Chapter XIV. Question 14 God’s knowledge

“Havine considered what belongs to the divine substance,” says St. Thomas, “we have now to treat of God’s operation.” Those commentators who maintain that self-subsisting Being is what formally constitutes the divine nature, according to our imperfect mode of conceiving it, say that the divine intellection, according to St. Thomas, belongs to His operations. But those who hold that subsistent intellection is what formally constitutes the divine nature, declare that St. ‘Thomas does not say that he has so far treated of the divine nature, but of those things that belong to God’s substance; nor does he say now that he is considering only the divine operations, but those things that belong to God’s operations. But nature belongs to them as their principle. Nevertheless this passage of St. ‘Thomas favors rather the first opinion, and it seems that St. Thomas did not wait for this fourteenth question in order to treat of what formally constitutes the divine nature.

First are considered merely immanent actions, such as intellection and volition, and then virtually transitive operations, in which God's power is discussed.

In the fourteenth question, which concerns God's knowledge, four principal points are considered: ¹ Is there intellection in God, and what is its nature? (2) the primary object of God’s knowledge (a. 2, 3, 4); (3) the secondary object (a. 5-13); (4) the way the divine knowledge operates; whether it is enunciative, variable, speculative, practical (a. 14,16).

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER THERE 18 KNOWLEDGE IN GOD

State of the question. In the title, “knowledge” is taken in its broad sense as referring to certain and evident intellectual cognition. The article is not concerned with knowledge strictly so called, as distinct from wisdom; and so it is cognition acquired by proximate causes, and not by the highest of causes. In fact, in the reply to the second objection, it is stated that the divine intellection is eminently, without distinction of habits, intelligence, science, wisdom, prudence, and art.

The difficulties enunciated at the beginning of the article apply, however, to knowledge in the strict sense, inasmuch as it is a habit distinct from act, being concerned with conclusions and with universal abstract cognition, All these pertain to the created and imperfect mode of our knowledge.

Reply. God occupies the highest place in knowledge, because He is in the highest degree of immateriality.

1. This conclusion is a revealed truth, for there are many texts in Holy Scripture in which it is clearly stated that God is intelligent. It is a dogma of faith; in fact, the Vatican Council states that “God is infinite in intelligence.”(2)

It is also demonstrated by the following syllogism: The immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive, and the mode of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality. Therefore God occupies the highest place in knowledge, for He is in the highest degree of immateriality.

The minor has already been proved.’ God is not a body, not composed of matter and form, but is pure subsisting form; in fact, He is the self-subsisting Being,* and besides is infinite.» He transcends all limitations of essence, and a fortiori of matter.

The first part of the major is as follows: The difference between the intelligent being and the non-intelligent being is that the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other, which is therefore because of the amplitude of its nature; but the contraction of the form comes from the matter,® which limits the amplitude of the form; therefore the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive.

This argument gives the proof for the second part of the major. The mode of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality; thus the intellect is more cognitive than sense. Therefore, since God is in the highest degree of immateriality, He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

The whole of this doctrine has its foundation in the principle that the intelligent being differs from the non-intelligent being, inasmuch as the former can in a sense become something other than itself. Thus Aristotle says: “The soul is in a sense all things.” 7

Whereas the plant, which at first was cold, under the influence of the sun’s rays undergoes a change, becoming warm, the intelligent being, on seeing the sun, does not undergo a change, becoming warm, but in a sense becomes something else. This demands for such a being the possibility of its having in itself not only its own form but also the form of the other thing, namely, the representative species of the thing to be known.

But if the contraction or limitation of the form comes from the matter which receives the form, and which individualizes it, the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive. Hence plants, because of their materiality, are not cognitive, whereas God is in the highest degree cognitive, because He is in the highest degree immaterial.

Both the materialists and the subjectivist idealists fail to perceive this profound reason why anything is cognitive. Materialism denies this immateriality of the principle of cognition, maintaining that it is only an epiphenomenon of not much importance, which transcends the physico-chemical phenomena.

On the other hand, subjectivist idealism does not admit that the knower truly knows something other than himself, but that he knows only his subjective modifications.

In these two extreme systems, which are fundamentally in opposition to each other, there is no conception of what is meant by this intentional change necessary for our knowledge, and transcending the physical or organic change already existing in the non-cognitive plant.

Whereas in physical or material reception there is appropriation of the form, which thus becomes the proper form of the subject, as when a plant is first cold and then becomes warm; on the other hand, in immaterial or intentional reception there is no appropriation of the form received, this remaining the form of the other thing. Hence Averroes was right in saying: “The knower and the known are more one than matter and form”; for matter does not become the form which it receives, whereas the knower, in a sense, namely, intentionally or representatively, becomes the object known, or becomes something other than itself.8

St. Thomas says: “Change is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual, Natural change takes place by the form of the changer being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing changed, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual change takes place by the form of the changer being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing changed. . - - Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual change is re-

8 Consult the commentaries of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on this article.

quired, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ.” ° Previous to this, he had written: “But feeling is evidently accompanied with some change in the body... , and thus every operation of the sensitive soul is an operation of the composite. . . . Understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ.” 1° Now indeed, the sensitive faculty is in some way elevated above material conditions, although it depends intrinsically on the organism. The intelligent being, of course, first becomes intentionally other than itself in first actuality by the impressed species of the thing known, and then in second actuality it becomes other than itself while actually knowing the extramental reality. It does not go out of itself in a literal sense, as a man goes out of his house, for knowing is an immanent act; but it becomes intentionally other than itself, inasmuch as the intentional species and the cognition are essentially related to the object of cognition.

From all that has been said, it is clearly enough established that knowledge has its foundation in the immateriality of the knower, and that the “mode of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality.” Since, therefore, God is in the highest degree of immateriality (inasmuch as He is not only a pure spirit but pure Act, the self-subsisting Being), it follows that He is in the highest degree knowing.

Cognition and intellection in their formal signification imply no imperfection, and thus they can be predicated of God analogically and properly, and not merely metaphorically.

Reply to first objection. Knowledge is said to be a habit that is not so perfect as act with regard to the created mode of its being, but not with regard to what is meant by the name. Moreover, there is not even a virtual distinction in God between wisdom and knowledge.

Reply to second objection. Likewise in man, knowledge, as regards its created mode, implies the imperfect process of formally discursive reasoning, and the transition from the unknown to the known. But there can be a most perfect knowledge, with only virtually discursive reasoning, and thus it differs neither from intelligence nor from wisdom."

Reply to third objection. Universal knowledge does not exist in

11 Yet it is knowledge in the strict sense which God has, namely, knowledge of things through their causes; because virtual discursive reasoning suffices for knowledge, as is the case with the angels, who know things not successively but by one intuitive act. God, as will be stated farther on, does not proceed from the known to the unknown, does not know the effects from their causes, but immediately in their causes.

God as abstracted from singular things; but by this knowledge God also knows at once singular things, a point that will be made clear in a subsequent article.'”

First objection. The following objection is raised against the fundamental proof in the argumentative part of this article: There are many immaterial things that are not cognitive, such as the will and its habits. Therefore the reason given by St. Thomas is of no value.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. That there are many immaterial supposita that are not cognitive, this I deny; that there are many operative principles, such as the will and its habits, I subdistinguish; that they are not cognitive as elective acts, this I concede; that they are not of the cognitive order, acting in concert with the intellect, this I deny.

Second objection. The air and the mirror receive the intentional species without undergoing any change, and yet they are not cognitive. Therefore the reason given is of no value.

Reply. That these species are received in the air and the mirror, as in their subject of inhesion, in which these species materially inhere, this I concede; that the air and the mirror receive them formally as intentional or representative species, this I deny. As a matter of fact, what the air and the mirror receive is rather the power by which the impressed species is produced in the senses, or in the visual faculty, and in this alone, as in its proper habitat, it is formed.'s

Third objection. All angels are equally immaterial, and yet they are not equally cognitive. Therefore the mode of cognition is not according to the mode of immateriality.

Reply. That all angels are equally immaterial in the negative sense, which means that they are without matter, this I concede: that they are so in actual fact, this I deny, for they do not equally participate in the intellectual lite.

Fourth objection. It is not repugnant for God to create an immaterial substance that is not cognitive. Therefore cognition is not dependent on immateriality.

18 It must be noted that St. Thomas says the souls of irrational animals and their senses are in some way (or in a certain sense) spiritual, since they are already in some way elevated above material conditions. Thus the soul of the irrational animal is not a body, and is a higher form than that of the plant; nevertheless the souls and senses of such animals are intrinsically dependent on their organisms, and so they are simply of the material order.

Reply. That there is no repugnance in the creation of an immaterial substance that is not proximately cognitive, this I concede; that is not radically cognitive, this either I deny, or I say, please prove it. An immaterial substance that in some extraordinary case would be deprived of its intellective faculty, would still be radically cognitive. Thus it remains true that the degree of cognition of a being corresponds to the degree of its immateriality, or of its elevation above material conditions. Hence God, who is in the highest degree immaterial, is in the highest degree cognitive.

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF

State of the question. The next three articles are concerned with the primary object of the divine intellection. This second article begins by presenting the difficulty that arises from the imperfect way in which we know our own soul; for it is a reflexive knowledge which presupposes a direct knowledge. Thus there is a multiplicity of acts which cannot be attributed to.God. Moreover, it is by means of a certain assimilation of the knower with the thing known that we have intellection, and this is accompanied by a certain duality of subject and object, which cannot be in God, who is most simple. Therefore Plotinus said that the supreme hypostasis, which is the One-Good, transcends the second hypostasis, which is Intelligence, in which there is duality of subject and object. This objection was revived by many modern pantheists, who denied the possibility of a personal or intelligent and free God, for intellection presupposes duality of subject and object, and this cannot be attributed to the most simple Absolute.

Reply. God understands Himself through Himself.

1. It is of faith that God understands Himself, and there are very many texts in Sacred Scripture confirming this, such as the following: “The things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.” 14

2. It is proved from reason that God knows Himself; and also from reason is proved the manner in which He knows Himself, which is immediately through Himself, without any duality or real distinction between the divine intellect and His essence understood by Him. This is demonstrated as follows:

The intelligible is not understood unless it is in the intellect understanding (at least by some representation), and there is no distinction between these two, except that each is in potentiality, namely, except that the intellect understanding does not of itself actually understand, and that the intelligible is not of itself the intellect in act.

But God, who is actually understanding and whose essence is intelligible, is without any potentiality. Therefore God understands Himself through Himself, so that “His intellect and (the primary object) understood are altogether the same,” that is, without the duality which Plotinus speaks of as being necessary for intellection.

The major is proved because intellection is an immanent act, its object being actually understood only in the intellect. Thus in the case of our intellect, when we understand the nature of a stone, this nature, which is in the stone itself, is only potentially intelligible, and is actually understood only in the intellect. And there is no distinction between our intellect and this intelligible object, except that each is in potentiality; for, prior to our act of understanding, it was possible for the intellect to understand, and for the stone to be understood. But when the object is actually understood, the intellect and the object understood are more one than matter and form, because, as it was stated, matter does not become form; whereas the intellect in the act of understanding in a certain sense becomes the object understood.

The minor is evident, because God is neither a body nor a composite of matter and form,!* and because He is intellect in act and pure Act without any potentiality.

Hence His intellect is of itself and eternally always in act, and His essence is not potentially intelligible (as the essence of a stone), nor is it only actually intelligible (as the angel's essence), but it is, of itself and eternally, actually understood. Hence there is no distinction between it and His intellection. This means that so long as all potentiality or imperfection is eliminated from the cognitive intellect and the intelligible object, they are identical. Aristotle had already said this.**

On the contrary, in the case of the angel understanding himself, there is not absolute identity between his essence that is understood and his intellective faculty; for the angel's essence is only actually intelligible and is not actually understood, and his intellectual faculty is not his intellection. The completion of this doctrine is in the fourth article of this question, in which the identity between God's intellect and His essence is considered not only objectively but subjectively, as the subject of intellection.

Reply to second objection. Intellection is not, properly speaking, movement, for it is an act of the agent, whereas movement, properly

speaking, is in the thing moveable by the agent. “Likewise, that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, or is assimilated to it, belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality. . - - But the divine intellect, which is in no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but it is its own perfection and its own intelligible object.” This is the best answer to the objection of the Neoplatonists and of others who said that any intellection whatever implies a duality of subject and object, and hence this cannot be formally or properly in God, who is most simple.

Reply to third objection. “God is pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself, which means without any impressed or expressed accidental superadded species. On the other hand, the angel is in need of an accidental mental word to understand himself, because his essence is not actually understood, but only actually intelligible.” 17

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER GOD COMPREHENDS HIMSELF

State of the question. Does God know Himself as much as He is knowable, or, in other words, is it an adequate and most complete knowledge which He has of Himself, knowing whatever is in Himself and in His productive power, which means knowing all possible things?

