Chapter XXII. Question 22 the providence of God

Havin considered all that relates to the will, we must proceed to those things which have relation to both intellect and will. Of this kind, however, is providence, and predestination is its more exalted part. There is resemblance, by way of analogy, between providence and our virtue of prudence, to which providence belongs with reference to the future as fully explained elsewhere by St. Thomas when he says: “Providence (as the name signifies) implies a certain relation of one who is distant from things that occur in time and that must be directed to their ends.” ! For providence is an orderly direction in the mind, the direction to their ends of those things that are to be done.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on providence has been explained at length by us in other works.? Therefore we now make some brief observations only about the principal points. St. Thomas’ division of this question is in four articles. (1) Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God, in which the questions as to the existence and nature of providence are solved. (2) Whether everything is subject to the providence of God, or what the scope of providence is. (3) Whether God has immediate providence over everything, the answer to which will be in the affirmative, and thus there is a difference between providence and divine government. (4) Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen. The solution of this doubt will be the corollary to the doctrine as already set forth on this point.

State of the question. The difficulty arises from the following facts: (1) “Providence” denotes a certain part of our prudence in which there is always imperfection, that is, doubt and uncertainty; (2) providence is concerned with existing things that are not eternal. Therefore it does not appear to be anything eternal. There are other difficulties arising especially from the existence of physical and moral

1Summa theol., Wa Iae, q.49, a.6. 2Cf. Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, art. “Providence,” and also Providence (Eng. tr., Herder Book Co.). 8 Cf. Summa theol., Ia, q.19, a.8. 625 evil in the world. These difficulties are pointed out by St. Thomas at the beginning of the second article, for he says: “We see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot prevent these, and thus is not omnipotent, or else He does not have care for everything.” This objection belongs properly to the question of the scope of providence, and is explained more fully in another work.*

It is affirmed in this article that providence is to be attributed to God, and very many passages from Holy Scripture and the declarations of the Church show that this doctrine «is of faith.

In the Old Testament, Judith prays as follows: “All Thy ways are prepared, and in Thy providence Thou hast placed Thy judgments. . . . The prayer of the humble and the meek have always pleased Thee. O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters, and Lord of the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy.” * The Book of Wisdom says: “God made the little and the great, and He hath equally care of all.” 6 “Wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.” 7 “Thou has ordered all things in number, measure, and weight.” 8 “There is no other God but Thou, who hast care ‘of all.” ° Of those crossing the sea in ships, it says: “Thy providence, O Father, governeth it; for ‘Thou hast made a way even in the sea, and a most sure path even among the waves, showing that Thou art able to save out of all things.” 1°

The prayer of petition presupposes faith in divine providence, which extends to the least of our free acts. Hence Mardochai prays in the following manner: “O Lord, Lord almighty King, for all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will, if Thou determine to save Israel.” 1 It is in this way, too, that Queen Esther prays and is heard.1* Never did even the nobler minded among the Greek philosophers reach such a degree of certainty about divine providence, which extends even to the least details. Again, in Ecclesiasticus we read: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand, . . . so man is in the hand of Him who made him; and He will render to him according to His judgment.” 18 And [Isaias says: “The Lord of hosts

hath decreed, and who can disannul it? And His hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it away?”¹

The psalms declare the wonders of God’s providence toward the Israelites, freeing them from captivity. Thus we read: “When Israel went out of Egypt.” ?5 “Direct me in Thy truth, and teach me; for Thou art God my Savior.” 16 “The Lord ruleth me: and I shall want nothing. He hath set me in a place of pasture. . . . He hath led me on the paths of justice, for His name’s sake. For though I should walk in the midst of the shadow of death, I will fear no evils, for Thou art with me.” 1 “But I have put my trust in Thee, O Lord. I said: Thou art my God. My lots are in Thy hands. Deliver me out of the hands of my enemies, and from them that persecute me. Make Thy face to shine upon Thy servant: save me in Thy mercy.” 18

There is a certain aspect of God’s providence that is most manifest from the order prevailing in the world. Thus the psalmist says: “The heavens show forth the glory of God: and the firmament declareth the works of His hands.” !° But on the other hand, as shown in the Book of Job, there are certain and indeed most sublime ways of Providence that are unsearchable, such as the dispositions of Providence toward Joseph, the son of Jacob, when God permits him to be sold by his brothers. Then the purpose of these ways is made clear, when Joseph says to his brothers: “Not by your counsel was I sent hither, but by the will of God: who hath made me . . . governor in all the land of Egypt.” ° The inaccessible height of Providence is also apparent in the following text: “Thy justice is as the mountains of God: Thy judgments are a great deep.” ™% But this greater obscurity is owing to the fact that He is far too luminous for our intellect; for God’s providence in itself is light inaccessible, and under the guidance of this light all things co-operate unto good. Hence the Scripture says: “Thou art great, O Lord, forever, and Thy kingdom is unto all ages. For Thou scourgest and Thou savest: Thou leadest down to hell, and bringest up again, and there is none that can escape Thy hand. . . . He hath chastised us for our iniquities: and He will save us for His own mercy.” *? The whole history of the Israelites is ordained by God's providence to prepare them for the coming of

the promised Savior. The history of Susanna is for this same end.*

God’s providence together with His goodness and omnipotence is frequently mentioned in the New Testament. Thus our Lord says: “Behold the birds of the air: for they neither sow nor do they reap nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?” ** It is an a fortiori argument, the implication being that if God’s care extends to the smallest things, far more so is He concerned with the life of the soul. Hence our Lord concludes: “For your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things. Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” ?5 And again: “The very hairs of your head are all numbered.” 2 The parables of the laborers in the vineyard ? and of the talents ** contain this same doctrine. “If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!” *° St. Peter says: “Be you humbled, therefore, under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt you in the time of visitation; casting all your care upon Him, for He hath care of you.” 30

All these texts declare that providence is evident by reason of the order prevailing in the world and the life of the just. On the other hand, there remains the profound mystery expressed by St. Paul in the following words: “How incomprehensible are His judgments and how unsearchable His ways!” *1 This mystery applies especially to the tribulations the just endure, and the iniquity perpetrated by evil persons, both of which are permitted by God for a greater good and which in this life often remain hidden.

