Chapter XIX. Question 19 tue will or God

AFTER considering the things that belong to the divine knowledge, we must consider what belongs to the divine will. We shall proceed in the following order: (1) About God’s will itself (q. 19). (2) About what strictly belongs to His will, namely, divine love, which is the act of His divine will (q. 20), and justice and mercy, which may be regarded as virtues residing in the divine will, by way of analogy with the moral virtues that reside in our will (q. 21). (3) About what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will, namely, Providence as regards all things (q. 22), and predestination in respect of man as regards his salvation (q. 23).

Already from this division as set forth in the prologue, it is evident that Providence is named by way of analogy with our prudence, which presupposes a rightly ordered appetite, or a rightly ordered will.

Thus the discussion is about the divine moral acts, by way of analogy with the virtues of the rational soul, namely, of the will and intellect; for it is evident that the virtues of the sensitive soul, such as temperance, cannot be analogically and properly in God, who is a pure spirit. In other words, the inferior virtues cannot be in God, nor even the theological virtues, which in us refer to God as our superior. Nevertheless, God’s love for Himself and for us, which is discussed in the twentieth question, corresponds analogically to our love of God and of our neighbor.

The nineteenth question, which concerns God's will, is divided into twelve articles, and these again are subdivided into three principal parts. The first part includes the questions as to the existence (a. 1) and nature of the divine will (a. 2). The second part is concerned with the ways in which God’s will operates as regards His acts and objects, in that creatures are freely willed by Him (a. 3), in that His will is the cause of things (a. 4), in that His volition is uncaused (a. 5), that it is most efficacious and immutable, and does not impose necessity on things willed (a. 6-8), and finally that His will is impeccable, or that He cannot will sin (a.g). The third part, which includes the last two articles, concerns the manifesta- tion of God's will: whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God, and whether there are five expressions of will assigned to the divine will.

In this arrangement, what constitutes the very kernel of this question is more clearly seen, for the division is not immediately made by means of twelve members in opposition to one another, but by means of two, which must afterward be subdivided. And, in fact, the first two parts are reduced to one, namely, God's will in itself, which must be considered before its manifestation is discussed.

But the subdivisions show that St. Thomas considered everything that pertains to this question, both as to God Himself and ourselves, according to the various modes of God’s liberty, and as to His efficacious causality and impeccability, which directly pertain more to His will than to His intellect.

The fourth article of this question, whether God’s will is the cause of things, must be carefully considered in its connection with the question of God’s knowledge,? in which it is stated that God’s knowledge is the cause of things in so far as His will is joined to it. The eighth article of this question: whether the will of God imposes necessity on things willed, which throws light on the foreknowledge of contingent futures, must also be most diligently examined.

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER THERE 1s WILL IN GOD

State of the question. The word “will” has two meanings, for it means either the act of willing, as when one says: it is my will that you do this; or else it refers to the faculty of willing. But in this article it matters not in which sense the word is used, for the other meaning is implied, especially in God, who is pure Act.

The difficulty is: (1) that the object of the will is the end; but we cannot assign any end to God; (2) that the will is an appetitive faculty which is for something not possessed; but this denotes imperfection, which is not in God; (g) that the will moves, and is moved in that it is moved by the intellect; but God is the first cause of movement, and He Himself is unmoved. It may be further remarked that Aristotle, who discussed God’s intellect at sufficient length,* did not at least explicitly refer to God’s will and liberty;

1It must be presumed that the author assigns the tenth article to the second part, including it in the third article of St. Thomas. [Tr] 2 See q.14, a.8.

perhaps he thought they could not be reconciled with the supremely determined although unlimited pure Act; for God is not capable of further determination by His divine free act, as though something might be wanting to Him. Hence the difficulty.

The answer is in the affirmative. There must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him.

1. This answer is not a theological conclusion, but is of faith, although the existence of God’s will can be proved from His intellect. That this conclusion is of faith is evident from very many texts of Holy Scripture, such as the following: ‘“Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” + “For who resisteth His will?” 5 The Fathers understood these and similar texts not in a metaphysical sense, as when it is said that God is angry, but in a proper although analogical sense. The reason for this interpretation is that, whereas anger includes imperfection, what is formally signified by will implies no imperfection.

Finally, it is the common teaching of the councils. The following quotation from the Vatican Council suffices for our purpose: “The Holy . . . Church believes that there is one God . . . infinite in intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.” 6

It must be noted that in this truth of the faith, namely, that will belongs properly to God, more is affirmed than in the following assertion from Plato: “Why did God produce the world? Because He was good and not avaricious, but free from envy.” 7 Similarly, toward the end of his treatise entitled The Banquet, he speaks not only of the supreme Good, but of His love for those things that proceed from Him. .

But Plato’s idea of God’s goodness is not so much a goodness of benevolence, as a metaphysical goodness that is essentially diffusive of itself and fecund. Similarly Plotinus’ supreme hypostasis is the One-Good, diffusive of itself, but actually diffusive of itself by a necessity of its nature, by way of emanation, and not by a free act of will creating all things other than itself from nothing.

So, therefore, in these conceptions of the Greek mind, the world appears as a necessary irradiation from God, just as the rays of the sun proceed from the sun; and so the world is a manifestation of His goodness and physical perfection. This paves the way for pantheism.

On the contrary, God’s will, and indeed His free will, the principle of a most free creation, are revealed to us far more clearly in

¹ the Old and New Testaments. Consequently God is conceived not only as the supreme Good, expressed in the neuter form, rò dyaOov (the good), but as He who is supremely good, full of benevolence, ó åyaĝós (He who is good); He is conceived, indeed, as the supreme Person. This is already evident from the first chapter of Genesis, for we read: “Be light made. And light was made.” ® So this thought is constantly recurring: “He hath done all things, whatoever He would.” ° This becomes increasingly evident in the New Testament, especially when Jesus says: “For God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son.” 1° Similarly, “He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is charity. By this hath the charity of God appeared toward us, because He hath first loved us and sent His Son to be a propitiation for our sins. My dearest, if God hath so loved us, we also ought to love one another.” 11 And again: “But God commendeth His charity toward us, because when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us.” !?

This mode of speech differs very much from that employed by Plato, Aristotle, or Plotinus. For these Greeks, the world appears to proceed from God according to a certain necessity of His nature, as the rays emanate from the sun. In this way God's metaphysical goodness, which is diffusive of itself, is made manifest rather than His benevolence, which is analogically conceived as the benevolence of a living person who has companionship with us.

There is a considerable difference on this point between the Christian teaching and that of modern philosophers. If some of them exaggerated the divine liberty and said, as Descartes did, that the truth of the principle of contradiction and the primary distinction between good and evil depend on God's free will, nevertheless very many did not sufficiently recognize God's free will. Spinoza and the pantheists of his school absolutely denied it, for pantheism is absolute determinism. Others, such as Leibnitz and Malebranche, exceedingly restricted God's free will, saying that God would be neither wise nor good if He had not created, and if He had not created the best of possible worlds.!3 This paves the way for pantheism, for if such be the case, then the world is already, as it were, a necessary irradiation from God, not indeed by a metaphysical or physical necessity, but by a moral necessity.

On the contrary, God's will is affirmed most emphatically in

revelation, and His absolute liberty is particularly described whenever it refers to God’s good pleasure, as in the following texts: “Remember us, O Lord, in the favor of Thy people.” 14 And again: “I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father; for so hath it seemed good in Thy sight.” 15

There is evidently nothing like this to be found in the writings of Aristotle, Similarly, in the writings of Greek philosophers there is nowhere any reference to the purpose of the divine will, so often spoken of by St. Paul, as in the following text: “He hath predestinated us .. . according to the purpose of His will.” 16 And in another of his epistles we read: “that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand” (iva ġ kar’ éxAoyhv mpdbeois Tod Ocod pévy)-17 The purpose of the divine will is the same as the decree of the divine will. It still pertains to the order of intention, which precedes the order of execution, just as our purpose must afterward be put into execution.

Thus in the very first article on God’s will, by the light of divine revelation His will is affirmed in the strict and full sense of the term, so that there is nothing like this to be found in the writings of Aristotle, or even in those of Plato and Plotinus; and far more so does this apply to the writings of Spinoza and the modern pantheists.

2. In the body of the article, St. Thomas proves a priori that there is will in God, and moreover that His will is His existence and His act of willing. Under this aspect these truths seem to be theological conclusions, but they are already revealed; for among the revealed truths, some are dependent on others, as the immortality of the soul depends on its spirituality.

But the existence of will in God is proved a priori, in that the will properly has its root in the intellect, and is reduced to the following syllogism: Will follows upon intellect; but there is intellect in God; therefore there is will in God.

The major is proved in virtue of the similarity of proportion that prevails between the natural form and the intelligible form, since we know spiritual things in the mirror of sensible things. For just as a natural thing, for instance, a plant, is in actuality by its specific form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form, which represents the object. But everything tends toward its natural form when it has not this form, and is at rest

therein when it has it; thus matter tends toward its form, or, when the form is acquired, it rests therein and retains it. Similarly every natural thing tends to possess and retain its integral parts, as the plant, for instance, seeks to have and retain its normal size. For all these things the natural appetite suffices, which is the thing itself tending by its very nature toward its natural perfection. It is often called a natural inclination, as in the case of the stone, that tends toward the center of the earth.

Hence proportionately so, as stated in this article, “intellectual natures have a like aptitude to good as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite,” which is called sensitive. And thus there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him.

Cajetan and John of St. Thomas draw attention to the difficulty that is, nevertheless, inherent in this proof. There is, indeed, a similarity of proportion between the natural thing, for instance, the plant, and the intellect; but from this it does not seem that, besides intellect, some appetite should be admitted as a distinct power and a distinct act. A natural appetite in the intellect appears to be sufficient, just as in the stone there is a natural appetite or inclination for the center of the earth, Thus Spinoza refuses to admit that intellect and will in us are two distinct faculties.

In fact, there is another difficulty, in that there appear to be four terms in the proof given by St. Thomas, because in the major he speaks of the intelligible form that is in the intellect, and in the conclusion, of the good apprehended outside the intellect. This second difficulty is of less importance, for the good referred to is that which is apprehended by means of the intelligible form.

In reply to the first difficulty, however, we say with Cajetan and John of St. Thomas that the natural appetite of the intellect does not suffice for this inclination, but that another faculty is also required, which is called the will or the rational appetite. This is evident for three reasons: (1) because the natural appetite, even in the intellect, follows its natural form, and not the apprehended form, or that of the thing known; (2) because the natural appetite is consequently determined to one thing, as the inclination of the stone is for the center of gravity, of a plant for a determined height, and of the intellect for knowledge in general. On the con trary, the appetite that follows the form of the thing known is not determined to one thing, but extends to various things, and is an act elicited by the will (or even by the sensitive appetite), just as cognition resulting therefrom is an act elicited by the cognitive faculty, either intellective or sensitive; (3) finally, the natural appetite of the intellect is concerned only with truth to be known, which is the good of the cognitive faculty; whereas, om the contrary, the rational appetite is concerned with the good of the subject in toto, or of man in toto, just as actually the animal or sensitive appetite is concerned with the good of the brute in toto. Hence man is not said to be simply good, unless he be a man of good will, which means that he wills the true good of the entire man.

There is this remarkable difference, which many intellectuals are not sufficiently aware of, since with them there is a sort of atrophy of the will along with a certain hypertrophy of the intellect, and they often do not advert to the fact that Christian contemplation must have its foundation not only in the love of knowledge, but also in the love of God Himself, as St. Thomas says.28

And therefore, just as in the brute animal the appetite that is called animal or sensitive is a special faculty distinct from the cognitive faculty of the sensible order; so also the rational appetite in man, the act of which follows intellectual cognition, is a special faculty that is called will and that is concerned not only with knowing, which is the good of the cognitive faculty, but also with the apprehended good of the entire man.’ Thus it is established that the will follows upon intellect. But, since there is intellect in God, there is also will in Him.

Confirmation. In fact, as St. Thomas frequently says, the distinction between these two faculties is evident from the fact that “knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is without the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it.” 2°

In other words, truth is formally in the intellect, being conformity of judgment with the thing judged; whereas good is outside the mind, being in the things themselves. They are two operations that take place in an inverted order, as experience proves; for by knowledge we mentally absorb things, whereas by volition and love we are attracted by the object loved. And, as experience proves, we will not only the knowledge of the true, but also the possession of the good. Thus we love not only the knowledge of God but God Himself. As the Scripture says: “Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.” 2 There is a great difference, for instance, between lov-

19 Ibid., Ia, q.80, a.1: Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul; also Ja, q.59, a.2: Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect.

ing to know humility, so as to speak about it, and loving humility itself.

The proof given by St. Thomas has not four terms: when he says “the intellect is actually intelligible by its intelligible form,” he subinfers “which is apprehended as good.” Thus it is legitimately concluded that “the intellectual nature as regards the apprehended good” tends toward it or rests therein by means of the will. Thus the above-mentioned proportionality is preserved with natural things. Thus the ascent is made by the mind from the lowest degree of natural inclination, such as that of the stone for its center of gravity, until the supreme will is reached, in which there is no longer to be found inclination or desire, but rest in the good that is eternally possessed. In this mental ascent the natural inclination of sensible things is first considered, because spiritual things are known only in the mirror of sensible things, and this leads us to know the supreme act of the will that delights in the divine good.

In the second part of the body of this article it is shown that God's will is His existence and His act of willing, because there is no difference as to the mode in which will and intellect are in God. But it was shown that God’s intellect is His existence and His act of understanding, without any admixture of potentiality. Therefore, so is His will.

Corollary. God's will is self-subsisting volition without any intrinsic virtual distinction; otherwise there would be a foundation in the divine reality for conceiving the will of God as in potentiality with regard to its act. Hence there is only an extrinsic virtual distinction between them, one that has its foundation not in the divine reality but in creatures, since the self-subsisting volition is the equivalent of our faculty of willing and our willing. On the contrary, there is an intrinsic virtual distinction between God’s intellect and His will, for which there is a foundation in the divine reality, because they belong to different orders. Similarly there is a virtual distinction between subsistent intellection and subsistent volition; yet it does not follow from this that there is a foundation in God for conceiving anything as in potentiality with respect to another thing.

In other words, this same corollary may be expressed as follows: God's will is not of the nature of a potentiality as regards His volition, which means that this notion of potentiality i in the divine will formally and eminently, but only virtually and eminently, as mixed _perfections are, such as rationability or discursive knowledge. For this pertains to the created mode of the will, and this created mode implies imperfection, which is not included in what is formally signified by the name “will.” This formal s not found signification is found in God not only virtually and eminently, but also formally and eminently, or properly. The solution of the objections confirms this.

Reply to first objection. The difficulty was that the object of will is the end. But God is not directed to any end. Therefore there is not will in Him. The reply is: “Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things,” and thus, as will be stated farther on, God wills things apart from Himself for the manifestation of His goodness.

Hence, for the solution of this difficulty, it must be said: there is no assignment of an end to the act of God's will, let this pass without comment; of things willed by God, this I deny. It is said that this non-assignment should pass without comment, because the divine goodness, which is willed by God, is not truly and formally the end of the divine volition, because the end is distinct from what is directed to the end, as being its extrinsic cause; yet it may be said that the divine goodness to be loved and made manifest is the reason for the divine volition, just as it is said that the divine immutability is the reason for eternity, and divine immateriality for subsistent intellection. In this sense the divine goodness can be said to be virtually, although not formally, the final cause of the divine will. This is a better way of distinguishing between what is formally signified by the name “will” and the created mode of our will.

Reply to second objection. Our will not only seeks the good that it does not possess, but loves the good which it possesses, and finds its delight therein. In this respect will is said to be in God. God’s will is primarily directed to the divine good, which it actually possesses. This brings out still more clearly the distinction between the formal signification of the word “will” and its created mode.

Reply to third objection. The relationship between the will and its object is one of moveable to mover, if it is a question of the created will, which is distinct from its objects; but it is not so with the divine will, which is identical with its object. Thus there is will in God, and this in the strict sense of the term, or formally and eminently, to the exclusion of all imperfections that pertain to its created mode. In its formal signification, will excludes imperfection.

Instance. Even in its formal signification will includes imperfection, since it denotes dependence on the divine intellect, from which it is virtually distinct. Therefore the difficulty remains.

In reply to this we say, first of all, that if such were true, then even indirectly the intellect would include imperfection, since it depends on truth and on the divine Being. We may reply directly to this objection by distinguishing the antecedent: if the will proceeded from the intellect as from its cause, then I concede the antecedent; if it proceeded as from a previously known principle, then I deny the antecedent. Thus in the Trinity there is no imperfection in the Son, because He proceeds from the Father, not as cause, but from Him only as the principle, just as the line proceeds from the point as principle.** Whatever imperfection there may be in this is due to our imperfect mode of conception, since we distinguish between the divine intellection and the divine volition, by a distinction known as rationis ratiocinatae, for which there is a foundation in the divine reality. But this distinction, as such, exists only in our mind, and so it is called a logical distinction (rationis). In actual fact, the divine intellection and the divine volition are identified (although not destructive of each other) in the eminence of the Deity in which they are formally and eminently.?* Thus in God, conceived as being, the divine attributes that must be deduced from Him are contained only actually and implicitly; whereas in God conceived as the Deity, namely, as He is in Himself, they are contained actually and implicitly, without the necessity of any deduction.

Finally, we must not overlook the importance of this assertion, namely, that will is properly or formally in God. We see the importance of this if we consider the superiority of our will as regards our sensitive appetite. For our will, inasmuch as it is specified by universal good and not by sensible good, is of almost infinite profundity on the part of the object willed, in the sense that God alone clearly seen can invincibly draw it; other goods do not of necessity draw it, and the will loves these freely.2* But if it is actually true to say that our will is of almost infinite profundity on tle part of the thing willed, what must be said of God’s will, which is specified not by universal good, but by the divine good, which is not really distinct from it but is absolutely identical with it? For it is infinite complacency in this good, divine rest therein; so that what is found by participation in the prayer of quiet is essentially in the divine will, to the exclusion of all imperfections.

22 If it is said that the divine will depends on the divine intellect, such dependence is according to our imperfect mode of conceiving this, arising from the virtual distinction between God's will and His intellect. This distinction is also called rationis ratiocinatae, because it is one formed by the mind, reasoned out by the reason, for which there is a foundation in the object. [Tr.] l

But if it is a question of the divine reality itself, then all theologians exclude all causality and dependence from the divine persons, admitting only an order of origin between them, See Ia, q.27, a.1, 2, and Billuart’s commentary on the same.

28 See Cajetan’s Com, in Iam, q.39, 4.1, no. 7. 24 Tauler speaks frequently about this fundus of our will.

From this it is already clear that the formal object of the divine will is the divine goodness, which of itself is not only lovable, but is actually and eternally loved; just as the divine truth is of itself not only actually understandable, but is actually and eternally understood,

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER GOD WILLS THINGS APART FROM HIMSELF

State of the question. Right now we consider the secondary object of the will. St. Thomas begins by stating most correctly the difficulties of this problem. Perhaps these are the difficulties that caused Aristotle not to affirm that God wills the world, and especially that He wills it freely. In fact, these difficulties were revived by Spinoza 2° in establishing his thesis that God does not act for an end, and that the world proceeds from the divine substance by a necessity of nature.

The principal difficulties are in the second, third, and fourth objections. In the second it is said that the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, which means that it entices, draws the appetite to itself. But God cannot be moved or enticed by another. Therefore He does not will any other thing than Himself. In the third objection it is stated that His own goodness suffices God and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not properly will anything apart from Himself. If this is affirmed, it is only by way of metaphor, as when God is said to be angry. The fourth objection presents the difficulty that, if God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, then there are two acts of the will in God, because the acts of the will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects, and this is contrary to God’s simplicity. These difficulties are presented to purify the concept of will from all imperfections in its relation to creatures. Thus the foundation is laid for the solution of the objections that concern the free act of

= God’s will, and of God’s love for creatures.?7

The answer given by St. Thomas consists of two parts: (1) God wills not only Himself, but also other things apart from Himself (and this indeed by taking will in the literal sense, not metaphorically); (2) God wills Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end.

1. Both are very often affirmed in Holy Scripture, and they are of faith. St. Thomas quotes the following text: “This is the will of

God, your sanctification.” 2° For the second part, the following text is usually quoted: “The Lord hath made all things for Himself”; °° and also: “He hath done all things, whatsoever He would.” * The Vatican Council expresses this second part, in equivalent words, by defining as follows: “If anyone shall deny that the world was made for the glory of God, let him be anathema.” ** Just previous to this, the canon defines that creation is a free act.

2. The first conclusion is proved from reason as follows: There is a similarity of proportion between the natural inclination and the rational inclination, which is the will; but natural things, in so far as they are perfect, are naturally inclined to communicate their good to others; therefore much more so does it pertain to the divine will, in so far as it is most perfect, to communicate by likeness its own good to others. Thus God wills Himself and things apart from Himself.

The major is not so clearly stated in this article as in the preceding. It necessarily prepares the ground for us, because we know spiritual things only in the mirror of sensible things, and we judge of the spiritual inclination because of a certain resemblance it bears toward the natural inclination of sensible things. This is the normal mode of procedure in the ascent of the mind to higher things.

The minor is proved by reason of the effects produced, or from experience, as Aristotle remarked. “We see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like.” From this it is evident that there is a natural inclination in every perfect thing to impart its good to others. Thus the fully grown plant produces its like, and so does every grown-up animal.

From this general observation, the mind proceeds by the inductive process to enunciate this general principle: “It pertains to the nature of the will to communicate to others, as far as possible, the good possessed.”

The Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus? and Dionysius, often enunciated this principle: “Good is essentially diffusive of itself.” The way they showed the truth of this was by an inductive and gradual process of reasoning in the ascendant order, observing that the sun gives out life and heat, the fully grown plant produces its like, just as the fully grown or developed animal does; also the natural tendency of a man who is master of his art or who excels in knowledge or wisdom is to communicate this knowledge to

others. Similarly the source of all gifts is perfect love, which explains the loving generosity of parents toward their children. Hence from all this it is evident that good is diffusive of itself; in fact, the nobler the nature, the more intimately and completely it is diffusive of itself. This doctrine of mental ascent is in substance retained by St. Thomas in the present article, and in another of his works,?? to illustrate God's interior fecundity in the generation of the eternal divine Word, and so as to enunciate elsewhere ** the fittingness of the Incarnation. But if this principle is true, then its application to God's will is manifest inasmuch as His will is most perfect.

As St. Thomas remarks,’ good is described as self-diffusive priinarily and immediately in the genus of final cause as regards the agent, and then mediately in the genus of efficient cause, inasmuch as the inclination of the perfect agent is to communicate actively to others the good possessed by it.

From this, however, Plotinus concludes not only that the supreme Good is diffusive of itself, but that it actually diffuses itself, according to a necessity of its nature, just as the sun emits its rays. Thus the world would seem to be a necessary irradiation of the divine goodness or of the divine perfection. Something like this is said by Leibnitz, who, according to his theory of absolute optimism, affirms, not the physical, but the moral, necessity of creation, and of the creation of the best among possible worlds. Otherwise, he says, God would not be infinitely wise and good.*%¢

St. Thomas affirms in this article that “it appertains to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others, as much as is possible.” By these words he affirms the fittingness, but in no way the moral necessity, of this communication.

There are three difficulties regarding this first part of the argumentative part of this article.

First difficulty. If good is essentially diffusive of itself, then it seems that God, being the supreme Good, is essentially diffusive of Himself ad extra; hence creation is not a free act. But, it is of faith that creation is a free act, as will be stated in the next article.

Reply. When it is said that good is essentially diffusive of itself, we must distinguish between the capacity of communicating and the act of communicating. Certainly the capacity of communicating good to others is a necessary perfection in God. Moreover, the act of communicating good to others or of perfecting involves no im-

36 (Euvres de Leibnitz (Erdmann ed.), Theodicée, §§ 7-10, pp. 506, 563; see also La Monadologie, § 53, p. 171, Boutroux ed.; also Introd. pp. 77-116.

perfection, and can be applied to God. But this suffices. Good entices the agent, inclines it to act; but the agent can act either according to a necessity of its nature, or freely. In the following article it is shown that God wills things apart from Himself most freely, because “the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them.”

Second difficulty. Is the act of communicating good to others a special perfection?

The answer is, that it is not, because God is neither better nor greater in having created the universe. This conclusion, fundamentally the opposite of what Leibnitz taught, will be better explained in the following article. Leibnitz said that, if God had not created or if He had not created the best of possible worlds, then He would be neither infinitely wise nor infinitely good. On the contrary, according to St. Thomas’ teaching which was admirably expressed by Bossuet against Leibnitz, God is not better in having created the universe, and He would have been none the less good if He had not created it. This point will be more clearly explained in the next article. The statement just made serves its present purpose, which is to indicate that the present article is concerned with the fittingness of creation, so much so that it would be equally fitting if God had not willed to create, as will be stated in the following article.