Reply. The conclusion in the affirmative is revealed (1) by the following statement from Holy Scripture, and in similar passages: “The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.” 18 (2) It is proved from reason as follows: A thing is, strictly speaking, comprehended when it is known to the extent that it is knowable, or when it is known adequately and completely. But the cognitive power of God is as great as His actuality is knowable; for His intellect is in no way in potentiality, being pure Act in the intellective order, just as He is pure Act in the entitative order. And both are identical, as was stated in the preceding article.

Hence, whereas man remains a sort of mystery unto himself, inasmuch as “the heart (of man) is unsearchable” 1° (this being the reason why St. Paul says: “Neither do I judge my own self, but He that judgeth me is the Lord” *°), God knows Himself most per- fectly, being no mystery unto Himself; and He likewise knows His power, which means that He knows all possible things, the multitude of which is infinite. .

It must be noted that this conclusion is most evident for us, although there are several other truths about the divine intellect that remain for us most obscure, such as God’s infallible knowledge and permission of sin, the sinner being charged with the offense. But in this treatise on the one God there is frequently to be found a wondrous “light-transcending darkness,” in which what is for us most clear is accompanied by an obscurity, which is not because of any absurdity or incoherence of thought in the revealed truth, but because the light is far too bright for our intellectual vision. It is most evident that God most perfectly knows or comprehends Himself, and it is the commonly accepted opinon among Christians that to deny this would be truly foolishness.

WHETHER THE ACT OF GOD'S INTELLECT Is HIS SUBSTANCE

State of the question. We have seen 2! that God's intellect is absolutely identical with His essence as the object known. Now the question is whether the act of God’s intellect is identical with His substance as the subject of this intellection.

The difficulties proposed at the beginning of this article are of less importance.

Reply. The conclusion is in the affirmative. It is proved in two ways, indirectly and directly,

1. Indirectly. The act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. But if God’s act of undertanding were other than His substance, then His substance would be related to His act of understanding as potentiality is to act, which is impossible, since God is pure Act. Therefore God’s act of understanding is identical with His substance. This indirect argument is apodictic.

2. Directly and ostensively.2? To understand follows on the intelligible species and perfects it, just as existence follows on the form. But God's essence is His existence 23 and His intelligible

22 By “ostensively” is meant a demonstration in which the conclusion is virtually contained in the premises. When some general principle contains the proposition to be proved, the demonstration is said to be direct and ostensive [Tr.] l species.2* Therefore God’s act of understanding is His essence or substance and His existence. In other words, as stated in the reply to the second objection, God is His subsistent act of understanding, like an intellectual and eternally existing flash of itself.

The major of this proof has its foundation in the proportionality prevailing between the existential and intellectual orders. But God in virtue of His essence is not capable of further perfection, and thus He must be pure Act, unreceived and unreceptive both in the existential and intelligential orders. This means that, just as God's essence does not differ from His existence, so His intelligible essence does not differ from His act of understanding.

At the end of the argumentative part of this article, St. Thomas, by combining this conclusion with that of the second article, sums up and says: “Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God the intellect understanding (subject) and the object understood and the intelligible species and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence, when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.” Thus it was an unwarrantable assertion on the part of Plotinus, for him to say that every intellection supposed a duality of subject and object which cannot be predicated of the first hypostasis, who is most simple. Hence the famous contrary statement of Aristotle, that “God is absolute self-thought,” 2° or God is self-subsisting intellection.

Reply to third objection. “The act of divine understanding which subsists in itself and belongs to its very self and is not another's is absolute self-thought.” The reference is to the primary object of the divine intellect; but the secondary object is not excluded.

First doubt. Is there a virtual distinction between God's essence, His intelligence, and His intellection?

Many Thomists with good reason reply that there is no intrinsically virtual distinction between these three, because, if this distinction were admitted, then God's essence and His intelligence would be conceived as in potentiality to His intellection, the divine reality constituting the foundation for this distinction. But this cannot be conceived of God, who is most pure Act; for nothing in Him can be conceived as potential or as capable of further determination or perfection. Therefore in God there is no intrinsically virtual distinction between these three.

If, therefore, there is a virtual distinction between these three, it is merely extrinsic, which means that the foundation for this dis-

24 Cf. q.14, a.2. 25 Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 9- tinction is not in the divine reality but in creatures, inasmuch as subsistent intellection is equivalent, in an eminent way, to the radical and proximate principles of intellection and to intellection itself.

Hence there is an intrinsically virtual distinction in God only between those perfections which, as found in created things, are distinct according to their objective concepts, and which belong to different orders, such as intellect and will. But intellect and actual intellection belong to the same order, and are concerned with the same formal object.*

However, there is a virtual distinction in God between His knowledge or wisdom and His providence. In fact, it can be said that the formal object of the divine intelligence is the divine essence, as absolutely knowable in itself. The formal object of the divine knowledge is the divine essence as the cause of this; of prudence or providence it is the divine essence as the reason of things to be done; of divine art it is the divine essence as the reason of things to be made.

Second doubt. What is the formal and primary object of the divine knowledge?

Reply. ‘The primary object is God or the Godhead, as containing actually and implicitly God's essence, His attributes and relations. The reason is that the formal and primary object of divine knowledge is that which primarily and of itself is attained by it. Now this object is neither created being, nor being as such, abstracting from created being and uncreated being, but is God Himself. But God as He really is, not as conceived by us, contains actually and implicitly what we call the divine essence, the attributes deduced from it, and the relations. There is only a minor virtual distinction between these, as already stated.” “In God all things are one and the same, where there is not a relation of Opposition,” *8 says the Council of Florence.

Durandus rashly maintained that the formal and primary object of the divine knowledge is being as such, as abstracted from created being and uncreated being, because, so he said, it is more universal than uncreated being. Rosmini said about the same. This opinion must be absolutely rejected, for nothing is or can be conceived prior to God. It is only according to our manner of speaking that abstract being is more universal than God, since we conceive being as having universality of content according to ontological reality.?9

26 See John of St. Thomas, commentary on this article. 27 Cf. q.g.

God knows being as such, not abstractively and imperfectly (for in this way He would know only actually and implicitly the various modes of being), but He knows it, so to speak, in the concrete, inasmuch as it exists in the divine being, namely, in the primary object of His knowledge, and inasmuch as it is in creatures, as in the secondary object of His knowledge. We must now treat of this secondary object of divine knowledge.

FIFTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF

State of the question. The secondary object of the divine knowledge is discussed in this and the following eight articles. ‘This object is considered first in general from the fifth to the eighth articles inclusive. The inquiry is about the existence, nature, and medium of this divine knowledge of creatures. Is it a proper knowledge of things as they are distinct from one another? Is it discursive? Is it the cause of things, and how is it the cause of things?

These articles, in which the question is discussed in a general way, are of great importance for the understanding of the following articles which treat in a special manner of such things as God’s knowledge of contingent futures and of evil. The last articles of this question, as also what is said in explanation of God's will, especially whether God’s will is the cause of things,” are closely connected with the eighth article, namely, whether God's knowledge is the cause of things.

In this fifth article there are two points of inquiry: whether God knows things other than Himself, and how, or through what medium He knows them.

That God has such knowledge is a dogma of our faith, or rather a dogma of Providence which is expressed in almost every page of Holy Scripture. But through what medium God knows things other than Himself, is a disputed question among theologians.

At the beginning of this article St. Thomas proposes three difficulties: (1) How can God know things that are outside Himself? Augustine says that “God does not behold anything out of Himself.” 3 (2) If God were to know other things than Himself, He would be perfected by something other than Himself, as the intellect is by its object. (3) The intellectual act is so much the nobler, as the object understood is nobler. Therefore only the divine essence can be the object of the divine intellect.

It must be noted that Aristotle gave these difficulties at least

some consideration, and was unable to solve them. In discussing the intellection of the first intellect, he says: “Clearly, then, it thinks that which is most divine and estimable, and does not change; for the change would be for the worse... . Clearly, then, there must be something else which is more excellent than Mind, namely, the object of thought; for both thought and the act of thinking will belong even to the thinker of the worst thoughts; wherefore this must be avoided. For it is indeed better not to see some things, than to see them. This is not so if thinking is the supreme good. Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best. And its thinking is a thinking of thinking.” 22

Several historians, such as Zeller and Ravaisson, said that in this text Aristotle denies knowledge of the world to God, inasmuch as it is more becoming for one not to see some things, as being of an inferior order. Contrary to this, St. Thomas observes that Aristotle appeals to this general axiom merely to show that the nobility of intellection depends on the nobility of its object, and therefore that the proper object of the divine intellect must be God Himself and not things of this world. As St. Thomas says: “Since, therefore, some act of understanding is to be avoided on account of the unworthiness of the intelligible species, it follows that the nobility of this act, which is to understand, depends on the nobility of the intelligible species. Therefore the thing understood is more excellent than the act of understanding it... . (Hence) it is that the (supreme Intellect) must understand Himself. . . . Evidently there is no perfecting of God’s intellect by any other thing besides Himself that is understood by Him. Nevertheless it does not follow from this that all things other than Himself are unknown to Him; for by understanding Himself He understands all other things (inasmuch as God is the cause of things).” 33

This text from Aristotle’s Metaphysics is indeed obscure. But it must be noted against Zeller and Ravaisson that the Stagirite has spoken more clearly in another chapter,** in which he praised Anaxagoras for having said that there must be a supreme intelligence who has ordained all things in the world. Aristotle said in this chapter that Anaxagoras thus showed himself to be the wise one among the foolish. He said likewise in another passage: “But the world refuses to be governed badly. The rule of many is not good; let one be the ruler.” *5

He also argued against Empedocles, that “God would be most

ignorant if He did not know discord.” 3 Finally, Averroes, accepting the teaching of Aristotle, admitted a general providence, by which God has a general knowledge of things in the world which He directs, if not as to each detail, at least in a general way.

It must be admitted, however, that Aristotle was always in doubt on this point, because he never succeeded in acquiring a clear concept of creation, especially of eternal creation. Therefore he was at a loss to explain how God can have any knowledge of this world without a certain passivity or dependence on things, which cannot be attributed to Him who is pure Act. But St. Thomas gives us an excellent solution of this difficulty.

Two truths are affirmed in this article: (1) God necessarily knows things other than Himself; (2) God knows things other than Himself, not immediately in themselves, but in Himself.

The first proposition is of faith, and is included in the dogmas of creation and providence. The words of St. Paul are quoted in proof of this: “All things are naked and open to His eyes.” 3

It is also proved by reason from what was said in the preceding articles: Anything is not perfectly known unless its power is perfectly known and unless it is known to what its power extends. But God knows Himself perfectly (otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding), and the divine power, which is the first efficient cause of all things, extends to things other than Himself. Therefore God necessarily knows things other than Himself.

In affirming that the divine knowledge of things is according to the knowledge of the divine power, St. Thomas already implicitly assigns the medium of this knowledge.

This proof is confirmed from the fact that the divine power contains things other than Himself, after the manner of an intelligible species. For a thing is in another according to the mode of the other in which it is. But in God, as first efficient cause, His existence is His act of understanding. Therefore whatever effects pre-exist in God as in the First Cause, are in Him His act of understanding and His intelligible species.

As Cajetan observes, this proposition, “God’s existence is His act of understanding,” is to be taken rather in its formal sense than as expressing merely identity. There is identity (by reason of the reality or subject of the proposition) between God's act of understanding and His act of willing, because there is no distinction between them. But something more is affirmed when it is said that

36 /bid., Bk. ILI, chap. 4 (Com. of St. Thomas, lect. 12); see also Ia, q.14, a.11; also De caelo, Bk. I, chap. 4, and Bk. II, chap. 9.

“God’s existence is His act of understanding,” for in God, as the First Cause, His existence is, strictly speaking, His act of understanding, inasmuch as His act of understanding is the foundation for His active power of intellectual cause as such. This is the case with the artificer, and it applies analogically to God, as will be stated more clearly in the eighth article.

In the second part of this article it is shown that God knows things other than Himself, not immediately in themselves, but in Himself. It concerns the medium of this knowledge, and is proved as follows: For a thing to be seen in itself, means that it is seen by its proper and adequate species (as through the medium by which it is seen); whereas a thing is seen in another when it is seen through the image of that which contains it, which is what is seen first, as the image of the mirror is what is first seen, and then what is reflected in it. But God knows things other than Himself inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of other things, and He does not know them through the proper species of each thing. Therefore God knows things other than Himself, not in themselves, but in Himself.

This means that God knows things other than Himself in Himself first known as what is known. On the contrary, we know external things not in ourselves, but in themselves; for our senses know sensible qualities through the proper species impressed upon them by these qualities, and our intellect knows the nature of external things through their proper intelligible species, which are abstracted from the things. Hence it is commonly said that, whereas our knowledge is measured by things, God's knowledge is the measure of things. But although God knows things other than Himself, His knowledge of things is intuitive, because it extends both to the existence of the thing and the mode of its own existence.*8

The solution of the objections of this article confirms this opinion. Reply to first objection. When St. Augustine says that “God sees nothing outside Himself,” this must be understood as meaning that God does not see what is outside Himself except in Himself. ; Reply to second objection. “Hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.” Thus is solved the difficulty which baffled Aristotle, because for him creation was an unknown concept. If God is the

Creator, then He is able to know the things of this world in Himself, in His causality, without His being in any way dependent on the things themselves.

