Chapter XXIII. Question 23 predestination

‘THERE are three parts to this question: ¹ The nature of predestination; (2) its cause; (3) the certainty of it.

The first part, which concerns the nature of predestination, consists of three articles. What its name implies and its reality (a. 1); its real definition and whether it posits anything in the predestined (a 2); what its opposite is, which is reprobation (a. 3).

The second part concerns the cause of predestination. On God’s part, whether the predestined are chosen by Him (a. 4); on our part, whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination (a. 5).

The third part concerns the certainty of predestination: Whether it is a certainty (a. 6); whether the number of the predestined is certain (a. 7); whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints (a. 8).

We have discussed this question at length in a special work, to which we refer the reader.’ In the beginning of this work we treated of the significance and reality of predestination according to Holy Scripture, and of the teaching of the Church on this subject. The principal difficulties of this problem and the method of procedure, as also the classification of the theological systems, were then considered. In this same work the teaching of St. Thomas was compared with that of St. Augustine and with the theories of several modern theologians, especially of Molina and the congruists.

This question is connected with the preceding question. The gratuity of predestination is a disputed point among theologians, in so far as they admit or do not admit the intrinsic efficacy of the divine will as regards the merits of the predestined. For St. Thomas,* the Thomists, the Scotists, and the Augustinians, these decrees are of themselves efficacious, so that the merits of the predestined are the effects of predestination and therefore cannot be the cause of predestination, as will be stated in the fifth article. For the Molinists and the congruists, the divine decrees as regards the merits of the predestined are not of themselves efficacious; but their efficacy depends on our consent foreseen by means of the scientia media, and therefore Molina says: “To the foreknowledge, which is included in predestination on the part of the intellect, there is attached the condition of the use of free will without which there would have been no preordaining by God.” * Something similar is to be found in the congruism of St. Robert Bellarmine and of Suarez, in so far as they retain the theory of the scientia media; nevertheless they agree with St. Augustine and St. Thomas in defending the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory.

As we shall see, what clarifies this entire question is the principle of predilection as formulated by St. Thomas in a previous article, in which he says: “Since God’s love is the cause (efficacious of itself) of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will a greater good for one than for the other.” + And again: “The reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good.” 5 ‘This means that no one would be better than another unless loved and helped more by God. This principle presupposes that God’s will or His love is the cause that is of itself efficacious of the goodness of our salutary choices and of our merits in accordance with the following text: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” è It follows from this, as will at once be seen, that as merits are the effects of God’s predilection and predestination, they cannot be its cause, as will be stated in the fifth article of this question. This teaching on the divine causality constitutes what there is of clarity, and the permission of the sin of final impenitence constitutes what there is of obscurity in this chiaroscuro.

In other words, St. ‘Thomas preserves the principle of predilection absolutely intact in this question, whereas Molina says: “Of two that are called and equally aided by grace, it can happen that one of them is converted and the other not. It is possible for one who has received a less grace to rise again, when another who has received a greater grace does not rise again, and remains obdurate.”’ 7 Nevertheless, so as not to deny the mystery of predestination and at least defend the extrinsic validity of the principle of predilection, Molina says that it depends entirely on God's good pleasure that Peter was placed in those circumstances in which God, by the scientia media, had foreseen his good consent, and that Judas was placed in different

3 Concordia, q.23, a.4, 5, disp. I, membr. 11, p. 516. 4Summa theol., Ia, q.20, a.3.

² circumstances in which God, by this same knowledge, had foreseen his sin.* Thus the solution of this entire question on predestination is to be sought in the preceding questions on God's knowledge and will, The Thomists reject the scientia media completely, for it posits a passivity in God with reference to our conditionally meritorious free acts of the future. They always appeal to this most exalted principle, namely, that no good is actually done by this particular man rather than by another unless God efficaciously willed it, and no one actually commits sin without God’s permission.®

If these principles are borne in mind, it will be easier to understand what must now be said on this subject.

Let us see what is the general condition of this question from the standpoint of Holy Scripture, what are the principal conflicting errors and the classification of the Catholic theological systems. The explanation of the articles of St. Thomas will thus be much simplified. Many appeal to him as their authority, yet their appeal does not always rest on solid grounds.

TESTIMONY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

There is already indeed in the Old Testament frequent reference to the gratuitous election by which God chose the people of Israel from among all nations. Thus Seth was elected by God, and not Cain; then Noe was chosen, and Sem in preference to his two brothers; Abraham and Isaac, too, in preference to Ismael, and then Jacob was preferred to Esau. Similarly, in the New Testament we read that God freely calls the Gentiles to salvation, whereas He permits the crime committed by Israel.1°

Thus it is often said in the Old Testament that God's free election does not conflict with justice. There is no evidence that this divine election presupposes the divine foreknowledge of man’s merits. Hence St. Paul says of Jacob and Esau: “When the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil (that the purpose of God might stand), not of works but of Him that calleth, it was said to her (Rebecca): the elder shall serve the younger; as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated,” + that is, but I loved Esau less. Thus the mystery of salvation was announced “as a type” 1? in the Old Testament.

Does the Gospel declare the mystery of predestination? It cer-

tainly does, inasmuch as it speaks of the elect and the divine election. The Gospel announces indeed to all the mystery of redemption and the possibility of salvation, as in the following text: “Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” 13 St. Paul likewise says: “God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself a redemption for all,” 14

Most certainly God does not command what is impossible, but makes the fulfillment of His precepts really possible at the very moment that they are of obligation, and in so far as they are known by men.

Nevertheless there are men and angels who, through their own fault, have strayed from the path of salvation or have perished, even men who knew Christ the Savior and followed Him, such as “the son of perdition.” 15

Others, who in the Gospel are called the elect, are saved. If they are adults, they not only can keep God’s commandments, but they actually do, and they persevere unul the end. Of these Christ says: “My sheep hear My voice, and I know them and they follow Me. And I give them life everlasting; and they shall not perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My Father hath given Me is greater than all; and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father. I and the Father are one.” 18 Similarly He says farther on: “Those whom Thou gavest Me have I kept; and none of them is lost but the son of perdition, that the Scripture may be fulfilled.” 7 There is reference in these texts not only to God’s foreknowledge, but especially to His most efficacious omnipotence.2®

It is likewise declared that “many are called, but few are chosen.” 19 Also in the prophecy concerning the fall of Jerusalem and the end of the world, we read: “Unless those days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved. But for the sake of the elect those days shall be shortened.” 2°

18 Consult St. Augustine’s Com, in Joannem, 10: 27, tr. 48. Also St. Thomas’ Com. in Joannem (ibid.).

Therefore the Gospel treats of the mystery of the divine election, which is the same as the mystery of predestination. In fact, as St. Robert Bellarmine shows, there are three certain propositions which we conclude from the Gospel.?!

1. God has chosen several among all classes of men. In the parable of the laborers in the vineyard and in the other of those that were invited to the marriage feast, we read: “Many are called, but few are chosen.” *? And again, there is the following text: “God shall send His angels with a trumpet and a great voice, and they shall gather together His elect from the four winds, from the farthest parts of the heavens to the utmost bounds of them.” 23

2. God efficaciously chose those to be saved that they may infallibly attain to eternal life. Thus we read: “There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, insomuch as to deceive, if possible, even the elect,” ** that is, if this were possible. And again: “This is the will of the Father who sent Me: that of all that He hath given Me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again in the last day.” 25 “My sheep . . . shall not perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand.” This text seems to point to the intrinsic efficacy of the divine election and grace, and that this efficacy does not depend on our foreseen consent. For this text does not speak of God’s knowledge, but of His omnipotent will that preserves the elect and leads them to salvation.

3. God's choice of the elect was gratuitous, for we can in no way conclude from the Gospel that God chose them on account of their foreseen merits. Thus in the text: “Fear not, little flock, for it hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom,” 2? the verb “hath pleased” expresses God’s good pleasure and mercy. The text does not say: “Fear not, because your merits were foreseen.” Likewise, we read: “I have called you friends. . . . You have not chosen Me,

21 De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. g £.

24 Ibid., 24:24. John Maldonatus in his commentary on this text remarks: “When he says, ‘if possible,’ he indicates that it is not possible. But it is not possible, posited the fact of divine predestination, as the theologians admit in discussing this text. From this passage they conclude the stability and, as they call it, the certainty of predestination. Christ is not speaking of any kind of straying away, but of the kind that is called final separation. For the elect can often be led astray, but they cannot die in that state.” Consult also Matt. 24: 40: “Then two shall be in the field: one shall be taken, and one shall be left. Two women shall be grinding at the mill: one shall be taken, and one shall be left.”

26 [bid., 10: 28. Consult St. Thomas’ commentary on this text.

but I have chosen you, and have appointed you that you should go and should bring forth fruit, and your fruit should remain.” ?8

These words are uttered, indeed, directly to the apostles, but they concern indirectly all those who must labor in the Lord’s vineyard and all God's friends. St. Thomas says: “Many attribute to themselves the cause of divine friendship, in that they attribute the principle of good works to themselves and not to God. And the Lord excluding this, says: ‘You have not chosen Me’ (namely, that I should be your friend); ‘but I have chosen you’ (that I should make you My friends), and He is not speaking here only of the grace of the apostolate.” 29 St. Thomas explains the whole of this passage as referring to the gratuity of predestination, and he concludes: “It is the good already present in the thing that influences our choice, but the divine election is the cause of greater good in one thing than in another. . . - This shows clearly God’s mercy to some, whom He prepares for grace without their having previously merited it.” %0

The gratuity of the divine election is likewise intimated in the following words of our Lord: “I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things (the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven) from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father, for so hath it seemed good in Thy sight.” 31 This means, as we read in one of the epistles: “God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble,” ** and even makes them humble; for humility is God’s gift. Hence St. Thomas explains this text from St. Matthew by referring it to predestination, saying: “Why God is merciful to this one rather than to a certain other, is to be attributed solely to His will . . . His will of good pleasure.” 38 Therefore, Jesus says: “Yea, Father, for so hath it seemed good in Thy sight.” 34

The deep humility of the saints has its foundation in this, that when great saints see a criminal condemned to death, they say to themselves: “If this man had received all the graces which I received, perhaps he would not have been so unfaithful; and if God had permitted me to commit the sins which He permitted him to commit, this man would be in my place and I would be in his.” Thus Christian humility has its foundation in the mystery of creation from nothing and in the mystery of grace or divine election.

Hence already in the synoptic Gospels and in the Gospel of St.

John the mystery of the divine election is declared, as well as its efficacy and gratuity. It must be noted that, just as in the principle of predilection enunciated by St. ‘Thomas,** so the gratuity of election follows from its efficacy, which extends even to the merits of the elect, for our Lord says: “Without Me you can do nothing.” 38

What is stated more clearly about this mystery in the epistles of St. Paul? It is called predestination, a name that properly applies to it. The efficacy and gratuity of this predestination are more clearly presented.

Now, in truth, St. Paul frequently declares the principle of predilection, which virtually contains the doctrine of predestination. He says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” 8 This is a quasi-commentary on our Lord's words: “Without Me you can do nothing” 38 as regards salvation. That is, no one thing would be better than another if God did not will greater good ‘for one than for another. St. Paul also says: “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” ** The efficacy and gratuity of predestination, which is asserted in the following texts, already follows from this principle of predestination.

Such texts are: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual blessings in heavenly places, in Christ: as he chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself: according to the purpose of His will: unto the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son.” 4° St. Thomas, like his predecessor, St. Augustine, commenting on this passage in his commentary on this epistle, says: “He chose us, not because we were saints, for we were not; but He chose us that we might become saints by leading a virtuous life and one free from vices. . . . But when the Apostle says that God predestinated us unto adoption, these words may be referred to the imperfect likeness of adoptive sonship realized here on earth by sanctifying grace; yet it is better to say they refer to the perfect likeness to God that will be realized in our heavenly home, and it is of this adoption that St. Paul says: ‘We ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting

85 Summa theol., Ia, q.20, a.3. 36 John 15: 5. 87 I Cor. 4: 7. 38 John 15: 5. 89 Phil. 2: 13. 40 Eph. 1: 8-7- for the adoption of the sons’ (Rom. 8: 23). But there are two causes assigned . . . for the divine predestination. One is the simple will of God, denoted by the words, ‘according to the purpose of His will.’ . . . The other cause is final, which is, that we may praise and know God’s goodness, and this is denoted by the words, ‘unto the praise of the glory of His grace.’ ” 44 This interpretation of St. Thomas is confirmed by the fact that adoptive sonship in this life is willed by God on account of the perfect adoption realized in heaven. This interpretation also brings out clearly both the gratuity and the efficacy of predestination.

And again St. Paul says: “We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew (zpoéyvw) he also predestinated (zpodpicev) to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the firstborn amongst many brethren. And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified.” +?

With St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and St. Robert Bellarmine,‘* we must remark that in this last text the words, “whom He foreknew He also predestinated,” the meaning is: “Those whom God has foreknown, looking favorably upon them, He has also predestined. These words do not refer to the divine foreknowledge of our meritorious acts, for such interpretation would imply that there is some good not produced by God Himself. Nowhere in St. Paul’s epistles would we find any foundation for this interpretation; and it would contradict the texts just quoted and the ones we are about to quote. The meaning is: Those whom He has foreknown, looking favorably upon them (and among these are children who will die immediately after being baptized, before they performed any meritorious act). This is the frequent acceptation in Holy Scripture of the verb (xpoyryvdoxw) “I foreknow.” Thus we read: “God hath not

41 Com. in Eph. 1: 3-7; see also tbid., 1: 11, 12. Consult Estius, Com. in Ep. ad Eph., 1:11, 12. Concerning the words, “having been predestined in the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will,” Estius says: “And so the Apostle is of the opinion that our salvation and the whole process of our sanctification is the result of God's efficacious Operation in us, just as He operates in all things by a causality that in the strict sense of the term is called physical, which is rashly denied by some who in other respects are learned It follows, moreover, from this that we are predestined not on account of our merits but simply because it was God's will. St. Thomas, too, clearly adverts to this fact in his commentary on this passage.” See also Father J. M. Vosté, O.P., Com. in Ep. ad Eph., pp. 99-121. s `

43 De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. IL, chaps. g£.

cast away His people, which He foreknew.” +44 The Gospel speaks of the Lord as saying to the wicked: “I never knew you: depart from Me, you that work iniquity.” #® And St. Paul says: “But now, after that you have known God, or rather are known by God.” 48 “If any man love God, the same is known by Him.” 4 “Then I shall know even as I am known.” 48 “The Lord knoweth who are His.” # “The Lord

• knoweth the way of the just, and the way of the, wicked shall perish.” 5°

This exegesis of St. Thomas and St. Robert Bellarmine is upheld at the present day by Lagrange, Allo, Zahn, Julicher, and others.