On this point the Thomists generally do not adopt the language of Cajetan, who, in his commentary on this article, writes: “It is a perfection for the divine will, that it tend in the manner that pertains to it, to communicate its good to others; but . . . this perfection is voluntary . . . and absolutely free. But there is no unfittingness in conceding that God’s willing of things apart from Himself is a voluntary and absolutely free perfection . . . for this means that its opposite is no imperfection.” 37

The Thomists, however, commonly repudiate such language as this, for they say that God cannot be conceived as acquiring some new and free perfection superadded, as it were, to the infinite and necessary perfection of pure Act, and virtually distinct from it. In such a case there would be a foundation in the divine reality for conceiving the divine will as in potentiality with regard to this new and free perfection that is superadded; in this there is a certain danger of pantheism, since in this way the validity of the following principle is impaired: “The divine being is being that can have nothing added to it.” 38 Hence there can be no accident in God.

Therefore the Thomists say what Cajetan, after more mature reflection, wrote: “To communicate oneself to others implies perfection not in the one communicating, but in the recipients of this communication. . . . And it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others, not for the betterment of the one communicating, but for the sake of others to be made good by it.” 39

Godoy *° correctly observes that the way Cajetan first expressed himself must be understood as referring to a free perfection, which God may not possess, not inasmuch as it is a perfection, but in the sense that the object willed is contingent. But to express this exactly, the Thomists say that the free act in God does not add a new perfection in Him, but presupposes the infinite perfection of pure Act, and is defectible only because of the object willed.

The terminology commonly accepted in the schools expresses in somewhat different language what Cajetan meant. It is formulated, of course, as a modal proposition that refers to the saying rather than as a modal proposition that refers to the thing. It does not say that the act of creating is a free and befitting perfection in God, for then the word “befitting” would terminate in an apparently superadded perfection. But it says that it is befitting that God created the universe, although it would have been just as befitting if He had not created. Similarly it is befitting that God raised us to the supernatural order, and that He sent His Son into the world to save us, although it would have been just as befitting if He had not raised us to the supernatural order, or if He had not willed the Incarnation. These are, indeed, absolutely free acts.

In the example just given, it is evident that a modal proposition referring to the thing is not equivalent to a modal proposition referring to the saying, as St. Thomas observed.*? For it is false to say that everything known by God is necessary. But it is true to say that everything known by God must needs be (by a necessity of consequence but not of consequent). Similarly it is true to say that it is necessary (by a necessity of consequence) for the predestined to wish the good of salvation and be saved. But it is false to say that the predestined necessarily wills the good of salvation and is saved. Hence the argument of St. Thomas holds good, namely: “It appertains to God’s will that He communicate His good to others as much as possible.”

Third difficulty. It arises from the concluding words (“as much as possible’) of the sentence just quoted. This seems to suggest that

if God creates the world, He ought to create the best of possible worlds, as Leibnitz asserts. '

Reply. St. Thomas holds, as we shall find him stating in the next article, that the volition by which God most freely wills things apart from Himself, cannot be known by us a priori but only after the act, or by revelation. But now, after the creative act, it is shown to be fitting for God to create, although it would have been equally fitting if He had not created, as will be stated in the next article. Hence these words, “as much as possible,” indicate only this aforesaid fittingness. Moreover, as will be stated farther on, the supreme limit in the possible or creatable is impossible of conception, because “the (infinite) God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.” 4 Thus He can create better angels and of a higher order, because, between any created being and the infinite perfection of God, the distance is infinite.

Second conclusion. It states that God wills Himself as the end and other things as ordained to that end. This follows as a corollary from the first conclusion, because God cannot, except by not observing the order of subordination, will Himself and things apart from Himself. He cannot will equally, as it were, two things that are co-ordinated; for all co-ordination presupposes subordination. Order is the arrangement of things according to priority and posteriority with reference to some principle. Hence it is verified first in subordination and then in co-ordination. Thus two soldiers are not so much co-ordinated as subordinated to the same general of an army.

A difficulty arises concerning this second conclusion. If God wills all things for Himself, this seems to impair the ordinary conception we have of His goodness or liberality, and of the generosity of His love for us. In fact, God's love for us is not a love of concupiscence but of benevolence. But by the love of benevolence we love others not for our sake but for their sake. Therefore, that God’s love for us should be truly a love of benevolence, He must love us for our sake and not for His sake. Kant, Hermes, Gunther, and more recently Laberthonniére, proposed this objection.*

Reply. Against Hermes and Gunther it was defined by the Vatican Council in one of its canons: “If anyone shall deny that the world was made for the glory of God, let Him be anathema.” 45 This same point is explained by the Council in the chapter to which this canon is attached, for it says: “This one, only, true God, of His own goodness and almighty power, not for the increase of His

own happiness,*® nor to acquire but to manifest His perfection by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing, from the beginning of time, both the spiritual and the corporal creature, namely, the angelic and the mundane; and afterward the human creature, as partaking, in a sense, of both, consisting of spirit and of body.” 47

The Vatican Council explained the following text from Scripture: “The Lord hath made all things for Himself,” 48 as meaning “for the manifestation of His goodness.” If a man’s actions are performed to show how good he is, not directing them to God, then this is vainglory; but if either man’s acts or God's acts are performed to manifest the divine or supreme goodness, there is no vainglory but true glory in this; for this manifestation results in God’s being clearly known and praised, which is true glory and due recognition of His supreme excellence.

It does not follow, therefore, that God loves us, not with love of benevolence, but of concupiscence. For the love of benevolence is that love by which the lover wills good to the one loved, and not only to himself. But God wills good to us, and not only to Himself. In fact, God wills to give Himself to us, and gave us His Son; but we are subjected to God as the supreme good. Therefore God loves us with the love of benevolence, but He subjects us to Himself. In other words, God loves us as that for which He wills good, but not as the end of creation.

Unless this were so, there would be an inversion of the established order, which would be a perversion, as when a miser prefers money to his own dignity as a rational being, and through love of money loses his soul. In fact, if God were to love the creature as the end of creation, He would no longer love the supreme good above all things. Thus God would repudiate Himself, which would be a mortal sin in God, the height of absurdity.

Hence this would result in a false definition of the love of benevolence, and it could not be attributed to God if it were said to be the love by which another is loved for his own sake and not for the sake of the lover. The love of benevolence must be defined as the love by which we wish good to another, so that the other is the one to whom we wish the good, and not necessarily the ultimate end of our love.*®? But when we love God with the love of benevo-

46 This would imply love of concupiscence.

47 Denz., no. 1783. See also Vacant, Etudes théologiques sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 268, against Hermes and Gunther.

49 If it is sometimes said that it is of the nature of friendship that the friend be loved for his own sake, the meaning is that the friend is loved as the end for lence and of charity, we wish God His good, namely, His glory, and we love Him, moreover, as the ultimate end. Thus the Scripture says: “Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory.” °°

Thus teachers truly delight in expounding sublime truths to their students, even to only one student, and more indeed from love of God and of truth than from love of the student to whom the truth is communicated.

Moreover, from the stand taken by Kant, Hermes, and Gunther, it would follow rather that the creature, instead of being happy, would be unhappy. For if the rational creature were the end of creation, the ultimate end of man would not be the supreme Good, who is to be loved above all things, but it would be the limited good that is contained in the dignity of the human nature. Thus the natural aspirations of man for the infinite good would be frustrated even in the natural order.

Finally, it is false to say that it amounts to “egoism” in God, if He made all things for Himself. Egoism is that inordinate love of self by which a man prefers himself to a higher good, such as family, country, and the like. But God cannot prefer Himself to a higher good, because He is identical with the supreme Good. God, in loving Himself above all things, prefers, as one must, the supreme Good to all things.*!

Hence this doctrine, no matter what Kant, Hermes, Gunther, and Laberthonniere may have said, by no means impairs God's liberality and His love of benevolence or of charity for us; but it most clearly ilustrates that the divine goodness is capable of being loved in the highest degree, which is the only object that can be loved by God as the end. Created goodness or the creature is the one to whom God by the love of benevolence wills good as a manifestation of His goodness.

In fact, because the love of creatures, as will be stated in the next article, is most free, it being not at all necessary for God's happiness, for this very reason it is absolutely gratuitous and therefore most liberal, being the very opposite of egoism, since it manifests God’s generosity or His magnanitnity. Billuart, in his commentary which, or the one to whom, we wish the benefits. It does not mean that the good qualities we perceive in the friend are the reason why we love him; in fact, the friendship is more generous when there is nothing lovable in the one that is loved.

51 In this we see how egregiously those erred who spoke of God's “transcendental egoism.” Egoism is not an absolutely simple perfection, but is a defect, since it is an inordinate love of self. It does not, therefore, exist in God, nor does the addition of “transcendental” suffice to make this defect an absolute perfection.

on this article remarks: “The more generous and the more perfect is the friendship, so much the more is another loved and showered with benefits, who is most destitute of anything that is lovable, God's love being solely a gratuitous act of His will. Thus it is solely by reason of His goodness that God loves creatures, and communicates His good gifts to them, not for His sake, but that it may well be for them a means of seeing Him as their supreme Good and ultimate end.” Many texts in Scripture are to this effect, such as: “Give glory to the Lord, for He is good, for His mercy endureth forever.” * “He hath filled the hungry with good things.” 5 In the parable of the talents, in rewarding the good deeds performed, the Lord says: “Well done, good and faithful servant. . . . Enter thou into the joy of thy lord.” 5 Here we have the perfect love of friendship, since God gives us His own happiness.

The conclusion of this article is confirmed by the solution of the objections.

First objection. It is of minor importance. It states that the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.

Reply. That the divine will is God’s existence objectively and

, not conceptually, this I concede; objectively and conceptually, this

I deny. It is of the nature of volition that it relate to something. Second objection. The thing willed moves the will, entices the

. will. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will is moved, enticed by another, which is impossible. Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the thing willed moves

. the will for its own sake, this I concede; for the sake of something else, this I deny. Thus in the case of a person who takes a bitter

` medicine for the sake of health, it is health alone that moves the will. But God wills things apart from Himself only for the mani-

, festation of His goodness, which is the reason for His loving crea- , tures, and the reason for all God’s works ad extra. Nor can it be _ said, strictly speaking, that the divine goodness moves, entices, the , divine will, but it is the reason for His loving creatures.

Third objection. What is willed suffices the willer, and he seeks

• nothing beyond it; but His own infinite goodness suffices God, there-

J J fore God does not will anything apart from Himself.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that he seeks nothing beyond it, unless such is a reason for its being made manifest, this I concede; that he wills absolutely nothing beyond it, this I deny. Thus God wills nothing besides Himself, except by reason of His goodness, but He wills things apart from Himself for the manifestation of His goodness.

Fourth objection. Acts of the will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it will follow that the act of His will is manifold.

Reply. “As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own greatness.

First doubt. Is the divine goodness alone the formal object, the motive and what terminates the divine will, so that creatures are only its material object?

It follows from the reply to the second objection of this article that the answer is in the affirmative. For the formal object of a faculty, its motive and what terminates it, is that which and by reason of which it is directly moved to act, and which directly and by reason of which it attains its object. But God wills all things for the manifestation of His goodness. Consequently the moving and hence the termination of the faculty find their complete explanation in the divine goodness, because the principle that attracts and the terminus of volition coincide; but it is called principle with reference to the intention, and terminus with reference to enjoyment of the good intended and possessed. Moreover, the will is specified by its formal object. But the divine will can be specified only by the divine goodness, for otherwise it would be dependent on some other goodness.

Second doubt. Is the divine goodness alone the adequate object of the divine will?

The Thomists reply in the affirmative, because the divine goodness in the order of good is coextensive with the divine will as faculty, for each is infinite. Hence the distinction that is made as regards the created intellect between the proper and the adequate objects, does not apply to God. The adequate object of the created intellect is being in all that pertains to being, whereas the adequate object of the divine intellect is the Deity, which, in a certain sense, transcends being and good, as it contains these formally and eminently.

Objection. Nevertheless God is moved on account of our merits to reward us, and on account of our miseries to come to our assistance, for the misery of others is the reason why one is merciful. Thus God willed the Incarnation for our redemption. Therefore the creature in some way moves the divine will as the motivated object.

Reply. The antecedent is denied: for God is moved toward these things solely by reason of His goodness considered under various aspects. For God is not moved toward these things as we are moved, on account of some particular good quality reflected in these objects. But the divine goodness, being the reason for doing good, specifies the divine liberality; being the reason for giving everyone his due, it specifies divine justice, which rewards or punishes according to one’s deserts. Similarly divine goodness, being the reason for coming to the assistance of those in misery, moves and specifies divine mercy, because the divine virtues cannot be specified by created good. If, therefore, St. Thomas says that “the misery of others is the reason why one is merciful,” * he is then speaking of created mercy; and, moreover, he says this as regards the material cause, for the perfecting of it, and not as regards the final cause, or the end for the sake of which the act is performed. Thus God is said to have willed the incarnation of His Son for our sake, inasmuch as the redemption of the human race was the subject for the sake of which or the end for which the Incarnation was of benefit.57 Thus it remains true to say that the ultimate end of the Incarnation is the manifestation of divine goodness.

Instance. Yet God wills one creature for another, and all things for the sake of the elect. Therefore, at least the higher creatures are the motivated object of the divine will.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent in this sense, that “God wills this to be as means to that; but He does not will this on account of that.” $ In other words, the conjunction propter (“on account of’) affects the object, for God wills one creature to be on account of another; but the conjunction does not affect the divine volition, which is one only and uncreated, and is not dependent on creatures. Thus God wills all things for the sake of the elect; but the elect are not the cause of this divine volition (‘‘volition” in the subjective sense). On the contrary, our will has at least two acts, namely, intention and choice, and on account of the end intended we will the means by a subsequent act of choice, which is the effect of the first act of intention. Therefore it remains true to say that God wills no created good by reason of itself, but by reason of the divine goodness to which all created things are ordained.

Corollary. When it is said that all God’s operations ad extra have been for His external glory, this must not be construed as meaning

that they have been for the created and distinguished knowledge of Him with praise, because this created knowledge and praise are ordained to God; but it must be construed as meaning that all His works are for the manifestation of His uncreated goodness. ‘This most admirably confirms the answer of St. Thomas, that God wills both Himself and other things, but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end.

From what has been said it is also evident that the ultimate end of all God’s works ad extra, even the incarnation of the Word, is the manifestation of divine goodness, although there may be a subordinated end, since the Incarnation is for our salvation, as being beneficial to us.

Another corollary. Hence, just as only the divine good can completely satisfy the will of the blessed, far more so is this the case with the divine will. We'say a fortiori, because the divine will is specified by the divine good, whereas the created will is specified by universal good. If we were to say that the created will is specified by the divine good, it would already have the same specified object as infused charity, and then it could not be elevated to the higher order of grace.

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER WHATEVER GOD WILLS, HE WILLS NECESSARILY

State of the question. The question in this article is whether God freely wills things apart from Himself, or whether He wills them from a certain necessity either of nature or of knowledge, namely, because of a physical or moral necessity. According to the pantheists, such as Spinoza, God necessarily produces things apart from Himself, this necessity being metaphysical, or at least physical; and so nothing would be possible besides that which exists. Thus Spinoza could not have been born in any other city than the one in which he was born, as Leibnitz replied to him. Yet Leibnitz himself said that God wills things apart from Himself by a moral necessity, because it would be unbecoming, contrary to wisdom and goodness, for God not to will things apart from Himself, and not to will better things. This same doctrine is found in the writings of Malebranche, and later on in those of Gunther and Rosmini. If such were the case, then it would have been morally necessary for Leibnitz to be born only in that city and at that time in which he was born. Thus in the opinion of Leibnitz, all things that happen would be necessary, at least morally so.*®

St. Thomas in the state of the question makes known the difficulty of this problem. He begins by positing six objections.®°

Two of these present special difficulty. There is first the difficulty as regards the exercise of the free act, which appears to be something contingent in God, because there is a possibility of its absence. This difficulty is touched upon in the fourth objection by the following remark: “The divine will would be contingent upon one or the other of two things, and so imperfect”; in fact, there would be a free volition that could as well not be. The fifth objection inquires into the cause of this contingent determination in God. This diffculty is thoroughly examined by the Thomists.

The other difficulty is concerned with the specification and the motive of the free act in willing the object, since nothing is willed unless it is foreknown as suitable and better. Thus it is better to create; it would be unbefitting not to create, and not to create better creatures. Hence it seems that God ought to will things apart from Himself, if not from necessity of His nature, at least because either His knowledge or wisdom or goodness dictates this.

In other words, if there is not a metaphysical and physical necessity, at least there is a moral necessity for this, otherwise there will be imperfection in God. Leibnitz, Gunther, and Rosmini make this objection the subject of special discussion. St. Thomas knew of this objection, and he touched upon it to some extent.

Aristotle never affirmed God's liberty, because he found himself unable to reconcile it with His immutability. It seems that he admitted not only that the world was from eternity, but that it was a necessary production. This was the view of the Neoplatonists, as expressed in their doctrine of emanation.

In the Middle Ages it was Abelard who denied God’s liberty, saying that “God can do only what He does.” 6 Aureolus taught that liberty was attributed to God only metaphorically, for otherwise His free act would be contingent. In later times, Wyclif, Bucer, and Calvin seem to have denied true liberty in God. This question has been discussed at length by us elsewhere.**

The answer is that God wills things apart from Himself, not necessarily, but most freely.

1. It is of faith and is often declared in Holy Scripture, as in the

60 De veritate, q.23, a.4; De potentia, q.3, a.15; Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 76, 81, 82; Bk. H, chaps. 23, 24, 26, 27 (against the Averroists).

61 See the second and sixth objections of this article; also q.25, a.6: Whether God can do better than what He does; and Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chaps. 26, 27, against Averroist determinism,

following texts: “And God said: Be light made. And light was made.” % “The God of revenge hath acted freely.” “And the Lord said to Moses . . . I will have mercy on whom I will; and I will be merciful to whom it shall please Me.” ® “Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.” 6 “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” ° There are many other passages that refer to God’s will of good pleasure and to the gratuity of His love for the elect. The divine election is, in the strict sense, a free act. In the parable of the laborers in the vineyard, the Lord says: “I will also give to this last even as to thee. Or, is it not lawful for me to do what I will?” 7°

In fact, even in the Old Testament we find God's liberty frequently affirmed, as in the following texts: “As the potter’s clay is in his hands . . . so man is in the hand of Him that made him, and He will render to him according to His judgment.” 7 “For if it shall please the Lord, He will fill him with the spirit of understanding.” 72

The Vatican Council, in attacking the moral necessity of creation as taught by Gunther and Leibnitz, defined as follows: “If anyone shall say that God created not by His will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He loves Himself; let him be anathema.” * In the corresponding chapter it states that God “with absolute freedom of counsel” * created.

Likewise the following proposition of Anthony Rosmini was condemned: “The love by which God loves Himself even in creatures, and which is the motive that determines Him to create, constitutes a moral necessity which in the most perfect being always brings forth the effect; for it is only in the many imperfect beings that necessity of this kind leaves liberty intact on either side.” 75 If such were the case, then liberty would be a mixed perfection, just as discursive knowledge is. On the contrary, liberty is an absolutely simple perfection, and so it must of necessity be in God. Nevertheless, as we Shall see, this free act, such as that of creating, is not an

T4 Ibid., no. 1783. See Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, 1, 269, 270. 75 Denz., no. 1908.

absolutely simple perfection in God, as least in the strict sense, because it is not better for God to have this act than not to have it.

2. It is proved by reason that God necessarily wills His own goodness, and things apart from Himself freely.

The first part presents no difficulty: “For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object.” Moreover, there is not and cannot be any idea of evil resulting from the divine goodness, but in it we see clearly all that pertains to good. And then God is of necessity actually willing and not merely potentially so. Therefore God necessarily wills His goodness, and the necessity is one of specification and not of exercise.

St. Thomas proves the second part of this proposition from the fact that God is in no way dependent on creatures for the possession of His infinite goodness. This point is made clear by the following argument.

In willing the end we do not necessarily will those things that are conducive to the end, unless they are necessary for the attainment of the end. But God wills things apart from Himself as ordained to His goodness (for its manifestation), which, since it is perfect, can dispense with creatures, and no perfection accrues to Him from them. Therefore God does not necessarily will things apart from Himself. But supposing that He wills these, He is unable not to will them, because His will cannot change.

There is another way of expressing the minor, by saying that after creation there are more beings, but not more being, or more perfection or goodness, because prior to this there necessarily and from eternity pre-existed infinite goodness that is necessarily and actually loved and possessed by God.

This proof is apodictic and most clear. This is the element of clarity in this light-transcending obscurity. The obscurity will be in what formally constitutes God’s free act.

THE SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS CONFIRMS THIS PROOF

Reply to first objection. Everything that is eternal is necessary either absolutely or hypothetically. Hence from the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that it is absolutely necessary for Him to will things apart from Himself. This is only hypothetically necessary, on the supposition that He wills these.

Reply to second objection. The divine goodness, which God necessarily wills, can exist without other things. Hence God most freely wills things apart from Himself, and with absolute generosity.

Reply to third objection. It is not natural to God to will things apart from Himself; yet it is not unnatural but voluntary and free, in fact most free.

Reply to fourth objection. Every contingent being is imperfect. But the divine will is contingent to one or the other of two things. Therefore it would be imperfect. This difficult objection is solved by conceding the major and denying the minor. That the divine will would be in itself indifferent to one or the other of two things, this I deny; in that it is not necessarily related to something willed, this I concede. The conclusion is distinguished in the same way, so that the imperfection is only in the contingent thing willed, but not in the divine will. This is well explained by St. Thomas in his reply. He says: “Sometimes a necessary cause has a nonnecessary relation to an effect, owing to a deficiency in the effect and not in the cause. Even so, the sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent effects on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause.” Thus certain fruits never become ripe.

Reply to fifth objection. Nothing determinate results from that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, unless it is determined by an extrinsic cause; but God cannot be determined by an extrinsic cause; therefore God is not indifferent to one or the other of two things. This objection is answered by distinguishing the major. What is indifferent potentially or passively, this I concede; that the indifference is actual and active, this I deny. I concede the minor, and distinguish the conclusion as follows: That God is not indifferent potentially or passively so, this I concede; that the indifference is actual and active, this I deny. St. ‘Thomas says the equivalent of this in his reply: “A naturally contingent cause, such as human liberty, must be determined to act by some external power (thus it is attracted by the object and moved by God to choose this object freely); but the divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.”

For the explanation of this distinction, it must be observed that there is a dominating potential or passive indifference in our free will before it chooses anything. But once it is determined by reason of its choice, although it remains free, it retains a dominating indifference, not indeed one that is potential or passive, but one that is actual and active, inasmuch as man, in freely choosing some particular good, not universal good, is not invincibly attracted by it, but actually wills it at the same time retaining the real power of not willing, in fact, of actually not willing it. In God, however, who is pure Act, there is no potential and passive indifference, but only a dominating actual and active indifference of His self-subsisting act of willing, or of His self-subsisting love, which is in no necessary relation to creatures.

These last two objections of St. Thomas, as we shall at once see, are of great help in explaining the nature of God's free act and its indifference.

Reply to sixth objection. Whatever God knows, He knows necessarily, because His knowledge is His essence. Therefore it likewise follows that whatever God wills, He wills necessarily. This objection may be answered by distinguishing the antecedent: I concede this statement of His knowledge of simple intelligence; I deny it of His knowledge of vision, and I deny the consequent and consequence, because in this case the will is now joined to God’s knowledge of vision.”* Moreover, God’s knowledge of things is as these are eternally present to His knowledge, whereas the will is related to things as they are in themselves (inasmuch as good, unlike. truth, is not in the mind but in the things). Things in themselves, however, are contingent.

There are especially two objections among others that are proposed. As already stated, good is essentially diffusive of itself. But God is the supreme good. Therefore God is essentially (or necessarily) diffusive of Himself.

We reply to this by distinguishing the major: good is essentially diffusive of itself, that it may communicate itself, and first in the genus of final cause, this I concede; that de facto it necessarily communicate itself, this I subdistinguish: if it is a question of communicable natural good, such as the light given by the sun, this I concede; if it is a question of communicable good by a free act of the will, this I deny. Hence God essentially diffuses or communicates Himself; but it is only by a free act of His will that He actually communicates a participation of His goodness, because for the complete possession of this goodness He is in no need of creatures.

Finally, the following objection must be noted. God is absolutely immutable, or, in other words, He cannot be otherwise than He is. But God would be mutable if He could will or not will to create, or, in other words, He would be otherwise than He is if He were not the Creator. Therefore the difficulty remains.

From what has already been said, we answer this by distinguishing the major and denying the minor. For God is absolutely immutable, although it was in His power not to choose that which He freely chose from eternity. For this free choice is not even in the least degree a superadded accident in God, and it posits no new perfection in Him. Hence the change and variation is solely on the part of the things willed, as stated in the reply to the fourth objection. This gives rise to some doubts, however, which must be examined.