Reply to third objection. “Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself, because the intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood.”

This opinion held by St. Thomas concerning the medium in which God knows things other than Himself is not admitted by all theologians, and especially by the Molinists; for if God cannot know: things other than Himself except in Himself as the cause, this means the end of the scientia media by which, as Molina will have it, God knows conditionally free acts of the future (futurables) independently of His decree, or of His causality.

Therefore many Molinists, particularly Vasquez, hold that God knows things other than Himself immediately in themselves, or at least both ways, namely, either immediately in Himself as the cause (thus He knows created things), or immediately in themselves (thus He would know futurables independently of the divine decree).

But the Thomists refute this opinion, arguing from the principles laid down in this article. For to have immediate knowledge of external things is to know them by their proper species. But there is only one species in God, which is His essence, and tke divine essence is not immediately representative of created things as the medium by which He sees them, but is that which is seen by God, and that in which God's effects are known. But whatever is external to God, must be in a relation of dependent causality to Him, who is the cause of all beings and their real modes of being. Nor can it be said that God has immediate knowledge of things other than Himself without a species, for then His knowledge would not be determined more to one particular thing than to a certain other. The final result of this would be that the divine intellect is determined and perfected by something extrinsic. Thus God would not be pure Act, and the first determining Being, but would be determined by another, and this would make Him dependent on another. This is the grave defect in the theory of the scientia media, as will be stated in a subsequent article.

Nor can the divine essence be considered as the immediately representative medium by which He knows created things; for immediate representation is effected by the proper and adequate species. But the divine essence infinitely transcends every created being. Nor can it be said evidently that God, by reason of His essence, knows, as it were on equal terms, both Himself and creatures. There must be not co-ordination but subordination of either a possible or an actual effect in relation to its cause. Thus God knows all things other than Himself in His essence as the cause.*®

Objection. Some say that God knows created truths in as many ways as they are knowable. But truths are also knowable immediately in themselves, and they are thus known by angels and by us. Therefore God knows them immediately in themselves,

Reply. That God knows created truths in as many ways as they are knowable on the part of the thing known, this I concede; on the part of the knower, I subdistinguish: in every way that does not imply imperfection, this I concede; otherwise I deny it.

Objection. Still some insist that to know a thing in itself is a more perfect way than to know it in another. Therefore this way must be attributed to God.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: if the thing to be known is not so clearly expressed in another as it is in itself, then I concede the antecedent; if it is more clearly expressed in another than it is in itself, then I deny the antecedent. Things are contained, however, more perfectly in God, as in the most eminent intellectual cause, than in themselves. Just as the production of a work of art pre-exists in more perfect form in the mind of a great painter or sculptor than on the canvas or in the marble, and as he cannot produce in matter whatever is vividly conceived by him, then far more so are things contained in God in a more eminent way than in themselves. By knowing them in Himself, God knows them as in their dawning, by what St. Augustine calls morning vision, which is measured by the unique instant of motionless eternity, On the contrary, whereas we know things in themselves, we know them as in their twilight, by what is called evening knowledge, in the obscurity of sensible and material things. Therefore it is the common opinion among theologians in discussing the knowledge of the blessed, that it is a more perfect way for one to know created things in the Word than outside the Word.*°

Final difficulty. God is not the adequate cause of our vital acts, especially of our free ones. Therefore God cannot know them in His causality.

Reply. Although God is not the proximate cause of our acts, yet

89 But if certain Molinists say that God knows futurables in His essence, they do not mean by this that He knows them in His essence as the cause, for they maintain that futurables are not dependent on the divine decrees, as will be stated in a subsequent article.

e whatever entity and perfection they have come from God and are contained eminently in Him.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF BY PROPER KNOWLEDGE

State of the question. This article is concerned with proper knowledge, not on the part of the knower as acquired by various acts, but on the part of the thing known. In other words, does God by a single act know things in the world as they are distinct from one another and according to their proper natures, or has He merely a general knowledge of them? The difficulty is that other things are in God as in their common and universal cause, and,’ moreover, the proper ratio of the divine essence cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things.

Reply. The conclusion is in the affirmative and is of faith.

1. It is revealed in several passages of Holy Scripture, as when it speaks of God’s knowledge of things as “reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight; but all things are naked and open to His eyes.” * The concluding words of this passage are quoted by the Vatican Council, and it adds “even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” 4?

It must be noted that this article is especially directed against those who, like Averroes and Algazel, maintained that God has a general knowledge of things in the world, as regards the general laws of nature, but that He does not know them in particular.‘

2. Indirect proof. To know creatures in a general way would be to have an imperfect or confused knowledge of them. Therefore both God’s understanding and His being would be imperfect, which is an impossibility. For it is evident that such knowledge is imperfect on the part of the thing known, because it would not be perfectly known.

3. Direct proof. It specifies the mode of this proper knowledge. St. Thomas does this gradually, first by giving the examples brought forward by others in explanation of this mode, as, for instance, if the center knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from

43 Malebranche wanted even more or less to restrict divine providence to general laws, so as to explain the presence of evil in the world and of free will in man.

the center; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors. But these examples are not sufficiently convincing, says St. Thomas, because multitude and diversity are not caused by that one principle as regards that which is the reason for the distinction but only as regards that in which they communicate. Hence, if the center knew itself, it would know only that to which the lines converge. It must be shown that whatever perfection exists in any creature, even what belongs properly to it as such, pre-exists either eminently and formally or eminently and virtually in the cause of the total being of things.

St. Thomas gives a more convincing example as evidence of this, namely, the perfect act, which is posterior in the order of generation, and which contains all imperfect acts, which are prior to it in the order of generation. Thus animal and living are included in man, and the sensitive and vegetative souls are included in the intellective soul, because whatever perfection there is in the imperfect act, is found eminently in the perfect act. Thus he who knows a man knows an animal by proper knowledge.

This gradual preparation leads up to the following direct proof: The divine essence contains in itself whatever there is of reality in all creatures even to what ultimately differentiates them, of which His essence is the total cause, inasmuch as there is nothing in the creature that is not caused by God, not even matter, which is the principle of individuation in sensible things. But God has comprehensive knowledge of His essence, which is the self-subsisting Being. Therefore God by knowing Himself, knows all things by proper knowledge. In other words: “God knows all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others.”

In addition to this it is said: “Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being.” Averroes, denying this, failed to perceive that the self-subsisting Being contains all modes of being. He judged of being, the modes of which are also being, as of any genus, the differentiae of which are extrinsic to it. Thus rationality is an extrinsic differentia of animality. Hence, whoever perfectly knows an animal does not by reason of this know a rational being by proper knowledge. But whoever knows a rational being knows an animal.

Corollary. Only God, who has comprehensive knowledge of selfsubsisting Being, has perfect knowledge of the very nature of being, either as an act or as an entity. Thus He alone knows all possible modes of being, or the infinite number of possibles. We know by abstraction those things that are actually and explicitly in being, but not all those that are actually and implicitly in being, that is, we do not know all modes of being. We know these successively by experience and by discursive knowledge.

The solution of the difficulties confirms this conclusion.

Reply to first objection. Although God knows things in this world, not immediately in themselves, but in Himself as they are in Himself, nevertheless He knows them in their own nature as they are in themselves. Thus by one cognitive act, which is selfsubsisting intellection, He knows them distinctly, and “all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.”

Reply to second objection. “The created essence is compared to the essence of God, as the imperfect act to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.”

Reply to third objection. “The divine essence (by reason of its eminence) can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in and imitate it.” Thus, dependent on God, stones participate in being, plants in life, animals in cognition, men and angels in intellective life, and the just in divine life strictly as such. It is only this last participation that is called a “participation of the divine nature,” all others being imitations of the divine essence according to being, life, and intellection.

This eminence of the divine essence is for us mysterious or invisible, but in it is verified the principle, that “superior beings unite in themselves the various perfections of inferior beings.” Thus one visual act of sense perception includes within its range all visible things of a vast region, which are seen in one glance. Likewise one thing perfectly known includes within itself all intelligible objects pertaining to it. Transcending all beings, God has comprehensive knowledge of the self-subsisting Being, that is, of Himself, and He has perfect knowledge of all possible and actual modes of being.

SEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS DISCURSIVE

The reply is in the negative, and it follows as a corollary from the preceding. Discursion is of two kinds; either it is according to succession only, inasmuch as in point of time the things understood follow one another, as the night the day; or else it is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions.

But neither kind of discursion belongs to God, because He sees all things together, seeing them all in one thing, which is Himself. Moreover, since God does not proceed from the known to the unknown, He knows effects not from their cause, but immediately in their cause, as we do when the terminus of discursive reasoning is reached.

EIGHTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS

State of the question. The question asked in this article really includes two questions: (1) Whether God’s knowledge is at least the directive cause in the production of things, these being truly produced by God, so that God, the Creator and Ordainer, operates most wisely, and not in a blind or ignorant way; (2) whether God's knowledge is the effective cause of things, so that it in no way is caused by or is dependent on things (not even on our future free acts). But, if the first question is solved in the affirmative, then so is the second, on the supposition that there can be nothing real or future (either absolute or conditional) that is not dependent on God.

The answer to this first question, however, is in the affirmative and is of faith; for it is expressed in very many texts of Holy Scripture, such as in the following: “Thou hast made all things in wisdom”; #4 “who made the heavens in understanding.” 4 Moreover, this is already evident to reason from the proof of God’s existence because of the order prevailing in the world; for the supreme Ordainer of things acts not in a blind way but most wisely, since He operates by His intellect in all things effected by Him.

But as for the second question, namely, whether God's knowledge is the effective cause of things, so that it is in no way caused by things, St. Thomas in the first objection and in the counter-argument, notes a certain difference of opinion on this point between Origen and St. Augustine. For Origen, who is quoted in the first objection, when commenting on the words, “Whom He called, them He also justified,” + says: “A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God before it exists.” 4 Taken literally, these words seem to mean that God’s knowledge is in some way dependent on future things.

Contrary to this, St. Augustine says: “Not because they are, does

God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them therefore they are.” 4 This means that things are dependent on God’s knowledge, and not God’s knowledge on things.

St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine, following him as his authority. In his reply to the first objection, he charitably interprets Origen’s words in a good sense. If these words were taken literally, it would follow that God knew things to be created because they were to come into being, and not that they were to come into being because God knew and freely willed them. But, as a matter of fact, in this passage Origen is referring especially to sin, which God is not the cause of, and Origen means that the divine foreknowledge does not do away with human liberty. Moreover, as St. Thomas says, “if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause of God’s knowing them.” 49

For a better understanding of the importance of this question, we should note that the difficulty arising from the conflicting statements of Origen and St. Augustine, persisted among theologians as regards the divine foreknowledge. This is especially the case with Molina who, in his theory of the scientia media, maintains that God foresees conditionally free actions of the future or futurables before there is any determining divine decree concerning them. Thus the divine knowledge of futurables in its relation to these would not be determining, but rather determined by them and dependent on them. For Molina says: “It was not in God’s power to know by this scientia (media) anything else than He actually knew. . . . (But) if the created free will were to do the opposite, as it truly can, He would have known even this by the same knowledge, but not that He actually knows it.” 5° Thus Molina speaks rather the language of Origen than that of St. Augustine.

Therefore, as for the question asked in this article, Molina holds that God’s knowledge is indeed the directive cause of things which are produced by Him; but he maintains that God’s knowledge is not the effective cause of the determination of our free will, the act of which, in his opinion, is first foreseen by God as a conditionally free action of the future; e.g., if Peter were situated in certain circumstances he would choose this particular thing, and then, with the positing of the conditions, it is foreseen as a future act; ie., Peter, actually situated in certain circumstances, will choose this particular thing. But St. Thomas settles both questions by one answer.

His answer is: The knowledge of God, in so far as His will is joined to it, is the cause of things, and is not caused by them.

1. There is foundation for this doctrine in Holy Scripture, as shown from the following texts: “The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, hath established the heavens by prudence”; 51 “and God said: Be light made. And light was made”; 5 “by the word of the Lord the heavens were established”; 5 “Who is a more artful worker than she (Wisdom) of those things that are?” 54 “All things were made by Him (the Word)”; 5 “upholding all things by the word of His power.” ** But these complex terms, “The Lord by wisdom hath founded, hath established, is an artful worker,” convey the idea that God’s knowledge is the cause of things.

2. Among the Church Fathers, who stated this truth more clearly, prominent is St. Augustine, a quotation from one of his works being given in the counterargument of this article.5’ He also says in another of his writings: “This world could not be known to us unless it existed, but it could not have existed unless it had been known to God.” *8 St. Gregory the Great asserts: “For even whatsoever things are, in His eternity are not therefore seen because they are, but therefore they are because they are seen.” *°

3. The conclusion is proved by the following theological argument: The knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to the things made by his art. But the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art so far as his will is joined to it. Therefore the knowledge of God is the cause of all things, in so far as His will is joined to it.

