men in this state of wayfarers, such that they have not the immediate vision of His essence. This distinction of Scotus, however, is in harmony with his doctrine as formulated in two of his theses; for he says that being is predicated univocally of God and creatures, wherefore there is no essential and necessary distinction between the natural and supernatural orders. He states also that, since God's will is higher than His intellect, the distinction between the two orders is the result of God’s free decree. This conclusion is also in accordance with the principles of Nominalism,}* for the Nominalists maintain that the common name “humanity” designates a collection of men and not a necessary and immutable nature,

But it is difficult to see how this merely contingent distinction can be reconciled with the teaching of the Vatican Council, which says: “The Catholic Church with one consent has also ever held and does hold that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowledge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known... . For the divine mysteries by their own nature [there is no mention of any free divine decree] so far transcend the created intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they remain covered with the veil of faith itself . . . so long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, not yet with God.” 1°? Hence this su-

188 See his commentary on this article, no. 9.

189 Clypeus thomisticus, De gratia, disp. I, a.g: Whether habitual grace is an essentially supernatural form. In this article he says: “The opinion of Scotus is commonly rejected, because he does not distinguish between the intrinsically supernatural, or as to its entity, and the extrinsically supernatural, or as to the mode (of its production). It is also against the common opinion of the theologians, who admit the existence of essentially supernatural beings; it is even against faith, which also emphasizes the same.” Thus grace and the infused virtues are essen- tially supernatural, whereas it is the natural life that is supernaturally restored to a dead person.

191 Cf. Zigliara, Summa phil, Ontologia, Bk. I, chap. 1, a.4: Dotes essentiarum contra nominales.

periority has its foundation not in the divine liberty, but in the very transcendence of the divine nature. Thus, A. Vacant '* and Scheeben +% have not interpreted the above text from the Vatican Council in favor of Scotus’ opinion.

OBJECTIONS OF SCOTUS 1°5

First objection. From the fact that the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower, it follows solely that the knower cannot know naturally an object of a higher order except in an inferior manner. But it does not follow that the knower is absolutely incapable of knowing this object in a natural way. Therefore a natural, confused, and finite knowledge of the Deity or of God’s intimate life is perhaps possible.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the knower can naturally know an object of a higher order only in an inferior manner, that is, as it is related to the formal object of the lower order, namely, in some inferior image, this I concede; that it can naturally and immediately know this object according to the formal concept of the higher order, at least confusedly, this I deny. And I deny the consequent. We naturally know God in the mirror of creatures, according to the analogically common notions of being, goodness . . . , but not immediately according to the proper and intimate notion of the Deity. Otherwise our knowledge would be simultaneously according to two opposite modes of immateriality, namely, according to the human and the divine modes. ‘This superior mode can be participated in only by the infusion of supernatural light, which is a certain participation of the divine nature. Indeed, to know God confusedly is to know God under the common notion of being, and not under the most proper and most eminent notion of the Deity. It was not in a formal but in a material sense that Scotus understood the proposition of St. Thomas, that “the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower,” that is, according to the mode of immateriality of the nature of this knower. This principle, however, has its foundation in the principle that the intelligent being differs from the nonintelligent being, since by reason of its immateriality it can become something other than itself.

Second objection. There is no need of proportion between the

193 Cf. Etudes sur la philosophie-de saint Thomas et sur celle de Duns Scot (1891), p. 14.

195 Cf. In IVam Sent., d.49, q.11; also In Iam Sent., d.3, q-3, and Cajetan’s replies In Jom, q.12, a.4.

intellect and its proper object. St. Thomas maintains, to be sure, that for our intellect this object is of a lower order, as being the essence of things material. But if there is no need of proportion, then the proper object also of our intellect can be of a higher order.

Reply. There is no comparison, for our intellect by its natural power can elevate an inferior material object to its own mode of intelligibility; but it cannot in a natural way, or according to its mode of operation, be elevated to the higher mode of operation of the divine intellect.

Third objection. Then it follows that the angel of a lower order could not by its own power know the angel of a higher order, which is false.

Reply. Two angels are of the same order of immateriality; wherefore the lower by its own power knows the higher, but not so clearly as the higher knows itself.

WHETHER THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS ANY CREATED LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD

State of the question. So far we know that the created intellect can be raised to see God’s essence (a. 1) and that it cannot by its natural powers attain to this (a. 4). It is now a question of the necessity of the supernatural light of glory, which was already affirmed somewhat incidentally in the second article. The nature of this light must be determined. How does this necessity manifest itself and what is its proper effect?