Some of the Fathers ** wrote especially about providence. Thus St. John Chrysostom wrote a number of treatises concerning the providential purpose and advantage of suffering in the lives of the just.**

29 Luke 11: 13. Consult also Luke 15: 4 (parable of lost sheep), and John 10:1 (parable of good shepherd).

82 Cf, Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion patristicum, nos. 202, 422, 1014, 1134, 1377-

38 CE. dd Stagir., in which he remarks that we alone are the cause of our spiritual wounds, and one of his treatises concerns those who are scandalized on account of adversities. Consult also St. Leo’s Ep. ad Thuribium, and St. Gregory Nazianzen’s Oratio 16.

St. Augustine wrote a book explaining the action of divine providence in its dealings with human beings.** There are two cities in the world, which at present are intermixed, but which at the end will be separated. There is the city of evil in which love of self finally leads to hatred of God, and there is the city of God, in which the love of God finally leads to contempt of self.*5

From the definitions and declarations of the Church it is evident that God certainly foreknew from eternity, and immutably preordained, all future things;** yet it does not therefore follow that this makes it absolutely necessary, for all things that come into being.? God governs by His providence both visible and invisible things,* truly acting upon the world and man.® He does not will evil things just as He wills good things,® only permitting sin.“ He does not have to obey the devil,? neither does He communicate His omnipotence to us, nor is He subject to us,* and He ordains all things for the manifestation of His goodness.** Hence the course of man’s life is not under the controlling influence of the stars,** nor is man ruled by fate.*®

Among these definitions, the following declaration of the Vatican Council deserves special mention: “God protects and governs by His providence all things which He has made, reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly. For all things are naked and open to His eyes, even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” #7

In the body of the article St. Thomas proves the existence of providence, which is a revealed doctrine. This he does by means of a theological argument, and at the same time he defines providence. He presupposes its quasi-nominal definition, according to which providence is a part of prudence, which orders different things to

34 De civitate Dei.

35 Cf. ibid., Bk. VII, chap. 29. This chapter must be read since it treats especially of Providence. Consult also Dict. de théol. cath., art. “Providence” (section concerning St. Augustine).

the attainment of their end. Thus the common saying is that it belongs to the governor of the state to provide for its grain supplies, and to the father of the family for necessities of life.4* This common notion of providence can be attributed to God only analogically; but now the question is whether it is to be attributed to Him analogically and in the strict sense, or only analogically and metaphorically.

The answer is that providence is predicated analogically and properly of God, and it is proved as follows.

In every effect produced by an intellectual agent, the type or idea of this effect pre-exists in such agent. But God is the cause of all created good by His intellect and hence of the order of things to their end, particularly their ultimate end. Therefore the type of the order of things to their end, which is called providence, in accordance with its nominal definition, pre-exists in God. Thus providence is suitably attributed to God analogically and properly, as it implies no imperfection.

The major of this argument is self-evident and, moreover, is equivalently revealed. But the minor is revealed, and is also proved by philosophy. Thus this argument, by reason of its twofold aspect, belongs to either theology or philosophy.‘® Therefore providence is suitably attributed analogically and properly to God, just as intelligence, will, and the free act of creating are. To deny God’s providence would be to deny that He is intelligent, or that He is God.

This proof is quasi a priori, since it presupposes that God is the cause by His intellect; quasi a priori, I say, because providence is not immediately deduced from God's nature, but presupposes that God most freely willed to create.

A philosophical a posteriori proof can also be given of providence, reasoning from the order prevailing in the world. This proof corresponds exactly to the fifth way by which St. Thomas proves God's existence, especially as the supreme Designer.®° This proof is reduced to the following syllogism: things which lack intelligence do not tend toward their end unless they are directed to it by some intelligent being, as the arrow is shot to its. mark by the archer; but we see that things which lack intelligence act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result; therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and this being we call God.

It must be remarked that St. Thomas in this fifth proof, just as in

49 Cf, supra, q.14, a.8: Whether God's knowledge is the cause of things; als q-19, a.8: Whether God's will is the cause of things, Bi our argument, insists that the order of things toward their end pertains to the good of the universe, of which God is the author. As we stated above,®! Aristotle splendidly formulated and explained the minor of this fifth proof, namely, that natural agents operate for an end, but he did not grasp the concept of creation, especially of a most free creation from nothing for the manifestation of the orderly direction of divine goodness. Hence he did not acquire the right idea of divine providence.

In the Middle Ages the Averroists, who deny a free action, reduced providence to some general preordination that extends only to the general laws of the world, but not to particulars.®

COFIRMATION OF THIS CONCLUSION BY THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED 1N THIS ARTICLE

Reply to first objection. Although to take counsel about doubtful matters does not belong to God, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things toward an end does belong properly to God, because it implies no imperfection.

Reply to second objection. Providence is, properly speaking, the reason of order (or the ordering) of things to their end, whereas divine government is the execution of this order, Thus providence is eternal, whereas divine government is predicated of God in time, since it implies a relation to already existing things.°®*

Reply to third objection. Providence, as the word denotes, as being an ordering of things, is in the divine intellect, but it presupposes the willing of the end. “Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end, unless he wills that end, as St. Thomas remarks in this reply. Thus human prudence presupposes the moral virtues, which direct the appetite aright concerning the end. In this reply it is already evident that for St. Thomas, God, like every wise person, first wills the end before He wills the means for the end. This does not miean, indeed, that there are two acts of the will in God, for as stated above, “He wills this to be as means to that, but He does not will this on account of that.” 54

The solution of the objection arising from the existence of evil in the world is given in the following article of this question.**

First doubt. In what act of the intellect does providence, strictly speaking, or at least principally, consist? What acts of the will does it presuppose?