The major enunciates an analogy drawn from the Holy Scripture in which God’s wisdom is called the “artificer” of all things. Moreover, this is also evident to reason from the proof of God's existence as supreme Ordainer by reason of the order prevailing in the world. Hence, as stated in the body of the article, “It is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding,” a truth previously established.*° This is also clearly seen from the fact that to act by the intellect is a

more perfect and more universal mode of action than to act by nature.®

Now in man, for instance, the intellective life is above the vegetative which operates from a necessity of its nature. Finally, to act by the intellect is to determine the form and end of its action, whereas, on the other hand, to act by nature is to be determined by the Author of nature. This answers the objections of the pantheists.°* Therefore it can truly be said that knowledge is predicated analogically of God and the artificer.

The minor of this proof states, however, that the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art, in so far as his will is joined to it. For it is evident that the artificer acts by his intellect, and therefore by his practical knowledge or by his art, which is the perfection or form of his intellect. But besides this it is of necessity that there, be conjunction of will and intellect; for just as the natural form, for instance, of a plant, is for action by reason of its natural appetite or inclination, so also the intelligible form, by reason of its rational appetite or will, is for the same end. “For since the intelligible form,” says St. Thomas, “has a relation to opposite things, inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites (thus ethics is concerned with the performance of good and the avoidance of evil), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite.” 63 For the intelligible form or the idea has a relation to opposite things, namely, to being and to non-being. Thus the artificer can produce or not produce the work of art that is conceived by him, and God can produce or not produce the world, and of possible things these particular ones in preference to others. But God’s knowledge joined to His will constitutes the divine determining decree, and is not only the directive but also the effective cause of things, just as command presupposes freedom of choice.

St. Thomas states this more clearly in various passages of his works, Thus he says: “Knowledge never produces its effect except through the intervention of the will, the concept of which implies a certain influx into things willed.” ® “Hence it does not necessarily follow that things come into being whenever there is knowledge, but only when the production of these is determined by the will.” © “The (divine) idea is determined as regards those things that are,

63 Com. on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. 1X, chap. 5, lect. 4. 64 De veritate, q.2, a.14.

or were, or will be produced, by a decree of the divine will; but it is not so determined as regards those things that neither are, nor were, nor will be.” 6 “God does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.” 6 “The form, as it is in the intellect only, is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will.” °

This determination just mentioned is nothing else but the determining divine decree, for which, just as for a human decree, there is required: (1) a judgment of the intellect directing the free choice of the will; (2) the choice itself by the will. Then there is the command of the intellect directing one to make use of the means willed. The gradual development of this doctrine is to be found in St. Thomas’ treatise on human acts.®® It is there shown that there are two orders, one of intention and the other of execution. In the order of intention, the intellect apprehends the end and proposes it to the will; the will intends the end, and in virtue of this intention the intellect inquires into the means more suitable for the attainment of the end, and the intellect judges of them or distinguishes between them (this being a practical judgment); then the will freely chooses these means, and this terminates the order of intention, by a descendent process from the end intended down to the first and least of the means chosen. After this begins the order of execution through a command of the intellect, which means that the intellect commands the use of the means willed, beginning with the lowest and ascending to the higher until the end is attained, which is first in intention and last in execution. In virtue of this command the will applies the faculties to the performance of their acts, and this application is called the active use, which is followed by the passive use of these faculties, and after this comes the attainment of the end.?®

This is analogically verified in God. The divine intellect apprehends the divine goodness manifested to it as its end, and the divine will intends this end. In virtue of this intention the intellect, so to speak, inquires into the means, proposing these to the divine will, which wills them, and this terminates the order of intention. In this process the divine knowledge is directive but not effective. But, posited the efficacious choice of the means, in virtue of this the intellect commands the employment of the means,

and thus the divine knowledge is not only the directive but is also the effective cause of things in second actuality. In this setting, the divine knowledge, presupposing as it does election, was usually called “knowledge of approbation” or even “of vision,” because by producing the effect it sees, and by seeing it produces the effect, which ineans that it extends to things either as actually present or as belonging entirely to the future, not precisely as it is knowledge of vision, but as the will is joined to it.

Hence the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is concerned with possible things before God's free choice of them, is only the directive cause of things, whereas the knowledge of approbation, which follows the efficacious choice, is the effective cause of things. This commanded act is efficacious, inasmuch as it presupposes a determining choice, and this latter is often called the purpose or efficacious decree of the divine will.

Thus we understand why St. Thomas said: “Determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.” By “the determination of the will” is meant here the election which follows the directive judgment and which precedes the command moving one to make use of the means.

Conclusion. Therefore God's knowledge is the effective cause of things, as being a command that presupposes the efficacious act of election on the part of the divine will. And it is concerned with all things without exception, for there can be no reality that is not causatively dependent on God's knowledge and will, not even the free determination of our choices.

Reply to first objection. It solves the difficulty presented by the text quoted from Origen, who spoke inappropriately and in too human a way about God's knowledge. Truly, his purpose is to prove that God’s knowledge is not harmful to human liberty, and he is especially concerned with sin, which God is not the cause of, because He only permits it. Moreover, it is still true to Say in an illative sense, but not in a causal sense, that if anything will come into existence, this is known by God before it exists.

Reply to second objection. Although God’s knowledge is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal, because it was not in God's knowledge that things should be eternal, but only that they should come into being in a time that is determined by God's will.

Reply to third objection, The knowable is prior to created knowledge, but not to the uncreated knowledge. Whereas our knowledge is measured or caused by things, God’s knowledge is the measure and cause of things.

Objection. Created liberty cannot exist with that knowledge which, in virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree, is the cause of future action. But such is God’s knowledge, in accordance with the preceding thesis. Therefore God’s knowledge is not the cause of future actions.

Reply. According to what St. Thomas says in a subsequent question,?? I distinguish the antecedent as follows: If the decree of the divine will concerns only the substance of the future action, I concede it; if it concerns also the free mode of this action, then I deny it. Replying to one of his objections in this subsequent question, St. Thomas says: “From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.” 73

Another objection. Then God could not know sin, because He is not the cause of sin. Therefore the difficulty remains.

Reply. In the tenth article of this question St. Thomas solves this difficulty by pointing out that God knows possible evil things by their opposite good things; also actual and future sins, inasmuch as He wills to permit them for a greater good."

Doubt. How does St. Thomas distinguish between the knowledge of simple intelligence and that of vision?

Reply. St. Thomas explains this in different works of his.” In his opinion, the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision are not two kinds of knowledge, but are one and the same in God; their difference arises only from the diversity of their objects. In other words, the knowledge of simple intelligence has not the will joined to it, and is concerned with possible things, thus being a necessary knowledge. The knowledge of vision has the will joined to it, and is concerned with really existing things, either present, past, or future. The knowledge of vision is said to have the will joined to it inasmuch as it is accompanied by either a positive or permissive decree of the divine will. As will be stated farther on, the knowledge of conditionally free actions of the future or of futurables refers back to the knowledge of vision inasmuch as it pre-

74 Ibid., a.g ad gum, in which this divine permission is discussed.

78 Cf. Ia, q.14, a.16; De veritate, q.3, a.8 ad 8um; Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps.

supposes a conditional decree of the divine will, without which these conditionally free actions of the future would be undetermined. Such as these are: What would Peter do if situated in certain circumstances? Or what would Paul have done, if he had been in Peter’s place, in the circumstances of our Lord’s Passion? Confronted by the two possibilities of faithfulness or unfaithfulness, which would he have chosen? If we say that God is able to know this infallibly before His decree, then such knowledge is not the cause of things but is caused by conditionally free actions of the future or is dependent on them; nevertheless, inasmuch as they are contingent, they are still undetermined. From this we already see how very important the present article is as regards the foreknowledge of future things.

In this article we have a legitimate application of the analogical method, to the exclusion of all anthropomorphism, because what is said of the artificer’s knowledge, inasmuch as it is the cause of things made by his art, does not in its formal concept imply any imperfection. Thus knowledge is predicated analogically of God in the literal sense and not merely metaphorically, those imperfections being removed, of course, which are found in the created mode of the artificer’s knowledge.

NINTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THAT ARE NOT

State of the question. By “things that are not” is meant things that do not actually exist but that exist only potentially so, either in God or in a creature.

The answer is affirmative. (1) It is of faith, for the Scripture says: “Before I formed thee in the bowels of thy mother, I knew thee.” 76 There are very many parallel texts in Holy Scripture concerning God’s knowledge of things that are not, but which are either possible or which did exist or which will exist.

2. Proof from reason. Things that are not absolutely, namely, that are not actually, are in the power either of God or of creatures, But God knows those things that are either in His power or in the power of a creature, otherwise He would not have comprehensive knowledge of Himself. Therefore God knows things that are not absolutely.

There are two more conclusions:

1. By the knowledge of vision, God knows past or future things, because God's glance is measured by eternity, which is without succession and which comprehends all time, just as the apex of a pyramid corresponds to all the points of its base.

2. By the knowledge of simple intelligence God knows merely possible things, those which never were nor are nor will be. God knows these in His essence as it is infinitely imitable.’

St. Thomas in this article is not speaking of conditionally free actions of the future, for he treats of this elsewhere when discussing prophecy of denunciation.’* He is now speaking of merely possible things, which must not be confused with futurable; for the futurable means this: of two possible things (for instance, of remaining faithful or of being unfaithful), which would one choose if situated in certain cicumstances? Thus the futurable adds a new determination to the possible.

The purely possible is merely what is capable of existence, what is not repugnant to existence. Inasmuch as it is something really possible, it is called a real possible, which is a different entity from what is purely a figment of the mind or mental being, which is not capable of real but only of logical existence, like the universality of any predicate. It also differs from real and actual being, or actually existing being.

TENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS

State of the question. The most serious difficulty is that God knows things other than Himself inasmuch as they are in Himself as in their cause. But God is not the cause of evil. Therefore it seems that God does not know evil things.

Nevertheless the contrary is affirmed frequently in Holy Scripture, as in the following text: “Thou hast set our iniquities before Thy eyes.” 7° It is of faith that God knows physical and moral evils and, if God did not know sins and the gricvousness of these, He could not justly punish them.

The body of the article contains two conclusions: (1) God knows evil things; (2) God knows evil things by their opposite good things.

Proof of first conclusion. ‘There are some good things that can be corrupted by the presence of evil; but all good things and what can be accidental to them are perfectly known by God; therefore evil things are known by God.

The major is evident both as regards natural good, such as health, the loss of which may be due to various causes, and as regards moral

78 Summa theol., Ila Iae, g.171, a.6, ad gum; q.174, a.1; Ia, q-19, a.7 ad gum. 79 Ps. 8g: 8.

good, such as virtue, which can likewise be corrupted so as to beget vice. The minor is evident, it having been established that God has comprehensive knowledge of those things that are in Himself as in their cause.

Proof of second conclusion. A thing is knowable in the degree in which it is. But the essence of evil consists in the privation of good. Therefore God knows evil things by their opposite good things, just as darkness is known by light. Thus God knows injustice by justice, and from the fact that He has knowledge of all justice, He knows the gravity of injustice. But because we have not intuitive knowledge of all justice, our valuation of it is obtained from injustice and from the grief caused by grievous injustice. These two ‘conclusions are concerned more with the nature of evils than with their existence.

Doubt. With regard to the existence of evils and with regard to the elucidation of the second objection, the following question is asked: How does God foresee evils, especially sins?

The answer is: God knows them in His permissive decree. St. Thomas speaks of this permissive decree in the preceding article, saying: “The knowledge of God joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that whatever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be.” $ St. Thomas’ answer is the same in the following replies to objections proposed by him: “God does not will evil to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.” §1 “One who provides universally, allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.” $2 “Reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” 8 “Permission is of many kinds. There is permission: (1) of licit concession; (2) of dispensation . . . ; (3) of tolerance, as when a lesser evil is permitted for a greater good. Such was the permission given by Moses, when he allowed a bill of divorce . . . ; (4) of favorable concession, as when something is permitted, though its opposite is better; as when the apostles permitted second marriages (I Cor., chap. 7)... (5) of forbearance, as when God permits evils to happen, that through them He may effect some good.” *

Before the permissive decree God knows sins as possible, but not as future. Moreover, God wills to concur in the act of sin, so that

whatever actuality there is in it depends on the First Cause.** Nor does it follow from this that God is the cause of sin, namely, of the deordination in sin. Since God is indefectible, He cannot be either the direct or the indirect cause (as it were through negligence) of this deordination, which is a defect.8* Thus evil is explained on . three grounds: (1) on the part of the formal cause (as being the privation of a good that is due); (2) on the part of the material and defective cause (the defectible creature); (3) on the part of God permitting it, who in no way is the cause of sin, His permission being the indispensable condition for sin, which He ordains for a greater good as the end in view.%?

