Chapter XIII. Question 13 tue names of God prologue

“AFTER the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.” 1 For words are signs of ideas, and ideas express the nature of things, as explained by Aristotle.? Thus every science has its terminology, although we must not say with the nominalists, especially with Condillac: “The sciences are well-constructed languages.” Science makes use of good terminology in expressing its ideas; but, since it consists especially in the well-ordered arrangement of ideas as expressive of the very nature of things, it transcends this terminology. In fact, science is a simple quality, a habit that is specified by its formal object, subordinating the ideas with reference to this formal object.

The importance of this question. This question is of great importance, as it treats of the analogy existing between God and creatures, and in this life God is known and named only analogically by us. We shall give here but a brief explanation of this analogy, not only because it has been already discussed in our refutation of agnosticism in the question concerning the demonstrability of God’s existence, in which we treated of analogy by way of investigation in the ascendant order, but also because we have written extensively on this subject in two other works.‘

By all means the conclusions and reasons given by St. Thomas must be here presented, so that it may be clearly and distinctly seen how his theory avoids the two extremes, namely, of agnosticism and of a certain anthropomorphism. Agnosticism gets no farther than a certain symbolism in which there is no criterion so as to distinguish between what is predicated literally of God and what

1Summa theol., Ia, q.13, prologue.

2 Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. 1.

4Cf. God, His Existence and His Nature, 1, 206-41; Il, 187-267, e 397 £. See also De revelatione, 1, 276-318.

is predicated metaphorically of Him; e.g., in determining why it can properly be said of God that He is just, but not that He is angry. Thus in the end we should have to say that God is absolutely unknowable and ineffable in a depreciatory sense.

On the other hand, there is a type of anthropomorphism which considers God, not indeed as a great man as the ancient anthropomorphists did, but which considers Him in too human a way, predicating the divine names univocally or quasi-univocally, as if they had absolutely the same meaning when predicated of God and of creatures, as when wisdom is predicated of God and of a wise man.

We shall see that St. Thomas maintains that divine names are not predicated either equivocally (this would be the symbolism of the agnostics) or univocally (this would be the tendency of anthropomorphism), but analogically; yet they are not predicated merely analogically in the metaphorical sense, as when God is said to be angry, but they are predicated analogically in the literal sense, as when it is said that God is just, and when absolutely simple perfections implying no imperfection in their formal signification are attributed to Him. Hence, as we shall state farther on, these analogical names that are predicated of God and creatures, do not in their concept signify what is absolutely the same, but what is proportionately so. Thus wisdom is the knowledge of things by their highest causes; but God’s wisdom is the cause of things, whereas our wisdom is caused by things.

Having shown the importance of this question by the foregoing principles, we must point out that it is divided into three parts. The first part, which treats of the divine names in a general way and which includes the first seven articles, contains the following queries: whether God can be named by us, whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially (or only causally); literally (or only metaphorically); whether any names applied to God are synonymous (so that it can be said that God punishes by His mercy, as He is said to punish by His justice); whether names are applied to God and creatures univocally, or equivocally, or else analogically; but if analogically, whether they are applied first to God or to creatures; finally, in the seventh article, whether some names are applied to God temporally, as Creator and Lord, and others eternally. The second part of the question, which includes four articles, is concerned with the meaning of this name “God” in the first three articles, and in the fourth with the meaning of this name, “Who is,” whether it is the supremely appropriate name of God. The third part is a sort of recapitulation and application of the preceding doctrine to the conclusion established in the last query, namely, whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God.°

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER A NAME CAN BE GIVEN TO GOD

State of the question. Three difficulties present themselves: (1) because it is commonly held that God is ineffable; (2) because every name is either concrete (wise), or abstract (wisdom). But a’ concrete name does not belong to God, since He is simple; nor does an abstract name belong to God, because He is subsisting Being; (3) there are special difficulties for the names taken to signify substance with quality, because God is without quality; for demonstrative pronouns, because God is not pointed out; for verbs that have a temporal signification, since God transcends time,

Yet the answer is that God can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name signifying Him expresses the divine essence in itself or quidditatively.