First doubt. What formally constitutes God’s free act?

The difficulty is that God either could or could not have been without His free act, for instance, the creative act. If He could, then how is He immutable? He is at least from eternity, otherwise than He could have been. If He could not, then how is He free? 7"

This is what is obscure in this light-transcending darkness, whereas what is most clear in it is that God most freely created, as He in no way is in need of creatures for the most complete possession of His infinite goodness. For the solution of this difficulty two contradictory and improbable opinions are proposed.

The first of these opinions states that God's free act is constituted by some intrinsic and defectible reality in Him, which is superadded, so to speak, to His pure Act.

Reply. If this reality were identical with God, then He would be intrinsically defectible. If, on the other hand, this reality were really distinct from God's substance, then it would be an accident in God, and then He would be neither absolutely simple, nor pure Act, since He would be in potentiality for this new determination, which, indeed, He would have from all eternity, but which it was possible for Him not to have. Thus the self-subsisting Being would no longer be the “being to whom nothing can be added.” 78 He would not be both the unreceived and unreceptive Being. This opinion would prepare the way for pantheism, which posits certain accidents in God, such as are the finite modes admitted by Spinoza, the series of which would be infinite both regressively and successively.

The second opinion, which is proposed by Aureolus, states that God’s free act consists in some extrinsic denomination that is appropriated from creatures. Thus Aureolus says that the free act is not formally and properly in God, but only metaphorically, as anger is, which is a passion of the sensitive appetite,

Reply. God is from all eternity free, before anything was created by Him. In fact, the free creative act exists eternally in God as a formally immanent and virtually transitive vital act, although its effect ad extra is passively produced only in time. Therefore God's free act cannot be constituted by something purely extrinsic to Him and created, but it must be something intrinsic to Him. Pcie pee oe Salmanticenses, Gonet, and Billuart in their com-

THE WILL OF GOD Big

Likewise we must reject the opinion which differs but little from that of Aureolus. This opinion states that a logical relation to creatures is what constitutes God's free act. For logical being cannot be the cause of real being. But God’s free act is the cause of the real being of all creatures. Moreover, God's free act exists before there can be any logical relation in Him, which has existence only in the created intellect. Therefore God's free act must be something real and intrinsic to Him. But there is still the difficulty as to how this act is defectible in God, or may as well not be.

The more common opinion among the Thomists mediates between the above-mentioned contradictory opinions and is superior to them. It is, as it were, a higher synthesis, combining what is best in each of the other opinions, for it states that the entity of God's free act is indeed intrinsic to Him, but only its defectibility is extrinsic to Him.

To be more explicit, this means that God's free act is nothing else but the necessary act by which He loves His goodness, in so far as this connotes a non-necessary relation to creatures, and so it is only extrinsically defectible by reason of the defectibility in the thing willed. There is foundation for this opinion in many texts from the writings of St. Thomas. Thus in the preceding article he says: “The divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.” 7°

In this article he says: “That God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed.” ®© More explicitly he writes: “God’s will by one and the same act wills Himself and other things. Now His relation to Himself is necessary and natural; whereas His relation to other things is by way of a kind of fittingness, not indeed necessary and natural, or violent and unnatural, but free.” 81

Thus, from the teaching as set forth in this present article, this opinion is proved by the following syllogism: Divine liberty does not, like human liberty, consist in the indifference of a potency with regard to several acts, but it consists in the indifference of one most simple act with regard to different objects. But this act, simple in itself, is virtually multiple, and is necessary and free under different aspects; for it is necessary in so far as it terminates the divine goodness, and free in so far as it connotes a non-necessary relation to creatures. Therefore this act, permanently unmoved in itself, is in God something vital and intrinsic by reason of its en-

80 Cf. ad gum; see also ad gum. 81 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 82. See also Bk. I, chap. 76, no. 1.

tity, and is only extrinsically defectible because of the defectibility in the thing willed, namely, the creature; for the aforesaid termination would be lacking in the case of a creature that does not or will not exist. This likewise explains why the free act is called volition in so far as it terminates in the being of the creature, and is called nolition in so far as it terminates in the non-being of the creature.

Thus the absolute actuality as well as the simplicity and eminence of the divine act gives us the solution of the question. St. Thomas illustrates this by a comparison in another of his works: “For every power tends by one operation or act to its object and the formal aspect of that object: even as by one sight we see light and the color made visible by light.*?

In fact, by one and the same act of seeing, we see light together with many colors and objects seen by means of color; yet some of these colors are absent, though the act of seeing remains the same. Far more so does God by one and the same act see His goodness and the manifestation of this in different things, though His relation to these is not a necessary one. Thus it is said of Him:

God, powerful sustainer of all things,

Thou who dost remain permanently unmoved, Determining the course of time

By successions of day and night.

Thus the entity of the divine free act is intrinsic to God, whereas its defectibility is extrinsic to Him.

Objection. The relation of the necessary act to creatures is only a logical relation. Therefore it seems that God’s free act consists only in this logical relation.

Reply. I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequent. ‘There is, indeed, a logical relation as a result of this act; but God’s free act is something real, vital, intrinsic to Him, which is God’s love that connotes a non-necessary relation to creatures, this being the foundation for the logical relation, and this free act is virtually distinct from the necessary love of His goodness.

Another objection. The very termination of the immanent and eternal free act must be intrinsic to God, and hence intrinsically defectible. So the difficulty remains.

Reply. I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequence. That this termination of God's immanent and eternal act is intrinsic to Him as regards the entity of this immanent act, this I concede; as regards its defectibility, this I deny, It is only extrinsically defecti-

ble, by reason of the defectibility in the thing willed. Hence, as stated above, the entity of the free act is, indeed, intrinsic to God, and only its defectibility is extrinsic.**

Hence in answer to the principal objection posited at the beginning of this article, the following must be said: that God’s free act could as well not be, this I distinguish: that it could not be as regards creatures, this I concede; in itself, as it is the unique act of God's love, this I deny. To put it in other words, God, who is permanently unmoved, had it in His power not to create, and to bring other creatures into being, for the divine liberty is the dominating indifference not of a potency but of a pure act of subsistent love. Thus the peak of a pyramid, which in itself is fixed, is the terminus of new lines converging toward it. So also he who, remaining in some place, and having within his view a certain territory, sees all the objects that change their locality in this territory, though he remains in the same place. This is indeed a feeble comparison, but it shows that even in sense perception the higher beings unite within themselves those things that are found dividedly in lower beings. It is the application of general principles. Thus the absolute simplicity and immutability of the pure Act is safeguarded. Hence this whole question consists in a proper understanding of dominating indifference, an indifference that is not potential and passive, but actual and active, and which formally and eminently, or properly, and not merely metaphorically, applies to God.

Second doubt. Can God, without undergoing any change, begin to will what He did not will, and not will what He willed?

The answer is in the negative,’ for once the relation is established toward things willed, it cannot be changed, unless we presuppose a change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the willer. But neither of these changes can take place in God.

Suarez advances the objection that from the mere idea of liberty, without anyone undergoing any change either in disposition or in knowledge, he could begin to will what before he did not will.

Reply. There cannot be another free choice without another practical judgment that immediately regulates the choice. But there is no change of judgment in God, for His judgment of all things is from all eternity immutable. There is something similar to this in the angel, because of the perfection of his intellect, as “the angel's free will is flexible to either opposite before the choice but

83 Cf. ad 4um of this article; also what St. Thomas says in the De veritate, q-23, 4.4, €. and ad gum.

84 Consult Gonet, Goudin, and Billuart in their commentaries on this article.

85 See a.7 of this question.

not after.” 8 Thus all the blessed in heaven are unchangeable in their love of God.

Third doubt. Can there be a suspension of any act on the part of God’s free will concerning a created object?

The Thomists generally deny this against Gonet. ‘They hold that God cannot remain, as it were, in suspense and undecided as to whether He will create or not create. Concerning this there must be either a volition or a nolition, because this suspension of any free act would seem in a way to detract from the divine perfection. For God is of necessity free, and His liberty is not a potential but an actual dominating indifference. ‘Therefore it seems that God ought to have one or the other of these acts: to will to create, or to refuse to create. The refusal to will differs from non-willing.

Fourth doubt. Is God’s free creative act an absolutely simple perfection?

Reply. It is not an absolutely simple perfection, at least in the strict sense; for this is defined as a perfection which implies no imperfection, and which it is better for one to have than not to have. But it is not better for God to have the creative act than not to have it. Therefore this free creative act is not an absolutely simple perfection.

Yet it remains true to say that liberty in God is an absolutely simple perfection, in the strict sense, for it is better for God to have it than not to have it; in fact, God is of necessity free, although it is not necessary for Him to have this particular act rather than a certain other.®?

FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS

State of the question. So far we know that God freely wills things apart from Himself, or acts freely ad extra. We now inquire whether He acts by His will. On first consideration, this seems to be a useless question after what has been said in the preceding question; for if God freely wills creatures, then He causes them by His will. Yet it is really another question that is now asked, and

87 Some raised the following objection against divine liberty: The divine goodness is of necessity perfectly willed by God; but it cannot be perfectly willed by God, without His willing the manifestation of this goodness by creation; therefore creation is not a free act.

We reply to this by distinguishing the major: that the divine goodness is of necessity perfectly willed by God, intensively as a perfection, this I concede;

extensively as such, this ] deny; for God's goodness is complete in itself apart from His diffusion of this ad extra.

one that requires special examination. For man does, indeed, freely generate, yet he does not do so by his will, but because he is of a certain nature. Hence, if he generates, he can generate only one like himself in species. Therefore it is now a question not only whether God freely willed to create, but whether God is the cause of things by His will, or by His nature.

This is clearly made known to us from the difficulties presented at the beginning of this article. They state that it seems God is not the cause of things by His will, but by His nature: (1) because, as Dionysius says, “the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon everything that exists”; 88 (2) because God is the first agent, therefore He acts by His essence, just as He is essentially being; (3) because God is essentially good, and Augustine says: “Because God is good, we exist”; (4) because God is the cause of things by His knowledge, He is therefore not so by His will.

Yet the answer is that God's will is the cause of things, or that God acts by His will, and not by a necessity of His nature.

In this article we get a much clearer conception of what was meant when it was said in a previous question that “God’s knowledge is the cause of things, in so far,as His will is joined to it.” 89 We are now concerned with this conjoined will, and the determination of this divine will. There is special reference to this latter in the second proof of the argumentative part of this article, which is afterward frequently called the decree of the divine will. At the same time, this article completes the refutation of pantheism, for the pantheists, like the Averroists of the Middle Ages, hold that God is the cause of things by a necessity of His nature. The beginning of this refutation of pantheism is in God’s transcendence as the extrinsic cause of the world, and this point is made clear in the proof of God’s existence, and from the fact that God is most simple, there being no accidents in Him,*! and absolutely immutable,” whereas the world is composite and continually subject to change.

The truth of this answer is established in various texts of Holy Scripture. We quote the following: “And how could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?” ° “And God said: Be light made. And light was made,” ®t which means that God is the cause of things by

88 De div. nom., Bk. IV, chap. 1. 89 Summa theol. Ia, q.14, a.8. 90 Ibid., q.2, a.3.

a command of His intellect and will. And again: “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” %

Three proofs are given in the body of the article: (1) from the very order of active causes; (2) from the disposition of a natural agent; (3) from the relation of effects to their causes. These proofs given in the article are clear, especially after the explanation of the proof for God’s existence as supreme Ordainer from the order prevailing in the universe.

First proof. The first agent must act by intellect and will. But God is the first agent. Therefore He must act by intellect and will. The major is proved as follows: since both intellect and nature act for an end, the natural agent must have the end and the means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; thus the end and definite movement are predetermined for the arrow by the archer.

The ultimate reason for this is that the things which lack intelligence do not know the nature of an end as such, even though, as animals, they have a sensitive knowledge of the thing which constitutes their end, as in the case of the swallow collecting the wisps of straw for building its nest. They have no knowledge of the end as such, or of the raison d’étre of the means, because they lack the faculty whose object is intelligible being and the raison d’étre of things. Hence, as stated in the fifth proof for God's existence: “Those things that are without (intellectual) knowledge do not move toward an end, unless they are directed by some being that is endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.” % Hence the supreme agent must act not by nature, but by intellect and will.

Second proof. A natural agent always produces the same effect, unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent. But God in His being and nature is infinite or unlimited. Therefore, if God were to act, not by His intellect and will, but by His nature, then He would produce an infinite effect in being, which is impossible.%

It must be observed that the major of this syllogism is an inductive principle, already invoked by Aristotle, namely, that the same natural cause in the same circumstances always produces the same effect; for in this article it is stated that “the nature of the act of the natural agent is according to the nature of the agent; and hence, as long as it has that nature, its act will be in accord-

ance with that nature.” %8 If, therefore, it is certain that heat once or on several occasions expanded iron, then there is no need of having recourse to the method of induction by exhausting the number of particular cases; but we can affirm that if heat is truly the natural cause of the expansion of metals, it will always be so in the same circumstances, so long as heat remains the same in nature. And so, no matter what historians in our times may say, Aristotle and St. Thomas well knew on what the inductive principle of the laws of nature rests, namely, that the natural agent is determined to one thing.

At the end of this second proof St. Thomas speaks explicitly of the determination of the divine will, which is afterward frequently called the decree of the divine will. He says: “(God) does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.” Why did he put the will before the intellect? The reason is found in what was previously stated by him: “Since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (for the thing to be or not to be), inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites, it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite.” °° Thus both in ourselves and in God, the will in choosing brings it about that the last practical judgment is the final one (so that there is an end of deliberation), and after the will has made its choice (which terminates the order of intention, and which is frequently called the purpose of the will), then the intellect is urged to command the act (which begins the order of execution).

Finally, it must be remarked concerning this second proof that the determination of the divine will is required not only in electing that things come into being or not, but also for the non-necessary determination of these things, such as that the movement of the heavenly bodies should be, as at present, from east to west, instead of contrariwise. This point is made much clearer in a subsequent question,**! in which it is stated that “(God) produced things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone.” 1°? Thus

98 Otherwise a change in the effect, without a change in the cause or circumstances, would be without a reason for its existence.

100 On this point consult the reply to the fourth objection of this article.

God’s intellect and liberty are the explanation for the many and different creatures that proceed from the supreme Agent, who in Himself is most simple. Contrary to this, the Neoplatonists, in denying the absolute freedom of the creative act, advanced the theory of emanation, namely, the One-Good, as if indeed, in accordance with this theory, the first hypostasis, namely, the One- Good, generated by a necessity of his nature a second hypostasis inferior to himself, then a third and so on in succession. But then it is not explained why the second hypostasis is inferior to the first; for if the first acts from a necessity of his nature, as man generates, he ought to produce an effect like to himself in nature and therefore infinite, which is impossible, as stated in this second proof.t¢s

Third proof. Effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent. But God’s being is His own intellect. Therefore effects pre-exist in God after the mode of intellect, and therefore they proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently these effects proceed from Him after the mode of will.1%*

Reply to first objection. When Dionysius says that God communicates a participation of His goodness just as the sun illumines all things, he does not mean to exclude election from God absolutely, but he means that, just as the sun illumines all things, so God communicates a certain participation of His goodness to all things.

Reply to third objection. God’s goodness is the reason for His willing all things, and in this sense Augustine said: “Because God is good, we exist.”

From this it is evident that God not only created most freely, but by His will, and so He differs from man, who does indeed freely generate; but he does so, however, by his nature, inasmuch as he is of a certain nature, and hence he can generate only a being like himself in species. In fact, as Cajetan remarks, in commenting on this article: “A vigorous male generates a male, and the irascible

103 Grecian philosophers, who never succeeded in acquiring the concept of a free creation from nothing, were incapable of explaining how a multiplicity of things proceeds from one supreme principle. Plato wrote much in his dialogues, especially in the Parmenides and the Sophist, to solve this problem. He failed finally to show the relation between the different exemplary ideas and the idea of the supreme Good. In explaining the multiplicity of individuals, he admitted the eternal existence of matter which does not proceed from ideas, for they bear no resemblance to them. He also added that matter is not-being, which in a certain way exists.

104 See Cajetan’s commentary, and St. Thomas’ reply to the second objection; also Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 23; De potentia, q.1, a.5} G.3, a.15.

one that is irascible, as Aristotle says in his Ethics, Bk. VII, chap. 6.” 105

FIFTH ARTICLE WHETHER ANY CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL

State of the question. It seems that some cause is to be assigned to God’s will. The reasons for this are the following: (1) otherwise He would act irrationally; (2) otherwise there would be but one answer to any question whatever, namely, God willed it so, and thus it would be useless to seek the causes of things, which would mean the abolition of science, since it is knowledge by causes; (3) finally, we would have to say that all things depend simply on the will of God, there being no reason prior to this. Thus we could not even discover reasons of fittingness for any of the divine operations, such as creation, incarnation. Thus, in the fourteenth century, Ockham said, too, that the distinction between moral good and moral evil, or the first principle of the practical reason, namely, that good must be done and evil must be avoided, depends simply on the will of God, that is, on the divine positive law, so that this would be to do away with the natural law. Descartes says, too, that the truth of the principle of contradiction depends on God's free will. Contrary to this, St. Thomas wrote: “To say that justice depends simply on the will, is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the regulations of wisdom; and this is blasphemous.” 1% Leibnitz said likewise against Ockham and Descartes: “It is dishonoring God to hold that He established the distinction between good and evil by a purely arbitrary decree. . . . Why, then, would it not be the Manichaean principle of evil as the orthodox principle of good?” 1° This would result in the mind finally accepting the theories of absolute contingency and libertism, which are the very opposite of absolute determinism, such as that taught by Spinoza. Thus the statement of the question is evidently concerned with grave enough problems.

The answer is: There is no efficient cause of the divine will, or God does not will this on account of that (which is first intended), but He wisely wills this to be as means to that.

The first part is proved on the authority of St. Augustine in the counterargument, and then the following proof is given: The will follows from the intellect; but the divine intellect by one intuitive

105 Com. in lam, q.19, 4.4, no. 8. 106 De veritate, q.23, a.6. 107 Theodicée, II, §§ 176, 177.

act knows both principles and conclusions; therefore the divine will by one act wills its own goodness in itself and as it is the reason for loving creatures. Hence in God intention or the willing of the end is not, as in us, the cause of another act, namely, the choosing of the means. And so ıt is said that He does not will this on account of that; for God, the end is not the motive of His willing on the part of His act of willing, but only on the part of the thing willed.

The second part is proved as follows: The wise person wills the means to be for the end, the lower for the higher; but God wills most wisely whatever He wills; therefore God wills the means to be for the end, and the lower for the higher. This is stated in the body of the article and in the reply to the first objection. These two parts of the answer are summed up briefly in the following accepted formula: God does not will this on account of that, but He wills this to be as means to that. Hence, when we speak of the motive of either the creation or the incarnation, this does not mean the motive on the part of the willer, but on the part of the thing willed. Thus there is an end to difficulties.

Reply to second objection. It is not, therefore, useless to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. In fact, there are absolutely necessary laws in things, such as metaphysical principles, or the laws of being, for instance, the principle of contradiction, the truth of which does not depend on the divine liberty, notwithstanding what Descartes said. Similarly, mathematical laws, which abstract from both efficient and final causes, are absolutely necessary, for it is impossible that the three angles of a triangle be not equal to two right angles. Moreover, there are hypothetically necessary natural laws in things. Thus, if there is fire, then its action is to burn and not to cool, although God may miraculously prevent its action. In fact, there are certain laws of nature that are absolutely contingent and especially dependent on the divine liberty, such as that the motion of the heavenly bodies is from east to west, rather than in the reverse order. Finally, there are certain laws in things dependent solely on the will of God. As St. Thomas says: “In the things of nature, since primary matter is altogether uniform, a reason can be assigned why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.” 108

First corollary. Two errors must be avoided: (1) absolute contingency, which denies the absolute necessity of metaphysical and mathematical principles, and the hypothetical necessity of the laws of nature; (2) absolute determinism, which denies all contingency, as in Spinozism, or in a certain kind of mechanical materialism, in which, for instance, the law of conservation of energy is declared to be absolutely necessary, so that the influence exerted by our liberty on our organism and God’s miraculous intervention are excluded; for, as they say, there would thus be an increase in the quantity of energy in the universe, which remains the same. It does, indeed, remain the same in this sense, that when one form of energy is produced, such as heat, this is equivalent to an antecedent form, namely, of local motion necessary for the generation of heat. But the law of conservation of energy, without a begging of the principle, cannot be enunciated as a law that is by all means or absolutely necessary, in this sense, that the whole universe would be a closed system that would be removed from all external influence, even the invisible influence of God the Creator, who conserves and keeps it in motion. For how could experimental knowledge exclude this invisible influence, which is beyond the scope of experience? On the contrary, the transformation of energy demands not only a secondary cause, such as local motion for the generation of heat, but it also demands the First Cause; for only the First Cause is its own action and being, and without it the other causes produce no effect. Hence both absolute contingency and absolute determinism must be avoided.

Second corollary. It is hinted at in the reply to the third objection: the first effects willed by God depend on His divine will, namely, that creatures exist rather than that they do not exist depends solely on the most free will of God. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work; or we may say that God willed the incarnation of His Son for our redemption, as the end for which or the subject to whom the Incarnation is of benefit.

Third objection. Hence it would be false to say with the absolute nominalists, that we must not seek for reasons of fittingness for the creation or the Incarnation. But we must say that creation is so expedient for the manifestation of divine goodness that it would be inexpedient if God had not created, so that creation is a most free act. The same observations apply equally to the decree of the Incarnation. We must not seek for reasons of fittingness in those things that depend only on the simple will of God or solely and merely on His will of good pleasure, for example, “why this part of matter is under the form of fire, another under the form of earth.” 109

SIXTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS ALWAYS FULFILLED

State of the question. It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. (1) For the Apostle says that God “will have all men to be saved,” 11° and it does not happen so. We have also the following texts: “How often would I have gathered thy children together . . . and thou wouldest not.” 11 “I called, and you refused.” 122 “You always resist the Holy Ghost.” 18 (2) It seems that, just as God knows all truth, He wills all good, and yet many good things do not become realities. (3) The effects of the First Cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause. On the other hand, there are many texts in Holy Scripture that state the opposite, such as: ““Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” 114

The answer is: It is of faith that there is a certain will in God which is always fulfilled. This will of God is called the simple or consequent will, or the will that is absolute and efficacious.

1. Revelation proves this clearly, for we read: “The Lord of hosts hath decreed, and who can disannul it?” 115 “My counsel shall stand, and all My will shall be done.” 116 “There is none that can resist Thy will.” 17 “He will do all that pleaseth Him.” 18 “For who resisteth His will?” 11° “I give them (My sheep) life everlasting, and they shall not perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My Father hath given Me is greater than all; and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 120

The Church has particularly defined that God’s will concerning the bringing of the elect to glory is always fulfilled.121 In fact, con-

cerning the two divine wills, one of which is not always fulfilled, but the other infallibly so, the Council of Quierzy declares as follows: “Almighty God wills without exception all men to be saved, though not all are saved. That some are saved, however, is the gift of Him who saves; if some perish, it is the fault of them that perish.” 122 This formula is taken from the writings of St. Prosper.1?%

The Fathers, in explaining the above-quoted texts from Holy Scripture, often affirmed the infallibility of God’s consequent will, as St. Augustine did in the following words: “Nor is there any other reason why God is truly called omnipotent except that He can do whatever He wills to do; nor is the effect of God’s omnipotent will prevented by the will of any creature.” 124

The argumentative part of the article gives the following theological proof for the conclusion: It is not possible for anything to fall outside the order of the most universal cause, under which all particular causes are included; but God’s will (which is the will in the absolute sense) is the most universal cause, under which all particular causes are included; therefore it is not possible for anything to fall outside the order of this cause, and it is contradictory for this cause not to produce its effect.

The major is illustrated by a comparison between efficient and formal causes; for the agent acts in so far as it is in act, by means of its form. But in forms, although a thing may fall short of a particular form, such as humanity or life, it cannot fall short of the most universal form, which is being; for it is not possible for anything not to be being. Similarly, in efficient causes, somethiug can fall outside the order of a particular cause, for instance, the sun; but it cannot fall outside the order of the most universal cause, under which all other causes are included.

The minor is evident from the fact that God’s will is the cause of all things, as already shown.'*5 It presupposes a certain distinction which is explicitly made in the reply to the first objection, namely, the distinction between the antecedent or conditional and the consequent or absolute wills in God. It is only this latter which is called will in the absolute sense, and which is always fulfilled, a point that will be at once more clearly seen in the explanation that follows.