Clarity and obscurity are combined in this solution. What is most clear is this, that, just as God cannot produce what is not included in the notion of being, so He can in no way be either the direct or the indirect cause of the deordination in sin, which is excluded from the adequate object of divine omnipotence. Nothing is more exclusive in itself than the object of any faculty. Thus the intellect knows good only under the aspect of the true; for although there is no real distinction between the true and the good, yet the intellect does not attain to the good under the concept of good, this being the province of the will, but it attains to this under the proper concept of the true. Thus God wills, and causes sin only as it is an entity, but not as it is a sinful act. This is an absolute certainty. Yet there is obscurity as to the intimate mode in which God, by permitting sin, concurs in its entity and in no way concurs in its malice. This intimate mode is hidden from us; and no wonder, for the mode is strictly divine, and is only analogically known by us in an inferior mirror.®8

ELEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD KNOWS SINGULAR THINGS

The answer is in the affirmative and is of faith, being a part of the dogmatic truth known as Providence which, according to Holy Scripture, extends even to the least of singular things, as is evident from the following passage: “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.” 89 St.

Thomas quotes a text from the Old Testament: “All the ways of a man are open to His eyes.” °°

In the body of the article it is shown: (1) that God knows singular things; (2) how He knows them.

The truth of the first statement is established by the following argument: All perfections found in creatures, which in their formal signification imply no imperfection, pre-exist formally and eminently in God; but knowledge of singulars is of this nature; therefore such perfections pre-exist in God formally and eminently.

The major was proved in a previous article.” The minor is evident. For, although sense perception of singular things implies imperfection, such is not the case with intellectual knowledge of singular things, if this intellectual knowledge does not have to be in conjunction with sensitive knowledge.

St. Thomas appeals to the authority of Aristotle, who, in refuting Empedocles, says: “God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord.” ® Yet it is not quite clear that Aristotle has in mind not only discord in general, but also particular cases of it.

In the second statement the question is asked: How does God know singular things? The answer is, that it will not do to say that God knows singular things in that He knows all their universal causes; for the singular thing, in its singularity, is dependent on individual matter, and thus the singular would not be realized as such. Nor will it do to say that God applies universal causes to particular effects, for this application presupposes but does not constitute the singular as known. It must be said that God, as shown above,®* knows things other than Himself by His essence as their cause. But the divine causality extends to singular things inasmuch as it produces not only the form of things, but also the matter by which things are individualized. Therefore God knows singular things by His essence as their cause.

The minor is evident, for matter, although it is pure potentiality, still is being, and is distinct from both actuality and nothingness. Therefore it is not independently of God, the first Being, that this matter is caused and preserved here and now in such individual. “Matter, in so far as it has being in this or that way, retains a certain likeness to the divine Being.” 4

Hence, whereas we know spiritual things in the mirror of sensible things, God knows material things in the most exalted mirror of

92 De anima, Bk. I, chap. 5; Metaph., Bk. III, chap. 4. 93 Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8.

His essence, which is the cause of all things even as regards their singularity. For us the spiritual is something immaterial: for the pure spirit and especially for God, the material is something nonspiritual, not having the amplitude of spirituality, something limited or confined here and now by matter, the ultimate subject, which is almost nothing. Thus in a spiritual way God knows from on high, for instance, a symphony which we perceive by the sense of hearing.

TWELFTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW INFINITE THINGS

State of the question. It seems that the infinite, such as an unending series of days, is something unknown and unknowable, because a thing is knowable inasmuch as it is in act, or determined. Also the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, for it has no end. Such, for instance, is the successive and endless series of intellectual and volitional acts. For that alone is traversable which has a beginning and an end.’

The answer is, however, in the affirmative, and it is of faith, a point that will be more clearly established in the next article, which affirms that God knows future contingent things, even the intellectual and volitional acts of immortal souls, for there will be an unending series of such acts. It is first proved that God knows infinite things both by the knowledge of simple intelligence and by that of vision. Then the reason is given for the possibility of this knowledge.

1. As regards the knowledge of simple intelligence. Those things that are possible to God and to creatures are infinite. But God knows not only actual things, but all those that are possible to Him and to creatures. Therefore He knows infinite things, namely, an actually infinite and innumerable multitude of possible things. For, as St. Thomas says, “number adds to multitude the idea of measure; for number is multitude measured by one.” 98

2. As regards the knowledge of vision. The thoughts and affections of immortal souls will be multiplied to infinity. But God knows all these actually and simultaneously, and not successively, as we know them. Therefore also by His knowledge of vision He knows infinite things. The multitude of these thoughts is successively infinite, and absolutely innumerable.

3. The reason is given for the possibility of this knowledge of infinite things. Knowledge is measured by the mode of the form,

95 See St. Thomas’ Com. on Aristotle’s Physics, Bk. VI, lect. 9- 96 Ibid., Bk. III, lect. 8. CF. supra, q-7, a.4.

which is the principle of knowledge. But the divine essence, whereby God knows, extends as cause to infinite things, even as these are distinct from one another.®°?

The major is evident by an inductive process. Sense perception is co-extensive with the sensible species, and includes all sensible things represented by this latter. Our intellect, however, is coextensive with the abstracted intelligible species, and includes an infinity of particulars as these communicate in the specific nature so understood, but not as they are distinct from one another.

But the minor is proved from the sixth and the eleventh articles of this question, in which it is stated that whatever perfection exists in creatures, even their individuating notes, pre-exist in God as in their most eminent cause, which most perfectly knows its power and causality.

The solution of the objections confirms this conclusion.

Reply to first objection. To know the infinite successively, part after part, is an impossibility even for God, because there would never be an end of this addition. But God knows the infinite or infinite things, not successively, that is, not part after part; for He knows all things simultaneously, inasmuch as they are contained in His power and eternal causality, which, as being simultaneously whole, includes all time. Thus it is not repugnant for infinite things to be contained in a most perfect and pre-existing Infinite, namely, in the power, intellect and eternity of God; for they exist unitedly in God, and are not as parts outside parts, as measured properly by time, but they are measured by the unique instant of motionless eternity.

Reply to second objection. “The infinite cannot be traversed by the infinite,” because transition imports a certain succession of parts (and is not the terminus of the infinite multitude of parts). But the infinite can be adequately comprehended by the Infinite, in the higher reason of the divine essence, whose power is infinite.

Reply to third objection. Thus God’s knowledge is not the quantitative measure of things, but is their measure inasmuch as things imitate God’s knowledge, as the things made by art agree with the art.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD’s KNOWLEDGE IS OF FUTURE THINGS

State of the question. The divine omniscience must indeed extend to all things, but it seems to eliminate contingency from things, because God’s knowledge, which is the cause of things, is not a

contingent cause but a necessary one, from which, therefore, a necessary effect proceeds. Moreover, everything known by God must necessarily be, whereas no contingent thing must necessarily be.

Hence, that the Stoics might defend God’s foreknowledge of future things, they denied free will; so also did the Hussites. On the contrary, since Cicero °: could not reconcile God's foreknowledge of future things with our freedom, in order to defend the latter he denied the former. The same also applies to Marcion, and in later times the Socinians maintained that God has only a conjectural knowledge of future free acts.

It is of faith, however, that God has infallible knowledge of all absolute futures, both contingent and free, without detriment to their freedom.??

This is evident from several texts in Holy Scripture, such as the following: “He who hath made the hearts of every one of them, who understandeth all their works”; °° “Thou hast understood my thoughts afar off . .. and Thou hast foreseen all my ways”; 1°

98 De divinatione, Bk. Il.

99 lt must be noted that the future is correctly defined as that which is determined in its causes to exist in course of time. Such is the common teaching of the Thomists.

It is not a question here of a cause having precisely the power to produce such effect, because this denotes merely what is possible; nor is it a question of a cause as actually producing such effect, because this denotes an existing thing. Therefore the definition concerns an absolute future.

Evidently the future must be constituted as such by that which eliminates it from the mass of possible things and distinguishes it from both possible and existing things. But there is only one way by which this is effected, and that is by the determination of that cause; and from all eternity the only cause was the First Cause.

Hence St. Thomas says: “That which now is, was future, before it was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing’s coming to be was not future. But the First Cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is, would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause” (la, q.16, a.7 ad gum).

The future is either necessary or contingent. The necessary is that which of its nature sceks to exist some time, nor can this be prevented by natural causes; such a future is the rising of the sun tomorrow. The contingent, properly so called, is that which of its nature is indifferent as to whether it exists or does not exist; such are those things that depend on free will. The contingent in the broad sense of the term, of its nature seeks to exist, but it can be prevented by natural causes; such a contingent is a long life because of robust health. The future contingent, properly so called, is either absolute or conditional. The absolute is independent of any condition: the conditional is dependent on a condition, and is called a futurable, because it mediates between the absolute future and the possible.

“For I know that transgressing thou wilt transgress, and I have called thee a transgressor from the womb.” 102 It is likewise said of Jesus: “For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that did not believe, and who he was that would betray Him.” 1° These texts refer to future and, in fact, free contingent acts. Nor is the reference here solely to conjectural knowledge, for such knowledge is not expressed by the words “understands,” “I know,” “knew from the beginning.” Moreover, a conjecture is fallible and is something repugnant to the most perfect Being, to the first Truth, and to supreme Intelligence. Finally, there is no reason why God should know one rather than another of many future things, as will be clearly seen from the proofs that follow.

Several councils have affirmed that the decrees of divine providence are infallible, and that they are accompanied by the most certain foreknowledge of future things. As the Council of Valencia says: “We unhesitatingly maintain that God absolutely foreknew that the good will be so by His grace, and that by this same grace they will receive the reward of eternal life; He foreknew that the wicked will be so through their own malice.” 1% The Vatican Council says: “All things are naked and open to His eyes, even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” 2°

Theological proof. This truth of the faith is proved from other truths which are likewise revealed, and which can be known by the natural powers of reason. Thus St. Thomas proves in the body of the article: (1) that God certainly knows future contingent things; and he declares (2) how God knows them, by assigning the proper reason for this knowledge both on the part of the thing known and on the part of the knower.

1. Arguing from common principles it is proved that God certainiy knows future contingent things; for God knows all things, not only those that actually are, but even those that are possible to Him or to creatures. But of these some are for us future contingent things. Therefore God knows them, which means that He certainly knows them. This is the reason that is deduced from common principles.

2. How does God know them? The proper reason is assigned for this both on the part of the thing known and on the part of the knower.

The contingent cannot be infallibly known unless it is known as actual and present. It is not enough for it to be known in its

proximate cause, for this is not determined to one thing. But God knows all contingents as they actually are and are present to Him. Therefore God knows them infallibly, and yet they do not cease to be contingent; just as when I most certainly see Socrates sitting, the contingency of this sitting is not thereby destroyed.

The minor is proved, and at the same time this knowledge is explained on the part of the knower.

Eternity, being simultaneously whole, comprises all time, so that futures are present in it; but the divine knowledge is measured by eternity; therefore the divine knowledge extends to future things, as actually present in this higher type of duration.

In other words, in the very now of eternity “God’s glance is carried over all things as they are in their presentiality.”’ 1% In the reply to the third objection it is said: “Things reduced to act in time, are known by us successively in time, but by God they are known in eternity, which is above time . . . ; just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all traveling by the way.”

Thus the unique and permanent instant of eternity corresponds to all the passing instants of time, just as the peak of a pyramid corresponds to all the points of its base. This was explained in a previous question,’®? in which it was declared that eternity is “simultaneously whole,” but that time is not. In this same question it was said: “The flow of the now as alternating in aspect, is time. But eternity remains the same to both subject and aspect.” 1°8 Eternity is the proper measure of the permanent Being, of His intellection and of His love, just as time is the proper measure of movement, suggesting succession and alteration, which cannot apply to God.

There are four points to be considered concerning this article of St. Thomas: (1) the interpretation proposed by the Molinists; (2) how future things are present in eternity, according to the teaching of the Thomists; (3) the objections proposed against the Thomist solution; (4) what is to be thought of the theory devised by Molina and known as the scientia media.

1. MOLINIST INTERPRETATION

It is generally admitted among the Molinists that St. Thomas, in those passages where he speaks professedly of the divine knowledge,*** does not mention the divine decree spoken of subsequently

by the Thomists, but he has recourse to the presence of future things in eternity, which comprises all time. Hence, according to St. Thomas, the medium of the divine knowledge of future things is not, as the Thomists would have it, the divine decree predetermining these future things. They say that the holy Doctor’s opinion is, that the foreknowledge of future free acts does not presuppose an absolute decree of the divine will concerning this future determination of our free will. Therefore his teaching can be reconciled with the theory of the scientia media, by which God, before His decree, certainly knows from all eternity conditionally free actions of the future (for instance, what Peter’s choice would be if he were situated in certain circumstances), and then God decreed to place this man in these circumstances, in which He foresaw what his choice would be.

Examination of this interpretation. The Thomists generally reply that this interpretation lacks foundation and contradicts many texts of St. Thomas; in fact, it is contrary to the very principles laid down in the preceding articles of this question.

For in the fifth article St. Thomas said: “Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, God must necessarily (by the perfect knowledge He has of His power) know things other than Himself. . . . He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself,” as in their cause.