The replies to the first and second objections of this article make it clear that providence consists, at least principally, in the act of the intellect that is called commanding or giving orders, as prudence does in us. It presupposes two acts of the will, namely, the intention wf the end and the choice of means for the end.°®

There are virtually several acts that concur in divine providence, just as there are really several acts that concur in human providence. (1) God's will, directed by His wisdom, intends as the end in view the manifestation of His goodness ad extra; (2) the divine intellect judges concerning the most fitting means for the attainment of the end. On this point, the Salmanticenses correctly state ®© that among all possible dispositions of things, this one is known as possible by God’s knowledge of simple intelligence, namely, the disposition in which there is subordination of nature, grace, and glory along with permission of original sin to the hypostatic union (for this constitutes some possible world); (3) this will accepts or chooses the means for the manifestation of divine goodness; (4) in virtue of this efficacious intention and choice, the intellect eternally commands that these means be made use of in time. Providence consists formally in this efficacious command, for, as St. Thomas says in this article, “it orders and gives a command as to the ordering of things toward an end,” and “nobody gives a precept about things done for an end, unless he wills that end.” ** This statement demands the attention of those who say that Scotus was the first among theologians who, on the subject of predestination, said that he who wills in an orderly manner, wills the end before willing the means to the end.

Objection. Once there is a choice of something by the divine will, then there is no difficulty in its execution, for nobody resists God’s will. Therefore command is superfluous, and hence providence finds its ultimate explanation not in command but in choice. e

Reply. I deny the consequent: for we do not posit command in God because of some difficulty to be overcome, but because the means as eligible and the means as possible of execution are objects different in concept. The means actually chosen never would be made use of, unless the command were present to direct the execution of the means. Hence there are two virtually distinct acts in God. In fact, whereas deliberation in the descendent order starts from the intention of the ultimate end to choice of the least of means, command, in the reverse order, by directing the execution of the means, rises from the choice of the least of means to the attainment of the ulti-

56 Cf. ibid., Ila Iae, q.47, a.8; Ia Iae, q-17, a.1: Whether command is an act of the reason.

57 Com. in Iam, q.1, a.3. 58 Summa theol., la, q.22, a.1 ad 1um et gum, mate end; for the end is first in intention and last in execution.

Divine government, however, is the execution in time of the ordering of things under the direction of the aforesaid command which is eternal. Thus St. Thomas said that the reason of order in things is eternal, whereas the execution of this order is temporal.°®

Second doubt. Whether God's practical knowledge, which is the cause of things,® is distinct from His providence.

Reply. St. Thomas shows that God’s providence is distinct from His practical knowledge, because knowledge concerns the end and the means, but providence concerns the means in so far as they are ordered to the end.* Providence is also distinct from the eternal law, just as the conclusion is distinct from its principle; for it is by the eternal law that God’s providence orders and governs all things, Similarly prudence in us presupposes practical or moral knowledge and the law.

Third doubt. What does providence presuppose on the part of God's will?

Reply. As we already said, it presupposes the willing of the end and the choice of the means. It follows from this that providence presupposes God's love for creatures and two virtues of uncreated love, namely, mercy and justice. Wherefore St. Thomas said in his reply to the third objection of this article that, just as “prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed toward good,” so it is distinct from art.

Hence the provident God is not only the supreme artificer, or the architect of the universe, but He is also the most holy ordainer of all things and minds to their ultimate end, which is the most holy and most liberal manifestation of His goodness. Thus providence is more than divine art, since it presupposes mercy and justice, just as a man cannot be prudent unless he is just and benevolent toward other men. But providence, since it presupposes justice and mercy, directs the execution of the works of mercy and justice, just as prudence, since it presupposes the moral virtues, directs the acts of these virtues.*?

Fourth doubt. Does providence presuppose the antecedent and consequent wills of God?

Reply. It presupposes both wills; for the antecedent will, as stated above,** concerns what is good in itself, on first consideration independently of actual circumstances. But since good is not in the mind

62 Cf. Summa theol., Ia, q. 103, a.2, 3; Contra Gentes, Bk. HI, chap. 97. 63 Ibid., Ia, q.19, a.6 ad tum.

but in things, and things exist only as they actually are, this antecedent will rests on the condition that it is because of some greater good that the defect in the thing is permitted. On the contrary, the consequent will is concerned with good when all its particular circumstances are considered, and therefore only this will is efficacious. Thus by the antecedent will the merchant in a storm at sea would will to save all his merchandise, but to save his life he de facto and simply wills to cast it into the sea.

Likewise, God wills antecedently that all the fruits of the earth become ripe, unless some greater good prevents this. In like manner, He wills that all animals find what is necessary for their sustenance, and far more so He wills all men to be saved. But God does not will consequently and efficaciously that all the fruits of the earth become ripe, that all animals actually have what is necessary for their sustenance, that all human beings de facto be saved; but, for a greater good not always known to us, He permits that what is defectible may at times be defective.

Thus we have the answer to the doubt, as to whether providence presupposes both antecedent and consequent wills in God. For it presupposes the efficacious intention of the end of all things in the universe, which is the manifestation of divine goodness by way of liberality, mercy, and justice, and moreover the choice of the most fitting means to this end, namely, the disposition of things in accordance with the orders of nature, grace with permission of original sin, and the hypostatic union. But all this implies God’s antecedent will to save all men, inasmuch as “God commands not impossibilities but, by commanding both admonishes you to do what you are able, and to ask for what you are not able (to do),” * as St. Augustine says. It also implies God’s consequent will of effectively leading some, although not all, to their ultimate end. And so we find St. Thomas saying farther on that predestination is a part of providence.**

Similarly, as regards the infallibility of divine providence, it follows from what has been said that providence is absolutely infallible even as to the attainment of the end, inasmuch as it presupposes God’s consequent or efficacious will; and it is infallible only as regards the ordering of the means to the end and not as regards the attainment of the end, inasmuch as it presupposes only His antecedent will. The Thomists are generally agreed that this consti-

67 This point will be made clearer in the next article.

tutes the difference between providence and predestination, which is the teaching of St. Thomas.®* For it is evident that the efficacy of providence, in the act, of command, depends, in the attaining of the end, on the efficacy of the willing or intending of the end.