1. It is proved from Sacred Scripture, in which God is referred to under various names, such as Lord, Omnipotent, Who is. On the other hand, it is likewise said in Sacred Scripture that God is ineffable. The Fourth Lateran Council also declares this in the following words: “We firmly believe . . . that there is only one true, eternal, immense, immutable, incomprehensible, omnipotent, and ineffable God, the Father and Son and Holy Ghost.” ¢ So also Dionysius calls God anonymous or ineffable; yet he says that God has several names.?

2. Proof from reason. We can give a name to anything inasmuch as we can understand it. But in this life we know God from creatures, as being their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion; in this life, however, we cannot see the essence of God. Therefore God can be named from creatures, yet not so that the name expresses the divine essence in itself.

The major has its foundation in the following principle formu-

5 Consult the commentary of St. Thomas on the work of the Pseudo-Dionysius entitled, De divinis nominibus. There is evidence of considerable progress in the doctrine as presented in this commentary compared with that given in this article of the theological summa. As to what the predecessors of St. Thomas held on this subject, consult also Alexander of Hales, Summa, Ia, q-48-70, and St. Albert the Great, Summa theol., Ia, tr. HI, q-13, membr. 1; q.14, membr. 1; q-15, membr. 1; and q.50-59- As for the commentators of St. Thomas, consult Cajetan John of St. Thomas, Xantes Mariales, and Gonet.

¹ lated by Aristotle, which clarifies this entire question: “Words are signs of ideas (of concepts and judgments), and ideas are the similitudes of things.” Thus words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual concept. This formula, transcending nominalism and subjective conceptualism, is realistic. For the nominalists maintain that ideas do not express the nature of things; for instance, the idea of humanity would not express the human nature, but rather an actually existing collection of men. Thus the purpose of ideas would be, not for acquiring a knowledge of the nature of things, but rather for action; this is pragmatism. Thus, according to the nominalists, the principle of contradiction is a grammatical law for avoiding contradiction in discourse, and is at most a law of discursive thought, but is not a fundamental law of extramental being. Thus they end in doctrinal nihilism.®

The minor is evident from what was said in previous articles.'® God is known from creatures as their principle. But we cannot have a proper concept of the Deity, such as would define it, for we have not a quidditative knowledge of the Deity. On the contrary, our concept of man, which defines man, is a proper concept. As St. Thomas says: “Such names (those signifying the divine substance) do not signify what God is, as though defining His substance.” 14

This is what St. Thomas thinks that St. John Damascene means, whom he quotes in this objection. Hence, as will be more clearly seen farther on, by the name “Deity” we understand that eminence which contains formally and eminently all absolutely simple perfections and the divine relations; but with reference to the Deity we are in this life like men who would know the seven colors of the rainbow without ever having seen whiteness. They would understand that the name “whiteness” implies the eminent fount of all colors; but the difference between whiteness and the Deity is, that whiteness contains colors only virtually, whereas the Deity contains all absolutely simple perfections formally and eminently. As Cajetan remarks: “The Deity is conceived through the medium of another concept (of being, of wisdom), yet it is not a representative but an abstractive concept of the Deity; and this is a sufficient rea-²³⁴⁵ son for distinguishing between the Deity thus known and what is directly known by us.” 1?

Hence the names attributed to God do not accurately express Him as He is, inasmuch as we have but an inadequate knowledge of Him from creatures, whether by way of causality (as when we say that He is the first Mover, the first efficient Cause, the first Ordainer), or by way of excellence (by means of such common concepts as supreme Being, supreme Truth, supreme Goodness), or by way of remotion (by means of such negative concepts as immaterial, immobile), or by a combination of common and relative concepts, as when we say that He is the First Being.'*

The solution of the objections confirms this conclusion.

Reply to first objection. God is ineffable inasmuch as “His essence is above all that we understand about God and signify in word.” For we do not know it quidditatively. We cannot say what formally constitutes the Deity in itself, just as a person who never saw whiteness cannot say what whiteness is. On the other hand, we know what man is, namely, a rational animal; although his specific difference is known by us abstractively and not intuitively, as the angels know it.