What is of faith concerning this? The necessity of the light of glory is affirmed in the Council of Vienne, as is evident from the condemnation of the following proposition: “The soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God and enjoy Him in this blessed state.” 197 Hence the Council affirms the light of glory in the blessed not only as being an actual fact, but also as necessary so that the soul may be raised to see God, and for this very reason it declares that this light is supernatural; otherwise the soul would not be raised to a higher order by this light. Yet even so, the Council does not determine the degree of this necessity. It is at least a necessity in accordance with*God’s ordinary power, although it may still be a disputed point whether this light is absolutely necessary, so that even by God's absolute and extraordinary power the created intellect could not see God unless it were elevated by means of this light. The Council, likewise, did not define that the

197 Denz., no. 475. This error is expressly refuted by Clement V in the fifteenth ecumenical Council of Vienne.

light of glory is a quality, an infused habit; but we must say of it what was afterward declared by the Council of Trent 198 concerning habitual grace, namely, that it is something created, infused and inherent in the soul. St. Thomas says more, inasmuch as he declares more explicitly that the light of glory is an infused quality and an infused habit.

Billuart puts the following question to his readers: “You will ask whether it is of faith that sanctifying grace is, in the strictly philosophical sense, an infused quality and an infused habit? Not in the strict sense, we reply; yet that it is so must be held as certain doctrine.” 1°° The same must be said of consummated and inamissible sanctifying grace, which is in the essence of the soul, and which is the source of the light of glory for the intellect of the blessed, just as it is of the infused light of faith for the intellect of wayfarers. Thus theology, in the common acceptation of the term, explains still more precisely what is defined by the Church.

It must be observed that the Council of Vienne, in thus determining the necessity of the light of glory for the soul to be raised to this higher order, presents more clearly the doctrine already formulated against the Pelagians and Semipelagians in the Second Council of Orange *° concerning the necessity of grace, which is the seed of glory.

THE VARIOUS OPINIONS OF THEOLOGIANS BEFORE AND AFTER THE COUNCIL OF VIENNE

Notice must be taken of two opinions proposed before the time of the Council, and conflicting with its decisions.

1. Opinion of Scotus. He understood the light of glory to be the beatific vision in its second actuality, inasmuch as it is communicated to us by God. This opinion is contrary to the teaching of the Council, which declares “that the soul needs the light of glory elevating it to see God.” Therefore the light of glory, since it is necessary for the beatific vision, differs from this latter. Hence Cajetan *°' says that, since the time of the Council, this opinion of Scotus is no longer tenable, which is also what Gonet says.202 John of St. Thomas says of Scotus’ opinion: “Its affirmation cannot but be a very dangerous assertion.” 2°

2. The opinion of Durandus. He, too, before the time of the

203 See his commentary on this article,

Council, understood the light of glory to be the divine essence itself, inasmuch as it immediately manifests itself to the intellect and changes it in the order of intellection. This opinion, says John of St. Thomas, is not in accord with the spirit of the Council; for those condemned as heretics did not deny the necessity of the divine essence manifesting itself as the object of vision, but they denied the necessity of a light elevating the intellect so that it can be united with the object.

3. Vasquez, who lived after the time of the Council, thinks the light of glory, as a habit perfecting the intellect, to be superfluous. Similarly, Molina and Suarez are of the opinion that, by God’s absolute power, all that is required is an actual help, but no infused habit elevating the soul. There is nothing surprising about this in the teaching of Suarez, for he admitted an actual obediential power, by which our nature would be positively and actively directed to the performance of supernatural acts, although it would need the divine assistance to pass into act. This active obediential power is somewhat like the innate natural appetite for the beatific vision admitted by Scotus, Suarez, and Molina, who conceive God elevating and our intellect more as two co-ordinated causes (like two men pulling a boat) than as two causes subordinated one to the other.?°

4. The Thomists reject this actual obediential power, for they say it would be both essentially natural, as being a property of the nature, and essentially supernatural, as specified by a supernatural object. Therefore they say along with St. Thomas that the obediential power is passive, and that its immediate reference is not to the eliciting of a supernatural act, nor to the object of this act, but to the agent of a higher order, that is, to God the author of grace, whom it obeys, and from whom it receives the grace which has as its purpose the attainment of glory. However, the obediential power, which in itself is formally passive, also inheres in the active faculty, namely, in the will; but then it is only materially active because the will is its subject of inhesion.