Fifth doubt. How does natural providence differ from supernatural providence?

Reply. There is only one providence in God; nevertheless it can be considered under different aspects on the part of its objects. (1) There is providence in its most universal or complete aspect, which consists in the ordering of all beings to the end for which the universe was created, which is the manifestation of God’s goodness. (2) Providence may be considered in its relation to particular ends, and thus it is called either natural or supernatural, the supernatural being cither ordinary or extraordinary. Thus providence is called natural in so far as it is concerned with natural things, which are ordered by providence in its most universal aspect to supernatural things and to Christ.

But such particular ends are not always efficaciously willed, and thus, although all human beings are by God’s providence destined for eternal life, yet not all are saved. On the contrary, the most universal end in the creation of the universe is efficaciously -intended by God.

From this it does not follow that we must admit a certain antecedent and inefficacious providence. There is but one providence, which presupposes, for many things, a consequent will, and for other things, an antecedent will. This applies proportionately so to human prudence. Thus there is but one prudence in the merchant who, when a storm is threatening, efficaciously commands the casting of his merchandise into the sea for the saving of his life, although at the same time he may will antecedently or conditionally to save his merchandise; in fact, this merchant prudently does all in his power to save it, but afterward he casts it into the sea. Hence it is not surprising that divine providence likewise for many things presupposes a consequent or efficacious will, and for other things an antecedent or conditional and inefficacious will.

Sixth doubt. How does providence differ from fate?

Reply. As St. Thomas says in explanation of this: “The order given by divine providence to things is called fate by Boethius (De consol., Bk. IV, prosa. 6). Hence as the idea is to the species of the thing, so is providence to fate,” ® in which fate is taken in a good sense, and

88 Cf. De veritate, q.6, a.1. 89 Ibid., q.5, a.1 ad 1um. By the species rei, St. Thomas is here referring to the intelligible species that is representative of the object known. By the idea, not as implying fatalism or absolute determinism, which is a denial of both divine liberty and human liberty.

St. Thomas also remarks *° that several ancient philosophers were of the opinion that fate is a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born, inasmuch as this disposition of the stars has an influence also on our human actions in things that take place by luck or by chance. To this St. Thomas replies: “It is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle,” 7? which is determined to one thing. Hence it does not cause those things that are altogether accidental, such as those things that happen by luck or by chance. Previous to this he had said that “human actions (as being spiritual and free acts) are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, unless accidentally and indirectly,” as proved above,’ that is, according to the influence they have upon the organism. But the indifference of judgment remaining intact, or the free judgment of reason, this influence of the stars on our choice, just as the attraction for us of sensible things, is not necessitating. Otherwise fate would have to be taken in the sense of absolute physical determinism.

But, as St. Thomas says, fate can be taken in a good sense, and then it signifies “the very disposition or order of second causes,” 78 to the production of some effects foreseen and ordered by God. ‘Thus we speak nowadays of the physical determinism of the laws of nature, in accordance with a series of connected causes, and besides these laws there is the possibility of miracles, and of various things happening by accident, such as those that happen by luck or chance.” “Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the divine will or power, is subject to fate.” 75 Thus we are free in our choices.

So then, in establishing the existence of divine providence, its analogical notion is suficiently determined by saying that it is “the type of the order of things toward their end, or the type existing in the divine mind of things ordered toward an end, It is already apparent in what the infallibility of providence consists, and this will be more clearly shown in the next article.

he has in mind the mental type or exemplar according to which things are made or produced. [Tr.]

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER EVERYTHING IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

State of the question. This article is concerned with the scope of providence, whether it extends to all things, even to the least detail and to the moral law. Whether it extends immediately to all things is the point of inquiry in the following article.

St. Thomas also discusses this subject of providence in other works,” directing his arguments especially against the Averroists, who were of the opinion that providence does not extend to particulars, but only to general laws.

This article begins by setting forth the state of the question and the many problems it presents. It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence: (1) because many things happen either by hazard or chance; but what happens by chance is not foreseen; (2) because there are many evils in the world, and it seems to follow from this that the omnipotent God does not have care for everything. One meets with this objection throughout the Book of Job and in the ninth chapter of Ecclesiastes. This difficulty made many say that God wills things only in a general way, and that His providence does not extend to details. So said the Deists and to some extent Malebranche. (3) Moreover, many things happen of necessity, and therefore they do not need to be directed by providence. (4) On the other hand, many things happen freely, and, as the Scripture says: “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” 77 Thus Cicero, for the safeguarding of human liberty, denied the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge and providence. Among modern philosophers, the Socinians and J. Lequier were of this opinion. (5) Finally, the Deists said that material individual things in their smallest details do not come within the scope of providence. All other objections can be reduced to these." Some ancient philosophers admitted three subordinated providences, the highest of which was divine, and did not extend to things in their least detail.

Yet the answer is in the affirmative and is of faith, namely, that all things, even those of least value, are subject to divine providence, so that nothing happens by chance on God's part.

1. That this conclusion is of faith is evident from many texts of

76 Cf. Ibid., q.103, a.5; De veritate, q.5, a.3-7; Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chaps. 1, 64, 75, 89, 90, 98.

78 Read the beginning of the argumentative part of this article, in which the errors of the ancient philosophers about providence are recounted. See also De veritate, q.5, a.3-10; Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chaps. 64-75; 89, 90, 94, 95, 149, 164.