Reply to second objection. With reference to creatures, abstract names, such as wisdom, signify a simple form, whereas concrete names, such as wise, signify a composite subsisting being in which such form is found. And as God is both simple and subsisting, we attribute abstract names to Him to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His subsistence. In addition to this we say that God is His Godhead; * for God not only exists, but is His existence, His goodness, and similarly for His other attributes.

Reply to third objection. “Verbs and participles signifying time are applied to God because His eternity includes all time.” Thus it is said of God that He is, was, will be, no distinction being made between present, past, and future. But the way we speak of God shows that we have an imperfect conception of Him, and this is because in this life we know Him only from creatures.

Corollary. The perfect name of God, that is, the adequate name, cannot be a name uttered by the voice, or formed in the imagination, or the word of a created mind but is the uncreated Word, in whom the Father adequately declares His essence.15⁶

WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD SUBSTANTIALLY

State of the question. God can be named; but how?

The title says “any name.” Yet the inquiry is not about every name, for there are relative names that do not properly express the substance of God, but His relation to creatures, as Creator, or even Father as regards the only begotten Son. Hence the question is whether any name is applied to God substantially to signify His substance (although not quidditatively), or whether all God’s names refer to creatures. Is this name “essential Being,” for instance, applied to God substantially?

The difficulty is that we know God only from creatures. But, on the other hand, it is sufficiently clear that there is a certain distinction between absolute names, such as “essential Being,” and relative names, such as “supreme Cause.” Moreover, St. Augustine, who is quoted in the counterargument, says: “The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified.” 16

Conclusion. Negative names and names referring to creatures do not signify the substance of God; but, of course, absolute and affirmative names do, although they do not fully represent Him.

Examples of negative names are “incorporeal,” “immense”; of relative names, “Lord,” “efficient,” “end”; of absolute and affirmative names, “being,” “living,” “wise.” The first part of the conclusion is evident, for negative names signify the elimination of some imperfection, and relative names signify God’s relation to creatures, or rather the relation of creatures to Him. Hence the second part must be proved, which concerns absolute and affirmative names.

That his argument may be convincing, (1) St. Thomas presents two opinions, (2) he proves his point by refuting these opinions, (3) he proves the same directly.

1. Two opinions are presented. The first was proposed by Maimonides (Rabbi Moses). He was born in Cordova in 1135, and his purpose was to give the true conception of anthropomorphism by distinguishing in Sacred Scripture between what is predicated metaphorically of God and what is predicated properly of Him. He believes that, to preserve God’s simplicity, we must say that affirmative names, too, have been brought into use to express the elimination of something from God, rather than to express anything that exists

positively in Him. Hence to say “God is living” would mean “God is not non-living.”

Others said that absolute and affirmative names also are not predicated substantially, but causally. Hence to say “God is good” would mean that “God is the cause of goodness in things.” 7

2. The conclusion is proved indirectly by refuting both opinions at the same time. (1) If these opinions were true, it could be said that God is a body, because this could have but one of two meanings, either that God is the cause of bodies, or else that He is not primary matter without any actuality." (2) Hence not only metaphorical names, but all names applied to God, would be predicated of Him in a secondary sense, and primarily of creatures. Thus, being and goodness would apply primarily to creatures, and this not only as regards the name that is imposed (by the way of investigation), but also as regards what is signified by the name.’® Then God could not be called the essential Being, the first Being; and creatures could not be called being by participation. Christ said: “No one is good, but God only.” 2°

3. Names express what is conceived by the mind of those uttering them. But the above opinions are contrary to what is meant by those speaking of God. For when they say that God is good, they do not mean to say that God is the cause of goodness, but that God is good in Himself. It is especially to this that Christ referred.

Moreover, it must be noted that St. Thomas says against Maimonides: “It would also follow from this that we could not say of God that He was wise or good bcfore creatures were. . . . Moreover, a negation is always understood on the basis of an affirmation, for every negative proposition is proved by an affirmative. Hence, if the human intellect could not positively know anything about God, it could not deny anything about Him.” 2?