In the previously quoted passage,*! the gratuity of predestination is clearly seen since it depends on God’s gratuitous purpose, which is there referred to.5? St. Paul also says in another epistle: “In whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the pur-

. pose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will, that we may be unto the praise of His glory.” 53

Likewise, in this previously quoted passage, the efficacy of predestination is made clear in its effects, which are vocation, justification, glorification.

Finally, St. Paul sets forth God’s supreme independence or liberty in the distribution of His graces.** For God had chosen Israel, which is now rejected because of its unbelief; and God announces salvation to the Gentiles, but the future conversion of the Jews is also foretold. The principle of predilection is proclaimed, which is ap- _ plied to nations and individuals in the following words: “What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. For He saith show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him that ila nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth

Falher Lagrange, O.P.58 shows that these words are indeed primarily said of the Gentile nations, but the principles enunciated therein are also applied, according to St. Paul, in a secondary sense³

to individuals; in fact, strictly speaking, only persons are predestined, The meaning of these words is that God freely chooses, without offending against justice. Therefore there is no injustice on His part. For God does not command what is impossible and deprives nobody of his due, when He freely grants a greater grace to some as we shall find St. Thomas stating farther on.”

St. Paul concludes: “Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and how unsearchable His ways! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counselor? Or who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of Him and by Him and in Him are all things. To Him be glory forever, amen.” 58

We shall explain several of these texts again in our commentary on the articles of St. Thomas. At present, however, we must show, with St. Robert Bellarmine,®® that the three propositions which we have formulated from the Gospel, which concern the divine election, are more clearly deduced from what St. Paul says in his epistles concerning predestination which follows the divine election. They are:

1. God has chosen and predestined some among all classes of men.®°

2. God efficaciously chose and predestined those to be saved that they may infallibly attain to eternal life. “Those whom He predestinated, them He has also called . . . and justified . . . and glorified.” 6

3. God has freely chosen and predestined the elect. “Those whom He foreknew (looking favorably upon them) He also predestinated.” 62 “Who shall accuse against the elect of God?” ® “There is a remnant saved according to the election of grace.” 6 “In Him, in whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will, that we may be unto the praise of His glory.” 6

The gratuity of election is also inferred when St. Paul says that “God is able to make him stand,” ® which means, as the Council of Trent explains, “that he stand perseveringly (and that He is able) to restore him who falleth.” * This implies that it is by a special

59 De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. g-15.

act of God’s mercy that he who falls is restored or converted, and it is just as much God’s predilection that is made manifest, if one is always preserved from sin and never loses baptismal innocence.

From all these texts of Holy Scripture, St. Augustine deduced the following definition quoted by all theologians: “Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits by which most certainly are liberated whoever are liberated.” ® and St. Augustine says more explicitly: “By predestination God knew what He Himself will do.” ® It is not the foreknowledge of our merits that is assigned as the cause of predestination in this definition, but the merits of the elect are clearly seen to be the effects of this predestination, which is therefore gratuitous. Thus St. Augustine frequently says that God, in rewarding our meritorious acts, crowns His own gifts."°

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AGAINST MUTUALLY CONFLICTING HERESIES

The teaching of the Church on this subject was formulated in the condemnations of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism. It is subsequently declared against the absolutely contradictory errors of predestinarianism as also against those of Protestantism and Jansenism. The teaching of the Church is thus like the mountain peak of truth that towers above and between these conflicting errors.

THE DECLARATION OF THE CHURCH AGAINST PELAGIANISM AND SEMIPELAGIANISM

The Pelagians said: “Without grace we can keep the commandments . . . and grace is not necessary except for making it easier to keep them.” This proposition was condemned in the fifth canon of the Council of Carthage (418).7* The Semipelagians said that man does not need grace for the beginning of faith and good will, spoken of as the “beginning of salvation,” and that he can persevere until death without a special grace. This statement was condemned by the Second Council of Orange.*? The Semipelagians held that God wills equally the salvation of all, although certain special graces are granted to some, such as the apostles. Consequently the Semipelagians identified predestination with God’s foreknowledge of the beginning of salvation and of merits by which man perseveres until

the end in doing good without any special help. Negative reprobation was identical with the foreknowledge of demerits. Thus predestination and negative reprobation followed human election, whether good or bad. Hence this eliminated the element of mystery in predestination spoken of by St. Paul. Hence God was no longer the author but merely the spectator of that which singles out the elect from the rest of mankind. Hence in Pelagianism and Semipelagianism the elect are not loved and helped more by God.

Concerning children who die before the age of reason, the Semipelagians said that God predestines or reprobates them, foreseeing the good or bad acts they would have performed if they had lived longer. Thus already the Semipelagians admitted, previous to any divine decree, a foreknowledge of the conditionally free acts of the future or of the futurables, which in later times was called by Molina the scientia media. The opponents of Pelagianism replied that such interpretation would mean that children are marked for reprobation on account of sins they did not commit, which is unjust.

Toward the end of his life St. Augustine wrote especially two treatises 7”? against Semipelagianism, in which he shows from the testimony of Holy Scripture particularly three things: (1) that, without a special and gratuitous grace, man cannot have the beginning of salvation, and that he cannot persevere until the end without a special and gratuitous grace; (2) that God does not will equally the salvation of all, but that He wills more the salvation of children who die immediately after being baptized. He likewise wills more the salvation of believers than of those who de facto do not receive the faith, and He wills more the salvation of those who persevere until the end; (3) that the elect, as their name indicates, are loved more and helped more, and that their merits are not the cause but the effect of the divine election. Even in one of his earlier works,” St. Augustine had already said, speaking of the angels who were of the elect, that they were “helped more” than the others.

The Council of Orange (529), in condemning Semipelagianism, took many of its formulas from'the writings of St. Augustine and of his disciple St. Prosper. All historians agree that it disapproved of the Semipelagian denials of the gratuitousness of grace and of its necessity for the beginning of salvation and for final perseverance.”5

Hence, on account of the declarations of the Council of Orange, all Catholic theologians admit three propositions, although they do not all interpret them in the same sense, They are: (1) predestination to grace 1s not because of God's foreseeing our naturally good works,

18 De praed. sanct.; De dono persever.

nor is the beginning of salutary acts due to natural causes; (2) predestination to glory is not because of God’s foreseeing we would continue in the performance of supernaturally meritorious acts apart from the special gift of final perseverance; (3) complete predestination, in so far as it comprises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorification, is gratuitous or independent of foreseen merits.

Nevertheless not all Catholic theologians interpret these three propositions in the same sense. There is particularly a difference between the Molinists who deny the intrinsic efficacy of grace, and others who admit it. The latter find this efficacy obviously stated in the declarations of the Council of Orange.

Thus, in the first proposition, for the actual grace that is required for the beginning of salvation, the Molinists understand this grace to be extrinsically efficacious, because our consent was foreseen by God. Hence they differ on this point from the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists.7* This does not safeguard so well the gratuity of grace as asserted by the Council of Orange.”

Similarly, contrary to the above-mentioned theologians, the Molinists understood the second proposition as meaning that the actual grace of final perseverance is extrinsically efficacious, inasmuch as God foresaw our consent by means of the scientia media. St. Augustine said of the grace of final perseverance: “It is a grace that is spurned by no one whose heart is hardened, and it is therefore given that the hardness of heart may first be eliminated.” 18 Contrary to this, Molina says: “It may happen that two persons receive in an equal degree the interior grace of vocation; one of them of his own free will is converted and the other remains an infidel. It may even happen that one who receives a far greater prevenient grace when called, of his own free will is not converted, and another, who receives a far less grace, is converted.” 79

It is not so easy to reconcile this statement with what the Council of Trent says: “of this great and special gift of perseverance . . . which cannot be derived from any other than from Him who is able to establish him who standeth ® that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falleth.” $1 Likewise, from what the Council of Trent teaches, it is commonly admitted that we cannot merit de condigno the grace of final perseverance, for the continuance of the

state of grace up to the moment of death is the principle of merit, and therefore cannot be merited.” *? Hence, if the Molinists wish to admit predestination to glory after foreseen merits, then they must say that predestination to glory is independent of our foreseen supernatural merits which, without the special gift of final perseverance, would continue until the end. This is expressed in the third proposition, which we are now going to explain.

The third proposition is: “Complete predestination, in so far as it comprises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorification, is gratuitous or independent of foreseen merits.” The Molinists differ from St. Thomas in the interpretation of this proposition.

Molina admits it, but he adds: “To the foreknowledge, which is included in predestination on the part of the intellect, there is attached the condition of the use of free will without which there would have been no preordaining by God.” 83

Contrary to this, Augustinians and Thomists understand complete predestination as it is explained by St. Thomas: “It is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatever is in man disposing him toward salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace.” 8t Thus even the free determination disposing one toward salvation is entirely included in the effect of predestination. “There is no distinction,” says St. ‘Thomas, “between what flows from free will and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.” *° They are two total causes that are not co-ordinated, but subordinated. But the effect of predestination cannot be its cause.

The import of these three propositions seems to be that they express the very teaching of St. Augustine and are obvious inferences from the canons of the Council of Orange.

This is especially made clear from the following canons of this same council. Canon g reads: “As often as we do good it is God who works in us and with us enabling us to act.” 8 Thus efficacious grace

82 The Council of Trent says: “The just man can truly merit eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself (if he dies in the state of grace).” (Denz., no. 842). See no. 809. This means that a man can merit the attainment of eternal life, if he retain his merits, however, until the end, and they are retained by the gift of final perseverance.

The Council of Trent, likewise says: “God's goodness toward all men is so great that He will have the things which are His own gifts (see no. 141) to be their merits (canon 32).”

not only makes it possible for us to do what is good, but by it we actually do what is good. It effectively works in us, as St. Paul says: “It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” 87 Also canon 12 says: “God so loves us, as we shall be by the gift of His grace, not as we are by our own merit.” 88 It follows from this that “God so much the more loves us, as we shall be better by the gift of His grace.” °° This means that no one would be better than another if he were not loved more by God. In the quotation of this last canon,® there is reference to the “Indiculus” on the grace of God, which expresses the same doctrine.®2

Hence ancient theologians, namely, Augustinians and Thomists, noted that this Second Council of Orange expresses in equivalent terms this principle of predilection, which is already enunciated by St. Paul in the following words: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” % It was this great truth which the Pelagians and Semipelagians denied in maintaining that God wills equally the salvation of all. Thus those who are saved would not be more loved and helped by God, who would be rather the onlooker than the author of what singles out the just from the impious.

We must now consider the declarations of the Church against the errors of those who deny God’s universal will to save.

Predestinarianism (ninth century) denied God’s universal will to save, and taught predestination to evil. Several said that these errors are to be found in the writings of Gottschalk. This was the occasion of much controversy. On this point must be quoted especially the declarations of the councils of Quierzy (853), Valence (855), Toul (859), and Thuzey (860). It was in this last council that the bishops of France came to an agreement on this difficult matter.

There are particularly two declarations which we get from these provincial councils. They are: (1) God wills in a certain way to save all men; (2) there is no predestination to evil, but God decreed from all eternity to inflict the penalty of damnation for the sin of final impenitence, a sin which He foresaw and in no way caused, but permitted,

The meaning and scope of these declarations are clearly seen especially from the third canon of the Council of Quierzy, which says:

89 St. Prosper’s fifty-sixth sentence.

“Almighty God wills, without exception, all men to be saved,’ though not all are saved. That some are saved, however, is the gift ot Him who saves; if some perish it is the fault of them that perish.” °° This canon is taken from the writings of St. Prosper, who was a disciple of St. Augustine. This canon makes it clear to us that God does not will equally the salvation of all, as the Pelagians thought; for that some are saved, is the gratuitous gift of Him who saves. Moreover, predestination to evil is excluded. Therefore the two extreme aspects of this mystery are declared in plain language, but we fail to perceive the mode of their intimate reconciliation. The fourth canon of the Council of Quierzy affirms that Christ died for all men,

The Council of Valence insists more strongly on the gratuity of predestination to eternal life. This council declared “that God absolutely foreknew that the good will be so by His grace, and that the wicked will be so through their own fault. Nor do the wicked therefore perish, because they could not be good, but because they refused to be good. . . . In the election of those to be saved, God’s mercy precedes their merits; but in the damnation of those who will perish, their demerits precede God’s judgment. The malice of the wicked was foreknown but not predestined by God, since He is not the cause of this.” %

Finally the Council of Thuzey (860) very plainly formulates the higher principles that elucidate this question. The first declaration is: ““Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven and on earth.*? For nothing is done in heaven or on earth except what He Himself is pleased to do or justly permits to be done.” % The bishops who accepted the teaching of St. Augustine demanded nothing more, and so they all agreed. This meant that no good deed is actually performed by this man rather than by a certain other, unless God Himself graciously wills and effects it; and no bad deed is actually performed by this man rather than by a certain other unless God justly permits it. Countless consequences are included in this absolutely general principle. The Thomists see in it the principle of predilection, that no one would be better than another, unless such person were loved more by God.

In the synodal letter approved by the Council of Thuzey all the other declarations proceed from this first one. The fifth declaration

reads: “Hence it is because of God's grace that the world is saved; and it is because man has free will that the world will be judged.” Thus the two extreme aspects of this mystery are declared: God’s universal will to save and the gratuity of predestination.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this teaching of the Church was confirmed by the decisions of the Council of Trent against the errors of Protestantism and by the condemnation of Jansenism. The Council of Trent says: “But, though He died for all * yet not all receive the benefit of His death, but those only to whom the merit of His passion is communicated.” 1° And again: “If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissively only, but also proprie and per se, so that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema.” 1% Also the following: “If anyone says that the grace of justification is attained only by those who are predestined to life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, as being by the divine power predestined unto evil, let him be anathema.” 1°?