Holy Scripture and several definitions of the Church quoted in the preceding article. It suffices for present purposes to recall the following words of the Vatican Council: “God protects and governs by His providence all things which He has made, reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). “For all things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb. 4: 18), even those which are yet to be by the action of creatures.” 7° In like manner, Pope Adrian I says: “God, in His eternal unchangeableness prepared works of mercy and justice. . . . He therefore prepared merits in the justification of human beings . . . and rewards; for the wicked, however. He did not prepare that their wills and deeds be wicked, but He prepared for them just and eternal punishments.” 8°

This doctrine concerning the scope of divine providence, which includes even all particular things, is expressed in many texts of Holy Scripture that have already been quoted in the preceding article. Thus Christ teaches that the birds of the air, the lilies of the field, the grass of the field, and the hairs of our head are all subject to divine providence, so that not one of them will fall without our Father's leave.®! Similarly, concerning our free acts, the Scripture says: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand . . . so man is in the hand of Him that made him.” ® And again: “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 8 It is foolish for the Christian to say that even some most insignificant act escapes God’s providence, and that it happens independently of His will or permission.

Likewise, what we think happens merely by chance ‘is subject to divine providence, for Holy Scripture says: “Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord.” §* Also when Joseph, Jacob’s son, was sold by his brothers, then cast into prison, and finally was raised to a high position, these things seem to have happened very much by chance; yet they are said to have been according to God's plan. If the merchants who bought Joseph had passed by one hour earlier or later, then this would have changed the entire course of events. But this happened according to the infallible design of Providence, for as Joseph said to his brothers: “Not by your counsel was J sent hither, but by the will of God,” ° and so it is of several other events recorded in Scripture.¢

The Church Fathers always understood these texts of Holy Scripture as applying to God's universal providence that extends even to the least detail. Thus true Christians, especially the saints, see providence and the finger of God even in the many insignificant things that happen.

The answer is proved by a theological proof, although it is apart from this revealed. The reasoning of this proof is theological if at least one premise is considered as revealed, and it is philosophical if both premises are considered as evident from the natural light of reason.

Since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects toward that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. But the causality of God, who is the first agent, extends to all things, down to particulars and the least details. Therefore it necessarily follows that, inasmuch as all things participate in existence, in so far they are subject to the divine ordination or to providence.

The major is, in the philosophical order, the corollary of the principle of finality, or of the relation of agent to end, for “every agent acts for an end”; every action tends toward an end that is either known or is not known but attained, as the arrow is shot to its mark. This corollary of the principle of formality is indirectly confirmed in this article by the following statement: “Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference toward the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than and outside the intention of the agent.” But no created agent can act without being moved to act by God.’

The minor. God's causality extends to all things, even particulars and the least details; and since God produces and conserves matter for the multiplication of individuals of every species, it follows that God by His providence just as by His knowledge knows things not only in general but also in particular.*§ As St. Thomas said in this last article just quoted: “God’s knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence, as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter (q. 44, a. 2), the knowledge of God must extend to particular things, which are individualized by matter.” 8 With far more reason it includes within its scope particular spiritual things.

This proof is most universal, and it includes God’s providence concerning our choices, which positively wills those that are good, and permits those that are evil, as will be more clearly explained.®

87 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3; q-19, a-4, 8. 88 Cf. ibid., Ia, q.14, a.6, 12.

Nevertheless there is no reference in this proof to what we find Molina afterward calling the scientia media by which God would foresee certain conditionally free acts of the future, whose positively free determination would be independent of Him, But there can be nothing external to God that is not in a relation of causality to God or dependence on Him, except the evil of sin, which is the privation of a good that one ought to have, and which is only permitted by God.

Almost the same proof is given of the universality of providence that extends to particulars even in their least details, for the divine government.” Thus, on the part of the agent, for the same reason God is the ruler and cause of things. But God is the cause of the total entity of all beings. Therefore there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This universality of providence can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. The end of the divine government is the manifestation of divine goodness. But all things have as their end the manifestation of divine goodness. Therefore nothing escapes from the divine government, not even sin, which includes the incurring of punishment. But punishment is a manifestation of God’s justice.®*

THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES CONFIRMS THIS PROOF PROVIDENCE AND CHANCE

The first difficulty was: Things that happen by chance do not seem to be subject to providence.

The reply to this first difficulty was: Things are said to happen by chance with reference to secondary causes. Thus the finding of a treasure in digging a grave is said to happen by chance to the one who digs, that is, it is beyond what was intended and foreseen. But this was not beyond what God foresaw and provided for. So also the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, was foreseen nevertheless by their master who purposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one did not know about the other. Thus God sent the Ismaelite merchants on a certain day and hour to that place where they bought Joseph, sold to them by his brothers. The reason given here is the same as in the argumentative part of the article, and it is thus enunciated: “Since, then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the

range of that universal cause.” This statement applies with equal truth to the free determination, which is the effect of our free will; for it is impossible that this determination should escape the order of the most universal cause, or that it should not be produced by God inasmuch as it is an entity and a good.

Moreover, as St. Thomas remarks farther on: “The very fact that an clement of chance is found in those things (that are generated and corrupted) proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite (not to anything), especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally, which constitutes the idea of chance.” 93 Expressed more briefly: if there were no natural laws and tendencies, then nothing would happen by chance outside the scope of these natural tendencies.

PROVIDENCE AND EVIL

The second difficulty was that the existence of both physical and moral evil seems to show that God does not have a care for all things in particular.

St. Thomas replies to this objection as Plato,®! Chrysippus the Stoic, and St. Augustine did,’ by considering the good of the universe.

The solution of the problem of evil is given in this reply by quoting these words of St. Augustine: “God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.” % Thus, unless the lion killed animals, it could not live; and there would be no heroic constancy in the martyrs unless they were persecuted.