4. The conclusion is proved directly. Absolute and affirmative names are predicated of God substantially, but imperfectly. For names express God so far as our intellect knows Him from creatures. But creatures are made like to God, the likeness being

17 Concerning these opinions, consult St. Thomas’ De potentia, q.7, a.5.

18 The reference is here to the Aristotelian and scholastic theory of matter and form. Primary matter is the substratum, or that which underlies every existing material thing. It is never found apart from its actualizing form. It is, in relation to its form, a pure potentiality; yet it is something real, and not merely a logical entity. [Tr.]

imperfect, which is neither specific nor generic, but which is analogous. Therefore absolute and affirmative names are predicated of God substantially but imperfectly.

The major is proved from the preceding article. The minor is evident from what was said in the third article of the fourth question, in which it was proved that creatures are like God inasmuch as every agent reproduces itself either specifically or generically or at least analogically.

Likewise, in the second article of the fourth question it was said: “Whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent, or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent (nonunivocal). . . . Since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way,” to the exclusion of imperfections.

But as St. Thomas points out in this article and in the following one, as also in another of his works, we must carefully distinguish between absolutely simple and mixed perfections, in that the former imply no imperfection in their formal concepts. Such are being, truth, goodness, wisdom, and love, although the created mode of these perfections is imperfect. On the contrary, mixed perfections, such as rationability and discursive knowledge, denote imperfection in their formal concepts.

Hence, as St. Thomas says in this article, when we say God is good, the meaning is not that God is the cause of goodness, or that God is not evil; but the meaning 1s that whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a higher way. And also, “because He is good in Himself, He causes goodness in things.” The solution of the objections confirms this.

What Dionysius meant when he said ¢ that such expressions as not-good, or super-good, not-wise . . . must be attributed to God, is explained elsewhere by St. Thomas.? His opinion is that these names are affirmed of God according to the thing signified, or according to what is meant by the name; but they may be denied because of the mode of their signification. For, according to the mode of their signification, abstract names, such as wisdom, signify a form apart from its subject, and concrete names, such as wise, signify a composite, consisting of a subject that has such a form. But God is pure self-subsisting form. To say that God is super-

28 This adverb “imperfectly” will be more fully explained in the third and fifth articles of this question.

good is to say that the Deity or God’s intimate life, contains all absolutely simple perfections in an eminent way, which was proved in the preceding article. In the next article it is proved that God contains these perfections not only eminently, but also formally and eminently, that is, more than virtually, But this is already suggested in the present article, in which it is said that absolute and affirmative names are predicated of God “not only causally but substantially, although imperfectly.”

And so the danger of agnosticism is already avoided, which maintains that God is absolutely unknowable, inasmuch as He transcends the genera and the species.

WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD IN ITS LITERAL SENSE

State of the question. It is not “commonly” but “metaphorically” that is here contrasted with “literally.” Thus we speak frequently of the literal meaning of words, meaning what is not metaphorical. In the interpretation of Sacred Scripture the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical senses must be very carefully noted. Thus it is often said that God is just, and sometimes He is said to be angry. He is said to be angry metaphorically, since anger is, strictly speaking, a passion, which has no place in the pure Spirit. But the question is whether the word “just” is to be applied to God in its literal sense, or is not to be so applied, because He is super-just. This difficulty arises from what Dionysius is quoted as saying in the second objection, who maintained that these names, “good,” “wise,” “just,” are more truly withheld from God than predicated of Him.

The conclusion of St. Thomas is that, as regards the signified perfection, several names are predicated properly of God and more properly and primarily than they are of creatures. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly apply to God.

First the terms are explained; for instance, as regards the perfection signified by the name, “wisdom” signifies knowledge by the highest of causes. But as regards the mode of its signification, wisdom is an accident, that is, a quality of the mind either acquired or infused, or a habit of the created mind. Thus wisdom is in a certain genus and in a certain species of quality; hence under this aspect it cannot be properly attributed to God, who is not in any genus.

The terms being thus explained, the reason for the conclusion, which is stated more clearly in the reply to the first objection, is that the perfection signified by these names implies no imperfection, as in the case of wisdom; whereas the mode of their signification is imperfect and applies to creatures. On the contrary, other names which, in their formal signification, imply imperfection, such as “angry,” are predicated of God only metaphorically.