Immediately at the end of the argumentative part of the article

123 Responsio ad secundam objectionem Vincentianam.

121 Enchiridion, chap. 96. On the omnipotence of the divine will, consult Rouet de Journel’s Enchiridion patristicum, nos. 111, 171, 194, 266, 323, 325, 402, 542, 628, 815, 1366, 1712.

the following corollary is deduced: “That which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns to it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will when by its justice he is punished.” The reason for this is that God's will is the most universal of causes, and He permits evil only for the sake of a greater good which is efficaciously intended by Him, and which will infallibly be realized. This is also what is said in the reply to the third objection of this article. Similarly, in the reply to the second objection it is remarked that God does not will all possible good.

THE ANTECEDENT WILL OF GOD

Nevertheless there is still a difficulty about the universal will to save. The first objection in this article refers to this will, and it is formulated by the Apostle as follows: “God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” 17° But this does not happen.

St. Thomas’ reply to this first objection must now be examined, and this universal will to save will be more fully discussed in our appendix to this article. We shall there see that the consequent will and even the antecedent will refer to the will of good pleasure, which properly belongs to God.

Now there are several things of great importance to be remarked concerning this reply to the first objection. It must first of all be read.

1. It mentions St. Augustine’s explanation of St. Paul’s words, “God wishes all men to be saved.” St. Augustine interprets these words as applying to God’s efficacious will which is always fulfilled, and therefore he says: “God wills all men to be saved that are saved; or God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small.” 127

It miust be observed that as regards adults who actually are not saved, St. Augustine said, as mentioned in the Council of Trent: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both admonishes you to do what you are able, and to pray for what you are not able (to do).” 428 These words declare that there is a certain will attributed to God, by which He wills that His divine precepts be right at the moment really possible of fulfillment for all adults,

127 De praed. sanct., chap. 8; Enchiridion, chap. 103. 128 De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50.

and according as these know that they are bound by such obligations. Thus according to God's will it is really possible for these to be saved, which is denied by Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius.1?°

2. St. Thomas in his reply to this first objection refers to the opinion of St. John Damascene, who held that the words of St. Paul, “God will have all men to be saved,” apply to God’s antecedent will, but not to His consequent or efficacious will. This means that God of His goodness wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will which does not take into consideration, of course, the foreseeing of sin. But God, having foreseen the final impenitence of many, wills by His consequent will to inflict upon them the punishment due to their sins.1%°

But this solution of St. John Damascene considers the problem only under its moral aspects, so as to reconcile God's infinite goodness with His damnation of many. More briefly, according to St. John Damascene, God, of Himself and prior to any consideration, wills the salvation of all; but many sin and remain in sin, and therefore, as a consequence of this, God damns them, and so de facto they are not saved. This is the commonly accepted answer among Christians.

But there is still the difficulty about how the will of the omnipotent God is not fulfilled concerning those who are not saved. Is it not in God’s power to preserve them from falling into the sin of final impenitence? But if He has the power, does He permit this sin for a greater good, and what greater good is this? Moreover, are those who are actually saved, loved more and helped more by Him? Thus does St. Thomas posit the problem as it was formerly posited by St. Augustine, not only in its moral aspect as it was considered by St. John Damascene, but in its higher metaphysical and theological aspects, considering it under the light of this higher principle in the present article, namely, that the will of the omnipotent is always fulfilled. Thus the question is approached from a higher lane.

r 3) St. Thomas solves the question by three syllogisms which have their foundations in the following principles.

A. Everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. But a thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, it may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; but if a man is a murderer, that he live is an evil. Thus a just judge antecedently wills all men to live, but con-

sequently (on second consideration) he wills the man to be hanged. Therefore, in like manner God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts.

In the first syllogism St. Thomas retains the doctrine of St. John Damascene on the antecedent will, and thus he gives a better explanation of St. Paul’s text than St. Augustine gave in the passages just quoted. But there is still the difficulty that is not sufficiently considered by St. John Damascene, though properly so by St. Augustine, ie, whether’ the omnipotent God is incapable of saving all men or of preserving them from falling into sin? St. Thomas solves this difficulty by means of two arguments which he deduces from the first.

B. What we will antecedently we do not will simply but in a qualified manner, because the will is directed to things as they are in themselves (for good is not in the mind, as truth is, but in things), and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications, that is, they are willed as they are at the moment of willing.

Thus the just judge wills only in a qualified manner that the murderer should live, namely, inasmuch as he is a man. Hence it is not surprising that this antecedent will is not fulfilled, God's omnipotence, however, remaining intact, as will be more clearly seen now in the final argument to be presented.

We will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered, and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, inasmuch as he is a man.'*: Therefore “whatever God simply wills takes place, although what He wills antecedently does not take place.” Thus the conclusion of this article is preserved intact, namely, that God’s will, which is the will in the absolute sense, is always fulfilled. The principle of St. Augustine concerning the will of the omnipotent God and the opinion of St. John Damascene are likewise safeguarded by the previous arguments. The opinion of St. John Damascene is now presented in a clearer light, and this not only as regards its moral aspect, but also as regards its metaphysical and theological aspects.

First corollary. It follows from this that the antecedent will is not only that will which precedes the foreseeing of sin, but it is also the divine will that is never fulfilled, as in the case of those fruits that never get ripe, of those sufficient graces that make it possible

181 Cf. Summa theol., Ia Hae, q.6, a.6, concerning the merchant who, during a storm, wills simply to throw his cargo into the sea, although he would wish to keep it.

to keep God’s commandments, but which remain ineffective because of the resistance of the created free will.

Second corollary. Similarly not only is the consequent will the divine will of punishing after having foreseen one’s demerits, or of rewarding after having foreseen one’s merits, but it also refers to every act of the divine will which is directed toward good considered as it actually is with its accompanying circumstances, for instance, the fruits that actually get ripe, and the effective compliance with God’s commands.

Third corollary. Thus the principle of the distinction between sufficient grace and that grace which is of itself efficacious is ascribed to a higher source, as will be more clearly explained in a subsequent article.18?

We shall also see farther on, after explaining the eleventh and twelfth articles of this question, that the antecedent will is also the will of good pleasure, which is truly found in God, and which is not merely the will of expression, not merely an external sign of the divine will.1%%

The whole of this most celebrated reply to the first objection can be summed up in the following syllogism: Everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God, and good exists only as it actually is; but the antecedent will is directed toward good considered in the absolute sense and not as it actually will be, whereas the consequent will is directed toward good as it actually will be; therefore “whatever God simply or consequently wills takes place, although what He wills only antecedently may not take place.” Thus we come to the final conclusion as established by St. Thomas, by writing in the major of this argument what is expressed in each of the majors of the three preceding arguments.

If these arguments, however, are given careful consideration, then this reply of St. Thomas to the first objection is seen in all its beauty of structure. All its concepts are expressed with absolute precision and simplicity of language, and are in perfect harmony, so that God’s omnipotence, as affirmed by St. Augustine, is reconciled with His universal will to save, as affirmed by St. John Damascene. There remains indeed for our consideration the mystery about how infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in the eminence of the Deity or of God’s intimate life 2%

133 See the appendix to this article: The teaching of St. Thomas on the universal will to save.

134 On this point consult farther on our commentary on predestination, q.23, a.5, c. et ad gum.

All this doctrine may be summed up in this most certain principle formulated in the Council of Thuzey (860), which put an end to the discussions on predestination arising from the works of Gottschalk: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven and on earth (Ps. 134: 6). For nothing is done in heaven and on earth except what He Himself is pleased to do, or justly permits to be done.” 135 It follows from this: (1) that no good thing positively and actually happens to be found in this man rather than in a certain other, unless God from all eternity efficaciously willed that it should so come to pass; (2) that no evil thing positively and actually happens to be found in this man rather than in a certain other, unless God from all eternity permitted it. The sinner, indeed, in the very act of sinning, can avoid committing the sin, and from all eternity God willed that it be really possible for the sinner to avoid committing the sin (which is God’s antecedent will); but God did not efficaciously will that this sinner right at this moment positively should avoid committing the sin, and if God had efficaciously willed this, then this sinner not only positively could avoid committing the sin, but truly would have avoided committing it. These are most certain and commonly accepted principles which have their foundation in revelation, and from them is derived the distinction between sufficient grace, which gives the power to do what is right, and grace that is of itself efficacious, which causes us freely to do what is right.

TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS ON THE UNIVERSAL WILL TO SAVE

This question is bound up with another, namely, whether Christ died for all men, and this evidently concerns the mystery of predestination. In fact, every error about God's will to save brings us back to an error about the mystery of predestination, and vice versa.

Thus the Semipelagians held that the beginning of salvation and final perseverance come from us, and not from God.13¢ Hence they said that God wills equally the salvation of all men, and went so far as to deny the gratuity of predestination on the part of the elect. On the other hand, the predestinarians and subsequently the first Protestants and the Jansenists so vitiated the notions of the gratuitous predestination of the elect and of human liberty, as to

136 Cf. Denz., nos. 178, 183, for condemnation of Semipelagianism by the Second Council of Orange.

deny God’s universal will to save and the existence of grace that is truly sufficient for those not predestined. They likewise said that Christ did not die for all men.**7

We must therefore investigate: (1) what is defined of faith and what is theologically certain on these points; (2) what is the disputed point among theologians, especially between Thomists and Molinists, as regards God's universal will to save; (3) what is the validity of the Thomist view as compared with the teachings of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. John Damascene. (5) Then there will be a solution of the objections.

I. WHAT 1S OF FAITH

1. It is of faith that God sincerely wills the salvation not only of the predestined, but of all the faithful. This is evidently so for two reasons. (1) The fifth proposition of Jansenius, asserting that “it is a Semipelagian heresy to say that Christ died for all men without exception,” 138 was condemned as heretical, if this means that Christ died only for the salvation of the predestined. (2) Moreover, the Apostles’ Creed is binding upon all the faithful, and it says of Christ: “Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven.”

2. It is certain and proximate to the faith that God sincerely wills the salvation of even all adult infidels, in so far as He makes it really possible for them here and now to observe His precepts whenever these are binding upon them. To say otherwise would mean that God commands what is impossible.'*®

3. It is the common opinion of theologians that God sincerely wills even the salvation of all infants who die before they can be baptized. But it is more difficult to explain how it is really possible for these to be saved. The faith of the Church on these points has its foundation in revelation as variously expressed in Scripture and tradition. Thus we read: “We hope in the living God, who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful.” 14 Even concerning infidels, St. Paul says: “I desire first of all that prayers be made for all men. . . . This is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowl-

edge of the truth.” 11 This text refers to all human beings. St. Augustine, too, understood these texts in this manner.**?

IN WHAT SENSE CHRIST DIED FOR ALL

The Church has declared that Christ died for all,+** not only for the predestined *** or only for the believers,*** although not all receive the benefit of salvation.'#*

How do the majority of Thomists explain this truth? They understand it in the sense that “Christ so died for all men that He truly and sincerely willed to offer His death to the Father for the eternal salvation of the whole human race, antecedently indeed and sufficiently salutary for the reprobates, consequently and efficaciously so for the predestined.” 147

St. Paul says: “If one died for all, then all were dead; and Christ died for all.” 148 Similarly he says: “Therefore as by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.” 149 According to this parallelism it must be said that each and all died because of Adam’s sin; therefore Christ died for all. Thus St. Augustine declares in one of his works: “Just as infants died through Adam’s sin, so also Christ died for them,” 150 even for those not baptized.

But the contrary teaching of Jansenius frustrates one of the principal articles of faith. Hope, which is founded primarily on Christ’s death offered for us, becomes languid, and charity, which finds its source of energy in the remembrance of Christ’s love as the Savior of mankind, becomes cold.

II. THE DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF MODERN THEOLOGIANS CONCERNING GOD'S ANTECEDENT WILL FOR THE SALVATION OF ALL MEN

This question is discussed at length by the Thomist, Gonzalez de Albeda,?** who wrote after Molina and Bannez. His special purpose

142 Cf. De catechizandis rudibus, PL, XL, 345. 143 Denz., nos. 319, 795, 1096, 3026.

is to show that sufficient grace, which depends on the antecedent will of God, is, in its order, truly sufficient. There is much that is helpful in his writings, although not all that he wrote is to be approved, and was not approved by the other Thomists. It must first of all be noted that there are two general and mutually conflicting opinions. These are the Thomist and Molinist opinions.

For the Thomists, who follow the teaching of St. Thomas,'®? the antecedent will of God is always of itself inefficacious, because it is concerned with what is considered absolutely as such to be good, but not with what is considered here and now to be good. But it is only good in this latter sense that comes into being.

On this point all Thomists agree, but they differ in this, that formerly some held the antecedent will to be more probably the will of expression, which is not found properly and formally in God, but only metaphorically, because it is more an external expression of God’s will. Such was the opinion of Cajetan, Bannez, Zumel, as also of several of the old theologians.1*#

Other Thomists who wrote after the time of Bannez (such as Lemos, Alvarez, Gonzalez, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart) hold that the antecedent will is the will of good pleasure, which is properly and formally in God.

The Molinists, however, have a different conception of the antecedent will. They are of the opinion that this will is not of itself alone always inefficacious; 1°* for they define it as that will which precedes the foreseeing of our consent that is known by means of the scientia media. And they define the consequent will as the will which follows this foreseen consent, and is thus the will by which God punishes or rewards. Molinists are agreed on this point, although there are certain minor differences among them, as will be stated farther on.

These opinions must be examined, and they may be expressed by the following schema:

168 Alexander of Hales (Ia, q.36, membr. 2), St. Bonaventure (I, d.46, a.1, q.1), and Scotus (II, d.46, a.1) are also quoted as in favor of this opinion. These ancient authors said that the will of good pleasure is always fulfilled; but in other parts of his works, St. Bonaventure said that the antecedent will is the will of good pleasure, which was what St. Thomas said.

154 Even in Molinism the antecedent will of God is not properly “of itself alone” sometimes efficacious, but by reason of our foreseen consent. Nevertheless it can be said that the will is “of itself alone sometimes efficacious,” understood in the sense that it is not found along with God’s consequent will. In this Molinism differs from Thomism. See Molina’s Concordia (Paris ed., 1876), pp. 384-94.

and is more probably the will of expression: the view is always | of Cajetan and Bannez.

ineffica- a P .

cious It is the will of good pleasure: the view of St. Thomas A and of the Thomists generally.

nte- cedent . S : , will ot the absolute gratuity of predestination to salvation is itself preserved intact: the opinion of St. Robert Bellarmine alone 1s not and of Suarez.

always ae T ineffica- so that predestination to salvation is after our foreseen cious merits, at least the conditionally free and meritorious acts of the future: the opinion of Molina, Valentia, l and Vasquez.

1. Cajetan and Bannez think it more probable that the antecedent will as regards the salvation of all men is only the will of expression, but not the will of good pleasure. They understand this distinction as explained by St. Thomas,!55 namely, that the will of good pleasure is the very act of the divine will, and thus it is formally in God; whereas the will of expression is only metaphorically and causally attributed to God, for it is, strictly speaking, something external which, as we understand it, is a sign that God wills something. Thus a divine command externally given to men, even the most wicked, is called the divine will, inasmuch as it is a sign that God wills us to do what is commanded. Thus God wills (by His will of expression), so they say, that all men, even criminals, be saved. Moreover, God does not command what is impossible, and so He wills at least that the fulfillment of His precepts be here and now really possible for all adults who have knowledge of these commands.158

Cajetan and Bannez also say that the will of expression, which is a command, sometimes is identical with the will of good pleasure, and sometimes not. Thus when God commanded Abraham to kill his son, this did not coincide with His will of good pleasure, since indeed He afterward commanded the contrary.1*

2. The opinion of other Thomists, such as Lemos, Alvarez, Gonzales, includes a criticism of the preceding. They reply that the antecedent will is not only the will of expression, but is also the will of good pleasure, as expressly stated by St. Thomas, for he says: “Will in the strict sense of the term is found in God, and so will is, strictly speaking, predicated of God, which is the will of good pleasure, and this is subdivided into consequent and antecedent wills.” 158 This is

158 De veritate, q.23, a.3; see also J Sent., d.46, a.2; Com. in Ep. I ad Tim. 2: 4 also quite clear from the examples given by St. Thomas in his reply to the first objection of the present article, in which he points out that a judge truly and in the strict sense wills that a man, inasmuch as he is a man, should live, although he condemns the murderer to death. Moreover, this opinion is proved both from Holy Scripture, and by a theological argument.

A. Scriptural proof. The words of Holy Scripture are to be taken in their literal sense, provided nothing derogatory to God or contrary to faith or morals results therefrom. But Holy Scripture in various texts asserts that God wills the salvation of all men coming into the world since Adam's fall, and if this is understood, indeed, as referring to His conditioned but proper and formal will of good pleasure, and not to His will metaphorically so called, nor merely to His will of expression, then there is nothing either derogatory to God or contrary to faith that follows therefrom. Hence the words of Holy Scripture asserting that God wills the salvation of all men are to be taken in their literal sense. By all means the following texts must be so interpreted: “Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth . . . (for) Christ gave Himself a ransom for all.” 15 “The Lord . . . not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance.” 160 “Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered together thy children, . . . and thou wouldest not.” 1861 St. John Chrysostom understood these texts as referring to God’s will which He truly possesses, for he says: “In a wonderful way God yearns for and vehemently desires our salvation.” 182 The Greek Fathers all speak in like manner, as Jansenius concedes. Even St. Augustine seems to admit this will of good pleasure, for he writes: “It is most sincerely to be believed and professed that God wills men to be saved, since indeed the Apostle, who was of this opinion, earnestly commanded what is faithfully observed in all the Churches, that supplications be made to God for all mėn.” 18

B. The generally accepted opinion among Thomists is proved by the following argument: The will of good pleasure derives its name from the interior inclination and ordination of God, and not solely from what is a sign of this will. But God interiorly wills the salvation of all men and provides them with sufficient means for this although, considering the circumstances, and because of the higher ends involved by reason of the manifestation of His justice and His other attributes, the defectibility of the human will presupposed, He

163 De spiritu et littera, chap. 33.

willed to permit that a considerable number fail to attain this end. Therefore His universal salvific or antecedent will is His will of good pleasure. .

The minor of this argument is proved as follows: as the choice of efficacious means for salvation presupposes the efficacious interior intention to save, so also the choice of sufficient means for salvation presupposes the inefficacious interior intention to save. So say the majority of the Thomists.

This argument is confirmed by a consideration of God's salvific will. For indeed an object that is in itself good and that is not only possible, but that is a conditioned future, terminates the internal decree of the divine will which is subjectively absolute but objectively conditioned. But the salvation of all men who are still wayfarers is something that is in itself good and that is a conditioned future or a futurable, and not something that is merely possible. Therefore the salvation of all men who are still wayfarers is a conditioned future that terminates the internal decree of the divine will which is subjectively absolute but objectively conditioned.

The major is explained by pointing out that, if this good object were merely possible, it would not terminate the internal decree of the divine will; if it were a contingent absolute future, it would terminate God’s efficacious decree; but as a conditioned future it terminates the internal conditioned decree of the divine will, namely, a decree similar to that presupposed in the prophecy of commination.1%

Therefore the conclusion we come to is, that the antecedent will is not only the will of expression, but is also the will of good pleasure, although it is objectively conditioned, as will be more clearly seen from the solution of the objections.

3. The opinion of Molina and the Molinists. Molina and Valentia think. that St. John Damascene and St. Thomas held different opinions on this subject, and they seek to depart from the teaching of St. Thomas and return to that of St. John Damascene. But among the Molinists, Vasquez maintains that St. Thomas interpreted aright the viewpoint of St. John Damascene, though he himself departs from the teaching of St. Thomas.

What is Molina’s teaching about the antecedent will? This is clearly made known to us from his writings.'®* He is of the opinion that the antecedent will as regards the salvation of all men is a conditioned will in this sense: “provided we, too, will.” Hence sometimes God's antecedent will is fulfilted, that is, when man wills to» make God's help efficacious in its second actuality; and sometimes ;

this antecedent will of God is only a velleity, that is, when man does not will to make God’s help efficacious in its second actuality. Hence for Molina the antecedent will is the will that is prior to the foreseeing of our consent.

Nevertheless, that Molina may escape the taint of Semipelagianism, which declares that God wills equally the salvation of all men, so that predestination is made to consist in the foreknowledge of the merits, he holds that God, by reason of His most free will of good pleasure, decreed to place this man, for instance, Peter, in those circumstances in which He had foreseen his good consent; whereas Judas is placed in other circumstances in which his infidelity to grace was foreseen. Thus Molina vitiates the above definition of the antecedent will. But, according to this definition, Molina must define the consequent will in the opposite sense, as being the will which follows the foreseeing of our consent, like the will of rewarding and punishing, of which St. John Damascene speaks.

It must be noted that Molina’s conception of the antecedent will is such that the predestination of the elect to salvation is considered the result of foreseen merits, at least of conditioned merits, which is the teaching of Valentia and Vasquez. In fact, Valentia maintains that all good acts which are dependent on free will are willed by God's antecedent will and not by His consequent will. On the contrary, St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez, although they retain from Molinism the theory of the scientia media and its corresponding conception of the antecedent will, nevertheless maintain with the Thomists, Augustinians, and Scotists, the absolute gratuity of predestination to salvation. Hence their conception of the antecedent and consequent wills is more in agreement with the opinion of St. Thomas. Thus, according to these theologians, sufficient graces are the result of God’s antecedent will; and congruous graces, are the result of God’s freely predestinating consequent will and are infallibly efficacious, not indeed of themselves, but because of the foreseeing of our consent by means of the scientia media,1**

CRITICISM OF MOLINA’S OPINION

1. This opinion rests on the theory of the scientia media. But the sctentia media, which is concerned with the conditionally free acts of the future before God’s conditioned decree, is a knowledge without an object, because before God’s decree the conditionally free act

166 Cf. Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. Il, chaps. 9-15; Bk. IV, chap. 15. Suarez, De auxiliis, Bk. III, chaps. 16f.; De causa praedestinationis, Bk. II, chap. 23; De scientia futurorum contingentium, chap. 7.

jg THE ONE GOD of the future is undetermined, since it is a contingent and free act.1* But if it is said that God, because of His super-comprehensive knowledge of our will and of the circumstances, foresees our consent if we should be placed in such and such circumstances, then this, theory, which was devised to safeguard our liberty, leads to determinism of circumstances, and moreover, since God would not be determining, then He would be passively determined in His foreknowledge. There is no solution of the dilemma: God is either determining or determined, there is no other alternative. The same is also to be said of the modified theory of the scientia media proposed by Suarez.'"°

2. The Molinist definition of the antecedent will results in a definition of the consequent will as the will which follows the foreseeing of our consent. But this definition applies to a certain kind of consequent will, namely, to that of rewarding or punishing, but not to every kind of consequent will. For indeed the consequent will of calling one efficaciously to faith and grace does not presuppose but precedes our consent, since it is the cause of this. Similarly the predestination of the elect to glory or salvation denotes the consequent will, and yet it does not presuppose the foreseeing of merits, as will be stated farther on,!°° because the merits of the elect are the effects of their predestination. St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez admit this. Even in Molinism, the will to place Peter in circumstances in which his good consent is foreseen, rather than to place him in certain other circumstances, is the consequent will, and yet it does not presuppose, like the will of rewarding or punishing, the foreseeing of Peter's consent as a future act, but only as a conditionally future act.

Hence we come back to St. Thomas’ opinion,'”° that the antecedent will is directed toward good, considered absolutely as such, and not as it is under particular qualifications. Thus of itself alone it is not efficacious, because only what is good under particular qualifications comes into being. On the other hand, the consequent will ial Summa theol., Ila Hae, q.171, a.g: “Future contingent things, whose truth is not determined, are not in themselves knowable.”

168 Consult what was said about the scientia media in our commentary on q-14, 2.13.

170 Ibid., Ia, q.19, a.6 ad 1um. The phrase “ante praevisa merita” which, translated literally, means “before foreseen merits,” may be misleading for many readers. It does not mean that God first predestined and afterward foresaw our future merits; this would be an imperfection in God, which is impossible. By one and the same act God decrees and foresees. Nor does it mean that God predestined certain persons to glory by a purely arbitrary act of His will, and that they would get to heaven without having merited this. It does mean, however, that the foreseen future merits of the elect were not the motive for God's predestination of certain persons to glory. [Tr]

is directed to good considered as such here and now, that is, when all the particular circumstances are considered. This is what is known as will simply as such, and it is always efficacious, because good is in things themselves, and these exist only under particular qualifications.

These definitions, which consider the will and good in their metaphysical aspects, can be applied universally. The first definition applies to every antecedent will, and the second to every consequent will, which means that it applies not only to the will of rewarding or punishing, but also to the efficacious will of calling one to the faith and predestinating one to salvation before foreseen merits.

Ill. THE VALIDITY OF THE THOMIST OPINION AND HOW IT COMPARES WITH THE TEACHINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE, ST. PROSPER, AND THE VIEWPOINT OF ST. JOHN DAMASCENE

The Thomist opinion is in harmony with the teaching of St. Augustine, whose interpreter was St. Prosper, and that of St. John Damascene. It reconciles these teachings from the exalted notion it has of the “simple will” of the omnipotent God, which is always fulfilled, as shown in this sixth article. A careful examination of the principal texts of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. John Damascene establish this point with sufficient clarity.