This Thomist opinion agrees exactly with what St. Thomas teaches in his various works in which he discusses the obediential power, especially that which is required as a prerequisite for the beatific vision. There is also a vast difference between this latter and the obediential power required in bodies in which miracles are to be performed, or in the water that is instrumental in the

204 Thus Suarez holds that the beatific vision is a naturally vital act. This means that the essentially supernatural act of the beatific vision would consist of two parts, namely, the naturally vital act and the supernatural superadded mode, just as at times a thin coating of gold is superimposed on a common metal, and then we have a gilt object but not one of solid gold.

production of grace. But for St. Thomas every obediential power, since it refers to God as agent and elevator, is a passive power. The two following quotations suffice: “In the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a creature.” 2°°Also: “In every creature there is a certain obediential power, inasmuch as every creature obeys God so as to receive in itself whatever God may have willed.” 2°* But God's will and omnipotence are limited only by what is repugnant to existence; hence all that is required for the obediential power in a being, is that it be not repugnant for such being to be raised to a higher order. Thus there is an obediential power in our nature even for the hypostatic union, to which our nature is not positively ordained. Similarly there is an obediential power both in the disembodied spirits and in the angels of heaven for a greater degree of the light of glory, because the highest degree of this glory is inconceivable. The light of glory could always be intensively increased, and yet it would never attain to the comprehensive vision of God, for this can apply to God alone.** Therefore St. Thomas says that there is no limit to the obediential power, for it corresponds to divine omnipotence, which is always able to produce still greater effects.2%

HOW ST. THOMAS PROVES THE NECESSITY OF THE LIGHT OF GLORY

In the body of the article he shows that the light of glory is necessary: (1) aS a disposition preparing the intellect for union with the divine essence; (2) as a power strengthening the intellect to elicit this act of vision.

Proof of first requisite: Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, needs to be supernaturally disposed for this; but the created intellect that sees God is so raised, and the divine essence takes the place of its intelligible species; °° therefore the intellect needs to be disposed so as to see the divine essence.

Proof of second requisite: A power must be proportionate to the act that is to be elicited by it, so that it can elicit this act; but the natural power of the created intellect is intrinsically incapable, or

205 Summa theol., Illa, q.11, a.1; see also Ila, q.1, a.3 ad gum; Com. theol., c.104; De potentia, q.6, a.1 ad 18um.

208 Summa theol., Ula, q.7, a.12 ad gum; q.10, a.4 ad gum; De veritate, q.20, a.4 ad 2um et gum. 209 See a.2.

is not in proportion so as to elicit the supernatural act of seeing God; therefore the intellect needs the reinforcement of a supernatural light.

The following objection is raised against the first argument: if the major were true, then a disposition would be necessary for the reception of this infused disposition, and so on indefinitely.

In reply to this we say with Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, that the reception of a form or perfection necessitates some disposition, of course, in the subject; but the disposition itself necessitates no previous disposition. In other words, there is no such thing as a disposition for a disposition; otherwise there would never be a disposition in any order. Hence the major of St. Thomas must be understood in the sense that there must be a first actuality or proximate potentiality in everything which is raised up to that which exceeds its nature and by which it is disposed for this. Such is manifestly the case in material things, and it is verified in every order. Thus the necessary prerequisite for wood to begin to burn is that it acquire a certain degree of heat. Similarly, for the reception of a substantial form (e.g., the sensitive soul, as also the intellective soul), there must be a disposition for this as a necessary prerequisite.

In like manner, in the attainment of knowledge, the student needs to be disposed so as to be able to listen to and profit by the special lectures on metaphysics. It must be noted that the lack of this requisite disposition for a form results in a monstrosity both in the natural order and in the intellectual order. So it would be if, through lack of this previous disposition, one were to understand Thomism in the Calvinist sense.

Not only is the disposition required for the action of an agent, but also for the proper reception of some exalted perfection, such as the proper appreciation of one of Beethoven’s symphonies, or the understanding of a difficult passage. So also the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are required so as to dispose one to receive His inspirations.**° Hence it is not surprising that a special infused disposition is required for receiving the divine essence as an intelligible form or impressed species.

For our intellectual faculty, which of itself is incapable either of making use of this essence as intelligible form so as to see God, or of receiving it without being elevated, must be proportioned to it, And this functioning of the light of glory by way of a disposition is closely connected with the second and principal function with which the second argument is concerned.

The probative force of the second argument is evident if we consider that the operative power, which of itself and intrinsically is incapable of any act, needs to be intrinsically elevated, strengthened, and perfected by the reception of some habit that is either acquired or infused. It is this general principle that is invoked in showing the necessity of habits, and it is quite clear that there is no reference here to an acquired habit, because the object is of the supernatural order. Therefore an infused virtue is meant, which is commonly called the light of glory, since here we have a case of analogy of proportionality; for this light is to the created intellect as regards the beatific vision just as material light is to the eye as regards its object of vision.