Moreover, in the eighth article he wrote: “The knowledge of God is the cause of things . . . in so far as His will is joined to it.” This is the decree of the divine will concerning which is the following clearer statement. “Determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.” =° In fact, the determination of the will is mentioned in this text before that of the intellect, for, as stated in the eighth article of this question: “Since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things, inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites, it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the philosopher says (Metaph., Bk. IX, chap. 5).” St. Thomas says similarly in another passage: “God’s idea as regards the things that are, or will be, or were to be produced, is determined by the purpose of the divine will.” +23

There is no retractation, however, of the universal principles laid down by St. Thomas in this question; but he is giving the particular application of this doctrine to future things that are contingent, by showing how these, although they are contingent, can certainly be known as present. It is not here a question of reconciling the determination of God’s most efficacious will with the contingency of the thing willed by Him. This will be discussed in its proper place when St. Thomas inquires whether God’s will imposes necessity on the things willed, in which we shall see that he says: “Since, then, the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills,” 123 namely, either contingently or necessarily,

This point belongs properly to God’s will, and there was no need of discussing it here along with God’s knowledge. It is precisely this alone that St. Thomas proves in the present question, namely, that the knowledge of the future contingent thing, inasmuch as it is certain knowledge, does not take away contingency from the thing, if the contingent thing is known as present, just as when I certainly see Socrates who happens to be sitting.

There remains, however, this question: how is it that this future contingent thing, such as the creation of the world in the passive sense, or the conversion of St. Paul, is present in eternity rather than its Opposite, namely, that the world was not created, or that St. Paul was not converted? Most certainly, if this future contingent thing were eternally present to God independently of the determination of the divine will, it would be something necessary and not contingent. Therefore from the principles already mentioned in this question (concerning God's knowledge, which is the cause of things, inasmuch as the will is joined to it), it is evident that the presence in eternity of this contingent future rather than its opposite presupposes the determination of the divine will, which wil be more clearly explained in a subsequent question.228

Therefore in the second argument of this article, St. Thomas does not speak so explicitly of the medium of this foreknowledge as of the condition required for it to be intuitive. This condition is that the divine knowledge refers to the future thing, not as it is future, but as it is already present to this knowledge. Abstracted knowledge can refer to those things that are not present, but intuitive knowledge, and this alone is most perfect knowledge, refers to things that are present. +4

114 St. Thomas already spoke of the medium of God’s knowledge of creatures in the fifth article, in which he said: “God knows things other than Himself in Himself,” as in their cause. In the eighth article he said: “The knowledge of God is the cause of things, in so far as the will is joined to it,” which means in so

Hence in this article St. Thomas most certainly presupposes that there is and will be nothing outside God, no matter what its grade of being may be, that is not related by way of causality to God, or is not dependent on Him. In fact, in the beginning of the argumentative part of this article he says: “Since God knows all things, not only things actual but also things possible to Him and the creature, and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.” This is the proof that is derived from common principles."*

There are many other passages from St. Thomas’ works that confirm this interpretation, such as the following: “God knows our mind’s thoughts and our secret wills in their virtual causes, since He is the universal principle of being. . . . God so knows other things in knowing His essence, as effects are known through their cause being known. Therefore by knowing His essence God knows all things to which His causality extends. Now this extends to the works of the intellect and of the will. . . . So by knowing His act of intelligence and will, He knows every thought and will.” 118

He also says: “But since the act of free will is traced to God as a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence.” 117 “Just as the will can decide otherwise, far more so can God do this.” 118

But if St. Thomas says in this article, “a contingent thing as it is in its cause ... is not subject to any certain knowledge,” he is speaking of the created cause considered as such, which as regards its effect is contingent and future. He has not in mind the divine cause, for which nothing is future, all things being present to it.

far as the determination of the divine will is joined to it. On this point see q-19, 4.4, 8.

115 In fact, in this article St. Thomas alludes to the divine decree when toward the end of the argumentative part he says: “Hence, all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say”; but the practical types of things are ideas determined by the decree of the will.

He said the same in J Sent., d.38, q.1, a.5: “God, from all eternity, saw not only His relation to that thing which by His power was to come into existence, but He also directly saw the very existence of this thing.” This means that He not only sees future things in the decree of His will, but as they are present to Him. Nor would these things be present to Him rather than their opposites, except by a decree of His will.

117 Summa theol., la, q.22, a.2 ad 4um; see also Ia, q.103, a.8; q-105, a.4; Ta Iae, q.10, a.4 ad gum.

Il. HOW FUTURE THINGS ARE PRESENT IN ETERNITY THE THOMIST VIEW

According to the Thomists and many other theologians, including Fonseca, Tiphanius, and others, future things are eternally present in God not only objectively and intentionally, but physically and really. They give two proofs for this, one indirect and the other direct.

Indirect proof. If futures were not so present, then they would be for God absolute futures, for simple representation does not exclude the notion of futurity. Thus what is foretold in prophecy precedes its realization. If God had only objective knowledge of future things, He would thus begin again to see things as actually existing. Thus God would be perfected in His knowledge, and only then would it become intuitive.

Direct proof. Eternity is duration which, as such, is infinite, indivisible and simultaneously whole. But this duration contains eminently, in the same permanent now, all successive durations, past, present, and future, and it so contains them as not to cause a variation In it when something new occurs in the inferior kinds of duration. Thus St. Thomas says: “Newness of effect does not demonstrate newness of action in God, since His action is His essence,” 119

Objection. Some say that this merely proves that eternity is without intrinsic but not extrinsic succession, just as the tree on the bank of a river undergoes no change, though the constant flow of the stream results in only a part of this water being present to the tree, and not all the water is simultaneoutly present to the tree. Therefore future things are not physically and really present in eternity.

Reply. I deny the antecedent. A better illustration of eternity would be to compare it with a tree planted equidistant from the source and mouth of the river, and of such vast size as to extend to all parts of the river. Similarly, it might be more fittingly compared with the apex of a pyramid, which at one and the same time without succession is coexistent with all points of its base. Hence there is no increase in God's knowledge when things appear in course of time. .

But they again object that it is unintelligible for something to exist in eternity which does not have individual existence. But futures do not now have individual existence. Therefore they do not exist in eternity.

Reply. I distinguish the major: it is unintelligible for something to exist in eternity which does not have individual existence according to its proper duration, this I deny; that it does not have individual existence in duration of a higher order, this I concede. I explain with John of St. Thomas +% as follows: Eternity does not measure created things immediately in themselves and by supposing them already in themselves passively produced; but it measures them properly, as they are contained in the divine action, by which created things are attained and viewed as the terminus of this action. For not only God’s intellection and volition are eternal, but also His creative and motive action is eternal, although it has its effect in time. This action is formally immanent and virtually transitive. Thus the creative action in the creation of this particular soul, from eternity regards this individual soul, and yet it is produced only in time.

Futures indeed do not actually have individual existence, either in time or from eternity as passively produced effects, but they exist from eternity as terms implying actual eternal action. And under this aspect, the created thing, although it is not as yet passively produced, is however not only possible, or not only future, but it is really present in eternity, for the divine essence contains it not only as having the power or will to produce it but as actually producing it. Thus the created thing is the object of direct knowledge, although it does not yet exist in its own duration.

Doubt. Is this presentiality the medium of the divine knowledge of future contingent things?

Reply. Presentiality is not the medium of this knowledge, but a mode affecting the object known and a condition for this knowledge to be intuitive. The medium of this divine knowledge, however, is the determination of the divine will as actually causing from eternity. For St. Thomas, to see future things as present in eternity is to see them in the divine will as actually causing them. This is most evident from what St. Thomas has already said in this question, namely, that God does not see created things immediately in themselves, but in Himself as their cause.!#1 Farther on he declares that God is the cause of things by His will.1#

Ili. THOMIST SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CONCLUSION OF THIS ARTICLE

First objection. It is at the beginning of this article, and is as follows: From a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect; but the

knowledge of God is the necessary cause of things known by Him; therefore things known by Him are necessary.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that a necessary effect proceeds from a proximate necessary cause, this I concede; that from the supreme cause such an effect proceeds, this I subdistinguish: with a proximate necessary cause, this I concede; with a proximate contingent cause, this I deny. Thus, owing to the necessary influence of the sun’s rays, the germination of the plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause.

It must be noted that God’s knowledge cannot be called a necessary cause, except in an improper sense: (1) in that it is a necessary prerequisite; (2) in that it is infallibly efficacious; but as such it is a free cause, and as St. Thomas says, “God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently.” 123 Hence, as will be explained farther on,1?4 the divine causality transcends the necessity and contingency that proceed from it.

Second objection. Every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is necessary, must have a necessary consequent; but in this conditional proposition, “If God knew that this thing will be, it will be,” the antecedent is necessary, in that it is eternal and immutable; therefore the consequent is also necessary.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if the antecedent is absolutely necessary in fact, then I concede it; if it is necessary as something contingently seen, which cannot at the same time not be seen, then I deny it. Thus, if I see Socrates sitting, he must be sitting, but it is contingent, nevertheless, that he sits.

Third objection. Everything known by God must necessarily be; but no future contingent thing must necessarily be; therefore no future contingent thing is known by God.

Reply. That everything kuown by God must necessarily be, by reason of a conditional necessity or one of consequence, this I concede; by reason of an absolute necessity or one of consequent in itself, this I deny. Thus, if I see Socrates sitting, he must of necessity be sitting; but it is contingent, as stated above, that he is sitting.

In other words, this proposition, “Everything known by God must necessarily be,” if it concerns the thing is divided, and is false; for the meaning is: Everything which God knows is necessary. But the same proposition is true, if understood of the saying and in the composite sense, for then the meaning is: That which is known by God is necessary.'?5

Similarly, we say that what is foreseen by God must of necessity happen; but it happens contingently. For the mode of the necessity affects not the thing and the mode of the thing in itself, but the statement declaring that some foreseen contingent event will infallibly come to pass, such as the conversion of St. Paul.

Expressed more briefly, as stated in the body of the article and in the replies to the second and third objections, the necessity does not affect the thing as it is in itself, but as it is subject to the divine knowledge, as in the case of Socrates who is seen to be sitting.

By this reply contradiction is avoided, but we have still to give the reason why the infallible efficacy of the determination on the part of the divine will does not destroy the freedom of the human will. The divine will does not destroy this freedom, because it actualizes the same aiid extends even to the free mode of our choice. For God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently; and this infallibly happens as God wills.1#¢

Another objection. Effects cannot be known with certainty in their universal and remote cause, because the power of the universal cause can be modified and even prevented by a particular cause, just as the sun’s rays can be because of a defective disposition in the plant, which prevents the ripening of the fruit. But the divine cause is the universal and remote cause. Therefore effects cannot be known with certainty in it.

Reply. I distinguish the major; in the universal cause, which is not the supreme cause, this I concede; in the supreme universal cause, on which every other cause depends, this I deny. For nothing prevents the First Cause from producing its effect, unless this is permitted by it. But God does not permit such deficiency in those things which He efficaciously wills, namely, in future contingent things efficaciously willed by Him; and it is of these that we are speaking.'*7

Final objection. If the decree of the divine will is of itself infallibly efficacious, then our acts are necessary, and therefore not free.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: if the decree extends only to the substance of the act, this I concede; if it extends also to the free mode of this act, this I deny. For God moves creatures in the way that is befitting to their natures. What is more absurd than to say that God wills efficaciously that this particular sinner be converted freely, as Bossuet says,}?8 and then to conclude that he cannot be converted freely? 1”

IV. THE “‘SCIENTIA MEDIA”

What must be said of the theory proposed by Molina, and known as the scientia media?

Molina says: “We must distinguish between three kinds of knowledge in God, unless we want to expose ourselves to the danger of laboring under a hallucination in reconciling the freedom of our will and the contingency of things with the divine knowledge. One kind is merely natural, and hence it could on no account be other than it is in God, (for it is concerned with necessary and possible things). . . . The second kind is merely free, by which God, after a free act of His will, regardless of any hypothetical condition, knew absolutely . . . what things would come into existence. The third kind, finally, is the scientia media, by which God, from a most profound and inscrutable comprehension of every free will in His essence, has intuited what each, according to its innate liberty, would do if placed in this or that condition, or even in infinite conditions of things, although it could, if it wisled, do exactly the opposite.” 18°

Hence Molina maintains that God’s merely natural knowledge is concerned with necessary and possible things; His free knowledge with absolute contingent futures; and the scientia media with conditional futures, which are called futurables, inasmuch as they mediate between the merely possible and the absolute future.

Immediately after the preceding extract, Molina adds: “Perhaps someone will ask whether this kind of scientia media is to be called free or natural. In reply to this it must first of all be said that on no account must this knowledge be called free, both because it precedes every free act of the divine will, and because it was not in God’s power to know by this knowledge anything else than He actually knew. . . . (But) if the created free will were to do the opposite of what it did, as it truly can do, God would have known this very act by the same knowledge, but not that He actually knows it.” 1% Here we have a point of greatest difficulty.