It is likewise affirmed against the Jansenists that Christ did not

. die only for the predestined, or only for the faithful, but for all men; 1°83 that there is a grace which is truly sufficient, and which makes it possible for adults to observe God’s precepts according as these can be known by them.

The Church, quoting the words of St. Augustine, affirms against the reformers: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by com-

; manding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able, and to _ pray for what thou art not able (to do).” 1°

The Church, however, though asserting that God by a sufficient grace makes the fulfillment of His precepts possible for all, neverthe- less affirms the efficacy of grace that actually is productive of good = works. Thus the Council of Trent declares that’ “God, unless men are themselves wanting to His grace, as He has begun the good work, so will He perfect it, working in them the will and the perform- ance. ™ 105 From all these declarations of the Church against conflicting heresies, we get, by way of summary, the following four propositions.

104 [bid., no. 804; see also nos. 806, 807, 816, 827, 1647, 1677- 105 Ibid., no. 806; Phil. 2: 13.

A. AGAINST PELAGIANISM AND SEMIPELAGIANISM

1. The cause of predestination to grace is not the foreknowledge of naturally good works performed, nor is it on account of any preliminary acts of the natural order that are supposed to prepare for salvation.

2. Predestination to glory is not on account of foreseen supernatural merits that would continue to be effective apart from the special gift of perseverance.

More briefly: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves.” 106

B. AGAINST PREDESTINARIANISM, CALVINISM, AND JANSENISM

1. God (in a certain way) wills to save all men.

2. There is no predestination to evil, but God has decreed from all eternity to inflict eternal punishment for the sin of final impenitence which He foresaw, He being by no means the cause of it, but merely permitting it.

More briefly: “That some perish, is the fault of those who perish.” 10"

Hence the two truths that must by all means be held as of faith on this subject are these two propositions declared by the Council of Quierzy: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves. That some perish, however, is the fault of those who perish.” Pelagianism denied the first statement, predestinarianism the second. Between these two precipices of error the revealed truth towers like a mountain whose peak cannot be seen. It will be seen only in heaven, for it is the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty in the eminent Deity. Long ago Holy Scripture expressed the two extreme aspects of the mystery, which must be reconciled in these words of the prophet: “ Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” 1%

‘These two truths are most certain and the assent of the Christian mind has always been given to them; but their intimate reconciliation can be clearly seen only in the beatific vision.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

The revealed doctrine of predestination and of the will to save mankind is, as we have remarked, like a mountain peak towering

106 [bid., no. 318. The Council of Quierzy is quoting from the writings of St. Prosper. >

107 [bid., no. 318. Again the Council of Quierzy is quoting from St. Prosper. 108 Osee 13: 9.

above and between the two precipices of Pelagianism on the one hand, and predestinarianism on the other.

This representation makes it easy to see how the theological systems are at variance with one another. There are two contrary systems, each situated about half way up on opposite sides of the mountain. On one side above Semipelagianism is Molinism, and a little farther up the congruism of Suarez. On the other side we have the more rigid interpretations of Augustinianism and Thomism, which modify, so it seems, God’s universal will to save, saying that negative reprobation, which is previous to foreseen demerits, consists not only in the permission of sins that are not forgiven, but in the positive exclusion from heavenly glory as from a favor to which one is not entitled.:

Midway between the two sides, however, we find the eclecticism of the congruists of the Sorbonne, who with the Molinists admitted the extrinsic efficacy of grace for salutary acts easy of accomplishment, and who with the Thomists and the Augustinians admitted the intrinsic efficacy of grace for difficult salutary acts. This view, which seems to be practically applicable, has in its speculative aspect all the difficulties of Molinism or of the scientia media for acts easy of performance, and almost all the difficulties of Thomism for difficult salutary acts. Hence it does not set the mind at rest.

Higher up is the mountain peak, which is, indeed, inaccessible for pilgrims here on earth, this being the Deity just as it is, in whose eminence infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled. But before we reach this peak, it is possible for us in this life to formulate most certain principles, in which we clearly see the equilibrium or harmony of the revealed doctrine, and which enable us to determine in this life the exact location of this inaccessible peak. These principles are: (1) God does not command impossibilities, but makes it possible for all to be saved. (2) One person would not be better than another, unless such person were loved more by God. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 11° But these two principles stem from one more sublime, namely, ‘‘God’s love is the source of all good,” that is, of grace by which we can keep God's commandments, and of grace by which we actually do keep them.

But these two higher principles are the ones that were so famously formulated by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, both of whom admitted their universal validity.

Thus we can now come to the methodical classification of the Catholic systems:

Gratuitous predestination. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” (I Cor. 4: 7.)

Universal will to save. God does not command impossibilities.

he more rigid Thomists

Congruism 1g) and\Augustinians

Ecledticism

Molinism

Semjpelagianism

Pelagianism Predestinarianism Negation of gratuitous Negation of universal will predestination to save

The systems have been classified in three ways. The first classification, which is the one more commonly proposed, considers not so much the principles as the conclusions of the theologians. The second, proposed by Father Billot, S.J., is from the Molinist point of view and considers rather the principles. The third, proposed by Father del Prado, O.P., is from the Thomist point of view and likewise considers not so much the conclusions as the principles.

1. According to the commonly proposed classification there are two principal tendencies. Some say the predestination of adults to glory is the result of foreseen merits; these are sponsors of the purely Molinist view, such as Vasquez and Lessius. Others say that the predestination of adults to glory is previous to foreseen merits, and that negative reprobation or non-election is previous to foreseen demerits. Such is the view of the Thomists, the Augustinians, the

Scotists, and, even among congruists, it is the view of St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez.

Nevertheless there is considerable. difference of opinion between the theologians of this second category, of those, namely, who admit the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory. Almost all of the old school, namely, the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists, hold that this gratuitous predestination has its foundation in the divine predetermining decrees. St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez, however, deny these decrees and retain the Molinist theory of the scientia media so as to explain the distribution of “congruent” grace and God's certain knowledge of the consent given by the elect to this grace.

2. The second classification, which is the one proposed by Father Billot," has its foundation not so much in the conclusions as in the principles. For some, he says, the foundation of foreknowledge, which implies predestination, is in the divine predetermining decrees; for others, however, it is in the scientia media. Among these latter, there are some who, like Vasquez and Lessius, admit the predestination of certain adults to glory after foreseen future merits, and the non-election of certain ones after foreseen future demerits. But there are others who, like Suarez, hold that the predestination of adults to glory is even before conditionally future foreseen merits, and that negative reprobation or non-election is even before conditionally future foreseen demerits. Finally, others will have it that predestination of adults to glory is after foreseen merits as conditionally future, but not as future. Father Billot admitted this last opinion, which he thinks is the one Molina taught. Thus, for Father Billot, what is absolutely gratuitous is the divine choice of circumstances in which God places a certain person, after having foreseen by the scientia media that in these circumstances the consent would be freely given. But as for negative reprobation or non-election, Father Billot’s view does not differ much from that of Vasquez, which latter is very difficult to maintain.

Lastly, there is a third classification proposed by Father N. del Prado, O.P.112 He also takes into consideration not so much the conclusions as the principles of, the theologians, according as they admit as the foundation for their doctrine predetermining decrees, or the scientia media, But he insists that only the theologians admitting the divine predetermining decrees are faithful followers of St. Thomas, who wrote: “Whatsoever is in man disposing him toward salvation is all included under the effect of predestination, even the preparation for grace.” 113 This includes, therefore, even the free determination of the salutary act in so far as it is in this one rather

than the other, for example, in the good thief on Mt. Calvary rather than in the other. The absolute gratuity of predestination to glory is thus clearly seen; for, since the merits of the elect are the effects of predestination, they cannot be its cause. This is truly what was meant by St. Thomas, who previously in the article just quoted had written: “Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.” For they are two total subordinated causes, so that the entire effect is from God as the first cause, and the effect is entirely from our will as the secondary cause moved by God. They are not two partial coordinated causes, as when men are pulling a boat.'

It must also be remarked that only the theologians who admit the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace recognize the absolute and universal validity of the principle of predilection formulated by St. Thomas in these words: “Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 15 Similarly St. Thomas says: “He who makes a greater effort does so because of a greater grace, but to do so he needs to be moved by a higher cause.” 24° This principle of predilection presupposes that the divine decrees concerning our future salutary acts are intrinsically and infallibly efficacious. If, on the other hand, this intrinsic efficacy of grace is denied, the case might arise in which, of two persons who are loved and helped to the same extent by God and who are placed in the same circumstances, one would correspond with the grace received and the other would not. Thus without having been loved and helped more by God, one would prove to be better than the other by doing something either easy or difficult to perform, whether this is the first or final act. This is indeed what, in opposition to St. Thomas, Molina maintains. He reduced the principle of predilection to the divine choice of favorable circumstances in which God places those whom He foresaw will consent to make good use of the grace in such circumstances.

Conclusion. Hence a comparison of the different systems about predestination brings us back to the question of the value of the principle of predilection, namely, that one thing would not be better than another, unless it were loved more by God. Is this principle of absolute and universal validity, as the early theologians thought, especially the Thomists, or has it merely a relative value and one

that is restricted to favorable circumstances, as the Molinists and the congruists think, who admit the scientia media?

As we shall see when we come to explain the doctrine of St. Thomas in the articles of this twenty-third question, this principle of predilection, in the philosophical order, is the corollary of the principle of causality applied to God’s love which is the cause of all good. Hence St. Thomas says: “Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, one thing would not be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 17

In the supernatural order, however, this principle of predilection has been revealed by St. Paul in these words: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 18 He finds this principle expressed in the Old Testament writing: “For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy.” 119

This principle of predilection, as we stated above, was admitted by St. Augustine even for the angels. He says, concerning the good and the bad angels: “If both were created equally good, then, while some fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and reached that high degree of blessedness from which they became certain that they would never fall.” 12° It is evident, of course, that the following text applies even to the angels: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 121 St. Augustine also says, speaking of predestination: “Why He draweth one and not another, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 122 We must now explain the articles of St. Thomas.

As we said, this twenty-third question consists of three parts. The first part contains the first three articles: (1) What is meant by the

122 On St. John, hom. 26. Consult Rouét de Journel’s Enchiridion patristicum, Index theologicus, p. 850, nos. 127-40. See also ibid., what is meant by the “‘predestination of the saints,” doctrine of St. Augustine: There are some whom God “has predestined to eternal life, He being most merciful in the bestowal of His graces” (nos. 1882, 1951, 1985, 1988, 2002). Predestination to the faith and to justification is absolutely gratuitous. Predestination is “the hidden work of God.” Those who are damned, are damned through their own fault. The teaching of other Fathers: Predestination is “God's secret plan” (St. Fulgentius), nos. 2246, 2254, 2255, 2286. Rouct de Journel quotes these words of St. Ambrose: “God predestined to reward those whose merits He foreknew” (no. 1272), De fide ad Gratianum, PL, XVI, 665. But these words refer to glory inasmuch as it is the reward in the order of execution; and inasmuch as it is the reward, it is evi- name predestination and whether persons are predestined, (2) The real definition completes this inquiry: Does it place anything in the predestined? (3) What is meant by its opposite, reprobation? The second part concerns the cause of predestination (a. 4, 5); the third part treats of the certainty of predestination (a. 6, 7, 8).

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER MEN ARE PREDESTINED BY GOD

State of the question. The difficulty is (1) that St. John Damascene says: “God foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” 128 (2) Other creatures are directed to their end by Providence and are not said to be predestined. Then why would men be predestined?

The answer is: It is fitting that God should predestine men; and predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.

1. The conclusion is proved on the authority of St. Paul, who says: “Whom He predestinated, them He also called.” 124

The word “predestined” (xpodpiev, from the verb zpoopifw) signifies to predefine, to decree.*° The word praedestinavit, which St. Thomas quotes from the Latin Vulgate, is a good translation of the Greek verb, though it denotes something that is sent on in advance. There is another foundation for this idea in the Old Testament, for we read: “He hath made me as a chosen arrow. In His quiver He hath hidden me.” +% Likewise in the New Testament: “As many as were ordained to life everlasting, believed.” 127

Moreover, the Fathers and Councils make use of this word “predestination.” Thus the Council of Quierzy (853) says: “God, who is good and just, chose from the same mass of perdition (descendants of Adam), according to His foreknowledge, those whom He has predestined by grace for life,1** and He has predestined eternal life for them. But the rest, whom by His just judgment He left in the mass of perdition, He foreknew will perish, though He did not predestine dently given to adults in the order of execution only on account of merits. Hence, as pointed out farther on, the Thomists generally agree in saying that “God (in the order of intention) freely wills to give glory to the elect, but He does not will to give it freely (in the order of execution).”

that they should perish. But because He is just He predestined eternal punishment for them.” 12°

This dogma of predestination is affirmed also by the Council of Trent, which says: “No one, moreover, so long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to presume as regards the secret mystery of divine predestination as to determine for certain that he is assuredly in the number of the predestinate.” 130 It likewise says, speaking of the gratuity of the gift of final perseverance: “Which gift indeed cannot be derived from any other but Him who is able to establish him who standeth, that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falleth.” 181

The proof from reason is as follows: “Just as there is a type in the divine mind of the ordering (disposition and direction) of all things to their end, which is called providence, so there must be a type of the ordering of those who are to be transmitted to their end, which is supernatural happiness. But the type of the transmission of the rational creature is called predestination, for to destine is to send. Therefore it is fitting that God should predestine men, and predestination is, as regards its objects, a certain part of providence.

This argument means the end of all difficulties. In the reply to the first objection it is remarked that where Damascene says that God “does not predetermine what is in us,” he means that “He does not predetermine by an imposition of necessity.” This is evident from the context in which Damascene says: “God does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Hence predestination is not excluded by Him.

Reply to second objection. Irrational creatures cannot properly be said to be predestined, because they are not capable of attaining to eternal life.