Hence, as is more clearly seen in the answer to the first objection, the light of glory in the blessed is a permanent quality or a supernatural infused habit inhering in the intellect, elevating and perfecting it so as to see God. But this habit is always in second actuality, because the vision itself is permanent, and resides in the intellect as charity does in the will, and this light does away with the infused habit of faith. The principal function of this light is to elevate the faculty to elicit the act of vision, and its secondary function is to dispose the faculty to receive the divine essence as the intelligible form. Yet it is not of faith that the light of glory is a habit.

The first series of objections denies the necessity of the light of lory.

5 First objection. What is of itself lucid needs no other light in order to be seen; but God is of Himself lucid, because He is light itself; therefore no other light is needed in order to see Him.

Reply. What is of itself lucid needs no other light on its own part in order to be seen, this I concede; on the part of the visual faculty, this I deny. I contradistinguish the minor in the same way."

Second objection. A created light is not required even on the part of the visual faculty, for God takes the place of the impressed species; but the impressed species functions on the part of the visual faculty; therefore, in like manner, God can take the place of the light of glory.

Reply. I concede the major, but distinguish the minor. That the species functions as a perfection actuating the faculty by way of terminating it, this I concede; as informing form, this I deny. For it takes the place of the object. On the other hand, the light that strengthens the faculty belongs properly to the operative faculty, as informing form, and God cannot take the place of the informing form, which is essentially something participated and thus imperfect.

Third objection. But the divine concurrence suffices on the part of the subject so as to render the intellect capable of seeing God; therefore the intellect does not need to be strengthened by any created light so as to see God.

Reply. If the beatific vision transcended the faculty merely intensively in the natural order, then I concede the consequence. But this vision is essentially supernatural. Hence this faculty, which of itself is intrinsically incapable for such act, must be supernaturally elevated so as to be made intrinsically capable in first actuality for this vision.

SECOND SERIES OF OBJECTIONS, TO SHOW THAT THE LIGHT OF GLORY IS SOMETHING REPUGNANT

First objection. If God is seen by means of a light, then He is seen through a medium; but the beatific vision is absolutely direct; therefore the light of glory is incompatible with this vision

Reply. I distinguish the major. If God is seen by means of a light, then He is seen through an objective medium quo or in quo, this I deny; that He is seen through a subjective medium sub quo, or one that strengthens the faculty, this I concede. The minor I concede, and I distinguish the conclusion in the same way.?!?

Second objection. Even this subjective medium that strengthens the faculty is something repugnant. For what is finite cannot dispose one to see the infinite. But the light of glory is finite, since it is created. Therefore it cannot dispose one to see God, who is infinite.

Reply. I distinguish the major. What is finite in the entitative and natural order, this I concede; what is finite in the entitative and supernatural order cannot dispdse one to see the infinite, this I subdistinguish: it cannot dispose one for an infinite or comprehensive knowledge of God, this I concede; that it cannot dispose one for a finite knowledge of God, this I deny.?18

Third objection. The light of glory is incompatible even with a finite knowledge of God, for the power that perfects a vital faculty must itself be vital; but the light of glory is not vital, because it does not proceed from an intrinsic principle; therefore this light is repugnant to the faculty.

Reply. I distinguish the major. The power that perfects a vital

faculty must itself be vital, as being that by which the act is a vitally elicited act, this I concede; as being that which is vitally produced by the created intellect, this I deny. Although the light of glory is not vital as being what is produced by the intellective faculty, yet it is vital as being that by which the elicited act of vision is vital.

First doubt. How does the light of glory concur with the intellect in the beatific vision?

Reply. Each concurs actively, as two total and subordinated causes, but each under a different aspect. For the created intellect and the light of glory are not two partial and coordinated causes, such that the vitality of the beatific vision would be a natural vitality, as Suarez would have it in accordance with his conception of an active obediential power which, as we stated, almost dispenses with the necessity of an elevation or of an elevating grace.?14

The created intellect and the light of glory are indeed two total and subordinated causes, such that the intellect is the total and radical principle, and the infused habit of the light of glory is the total and proximate principle by which the act of vision is elicited. Hence the vitality of the beatific vision is essentially supernatural, because it proceeds not from a purely natural faculty, but from an elevated faculty. Thus eternal life is truly a new life, the two aspects of life and vision being equally applicable in this sense; for it is essentially supernatural as being specified by an essentially supernatural object.?!8 Thus the beatific vision differs entirely from the miraculous restoration of sight to a blind person, because this sight is essentially natural and is only supernaturally restored. In other words, it is only supernatural as regards the mode of its production.