The reply to the first objection finds fuller expression in another of St. Thomas’ works.** According to what he states there, it may be said that God is not wise, but super-wise, if the imperfect mode is considered, inasmuch as wisdom is found in man as an acquired or infused habit.

It must be noted that the expression “properly as regards what is formally signified and not properly as regards the mode of signification” is somewhat the equivalent of “formally” and “eminently,” that is, formally as regards the perfection signified, eminently and virtually as regards the mode of signification. However, this term “formally” must be understood as referring to predication not in the univocal sense but in the analogical, as will be stated in the fifth article.?

FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER NAMES APPLIED TO GOD ARE SYNONYMOUS

State of the question. Synonymous names are those that have absolutely the same meaning, so that to say that God is wise, good, merciful, just, would be the same in meaning. If this were so, then, as it is said that God punishes by His justice, it could likewise be said that He punishes by His mercy, for justice and mercy would have the same meaning. This would result in agnosticism, and any distinction between justice and mercy would be no longer tenable. Yet evidently they are distinct from the way Sacred Scripture uses these terms.

But the difficulty here is to show why such names are not synonymous. This question is the same as the problem about the distinction between God’s attributes. As previously remarked by us, the nominalists admitted only a logical distinction between them, such as between Peter the subject and Peter the predicate in a proposition, as when we say: Peter is Peter; or they admitted a nominal distinction, such as that between Tullius and Cicero. Scotus Eriugena said about the same. Similarly, these two propositions of Master Eckhart were condemned: “Any distinction in God

is both impossible and inconceivable. Any kind of distinction does not apply to God.” 8

On the contrary, Gilbert de la Porrée said: “The divinity is not God, but the form by which He is,” *! because abstract names do not signify the subsisting subject. There is a certain anthropomorphism in this, since the imperfect mode of creatures is thus transferred to God.

Duns Scotus posited his actual-formal distinction between the divine attributes, considered as objects. There appears to be no possibility of a medium between the distinction that is not the result and that which is the result of the mind’s consideration. But if this distinction of Scotus is more than a virtual distinction, as previously stated, then it is incompatible with God’s absolute simplicity.

Very many theologians admit a minor virtual distinction between God's essence and His attributes, inasmuch as His essence, which is conceived by us actually and implicitly, but not explicitly, signifies the attributes that are derived from it.3?

The exclusion of synonymous names is still the difficulty that confronts us; for, as stated in the objections, all divine names mean the same thing, namely, God’s substance, which is most simple. If it is said that they signify the same thing, but differ in idea, there seems to be no purpose in different ideas that do not correspond to different things. Moreover, God is supremely one, not only in reality, but also in idea, which means that there is one proper and most eminent concept which expresses Him, this being the concept of the Deity.

Nevertheless the conclusion is that names attributed to God, although they signify the same reality, are not synonymous.

1. This conclusion is proved indirectly in the counterargument, for if these names are synonymous then their multiplication would be redundant or absolutely superfluous; because it would be affirming the same thing when we say that God is just and that God is merciful. In fact, if these names were synonymous, it could be said that God punishes by His mercy, and forgives by His justice. This would be agnosticism.

2. Direct proof. Names that signify the same thing but have different meanings are not synonymous. But such are the divine names: supreme being, wisdom, goodness, justice, mercy. . . . Therefore divine names are not synonymous.

The major has its foundation in the principle that names signify

80 Denz., nos. 523 f. 31 [bid., no. 389. 8? See introduction to third question: the divine attributes.

the thing only through the medium of the intellectual conception.** The minor, however, is proved in the body of the article as follows: “But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided, and multiplied.”

This means that being, wisdom, goodness, belong indeed properly to God, as was stated in the third article, but they are identified in the eminence of the Deity; and they are so identified in the Deity as not to be destructive of one another, but are there in a most pure state.. Thus the divine being is the self-subsisting Being, who is identical with His self-subsisting intellection; also the divine existence is identical with the self-subsisting will of God. But there is only a virtual distinction between God's subsistent intellection and His subsistent will. Thus what inferior beings have separately, superior beings have unitedly.**

So, analogically, the rational soul is eminently and formally both sensitive and vegetative. This means that there are not three subordinated souls in man, but only one, which is at one and the same time the principle of the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative lives. These three names are not synonymous, although they denote the same soul, because they denote it under different aspects. Nor need we have recourse to the actual-formal distinction on the part of the object, because this distinction is either previous to or the result of the mind’s consideration. In the latter case the distinction is virtual; in the former case, the distinction is already real, which is repugnant to God’s absolute simplicity.