St. Thomas says in various parts of his works that good and evil are subject to divine providence as foreknown and ordained; but it is the good that is intended, and not the evil. In fact, moral evil cannot even indirectly and accidentally be willed by God.® It is only permitted, and by God's permission it is made to serve a greater good. It is in this sense that St. Thomas says evil is foreknown and ordained by God, yet not intended. “Whatever pertains to the right order of providence comes under providence not only as ordered to

97 On the advantage of sufferings for Christians and of Christ suffering patiently for us, cf. Ila, q.46-49; also on patience consult Ia Iae, q.136.

the other, but as that to which the other is ordered; but that which departs from the right order, comes under providence, inasmuch as it is ordered to the other but not as the other is ordered to it.” °° Thus evil is permitted for a greater good, and so it is declared that all things are “for the sake of the elect.” 1°°

In like manner, St. Thomas says: “It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.” 1%

Thus evil and errors are permitted by providence only that goodness and truth may be more clearly made manifest; just as in a painting the purpose of the darker colors is to bring out the lighter colors in bolder relief, and just as the malice of several actors in a tragedy is for the purpose of showing more clearly the heroism of the famous actors.10?

There is no contradiction in the chiaroscuro effect of this mystery, but in it these certain principles are preserved intact: moral evil cannot even indirectly be willed by God; God commands not impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you to do what you are able, and to ask for what you are not able (to do), as said by St. Augustine, whom the Council of Trent quotes.!°* But, on the other hand, no one would be better than another, unless he were loved more by God.1% But the intimate reconciliation of these principles can be seen only in the immediate vision of the Deity, in whose eminence infinite justice, mercy, and supreme liberty are reconciled.*%

OTHER SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES

The third objection was: Many things happen in the world from necessity, and these do not need the direction of providence. It is the objection of Democritus.

Reply. That these do not need the direction of man, this I concede; that they do not need the direction of the Author of nature, this I deny. Thus God made the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing, the feet for walking, wings for flying. This ordering, to be sure, inasmuch as it is natural, is necessary and is determined to one effect; but it is so determined by the Author of nature, for all ordering to an end is from the supreme Ordainer, inasmuch as every agent acts

99 De veritate, q.5, a.4. See also I Sent., d.39, q-2, a.2 (about the end). 100 Matt. 24: 22.

for an end, tends to some end, and the order or subordination of agents corresponds to the order of ends.1%

The fourth objection was: “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” 1° ‘Therefore man, inasmuch as he is free, is not subject to divine providence, as Cicero thought.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: God left man to himself, inasmuch as He gave him the operating force that is not determined to only the one effect, this I concede; inasmuch as the very act of free will is not traced to God as to a cause, this I deny. And I deny the consequent.

St. Thomas furthermore remarks: “God extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked, inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. “For to them that love God, all things work together unto good” (Rom. 8: 28).1°8 In this sense it is said that “all things are for the sake of the elect.” 10°

Fifth Objection. It has its foundation in this query of St. Paul: “Doth God take care for oxen?” 1° This was the objection raised, by Maimonides (Rabbi Moses).

Reply. God does not show His care in the same way for oxen as for men; but His providence extends even to oxen. As St. Thomas remarks farther on: “Irrational creatures are only acted upon (by God) and do not act. So, when the Apostle says that it is not for the oxen that God has care, he does not wholly withdraw them from the divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.” 111

Thus the answer of the article is established, namely, that God’s providence is most universal, reaching down to the least of individual corruptible things, which is contrary to what Maimonides thought, Thus divine providence disposes all things most wisely, firmly, and suavely, subordinating the lower to the higher. Hence divine providence wills in some manner for their own sake those things that are honorable in themselves or deserving of honor, and likewise those things that are permanent either as individual beings (such as the angels), or specifically so (such as sensible singular things, which serve as means for something higher).!12

106 See supra, Ia, q.2, a.3: filth way of proving God’s existence.

109 Cf. Matt. 13: 20, 22; 24: 22; Rom. 8:33; II Tim. 2: 10. See article 4 of this question, and Ia, q.103, a.5 ad 2um, gum.

112 Cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chaps. 111-13; De veritate, q-5, a.3. See also Tabula aurea, under the word “Providentia,” nos. 22, 28, 32, 33, 40.

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER GOD HAS IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OVER EVERYTHING

State of the question. It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For: (1) it belongs to the dignity of a king to have ministers by whom he provides for his subjects. Therefore this likewise belongs to the dignity of God; (2) because it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; (3) because St. Augustine says: “It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things.” 18 Aristotle says the same, in fact he seems to declare this of God Himself.

Yet the answer is in the affirmative, and it is of faith.

1. According to revelation, from previously quoted texts,!® it is evident that divine providence, like divine knowledge, is not ignorant of anything, but orders all things down to the least detail, and even immediately. St. Thomas quotes in this article a text from the Old Testament. Many other texts can be quoted, especially those which make it clear that God knows the prayers addressed to Him by the faithful, and hearkens to them. Our Lord also says: “Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings? And not one of them is forgotten before God. Yea, the very hairs of your head are all numbered.” 117 This means that they are numbered directly by God Himself.

The definition of the Vatican Council must be understood in the same sense: “God protects and governs by His providence all things which He has made, reaching from end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly. (Wis. 8: 1). For all things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb. 4: 13), even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” 18 This means that divine providence of itself without any intermediary, reaches to all things and orders them from end to end, even what we do of our own free will, inasmuch as He wills efficaciously our actually accomplished good deeds, and wills to reward them. He also permits evil deeds, either ordaining a just punishment for them or else mercifully pardoning them.

2. The theological proof in the argumentative part of the article results in two conclusions, the first of which belongs to providence and the second to divine government, or to the execution of the providential order,

The first conclusion is: As regards the type of the order of things foreordained toward an end, God has immediate providence over everything.