It must be observed also that the created intellect is not the instrumental cause of intellectual vision, as baptismal water is of grace; but the beatific vision is its vital and connatural act, although it does not elicit this act independently of the infused habit. This habit, however, functions by way of a second nature of the higher order. So also the will of the blessed is not the instrumental cause of the act of charity elicited by it, but is its connatural act.

Second doubt. Can there be the creation of an intellect to which the light of glory would be connatural?

St. Thomas denies this in his reply to the third objection: “The light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has

214 See John of St. Thomas, Com, in Jam, q.12, a.2, NO. 10 f: 215 An essentially supernatural and simple act cannot be partly natural and partly supernatural.

a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article.”

Scotus held the opposite view.?4* But from Scotus’ opinion it follows that consummated grace, as a matter of fact, would be grace not essentially, but only contingently. This is contrary to the principle that powers, habits, and acts are specified by their formal object.?"7 But the formal and proper object of the divine intellect evidently transcends the proper and natural object of any creatable intellect whatever; otherwise this intellect would be of the same nature as God, would be God created.

Third doubt. Why is a created and supernatural substance a contradiction in terms?

It is because the intellect of this substance would be of the same nature as the divine intellect, for it would be specified by the same formal object, and hence would be the divine nature created, which is a contradiction in terms, just as pantheism is.

Moreover, this substance would be supernatural; but it is intrinsically repugnant for a supernatural substance to be created. Indeed, nothing created can be essentially supernatural without its being essentially related to the Deity as such, to God's intimate life, and thus specified by it; for it is only God's essence that transcends every created nature. But no created substance can be essentially related to the Deity and specified by it, since substance is being in itself and for itself. This means that the reason for its specification is to be found in itself, and it cannot be defined because of its being referred to something else. On the contrary, an accident, such as a power or a habit, can be essentially related to something else. Thus grace, which is the seed of glory, is specified by God’s essence, of which it is a participation, and by means of it we are ordained to see God in His essence.?!8

WHETHER, OF THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD, ONE SEES MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER

The answer is in the affirmative, and it is of faith against Jovinian, as also against Luther, who said that all men are equally blessed,

217 This principle, however, pervades the whole of psychology and theology as the searchlight in all that concerns the acquired virtues, the infused virtues, and the vices. Thus St. Thomas says: “The species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain” (IIa Iae, q.5, a.g).

218 Cf. Gonet, Clypeus thomisticus, De gratia, disp. I, a.3; Billuart, De Deo, diss. IV, a.5, § 4.

in that they are justified not by their own justice, but by the justice of Christ which is imputed to them.

The Council of Florence defines it to be of faith in the following words: “The souls of the saints ... clearly intuit the one and triune God, one seeing Him more perfectly than another, according to the diversity of their merits.” 24° Likewise the Council of Trent condemns those who say that “men justified by good works do not merit an increase of glory.” 220

This doctrine of the faith is equivalently expressed in the following passages of Holy Scripture: “Star differeth from star in glory”; 221 and this is said of the blessed. Similarly we have: “In My Father’s house there are many mansions”; 22? and these words must be understood as referring to the kingdom of heaven, because in this same chapter our Lord says: “I go to prepare a place for you . . . that where I am, you also may be.” 228

The Fathers, especially St. Augustine, frequently alluded to the doctrine of the various degrees of happiness in heaven that correspond to the varying degrees of merit among the blessed.??t But Holy Scripture also discloses the reason for this inequality, which has its foundation in the merits acquired in this life. Such texts are: “Your reward is very great in heaven”; 22° “Who will render to every man according to his works.” 22 But there is inequality of merit among wayfarers.

Theology, which explains more clearly the reason for this inequality, teaches that the more the intellect participates in the light of glory, the more perfectly it sees God. But the greater the charity, the greater is the participation in the light of glory; for desire actuated by charity in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt to receive the object desired.

First doubt. Does the inequality of vision result solely from the inequality of participation in the light of glory, or is it also because of the inequality of the natural power of the intellect?