Reply to second objection. “The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.” This means that the eminence of the Deity, which is most simple, is virtually multiple, since it is variously imitable. Similarly, in the natural order the same cause is virtually multiple, inasmuch as it produces different effects in different subjects. Thus fire expands iron, melts wax, burns flesh. . . . It is also evident a priori, as was shown above,’ that multitude does not explain the reason for unity, and that it must proceed from the supremely One, who must hence be virtually multiple. In like manner, great artists,

84 See Cajetan’s commentary on a.g, no. 7. He shows most clearly that intellection and volition can be identified only in one formal concept of a higher order, namely, in the concept of the Deity; otherwise they would be destructive of each other, since volition would be completely changed into intellection, or vice versa.

Thus the Deity is eminently and formally intellection and love. 85 Summa theol., Ia, q.2, a.3 (fourth way).

such as Leonardo da Vinci, in their portraits of persons seek to depict what is, so to speak, the predominant trait, which, though simple in itself, is virtually multiple. So also the fundamental principle of any doctrine is simple in itself and virtually multiple, such as the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality. In the reply to the difficulty proposed in the third objection, it is stated that God is supremely one, not only in reality but also in idea. In other words, there is not only one reality in God, but also only one most proper and most eminent concept of Him, namely, the concept of the Deity, which, according to revelation, is expressed in His only Word.

St. Thomas also says in his reply: “The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly.” This must be given careful consideration, since it is the foundation for the distinction between the most imperfect unity (for instance, of primary matter) and the supreme unity. This inferior kind of unity is potential, and is found in primary matter, which is quasi-negatively the same in all bodies; for this inferior kind of unity is found even in inferior elementary bodies and in the primitive cell from which the embryo originates, before the multiplicity or diversity of the. parts of the organism appear in it. Contrary to this, the higher kind of unity is not potential but actual, and is then virtually multiple; such is the unity of the\rational soul on which the divers parts of our exceedingly complex organism depend. But transcending all is the divine unity, which is the maximum in actuality, and of such virtual multiplicity that it contains an infinite multitude of possible things. At the end of. this reply to the third objection the reason is given why “our intellect apprehends God in a manifold manner,” because it apprehends Him “as things represent Him, which is in a manifold manner.”

First Corollary. There is only one truth for the divine intellect concerning God, the one and only Word being the adequate expression of this truth. This truth not only expresses equality but also identity between the divine intellect and the divine reality.

Second Corollary. As for the created intellect, especially the human, there are many truths about God, and there are many names applied to Him that are not synonymous, which means that they do not have the same meaning. The reason for this is that truth exists formally in the mind and not in the thing; for it denotes conformity between the judgment formed by the mind and the thing judged conformable to it. Hence for us there are certain revealed truths about God, others that are deduced from revealed truths, and also others that are naturally knowable.

Third Corollary. To say that these two truths, “God is intelligent” and “God is free,” have the same meaning and that therefore, if the first is revealed, by this very fact the second is revealed, is to say that divine names are synonymous. Then it could be said that God punishes by His mercy, and forgives by His justice.**

Fourth Corollary. The lower the degree of intellectuality of the created intellect, the more it apprehends God by a multiplicity of concepts.

WHETHER WHAT IS SAID OF GOD AND OF CREATURES IS UNIVOCALLY PREDICATED OF THEM

State of the question. We know that many names applied to God, who is most simple, are predicated of Him substantially and in the literal sense, yet not so as to be synonymous. The question is whether they are predicated univocally or analogically. Now it is certain from what has been said that they are not predicated equivocally, because they are attributed to God in the literal sense. St. Thomas adopts Aristotle’s terminology,*7 and this must be explained, as St. Thomas himself explains at the end of the argumentative part of this article.