It must be noted first of all that St. John Chrysostom distinguishes two wills in God.17! One is the will to save all men, even sinners; the other is the will to punish consequent to the foreseeing of the sin. Yet he maintains that the elect are more loved and helped by God, in accordance with the scriptural text: “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 172 In his commentary on this epistle he says: “Therefore thou hast what thou hast received, neither this only nor that, but whatever thou hast; for these are not thy merits, but God’s gifts.” 173

But as St. Augustine frequently remarked, the Fathers who wrote before the time of the Pelagian heresy spoke only incidentally of predestination. It is a mystery that is intimately connected with God's universal will to save.***

173 Hom. 12. See also St. Gregory Nazianzus, Com. in Rom., hom. XIV, 7; hom. XIX, 7. Cf. also Tixeront's History of Dogmas, IJ, 145 E.

174 On this subject consult St. Robert Bellarmine’s De gralia et libero arbitrio, Bk. H, chap. 14; also Tixeront, op. cit, II, 497-500, for St. Augustine's teaching on God's universal will to save. This point had already been discussed by Petau in his De incarnatione, Bk. XIII, chaps. 3 f.

1. St. Augustine, as we already said, frequently understood St. Paul’s text, “Who will have all men to be saved,” 17° as referring to God’s efficacious will; so he at once interpreted it as meaning: “God wills all men to be saved that are saved, and He wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small.” 1° What St. Thomas says of God's consequent will, which is always fulfilled, is absolutely in agreement with these texts of St. Augustine.

2. St. Augustine spoke in another of his works in equivalent terms of God’s antecedent will, which is not always fulfilled. Thus he wrote: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able and to pray for what thou art not able (to do).” +77 From this text, which is quoted by the Council of Trent,!*§ it is evident that, according to St. Augustine, God wills to make the fulfillment of His precepts really possible for adults, here and now, in so far as these are not only known by adults, but also as they are of obligation for them; otherwise God would be commanding impossibilities, and then sin would be unavoidable, in which case He would be punishing them unjustly, especially with eternal punishments. The Thomist doctrine of the antecedent will, by which God gives sufficient graces which make it really possible for us here and now to fulfill God’s precepts, is absolutely in agreement with this and similar texts of St. Augustine,

3. Afterward, in various places, St. Augustine spoke more explicitly of the universal will to save, as referring to God’s antecedent will, although he does not use these words. It is more a question of what is implied than of words used. Thus he writes: “God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; yet not in such a way that He deprives them of free will, for the good or bad use of which they will be most justly judged.” 19 As is evident from the context, St. Augustine means this proffered statement of his to be taken as a probable way of explaining the words of the Apostle: “God will have all men to be saved.” 18°

In like manner St. Augustine says: “God, in His mercy, sent His only begotten Son, wishing to free men from this death that consists in eternal punishments, provided they are not their own enemies, and do not resist the mercy of their Creator.” 181

ay De praed. sanct., chap. 8, and the Enchiridion, chap. 103, one of his earlier WOrks.

181 De catechizandis rudibus, chap. 26. See also ibid., no. 52.

Moreover, St. Augustine clearly affirms that Christ died for all, which presupposes in God the will to save all. For the holy Doctor says: “One, says the Apostle (II Cor. 5: 15), died for all, therefore all died: showing by this that He could have died only for those who died. For by this he proved that all died, because one died for all. . . . See, as a consequence of this, that he wanted us to understand that all died, if he died for all.” 182

Finally, in one of his uncompleted works, St. Augustine likewise says: “One died for all, therefore all died. This conclusion of the Apostle remains unchallenged, and by reason of this, because He also died for infants, assuredly, too, infants died.” 18° The holy Doctor says this against the Pelagians, who refuse to admit the existence of original sin; but from this it is evident that, in St. Augustine’s opinion, Christ died for all without exception, even for infants who die without being baptized, and who de facto are not saved. This shows clearly that there is a will in God to save all, which of itself, since it is not found in connection with His efficacious will, is not actually fulfilled. Therefore these texts of St. Augustine are fully in agreement with the Thomist opinion concerning the antecedent will.

On this point, what was the teaching of St. Prosper, who was a disciple of St. Augustine? 18t St. Prosper was prompted to write by reason of the error of Cassian, who in his Collations showed a preference for Semipelagianism.'** Cassian, indeed, and many of the monks of Marseilles had rejected the absolute gratuity of predestination taught by St. Augustine. St. Prosper and St. Hilary wrote to St. Augustine about this (429), so that he wanted to refute them.18* These monks of Marseilles said that ‘““God’s grace accompanies but does not precede human merits,” 187 and that “God wills indifferently all

. . to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” 18° Thus the predestination of the elect was reduced to the simple foreknowledge of their merits, as in Semipelagianism, and hence the elect were not the objects of God’s predilection, nor were they more helped by Him.18°

St. Augustin replied to these epistles of St. Prosper and St. Hilary by writing two treatises ‘°° against the Semipelagians, in which, to

183 Contra Julianum, op. imp., Bk. II, chap. 163; cf. ibid., chaps. 63, 174, 175.

184 Consult Tixeront, History of Dogmas, III, 272-82.

186 Among the letters of St. Augustine, letter 225 is the epistle of St. Prosper, and letter 226 is the epistle of St. Hilary.

190 Cf. De praedest. sanct.; de dono persever.

make it clear that predestination is gratuitous, he stresses certain texts from St. Paul’s epistles.’*

After the death of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, who was a layman but a most faithful disciple of St. Augustine, defended his master’s doctrine about the beginning of faith and the intrinsic efficacy of divine grace by which we perform good acts; hence he denied that God wills “indifferently” that all men be saved.'*?

Nevertheless, St. Prosper wrote: “It must be most sincerely believed and professed that God wills all men to be saved.” 193 But he adds that this will is efficacious only for the predestined, whose number is determined. Thus he is clearer than St. Augustine in teaching that damnation is after foreseen demerits; yet he retains the absolute gratuity of predestination, which is thus before foreseen merits.

Shortly after St. Prosper’s death, between the years 434 and 460, some unknown person wrote a work !% in which he set forth the teaching of St. Augustine, yet not in all its rigor. The author of this work seeks to reconcile God’s universal salvific will, which he admits, with the fact that many are lost. Therefore he distinguishes between a general grace, which is offered to all, and a special grace which, by God's special mercy, is granted to many and which is the efficacious cause of their salvation.

In the fifth century, however, the priest Lucidus seems to have denied God's universal salvific will. Faustus of Riez replied in the Semipelagian sense.'** Finally the African, St. Fulgentius, strictly defended St. Augustine’s doctrine on the gratuity of predestination, though it does not seem that he stresses enough God's universal will to save. Yet St. Fulgentius refused to deny this proposition of St. Augustine: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able, and earnestly to ask for what thou art not able (to do).” 197

Finally, in the eighth century, St. John Damascene distinguished between God's antecedent and benevolent will, by which He wills the salvation of all men, and His consequent will, by which He wills to punish sinners either for a time or for eternity.1%

Nevertheless he says: “Without God’s help we can neither will nor

191 Cf. Rom., chaps. 8 f.; Eph., 1: 4-12; I Cor. 4: 7: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?”

192 Cf. Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum gallorum calummantun, 4, 5-

193 Responsiones ad capitula objectionum vincentianarum, chap. 2.

do what is good, but we are free either to persevere in doing good or refrain from so doing.” 1° From this text it is dear that those who persevere in doing good (the elect) are more helped by God than the others whom He permits to fall into sin. For God is the cause of the meritorious act, but not of sin. St. John Damascene clearly states this, although he makes no profound statement about the necessity and efficacy of actual grace in the life of the predestined.?°

As I said above, St. John Damascene considered this question in its moral aspect as it refers to God’s goodness and man’s culpability, rather than in its theological and metaphysical aspects as it refers to God’s omnipotent will, which is always fulfilled when it is a case of His absolute will and not of His qualified or conditioned will.

On the contrary, it was particularly this second aspect of God’s will that was considered by St. Augustine. And St. Thomas reconciles both aspects, by explaining the antecedent will, which St. John Damascene speaks of, as referring to good considered absolutely as such, and not as it is here and now; whereas the consequent will, he observes, is directed to good considered as it is here and now. But since good, which is in the things themselves, comes into being here and now only, it follows that the antecedent will of itself alone, when not joined to the consequent will, remains inefficacious. Hence the division of God’s will into these two wills is the ultimate foundation for the distinction between sufficient grace, and grace that is of itself efficacious. The former is the result of God’s antecedent will, which makes it really possible for us here and now to do what He commands; the latter is the result of His consequent will, which moves us so that we actually do what He commands. But from the fact that man resists sufficient grace, by reason of his defectibility, he deserves to be deprived of efficacious grace.

Thus the teaching of St. Thomas preserves intact both St. Augustine’s opinion and St. John Damascene’s, thus safeguarding the omnipotence of God, whose absolute will is always fulfilled, and the goodness of God, who does not command impossibilities and who makes it really possible for all to do what He commands.” What-

200 On this point consult also his Com. in I Cor. 4:7: “What hast thou that thou hast not received?”; and in II Cor. 3: 4 f., in which he affirms that every good act, and hence our merits, are the result of God's grace. Cf. Tixeront, op. cit., ITI, 478.

Some, too, in recent times have sought to interpret St. John Damascene’s doctrine in a Molinist sense. But several of his texts can be understood in the opposite sense. In truth, it must be said that St. John Damascene had not as yet so explicitly considered this question.

201 Consult St. Thomas’ Com. in I Sent., d.46, a.1; d.47, a.1; De veritate, q-23, 2.2; in I Tim. 2: 1-6, which agrees with what he said in the reply to the first objection of this sixth article.

ever the adversaries may say, Thomism acknowledges that this question of the salvific will is a mystery, not only as it affects our liberty, but also on God's part. And in this we clearly see both the exalted nature and insufficiency of sacred theology, which disposes one for the knowledge of infused contemplation, in which there is peace of mind and rest; for this contemplation is the effect of grace, which is a formal participation of the Deity, in which justice, mercy and supreme liberty are identified.

IV. SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

First objection. One fails to see why the antecedent will is conditioned, unless it is said that God wills all men to be saved, if they themselves will to be saved. But this is precisely Molina’s opinion. Therefore, unless Molina’s opinion is accepted, one fails to see why the antecedent will be conditioned.

Reply. This opinion, as we have said, presupposes the theory of the scientia media, for which there is no foundation and by which God, in His foreknowledge of conditionally free acts of the future, would be in a passive state. This theory was not fully approved even by Molina himself, who, to avoid Semipelagianism and preserve intact the dogma of predestination, admitted that God of His own most free will of good pleasure places the elect in circumstances in which He foresaw their good consent. And it is the gratuity of predestination that is more aflirmed both by St. Robert Bellarmine and by Suarez.

Hence it is for Molina himself to answer this question, namely, why God did not will to place all men in those circumstances in which He foresaw their good consent.

But he must answer this question as St. Thomas did, by quoting St. Paul’s text: “What if God, willing to show His wrath (i.e. the splendor of His justice), and to make His power known, endured (i.e., permitted) with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory (where is the injustice?)”’ 2°

Hence it follows that the antecedent will is conditioned in this sense, that God would will the salvation of all men if He did not will to permit in many the sin of final impenitence to serve the higher ends of either manifesting the splendor of His justice, or His inalienable rights to be loved above all things. Thus He willed to ett His goodness, sparing by His mercy and punishing by His justice.

J

This condition is retained even by Molina, otherwise he would be absolutely denying the mystery of predestination. It is, indeed, an inscrutable mystery, and its reconciliation with the universal salvific will is nothing but the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty in the Deity, which is hidden from us, and which can be seen only in the beatific vision. But a strictly syllogistic objection, and one that is incapable of solution, cannot be raised against the possibility of God’s permitting the sin of final impenitence.

But I insist: Nevertheless, what was said by several of the post- Nicene Fathers, namely, those who wrote before the rise of Pelagianism, and after the rise of this heresy what St. John Damascene said, practically meant that God wills the salvation of all men if they themselves will to be saved. Therefore the condition on which God’s antecedent will depends, finds its explanation in none of the higher motives, but merely in man’s will.

The Thomists reply to this by distinguishing the antecedent: God wills the salvation of all men, if they themselves will to be saved, waiting for them so to will, this I deny; if such volition is the result of God’s operation in them, this I concede, according to what St. Paul says: “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 2? I distinguish the consequent in like manner. It was not the intention of the post-Nicene Fathers or St. John Damascene to deny this text of St. Paul or the following: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 204

To say otherwise would not be to uphold the definition of the Council of Orange, which says against the Semipelagians: “If anyone maintains that God waits for us to will that we be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even this act of willing to be cleansed from sin is the result of the inspiration and operation of the Holy Spirit in us, such a person resists the Holy Spirit . . . and the Apostle preaching for our spiritual benefit that: It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 2° St. Augustine wrote in like manner.?°* To say otherwise, as we already remarked, would be to deny the mystery itself of predestination. Wherefore, as we pointed out, even Molina somewhat restricted his definition of the antecedent will. On the other hand, all Catholics admit that God wills all men to be saved, if they themselves will to be saved, that is, presupposing their co-operation prompted by grace.

St. Augustine himself says: “He who created you without your help, will not save you without your help.” #°* Nor did anyone ever think of saying that God wills to save those who refuse and do not wish to be saved.

Second objection. What is conditioned is imperfect. But the antecedent will is conditioned, because, as stated above, it presupposes a greater good, namely, the manifestation of God’s attributes. Therefore it implies an imperfection, and hence cannot be properly and formally in God, but only metaphorically and virtually, as being the will of expression and not of good pleasure. This objection expresses the very opposite of the preceding.

Reply. I distinguish the major. The conditioned is imperfect, on the part of that which is conditioned, this I concede; otherwise I deny it. I contradistinguish the minor: that the antecedent will is conditioned on the part of the thing willed, which is not accepted with all its accompanying circumstances because of a higher good, this I concede; that it is conditioned, as if God were incapable of saving all men, this I deny. So say St. Thomas ° and the majority of the Thomists when discussing God’s subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned decrees.2°° This means that God wills all men to be saved, if this does not conflict with the manifestation of His divine attributes, the ordering of all things by His providence, and the contingency and defectibility of human beings.

But I insist: The efficacious will as such is a perfection; hence the inefficacious will as such is an imperfection. Therefore this cannot be properly and formally in God.

Reply. I distinguish the consequent: that the inefficacious will, which is the result of the nullification of its power by an extrinsic impediment, is an imperfection, this I concede. Such is the will of the merchant who desires to save his merchandise at the moment of shipwreck. That the inefficacious will, which is the result of the willer’s positively ordaining things to higher ends, is an imperfection, this I deny.

It is the antecedent will, as conceived by Molinists, that posits imperfection in God; for they say God wills all men to be saved, provided they themselves will to be saved. In this case the antecedent will would be conditioned, the condition depending on the consent

208 St. Thomas says (I Sent., d.46, q.1, a.1 ad 2um): be called conditioned; yet its imperfection is not on the part of the divine will, but of the thing willed, which is not willed with all the circumstances that are required for being rightly ordered to salvation.” St. Thomas says about the same in his reply to the first objection of this article. 209 For a critical estimate of the scientia media, for instance, Billuart, De Deo, diss. VI, a.6, § 10.

“The antecedent will may consult their commentaries, or dissent of human beings, and not solely because of a higher good intended by Providence, this being the manifestation of God's attributes.

This solution is confirmed by the fact that Holy Scripture records many instances of conditioned futures. Thus God promised Abraham to spare Sodom, if ten just men were found in it. Similarly it was revealed that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted if Christ had come to them. But these conditioned futures are infallibly knowable by God only in His subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned decrees, and this we say against those who favor the theory of the scientia media. Hence a subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned decree must likewise be admitted with regard to the conditioned salvation of all men.

Third objection. But the subjectively absolute and the objectively conditioned decree implies a contradiction, for by it God wills and does not will the same object. Thus God wills the conversion of the Tyrians, and, on the other hand, He does not will it, because He does not will that the gospel be preached to them. Therefore the same holds good of His decree.

Reply. It is false to say that by this decree God wills and does not will the same formal object, but only the same material object, and this in different ways; that is, God wills inefficaciously the salvation of all men, absolutely considered, and He does not will efficaciously the salvation of all, having taken into consideration all the circumstances and the higher ends in view. Similarly He wills inefficaciously the conversion of the Tyrians, provided the gospel should be preached to them, and He does not will it efficaciously because, on account of higher ends in view, He does not will the gospel to be preached to them. There is no contradiction in this.

Thus the merchant during a shipwreck truly, though inefficaciously, wills to save his merchandise, and he efficaciously wills to cast it into the sea. It would be a contradiction if God willed antecedently the salvation of those already damned, to whom He no longer gives graces sufficient for salvation.

Fourth objection. If this decree of the antecedent will does not involve a contradiction, it is at least useless and illusory, it being as if a wealthy person were to say to a poor person: I will give you a hundred pennies if you fly.

Reply. This decree is not useless, because, although it fails to attain its ultimate effect, yet it serves many other useful purposes. (1) It establishes the foundation for the foreknowledge of conditionally free acts of the future. (2) By this decree God provides for all wayfarers sufficient means whereby they may be saved, whereas, on the other hand, for the salvation of those who are already damned, His attitude at most can be merely one of passive complacency. (3) It serves as the foundation for God’s promise to save us on certain conditions; for He could not sincerely and conditionally promise anything, unless He willed by such decree.

Moreover, this decree of the antecedent will is not illusory, because the condition is possible, not impossible, such as the example given above by the objector: “I will give you wealth, if you succeed in flying.” For God does not command impossibilities. But in this there is the mystery of God’s permission of the sin of final impenitence for higher ends, and it is not in our power to judge of these.

Finally, we can turn back the objection on our opponent by saying: What we consider contradictory is the conditioned decree as conceived by the Molinists, namely, “I will concur in your action if you have first freely determined yourself to act.” This, in our opinion, implies a contradiction, because the divine concurrence is no less necessary for man’s self-determination than light is for seeing, or existence for acting. Hence to say: “I will concur in your action, if you have first freely determined yourself to act,” is tantamount to saying: “I will give you light, if you see this object,” or “I will give you existence, if you do this.” No wonder Molinism leads to such conclusions, for, if Thomism is true, then Molinism is absurd, or vice versa. For the principles of these two systems are contradictory, that is, before God’s determining decree, either He can or cannot know conditionally free acts of the future with infallible certainty.

But I insist: Nevertheless this antecedent will is de facto merely inoperative and sterile, for by its own power nothing is accomplished, but only when it is joined to the consequent will, for it is only this will that is directed toward good considered with its accompanying circumstances.

Reply. It is, indeed, true that the antecedent will by its own power never accomplishes anything, because it is directed toward good absolutely considered, and good comes into being only with its accompanying circumstances.

But it does not follow that the antecedent will is merely idle and sterile, for by it God gives sufficient graces, which make the fulfillment of His precepts here and now really possible for adults, although it is not here and now effective.

Moreover, all Thomists are agreed that every grace which is called proximately sufficient as regards some perfect act, for example, that of contrition, is infallibly and of itself efficacious, in virtue of some absolute decree, as regards an imperfect act, for example, that of attrition. But because man, by reason of his own defectibility, resists the sufficient grace, in which the efficacious help was offered to him, God justly denies the efficacious grace that was previously of- fered to him. This denial on God's part is of the nature of a penalty, and thus it presupposes at least a first offense. Hence there is a distinction between it and the divine permission of this offense, which, as is evident, precedes the offense. In fact, God often moves us wayfarers to pray as in the prayer of the Mass before Communion: “Permit me not, O Lord, to be separated from Thee.”

Hence God's antecedent will concerning the salvation of all wayfarers is not inoperative and sterile. This is more clearly seen by comparing it with God’s will concerning the salvation of the damned. For God ceases to operate as regards their salvation, because they are incapable of being saved, as they have reached the end of their course and are confirmed in evil. Hence, as we said, God’s attitude toward the salvation of the damned can be only one of merely passive complacency. But it is not so as regards the salvation of the wayfarer, no matter how great a sinner such a person may be, because as long as a person is in this world there is possibility of conversion and salvation.

But you insist: St. Thomas says: “The antecedent will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will.” 210

Reply. What is denied by this statement is that the antecedent will is an absolute will, but not that it is a will; for it is called “a velleity” compared with the consequent will, which is the simple or absolute will.

Final objection. The antecedent will in God does not denote what He sincerely and positively wills. For indeed, he who has the power to do what he is said to will, and does not do so, does not positively and sincerely will it; such would be the case with a merchant who could save his merchandise and would not do so. But it is in God’s efficacious power to save all men, and He does not do so. Therefore He does not positively and sincerely will all to be saved.

Reply. I distinguish the major: he who has the efficacious power to do what he is said to will, and does not do so, does not positively and sincerely will it by the consequent will, this I concede; by the antecedent will, this I deny. For it may happen that something, absolutely considered, is good, and not merely a possible but a conditioned future, namely, unless this conflict with higher ends. Such a good terminates God's conditioned decree of His positive and sincere will, which is distinct, for example, from His quasi-negative will of permitting sin. Hence the object of God's universal salvific will is in itself good, but as it stands in the way of a greater good, it is not good, and consequently is not willed. Hence, just as the merchant sincerely wills to save his merchandise, which, however, he throws overboard because there is danger of shipwreck, so also God sincerely wills to save all men, though He does not save all, considering the higher ends in view.

But you insist: I deny the parity in the above illustration, tor God, unlike the merchant, can efficaciously save all human beings.

Reply. It is not a case of absolute parity, but of analogy. It is indeed in God’s efficacious power to save all, if we consider His omnipotence; but it is not so, if we consider the present ordering of His providence, by which He wills to manifest His infinite justice, as also His infinite mercy, governing and moving defectible creatures in accordance with their natures. Thus He does not efficaciously will all the fruits of the earth to become ripe. Hence, if all these and other conditions are considered, whether they are occult or manifest, it is not good, if in each case the particular circumstances are considered, that all should be saved. For it pertains to the universal Provider to permit various evils to happen so that the higher ends in view may not be frustrated.

Finally, you insist, arguing tliat if such were the case, then there would be no more hope for anyone, and the value of prayer would be very much impaired. Such is the case with the congruism of the Sorbonne, especially as Tournely presents it, by which salutary acts easy to perform, such as prayer, do not require a grace that is of itself and infallibly efficacious, this being required only for acts that are difficult to perform.

Reply. Even a salutary act easy of performance is the positing of an act that is actually as such a good. Therefore it presupposes the divine consequent will that is of itself efficacious, and grace that is of itself infallibly efficacious. Otherwise the previously enunciated principles are no longer exclusively and metaphysically certain.

But it does not follow that hope is either destroyed or diminished, because the formal motive of this theological virtue is not to be attributed to our endeavor, but to God’s help; for the formal motive of this virtue postulates the uncreated, and so God Himself. But in Molinism and congruism the formal motive of theological hope would be partly created, because our endeavor would enter into it; for a part of man’s hope would be by reason of his endeavor, and to some extent he would be singling himself out, contrary to what St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” *** For the result would be that of two persons equally loved and helped by God, one would be better than another, at least because of the salutary act easy to perform. But this is impossible, as we shall see farther on, for St. Thomas says: “Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be

better than another if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 212

Nor are the value and necessity of prayer impaired by this doctrine. In fact, they become more convincing, for, according to the teaching of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas, we have to pray even for the grace that is of itself efficacious for the performance of salutary acts, whether these are difficult or even easy to perform. On the other hand, if either Molinism or the congruism of the Sorbonne were true, then human beings would not, in their temptations, have to pray to obtain the grace that is of itself efficacious for the performance of salutary acts, at least those easy to perform; all they would have to do would be to strive to give the salutary consent which God expects of them.

This brings us back, therefore, to our original conclusion, namely, if we wish to consider this mystery, not only in its moral aspect, as it concerns the exhortation of men in the order of execution or fulfillment of God’s commands, but also as it concerns God's attributes, His omnipotent will, and the order of intention proposed by His providence, that is, in its metaphysical and ‘strictly theological aspects, then the doctrine of St. Thomas remains intact. It is in agreement with the teachings of St. Paul and St. Atgustine, and it resolves itself into this dogma, which is thus expressed by St. Augustine: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able and to pray for what thou art not able (to do).” %3 If one did not resist the sufficient grace to pray, then the efficacious grace to pray, and subsequently other graces, would be given. Hence St. Prosper’s formula of God's salvific will, quoted by the Council of Quierzy (853), which is in agreement with St. Augustine’s teaching, is the best way of expressing this dogma. It reads as follows: “The omnipotent God wills absolutely all men to be saved, although not all are saved. That some are saved is the gift of Him who saves. That some perish is the fault of those who perish.” 214 These are two most certain aspects of this mystery. We have considered this second aspect, namely, “the fault of those who perish”; the other aspect: “the gift of Him who saves,” will be discussed in the treatise on predestination.*15

But the intimate reconciliation of these two aspects is for us mysterious, for it is the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty in the eminence of the Deity or of God’s intimate

life; and it is only by the beatific vision that this can be clearly known, and as it actually is.