Reply. The general answer to this, against the Scotists, Molina, and even partly against Cajetan, is that it is solely because of the inequality of participation in the light of glory. As St. Thomas says: “it [the inequality] will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of

224 Cf, Rouet de Journel, Enchir. patristicum, nos. 696, 710, 1383, 1502, 1831, 1931, 2308, the intellect, not indeed the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.” 227 Why is this? It is because, as stated in the body of the article, “the faculty of seeing God does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory.” Therefore the faculty of seeing God more perfectly does not belong to the created intellect according as it is by nature more perfect. Hence the penetrative vision of the divine essence is not greater in the angelic intellect than in the human intellect, if each receives an equal degree of the light of glory. The incongruity resulting from its denial confirms this view. For otherwise, granted equality of merit, one would see God more perfectly than the other, namely, the one whose intellect is endowed with greater penetration of vision; but this would be contrary to the notion of reward. There is another incongruity in that any degree of glory would not be according to the corresponding degree of grace, but would be according to one’s natural powers, and thus man by his natural powers would claim something as his own in the spiritual order, which is contrary to what St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee?” 228

The opinion of the Scotists and Molina arises from the fact that they consider the intellect and the light of glory not so much as two total and subordinated causes, but rather as two partial and coordinated causes,

Second doubt. Do some of the blessed enjoy an equal degree of glory?

Reply. This we affirm, especially for baptized children who die before coming to the use of reason.

SEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD COMPREHEND HIM

It is of faith that the blessed do not comprehend God, inasmuch as the Lateran Council declares that “God is incomprehensible.” 229 It is commonly admitted among theologians that this incomprehensibility is to be understood as referring not only to the natural but also to the supernatural faculties; for there is a difference between invisibility and incomprehensibility. The blessed are called comprehensors, inasmuch as their immediate vision of God is construed as comprehension in the broad sense of the term.2%°

The theological proof given by St. Thomas is clear. To compre- hend God is to know Him both intensively and extensively so far as He is knowable, that is, infinitely; but no created intellect, either by its own power or by means of the light of glory, can know God infinitely; therefore no created intellect can comprehend God.

The major has its foundation in the principle that the source of knowledge and of knowableness is immateriality. But God alone is absolutely immaterial as being most pure act both in the entitative and in the intellectual orders. Hence no created intellect can see God with the same clarity, distinction, and penetration, as God sees Himself, that is, intensively; nor even extensively, for the more profound one’s knowledge of God is, the more profound one’s knowledge is of what comes within the scope of omnipotence or divine causality.?t

Objection. It is stated that the blessed see the indivisible God as a whole. Therefore it does not seem possible for their vision to remain imperfect.

Reply. In reply to the second objection it is pointed out that the blessed see the whole of God but not as He is infinitely knowable. Thus he who knows any demonstrable proposition by a probable reason, knows every part of the proposition, namely, the subject, the predicate, and the verb “is”; yet he does not know it as perfectly as it is capable of being known. So also in sense perception, when several persons see a MOuntain more or less perfectly, clearly, and distinctly, it is seen in all its details according as one has a keener vision than the other.

Similarily, it is pointed out in the reply to the third objection that the blessed see God as a whole, but not wholly, in the sense that the mode of the one knowing does not adequately correspond to the mode of the object known. This means that the blessed see God only in a finite way.

First doubt. Do the blessed see all the formal and necessary constituents of God, namely, the essence, the attributes, and the Persons.

Reply. That they do is commonly affirmed against the nominalists.2°? In fact, the common teaching against Scotus is that it is repugnant for the divine essence to be seen by the blessed apart from the attributes and the Persons, because there is no real distinction between the divine essence, the attributes, and the Persons,

232 Contrary to the nominalists, it must be said that omnipotence, which as its name implies denotes a reference to undefined creatures, can be known quidditatively provided the formal and primary object of its action be known, which is the idea of created being. It is not necessary that the material and secondary objects be known, which are all possible creatures. Thus the quiddative knowledge of matter does not necessitate the knowledge of all material things.

not even an actual formal distinction on the part of the object, as posited by Scotus; for there is no intermediary distinction. Either the distinction between objects is real and exists before the mind's consideration, or it is logical, and does not exist before the mind's consideration. Thus the divine reality, as it is in itself, actually and explicitly contains not only the divine essence, but also the attributes and the Persons. But if it is a question of the divine essence as conceived by us wayfarers, then the attributes and the Persons are contained actually and implicitly in it.

Second doubt. Do the blessed in seeing God see His free decrees?

Reply. They see them inasmuch as these are existing realities in God, but they do not see them inasmuch as these terminate defectibly in creatures, unless God wills to manifest this to them. ‘Thus they do not know the day of judgment or the number of the elect. The reason is that future free things are contained in God’s essence only by reason of His free decree, which is made known either by some effect or by God’s special revelation. Having sufficiently discussed the primary object of the beatific vision, we now pass on to consider its secondary object.