The text of Molina is of great importance. Therefrom it seems to follow that there is a dependence or passivity in God as regards futurables, for instance, this one: If Peter the apostle were placed in the circumstances of the Passion, he would deny the Lord, so that in this order of things God could not have preserved Him from sin. For Molina says: “It was not in God’s power to know by this knowledge anything else than He actually knew... . (But) if the created free will were to do the opposite of what it did, as it

130 Concordia, q.14, a.13, disp. 52, pp. 317 f. 131 [bid, truly can do, God would have known this very act by the same knowledge, but not that He actually knows it.” +82

This consequence appears to be absolutely necessary: for if God is not the first determining Cause as regards free conditionate futures, He is determined by them, and there is no other ‘alternative. If all things are not dependent on God, then God Himself is dependent on another. Here is the main difficulty of the question.

The Thomists maintain, indeed, that God infallibly knows free conditionate futures, referred to in prophecies of commination, such as the destruction of Ninive, if the Ninivites are not converted." But they add: God infallibly knows these contingent futurables in a decree that is objectively conditional and subjectively absolute. Such are, for instance, the destruction of Ninive or the conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had preached to them.

This decree is required, so the Thomists say against the Molinists, because, even posited the condition, these conditionally free acts of the future (futuribilia), as being contingent and free acts, are undetermined. To make the gratuitous assertion that they are determined in themselves, is to end in determinism of circumstances and to posit passivity and dependence in God as regards these acts. For God either is the first determining Cause or is determined by another, or dependent on another at least in the foreknowledge of conditionally free acts of the future.

Therefore the theory of the scientia media essentially consists in this, namely, that God, before the actual decree that is objectively conditional, infallibly knows free conditioned futures, namely, what the created free will would do if placed in certain circumstances. Afterward God decreed to put the will de facto in these or other particular circumstances; and thus dependent on the scientia media He knows absolute contingent futures. Thus God foresees before any decree of His that Peter, if placed in certain circumstances, would make good use of the sufficient grace to be offered him, and then God wills to place Peter in such circumstances.'**

183 Summa theol., IIa IJae, q.171, a.6 ad 2um; q.174, a.1; Ia, q.19, a.7 ad 2um.

184 Some want to prove the existence of the scientia media by the’ following argument: The divine knowledge gets its name, too, from the object. But between the merely possible and the absolute future there is an object of intermediate knowledge, namely, the conditionally free act of the future (futuribile). Therefore, in like manner, between the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is concerned with possible things, and the knowledge of vision, which is concerned with future things, there is the scientia media, which is concerned with conditionally free acts of the future. In reply to this we say that this is conceded also by the Thomists, provided the scientia “media” presupposes some objectively conditional

Molina wants to explain the scientia media by the divine supercomprehension of the created free will. Suarez preserves intact the scientia media in his congruism, but he explains it by the divine knowledge of the formal or objective truth of futurables, as if contingent futurables were in themselves determined before whatsoever divine decree; as if, before any decree, of two contradictory propositions in a contingent matter of the future, such as, Peter placed in these particular circumstances would or would not deny the Lord, one were determinately true and the other false.!35

CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF THE SCIENTIA MEDIA

This theory is not in agreement with the doctrinal principles of St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. ‘Thomas.

1. St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?” t* Christ, too, had said: “Without Me you can do nothing.” +87 According to St. Paul’s words just quoted, the singling out of one from another must finally be sought not in the human will, but in God who singles out one from another by His grace. But the scientia media supposes that one by his own will singles himself out from another, divine decree, and then it differs from the scientia media admitted by Molina.

It must be noted with Father Diekamp (Theologiae dogmaticae manuale (1933), I, 204): “This doctrine is very often proposed in such a manner as if Molina had set forth this knowledge as occupying a middle ground between the knowledge of vision and that of simple intelligence, and in this sense it is attacked by the Thomists. But the case is not exactly so. Conditioned futures can indeed in some way be conceived as occupying a middle ground between merely possible and really existing things. For this reason we may divide the divine knowledge into three parts, inasmuch as it is knowledge of existing things, of conditioned futures and of merely possible things. But this knowledge of conditioned futures cannot be identified with the Molinist scientia media. For it is precisely this that Molina asks, namely, whether God, before any free decree of His will, knows conditioned futures, and whether this knowledge necessitates a special mode of cognition in God, namely, a knowledge that mediates between His necessary knowledge and His free knowledge. This the Molinists affirm, though the Thomists deny it.

Consult Father N. del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, TII, 117 £. Consult also among Jesuit authors, Father M. de la Taille’s article entitled, “Sur les diverses classifications de la science divine” (Recherches de la science religieuse, 1923, pp. 7 £, 528 f.). But Father de la Taille separates from the Thomists inasmuch as, instead of a predetermining decree, he admits one that is concomitant, which the Thomists say is not sufficient for the foundation of infallible certainty required for the divine knowledge of futurables, as will be stated farther on.

185 Cf. Suarez, De scientia futurorum contingentium, chap. 7.

for instance, Peter from Judas. Therefore the scientia media does not seek for this singling out in God.

Proof of the minor. Let us suppose that Peter and Judas situated in equal circumstances receive equal prevenient grace; then God sees Peter consenting to accept that grace, and hence singling himself out from Judas who does not consent, not on account of the grace, for an equal grace is indifferently offered to each. Therefore it is because the will decides to accept the grace. Thus do all Thomists argue against Molina, and they thus affirm as revealed the principle that can be called “the principle of predilection,” namely, that no one would be better than another unless he were loved more and helped more by God. This principle is frequently enunciated by St. Paul, as in the following text: “For the Lord saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, 138

But this principle cannot be reconciled with the scientia media. For what two persons equally have is not a reason for singling out one from another. But in the same circumstance the grace is supposed equal in Peter consenting and in Judas not consenting. Therefore this grace does not single out one from another, but in the final analysis Peter singles himself out by that which of himself he adds to it, namely, by his consent to and use of the grace. Moreover, St. Paul says: “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 189

2. St. Augustine often quotes the aforesaid text of St. Paul against the Semipelagians: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 1° He says: “It is grace that singles out the good from the bad, not a grace that is common to both good and bad.” 1 “And so this grace that is secretly given by the divine liberality to human hearts, is spurned by no one hard of heart, because it is primarily given to overcome this hardness of heart.” 12 “Of two infants equally bound by original sin, why the one is taken and the other left; and of two wicked men already mature in years, why one should be so called that he follows Him that calleth, while the other is not called at all, or is not called in such a manner; these are unsearchable judgments of God.” 143

141 De praedest. sanctorum, chap. 5.

Contrary to this, according to the theory of the scientia media, it would have to be said that of two wicked men situated in equal circumstances, and receiving an equal prevenient grace, God sees one consenting to that grace and then singling himself out from the other.

The considerable opposition between the doctrine of St. Augustine and that of Molina is therefore evident in their definition of predestination. St. Augustine thus defines it: “The predestination of the saints is nothing else than the foreknowledge and preparation of the gifts whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered.” 144 “By predestination God foreknew those things which He was going to do.” 145

On the contrary, Molina says: “To the foreknowledge which includes predestination on the part of the intellect, there is the condition attached of the use of free will without which there would have been no foreknowledge in God.” 18€ He also says: “Of two called and helped by an equal grace, one is converted and the other not.” 147 Hence no wonder that Molina acknowledges his departure from the teaching of St. Augustine, as is evident from many passages in the work just quoted.1*8

3. The principles of St. Thomas equally exclude the scientia media, a) St. Thomas admits only the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is concerned with possible things, and the knowledge of vision which, granted a decree, intuits future things. The knowledge of conditioned futures belongs by a reductive process to this latter.

b) In reconciling the freedom of the will with the divine decrees, St. Thomas never has recourse to the scientia media, which explores the field of human liberty concerning the consent or dissent of the will before there is a divine decree, but with St. Augustine he asserts: “Since the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently (and freely).” 149 c) For St. Thomas, before there is an actual decree on God’s part, there is nothing that will be, as is evident from the following pas-

145 De praedest. sanctorum, chap. 10.

148 Ibid., 4.23, a.4, 5, disp. 1, membr. ult., pp. 546-48. 149 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.

sage: “That which now is was about to be before it actually was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing’s coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.” 150 Also this text: “Contingent futures are not knowable in themselves, because their truth is not determined.” 151 It is not determined before God’s decree, and if it were determined before, God would be determined by these contingent futures in His foreknowledge.

d) According to the teaching of St. Thomas, “God sees things other than Himself, not in themselves but in Himself” 152 as in their cause. But in the theory of the scientia media God is not the cause of the determination of conditionally free acts of the future. Therefore, according to the principles of St. Thomas, God cannot know this determination. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor admits the principles which we now give.

4. Finally, the sctentia media conflicts with many principles commonly accepted by the theologians.

a) Before the divine decree, there is no object for the scientia media, because the conditionally free act of the future is not determined either in itself or in another, as was stated.

b) The medium of the scientia media does not precede the divine decree, because there is no cause in which this conditioned future is determined; for it is not determined in the divine cause or in human liberty or in the circumstances; and if it is said that God knows infallibly this conditioned future by exploring the circumstances, then this theory would end in determinism of circumstances. Thus the scientia media, which is devised to save created liberty, would destroy it.

c) God’s knowledge cannot be determined by anything which is extrinsic to Him, and which would not be caused by Him. But such is the scientia media, which depends on the determination of the free conditioned future; for this determination does not come from God but from the human liberty, granted that it is placed in such particular circumstances; so that “it was not in God’s power to know any other thing ..., but if the created free will were to do the opposite, He would have known this other thing,” as Molina says in the passage just quoted.: Thus God

150 Jbid., Ia, q.16, a.7 ad gum. 151 /bid., Ila Ilae, q.171, a.3.- 152 Ibid., la, q.14, a.5.

would be dependent on another, would be passive in His knowledge, and would be no longer pure Act. The dilemma is unsolvable: Either God is the first determining Being, or else He is determined by another; there is no other alternative. In other words, the scientia media involves an imperfection, which cannot exist in God. Hence there is a certain tinge of anthropomorphism in this theory.

All the aforesaid arguments bring us to this conclusion: there is no determination without a determining cause, and the supreme determining cause is God, otherwise He would be determined by another. But this is nothing else than the principle of causality.

d) With the positing of the scientia media, God is no longer the first and universal Mover, the First Cause, for any movement of the created free will to determine itself is not from God. Thus the demonstration of God’s existence by the first way (from motion) loses very much in forcefulness.

e) Thus this theory takes away from God His supreme dominion over created free wills. In such circumstances, God could not convert the will, if it wills the opposite. For Molina says: “It was not in God’s power to know any other thing, but He would have known this other thing if the created will were to do the opposite of what it did.” 154 But this is contrary to what Holy Scripture says, as in the following texts. “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” 1% “As the potter’s clay is in his hand, to fashion and order it..., so man is in the hand of Him that made Him.” 156 “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 137 The theory of the scientia media limits the divine omnipotence. For if God, by means of the scientia media, foresees that our will under certain conditions will refuse to be moved to perform some good act, then He is already incapable of moving our will so that in these conditions it freely consent to be moved to perform this good act.158 f) God would no more be the author of good than of bad acts, at least as regards their intrinsic and free determination, because neither good nor bad acts would come from Him, at least as regards the performance of these acts. He would be the cause of the good determination only by proposing the desirable object. And this even men can do.

158 So does Father Diekamp very wisely remark in his Theol. dogm., I, 224.

8. The scientia media puts less emphasis on the need for prayer. For the Molinist, who would wish to have his theory remain unimpaired in prayer, could not ask God for the efficacious grace that makes him will, that takes away from him the stony heart, that compels the rebellious will to turn to God, as the Church prays. He cannot pray with the profundity of meaning as in the prayer of the Mass: “Make me adhere to Thy commandments and never permit me to be separated from Thee.” 18 But according to the Molinist’s theory, he asks God merely to place him in those circumstances in which He foresaw that he would consent to the grace offered.

h) This theory seems to savor somewhat of Semipelagianism, which holds that the beginning of salvation is from ourselves, and not from God’s grace.'*° Molinism admits a prevenient interior grace, indeed, but maintains that it moves the will only objectively and not infallibly; in fact, according to Molina, “of two that are called and equally aided by grace, it can happen that one of them is converted, and the other not.” 161 Thus the true beginning of salvation appears to be only in the one who is converted, which ap- ‘pears to be a free determination that is from God only in so far as He objectively urges this one to the free determination, just as He urges the other who is not converted.

Finally, the scientia media has been frequently condemned because of the novelty of this theory. In fact, Molina acknowledges that he is the discoverer of this theory.1®? Nevertheless the Semipelagians made use of this knowledge according as it served their purpose, saying that God foresees the good use of free will and for this reason gives the grace. He also foresees the good works that would have been performed by the baptized infants it they had not died.

The Molinists object, indeed, that Christ said: “Woe to thee, Corozain! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! For if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 1% But, as they say, this reproof would have been unjust if understood in the Thomist sense; for, according to the opinion of the Thomists, the Jews could have justly replied to this by saying: Lord, if Thou hadst efficaciously decreed our penance on the supposition of Christ’s preaching, just as Thou didst decree the penance of the

159 Prayer before priest’s communion.

161 Cf. Concordia, pp. 51, 565, and the index under the word “Auxilium.” 162 Jbid., pp. 546-48.

Tyrians on the same condition of Christ’s preaching and miracles, we would have repented, just as they did.