Doubt. Does God provide sufficient means for all to be saved?

The answer is that He does. He not only prepares for all, without distinction, those general helps that are sufficient for salvation, but He also offers, in fact, He bestows upon each and every adult, means that are sufficient for salvation.

First part. That God prepares for all, without distinction, those general helps that are suficient, is admitted by all Catholics against Jansenius. This conclusion is deduced from God's universal will to save and the fact that Christ died for all. For God cannot will the end without willing the means that are sufficient for attaining the end. Otherwise God would command what is impossible.

The universal salvific will not only refers, as Arnauld contends, to the human nature considered in the abstract, or as it exists in the mind; but it also refers to the human nature objectively as such, which means all human beings without exception, inasmuch as they are all individuals of the same nature which God has destined for salvation, even after A’dam’s sin. Nor can it be said that sufficient grace is merely sufficient in the abstract, as Arnauld contends, but it makes the fulfilfment of God's precepts really possible here and now in the concrete, although it is not the cause of the actual fulfillment of the precepts. Thus a man who is sleeping, although he does not actually see, yet he has at the very time the power to see, for he is not blind; and to say that sufficient grace does not give the power to perform a good act is to say that one who is asleep, is blind.

Second part. The answer to this, namely, “that God offers, even bestows upon each and every human being, sufficient helps for salvation,” is not admitted by all Thomists. It is denied especially by Gonet, not indeed for the just, but for all hardened and blinded sinners. But several of the best Thomists teach this, such as the Salmanticenses, Billuart, Bancel, and Goudin, who quote Ferrariensis as being on their side.

It does not, indeed, follow from this that an equal degree of sufficient grace is given to all. This second part of the reply, however, is to be understood in the sense that God gives to each and every one (at least to those who have the use of reason), where and when the fulfillment of a precept is of urgent necessity, helps that are proximately or at least remotely sufficient for salvation, according to each one’s condition. Hence if they do not keep some of God's commandments, this is not because God denies them the sufficient help,

216 This is said because of the special difficulty concerning infants who die without baptism, which will be examined farther on. ‘ but because men either reject the proffered sufficient grace, or else resist the sufficient grace already given.

According to this conclusion, he who does not resist the remotely sufficient grace, will receive the proximately sufficient grace. Thus the proximately sufficient help to begin to pray is remotely sufficient with regard to the more perfect salutary act. There is the mystery, inasmuch as to resist sufficient grace is an evil that comes solely from ourselves, whereas not to resist it is a good that comes from the source of all good.?3?

Holy Scripture furnishes us with the foundation for this conclusion in the many texts by which it affirms God’s mercy toward all wayfarers. Thus we read: “I called, and you refused. I stretched out My hand, and there was none that regarded.” 218 “Thou hast mercy upon all, because Thou canst do all things.” 21° “Jerusalem . . . how often would I have gathered together thy children as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldest not?” 22° “What is there that I ought to do more to My vineyard, that I have not done to it?” 221 “I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear My voice and open to Me the door, I will come in to him.” *? “The Lord is compassionate and merciful, long suffering and plenteous in mercy,” 223

The theological reason is that otherwise God would command what is impossible. Thus sin would be unavoidable, and to punish it would be an act more of cruelty than of justice. For God would command what is impossible if He denied man the sufficient and necessary help to keep His commandments. Hence the Council of Trent quotes against the Protestants the following words of St. Augustine: “God commands not impossibilities, but by commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able and to pray for what thou art not able (to do).” 224

217 In fact, that one at the very moment does not resist a sufficient grace is a good efficaciously: willed by God’s consequent will, which alone, as we said, is directed toward good that is at the very moment to be performed.

The sufficient grace, inasmuch as it is sufficient, or as it refers to the possibility of complying with God's commands, depends on His antecedent will; but, inasmuch as it is a gift and a good bestowed at the very moment, it depends on His consequent will, and it truly produces in us the good thought and often the pious desire that inclines the will in its choice of the means for salvation.

221 Is. 5: 4. In this text we read: “what I ought to do,” not “what I could do”; for God can, moreover, give the efficacious grace.

These principles must be applied to infidels and hardened sinners, when the occasion arises that the fulfillment of a precept is of urgent necessity. If these do not resist the remotely sufficient grace, they will receive the proximately sufficient grace and subsequent graces, in virtue of the commonly accepted principle that “to the man who does what he can (with the help of actual grace), God does not refuse the (habitual) grace.” #5 Expressed more briefly: salvation is possible for any wayfarer; for this, however, sufficient grace is required. As Pius IX declared: “It is known to us and to you that those who labor under invincible ignorance concerning our most holy religion and who, diligently observing the natural law and its precepts that are engraved in the hearts of all by God, and being ready to obey Him, lead an honest and upright life, can, through the operative power of divine light and grace, attain eternal life.” 228

According to several theologians it is sufficient for such persons to believe that God (the author of salvation) exists and is the rewarder of the good, and that they love Him above all things. Several Thomists, the Salmanticenses included, hold that, although strictly speaking an explicit belief in the mystery of the Incarnation is necessary, since it is the necessary means by which salvation is obtained, yet it may be that it is not necessary for the one to whom the mystery was not preached, or to whom it was not sufficiently proposed.??7

A special difficulty presents itself about infants who die without being baptized. On this point it must be said that, the condition of these infants being taken into consideration, God has sufficiently provided for them by instituting the sacrament of baptism, inasmuch as it was instituted for all and can be conferred on all, although various natural and free causes sometimes intervene to prevent its actual administration. Not infrequently, indeed, infants fail to receive the grace of baptism through the fault of their parents who neglect to pray and make use of the means for salvation. The principle in the solution of this difficulty is that God, on His part, provides for the salvation of all according to each one’s capacity; but infants are not capable of being saved by any salutary acts but only by baptism, the actual administration of which, since it depends on both natural and free causes, can be prevented by these causes. Nor does

225 Summa theol., la, q.49, a.2 ad gum; Ia Hae, q.109, a.6; q.112, a.3; De veritate, q.14, a.11. ,

226 Denz., no. 1677. 227 Cf. Salmanticenses, Com. in Ham Iae, q.2, a.7. Suarez was more or less of this opinion. Just recently Capéran defended this o inion in his theological entitled: Le problème du salut des infidèles. P ogical essay it pertain to God’s general providence that He interrupt the course of secondary causes.??6

Finally, infants who die without being baptized are not punished for actual sins, but only for original sin. Therefore they do not suffer interiorly the pain of sense, nor do they suffer as adults do, at being deprived of the beatific vision.??? They enjoy a certain natural happiness which, even in the natural order, is not absolute but relative happiness; for their will, which is directly turned away from their ultimate supernatural end, is indirectly turned away from their ultimate natural end; for every sin that is directly against the supernatural law is indirectly against the natural law, which demands obedience to God in whatever He commands.?*° Hence the limbo of the children clearly shows that the supernatural life is gratuitous, and also that in the present economy of salvation the absence of the state of grace makes perfect natural happiness simply impossible. Man’s present condition is not the state of pure nature, but he is ordained to the life of grace, and if he does not attain to it, it cannot be said that he is absolutely happy even in the natural order. This does not denote a lack of harmony in the disposition of Providence, but, on the contrary, it is consistent with the principles, posited that the whole human race is ordained to the supernatural life. Thus the doctrine of God’s universal salvific will remains intact, which is not His consequent will or that which of itself is efficacious, but it is His antecedent will by which He gives sufficient graces to all according to each one’s capacity. What always remains a mystery in this doctrine is the intimate reconciliation of the salvific will with the gratuitous predestination of the elect, that is, the mystery of the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice and, supreme liberty in the Deity.

SEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS CHANGEABLE

State of the question. What is asked in this article is whether God can begin to will what He did not will, and not will what He willed,

229 See Supplement to St. Thomas’ Summa theologica, q.69, a.6 ad 2um, in which there is the following quotation from St. Augustine’s Enchiridion, chap. 93: “The punishment of children who die only with original sin is most lenient.” See also ibid., q.71, a.7; De malo, q.5, a.3-

230 Summa theol., Ia Mae, q.82, a.1 ad 1um; q.85, a.1; q.109, 2.3. John of St. Thomas, De gratia, disp. XIX, a.4; Salmanticenses, De gratia, disp. II, dub. 3, nos. 102, 116. Billuart, De gratia, diss. Il, a.3- so that from not willing He becomes willing, and vice versa. As a general rule, indeed, God's will is said to be unchangeable, but the Lord Himself says: “It repenteth Me that I have made man.” 231 Moreover, God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and afterward forbade it. Finally, God is free; therefore He does not have to will continually and irrevocably what He first willed. In fact, just as it was possible for God not to will what He willed, without undergoing any intrinsic change, why could He not, without undergoing any intrinsic change, begin to will what He did not will?

Yet the answer is that God's will is entirely unchangeable, just as His substance and His knowledge are.

1. Holy Scripture shows that the conclusion is of faith, for we read: “God is not as the son of man, that He should be changed.” 232 “I am the Lord and I change not.” ?33 Likewise, the Vatican Council declares that God “‘is one absolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance.” *%4 It is the constant teaching of tradition that the determinations of God’s will are unchangeable, that His decrees, which are measured by eternity, in which there is no before and after, are unchangeable, as the following text asserts: “There are many thoughts in the heart of man; but the will of the Lord shall stand firm.” 235

Theological proof. There would be a change in God’s will if He began to will what before He had not willed; but this is impossible; therefore a change in God's will is impossible.

Proof of minor. A change in God’s will would presuppose either a change in His substance (and thus something would begin to be good for Him, which before was not), or else in His knowledge (as He would know for the first time that a thing is good for Him, which He did not know before). But it has already been shown 2%¢ that God's substance and His knowledge are unchangeable, inasmuch as He is pure Act, and not in potentiality for further actuality both in the oe and intellectual orders, and therefore not in the volitional order.

Corollary. God, by His same permanently unchangeable will, wills a change in some things; for it is one thing to change the will, and another thing to will a change in things. Thus change occurs only in time, but not in eternity, which admits of no variation; for it is “the

simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” 287

Reply to first objection. The Lord spoke metaphorically when He said; “It repenteth Me that I have made man,” 238 thereby making known that it was His will to punish men; for from all eternity God foresaw their sins, and He decreed that they must be punished for them.

Reply to second objection. The same must be said of prophecies of commination concerning conditioned futures that are not realized, because the condition is not fulfilled.28* Thus we read in the Old Testament: “Yet forty days, and Ninive shall be destroyed”; 24° but because the Ninivites repented, the Lord changed His sentence of condemnation, but not His counsel or the eternal decree of His will.

Reply to fourth objection. “Although God’s willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will.” According to the teaching of St. Thomas, there is something similar to this by way of participation in the angels, because of the vigor of their intellect, for he says: “The angel's free will is flexible to either opposite before the choice, but not after.” 241 With us wayfarers, the free will is flexible to either opposite even after the choice, because we can always reconsider the thing, about which we already made the choice, under new aspects. Thus, because of the imperfection of our knowledge, which is acquired gradually, we can make a different choice. Contrary to this, God’s will is entirely unchangeable.

EIGHTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IMPOSES NECESSITY ON THINGS WILLED

State of the question. The question asked in this most famous article is how to reconcile the efficacy of the determination of the divine will with the freedom of our actions. This problem belongs properly to this question of God's will, rather than to the question of God’s knowledge, which states merely “that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality (as God’s knowledge is measured by eternity, which comprises all time); yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.” 4 This left unsolved the

560 l THE ONE GOD question why this contingent future, for example, the conversion of St. Paul, is eternally present to the divine sight rather than Paul's resistance. It is certain and of faith that Paul’s conversion would not have taken place in time, or have been eternally present to the divine sight, if God had not willed it; for if this conversion had been in this way present independently of God’s free will, then it would have been of itself necessary, and not something contingent. Therefore it is now a question whether God's efficacious will, which is always fulfilled, imposes necessity on all things, even on our choices. This same question is discussed by St. Thomas when he treats of God’s providence.4 Hence this article is concerned strictly with the question of the transcendent efficacy of the determinations or decrees of the divine will with reference to our free acts. In other words, is this predetermination necessitating or non-necessitating?

The article begins by presenting three difficulties, and these constitute the state of the question. They are: (1) It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on all things, because St. Augustine says (Enchir., chap. 103): “It must necessarily be, if God wills (anything).” (2) “God’s will cannot be hindered. Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.” This objection is afterward revived by the Molinists against the Thomists. (3) Lastly, “this true conditional statement is necessary: If God wills a thing, it comes to pass.” Now it is quite clear that the first and third difficulties are easily solved by means of the distinction between absolute necessity (or of consequent) and conditional necessity (or of consequence), as when I see Socrates sitting, he must be sitting, the necessity being one of consequence; but that he sits is contingent.244 The second objection presents the principal difficulty, namely, that God’s will cannot be hindered; and this is solved in the body of the article.

The answer is that God’s will does not impose necessity on all things, but that some things happen contingently, because God wills that they should happen contingently. To Say otherwise would be to do away with free will, merits, laws, counsels, rewards, guilt, and punishment, all of which must be acknowledged as pertaining to the faith, as stated in the counterargument.

This conclusion was subsequently expressed in equivalent terms by the Council of Trent in the following canon: “If anyone says that man's free will moved and aroused by God, by consenting to God's call and action, in no way co-operates toward disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it wishes, but that, as something inanimate, it does

243 Ibid., q.22, a.4; Ia Ilae, q-10, a.4, the title of which is: Whether the human will is moved of necessity by God. Also De veritate, q.23, a5. 244 Ibid., Ia, q.14, a.13 ad gum.

nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.” 245

The following Jansenist proposition was condemned: “For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from internal compulsion is not required; it is sufficient to be free from external restraint.” 74° It was not defined, however, whether the divine decree concerning our future salutary acts is intrinsically efficacious, or extrinsically so, namely, because of our foreseen consent (by means of the scientia media), as the Molinists and congruists contend,

But all Thomists, as also Scotists and Augustinians, hold that the decrees of the divine will concerning our future salutary acts are intrinsically or of themselves infallibly efficacious, that is, because God wills, and not because man wills. They assert that such is the teaching of St. Thomas in this article and wherever he discusses this subject. In fact, they hold that this doctrine is connected with the principles of the faith, and is proximately definable.” Let us see what Holy Scripture, the councils, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas himself have to say on this subject.

According to Holy Scripture, even God’s efficacious will does not impose necessity on all things. We find it frequently mentioned in the Old Testament that God’s will is efficacious, and that we are free to choose. Thus we read: “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it’; 248 and yet the king freely wills what he decides upon doing. Similarly, Queen Esther prays as follows: “O Lord, King of gods and of all power, . . . turn his heart to the hatred of our enemy”; %9 and farther on we read: “And God changed the king’s spirit into mildness” (toward the Jews).?°° Again we have: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand . . . , so man is in the hand of Him that made him.” 251 “The Lord of hosts hath decreed, and who can disannul it? And His hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it away?” 252 Yet our freedom remains intact, as is clearly stated in the following text: “And I will give you a new heart and put a new

247 To know this truth with certainty there is no need of an objectively illative process of reasoning, but an explanatory discursive process suffices. It is sufficient, for example, that the following revealed words be explained: “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will” (Phil. 2: 13). See supra, pp. 4g f.

spirit within you, . . . and I will cause you to walk in My commandments and to keep My judgments and do them.” 253 Likewise in the New Testament we have: “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 254 “No one can snatch them (My sheep) out of the hand of My Father.” 255 Especially to the point is the following text: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” 258

The Second Council of Orange likewise declares against the Semipelagians “God does many good things in man, which man does not accomplish; but there is no good work done by man which God does not assist him to do.” 7 The same council declares: “No man can claim as his own anything except lying and sin. If a man hath anything of truth and righteousness, it is from that foundation which it behoves us to thirst after in this desert that being, so to speak, refreshed with some of its drops we may not faint by the way.” 238 This means that every salutary work is performed by means of at least actual grace, and that every ethically good act is performed by God's natural concurrence, which is due to the human nature, but not to this individual here and now rather than to another whom God permits to fall into sin.

Teaching of the Fathers. Those who wrote before the rise of Pelagianism and against Manichaeism and its denial of free will, sometimes did not speak quite so correctly on this point, as St. Augustine often remarks. Yet they always said with St. Paul: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” 35% Hence St. Cyprian says: “We must not boast of anything, since there is nothing that is ours.” 26° St. Basil likewise says: “Nothing is left to you, O man, of which you may boast; for in all things we live by the grace and gift of God.” 281 But if the free determination of the salutary choice were in man’s power and

265 John 10: 2g. See also Matt. 24: 24; John 7: 30; 13:1; 15:5; 17: 1; Acts 2: 233 10: 41; 13: 48; 17: 26; 22:14; Rom. 8: 28; g: 11-18, 23, 97; 11:1-7; I Cor. 4:73 Eph. 1: 5-7, 12.

261 Hom. XXII, De humilitate.

not from God, then he would have something that would single him out from another equally loved and helped by God, and what is better in the created order would not come from God.?6?

It is particularly St. Augustine who, against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, explains the infallible efficacy of the divine will and grace, not because of our foreseen consent, but by reason of God's omnipotence. Commenting on the words of St. Paul, “It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish,” 26° he says: ‘“Certainly we will, when we will; but He causes us to will what is good, . . . Certainly it is we who act when we act; but He causes us to act by enabling the will to act efficaciously. . . . When He says: I will cause you to act, what else does He say but: I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and will give you a heart of flesh?” 264 Similarly he says: “God has power over the heart, moving it from within . . . ; and the wills of men are more in His power than in their own; who else causes it that chastisement is wholesome and that the heart being contrite there should be amendment of life?” 26s Similarly he says: “Secretly this grace is bestowed by the divine liberality upon human hearts, and it is spurned by no one that is hard of heart; for this very purpose it is bestowed, that the hardness of heart may first be taken away.” ° It is sufficiently clear that the text of St. Paul just quoted concerns grace that is of itself efficacious, because God wills it to be, and not because we will it to be so by reason of our consent.?67

262 Rouet de Journel (Enchiridion patristicum, index theologicus, no. 335), after having correctly said that “grace does not destroy free will,” and having quoted the testimony of many of the Fathers on this point, then adds: “Hence also with an equal grace, one can consent, the other can dissent,” which seems to be meant in the Molinist sense, namely, that one actually consents, the other actually dissents. But there are two quotations from the writings of St, Irenaeus (no. 247) and of St. Augustine (no. 1753), and these in no way prove that he is in favor of Molina’s opinion. In fact, St. Augustine a little farther on in this passage just cited (De civitate Dei, Bk. XH, chap. 9), says: “If both the good and bad (angels) were created equally good, then, whereas the latter fell by their evil will, the former were more abundantly assisted, and reached that state of complete happiness which made them absolutely certain of never losing it.” This is the simple application of the principle: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” (I Cor. 4:7.) The angels who turned to God and received their reward, the others having fallen from grace, in this respect were better, and this same was the result of God’s grace, as having been more helped, the freedom of the will, however, remaining intact.

265 De correptione et gratia, chap. 14.

In this article St. Thomas first of all mentions the opinion of some who maintain that the divine will imposes necessity on all things, because what God produces by necessary causes is necessary, but what He produces by contingent causes is contingent. Thus the distinction between contingent and necessary things would be the result only of secondary causes. This seems to be the opinion of the Averroists, that contingency would be the result only of secondary causes.

It is rejected by St. Thomas for two reasons. (1) The effect of a universal cause, such as the sun, is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered because of a defect in the secondary cause, as the sun’s power is hindered by a defect in the plant, so that the fruit does not become ripe. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect; for God can remove this defect, otherwise He would not be omnipotent. (2) If the distinction between the necessary and the contingent is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. For everything external to God must of necessity be in a relation of causality or dependence with respect to God’s will. Thus, as our immediate declaration will have to be, not even the free determination of our salutary choices can be made independently of God's will, who “worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” 268

Then St. Thomas shows what is the ultimate reason for the distinction between the coutingent and the necessary, and he proves his conclusion, namely, “God does not impose necessity on all things,” by appealing to the absolute efficacy of the divine will.

He builds up his argument as follows: When a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus the one generated is generated even in accidental points. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. But God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe.

Therefore to some effects God has attached necessary causes, which cannot fail, from which effects necessarily proceed (just as day and night follow in regular succession); but to other effects He has attached defectible and contingent causes from which arise contingent effects (such as the ripening of fruits and the acts of our free will). Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God has prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.?%°

This whole argument has its foundation in the following principle: “When a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows from the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being.”

There is first of all inductive evidence of this principle; for, because of the debility in the generative power, it happens that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, which pertain to its mode of being. On the contrary, if the father is very vigorous, the child is born like him even in accidental points, for example, in the general expression of the face, as we observe in different families whose facial expression conforms persistently through several generations to a certain type. Similarly many soldiers die in war; but there is a heroic way of dying, and not many die heroically.

In like manner great generals not only lead their soldiers on to victory, but they lead them in that characteristic and genial way by which the latter obey willingly. This special manner is quasicharacteristic of this general. Likewise great writers, great poets, have their special manner of expressing themselves, also great musicians, but far more so God, whose will is perfectly efficacious.

The aforesaid principle is not only inductively evident, but its truth is clearly seen from the very analysis of the concepts of its constituent parts. For when a cause is efficacious to act, its influence extends not only to the thing done, but also to the manner in which it is done; because the whole effect depends on and is determined by its cause.

Lastly, this principle is not only found out by reason, but is also equivalently expressed in revelation, which speaks of the absolute efficacy of the divine will, as in the above quoted texts that follow the

269 There is a considerable difference between this opinion which St. Thomas gives and the one he rejects at the beginning of his argument. For according to this discarded opinion, which seems to be that of the Averroists, God's providence would not at least be concerned particularly with the freedom of human acts, but He would be the prime mover, moving all things in the same way, without any free decree. Thus all things would happen of necessity, with the exception of some contingent things, their contingency being the result of defectible causes. This would explain why all the fruits of the earth do not become ripe.

On the contrary, according to St. Thomas’ opinion, God in His providence first willed for the order of the universe that there be some necessary things, such as the movements of the heavenly bodies, and some contingent and even free things, such as free human acts. Therefore He prepared for necessary effects necessary causes or those that of their nature are determined to one thing; and for free effects He prepared causes that are not of themselves determined to one thing.

state of the question in this article. Thus we have: “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it,” 27° and yet the king freely wills what God moves him to do. Similarly, “As the potter’s clay is in his hand... , so man is in the hand of Him that made him.” 271 “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 272

Are the Thomists justified in concluding from this article their doctrine of the intrinsic and infallible efficacy of God’s decrees and of grace with respect to our free salutary acts?

The answer is in the affirmative. For St. Thomas already said as much, when he declared: ‘“God’s knowledge is the cause of things . . . in so far as His will is joined to it.” 278 And again: “The will of God is the cause of things. . . . Determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.” 274 This determination of God’s will is often called His purpose.?7> We now take up the question of the absolute efficacy or decree of the divine will.?7¢

But if it is admitted that God’s decrees and His grace are only extrinsically efficacious, that is, because of our foreseen consent through the scientia media, then God’s will is no longer perfectly efficacious, nor does it extend even to the contingent and free mode of our salutary choices. In fact, the free determination of these choices is then, as regards the performance of these acts, solely from us, not being referred to God as dependent on His will, which is impossible, since this is contrary to the universal causality of the supreme Cause. For nothing can exist that is external to God unless it is in a relation of causality toward Him or of dependence on Him; to say otherwise means the nullification of the proofs for God’s existence, these having their foundation in this necessary dependence. Finally, in this way the mind would revert to the opinion refuted by St. Thomas in the beginning of the body of this article, namely, that the distinction

275 Rom. g: 11; 4: 5; 8: 28; Eph. 1:5, 11; II Tim. 1: 9; see also Commentary of St. Thomas on these texts.

276 Scotus uses the expression “decree of the divine will,” and so do the Scotists; but it by no means follows that the Thomist doctrine on the divine decrees originated from Scotism and not from St. Thomas himsel] f, who uses an equivalent expression, speaking of “the determination of the divine will,” and of the preordainings of providence and predestination, which presuppose election on the part of the divine will. See Ia, 4-22, a.t, 3; G.23, aa, 4, 5, 6.

between the contingent and the necessary would arise from secondary causes, and would not be included in God’s intention.