A univocal term is one that is predicated of things simply in the same sense. Thus “man” is predicated univocally of various men, as “animal” is predicated of the horse, the wolf, and the lion. For by these names is meant either the species that is simply the same in individuals of the species, or else the genus which is likewise simply the same. Thus the name “animal” signifies a living body endowed with sensitive life, and this genus is diversified by differentiae that are extrinsic to it. Thus the univocal concept ad-

36 Father Marin Sola does not pay sufficient attention to this, for in his Evolution homogène du dogme catholique (Fr. tr., II, 333), he says: “Two propositions that have the same subject (God) differ or are identical in meaning according to their predicates. If, therefore, the predicates are really identical, the meaning of the propositions will be also.” If the predicates are really identical in reality and idea, then the propositions will have the same meaning, this I concede; if the predicates are identical in reality and not in idea, then I deny this. It is quite clear that in God, inasmuch as He is a reality, there is no real distinction between intelligence and liberty. But divine intelligence and divine liberty are not the same in meaning, are not synonymous; they do, indeed, concern the same thing, as it is a reality, but not as it is an object, as Cajetan says in his commentary on Ia, q-1, a.3, no. 8. Otherwise, in wishing nothing else but to consider the point, under the pretext of avoiding nominalism, this nominalist thesis would be admitted by us, namely, that divine names are synonymous.

37 See Categories, chap. 1, no. 2; Post. Anal, Bk. II, chaps. 13, 14; Metaph. Bk. IV, chap. 1; Bk. X, chap. 1; Bk. XII, chap. 4; Ethics, Bk. 1, chap. 6.

mits of complete logical separation from the different subjects to which it is attributed.

An equivocal term is one that is predicated of things in an entirely different sense. Thus “lion” is predicated equivocally of the quadruped and of one of the signs of the zodiac. Similarly “dog” is predicated of the animal and of a certain constellation.

An analogous term is one that is predicated of different things neither in simply the same sense nor in an entirely different sense, but according to a certain proportion or proportionality.®* An example of analogy of proportion or of attribution is the following: health is predicated primarily of the animal; and then proportionately, as referring to the healthy animal, the urine is said to be healthy (as a sign of health), the air, the food (as being the causes of health), medicine. ... There is a proportion among these analogates, and extrinsic denomination suffices for this, as health is intrinsically in the healthy animal, and only extrinsically in the air, the urine. .. . Hence this analogy is also called analogy of attribution, because extrinsic attribution suffices for such analogy.

An example of analogy of proportionality is the following: what the head is to the organic body, such is the general to his army, and the king to his kingdom. But this analogy of proportionality can be either metaphorical or proper. The king is metaphorically said to be the head of his kingdom. On the contrary, being is predicated in the proper sense of substance and of accident; for substance has existence in itself, and accident in another. Similarly, cognition is predicated properly and proportionately of sensation and intellection, because sensation is to the sensible what intellection is to the intelligible. Similarly love is predicated properly of sensitive love and of rational love. Nor does this demand a deter-

88 Certain eclectics, refusing to decide which is the true general metaphysics, whether it be the Thomistic, the Scotist, or the Suarezian metaphysics, say: “Those things are analogous which have the same name, but what is signified by the name is partly the same, and partly different.” This was, indeed, at one time the view of St. Thomas; but it is merely a nominal and as yet confused definition of analogy. For Scotus and Suarez, the analogical concept is simply the same and relatively different; on the other hand, for the Thomists such a concept is simply different and relatively (or proportionately) the same. (See the appendix to the seventh article of this question, in which these doctrines are compared.) St. Thomas knows quite well that the definition of analogy must declare in what the analogical concept (or perfection) simply consists: whether it has absolutely the same or has absolutely a different meaning in the things it represents. And he says at the end of the argumentative part of the article: “For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing.” The same applies to analogy of attribution, and it is proportionately the same idea that is signified by the term in the analogy of proportionality. See also Ia, q.4, a.2, 3; De veritate, q-2, a.11.

minate proportion among these analogates; in fact, there is an immense or immeasurable difference among them, since intellection pertains to the higher order, so that the internal senses would always be susceptible to further perfection in their order, and yet they would never attain to the dignity of the lowest grade of intellection.*®