Reply to third objection. Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men. Thus St. Augustine says: “Who made the good will in the angels, if not He who created them with their good will, that is, with their chaste love, by which they adhered to Him, at the same time establishing them in their nature and endowing them with grace?” 132 A little farther on St. Augustine says that the good angels “were more abundantly assisted and attained to their eternal hap- _ piness, whereas the others fell by reason of their evil will.” 133

From this article we get the definition of predestination, which is:

“the type of the ordering of some persons toward eternal salvation,

132 De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 9. 133 [bid, existing in the divine mind.” '** This means that it is the ordering, preconceived in the divine mind, of some to salvation. On this point St. Thomas is completely in agreement with St. Augustine, who defined predestination as “the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered.” 19°

In this definition St. Augustine by “foreknowledge” does not have in mind merely speculative knowledge, or the scientia medta by which God before any decree foresaw what we of ourselves will do; but he is referring to that practical and effective knowledge by which God foresees what He Himself will do. It is therefore dependent on His executive decree. Wherefore it is said that predestination is “the foreknowledge and preparation of the gifts, whereby they who are delivered, are most certainly delivered.” St. Augustine had also said: “By predestination God knew what He will do.” 138

St. Thomas likewise says: “Although knowledge as such does not concern things to be done, nevertheless practical knowledge does, and it is to this knowledge that predestination refers.” +37 This means that predestination refers to God’s knowledge, “which has the will joined to it, and is the cause of things.” **8

Thus St. Thomas t° explains St. Paul’s words: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated,” 14 as meaning that He foreknew by the practical knowledge that regulates the choice, and the choice of the will precedes predestination as will be stated farther on; 11 for predestination, as St. Thomas declares,'*? is an act of the intellect, which means that it is an efficacious command concerning the means, concerning the execution of the means already chosen.

To predestine, indeed, means the ordering of the means that are efficacious for the salvation of the elect. But ordering is an act of the intellect, and the ordering of the efficacious means for the attainment of anything is a command that directs the execution of a preconceived and chosen thing. Also providence, of which predesti- nation is an objective part, is an act of prudence, or a command that presupposes choice.

134 Yet it is in a.2 of this question that St. Thomas gives us this definition of predestination. [Tr.]

135 De dono persever., chap. 14. 136 De praed. sanci., chap. 10. 137 De veritate, q.6, a.1 ad jum. 188 Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8. 439 De veritate, q.6, a...

First doubt. In what sense is predestination an objective part of providence?

Reply. It is not to be understood as constituting a subjective part of providence. This means that it is not subordinated to providence as the species is subordinated to its genus. Some said that there are four kinds of providence: (1) providence that concerns the order of nature; (2) general providence that concerns the salvation of all human beings; (3) special providence that concerns the salvation of the predestined, or predestination; (4) providence that concerns the order of the hypostatic union. The distinction between them would be virtual.

St. Thomas says at the end of the argumentative part of this article: “Predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.” This means that predestination constitutes some part of the material object of providence. Thus it is that one and the same divine providence concerns the three orders of nature, grace, and the hypostatic union, there being no virtual distinction between these kinds of providence, and it is only because of the different objects that this divine providence receives different names. In this respect it resembles the divine knowledge, which in itself is only of one kind, yet because of its different material objects it is called the knowledge of simple intelligence, of vision, and of approbation.

The reason why divine providence is one and undivided is because its object is one, namely, the universe, which consists of three subordinated orders, and there is one end to which all these orders are ordained, which is God’s glory. The Salmanticenses clearly show, in discussing the motive of the incarnation, that God by one and the same decree willed to manifest His goodness by means of the universe in which the subordination between the three orders is as follows: first comes the order of nature, which is subordinated to that of grace with permission of original sin, both of which are subordinated to the hypostatic union.

Second doubt. Does predestination add anything to providence in general?

Reply. it adds the efficacy of the means and the infallible attainment of the end.+* In other words, as Alvarez explains,'** by divine providence the end directly intended by God’s consequent will is always attained, namely, the good of the universe; but for the attainment of this end certain evils are permitted, and thus certain things are indirectly intended; these are willed by God’s antecedent

148 Cf. De veritate, q.6, a.1, and what we said in treating of providence (q-22, a.l).

will, such as that all the fruits do not become ripe, that all human beings are not saved. Contrary to this, since predestination depends solely on God’s consequent will, it always obtains its effect, in this sense that the predestined are always saved. Nevertheless, that the predestined in the course of their lives here on earth are permitted to fall into sin is more probably the effect of predestination, so as to make the elect more humble, as will be stated farther on.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION PLACES ANYTHING IN THE PREDESTINED

This article completes the definition of predestination, a point that is particularly evident from the fourth objection, which states that if predestination places anything m the predestined, such as grace, then it is something temporal, and is not eternal and uncreated.

The reply of St. Thomas is: Predestination is not anything in the predestined, but only in the person who predestines. But the execution of predestination is in a passive way in the predestined.

The first part is proved from the fact that predestination, as it was stated, is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for, but is a type of the ordering of those things that exist in the divine mind.

The second part is proved from the fact that, just as the execution of providence, which is the divine government, is actively in God, as an action that is formally immanent and virtually transitive, but is passively in the things governed; so the execution of predestination is passively in the predestined.

First doubt. But what is this execution of predestination, or what are its effects?

St. Thomas replies at the end of the argumentative part of this article that these effects are the calling and magnification, for St. Paul says: “And whom He predestinated, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified.” 145

Several Thomists, comparing what St. Thomas says in this article with other passages in his various works, define the effect of predestination by saying that it is whatever God does by reason of His efficacious intention of saving some in preference to others. Hence four conditions are required for anything to be the effect of predestination: (1) that the thing is caused by God; (2) that it is the result

of God's efficacious intention to save; (3) that it leads one certainly to eternal life, for, since it is the result of God's efficacious intention, it cannot be frustrated; (4) that it is the result of Christ’s merits, inasmuch as we are concerned here with the predestination of men in the state of fallen nature.

These four conditions are verified primarily in the proper effects of predestination, which result from it by an elective process. Such are the efficacious call, justification not interrupted by sin and continuing up to the moment of death, and finally glorification. But besides these proper effects there are others that are not a matter of choice, but are imperative only by reason of predestination. Such are the good disposition of the predestined and their natural endowments, which depend by way of choice on the general direction of providence in the natural order. Thus in our human life we distinguish between acts elicited by charity and those commanded by this virtue, which are, of course, elicited by a virtue that is subordinated to charity.

Having posited these conditions, Thomists are generally enough agreed, from a consideration of the various texts of St. Thomas, in arranging the effects of predestination according to the following schema:

Glorification.

Good use of grace in the life of the elect (a.5). This is against Molina’s theory.

Uninterrupted justification ending in final perseverance. Also interrupted justification inasmuch as the remembrance of this results in a life of penance by the predestined, and inasmuch as lost merits are restored.

Especially the efficacious call in the predestined; also the inefficacious call, inasmuch as its remembrance by the predestined leads them to give thanks to God.

Elective

Poverty, diseases, misfortunes, death in such circumstances as assure one of being saved.

Naturally moral good acts, or the good use of natural qualities, such as moral rectitude, meekness.

Good disposition of the predestined, natural endowments, such as being born of good parents.

Effects of predestination

Imperative

It is also more probable that the permission of sin in the predestined, inasmuch as it is the means of greater sanctification for them, is the effect of predestination. This last statement must be understood in the right sense. Indeed it is not sin but the permission of sin that is the effect of predestination, inasmuch as this permission is meant to be the occasion of leading the elect to greater humility and more fervent charity, as is seen in the life of St. Mary Magdalen, or in St. Peter’s life after his repentance for having denied the Lord. This doctrine has its foundation in these words of St. Paul: “To them that love God (until death), all things work together unto good”; 148 and St. Augustine adds: “all things, even sins,” inasmuch as they serve as the occasion to make one more humble.*#7

Second doubt. How are the natural gifts of the elect the effect of predestination, and how are they conducive to their salvation?

It is easy to see that natural gifts are conducive to salvation, since the natural inclination to fortitude is the foundation for stability in the life of the Christian, But it is more difficult to say how these natural gifts of the elect are the effect of predestination, because the order of nature is presupposed by the order of grace, to which predestination belongs. Hence there is not absolute agreement among Thomists in the explanation of this point, for they arrange in different orders the ordaining of the divine decrees concerning nature, grace, and the hypostatic union.

Some say: (1) God, intending to manifest His goodness, willed the order of nature; (2) He ordained intellectual creatures to a supernatural end; (3) having foreseen Adam's sin and original sin, He decreed the reparation of the human race through Christ the Redeemer; (4) in Christ, God chose some in a more special manner and effectively, leaving the rest alone. According to this order, it is difficult to conceive how the very being of the predestined, native endowments, and other natural qualities, are the effect of predestination, and are thus conducive to salvation. For, according to this view, all these natural qualities, which will be realized in course of time, are supposed as already present in the previous signs. These Thomists seem to multiply excessively the number of virtually distinct divine decrees, nor do they answer the question why God permitted Adam's sin and original sin. This order was followed by John of St. Thomas and Billuart in discussing the motive of the incarnation.

Other Thomists, however, such as the Salmanticenses, Godoi, and Gonet, differ, and with good reason, from John of St. Thomas and Billuart. In discussing the motive of the incarnation, they say that God permits sin only for a greater good. We cannot, of course, say a priori for what greater good He permitted Adam's sin; but after the incarnation this good is clearly seen, as St. Thomas remarks, who says: “God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): ‘Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.’ Hence, too, in the blessing of the paschal candle we say: ‘O happy fault, that merited such

and so great a redeemer.’” 148 Thus God permitted Adam’s sin on account of the redemptive incarnation that was first willed in the genus of final cause, but not in the genus of material cause that is to be perfected, just as He wills the matter as capable of being actuated by its form, and the form as actuating the matter. Thus. God permitted Adam’s sin and the abounding of the offense in order that grace might abound yet more. Nor is there any need for a multiplicity of decrees, but by one and the same decree God willed that the natural order should be subordinated to the supernatural order (with permission of Adam’s sin), and that the supernatural order should be subordinated to the hypostatic union.1*® In this way it is more readily shown how the natural gifts of the elect serve to promote the salvation of the predestined. Thus the natural intelligence with which St. Augustine and St. Thomas were endowed, helped them in their theological studies. Likewise, in the elect the inclination to prudence is subordinated to infused prudence, just as the natural inclination to fortitude is subordinated to the Christian virtue of fortitude in the martyrs.

Not only do the natural gifts and temperament of the elect promote their salvation, but also their misfortunes and sicknesses do, inasmuch as “to them who love God all things work together unto good,” 15° since there could be no heroic patience without suffering.

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER GOD REPROBATES ANY MAN

Since opposites have their foundation in the same principle, reprobation must be defined by its opposite, which is predestination.

Reply. It is of faith that there is such a thing as reprobation, which does not mean, however, predestination to evil. The Council of Quierzy says against Gottschalk: “God, who is good and just, chose from the same mass of perdition, according to His foreknowledge, those whom He has predestined for life,!** and He has predestined

149 This means that God, by His knowledge of simple intelligence, contemplated first of all several possible worlds, and among these was the world of sinners with the redemptive incarnation. In this possible world, the natural order is subordinated to the supernatural order with permission of original sin, and the supernatural order is subordinated to the redemptive incarnation. :

Thereupon, just by one decree, God willed this possible world together with all its parts. Thus the architect does not first intend the foundation of the house and then the roof; but he first intends to construct a suitable dwelling and the whole house together with all its parts.

eternal life for them. But the rest, whom by His just judgment He left in the mass of perdition, He foreknew will perish, though He did not predestine that they should perish. But because He is just, He predestined eternal punishment for them.” 15?

Holy Scripture speaks of the reprobates, of the son of perdition.1*4 St. Paul says: “I chastise my body . . . lest . . . I myself should become a castaway.” 15+ Christ Himself reveals to us the sentence of judgment: “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.” 155

Theological proof. The following answer is given to those who inquire about the definition and fitness of reprobation: It is the part of providence which permits the failure of some through their own fault to attain glory; and because it was their own fault, the penalty of damnation is inflicted on them. Thus reprobation is the opposite of predestination. It is a question of sin which de facto is not forgiven, especially the sin of final impenitence.

That it is fitting for God to reprobate some is proved as follows: It belongs to God's providence, as universal provider, to permit for the general good of the universe the failure among defectible things that are subjected to this providence. But intellectual creatures, who are destined for glory, are of their nature defectible. Therefore it belongs to God's providence to permit that some through their own fault fail to attain their end, and to inflict the penalty of damnation for their sin. The motive, however, of this divine permission will be discussed farther on 158 along with the motive of predestination.

First doubt. Does reprobation imply only foreknowledge?

Reply. It does not, but as St. Thomas says: “It includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” This negative reprobation is the will to permit sin which de facto will not be forgiven; and, as we shall sce,'*" this negative reprobation is previous to foreseen demerits that are not to be forgiven, which are not infallibly foreseen as _future without this divine permission.

Positive reprobation, however, is the will to inflict the penalty of damnation for sin, and this is the result of foreseen demerits; for every just punishment presupposes a sin, on account of which the punishment is inflicted.

Second doubt. What must be said of the opinion of certain Thomists who maintain that negative reprobation, which is prior to the

foresecing of demerits, consists in the positive exclusion from glory, as a gift to which they are not entitled? Such was the opinion of Alvarez, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and Contenson.

Reply. It is more difficult to reconcile this opinion with God’s universal will to save, and there seems to be no foundation for this theory in the present article of St. Thomas, or in any other passage of his works. All that St. Thomas says in this article and elsewhere is: “Reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin,” especially into the sin of final impenitence and other sins that dispose one for it. He does not speak of the positive exclusion from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled.

St. Thomas says, indeed, in the reply to the first objection of this article: “To some God does not wish this good which is eternal life,” which means that He wills eternal life to them only antecedently and not consequently or efficaciously. But to exclude them from glory as from a gift to which they are not entitled would be not only not to will, but to be unwilling; it would be an act of positive exclusion from glory. This seems, however, too harsh a view, and by this very fact, these men, before their demerits were foreseen, would be excluded not only from their ultimate supernatural end, but also from their ultimate natural] end.

Similarly, in the reply to the second objection it is stated that “reprobation is the cause of abandonment by God,” that is, after sin and on account of sin.

In the reply to the third objection it is explained that the reprobate can be saved, although de facto he will not be saved. This point is better explained, however, if we bear in mind that before foreseen demerits such a person is not excluded from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled.

Therefore this opinion of certain Thomists seems scarcely reconcilable with God’s universal will to save. For God, to the utmost extent, sincerely wills by His antecedent will that all be saved, so that it is their own fault if they are damned. But He would not will all to be saved if, before having foreseen any sin on the part of the reprobate, He had decreed positively to exclude such a person from eternal salvation as from a gift to which one is not entitled.