Moreover, St. Thomas spoke the same way in his other works and in other parts of his Theological Summa, as in the following passage: “We must remember that, properly speaking, necessary and contingent are consequent upon being as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.” 2

And again he says: “The divine will must be understood as existing outside the order of beings, as a certain cause that penetrates the whole of being and its differences; but the possible and the necessary are differences of being, and therefore necessity and contingency in things originate from the divine will.” 73 On the contrary, the evil of sin is not included in the adequate object of divine omnipotence; ?** and even if, though this is an impossibility, God were to will to be the cause of the evil of sin, He could not be so, just as the eye cannot see sounds. Similarly, in another passage he says: “God moves all things in accordance with their conditions, so that from necessary causes, through the divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.” 259 He says the same in the following reply: “If God moves the will to anything, it is incompossible with this supposition that the will be not moved thereto, But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily,” ** but it freely chooses and acts under the influence of the divine motion. Similarly, in one of his replies, he says: “God moves the will immutably on account of the efficacy of the moving power which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the will that is moved, which is indifferently disposed to various things, the will is not necessitated but remains free.” **?

In these various passages St. Thomas says: “God moves all things in accordance with their conditions,” that is, God adapts His move-

278 Com. in Periherm., Bk. 1, lect. 14; St. Thomas also speaks in like manner in his Com. on Aristoue’s Metaphysics, Bk. V1, lect. 3.

ment to creatures according as He moves either natural agents or our free wills. Thus secondary causes do not actively modify God's motion, but only objectively and materially, inasmuch as God operates in our will according to its natural inclination which He gave it and preserves in it. He is more intimate to it than it is to itself.

Hence, according to St. Thomas, God moves our will not only by proposing to it the object that attracts it, but also by applying it to make the choice. “It belongs to God to move the will, but especially by an interior inclination of the will.” 283

First confirmation. God is with greater reason the cause of our free consent than angel and man are. But the angel guardian and man concur in our free consent by moral suasions. Therefore these moral suasions do not suffice on God’s part.

Moreover, if an angel, or a human being very much loved by us, causes us to will what he wills, by proposing to us the object which attracts us, far more so can God do this by an interior movement of our will, moving it according to its natural inclination which He preserves intact in us, as the cause that is intimately present to all its effects.

Second confirmation. To say otherwise would be to deny that God is the truly efficient cause of our free consent. It is not enough to have recourse to moral suasion. For moral suasion does not belong to the order of efficient causalty, but of final and objective causality. Moreover, even Pelagius admitted that God moves us by moral suasion to good; yet St. Augustine rejects these movements as insufficient.?8*

Nor does it suffice to have recourse to simultaneous concurrence as advocated by Molina, which is offered indifferently, as to whether we consent or dissent; for such indifference of this simultaneous concurrence does not determine the will to consent rather than to dissent. The simultaneous concurrence and the human will are like two co-ordinated causes, like two horses pulling a boat; and one of these causes does not influence the other to act, but both of them influence only the effect. Hence what is better in the created order, namely, the free determination of our salutary choice, would not be from God, and, contrary to what St. Paul says, man would be singling himself out, because ol two men equally helped by God and situated in the same circumstances, one would become better than another, which is contrary to what St. Thomas says.?86

Third confirmation. If God does not determine, then He is determined, that is, He assumes a passive role in this foreseeing by means

of the sctentia media, which is antecedent to the decree of the divine will. For, according to this theory, God, by concurring indifferently and by moral suasion, must wait for and ascertain our consent, or inquire by examining our will as to what it would choose if placed in such and such circumstances. The result of this would be passivity or dependence in God’s knowledge; but there can be no passivity in Him who is pure Act. He is in the highest degree in actuality, and is nowise in potentiality.

Molina says: “It was not in God’s power to know by this (middle) knowledge anything else than He actually knew. Then again it

| must not be called natural even in this sense, as if it were so innate in God that He could not know the contrary of what He knows by it. For if the created free will were to do the opposite of what it did, as it truly can do, God would have known this very act by the same | knowledge, by which He really knows it, but not that He actually | knows it.” 287 Therefore passivity or dependence is thus posited in -= God’s knowledge with regard to our free conditional future choices, | which actually will be, if God decreed to place our will in these circumstances. The independence of God's knowledge is thus destroyed, and the conception of the divine knowledge becomes tinged with , anthropomorphism. | Lastly, it is not possible in this way for God to know infallibly our conditionally free acts of the future, and then our future choices, | because the determination of these choices cannot be seen by the supercomprehension of the human will, which in itself is undetermined, otherwise the will would not be free; nor is it possible for - God to have this knowledge by foreseeing the circumstances, other- . wise we would have to admit determinism of circumstances, and , this would mean the end of freedom. This we have more fully ex- _ plained in another work.?*

Therefore the doctrine of St. Thomas is vindicated, which was subsequently expressed so brilliantly by Bossuet in the following passages: “To reconcile the decree and the omnipotent action of God

-with our free will, we have no need to give it a concurrence which is ready for all things indifferently, and which becomes what we , please; still less do we have to make it wait for what our will is in- - clined to do, for it to formulate afterward with no risk its decrees about our resolutions. For without this poor circumspection which . gives us a confused notion of the First Cause, it suffices for us to bear

288 See Predestination (Eng. tr.), pp. 81 f., 300-309, 371-76. Consult also (ibid.) principle of predilection: “One thing would not be better than another if God did not will greater good for one than for another,” pp. 16, 38, 75-80, 129, 149,

173-75, 195 f» 329, 344» 349- in mind that the divine will, whose infinite power reaches everything, not only the essence, but also the modes of being, is of itself accountable for the complete effect, in which it puts everything which we conceive in it, ordaining that it will be accompanied by all the properties that are befitting it. ...

“God wills from eternity, all the acts that will be performed by the free will of human beings, all the good and reality there is in them. What is more absurd than to say, that it is not because God wills, that a thing exists? Must we not say, on the contrary, that a thing exists, because God wills it? And just as it happens that we are free in virtue of the decree that wills us to be free, so it happens that we act freely in this or that act, in virtue of the decree which includes all this in detail?” 289

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN THIS ARTICLE

Reply to first objection. When St. Augustine says, “Man must inevitably be saved, if God has willed it,” ?% the reference is to conditional necessity or to that of consequence, but not to absolute necessity or to that of consequent. Thus, when it is said, “I see Peter running,” Peter must at that very moment inevitably be running, by a necessity of consequence but his running is a contingent and free act, for he has the power not to run. Similarly, in the reply to the third objection it is said: “Things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional.”

Reply to second objection. It answers the principal difficulty revived by Molinists, namely, that every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily. But the will of God cannot be hindered, according to the following statement: “Who resisteth His will?” 2 It is not a question here of the antecedent will of God, on which suf. ficient grace depends, which a man often resists; but it refers to the consequent will of God, from which efficacious grace proceeds, which a man does not resist, but to which he consents. St. Thomas replies to this objection: “From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.” Hence St. Thomas does not have recourse to the foreseeing of our consent by God, as Molina did afterward in his theory of the scientia media; but again he affirms the absolute efficacy of

289 Traité du libre arbitre, chap, 8.

the divine will, this absolute efficacy extending even to the free mode of our choices. Therefore we reply to the objection by distinguishing the major: every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, if it is incapable of producing the contingent and free mode in its effect, this I concede; otherwise, I deny it.2°* Hence the absolute efficacy of the divine will not only does not interfere with the freedom of our choice, but causes this, as declared by St. Thomas in the following passage: “Just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.” 293 The free mode of our choices is a mode of being, and it is thus included in the adequate object of divine omnipotence, since it is only the evil of sin that is excluded from it.

Doubt. To what is contingency ultimately to be ascribed? To the freedom of the divine will, or to its absolute efficacy?

The Thomists answer with Cajetan: “It is of importance to know that, after the divinelike Thomas had written these things, there arose a new opinion about the ultimate foundation of contingency, advanced by Scotus.?** For he believes that the condition of the divine will truly constitutes the ultimate foundation of contingency, and on this point he is in agreement with us; but we say that the absolute efficacy of the divine will is that condition; but he says that it is its contingency. Concerning this theory of his, by contingency in the divine will he means its liberty: so that he imagines that because God wills and causes freely, for this reason there is contingency in the universe.” 2? To this Cajetan replies: “If the contingency arises from the manner of God's willing, then it is not chosen, but is the consequence of the manner of choosing. Therefore, according to this proposed theory, the effect is not produced by God as the agent. And thus there is contingency in the universe over and above what is intended by God, inasmuch as it is the consequence of His manner of willing, but not of His willing.” 298

Moreover, God also wills freely that some things happen necessarily in the world, such as that the sun gives out light and heat. Therefore contingency is not the result of the free mode of the divine will, but is due to the fact that God efficaciously wills some things

294 Com, in I Sent., d.2, q.1; d.8, q.5; d.39, q.1- 295 Com, in lam, q.19, a.8, no. 11.

to happen contingently in the universe and some necessarily. And God can produce these divers modes of being, because He is the author of being.

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS OF OPPONENTS

The opponents, that is, the Molinists and the congruists, who admit the scientia media and deny the intrinsic efficacy of God's decrees and grace, object to this doctrine, basing their objections (1) on scriptural grounds, (2) on the impairment of free will, (3) on the insufficiency of the help, (4) on the contention that by such teaching God would become the cause of sin. These objections are examined at length by such Thomists as the Salmanticenses, John of St. ‘Thomas, Gonet, and Billuart. We give only the principal objections. The replies taken together are like an ancient and exquisitely harmonious canticle. They are, so to speak, the leitmotif of ancient theology. They can be explained frequently, just as a symphony of Beethoven is heard many times. Our purpose is to show the intimate harmony that prevails in the whole Thomist system.

Objections from Holy Scripture. These are taken from texts that speak of man’s resistance with reference to God’s grace. Thus we read: “What is there,” said the Lord, “that I ought to do more to My vineyard, that I have not done to it? Was it that I looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it hath brought forth wild grapes?” *°? “I called, and you refused. I stretched out My hand, and there was none that regarded.” 298 “You always resist the Holy Ghost.” 299

Reply. These texts do not concern the consequent will of God by which He grants the efficacious grace; but they refer to His antecedent will by which He gives the sufficient grace, by reason of which the fulfillment of His precepts is made really possible, though not as yet effective. In fact, these texts refer to His will of expression, which is made known to us by His commands, which men do not always obey.

Therefore the first text just quoted does not say: “What is there that I could do more to My vineyard,” but “What is there that I ought to do more to My vineyard, that I have not done to it?” This means that God gave the Jews many sufficient graces, which had made it possible for them to be converted; but He did not give them the efficacious graces, which God had indeed been able to give them, but was not bound to give them, because the order observed in His providence did not demand this. If God were bound to give His efficacious grace always and to all persons, sin would never happen, which, however, He can permit for a greater good. Hence in the aforesaid text the Jews are reproved, because of their own accord they refused to obey God’s commands and make use of the sufficient grace, and thus they | deserved to be deprived of the efficacious grace.

The other texts are explained in like manner, namely; “I called, and you refused”; “You always resist the Holy Ghost.” Man often de facto resists sufficient grace by not obeying God's precepts; but he does not de facto resist efficacious grace, although he can resist it in sensu diviso, that is, inasmuch as he has the power to do the opposite; just as Peter cannot at the same time sit and stand, but when he stands, he has really the power to sit down. Likewise’a man asleep has really the power to see, and, although he does not actually see, yet he has really the power to see, for he is not blind.

Hence these texts of Holy Scripture nowise render less convincing others which refer to God’s consequent and efficacious grace. Thus we read: “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord. Whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” 300 “As the potter’s clay is in his hand . . . so man is in the hand of Him that made him.” #°

But I insist. Nevertheless we read: “Woe to thee, Corozain! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! For if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 802

The Thomists in general reply to this by appealing to the same principles. They say this text means that the inhabitants of Corozain and Bethsaida showed themselves more unworthy than those of Tyre, because of their greater blindness of intellect, hardness of heart, and ingratitude. For man of his own accord resists God’s grace, but there is a greater degree of resistance in some, for they resist even the greatest’ sufficient graces, as was the case with the preaching of Christ which was confirmed by miracles. The Jews of Corozain and Bethsaida placed a greater obstacle to the efficacious grace offered in the sufficient grace, just as the fruit is contained in the flower. ‘Thus they were deprived of the efficacious grace.

Still I insist. According to the teaching of the Thomists, the Jews needed an efficacious grace so that they might not resist the sufficient grace and thus place an obstacle to the reception of the efficacious grace. Therefore, if Thomism is true, it was possible for these Jews to reply that they resisted the sufficient grace because they simply

did not have the efficacious grace required for not resisting the sufficient grace.

Reply. The cause of this resistance is not the lack of efficacious grace, but man’s own defectibility. Resistance to sufficient grace is indeed an evil, or a deficiency, which comes from a defectible cause. An evil will, which is the first deficient principle, suffices for this. Hence it is false to say that our will resists the sufficient grace because it lacks the efficacious grace. But it must be said that our will lacks the efficacious grace because it resists the sufficient grace. The deficiency of a secondary cause is due to the fact that this cause is defectible. St. Thomas makes this clear by the following statement: “The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God’s part, according to Osee 12: 9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” 38

To state the case more briefly: resistance to sufficient grace is an evil, and is therefore due solely to a defectible and defective cause. On the other hand, the non-resistance to sufficient grace is a good, and is therefore not to be attributed solely to the secondary cause, but also and primarily to the First Cause, the source of all good.

Hence the Jews of Corozain and Bethsaida, after Christ's preaching confirmed by miracles, had no reasonable excuse for their resistance, and they were deservedly deprived of the efficacious grace, which the Tyrians, by God's mercy, would have received in similar circumstances, because they would not have resisted with such hardness of heart and ingratitude.

It is because Thomism teaches that this divine bestowal of grace, which is of itself efficacious, is the cause of the salutary act, that this final objection seeks to infer that therefore the non-bestowal of the efficacious grace is the cause of the sin of omission and of the resistance. :

But this does not follow; for, when two causes concur, one of which is indefectible and the other defectible, the deficiency comes from the defectible cause and not from the divine indefectible cause. Similarly, everything being in proportion, in that the clear explanation given by the teacher, arousing the attention of the pupil, is the cause of the pupil’s knowledge, it does not follow that the cause of the pupil’s error is because the teacher failed to give a clear explanation. This error can come from the defectibility in the pupil, from insufficient attention on his part.

More briefly: deficiency comes not from the indefectible cause but from the defecuble cause. Thus we read: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” 3% Similarly the Council of Quierzy

says: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; if some perish, it is the fault of them that perish.” 3% This text is taken from the writings of St. Prosper, being his reply to the second Vincentian objection.

Therefore it remains true to say that the Jews of Corozain and Bethsaida were deservedly rebuked, compared with those of Tyre, because they placed a greater obstacle to the efficacious grace that was Offered in the sufficient grace. The Tyrians would not have placed so great an obstacle to grace, and God in His mercy would have given them the efficacious grace of conversion.

This answer is clearly established from what our Lord says: “Without Me you can do nothing” %8 for salvation; also from what St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that, thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” 37 These words imply that every good thing comes from God, that is, to be able to keep His commandments, not to resist them, and actually to keep them. All these good things come from God, and if anyone not only can keep, but actually does keep, God’s commandments, this is a new good that certainly comes from God, the source of all good. But if a man could by his own power make God’s grace efficacious, then this would single him out from another equally loved and helped by God, and thus the words of St. Paul would be untrue: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou, that thou hast not received?”

EFFICACIOUS GRACE IN ITS RELATION TO HUMAN LIBERTY SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

The principal objection from this point of view is already solved by St. Thomas in this article, for he says: “From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will (consequent or efficacious), it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen either contingently (i.e., also freely) or necessarily according to His will.” %8 In other words: the determination effected by God's consequent will, which is perfectly efficacious, does not interfere with the freedom of our will, because it extends even to the free mode of our choice, producing this in us and with us. For this mode is a modification of being and action, and hence is included in the adequate object of the power of Him who is the Au-

thor of the being of all things and actions. Thus God by His primary contact does not interfere with, does not destroy, the freedom of our will, but actuates it.

The opponents bring forward another objection. They declare that the Council of Trent says: “If anyone says that man’s free will, moved and aroused by God . . . cannot refuse its consent if it wishes .. . let him be anathema.” ° But this refers to grace that is in some manner efficacious, with which man de facto co-operates, and to which he assents. Therefore, under the influence of this grace, man cannot refuse his consent, if he would, and hence this grace is efficacious, not of itself, but because our consent was foreseen by God. So say Lessius, Molina, Vasquez.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that the free will of man, moved and aroused by God, can refuse its consent, this I concede; that it can refuse its consent in sensu composito, that is, unite actual resistance with efficacious grace, this I deny; for this grace would no longer be efficacious. Similarly, Socrates cannot stand and sit at the same time, but, while he sits, he can stand, that is, he has the power to stand at the same time that he actually sits. Thus a man asleep, although he does not actually see, yet he can see, for the fact that he is asleep does not mean that he is blind. That the minor, indeed, refers to efficacious grace, this I concede. The conclusion is distinguished in the same manner as the major: that a man under the influence of efficacious grace can refuse his consent if he so wills, in sensu diviso, this I concede; in sensu composito, this I deny. That is, under the influence of efficacious grace, a man can refuse his consent, if he so wills; but, under the influence of this grace a man never de facto so wills. Thus St. Thomas says: “If God moves the will to anything it is incompossible with this supposition that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply,” 310 because the will really has the power to do the opposite.

In fact, many Fathers of the Council of Trent, who were either Augustinians or Thomists, understood the aforesaid canon as referring to grace that is of itself intrinsically efficacious, which they admitted; and against the Protestants they held that grace of itself efficacious does not take away the freedom of the will. But if such is the interpretation of this text of the Council of Trent, then it is more against the Molinists who, along with the Protestants, admit that grace of itself efficacious takes away the freedom of the will.

_ The earlier Protestants said, just as the Jansenists did in later times, that grace of itself efficacious takes away the freedom of the will. But after original sin, for the performance of a salutary good

act, grace of itself efficacious is required. Therefore, after original sin, free will is an empty title.

The Molinists reply to this by conceding the major and denying the minor. The ancient theologians, especially the Thomists, replied by denying the major and conceding the minor.

Hence from this text of the Council of Trent, in the formulation of which many Thomists and Augustinians collaborated, nothing can be concluded against Thomism.*1?

Moreover, from the complete text of this quoted canon it is clear that the doctrine condemned differs entirely from that of St. Thomas; for it says: “If anyone says that man’s free will moved and aroused by God, by assenting to God’s call and action, in no way co-operates toward disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it wishes, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.” 312

Yet I insist. But even Calvin admitted this distinction between the sensus divisus and the sensus compositus; yet he was condemned. Therefore this distinction does not suffice.

Reply. Calvin admitted this distinction, but not in the Thomist sense. The Thomists say that under the influence of grace that is of itself efficacious we can refuse our consent in sensu diviso, because our will really has the power to do the opposite. On the contrary, according to Calvin, under the influence of this efficacious grace, man has not the power to do the opposite; but when no longer influenced by efficacious grace, then the power to do the opposite reasserts itself, that is, as a consequence of original sin free will is extinguished, is an empty title.**? He admitted only a certain contingency for the will, as in the case of the fruits of the earth, all of which do not ripen because of some impediment. Thus he reduced human liberty to spontaneity or to freedom from external restraint. The same was said by Jansenius, whose third-proposition reads: “For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from internal compulsion is not required; it is sufficient to be free from external constraint.” 314

Second objection. A supposed condition that precedes and infallibly causes our choice, necessitates the will and takes away its freedom; but such is the Thomist opinion about predetermining decrees; therefore these decrees necessitate our choice.

Reply. I distinguish the major. That a supposed condition pre-

311 Cf, Reginald, O.P., De mente Concilii Tridentini, on this canon. 312 Denz., no. 814.

ceding and infallibly causing our choice necessitates the will as regards the substance of the choice, this I concede; that it also does so as regards the free mode of this choice, this I deny. I contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequent and consequence.*?®

But I insist. For our choice to be a free act, what it depends on and what it is infallibly connected with must be within our power; but the divine predetermining decree, on which our act depends and with which it is infallibly connected, is not within our power; therefore our choice is not a free act.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if the principle pertains to the order of secondary causes, as our ultimate practical judgment that regulates our choice, then I concede it must be in our power; if this principle pertains to the order of first cause, I subdistinguish: that this principle must be in our power in the originative sense, as it pertains to the order of first cause, this I deny; in the terminative sense, or as regards the execution of the act, this I concede; and so it is, because, while our will freely elicits the act of choice, it retains the power to choose the opposite.

Hence a distinction must be made before we can admit the Molinist definition of free will, namely, “that it is a faculty which, granted all the prerequisites for the will to act, can either act or not act.” We must distinguish as follows: granted all the prerequisites for the will to act when the time comes for the performing of the act, the will is free to act or not to act even in sensu composito; but if we presuppose only all the natural prerequisites, such as are the divine efficacious motion and the ultimate practical judgment, the will is indeed still free not to act in sensu diviso, inasmuch as it retains the power to do the opposite, but not so in sensu composito; for the nonpositing of the act cannot coexist with efficacious grace.*t° Thus, when Socrates is standing, he can sit down; but he cannot at the same time stand and sit down. The above-mentioned Molinist definition of free will implies a begging of the question, for it presupposes before it is proved, that the divine decrees and grace are not of themselves efficacious.

Moreover, this definition is contrary to the principle that “faculties, habits, and acts are specified by their formal object”; and to define these it suffices for us to declare their essential relation to this object. Thus free will is defined as the dominating indifference of the will (either divine, angelic, or human) with respect to an object that is not good in every respect, which can be judged as good under one aspect and as not good under another. Thus St. Thomas says: “If the will is offered an object which is good universally and from

every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. (Thus it cannot but will God who is clearly seen.) If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to this of necessity.” 37 This is the true definition of free will as obtained from its specified object, and without any begging of the question.

Moreover, this indifference of judgment remaining intact with respect to an object that is not in every respect good, God, by interiorly moving our will as regards the performance of the act, cannot necessitate it, because He cannot change the nature of this act that is thus specified by this object thus proposed to it; but the divine action really causes the free mode of our choice by actuating this dominating indifference, which before this was potential. In the very act of choosing there is an actual dominating indifference of the will with respect to particular good that is actually chosen and does not infallibly attract the will. On the other hand, the will of the blessed is infallibly attracted by God clearly seen, so that there is no longer indifference of judgment in this respect.

WHETHER SUFFICIENT GRACE IS AN INSUFFICIENT HELP SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

First objection. That help is insufficient which, for us to act, requires another which is not in our power. But in addition to the help that is called sufficient, according to the Thomist opinion there is required another help that is of itself efficacious, which is not in our power. Therefore the first help is truly insufficient for the actual observance of God’s commandments. Thus we must go back to the theory of the scientia media. This objection can be answered either indirectly or directly.

1. Indirectly. This objection is in substance the same as that which St. Paul put to himself.**8 Just previous to this, St. Paul, speaking of the divine election, had said: “It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. . . . Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will; and whom He will, He hardeneth.” ?18 He at once remarks: “Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why doth He then find fault? For who resisteth His will?” 22° But to this objection St. Paul replies: “O man, who art thou that repliest against

God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? . . . What if God, willing to show His wrath (avenging justice) and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory (is there in this any injustice in God?)” 321 But St. Paul, in thus replying to the objection, does not have recourse to God’s foreseeing our consent; for then man would single himself out, which is contrary to what he says in the following words: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 822

Therefore St. Paul’s reply comes to this: on the one hand, God does not command impossibilities; on the other hand, no one would be better than another, unless loved and helped more by God; “for what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 323 These two principles taken separately are most certain; but how are they intimately reconciled? This cannot be known by us in this life. This would be to see how infinite mercy, justice, and absolute liberty are intimately reconciled in the Deity, or in the intimate life of God. But it is only in heaven that the Deity can be seen as it really is. Therefore St. Paul says farther on: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and how unsearchable His ways!” 32+ It is in this way that the element of the mysterious must be safeguarded in this reply, so that the mystery be kept on its high plane, and that a human theory for which there is no foundation in the divine reality be not substituted for it. This would savor of anthropomorphism.

2. A direct reply in scholastic form must be given to this objection, so as to avoid an evident contradiction. That the help which requires another help is not absolutely sufficient and in every respect, let this pass without comment; that it is not sufficient in its own order, this I deny; for it confers a real power, in fact, the proximate power to act so that nothing is wanting on the part of the faculty or first actuality. Thus the visual faculty is sufficient for seeing, and the man who is asleep really has this faculty, although he does not actuall see. Therefore, to say that sufficient grace as conceived by the Thomists is not truly sufficient and does not really give one the proximate power to act, is to say that a man when asleep is blind. Aristotle 325

$21 Ibid., 9: 20-23. This is the answer to his previous objection: “Is there injustice in God?” (Ibid., g: 14.)

had already said this against the Megarics, namely, that a thing can be really in potency without functioning. Thus the art of building in the builder who is asleep and is not actually building, remains in him as an acquired art.