The reason is that He has in His intellect the type of everything, even the smallest, and He has assigned to all causes certain effects, from inanimate things, such as the gravitation required for the cohesion of the universe, even to the lives of the saints. Thus according to God's plan the grain of wheat is for the production of wheat, just as grace, which is the seed of glory, is for this very glory. Likewise God has ordained from all eternity that our prayers of petition are for the purpose of obtaining those things that are either necessary or useful for our salvation and sanctification. This constitutes the dogmatic foundation for the efficacy of prayer, which is very well explained by St. Thomas in the following passage: “For we pray, not that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers; in other words, that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give, as St. Gregory says” (Dial., Bk. I, chap. 8).119

But if God’s knowledge did not immediately extend to all things, then it would remain only general and confused, and therefore imperfect, just as is the knowledge of a king, who is incapable of supervising all the particular things of his kingdom. Hence for a king the complete centering of all things in himself would be a practical error, but it would not be so for God.129

Second conclusion. As regards the execution of the order, God governs things inferior by superior things, or through these as intermediary.

It is not because of any defect in His power that He does so, but, on the contrary, because of His abundant goodness, so that He may impart the dignity of causality even to creatures.!2!

So also Christ in His mystical body imparts to the Blessed Virgin Mary the dignity of causality, so that, for example, she may be the coredemptress. He also imparts to the saints that in Him and with Him and for Him they may save souls, by carrying their cross, preaching, and being merciful to others.

Thus the error of Plato or of several of the Platonists is excluded, who admitted three subordinated providences.2? According to a number of Platonists, the providence of the supreme God is con-

122 Cf. ibid., Ia, q.103, a.6 ad 1um; q.110, a.1; Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chap. 76; I Sent., d.39, q.2, a.2, 2a.

cerned with spiritual things and the whole world in a general way; the providence of the inferior gods is concerned with individual things that can be generated, and the “demons” in a certain manner direct human affairs, as the demon of Socrates does.

The error of the Averroists is likewise excluded, who admitted only a general providence that extends merely to the species and necessary individual things, to the sun and moon, for instance, but not to individual corruptible things.

THIS ANSWER CONFIRMED BY THE SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

Reply to first objection. “It pertains to a king’s dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science (both prudence and providence) is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.”

Reply to second objection. “God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes, which are the executors of His order.” Thus God provides immediately for all things, and as regards the execution of the plan of providence, He governs the lower creation through the higher, as St. Thomas says farther on: “Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government as a master who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.” 123

Reply to third objection. “It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher ..., and because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will toward evil. This does not hold with God, who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.”

First doubt. Does it follow from this conception of divine government through intermediaries that God does not operate immediately in all things?

It does not, for God immediately produces those effects that belong properly to Him, by the immediate contact both of His being and His power. Thus God alone creates things and immediately preserves them in being, even inferior things.12* So also God alone enters into the soul and moves interiorly our intellect and will. But through the mediation of- creatures He produces the effects that belong properly to these creatures. Thus He objectively illumines men

by means of angels and human teachers, although it is only He who can move interiorly the intellect and will to the performance of their acts.? Hence, stated morc briefly: Only God can produce and preserve in everything, being absolutely as such or being inasmuch as it is being; but any creature can produce and preserve in another creature of a lower order, a modification of being, for instance, that it be hot or luminous, or this particular kind of being.

Second doubt. Is divine providence always infallible, not only as to the ordering of the means to the end, but also as to the attainment of the end?

Reply. From what has been said,'** providence is not always infallible. For the efficacy of providence, which consists in the act of command concerning the means for the attainment of the end, depends on the efficacy of the willing or intending of the end. Hence providence is absolutely infallible even as regards the attainment of the end, in so far as it presupposes God's consequent or efficacious will, which is concerned with good here and now to be produced, for as previously stated: “Whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills (only) antecedently may not take place.” 127

On the contrary, God’s providence is infallible only as regards the ordering of the means to the end, and not as regards the attainment of the end; in so far as it presupposes only His antecedent will. This means that God's providence is infallible in so far as it prepares the means necessary for the salvation of all adults, making the fulfillment of His commands really possible for them, even when they do not actually comply with these commands.

So then in the most general ordering of all things to the end for which God created the universe, this being His glory and the manifestation of His goodness, providenice is absolutely infallible even as regards the attainment of the end, which is efficaciously or consequently willed by God.

But as regards certain particular ends, providence is infallible concerning the ordering of the means, but not concerning the attainment of these particular ends, because such ends are not efficaciously willed by God. Thus, although all men are ordered by God’s providence to eternal salvation, yet not all are saved, because God does not efficaciously will the salvation of all. Yet all the particular ways of providence, whether they result in the attainment of the end or not, concur in the attainment of the most universal end, for they are

126 See a.1, third doubt: What does providence presuppose on the part of the divine will? See also fourth doubt: Whether God’s providence presupposes His consequent and antecedent wills.

subordinated to it. Thus he who by the act of final impenitence departs from the way of salvation, concurs in God's glory through the manifestation of His justice.t*8

By means of these principles the various texts of St. Thomas about the infallibility of providence are thereby reconciled. Thus he says: “The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.” 1° And again: “Divine providence does not fail to produce its effect, nor in the way foreseen.” 15° These statements make it certain that God’s providence presupposes His consequent or efficacious will.2*

St. Thomas says in another of his works: “In all ordering of things to their end there are two points to be considered; namely, the order (to the end) and the result or consequence of this order; for not all things that are ordered to their end attain their end. Therefore providence (inasmuch as it depends on God's antecedent will) regards only the order to the end. Hence by God’s providence all men are ordered to eternal happiness; but predestination regards also the result or consequence of this order, so that it therefore refers only to those who attain to the glory of heaven.” 1%? Predestination presupposes God's consequent will as regards the salvation of the elect, and it orders and commands the means that are efficacious for salvation.

From what has just been said it is evident that no good ever actually takes place in the world unless God efficaciously willed from all eternity that it should take place, and unless He efficaciously arranged that it should take place, whether this good is natural or supernatural, whether this good is an act easy or difficult of performance. For as stated above, “whatever God simply wills takes place, although what He wills (only) antecedently may not take place.” 133 But the absolute or consequent divine will is concerned with good that will take place when all particular circumstances are considered, and it is only in this way that anything takes place.1% Likewise no one actually commits a sin, unless God permitted it from all eternity.