EIGHTH ARTICLE WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL IN GOD

In the title the word “all” signifies everything outside God and everything that can exist.

Reply. It is denied that the blessed see all that God does or can do, for then they would have a comprehensive knowledge of God, which means that they would know all that God does or can do; for the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen, and all possible effects if it is seen comprehensively.

Doubt. What, therefore, do the blessed see in God?

It is generally admitted that the blessed see of past, present, and future things whatever pertains particularly and principally to them.?** The proof is that the beatific vision must perfectly satisfy every lawful desire of the blessed. But the blessed lawfully desire to know what specially pertains to them. Therefore the blessed see all that specially pertains to them.

_ It is not easy to determine in detail what specially pertains to them. However, the theologians generally agree in saying that the blessed can be considered from three points of view: (1) inasmuch as they are elevated to the supernatural order; (2) inasmuch as they

are a part of the universe in the natural order; (3) inasmuch as each is an individual person, either public, as the Pope, the king, or the founder of a religious order, or in a private capacity, as the father of a family.

But the blessed as raised to the supernatural order see the mysteries believed in this life, such as those of the incarnation, redemption, predestination, and grace. It is not necessary, however, that these be seen in all their circumstances of time and place, as is evident concerning the day of judgment, which not even the angels know. Nor is it necessary for them to see the fulfillment of these mysteries in all individual cases. The blessed as part of the universe see the genera and species, as St. Thomas teaches in this article.?4

The blessed, inasmuch as each is an individual person, see all or at least the principal things that pertain to their state. Thus St. Peter and more likely the Pope, too, see all that pertains to the universal Church; so also does the king see all that pertains to his kingdom, and the father to his family. They likewise see all the prayers of the faithful who implore their intercession. Hence the knowledge of the Blessed Virgin Mary far surpasses that of any of the saints, especially as regards the prayers and thoughts of human beings; yet not, so it seems, all the thoughts of human beings. This privilege belongs to Christ, as judge of the human race, and thus He must know the acts of all those to be judged.?35

Similarly, the blessed see God’s free decrees in their fulfillment, those that specially pertain to them according to God’s good pleasure. `

WHETHER WHAT IS SEEN IN GOD, BY THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE, IS SEEN THROUGH ANY SIMILITUDE

Reply. The answer is that the blessed see without the intermediary of a created species what they see in the divine essence or in the Word. In this case the divine essence is for them the medium previously known, in which creatures are known as in their efficient and exemplary cause. This vision of creatures in the Word is the beatific vision itself, which is one of simple intuition.?%¢

This vision of creatures in the Word, which is called morning knowledge inasmuch as it is the vision of creatures as in their

dawning, is a certain participation of the knowledge which God has of creatures in Himself. They are known not merely in a confused manner, but distinctly as possible participations of the divine perfections. Thus he who would have an intuitive knowledge of the intellective soul, would know the sensitive and vegetative souls. Hence the knowledge of things in the Word is without any created species.

But the blessed can also know creatures outside the Word, and this by created species.?87 This knowledge outside the Word is called evening knowledge, as though it were twilight knowledge, because it is of an inferior kind; for, as St. Augustine says: “The knowledge ` of created things contemplated by themselves is, so to speak, more colorless than when they are seen in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which they were made.” 238

From this it is evident that the vision of things in the Word is more or less perfect according to the degree of the beatific vision and hence of merits. On the contrary, in the vision of things outside the Word there is not this same correspondence to the degree of the beatific vision and merits. Thus it may happen that the knowledge of a Pope or a king, who enjoys a lower degree of the beatific vision, may be greater as regards those things that specially pertain to him, which the blessed of a higher order do not have, since they are unknown to the latter.

John of St. Thomas remarks that theologians who, out of love for God, take up the study of theology, see the object of theology more eminently in the Word, whereas those who take up the study of theology more from a natural desire of acquiring knowledge, see the theological conclusions outside the Word.

Objection. If the blessed see various created things in the Word, why can they not see God's free decrees even as to their fulfillment?

Reply. The reason is that God, just as He freely brings creatures into being, so He freely makes use of His essence as the intelligible species in representing these rather than the former. Hence the blessed see the free acts of the future that specially pertain to them, only if God expressly wills to make these known to them, and this manifestation is a certain revelation; but it is one that is effected in the Word, although it may also take place outside the Word.