Confirmation of proof. God wills whatever there is of good in anything. But that a person, who is ordained to an ultimate end that is both natural and supernatural, before the foreseeing of sin, be excluded from this end as from a gift to which one is not entitled, is not in itself anything good. Therefore God, before the foreseeing of sin, does not exclude a person from the ultimate natural and supernatural end as from a gift to which one is not entitled,

Hence negative reprobation is simply God’s will to permit one through one’s own fault to fail to reach the ultimate end. Therefore Thomist theologians generally distinguish between the permission of sin and the denial of efficacious grace; for this latter is an evil that implies a penalty and it therefore presupposes sin; whereas, on the contrary, the permission of sin precedes the sin, and is not a penalty, but something that is not good; for privation is more than a simple denial. There is a great difference, indeed, between not giving something that is gratuitous and refusing to give it.

Objection. Since God proceeds according to order, He first intends the end before the means. But in the case of reprobation, exclusion from glory is the end, and the permission of sin is the means. Therefore God first intends exclusion from glory, and then the permission of sin.

Reply. I concede the major, and deny the minor; for the exclusion from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled is the end in the case of reprobation; for in the order of execution, the end is that which is attained. But God in the order of execution excludes no one from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled, but only asa punishment for sin.

Moreover, we must not look for absolute parallelism between reprobation and predestination, because divine providence is not related to good and evil in the same way. It directly intends good things, because these are in themselves appetible; but it does not indirectly intend, but only permits, evil things, because these are not in themselves appetible; and having permitted them, it orders them to some good, and it permits them only because of some good.

Hence, because God first intends the general good of the universe, which demands the manifestations of His justice, He at once and directly wills simply to permit sin, and then He ordains the punishment of the sin which has been permitted and foreseen, which is a good thing; for it is just that sin should be punished, and in this we see the splendor of God’s justice.

Third doubt. What is meant by God’s permission of sin?

Reply. God’s permission of sin means that the will, which by its nature is defectible, is not maintained by Him at that particular time in the performance of good; for if this will were maintained by Him in the performance of good at that particular time, sin would be prevented and would not be permitted.'58

But that the will is not maintained in the performance of good requires careful consideration. There is a mystery in this, and we must avoid contradiction. Three principles must be noted.

1. That the will, which by its nature is defectible, is not main-

tained by God in the performance of good is not yet an evil, because it is not the privation of a good to which one is entitled.

God is not bound always to maintain in the performance of good the will which by its nature is defectible; whereas, on the contrary, He is bound always to maintain it in existence along with the immortal soul.

Similarly, on the part of the creature, the will, which by its nature is defectible, is not bound always to be maintained in the performance of good, but only in being. If it were entitled to the former, then it would be impeccable.

Hence it is not an evil that the will, which by its nature is defectible, is not maintained by God in the performance of good. Nevertheless we do not say that it is a good. Thus the lack of greater perfection in a less fervent act of charity is not a good; neither is it an evil, because it is not the privation of a good that is due to one. Thus there is a great difference between the lack of greater perfection, and the smallest venial sin, which already is purely a moral evil.

2. Also the first sin that is committed is a moral evil, or the privation of that rectitude required of anyone. But sin follows inevitably the divine permission of sin which, as was stated, implies that one is not maintained by God in the performance of good. Thus the divine permission of sin is good because of the end in view; whereas that one is not maintained by God in the performance of good is neither a good nor an evil. But sin which infallibly follows therefrom, as a necessary consequence not of causality but of inference, is simply a moral evil or a sin,

The denial of God’s efficacious grace is not indeed a moral evil, but it is a just punishment which presupposes the guilt of sin. To be without grace is a privation of good, and is not a moral evil but a punishment. Thus this denial of grace differs from the non-maintenance by God of anyone in the performance of good, which precedes even the first sin, and which is neither a moral evil nor a punishment.

Calvin confuses the first principle with the third, namely, God's permission of sin with His denial of grace, whereas St. Thomas plainly distinguishes between them.'*® Similarly, in the reply to the second objection of this article he says: “Guilt proceeds from the free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true, “Destruction is thy own, O Israel.” Thus there is a difference between God’s permission of sin, which precedes it and which is only its indispensable condition (not e 159 Cf. I Sent., d.40, q.4, a.2.

being at all its cause, either direct or indirect), and being abandoned by Him, which is the result of sin.161

FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE ELECTED BY GOD

State of the question. In this tide the word “elected” as Cajetan observes, is taken strictly in the sense as expressing an act of the will by which, when the choice is offered to one, a person prefers or preelects one thing to another.

The principal difficulty is that to which reference is made in the third objection, which is: Election implies some discrimination. But God wills all men to be saved (I Tim. 2: 4). Therefore predestination, which preordains men toward eternal salvation, is without election.

The reply is in the affirmative, however, and is as follows: all the predestinate are objects of election and love, so that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination.

1. It is proved on the authority of Holy Scripture, for St. Paul says: “He chose us in Him (Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself: according to the purpose of His will.” 162 As St. Thomas explains: “He chose us, not because we were saints, for we were not; but He chose us that we might become saints and be without blemish,” 163 This is what St. Augustine had already said.1%

St. Paul clearly indicates election in the following passage: “For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil (that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand), not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger.” 165 And again: “Even so then at this present time also, there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace. And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace. 7%

This election that precedes predestination is expressed by St. Paul in the following words: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated,” 167 that is, whom He has foreknown looking favorably upon

160 Cf. Summa theol., la Iae, q.79, a.1, 2. See also infra: the motive of negative reprobation.

them or with predilection. There are several similar passages in Holy Scripture concerning the elect.1®

Theological proof. The conclusion is proved by means of two syllogisms. (Some have said recently that Scotus was the first who said: “God first wills the end before willing the means for the end.” 1% It is at once evident that this doctrine is to be found in the works of St. Thomas, and it belongs to the very notions of both providence and prudence.)

Nothing is directed toward an end unless the will for that end already exists. But predestination is a part of providence which, like prudence, is the ordering of some things toward an end. Therefore the predestination of some to eternal salvation, presupposes that God wills their salvation; and to this latter belong both election and love.

In the second syllogism it is shown that in God, though not in ourselves, love precedes election. It is proved as follows: God’s will, by which He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. But God by His love wills for some the good of eternal salvation, and by His election wills this good for them in preference to others. Therefore God's love precedes election in the order of reason, just as election precedes predestination.

The case is the reverse with our will which, in loving anyone, does not cause good in the person loved, but is incited to love because of the good pre-existing in the person. Hence we choose someone whom we love, and thus in us election precedes love.

This means, as stated above: “God's love infuses and creates goodness in things.” 17° Therefore God loves before He elects. Also: “God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others is that God wills a greater good for them. Hence it follows that He loves the better things more.” 11 And again: “Those are the better and the better loved who have more grace.” 172 This is the principle of predilection that has already been explained.178

This principle is denied by Molina, who says: “Given an equal grace or even a less grace, it can happen that one of two persons

168 Cf, Matt. 24: 22; I Tim. 5: 21; II Tim. 2: 10. See also Denz., no. 316 (Council of Quierzy).

169 The Divine Foreknowledge According to Duns Scotus and His First Followers by Dr. Schwamm, Innsbruck, 1934.

6go THE ONE GOD called is converted, and the other not.” 14 Hence it is not surprising that Molina wrote: “Election did not precede predestination. . . . Others affirmed the opposite. . . . And this seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas (Ia, q.23, a.4)- ... But I never found it acceptable.” 175

In Molina’s opinion, predestination to glory is because of at least conditionally future foreseen merits. Thus, as he himself acknowledges, he departs essentially from the teaching of St. Thomas.

Nevertheless, even Molina has to admit that God freely chose to place Peter in those particular circumstances in which He foresaw that he would give his good consent, and He chose to place Judas in other circumstances.

Hence, not even does Molina believe that God wills equally the salvation of all men. If he affirmed this, then he would be denying the very mystery of predestination, for the Council of Quierzy says: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; that some perish, is the fault of those who perish.” 176

St. Thomas points out in his reply to the third objection of this article that God's universal will to save is His antecedent will, which means that it is His conditioned, but not His consequent, will. This means that God wills all men to be saved, unless higher ends prevent this.

WHETHER THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS IS THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

State of the question. On this subject we must recall the principal systems according to the names given them by modern theologians. They have, indeed, already been stated in the prologue to this question.

Independently of the scientia media: St. Not because | Augustine of foreseen 4 Dependent on the scientia media for the

Predes- | merits distribution of congruent grace: congrutination ism of St. Bellarmine and of Suarez to glory Because of f At least conditionally future: Molina, foreseen Billot | merits Absolutely future: Vasquez

St. Thomas in his state of the question of this article shows that he is aware of the arguments of his adversaries. He says: (1) it seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, for the Apostle says: “Whom He foreknew. He also predestinated”; 117 (2) because otherwise there would be no reason for predestination or it would be unreasonable; (3) because it is unjust to give unequal things to equals.

Yet St. Thomas replies in the counterargument by saying that foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. It is his principal conclusion, Suarez and St. Bellarmine agreeing with him on this point.

St. Thomas means that foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination to glory, which was already defined by him as “the type of the direction of a rational creature to the end of eternal life.” 78 Moreover, predestination only to grace, which is common both to the elect and the reprobates, is not predestination in the strict sense of the word.

St. Thomas in a few words proves this conclusion on the authority of Holy Scripture in the present article, and more at length in his other works.279

St. Paul says: “Not by the works of justice, which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us.” 180 Similarly we read: “I will have mercy on whom I will; and I will be merciful to whom it shall please Me.” 181 “He saved me, because He was well pleased with me.” 182 “I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because ‘Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father, for so hath it seemed good in Thy sight.” 183 That some receive greater helps than others, as stated in these texts, is to be attributed to God’s predilection and good pleasure. There are also other texts fom St. Paul, which we already quoted in proof of election. These are: “He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy.” 184 “So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” 185 “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of Him and by Him and in Him are all

178 Cf. Com. in Ep. ad Rom. et ad Eph. See also the prologue to this question: Testimony of Holy Scripture.

things.” 186 “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what ‘hast thou that thou hast not received?” #87 This is tantamount to saying that our merits are the effect of God’s predilection, and therefore they cannot be its cause. “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and how unsearchable His ways!” +858

Moreover, that St. Augustine understood these texts in this sense,*° is recognized by St. Bellarmine and Suarez, even by Molina, for he departs from the opinion of St. Augustine when he says: “And this opinion of St. Augustine alarmingly disturbed the minds of many of the faithful, as also of the learned, and it was even the occasion that their salvation was placed in jeopardy. . . . But the divinelike Thomas, and subsequently many of the Scholastics, followed St. Augustine’s opinion.” 1% Farther on, when Molina is again explaining his opinion, which is the theory of the scientia media, he says: “If these principles had always been given and explained, perhaps neither the Pelagian heresy would have sprung up . . . , nor would so many of the faithful have been disturbed in their mind, and joined the ranks of the Pelagians, because of Augustine’s opinion.” 191 As if God finally revealed to Molina alone what to Augustine, the holy Fathers, and the most learned of theologians for countless centuries He has not at all made known.'%

In the prologue to this question we have already seen that this argument derives its greatest force from the texts of Holy Scripture and the writings of St. Augustine.1%

The principle of predilection as already formulated by St. Thomas elucidates this whole question: “Since God's love ‘is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 19+ The equivalent of this principle is declared by St. Paul when he says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 195

In the argumentative part of the article, St. Thomas first reminds

189 See prologue to this question.

192 On this point consult Salmanticenses, De gratia efficaci, disp. VII, dub. 1 et 3.

193 On this point consult also St. Albert the Great. Summa theol., Ia, q-63, m.g, ad.

us of the condemned heresies, which he arranges and passes judgment on in accordance with the principle of predilection as above enunciated.: He begins by remarking:

1. “Nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator”; for this is the uncreated act by which God does not will this on account of that, but wills this to be as means to that. This implies that by one uncreated act He wills all things, and His willing the end is not the cause of His willing the means, but He wills the ordering of the means to the end.1%

But the question is: “Whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or, what comes to the same thing, whether God preordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of merits.”

On this point there were three errors:

will make good use of it.

| This was the opinion of Ori- | But this contradicts St. Paul, 3 5 gen, who thought that souls | who says: “For when the chila] Z were created in the beginning. | dren were not yet born nor had E 5 done any good or evil... not S E of works but of Him that calleth, 2| z it was said to her: ‘The elder a i shall serve the younger.’ ” 198 — : Before justi- | So said the But this contradicts St. Paul, 2 fication, that | Pelagiansand | who says: “Not that we are suffi- 5 is, because of | Semipelagi- cient to think anything of our- A » | the begin- ans. selves as of ourselves.” 199 “4 | = | ning of salva- S | .¢ J tion made by ons m = |S | one. Í SS 3 After justification, that is, God | St. Thomas replies: “There is no Y predestined some to grace, be- | distinction between what flows Š cause He foreknew that they | from free will and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.

It must be observed that the refutation of this third error holds good against Molina, even against all who admit the scientia media, which supposes that there is a distinction between what flows from

free will and what is of predestination (that is, from either indeterminate grace or even a congruent grace).

The first and second causes, indeed, are two causes that are not co-ordinated but subordinated, such that the second cause acts only inasmuch as it is moved by the first cause. This doctrine of St. Thomas holds good, too, against all who admit a simultaneous concurrence, or even an indifferent physical premotion, as Pignataro, S.J.,20° and others admit. For even these latter theologians maintain that there is a distinction between what flows from the first cause, namely, the being of the act, and what flows from the free second cause, namely, the determination of the free will foreseen by the sctentia media. Willingly or unwillingly, they have to admit a certain passivity or dependence on God's knowledge, in Him who is pure Act; for of two men equally tempted and helped, according to their opinion, one could be converted and the other not. Thus man would single himself out, and this differentiation would come from the man and not from God, who in His foreknowledge would be a passive onlooker.?%4

In the second part of the body of this article St. Thomas posits two conclusions, and two more in the reply to the third objection.

First conclusion: “There is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. For the end is first in intention and last in execution. Thus causes mutually interact from different points of view, as God made the matter for the form, and the form as actuating the matter. Thus glory is the final cause of merits, and merits dispose one for the attainment of glory.