Moreover, to the first part of the distinction I said only transeat (“let it pass without comment”), and not “I concede.” Why this? It is because the efficacious grace is offered in the sufficient grace, as the fruit is offered in the flower; but because man, through his own defectibility, resists the sufficient grace, he is deservedly deprived of the efficacious grace, by which he not only could have kept God’s ‘commandments, but actually would have done so. Thus the sin of resistance falls upon the sufficient grace, as the hail falls upon the trees in blossom which gave promise of the fruit, and so the fruit did not materialize.

Lastly, all Thomists admit that every actual efficacious grace for the performance of the imperfect salutary act, such as the act of attrition, is sufficient for the perfect act, such as the act of contrition. Yet, when the sin of resistance intervenes, the efficacious grace of contrition is not given, which was truly offered in the preceding grace, as the fruit is contained in the blossom, as the act is contained in the potency.#?6

To resist grace is an evil, which is to be attributed solely to our deficiencies; not to resist is a good which comes from God, the source of all good. And there is again in this a mystery, but not a contradiction.

But I insist. If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, then negation is the cause of negation. Thus the sun illuminating is the cause of day, and its absence is the cause of night. But the bestowal of grace that is of itself efficacious is the cause of the salutary act. Therefore the non-bestowal of grace that is of itself efficacious is the cause of the omission of this act, or of our resistance to grace.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if it is a case of one cause, which is, indeed, posited and then taken away, such as the rising of the sun, then I concede the major; if it is a case of two causes, one of which is supreme and indefectible, and which would not be bound to prevent the defect of the other, whereas the other is defectible, then I deny it; for then the defect is to be attributed solely to the defectible cause, and not to the indefectible cause. Thus the Scripture says: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” #*7 Such is the teaching of St. Thomas.%?8

326 Cf. Alvarez, De auxiliis, Bk. IIL, disp. 80; Gonet, Clypeus, De voluntate Dei, disp. 4, no. 147; N. del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 423.

It must be observed that according to certain Thomists, such as Gonzalez, Bancel, Massoulié, and, among later Thomists, Guillermin,**° the actual sufficient grace is virtually efficacious, in this sense, that it not only would give the power, but even would give one the impulse to act, although not infallibly, because it would not remove all the obstacles. Therefore, even according to these authors (who, like other Thomists, reject the scientia media), even the salutary act easy to perform is not posited and persisted in de facto here and now, unless God from all eternity willed this by His consequent and infallibly efficacious will, and unless God grants at the moment the grace that is of itself efficacious to overcome the obstacles to the performance of this salutary act here and now to be posited or persisted in.

All Thomists maintain that to resist grace is an evil that comes solely from a defectible cause, but not from God; whereas, on the contrary, here and now not to resist sufficient grace is a good here and now posited, which presupposes, therefore, a decree that is of itself and infallibly efficacious of God's consequent will, as explained by St. Thomas in the following statement: “Whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.” 8° But the distinction between God's antecedent and consequent wills is the ultimate foundation for the distinction between sufficient and efficacious graces.

WHETHER THE INTRINSIC EFFICACY OF THE DIVINE DEGREES AND GRACE BEARS ANY RESEMBLANCE TO CALVINISM

Objection. It was defined in the Council of Trent that God in no way is the cause of sin: “If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.” 382 But, according to the Thomists, God is the cause of the

829 See Revue Thomisie, 1903, pp. 23 f. We have examined this opinion in Predestination (Eng. tr.), pp. 345 Ë.

330 Summa theol., Ia, q.19, a.6 ad 1um. 331 Cf. Billuart, De Deo uno, diss. VI, a.6, de scientia media, §9. This question has been treated more fully in Predestination (Eng. tr.), pp. 328, 333-

35. 345-51; also Revue Thomiste, May-June, 1937: “Le fondement suprême de la distinction des deux graces suffisante et efficace,” 332 Denz., no. 816.

act of sin by physical premotion, which presupposes a divine predetermining decree that concurs in the physical entity of sin. Therefore it seems that God is the cause of sin itself, as He is according to the tenets of Calvinism.

Reply. God is truly the author of the physical entity of sin; yet He is neither directly nor indirectly the cause of the deordination that there is in sin, as St. Thomas shows.*** For God to be the direct cause of sin, this means that He influences His or another’s will to commit sin. But. God draws all things to Himself, as to their end, and He cannot turn His will away from Himself. Therefore God is not the cause of sin.

He cannot be the indirect cause of sin, because to be the indirect cause of sin means not to prevent it. But God's wisdom and prudence do not require that He should prevent sins, which He permits. He can permit them, however, for a greater good, for the greater manifestation of His mercy and justice. Thus there would be no patience of the martyrs without the persecution of tyrants, as St. Thomas points out.*84 Hence St. Augustine gives the solution of the problem of evil, when he says: “Since God is absolutely good, He by no means would permit evil in His works, unless He were good enough and powerful enough to bring good out of evil.” 395

Moreover, the evident conclusion we must come to from this is that even if, by an impossibility, God willed to be the cause of sin, He could not be, for the evil of sin is excluded from the adequate object of divine and indefectible omnipotence, just as sound is excluded from the object of sight.#*¢

Yet it is insisted that he who premoves efficaciously and determinately to the act of sin, is the cause of sin itself. But, according to Thomism, God premoves efficaciously and determinately to the act of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin itself.

Reply. I distinguish the major: he who premoves, not prescinding from the malice of sin, this I concede; otherwise, I deny the major. I contradistinguish the minor. Similarly the motive power causes whatever motion there is in lameness, though prescinding from the defect of lameness.

Again it is insisted that God cannot prescind from the malice of sin, for He moves the will to the act precisely as coming from the will; but in the act of sin, as it comes from the will, malice is not excluded; therefore God moves the will to the malice of sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major. God moves one to the act of sin, as

it proceeds effectively from the will, this I concede; as it proceeds defectively, this I deny.

Still it is insisted that if two things are inseparably connected, the cause of the one is the cause of the other; but the act of sin and its malice are inseparably connected; therefore God is the cause of the malice in sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if the connected effect is included in the adequate object of this cause, let it pass without comment; otherwise, I deny the major. But malice is not included in the adequate object of divine omnipotence; for there is nothing that is more precisive than the causality of a faculty that is specified by its object, even though something else is intimately connected with it. Thus it is only the color of the apple that is seen by the visual faculty, and not the smell; and just as smell is not included in the object of sight, so the evil of sin is not included in the adequate object of indefectible omnipotence.

Finally, it is insisted that the cause of anything is the cause of that which is essentially combined with it; but certain physical acts are essentially and morally evil, such as the hatred of God; therefore God in moving one to these acts, cannot prescind from their malice.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that the cause of anything in the physical order is the cause of that which is essentially combined with it in the same order, this I concede; when what is essentially combined with it is in the moral order, then I deny the major.

Hence God causes whatever there is of a positive nature in sin, as it is an effectible entity, but not as it is a defectible entity, because the evil of sin is not included in the adequate object of indefectible omnipotence. Even if, by an impossibility, God willed to cause it, He could not do so. This constitutes what ‘is most clear in this chiaroscuro.

On the contrary, the objective motion to the act of sin, by reason of the object proposed to the will, does not prescind from its malice. Thus he who advises or commands the sinful act, is guilty of sin. But God does not move the will to the object of sin, but only to the performance of the act, and He does not determine it to the material element in sin, before it has in some manner determined itself to what formally constitutes sin, through the will deliberately refusing to consider at the very moment the fulfillment of the obligation imposed upon it. This deliberate refusal on the part of the will to consider the obligation imposed upon it is the beginning of sin, which coexists with sufficient grace, or the proximate power for the required consideration. And prior to this deliberate refusal of consideration, all that is required on God's part is the permission of sin, which is not the cause of sin, but its indispensable condition.

Moreover, we must carefully distinguish between the divine permission that is prior to the first offense, and which therefore is not a punishment, and the refusal of divine efficacious grace, which is already a punishment, and which therefore presupposes at least a first offense. To confuse these two, between which the Thomists take care to distinguish, as being that which is prior to the first offense, and that which follows it, would result, indeed, in Calvinism.%%*

Moreover, there is a vast difference between Calvinism and Thomism, inasmuch as Calvinism maintains the extinction of free will after original sin, it being an empty title. Thus there is an end of all merit, of all merit in obedience. The mystery of predestination is contaminated at its source by reason of the denial of God’s universal will to save, which means the overthrow of the whole Christian religion. There is, besides, a more complete solution of this question in the following article.

Finally, it must be noted that this assertion maintained by the Thomists namely, “the divine decrees and grace are of themselves efficacious with reference to salutary acts,” is connected with the principles of faith and proximately definable. In this almost all the schools, with the exception of the Molinist, agree with the Thomists.**8

This assertion must not, therefore, be confused with the two following statements: “grace of itself efficacious must be explained by physical predetermination”; “predetermination must be applied to natural acts and to the material element in sin.” These last two assertions may be looked upon as philosophical and logical deductions from the previous affirmation about grace that is of itself efficacious.

But the opponents strive to confuse these two questions, so that from the first assertion concerning the intrinsic efficacy of grace they may conclude that God becomes the cause of sin. Let them but remain faithful to the teaching of St. Thomas as set forth in this eighth article, and to his higher principles.***

339 1t must be noted that there is no possible medium between these two propositions: God infallibly knows free conditioned futures either before He issues a decree about these (as stated in the theory of the scientia media), or else after He has issued a decree (as all those admit who reject the scientia media). But of late several theologians have sought to find a medium between these two contradictory propositions, confusing the conditioned future with the purely possible, as an anonymous author did in a recent brochure entitled: Essai sur la determination exemplaire des futurs libres (Paris, Mignard, 1937). But there is no excuse for this confusing of the issue: all indeed know that if Peter were placed in certain circumstances, either he would or would not betray his Master;

NINTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD WILLS EVILS

State of the question. The difficulty consists in this: on the one hand, God, who is infinitely good, cannot will evil; on the other hand, He wills everything that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe. But the evil, for example, of persecution, without which there would not be the patience of the martyrs, pertains to the perfection of the universe. Moreover, if God in no way willed evils, these would not happen, because nothing happens unless God wills it. That is, as stated in the third objection of this article, “God does not will that evil should not exist.” Therefore it seems that God wills evils.

It must be noted that evil is of three kinds.*#° For there is (1) the evil of nature, which is the privation of good, even in irrational things; then there is (2) in voluntary things the evil of sin, which is the privation of moral rectitude; and there is (3) the evil of punishment, which is the privation of some good on account of sin.

There are two parts to the reply. The first part refers to the evil of sin, and the second to the evils of nature and of penalty.

1. God does not at all will or cause the evil of sin, even accidentally, but only permits it. He cannot in any sense be called the author of sin.

This conclusion is of faith according to Holy Scripture, which says: “Thou art not a God that willest iniquity. . . . Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity. Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.” 341

It was defined in the Council of Trent against Luther and Calvin: “If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.” 342

The reason for this first part of the answer is explained at length by St. Thomas elsewhere,** by showing that God can be neither the direct cause of sin (by inclining the will to sin), nor the indirect cause (by not giving the required help, or giving it insufficiently), and that He can permit sin on account of a greater good. Thus the evil these are two possible events; but the conditioned future implies also a new determination, that is, which of these two possibilities Peter would choose, 840 Cf. Summa theol., Ia, q.48, a.5. 841 Ps, 5: 5; cf. Rom. 3: 5; 9: 14; James, 1:13; I John 1: 53 3:9. 842 Denz., no. 816. 843 Summa theol., Ia Ilae, q.79, a.1.

of sin is a defect coming from a defective cause, not from God.

But in this article St. Thomas gives the general reason, which is: Since the aspect of good is the aspect of desirability, and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought directly and essentially, though it can be sought indirectly and accidentally, inasmuch as it accompanies a good that is more desirable than the good of which it is a privation. Thus a lion kills a stag for the purpose of obtaining food.

But God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness. Hence God in no way, either essentially or accidentally, wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of the order toward divine good. But, as stated,®44 He only permits it. l

Therefore, as we said previously,*** God knows future sins in His permissive decree. It can now be said more explicitly that God knows future sins in a twofold decree, namely, permissive and effective; for there is a positive element in sin, that is, the act of effect, which can be produced only with the concurrence of the First Cause; and there is the privative element, and this comes, however, solely from a defectible and deficient cause.

The other part of the answer, that which refers to the evils of nature and of punishment, is worded as follows: God wills the evils of nature and of punishment, not indeed essentially but accidentally, by reason of the good that is connected with them.

What has been said makes this clear. (1) It is, indeed, impossible than an evil, as such, should be sought essentially and directly, for the aspect of good is the aspect of desirability. (2) God wills accidentally the evils of nature and of punishment, because He wills more the good to which this twofold evil is annexed, than the good of which the evil is the privation. Thus, by willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills accidentally or indirectly, as a quasiconsequence, the corruption of certain natural things. So, by willing of itself the life of the lion. He wills accidentally the death of the stag; so also in the moral order, by willing of itself justice, He wills punishment indirectly and accidentally.

Reply to first objection. This reply is against Hugo of St. Victor,®*¢ who taught that God willed that evils should be done, because it is a good thing, inasmuch as evils are directed to some good end. St. Thomas replies: “This, however, is not correct, since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally . . . ; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions.” That which of itself is ordered to

good is not the evil itself which God permits, but God’s holy permission. ‘The reply to the second objection is to the same effect.

Reply to third objection. “God neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this (willing to permit it) is a good.”

‘Thus we must distinguish, as stated at the end of our commentary to the preceding article, between the permission of sin (especially the first sin), which is not a punishment, and the divine refusal of efficacious grace, which is already a punishment, and which presupposes, therefore, at least a first sim.?47

TENTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD HAS FREE WILL

It has already been made clear to us in the third article that God does not necessarily will things other than Himself; for His goodness is infinite, and He is in complete possession of it apart from other things. But this article shows that free will is to be attributed to God, because what it formally signifies implies no imperfection.

There are two conclusions. (1) There is free will in God, because there is election in Him, inasmuch as He does not necessarily will things apart from Himself. This is of faith. (2) God is absolutely free, although it is not possible for Him to sin, this belonging to the imperfection of creatures. As St. Thomas says: “Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two Opposites, inasmuch as He wills a thing to be, or not to be.” 38 This means that God enjoys absolute liberty, sin being for Him an impossibility, just as supreme wisdom excludes the possibility of error. This applies, though in a modified manner, to the most holy soul of Christ, which is both free and absolutely impeccable, for its liberty is the most pure image of the divine liberty, which is both absolute and impeccable.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE ‘ WHETHER THE WILL OF EXPRESSION IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED IN GOD

State of the question. The purpose of St. Thomas in this article is to explain the commonly accepted distinction between God’s will

347 Cf. Summa theol., la Mae, q.79, a.3 f. See also end of commentary to q.19, a.8: solution of the objections because of the supposed resemblance between Thomism and Calvinism.

of good pleasure, and His will of expression. The former has already been discussed in this question.%**

That God’s commands, which are not always observed, are called God’s will, seems to be the foundation for this distinction. Thus we read: “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” 35° Then the will of God is not the same in meaning as His consequent and efficacious will of good pleasure, which is always fulfilled, and this latter is not, absolutely the same as His antecedent will of good pleasure, which is of itself never efficacious.**! In what sense, therefore, is God’s command called His will?

To understand this distinction, St. Thomas makes the following observations in this article: “What is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God, just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes this precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven.” 852

St. Thomas concludes: “Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. ‘Will’ in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure (which is, as above stated, either consequent or antecedent); ‘will’ metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.”

It must be observed that sometimes God’s command does not coincide with His will of good pleasure, as is evidently the case when God commanded Abraham to kill his son Isaac, since indeed He afterward commanded the contrary. But this command was a sign that God wished the patriarch to will the slaying of his son and make the necessary preparations.

WHETHER FIVE EXPRESSIONS OF WILL ARE RIGHTLY ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL

State of the question. There are five expressions of will that are generally assigned in various passages of Holy Scripture to the divine will. These are: precept, counsel, prohibition, permission, and operation.

The reason St. Thomas gives for this enumeration is that in these five ways we are accustomed to signify that we will something. For

when we do anything it is a clear sign that we will it. When we command or advise something to another, it is a sign that we will it to be done (or not done, if it is something we forbid). Finally, when we permit someone over whom we have authority to do something, it is a sign that we do not will to prevent it. Hence St. Augustine says: “Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it.” 353

Doubt. How is the will of expression related to the will of good pleasure?

St. Thomas replies 35+ by showing that there is sometimes, but not always, agreement between these two wills. He says more explicitly in another of his works: “It is necessary for us to know that there are three ways in which the will of expression is related to the will of good pleasure. For there is a will of expression which never coincides with the will of good pleasure, such as when God permits the perpetration of evil, since He never wills this; 3*5 but there is a will of expression that always coincides with the will of good pleasure, as in the case of operation; and sometimes, indeed, they coincide, and sometimes not, as in the case of command, prohibition, and counsel.*8° ‘Thus when God commanded Abraham to kill his son Isaac, this did not coincide with His will of good pleasure, for He afterward commanded the contrary. Thus when a command is not fulfilled as it ought to be, it does not coincide with God's efficacious or consequent will of good pleasure, but with His antecedent will.

Objection. If the will of expression does not always coincide with the will of good pleasure, then it is incorrect to call it the will of expression; for a sign that is not in conformity with the thing signified is a false sign.

St. Thomas replies: “Although God does not will everything He commands or permits, yet He wills something concerning this; for He wills all to be under obligation to do what He commands, and that it be in our power to do what He permits, command and permission being an expression of this divine will.” 357

Finally it must be noted what is often said by spiritual authors, such as Bossuet: “Christian indifference being out of the question where the expressed will 358 of God is concerned, we must restrict it, as St. Francis de Sales does, to certain events controlled by His will of good pleasure, whose sovereign commands determine the daily

355 God wills only to permit the evil of sin.

357 Ibid., ad 2um. See also Ia, q.19, a.11 ad gum, 358 What is said here is against Quietism.

occurrences in the course of life.” 359% Dom Vital Lehodey says: “The good pleasure of God is the domain of abandonment; His expressed will, of obedience.” 3° We have explained at length elsewhere ®* in what sense it is true to say that the divine will of expression made known by various commands is the domain of obedience, whereas the will of good pleasure not as yet made known is the domain of holy indifference and abandonment into God's hands. But we-must now treat of God’s love for Himself and for us, or of the act of His will of good pleasure.

_ APPENDIX ON GOD’S PERSONALITY IN OPPOSITION TO PANTHEISM

The pantheists and monists either completely or partly identify the world with its principle, and therefore they deny the distinction between God and the world, and His real personality. For they teach that a personal God does not exist, since the notion of person implies limitation. For these, person or the ego presupposes another certain independent being, as a non-ego in opposition to the ego. Thus the notion of person implies limitation.

This error is refuted from the principles already established. We must bear in mind that a person is an intelligent and free subject.

But the teaching authority of the Church enunciates in the Vatican Council what is the foundation for this refutation, by attributing to God what formally constitutes person, namely, subsistence, intelligence, free will, and also a real and essential distinction from the world; and the reason assigned for this is that, whereas the world is essentially composite and mobile, it requires God as the supreme, absolutely simple, and unchangeable cause.

The Vatican Council says: “The Holy Catholic . . . Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intelligence, in will and in all perfection, who, as being one, sole, absolutely simple and immutable spiritual sub-

860 Holy Abandonment, p. 123. St. Francis de Sales explains this more fully in his Love of God, Bk. VII, chap. 5: “Of the conformity of our will with that will of God which is made known to us by His commandments and his counsels”; also chap. 14: “A short method for knowing God’s will”; similarly, Bk. IX, chaps. 1-5: “Of the union of our will with that divine will which is called the will of good pleasure, especially in afflictions, and of holy indifference.”

361 Providence (Eng. tr.), pp. 215-67, in which this doctrine is explained that, “in obeying as best we can God’s will as made known to us, we must abandon ourselves for the rest with full confidence to His will of good pleasure.” See ibid., p. 218.

stance, is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the world (which is composite and changeable), of supreme beatitude in and of Himself, and ineffably exalted above all things besides Himself which exist or are conceivable.” 36?

From what has been said in previous questions, it is evident that this doctrine has its foundation in Holy Scripture; moreover, the reason is given for the distinction between the absolutely simple and unchangeable God and the composite and changeable world, and the reason why the term “person” is predicated of God, since He is the intelligent, free, and subsistent Being who is independent of any other being.

Although revelation declares that there are three Persons in God, yet God, speaking of His nature and creative power, which are common to the Trinity,3** says to Moses: “I am who am... . Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath sent me to you. This is My name forever.” 3+ And again we read: “I am the Lord and I change not.” 385 “I am, I am the Lord; and there is no savior besides Me. I have declared and have saved.” *** God is always referred to in Holy Scripture as endowed with knowledge, volition, action, spiritually creating and exercising dominion over all things, and He often expresses that He is the personal Being, by using the pronoun “I” in speaking of Himself. Moreover, in accordance with revelation, God must be invoked as Father,? which is a personal name.* Therefore, whatever belongs to the notion of person (subsistence, intelligence, liberty) is found formally and eminently in God, without any imperfection.

Objection. But the subsisting ego is named in opposition to the non-ego, which is likewise independent. If, therefore, God were a person, this would presuppose something else independent of Himself, and thus He would not be the principle of all things.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the subsisting ego, inasmuch as this is a created and limited person, is named in opposition to the non-ego that is likewise independent and existing, this I concede; that this pertains to what is formally signified by the name “person,”

368 St. Thomas remarks (Ia, q.33, a.3): “This name Father in the divine persons is predicated first personally, and afterward essentially (as common to the whole

Trinity) with reference to creatures, especially rational creatures that by grace become the adopted sons of God.”

inasmuch as it is distinct from its created mode, this I deny. And I deny the consequent and consequence.

For indeed, as stated, what is formally signified by “person” implies only subsistent, intelligent, and free being, which can be called ego. Thus in God, ego is what is formally signified by person, and with reference to God, non-ego signifies possible things, and after creation those things which, inferior to God, either are, will be, or were created by Him.

Thus the name “person” is not predicated univocally of God and created rational beings, but analogically, and this not only metaphorically but properly, so that what is formally signified by “person” is in God formally and eminently as absolutely independent subsistence, intellection, and free will.

Another objection. Every person must be endowed with selfconsciousness. But all self-consciousness necessarily implies limitation, inasmuch as consciousness distinguishes the ego from the non-ego. Therefore God is not a person.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that a person must have the created mode of consciousness, this I deny; that a person can be without such mode, this I concede. I distinguish the minor: that the created mode of consciousness denotes limitation, this I concede; that what is formally signified by consciousness denotes limitation, this I deny.

Evidently a created person as such is self-conscious, inasmuch as it is this that makes such a person distinct from God and other created persons. But nothing prevents God from being most perfectly conscious of Himself, inasmuch as He is the self-subsisting Being, and by this He is distinct from possible beings and, after creation, from created beings.

THE SANCTITY OF GOD

From what has been said about God’s will, it is evident that God enjoys the highest degree of sanctity, because He is infinitely perfect both in intellect and in will, and, as we shall see in the following question, God infinitely and immutably loves His most perfect goodness for its own sake and as the measure of any moral good. Hence God’s will, which is impeccable,*® is most holy; in fact, it is essential sanctity.

Holy Scripture repeatedly asserts this, as in the following texts: “The Lord is just in all His ways, and holy in all His works.” *° “Who is like to Thee, glorious in holiness?” %1 “Holy, Holy,

Holy,” 32 the seraphim proclaim Him to be. God is often called ‘The Holy One of Israel.” This sanctity is the exemplar of our sanctity: “Be you therefore perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect.” #78

This sanctity of God, inasmuch as it is communicative, is called benignity. This is declared many times in Holy Scripture: “When Thou openest Thy hand, they shall all be filled with good.” *74 “O how good and sweet is Thy spirit, O Lord, in all things.” 35 “Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.” 376 Moreover, God in calling Himself Father, expresses His readiness to be beneficent. In fact, “God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son.” 37 As St. Thomas says: “It pertains to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as is possible.” *7§ Moreover, this benignity of God is especially evident in His love and mercy toward creatures, which we must now discuss.

Finally, from what has been said it is clear that there is infinite beauty in God, in fact, essential beauty not only of the ontological but also of the intellectual and moral orders.

For as St. Thomas says: “Beautiful things are those which please when seen; hence beauty consists in due proportion,” 879 which means that this requires unity in diversity or harmony, and splendor of this unity as well as of truth and goodness.

But God most perfectly and essentially possesses the infinite plenitude of being, intelligence, and goodness, of all perfections in the highest unity of His Deity, so that it is said of His wisdom: “For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars: being compared with the light, she is found before it.” 380 “She is the brightness of eternal light.” 881

Hence God by reason of His beauty is to Himself the fount of infinite delight and beatitude,** and the vision of God produces in intellectual creatures ineffable complacency and supreme joy. Thus God is the first beauty, and the exemplar of all ontological, intellectual, and moral beauty.

Footnotes

1. Timaeus, no. 2g. ↩