To this the Thomists reply: (1) This was the very way St. Paul argued in the objection which he put to himself; for, after having said: “So, then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, (who) hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will, He hardeneth,” 164 he at once follows this up with the counterobjection: “Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why does He then find fault? For who resisteth His will?” 1*° The apostle does not solve the objection, however, by having recourse to God’s foreseeing our consent, whether this is for what is good or for what is bad; but he says: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?” 188 The apostle does not settle the dispute by saying that all have sufficient grace, the efficacy of which depends on their consent foreseen by God. He replies that God is not bound to give the efficacious grace, for it is something freely given, as the name grace indicates.

A direct answer is given to this objection by saying that it was the Jews’ fault that they were hardened, whereas the Tyrians were not; because they made it more difficult for themselves to receive the efficacious grace, which was offered in the sufficient grace. The Tyrians would not have resisted Christ’s preaching and miracles, and thus they would not have been deprived of the efficacious grace. The Jews showed themselves more unworthy than the Tyrians, because of their greater blindness of intellect and ingratitude.

Instance. Man of his own free will can at least not resist sufficient grace, just as he can resist it. Therefore the difficulty remains.

Reply. I deny the antecedent, for there is a great difference between resisting and not resisting. To resist sufficient grace is an evil, and is solely of our own doing; not to resist it is a good which is not solely of our own doing, but which comes also from the source of all good, God’s efficacious will, who eternally willed this act of non-resistance to be performed right at this moment in time. As St. Thomas says: “Whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently, may not take place.” 187

167 Summa theol, la, q.19, a.6 ad ium. See also our commentary on this article.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE 46g

Final objection. God infallibly knows future sins, and yet He is not the cause of them. Therefore it is false to say that God’s infallible knowledge has its foundation in the divine causality or in the decrees of the divine will.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. God infallibly knows future sins in His permissive decree as to what there is of deordination or privation in sin; and He knows them in His positive decree, as to the physical entity of sin, with which He concurs. And I deny the consequent. Without a permissive decree, God would know these sins as possible, but not as future.

This reply has its foundation in this most certain principle, namely, that just as no good, however insignificant it may be, happens to belong de facto to this man rather than to a certain other, unless God eternally and efficaciously willed that it should thus happen, so no sin happens to be in this man rather than in a certain other, unless God permitted it. The sinner, to be sure, in the very moment of sinning, can avoid committing the sin, and God eternally willed that it be really possible for the sinner to avoid committing the sin, and this is known as God’s antecedent will. But God did not efficaciously will that this sinner right at this moment should de facto avoid committing sin; and if God had efficaciously willed it, this sinner de facto not only really could avoid sin, but would avoid it. As St. Thomas says: “Whatever God simply wills, takes place; although what He wills antecedently, may not take place.” 188 This is the ultimate reason for the distinction between sufficient grace and grace that is of itself efficacious. There is, indeed, a mystery in this, but we now disclose the element of clarity in this light-transcending obscurity. It cannot strictly be said, however, that Molina directly denies these commonly admitted principles just given; but by introducing the scientia media, which posits a passivity in God, he impairs their validity.

ON THE VARIOUS WAYS OF EXPLAINING THE SCIENTIA MEDIA

The Molinists say that the divine decree is not necessary for God’s infallible knowledge of conditioned futures, for He certainly knows them (1) either in His ideas before the decree, or (2) by His supercomprehensive knowledge of the causes, or (3) in the formal or objective truth of contingent conditioned futures.

In reply to this we say: (1) God cannot, before a divine decree, infallibly know conditioned futures in His ideas, because, according to the divine ideas, the thing may either exist or not exist;

there may be either consent or no consent, and they do not include the determination of our free will.*%

2. Nor is the supercomprehensive knowledge of causes a sufficient explanation of God's infallible knowledge of conditioned futures, because free causes are indifferent, and the examination of the circumstances does not suffice, unless we admit determinism of circumstances.

3. Nor does it suffice with Suarez to have recourse to the formal or objective truth of contingent conditioned futures, saying that before the divine decree, of two contradictory propositions concerning the future, one will be true and the other false, and that this is known by God from all eternity.

In reply to this we say with Aristotle,’ that of two contradictory propositions concerning the future in contingent matter, one will be true and the other false, but that neither is determinately true (before the divine decree); 1 otherwise the result of this would be the logical fatalism of the Stoics.

RECAPITULATION

From the foregoing it is clearly enough established that Molinism is not a scientifically elaborated system, one that proceeds from certain and universal principles. But it starts out by presenting some particular objection for solution. Then it proposes the solution of the same, and ends willingly or unwillingly in the denial of the principle of causality (the transition of the created free will from potentiality to actuality would in this case be without cause) and of higher principles which concern God. Such principles are the following: God is pure Act without any potentiality, passivity, or even dependence in His knowledge; God is the first Cause and most universal Mover of both corporeal and spiritual beings to their acts of understanding and their voluntary choices.

Therefore the theory of the scientia media seems to imply not only a mystery, but a contradiction, Although it is devised for the preservation of free will, it seems to end in the destruction of the same through determinism of circumstances.

On the contrary, Thomism is a scientifically elaborated doctrine, which starts from certain and universal principles, and reaches its conclusions by a legitimate process. Therefore, if in these conclusions there is obscurity, this is owing to God’s incomprehensibility

169 De veritate, q.3, a.6; also la, q.14, a.8. 170 Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. g, lect. 14 of St. Thomas’ commentary.

ate Truth follows being, and the being of the free future, or even of the free conditioned future, is undetermined.

and His intimate action on our free will, but it is not owing to contradiction.

Molinism says that it places the mystery in God's knowledge, namely, in the scientia media. Thomism finds that it consists in the efficacy of the divine will, which is able infallibly to move our will to choose freely, inasmuch as the divine will extends even to the free mode of our choice, actualizing but not destroying our free will.17?

HOW CONDITIONALLY FREE ACTS OF THE FUTURE ARE KNOWN BY GOD, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE . THOMIST DOCTRINE

The prophecies of commination are concerned with free conditioned futures which, as stated, occupy a middle ground between the purely possible and the absolute future. Such are, when the destruction of Ninive is announced, if the Ninivites are not converted, and when Christ our Lord said that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted, if the Gospel had been preached to them, and they had seen the miracles performed.

According to the principles of Thomism, how does God know infallibly from all eternity these free conditioned futures? The Thomists commonly reply that these are known in God's decree, which is objectively conditional and subjectively absolute; and without this decree, the aforesaid conditionally free acts of the future would remain, as stated, undetermined and therefore unknowable even to God Himself.

1. St. Thomas proves this inasmuch as he acknowledges in God an antecedent will to save all mankind,?§ and he says that this wil] is sincere and is one of good pleasure.!* But, according to St. Thomas, this antecedent will is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional. For the holy Doctor says: “The antecedent will can be called a conditioned will, and yet the imperfection is not on the part of the divine will, but of the thing willed, which is not accepted with all the required circumstances for its right ordering to salvation.” 175 This means that God would save all mankind, if this did not conflict with the manifestation of His attributes, one of these being His justice.17¢

2. Proof from reason. Without this divine decree contingent and secondary causes are undetermined as to whether or not they pro-

duce the effect. Hence without this decree conditioned futures would still belong to the order of possible things. But there is clearly a difference between the conditionally free act of the future and the purely possible. Thus it is evident that there are two possibilities for Peter as regards the situation in which he finds himself during our Lord’s Passion: he can either deny our Lord or not deny Him. But the conditioned future has this determination attached to it, namely, which of these two possible things Peter would choose if he were placed in these circumstances. Therefore without the aforesaid conditioned decree the free conditioned future would not be knowable, even to God Himself. “Contingent futures are not knowable in themselves, because their truth is not determined.” 177

WHAT MUST BE SAID OF THE OTHER OPINIONS CONCERNING THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONED FUTURES

1. Certain Scotists, as also some later theologians, said that God knows free futures in a concomitant and non-determining decree. But if this decree is only concomitant, then it will not be the cause of future things, for the cause, at least in the order of nature, precedes its effect. Hence this concomitant decree cannot be the medium for knowing the future. Thus all the disadvantages of the scientia media reappear.

2. Others teach that God knows future things in a decree, either absolute or conditional, multiplying the number of graces until the creature consents. This opinion resembles the congruism of Suarez, inasmuch as the multiplication of graces is equivalent to a congruent grace, but not to one that is of itself efficacious.

Nor can such a decree be the foundation for certainty of foreknowledge. There is no certainty in this multiplication of graces as to which of them will conquer the will, and when it will do so. God's foreknowledge is insufficiently explained by saying that He makes a shrewd guess; absolute certainty is required. Therefore these opinions, whether those defending them wish it or not, end finally in the theory of the scientia media. There is no other alternative between the scientia media and the doctrine of the divine predetermining decree. Either God infallibly knows contingent futures, even conditioned futures, in His determining decree, which extends even to the free mode of our choices, or else He does not know them in this decree, that is, before this decree, which is precisely the theory of the scientia media.

It must be noted finally that what has been said against the Molinists applies also to the Jansenists as regards the state of innocence; for these admit the scientia media and extrinsically efficacious grace in this state. If, after original sin, they admit the presence of intrinsically efficacious grace, they do so not because of the dependence of the created will on God, but because of its weakness, by reason of the consequences of original sin.178

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD KNOWS ENUNCIABLE THINGS

The answer is in the affirmative, because God knows whatever is in our power to perform. Yet He knows these enunciable things, not after the manner of enunciable things, by way of composition and division, but by simple intelligence. For all things are represented in the divine essence unitedly and undividedly, not like our intelligible species which represent one thing in such a way as not to represent another. So, in like manner, God knows material things immaterially.

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD’s KNOWLEDGE IS INVARIABLE

The answer is in the affirmative, because God’s knowledge is self-subsistent intelligence, which is altogether invariable, just as the self-subsistent Being is.

Therefore God’s knowledge is measured by eternity, and it absolutely transcends time, embracing all time. It is in this sense that we must understand the following text: With God “there is no change nor shadow of alteration.” 179

Reply to first objection. “Created things are in God in an invariable manner, while they exist variably in themselves.”

Reply to third objection. There is, indeed, variation in enunciable things known by God (e.g., Christ will be born, Christ was born). But God does not know enunciable things as we do, after the manner of enunciable things, by way of composition and division, but by simple intelligence, as was stated.

178 For the solution of the objections raised against Thomism by those who say that it does not preserve intact human liberty and the divine sanctity, and also that the helps are insufficient, consult q.19, a.8, in which St. Thomas shows that the divine will is most efficacious, and that it does not impose necessity on all things, nor does it interfere with but actuates human liberty.

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD HAS A SPECULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS

In answer to this it is stated that knowledge is said to be speculative in three ways: (1) on the part of the thing known, which is not operable by the knower; (2) as regards the manner of knowing, if the operable thing be considered also by defining it, resolving it into its universal principles, for instance, stating what a harp is; (3) as regards the end, if there be a consideration also of the operable thing only as it concerns knowledge, not action.'®°

But God has only speculative knowledge of Himself, because He is not operable. He has speculative knowledge of other things as regards the mode, since He knows not only how things are made, but what they are; He has practical knowledge of those things that can be made but never will be, and this as regards both the object and the mode, but not as regards the end on the part of the knower; He has simply and actually practical knowledge of those things that come to be in some period of time. But it must be noted that God’s knowledge is eminently speculative and practical, being in itself undivided, and the only distinction in it is on the part of the things known.

Scotus held that God’s knowledge of Himself is simply practical, because it is naturally prior to divine love by which He loves Himself. In reply to this it must be said that it does not suffice for practical knowledge that love of the object known follow it; the form of the work or the object of operation must be determined by it, so that it can be called the rule of operation.

Thus we terminate this question of God's knowledge, in which it has been our special purpose to show that God, by reason of His absolute immateriality, is in the highest degree cognitive; in fact, that He is the self-subsistent Intellection; that He knows things other than Himself, in Himself and not immediately in themselves; that He knows possible things, indeed, inasmuch as they have their foundation in the divine essence, as it is imitable ad extra, and He knows existing things in the decree of His will, without which His

180 Tt must be remarked with Cajetan that practical and speculative are here taken in the sense not only as they are conditions of knowledge in themselves, but also as they are on the part of the knower. Therefore it is said that the housebuilding art in one who does not intend to build a house is speculative as regards the end. This inust be further explained by saying, as it concerns the end on the part of the knower, not of the knowledge, because knowledge that is practical as regards the thing known and the manner of knowing it, is also as such practical as regards the end, although it does not essentially extend even to the actual execution of the thing known; and thus it differs from prudence. Cf. Ia Iae, q: 57) 3-4- knowledge would not be the cause of things; ** that He knows contingent futures not only in His decree, but inasmuch as they are already eternally present to Him, this being the intrinsic terminus of the eternal creative or motive action, the effects of which are passively produced in time. In this way the perfection of God’s knowledge, which is intuitive and absolutely invariable, is preserved intact. Its measure is eternity, which includes all time within its ambit.

Footnotes

1. Cf. supra, q.3. ↩