Thus “God preordained to give glory on account of merit” (for in the order of execution, contrary to what the Protestants say, God does not give glory gratis, but according to merit); and “He preordained to give grace (efficacious, as a result of His consequent will) to merit glory.”

Thus God predestines to glory before He predestines to grace, for the wise man first intends the end before the means to the end, because, as stated in the preceding article, “nothing is directed toward an end unless the will for that end already exists.” Scotus, St. Robert Bellarmine, and Suarez agree with St. Thomas and the Thomists on this point.

200 De Deo Creatore, p. 519. See also what we said about this opinion in Predestination, pp. 248 f., 267, 358 f.

201 See the last and weakest reply of Father d’Ales in his book entitled, Providence et libre arbitre (last chapter).

In this first conclusion St. Thomas does not mean that God preordained to give extrinsically efficacious grace to anyone to merit glory. This is excluded by what he has already said about God’s consequent will,° and concerning predestination in this article, he says: “There is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination.” The proof of the following conclusion likewise excludes this intention of giving extrinsically efficacious grace for the meriting of glory.

Second conclusion. “It is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us.”

This proposition is admitted by Molina, though in a restricted sense, inasmuch as it implies that the whole of the effect of predestination includes the first grace, which cannot be merited by us. But St. Thomas attaches a much deeper meaning to this proposition, as is evident from the reason he gives.

The reason is: “Whatever is in man disposing him toward salvation is all included under the effect of predestination, even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5: 21): Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.”

This means that even the free determination of our salutary act disposing us to justification and afterward the meritorious acts of the elect, are all included under the effect of predestination. Therefore no cause or reason can be given for predestination, and hence it is not because of foreseen merits. This is against what Molina says, even against congruism, which states that the congruous grace is not of itself efficacious. Thus in this system of congruism the free determination of the merits of the elect is not properly the effect of predestination.

The reason given by St. Thomas is therefore the corollary to the principle of predilection, which states that, “since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 2° “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 2°* Hence, more briefly: The merits of the elect are the effect of predestination, and hence they cannot be its cause.?°

205 St. Augustine said: “When God crowns our merits, He crowns His own gifts.” Thus in the /ndiculus on the Grace of God, it is said: “So great is God’s goodness to men, that what are His gifts He wills that they shall be our merits; and for those things which He has bestowed upon us, He will reward us with

Therefore St. Thomas adds at the end of the argumentative part of this article: “Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; toward which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.” This manifests God’s goodness,?°* and is explained in the reply to the third objection.

In the reply to the third objection there are two conclusions.

The third conclusion is: “God willed to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect to others whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.” Hence this mystery is both most charming and terrible.

St. Paul proves this by saying: “God, willing to show His wrath (that is, His vindictive justice) . . . , endured (that is, permitted) with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He -might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.” 207

This finds its explanation in the fact that God made all things in order to manifest His goodness, and indeed in many ways, because created things cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus God allows some evils lest many good things may not happen. But God's goodness, inasmuch as it is self-diffusive, is the foundation for His mercy; and inasmuch as He has an indisputable right to be loved above all things, this constitutes the foundation for His justice. Thus this mystery is a fitting manifestation not only of God’s mercy, but also of the splendor of His justice, and both express His goodness.2°%

The fourth conclusion is: “But why He chooses some for glory and reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will.”

Two proofs are given for this statement: (1) There is the authority of St. Augustine, who says: “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 2° (2) From the analogy prevailing between natural things and those made by art: thus, too, it depends on the simple will of God that this particular part of matter is under the form of earth, and that other part under the nobler form of fire. Similarly, from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in the lower part of the eternal life” (Denz., no. 141). See also no. 810, and Summa theol., la Uae, q- 110, a.1 (the end).

207 Rom. g: 22. See also II Tim. 2: 20. 208 Cf. De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 12. 209 Hom. 26 in Joan.

wall, and that other stone (which is absolutely the same in size and material) is in the upper part of the wall.

The analogy holds good, for the different goodness that is found in men is not theirs in their own right; because, since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 22° “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 211

The objection was: It is unjust that unequal things be given to equals,

The reply to this objection is: “In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: “Take what is thine and go thy way. . . . Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? ” 22 But in the elect, efficacious grace is the effect of predestination, not theirs by right, but gratuitously given to them. Yet sufficient grace is given to all adults, which makes it possible for them to keep God’s commandments. But the one who resists sufficient grace deserves to be

| deprived of efficacious grace.

The doctrine of this article was distorted by Calvin, but in itself it is a most beautiful and perfect expression of the traditional teaching on predestination.

This conclusion is confirmed by the teaching of ‘Trent on the gra-

| tuitousness of the gift of final perseverance, which is freely given to the good thief on Calvary rather than to the other, and to Peter in preference to Judas. The Council of Trent says: “As regards the gift į of perseverance, of which it is written: ‘He that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved,’ 248 it cannot be derived from any other but Him who is able to make him stand 2" that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls.” 215

Hence the common teaching is that the just person cannot merit the gift of final perseverance; for this gift is no more than the continuance of the state of grace up to the moment of death, and the State of grace is the principle of merit, and this latter cannot be merited.*}® If, therefore, some will have it that predestination is because of foreseen merits, they must at least add that these merits do not continue up to the moment of death without the gratuitous gift of final perseverance, which is granted only to the elect.

Thus St. Thomas in teaching the absolute gratuity of predestination retains the doctrine of Holy Scripture, especially of St. Paul, who says: “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” *** This also is the conclusion reached by St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez, who taught the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, although they retained the theory of the scientia media in order to explain the distribution of congruous grace and to explain that the effect of this grace may be infallibly known by God.

Therefore all this teaching of St. Thomas on predestination is virtually contained in the principle of predilection: “Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one would be better than another, unless such person were loved more and helped more by God.” 218

This principle applies even to the angels. Hence St. Augustine says of them: “If both were created equally good, then, while some fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and reached that high degree of blessedness from which they became certain they would never fall.” 229

Finally, there is the statement of the Council of Quierzy, which is taken from the writings of St. Prosper. It reads as follows: “Almighty God wills, without exception, all men to be saved, though not all are saved. That some are saved, however, is the gift of Him who saves; if some perish, it is the fault of them that perish.” %20

This doctrine eliminates systems founded on motives that are too human, and there is left the revealed mystery of predestination as the object of contemplation.

THE MOTIVE FOR NEGATIVE REPROBATION

First doubt. What is the motive for negative reprobation taken absolutely, not as yet considering it as it is the reprobation of this particular person rather than of a certain other?

In the explanation of the third article we said that negative reprobation, according to St. Thomas’ opinion, consists in “the will to permit a person to fall into sin,” whereas positive reprobation is “the will to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” 221 217 I Cor. 4: 7.

221 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.23, a.3. Against predestinarianism, as also against Wydif, John Hus, Jerome of Prague, Luther, and Calvin, all Catholics hold that God, the just judge, punishes only the one who is guilty. In fact, the Lord says: “I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way | and live” (Ezech. 33: 11). See also Council of Orange, Denz., no. 200.

Now the doctrine concerning the motive for negative reprobation must be carefully formulated, so that the disadvantages mentioned above (a. 3) may be avoided. These disadvantages follow from the opinion of those who maintain that this reprobation is the positive exclusion from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled, and it is difficult to reconcile this view with God’s universal will to save.

First of all, it is evident that the motive for negative reprobation or for the permission of the sin of final impenitence and of sins that lead to this impenitence cannot be the foreseeing itself of this sin; for God could not foresee the sin of final impenitence, for instance, the impenitence of Judas, as something not only possible but future, if He did not permit it. Likewise, the sins that precede this final sin could not de facto dispose one for that sin if God did not permit it; for God can come to the aid of hardened sinners, and He frequently does. The question is why God permitted sins not to be forgiven in others, either original sin or personal sins,

There is a great difference, indeed, between the permission of a sin, such as Peter’s sin, so that one may become more humble, at the same time intending that one’s salvation be assured, and, on the other hand, the permission of a sin that will not be forgiven, such as the sin of Judas, not intending that one’s salvation be assured.

From what has been said, however, it is evident that God permits some to fall into sin before having foreseen their demerits. By the very fact that some in preference to others are predestined to glory before the foreseeing of their merits, it necessarily follows that those are permitted to fall into sin who are not included in the number of the elect.???

More briefly: since negative reprobation is the will to permit some to fall into sin and fail to attain the glory of heaven, and since the permission of sin in the reprobates precedes this sin, this sin cannot be its motive.

We must always return to those higher principles, by which in the ninth century the controversy on predestination between the Augustinian bishops of Gaul and others was terminated. The Council of Thurzey (860) formulated these principles in the following words: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven and on earth

222 Contrary to this, there are Molinists such as Lessius (De div. perf., Bk. 14, chap. 2, no. 15). Franzelin (De Deo uno, th. 55), Pesch (De Deo uno, prop. 61-62), and others, who maintain, according to the principles of Molinism as they understand them, that there is no negative reprobation before foreseen demerits. On this point they differ from all Thomists, and even from Suarez, Bellarmine, and Ruiz.

(Ps. 134). For nothing is done in heaven or on earth except what He Himself is pleased to do (such as the conversion of Peter and of the good thief), or justly permits to be done (such as the sin of Judas and of the bad thief).” 223

Therefore, what is the motive for the permission of the sin of final impenitence, and of sins which de facto are not forgiven and which lead to the sin of final impenitence?

The general answer to this question is that God wills a thing only in so far as it is good, Hence it is only on account of some good to be obtained that He wills to permit some, through their own fault, to fail to attain the glory of heaven. Therefore St. Augustine says: “God by no means would permit any evil in His works unless He were powerful enough and good enough to bring good out of evil.” 224 More briefly: God permits evil only for a greater good.

But for what greater good does God permit the final impenitence of many men and angels? St. Thomas answers this in his reply to the third objection of this article: “God willed to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.” We find this already declared somewhat differently by St. Paul, who says: “God, willing to show His wrath (that is, His vindictive justice) and to make His power known, endured (that is, permitted) with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.” 225

Therefore the reason for negative reprobation, taken absolutely, is the manifestation of God’s goodness by means of His justice. God’s goodness, inasmuch as it is self-diffusive, constitutes the foundation for His mercy, and inasmuch as He has an indisputable right to be loved above all things, this constitutes the foundation for His justice,

This holds good as regards the end.

But it must furthermore be said that, as regards the creature or as regards the material cause, the natural defectibility of the creature or its disposition to fail, is the indispensable condition for negative reprobation. For if the creature, either human or angelic, were not by its nature defectible, God, who is the source of all goodness, could not permit it to fail. But, if anything is by nature defectible, the consequence is that it may sometimes fail.

Yet this defectibility is not, strictly speaking, the motive for repro-

bation, for God does not permit the defect on account of the defectibility of the nature, as being the motive for reprobation, but He permits the defect on account of some good to be derived therefrom. Therefore the natural defectibility is rather the indispensable condition, or the aptitude and disposition on the part of the matter.

In this whole question there is no proposition more obscure than that God permits the final impenitence of some (for instance, of the bad thief rather than of the other) as a punishment for previous sins which de facto will not be forgiven and for a greater good, which includes the manifestation of infinite justice. Indeed this proposition is most obscure. But that our firm assent to this proposition should be made easier for us, we may consider the fact that its contradictory cannot be upheld, or that the aforesaid proposition cannot be proved false. In this proposition we see clearly the application of the most exalted principle of predilection, which is a corollary to the principles of causality and finality, which state that all good comes from the supreme good and is ordered to it. The principle of predilection was revealed to Moses: “I will have mercy on whom I will; and I will be merciful to whom it shall please Me.” ? St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 227 No one would be better than another without being loved more beforehand by God. And among the nobler good things on account of which God can permit sin, are to be included either the splendor of His justice or the manifestation of His infinite goodness, which has an indisputable right to be loved above all things.

Thus God wills to permit sin for a greater good. For this reason He wills to permit that what is defectible may sometimes fail. This permission is the indispensable condition for sin, but it is neither its direct nor its indirect cause, because the universal Provider, who directly sees the higher ends, is not bound to prevent these sins, not even the sin of final impenitence.

The defectible creature, which by its nature is apt to fall into sin, cannot justly complain of not having received these more abundant graces, by which it would have been preserved from falling into sin. As St. Paul says: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? What if God, wishing to show His wrath (that is, the splendor of His justice and His mercy) . . . ?” 228 This symbolism was already employed in the Old Testament. Thus we read: “As the potter's clay is in his hand . . . so man is in the hand of Him that made him; and He will render to him according to His judgment.” 7°

Jeremias also said: “Behold as clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel.” ?8° And again Isaias said: “I, the Lord, that do all these things. . . . Drop down dew, ye heavens, from above. . . . Woe to him that gainsayeth his maker. . . . Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it: What art thou making, and thy work is without hands? Woe to him that saith to his father: Why begettest thou? And to the woman: Why dost thou bring forth?” 2%

On the one hand, that is, in respect of those not chosen, the splendor of God's justice is particularly made manifest, yet not without manifestation of His mercy. On the other hand, that is, in respect of those chosen, God’s mercy is particularly made manifest, yet not without manifestation of His justice. As St. Thomas says: “Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly, and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates in punishing short of what is deserved. In the justification of the ungodly justice is seen, when God remits sin on account of love though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: ‘Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much’ ” (Luke 7:.47).2%2

Moreover, as stated by St. Thomas in this same article just quoted: “Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says: (Moral., XXVI): “The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God.” 233

Corollary. Hence there is great inequality either of natural or of supernatural conditions. But sometimes the inequality of graces compensates for the inequality of natural conditions. As our Lord says: “Blessed are the poor in spirit. . . . Blessed are the meek. . . . Blessed are they that mourn. . . . Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice.” 234 This means that many are the tribulations of the just and that those of the just who are loved more by God, such as Christ and the Blessed Virgin Mary, must suffer for the others as victims offered up in complete sacrifice. It was so with all the martyrs and great servants of God, who always suffered much. Thus there

is effected a most wonderful compensation, which to some extent is pointed out by Christ in the parable of the wicked rich man and the good beggar, in which we read that Abraham said to the wicked rich man who was condemned to hell: “Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime, and likewise Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented.” 28°

We find this compensation most beautifully described in a passage of the Old Testament which expressed the dogma of predestination in these words: “The souls of the just are in the hand of God, and the torment of death shall not touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die and their departure was taken for misery. And their going away from us, for utter destruction; but they are in peace. And though in the sight of men they suffered torments, their hupe is full of immortality. Afflicted in few things, in many they shalt be well rewarded; because God hath tried them, and found them worthy of Himself. As gold in the furnace He hath proved them, and as a victim of a holocaust He hath received them (especially so the martyrs). . . . The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds. They shall judge nations and rule over people, and their Lord shall reign forever . . . for grace and peace is to His elect.” #8° Thus the dogma of predestination is already clearly expressed in the Old Testament.