Third doubt. Is the infallibility of divine providence only an infallibility of foreknowledge, as some in more recent times have contended, or is it also an infallibility of causality?

181 Cf. ibid., q.103, a.7, 8; also Conira Gentes, Bk. III, chap. 94. 182 De veritate, q.6, a.1; see also I Sent., d.40, q.1, a.2 188 Summa theol., Ia, q.19, a.6 ad 1um.

Reply. As regards sin, considered purely as such, of which God cannot be the cause either directly or indirectly, providence is only an infallibility of foreknowledge, on the supposition, however, of God's permissive decree, to which is added His positive decree concerning the physical entity of sin. But with reference to all that is real and good, the infallibility of providence is also an infallibility of causality; for God is the cause of all being and goodness of whatever kind. As St. Thomas says: “Since all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause.” 155

WHETHER PROVIDENCE IMPOSES ANY NECESSITY ON THINGS FORESEEN

State of the question. It seems to be so: (1) because the effect follows of necessity from eternal providence, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. (2) God is both provident and almighty. Therefore He imposes the stability of necessity to things provided. Nevertheless the answer is that divine providence imposes necessity upon some things, not upon all.

1. This conclusion is of faith, it being declared in very many texts of Holy Scripture, which affirms that our free choices, our prayers and merits, are subject to divine providence. Therefore the Vatican Council declares: “God protects and governs by His providence all things which He has made . . . even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” 138

The following theological argument is also given in proof of this conclusion.

It pertains to providence to produce every grade of being for the perfection of the universe. But, that every grade of being be produced, there must be both necessary and contingent effects, in fact, free effects. Therefore divine providence has prepared for some effects necessary causes or those that are determined to one particular thing; but for certain other effects providence has prepared contingent causes, so that they may happen contingently, and for some effects free causes or the power of choosing, with indifference of judgment and choice. This argument is but a summary of the complete proof on this point given in a previous article.1*7

The major is evident because the perfection of the universe de-

135 bid., Ia, q.22, a.2 ad 1um. Consult also Ia, q.19, 2.6; Contra Gentes, Bk. HI, chap. 94.

mands a subordination of beings. For the universe would not be perfect if there were only one grade of goodness in things, a point that is more clearly explained farther on.'**

The minor is likewise evident inasmuch as the species of things are necessary; and individuals which preserve the continuity of the species (for instance, of plants and animals) are contingent. ‘There must also be necessary effects, that is, those that proceed from a proximate cause that is determined to one particular thing, and contingent effects, in fact, free effects, which proceed from a proximate cause that is not determined to one particular thing. There is a special fitness in this so that in created things there may be a certain reflection of the divine liberty. Therefore the conclusion is established, and it is also revealed, as already stated.

THIS CONCLUSION CONFIRMED BY THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES

Reply to first objection. “The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow, but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency.” Hence, as St. Thomas says: “God foresaw that it (for example, the conversion of St. Paul) would happen contingently.1%* It follows then infallibly that it will be, contingently and not of necessity.”

Reply to second objection. “Thus all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen by God, whether from necessity or from contingency.” For, as stated above, “since the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills.” 140 Thus the divine will extends even to the free mode of our choices; by actualizing our liberty, He does not interfere with it. As Bossuet remarks, nothing is more absurd than to say that our choice cannot be free because God efficaciously wills it to be free.14

Reply to third objection. “The unchangeableness of providence does not fail to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen.” St. ‘Thomas also says in another work: “It belongs to God’s providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail and sometimes to preserve them from failing.” 142

We should note what Cajetan says on this point. He writes: “I suspect that just as to be foreseen posits neither contingency nor

141 Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.

necessity in the event that is foreseen . .. , so God, by reason of His excellence, that is far beyond our power of conception, thus provides for things and events, that to be foreseen by Him is the consequence of something more exalted than anything either avoidable or unavoidable.” 143

But Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis) censures Cajetan, not referring to him by name, however, and he shows that the way St. Thomas speaks is better, who says: “God foresaw that it (a particular effect) would happen contingently. It follows then infallibly that it (a particular effect) will be, contingently and not of necessity.” 14+ It follows infallibly as foreseen, and contingently as proceeding from a proximate cause that is not determined to one particular thing. Thus both the certitude of providence and the true contingency of things are preserved intact. Such is the general teaching of the Thomists.

But Cajetan expressed himself more clearly on this point in another of his commentaries.’4* He had also very well said concerning contingent futures: “The divine ideas . . . represent the existences of things and their contingent characteristics, it being presupposed that the divine will is freely determined as regards the other term of the contradiction.” !#* But the divine will is perfectly efficacious, as stated above,'*? and it extends to the free mode of our choices.

First corollary. The unchangeableness of divine providence does not thereby render our prayers useless, but is the very reason why we should pray, because God from all eternity willed and disposed things for our prayers. As St. Thomas says: “For we pray, not that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers.” 148

Second corollary. The great mystery connected with God’s providence is not so much its reconciliation with human liberty as its permission of sin, especially the sin of final impenitence, which pertains to the mystery of predestination and reprobation.

In fact, the reconciliation of the infallible efficacy of the decrees of providence with the liberty of our choices, although this is in itself profoundly obscure, yet it clearly enough follows from God’s nature and the omnipotence of His will. If God is God, He certainly can move created liberties interiorly, firmly, and suavely, and especially so to the performance of salutary and holy acts. Moreover, it is suf-

ficiently clear that the divine actualization of our. liberty cannot destroy or interfere with this liberty.

But God’s permission of sin is a great mystery, especially the sin of final impenitence. It is the mystery of the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty in the eminence of the Deity. Of two sinners (for instance, the two thieves dying on Mt. Calvary) one is efficaciously called, the other is not. As St. Thomas says, quoting St. Augustine, “To whomsoever help is given by God, it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld, it is justly withheld, in punishment of a previous sin.” 149 There is in this a most profound mystery, which we must now discuss in the following question.

Footnotes

1. Isa. 14: 27. ↩