The question may be asked whether the name “Word” imports relation to creatures. It certainly does, though not indeed essentially so, but only if there is a divine decree.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL THEY SEE IN IT AT THE SAME TIME

The article is concerned with the knowledge of things in the Word. In the title “at the same time” means that things are not seen successively.

Simultaneity of vision is affirmed, because this vision of things formally in the Word, is a unique intuition that is effected by means of but one and absolutely invariable species both as a representation and as an entity. Hence all things at one and the same time are included in this vision.

Therefore the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity, and not by time, not even by the discrete time of the angels in which their successive thoughts are measured.**® But participated eternity has indeed a beginning, but after its inception it is simultaneously whole, and it is not a fleeting but a permanent now. However, just as the beatific vision begins, so it could by God's absolute power come to an end; but as long as it endures, it is measured by participated eternity, by a single indivisible instant. This was so if St. Paul received it as a transient vision during his life here on earth.24° Hence what the blessed see in the Word, they see at one and the same time and not successively. On the contrary, what they see outside the Word by their own different species, are not seen at one and the same time, but successively, and this for the opposite reason.

Corollary. Probably the blessed know outside the Word the prayers directed to them, because if they saw formally in the Word at one and the same time all the petitions of all those praying to them, they would already know the day of the last judgment.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER ANYONE IN THIS LIFE CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD

The answer is that no one in this life can see the essence of God. The Council of Vienne condemned the following proposition of the Beghards: “It is possible for man to acquire in this life the same degree of final happiness as he will have in heaven.” #4? In like manner, the Scripture says: “Man shall not see Me and live.” 242

“No man hath seen God at any time.” 24° “While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith and not by sight.” 244

St. Thomas assigns as the reason for this that the soul, united as it is with the body and the senses, knows God in a natural way only as it is related to sensible things; that is, with reference to its proper object.

The same also applies to the soul in its supernatural belief, because it is by means of concepts naturally abstracted from sensible things that revelation is made possible, for example, concepts of nature, person. The proper object of the lowest in the scale of intellectual beings is the lowest in the degree of intelligibility.

However, as pointed out in the reply to the second objection, God could, by way of an exception, have given the beatific vision as something transitory to St. Paul, who was rapt in ecstasy so that he might be the teacher of the Gentiles. This is the opinion of St. Augustine, and of St. Thomas when he discusses the subject of rapture.?45

TWELFTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD CAN BE KNOWN IN THIS LIFE BY NATURAL REASON

The answer is that we cannot see God by our natural power of reason, because our natural knowledge begins from sense, and sensible effects do not adequately express the power of the First Cause. However, we can by these effects know that God exists, and that He has perfections the lack of which would make it impossible for Him to be the First Cause.

Thus there are three ways of knowing God, namely, by causality, negation, and eminence.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER BY GRACE A HIGHER KNOWLEDGE OF GOD CAN BE OBTAINED THAN BY NATURAL REASON

The answer is in the affirmative, and the superiority of this knowledge of God is considered from two points of view: (1) subjectively, inasmuch as our intellect is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light (light of faith, or also of prophecy); (2) objectively, inasmuch as it implies the presentation of an object that is not

naturally knowable; and this is effected either by the infusion of images or ideas, or by the divine arrangement of the acquired ideas to express a supernatural truth.

In the reply to the first objection it is remarked that “by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God what He is,” still we know Him more fully than by the power of natural reason, and thus we believe that there are three Persons in God. Hence, although the faithful do not know the Deity as it really is, yet they have an obscure knowledge of the same by means of God's revelation.

And so this terminates the question about the beatific vision both in itself as regards its proper object and its secondary object (created things seen in the Word), and also in its relation to other kinds of knowledge, which is knowledge outside the Word, these being faith, prophecy, and the natural knowledge of God. What St. Thomas made clear and particularly stressed is that the beatific vision is essentially supernatural. He is of the opinion that it absolutely demands the elevation of the intellect by the light of glory, such that this essentially supernatural light cannot be a natural property of any created or creatable intellect.

In like manner, St. Thomas shows convincingly that this vision is absolutely immediate, inasmuch as God’s essence is united to our intellect as impressed and expressed species. For no created species, which is intelligible by participation, can represent God Himself as He really is, who is the self-existing Being and selfsubsisting Intellection, in fact, His Deity, which in a certain sense transcends being and intellection, inasmuch as it contains these formally and eminently, which must at once be shown.

Footnotes

1. See prologue to q.3. ↩

2. Jbid., q. 109, a. 5; q. 110, a. 5; q. 112, a. 1, 5. ↩