This great mystery of divine predestination is of itself more an object of contemplation than of theological discussion. For it is the nature of theological investigation to enable one to acquire a certain more sublime understanding of the mysteries of faith. As the Vatican Council declares: “Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith, when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly, attains by a gift from God some, and that a very fruitful, understanding of mysteries . . . ; but reason never becomes capable of apprehending mysteries as it does those truths which constitute its proper object. For the divine mysteries by their own nature so far transcend the created intelligence . . . that they remain shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are in this mortal life exiled from the Lord; for we walk by faith, and not by sight.” 237

This statement is particularly true concerning predestination, which is the sublimer part of providence.

Second doubt. What is the motive for negative reprobation taken in the selective sense, namely, as it is the reprobation of this particular person rather than that other?

The answer of St. Thomas is that negative reprobation, taken in

the selective sense, has no reason except the divine will. He says: “Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will.” 238 He gives two proofs for this: (1) The authority of St. Augustine, who says: “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 28° (2) From the analogy prevailing between natural things and those made by art. He remarks: “Why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends on the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that (equal in size) in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.” 240

In this argument founded on the analogy prevailing between natural things and those made by art, there is an unexpressed but implied major, namely: in those who are alike as regards defectibility, no reason can be assigned why one rather than another is permitted to fall into some defect that is not willed by the one foreseeing it. Then the minor is subsumed. But all creatures that are destined for a supernatural end are alike as regards defectibility, and it is only by God’s help that they do not fall into some defect; for the very fact of not falling into some defect is a good that comes from the source of all good. Therefore it depends solely on God's will that these particular persons rather than certain others are permitted to fall into some defect. This truth is expressed by the Council of Trent which, in discussing the gift of perseverance, says: “which cannot be derived from any other but Him who is able to make the one stand who stands (Rom. 14: 5), so that such a one stand perseveringly, and to restore the one who falls. . . . Let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall (I Cor. 10: 12) and work out his salvation with fear and trembling (Phil. 2: 12).” 24

The foundation of Christian humility consists in this, namely, the twofold mystery of creation trom nothing and the gratuitousness of grace. This humility does not degenerate into pusillanimity and despair, because God does not command impossibilities, and He gives His grace to those who humbly pray for it.

The following principal objections are raised against this doctrine of the motive for reprobation, considered either in a general way or in particular cases. We must show that on this point there is no severity on God’s part.

First objection. Without anyone being reprobated, God’s justice

would be made manifest in the elect, both by rewarding them, and by punishing them for a time on account of sins they committed.

Reply. Such a procedure would be but an imperfect manifestation of God’s infinite justice. For the rewarding of the just is more an illustration of God’s mercy than of His justice, and, moreover, it is not at all a manifestation of His vindictive justice. This latter is to some extent made manifest in temporal punishments, but these do not make us realize what it ought to be by reason of the infinite malice of sin, which does all it can to rob God of His dignity of being the final end of creatures. Likewise, God’s mercy would be very feebly manifested if He were to reward the elect with the beatific vision only for a time.

Moreover it has been revealed that some are reprobated on account of their sins, which God permitted; and the only possible reason for this permission is the greater good that is intended.

But I insist. The will to manifest vindictive justice before having foreseen the sin, is to will the punishment before the sin. But this is an injustice which leads to the predestinarianism of Gottschalk and Calvin. Therefore this view must be rejected.

Reply. I deny the major, which confuses God's infinite justice with His finite chastisement. For God does not will the permission of sin because of His love and intention to impose finite chastisement, for that would be repugnant to justice. But because He wills the permission of sin for the manifestation of His infinite justice, or the inalienable right of sovereign goodness to be loved above all things, He first wills the permission of sin, and then wills to inflict the punishment for the sin in manifestation of His justice. The punishment is but a means of manifesting infinite justice, and it is a means that is not an intermediate end with reference to the permission of sin. Punishment cannot be, indeed, an intermediate end, for to punish is a good only on the previous supposition of sin. Hence God most certainly does not will the permission of sin because of His love to punish, for this would be cruelty; but He wills it from love of His infinite justice, or from love of His goodness which has a right to be loved above all things. But it is easy to depart from the orthodox teaching on this point, and a slight error in the beginning will be great in the end.

Thus God could cause the great persecutors of the Church to be converted at the last moment of their lives, but He can permit, too, their final impenitence from love of His infinite justice that must forever be made manifest; but He cannot permit this impenitence from love of punishment.

Again I insist. To will the permission of sin for the manifestation of justice, is to will the permission of sin so that it be punished. But this is a hard saying and savors of inclemency. Therefore to will the permission of sin for the manifestation of justice savors of inclemency. Reply. I deny the major, for it would mean to will the punishmént before the sin, which would not be the manifestation of justice, but its contrary. Punishment is not the immediate end, but only the means for the manifestation of justice; for punishment is good only when it presupposes sin, whereas, on the contrary, the manifestation of God's infinite goodness and justice is good even before the foresecing of the sin; the knowledge of the possibility of sin is sufficient. It is essentially good that God’s inalienable right to be loved above all things as the sovereign good be made manifest; and eternal punishment proclaims this truth, as Dante says in his Inferno:

Through me you pass into the city of woe: Through me you pass into eternal pain: Through me among the people lost for aye. Justice the founder of my fabric moved:

To rear me was the task of power divine, Supremest wisdom, and primeval love.?42

Second objection. But then we would have to admit the rigorous opinion of certain Thomists, namely, the positive exclusion of reprobates from glory as from a gift to which they are not entitled, before the foreseeing of their sins. For at the same moment in which God chose those who are predestined for glory, He excluded all the others from it. Therefore the more rigorous opinion that was previously rejected follows from this reasoning.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. That at the same moment in which God chose those who are predestined to glory, He positively excluded all the rest from it, this J deny; that He permitted them to be excluded, this I concede. Similarly I distinguish the consequent: that the permission of the reprobates to be excluded from glory precedes their foreseen demerits, which will not be forgiven, this I concede; that they are positively excluded from glory, this I deny.

God, in predestining some, does not intend to do the opposite of this, saying: “I will the rejection of the others from glory,” but He says: “I will to permit that the others, through their own fault, fail to attain the glory of heaven.” This act means, indeed, the exclusion of some from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven, but it does not mean their positive exclusion from this glory. Nevertheless the reprobates are always destined for glory, so that this glory would be attained by them unless they themselves prevented it.

Hence God does not repel them from the glory of heaven, but He

242 Inferno, Canto III, verses 1-6.

permits that they fail to attain the glory of heaven, and this through their own fault. As Billuart rightly observes,2** it is one thing to be excluded positively from glory before sin, and it is another matter to be excluded from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven. The first proposition we deny, but we concede that those not among the elect are excluded, before the foreseeing of their sin, from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven; nor is this efficacious election to glory due to them in virtue of God’s antecedent will to save all men, otherwise all would be saved, and God's universal will to save would not only be His antecedent will, but also His consequent will, and it would be infallibly fulfilled.

In truth, those not among the elect, before their sin was foreseen, are excluded from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven, as from a gift to which they are not entitled; and this is accomplished by leaving them to their weakness. This is also in some measure accepted by Molina when he says that God of His own gratuitous love decreed to place the elect in circumstances in which He had foreseen their salvation as a conditioned future, and He decreed to place others in circumstances in which He had foreseen their final impenitence.

Again I insist. But from this permissive exclusion the same effect infallibly follows as in the case of positive exclusion from glory. Therefore it is useless to deny this positive exclusion.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. That the same effect follows on the part of the reprobates, this I concede; on God’s part, this I deny. For it seems to follow from positive exclusion that God is the cause that some would not be saved, since He would refuse to save them. On the other hand, the only effect that follows from permissive exclusion is that those not among the elect, through their own fault, fail to persevere; and God merely permits this.

There is a considerable difference between these two exclusions. Just as God is not the cause of sin, which contradicts what Calvin asserted; so also He is not the cause of perdition, or of exclusion from the glory of heaven. But He is the cause of our salvation. Hence the Council of Quierzy says: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; but that some perish, is the fault of those who perish.” ?44

Still I insist. Yet the Council of Trent declared: “God forsakes not those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He is first forsaken by them.” %5 But the will to permit that some through their own fault fail to attain the glory of heaven is to forsake them

243 Cursus theol., Vol. I, De motivo reprobationis, § 2, Solv. objectiones.

before they separate themselves from Him. Therefore God cannot permit the failure of some to attain the glory of heaven.

Reply. Several theologians interpret these words of the Council of Trent as meaning:

1. That God takes sanctifying grace away from any of the just only on account of a previous mortal sin. And this is most certain.

2. Granted that this being forsaken by God is to be understood as meaning the withdrawal of actual grace, still I distinguish the major: that God is not, strictly speaking, the first to forsake the just by taking away from them His common helps and ordinary protection which He extends toward them, this I concede; for this withdrawal of common helps is a punishment, which presupposes .sin. But God permits sin before it is committed; and so it is only in an improper sense that He forsakes one. It is true, indeed, as Billuart says,” that God by leaving a man to his defectibility, does not keep him from falling into sin by means of a special and efficacious help. But this special and efficacious help, although it is in some way due to human nature in general, yet it is not due to this individual rather than to a certain other.

It is most evident that God’s permission of sin must precede the commission of the sin that is permitted, not indeed as the cause but as the indispensable condition. For if God did not permit this sin, it certainly would not happen to be committed, and nothing happens unless it is either willed or permitted by God. Hence this permission of sin by God does not mean, strictly speaking, that He forsakes anyone, concerning which the Council of Trent says: “God forsakes not those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He is first forsaken by them.” %7 If it were said that God forsakes anyone by the very fact that He permits him to fall into sin, then this would be the same as saying that God cannot permit the first sin before it happens to be committed.

The Council of Trent maintains,?** indeed, that every sin presupposes the divine permission, for it declares that God's part is permissive with reference to sin, for example, to the betrayal of Judas. We also pray in the Mass: “Permit me not to be separated from Thee.” 249

Final objection. Even the Thomists admit that no one is deprived of efficacious help except through his own fault. Therefore it is false to say that God in an improper sense forsakes a person by the withdrawal of His efficacious help.

249 Prayer before the priest’s communion.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the refusal of efficacious grace is a punishment, which presupposes at least a first sin, this I concede; but the simple permission of sin by God is not, strictly speaking, the refusal of efficacious grace, and this permission evidently precedes the sin.

God in conferring the sufficient grace wills antecedently to confer the efficacious grace, unless a man deliberately and wickedly resists the sufficient grace. God could, indeed, by giving more abundant help, prevent this resistance and this wicked act of the will; but as universal Provider He is not bound to prevent this, and with higher ends in view He wills by His consequent will to leave a man to his defectibility. Thus it is true that a man is deprived through His own fault of efficacious grace which God, in the bestowal of sufficient grace, willed by His antecedent will to give him.

Third doubt. Is original sin a sufficient motive for positive reprobation?

We answer this question as several Thomists do. We distinguish and say that it is a sufficient motive in those who have not been freed from original sin, especially in infants who die without being baptized. These children, inasmuch as they have no other sin, are thus deprived of the beatific vision, without having to suffer, however, the punishment of the senses. But I deny that it is a sufficient reason in those who have been freed from original sin. In these, the effects of original sin (such as concupiscence and a weakening of the will in the performance of good) are conditions that contribute to their greater defectibility, and this latter shows itself in actual sins, and ultimately in the sin of final impenitence, for which they are positively reprobated.

But if it is a question of negative reprobation, since original sin is the same in all, both in the predestined and the reprobates, this sin cannot be in the reprobates the reason why God permits the sins that will not be forgiven. Therefore St. Thomas does not speak of original sin in this article, but says: “Why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will.” 25° So say the Salmanticenses, Alvarez, and John of St. Thomas.

The effects of reprobation. By the effect of reprobation is meant whatever God does with the efficacious intention of manifesting His justice by means of those whom He reprobates.

Hence the proper effects of reprobation are: (1) the permission of a sin that will not be forgiven; (2) the refusal of grace; (3) blinding of the intellect; (4) hardening of the heart; and finally (5) condemnation to eternal punishmeut.

Sin itself is not the effect of reprobation, for God is in no way the cause of sin, not even indirectly, when He permits it.?%

The signs of reprobation, however, are too great an attachment to the transitory things of this world, the sin of lust persisted in even to old age, a rebellious attitude toward the teachings of the Church, aversion for the reception of the sacraments, and great pride.

According to the Salmanticenses,?? reprobation is the effect resulting from the predestination of the elect, because it shows more clearly God’s greater mercy toward the elect. Hence St. Paul says: “God . . . endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.” 253 Thus all things are for the sake of the elect, who realize the splendor of God’s justice in the very restoration of this order of justice and in the triumph of God’s goodness over evil.?5 Angels do not grieve either for sins or

251 Cf. Summa theol., Ia Iae, q.79, a.1, 2. St. Thomas says (ibid., a.1): “Neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance whereby they may avoid sin, and if He gave them this assistance they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is wisdom and justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer.” But God is not bound always to preserve from defect that which is naturally defectible. If anything is by its nature defectible, however, the consequence is that sometimes it is defective. And this is permitted by God for a greater good.

St. Thomas says (ibid., a.g), in explaining the blinding of the intellect and the hardening of the heart, which are a punishment of previous sins: “God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle.” And again he says (ibid., a.4): “Blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God’s mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestined, to whom all things work together unto good (Rom. 8: 28).”

252 Cursus theol., De praedestinatione, w. V, disp. V, dub. unicum, no. 25. See also ibid., disp. VIII, dub. 2, §2. Concerning reprobation, their conclusion is: “We must say of reprobation, as regards the first permission of the first sin that leads efficaciously to the damnation of the reprobate, that-the cause of this permission is not any demeritorious act of this same reprobate.” The reason is that, as regards the permission of this first sin, there can be no question of a previous sin that is the cause of this permission. We are not concerned here with sins that will be forgiven, as happens in the case of many of the elect. We are concerned here with the permission of the first sin that wil] not be forgiven; whereas, contrary to this, God permits the elect to commit sins that afterward will be forgiven. This is, strictly speaking, an inscrutable mystery, and it is verified both in the angels and in human beings.

253 Rom. g: 22 f. It is what St. Thomas says in his Com. in Ep. ad Rom., 9: 24. 254 Cf. Summa theol., Ja, q.113, a.7.

for penalties inflicted upon men, although sin is displeasing to them as it is to God. They will the fulfillment of the ordering of divine justice in this matter.

Thus too, as the same theologians of Salamanca say,?°> we see more clearly with what liberality God chose the predestined for glory without any obligation on His part, and thus the riches of His mercy toward them are made more manifest. Likewise we see more clearly from reprobation the defectibility of the created free will and at the same time the powers conferred on us by grace. Thus all things are directed “unto the praise of the glory of His grace.” 256 St. Augustine frequently said about the same, though more concisely, when he declared that the wicked are in this world either that they be converted or that they afflict the good.257 @

257 Cf. Bossuet, Défense de la tradition, Bk. XI, chap. 5. In this work (chap. 4), he says: “There is this difference between God and man, that man is not innocent if he allows himself to commit the sin which he can prevent, and that God, who is able to prevent the sin without this costing Him anything but the will to prevent it, and who allows man to repeat the sins even to the exceeding number seen by us nowadays, is nevertheless just and holy; although He is allowed to do, says St. Augustine (Op. imp. III, chaps. 23, 24, 27), that which, if done by man, would be unjust. Why is this, says this same Father (ibid., chap. 27), unless it is because there is a great difference between the rules of God’s justice and those of man’s justice? God, he goes on to say, must act as God; and man, as man. God acts as God, when He acts as first cause, omnipotent and universal, which subordinates to the common good what particular causes will and do either of good or of evil; but man, whose weakness cannot make the good triumph in him, must prevent all the evil that he can prevent.

“Such is then the profound reason why God is not bound to prevent the evil of sin. It is because He can draw a greater good from it, even an infinite good. Thus in the crime committed by the Jews in the sacrifice of God's Son, whose merit and perfection are infinite . . . it suffices for us to know, as St. Augustine again says (ibid., chap. 24), that the more exalted is His justice, the more impenetrable are the rules which it makes use of.”

Bossuet (ibid., chap. 5), in the height of contemplation, says: “Men wish indeed to understand the purpose in the permissions of sins that turn out to their advantage; for example, of the sin committed by the Jews, the purpose of which was to give men a Savior; of the sin committed by Peter, the purpose of which was to make him more humble; of all sins, whatsoever they may be, whose purpose is to make grace more conspicuous. But when they are told that God permits their sins to show the splendor of His justice, since this permission tends to make them suffer, their self-love turns them against His justice. We must stress just as much this fifth truth, namely, that God permits sin, because if He did not permit it, then there would be no avenging justice, and God's severity would not be known, which is equally adorable and holy as His mercy is. . . . This is what God said to Pharaoh, speaking through Moses (Ex. g: 13), at the same time announcing to him the punishment for his sins, and we know how forcibly this utterance was repeated by the Apostle (Rom. 9:17). In this text indeed,

Molina 2°* admits that the manifestation of justice is one of the ends for which God permits sin.

PREDESTINATION AS A MYSTERY OF MERCY

The whole of this doctrine on gratuitous predestination may be summed up finally by what we may call an a posteriori observation. It is one that has already been made by us, and it is this: if, of two sinners who are equally obdurate, one is converted rather than a certain other, this is the effect of God’s special mercy toward such person. A fortiori, it is the effect of God’s special mercy, if any just person perseveres in doing good for many years, and especially if anyone is preserved in the state of grace from the time when he was baptized as a child until death. Thus the mystery of gratuitous predestination is a posteriori made manifest, so to speak, to those who are Christian in sentiment, just as God's universal will to save is also manifested to such as these in many ways. The intimate reconciliation of these truths is hidden in the obscurity of faith, but the light of life, which is the object of contemplation, is found in this obscurity.

The author of the Jmitation of Christ in his treatise on the spiritual life said about predestination: “I am He who made all the saints, I gave them grace, I brought them glory. I know what every one hath deserved; I led them with the blessings of My sweetness.?5* I foreknew My beloved ones before the beginning of the world. I chose them out of the world; *® they chose not Me first. I called them by grace, | drew them by mercy, I led them safely through sundry temptations. I poured into them glorious consolations, I gave them perseverance, I crowned their patience.

“I acknowledge both the first and the last; I embrace all with love inestimable. I am to be praised in all My saints; I am to be blessed above all things, and to be honored in all whom I have thus gloriously exalted and predestined without any merit of their own.” 261

St. Paul says to us: “Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.”

In this same work (chap. 6), Bossuet quotes again this saying of St. Augustine, which serves as a principle for every school of theology: “God hardens the heart of anyone, not indeed by bestowing malice, but by not bestowing mercy. (Ep. 194)-" In this same chapter Bossuet points out that it is a calumny to say: Therefore, according to St. Augustine, God is the cause of sin; for times without number he plainly said the contrary.

Farther on, this same author says: “They glory not in their own merits, inasmuch as they ascribe no goodness to themselves but attribute all to Me who of Mine infinite love have given them all things.” 76?

Hence this same author says: “When a certain person who was in anxiety of mind, often wavering between fear and hope, said within himself, ‘O, if I knew that I would yet persevere,’ he presently heard within him an answer from God, which said: ‘If thou didst know it, what wouldst thou do? Do now what thou wouldst do then, and thou shalt be secure.’ And being immediately comforted and strengthened, he committed himself wholly to the will of God, and his anxious wavering ceased.” 263

SIXTH ARTICLE WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS CERTAIN

State of the question. It seems that predestination is not certain: (1) because the crown, which is the effect of predestination, can both be acquired and be lost; (2) because it is possible that one predestined, such as Peter, may sin and then be killed; (3) because God, who most freely predestined this particular man, has it in His power not to predestine him.

Yet the answer is that the effect of predestination is certainly attained. It will at once be seen from the argument that St. Thomas has in mind not only certainty of foreknowledge but also of causality. This latter is denied, however, by Molina.

The certainty of predestination is clearly established from texts in Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “No one can snatch them (My sheep) out of the hand of My Father.” 284 This text points to the certainty not only of foreknowledge but also of causality on the part of divine omnipotence, which preserves and leads the elect to salvation, Our Lord says: “There shall arise false Christs . . . insomuch as to deceive, if possible, even the elect.” 6° If possible means: unless they had been specially preserved from falling into sin by God.

The certainty of God's foreknowledge and causality is likewise pointed out in St. Augustine’s definition of predestination, who says that it is “the foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts whereby whoever are liberated are most certainly liberated.” 2%

Theological proof. Predestination is a part of providence, which includes God’s absolute and consequent will concerning the elect. But this absolute and consequent will of God is always or infallibly fulfilled. Thus predestination differs from simple providence, which is not fulfilled in the case of those who are included only in God's consequent will. God wills antecedently the salvation of all, but He permits the perdition of many, and wills consequently or absolutely the salvation of the elect.

Yet this consequent will does not interfere with created liberty, because God efficaciously wills also that the elect freely merit eternal life. The divine causality extends even to the free mode of our choices; it actualizes our liberty, and in doing so most certainly does not destroy it, a point which has already been explained.?%

St. Thomas excludes Molina’s opinion, when he writes: “It cannot be said that certainty of foreknowledge is the only thing superadded to providence by predestination. This is tantamount to saying that God ordains the one predestined to salvation as He does anyone else, but that in the case of the one predestined He knows that he will not fail to be saved. In such a case, to be sure . . . , predestination would not be because of the choice of the one predestining, which is contrary to the authority of Holy Scripture and the sayings of the saints. Hence in addition to the certainty of foreknowledge, there is infallible certainty (of causality) in this order of predestination.” 268

Nevertheless this certainty is not injurious to created liberty because, since God’s will is most efficacious, it follows not only that the elections of the predestined take place, but that they take place freely, as God wills.

THE SIGNS OF PREDESTINATION

The following signs of predestination, which give one conjectural or at most moral certainty about it, have been taken by the theologians from various passages in the writings of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and St. Thomas. These are: G) A good life until the end; (2) the testimony of a conscience that is free from serious sins, and especially if one is prepared rather to die than offend God grievously; (3) patience in adversities endured for the love of God; (4) readiness to hear the word of God; (5) compassion for the poor; (6) love of one’s enemies; (7) humility; (8) a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin, of whom the Church chants: “He

that shall find me shall find life, and shall have salvation from the Lord.” 26°

Hence the author of The Imitation says: “If thou didst know it (that thou art predestined), what wouldst thou do? Do now what thou wouldst do then, and thou shalt be secure.” 270

These signs are such as to give one particularly a feeling of security under the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, concerning whom St. Paul says: “The Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God,” #7! through the filial affection we have toward Him, which He inspires in us, as St. Thomas points out in his commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Nevertheless, as the Council of Trent says: “Except by special revelation, it cannot be known whom God has chosen unto Himself.” 2"? And again: “If anyone saith that he will for certain, with absolute and infallible certainty, have that great gift of perseverance unto the end, unless he shall have learned this by special revelation; let him be anathema.” 278

Thus the fact itself of being saved at the end of one’s life still remains an uncertainty; yet “hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.” 7 Thus the certitude of hope is not certainty of salvation, but a tendency to salvation, which is more and more deepened in one as one approaches the end of life.

WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS CERTAIN

The answer is that the number of the predestined is certain, and this not only formally but also materially; for God knows how many will be saved, and who will be saved. Thus our Lord says: “I know whom I have chosen”; *7° and St. Paul remarks: “The Lord knoweth who are His.” 276 '

The Church says that God alone knows the number of the elect

269 Prov. 8: 35; cf. Summa theol., Ia Iae, q.112, a.5; Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chaps. 21, 22, concerning the signs of the state of grace.

who are destined for the happiness of heaven.?*7 When this number is completed, the end of the world will come and the generations of men will cease.

Is there a great number of the elect? Absolutely speaking and not comparing them with the number of the reprobates, we can state that the number is very great, for the Apocalypse says: “I heard the number of them that were signed, a hundred forty-four thousand. . . . After this I saw a great multitude which no man could number.” 278

But if we compare the number of the elect with the number of reprobates, then St. Augustine and St. Thomas think that there are not so many elect as reprobates, for our Lord says: “How narrow is the gate and strait is the way that leadeth to life! And few there are that find it.” 27° And again: “Many are called, but few are chosen.” 25° We are concerned here with “the good that exceeds the common state of nature.” %81 But if we include among the saved both angels and men, then St. Thomas is of the opinion that the number of the elect is probably greater than the number of reprobates.?*? Several theologians think it more probable that, among Christians who are Catholics, the number of the predestined is greater than the number of reprobates. It seems possible for us to reach this conclusion from the intention of Christ in instituting His Church and from the efficacy of His Passion and the sacraments.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE FURTHERED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS

The answer is that no one is predestined by the prayers of the saints. Predestination, as St. Thomas declares,?** depends solely on God’s good pleasure. But the prayers of the saints can obtain certain effects of predestination; just as the good works of the elect are the meritorious cause of their glory in heaven. Thus “whatever helps that person toward salvation, falls under the order of predestination,

277 Secret of Mass for the dead.

280 [bid., 20: 16; 22:14. This text is disputed. Many exegetes say it refers to the call of the Jews to accept our Lord as the Messiah. [Tr]

whether it is one’s own prayers, or those of others.” 284 Thus the saints by praying for others, are God's assistants.2®

285 To present the mystery of predestination in more concrete form, we may quote the following extract from Father J. P. Caussade’s beautiful work, entitled: Absolute Surrender to Divine Providence (Bk. III, chap. 12): “God assures to faithful souls a glorious victory over the powers of earth and hell”:

“IF the divine action is veiled here below by an exterior of weakness, it is that the merit of faithful souls may be increased; but its triumph is no less sure. The history of the world is simply the history of the struggle maintained from the beginning by the powers of the world and hell with souls humbly submissive to the divine action. In the conflict all the advantage seems to be on the side of the proud; yet humility is always victorious.

“This world is represented to us under the form of a statue of gold, brass, iron, and clay. This mystery of iniquity, which was shown in a dream to Nabuchodonosor, Is but the confused assemblage of all the acts, interior and exterior, of the children of darkness. These are again represented by the beast coming up out of the abyss from the beginning of all ages, to make war upon the interior and spiritual man; and this war still continues. The monsters succeed one another; the abyss swallows them and vomits them forth again. . . . The combat begun in heaven between Lucifer and St. Michael still wages. . . . Lucifer is the chieftain of those who refuse obedience to the Almighty; this mystery of iniquity is but the inversion of the order established by God. . . . All these impious persons who have declared war against God . . . have been seemingly great and powerful princes, famous in the world and adored by men. They are but the beasts which rise from the abyss . » + and God has always resisted them with men truly powerful and great, who give the deathblow to these monsters; and even as hell vomits forth new monsters, heaven raises up new heroes to battle with them. . . . Were the powers of earth and hell arrayed against one single soul, that soul would have nothing to fear in abandoning itself to God’s order. That apparent might and irresistible power of iniquity, that head of gold, that body of silver, brass, and iron, is but a phantom of glittering dust. A pebble overthrows it and makes it the sport of the winds... .

“All these monsters are sent only to exercise the courage of the children of God; and when the latter's virtue has been sufficiently tried, God gives them the pleasure of killing the monster, and He summons new warriors to the battlefield. ...

“Thus all opposition to God’s order serves but to render it more adorable. All servers of iniquity are the slaves of justice, and from the ruins of Babylon the divine action builds the heavenly Jerusalem.”

Footnotes

1. Predestination (Eng. tr., Herder Book Co.). 2 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.19, a.4, 6, 7, 8; q.14, a.8; q.20, a.3, 4. 653 ↩

2. Concordia, pp. 51, 565. See also index to this work, under the word “Auxilium.” ↩

3. to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will ↩