This division of analogy may be expressed by the following schema:

a urel en ona š g S abd Ae (as medicine and air with reference to the animal’s health). ea] 3 1c Ese o °°S } not s e . 5 = purely (thus quality and quantity are spoken of as being dependent on $ [extrinsic substance; yet intrinsically they are beings). & 2 m4 Peer P i A A P £ > ‘ (thus the lion is said to be the king of animals; God is said to Z 5 metaphorical be angry). E o + . * 2 distance created substance _ proportionate accident 2 determined: its existence = its existence ° - = (proper in created beings (intellection and sensao . tion are analogically distance _ er rat and properly cognitions).

*| between God and God _ Creature the creature His existence its existence 40

With these principles posited about the terminology, the chief difficulty about our knowledge of God is in the statement made immediately before the argumentative part of this article, namely, “God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other.” If, therefore, no corporeal being seems to be a sufficiently expressive image for our knowledge of the created pure spirit, far more so no creature whatever can be this for our knowledge of God.

Yet the reply is that names are predicated of God and creatures, neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically or proportionately. There are three parts to this reply.

First part. Not univocally: because the names are not predicated as having absolutely the same meaning. The reason for this is that “the effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full

39 Read what St. Thomas says about this at the end of the argumentative part of this article. Although he does not clearly distinguish between analogy of proportion and analogy of proportionality in this article, yet he speaks about this latter in the body of this article, and in the replies to the first and second objections, in which he refers to the likeness of the creature to God. See also Ia, q.4, a.2, 3; q.13, 2.2, 3; De veritate, 4.2, a.11. 40For a fuller explanation of these matters consult what we wrote in De revelatione, I, 301-18.

degree, but in a measure that falls short.” Thus wisdom in man is an accident that is distinct from his essence, his existence, his intellectual faculty, whereas in God wisdom is the same as the divine essence.

This terminology of St. Thomas must be carefully noted, for he says: “Hence it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man.” St. Thomas says the same in several other passages. Cajetan most faithfully preserves St. Thomas’ teaching, with which Scotus disagrees.

2. These names are not predicated equivocally. This has been already refuted in the second and third articles of this question, in which it is shown that several names are predicated of God substantially and in the literal sense. In this article equivocation is disproved by reason of its inappropriateness, since “nothing could be known about God” which is contrary to Sacred Scripture testifying that “The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” #2 Moreover, it is quite clear that the words “being,” “wise,” do not signify in God and creatures totally different ideas or perfections, as when “dog” is predicated of animal and the constellation. For “being” signifies, both in God and in creatures, that which is, although God is self-existent and creatures are not. Similarly “wisdom” signifies, both in God and in man, knowledge by the highest of causes, although not applied in the same way to each.

3. These names are predicated analogically. The reason for this, which has already been given 43 and which is repeated in the body of this article and in the reply to the first objection, is that every agent reproduces itself, inasmuch as it determines according to its own determination, and therefore it produces something that is either specifically or generically or at least analogically like itself. Thus there is proportion or order, and proportionality between God and creatures. But St. Thomas speaks more of the analogy of proportion in this article. In other passages, however, he speaks explicitly of the analogy of proportionality.**

#1. Cf. Ta, q.4, a.2: “Whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent, as when man reproduces man, or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal or nonunivocal agent.” Also in Ta, q.4, a.g, he says: “In a third way, some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form (or perfection), but not according to the same formality, as we see in non-univocal agents.” Likewise at the end of the argumentative part of the present article, he says: “For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals.”

1. There is proportion, or preferably order of the creature toward God as to its principle and cause, so that the being of creatures depends on the divine Being. This is stated in the article.

2. There is proportionality, since there is a likeness between the being of creatures and the divine Being, between created wisdom and uncreated wisdom.

God __ creature God __ the wise person His being its being toall things ` toal things that must be known that must be known

This similitude is according to a formality that is neither absolutely the same nor totally different, but proportionally the same. The creature, like God, is intrinsically being, namely, that which exists, but it is not its existence. Man, like God, is intelligent, but he is not his intellection; created wisdom is knowledge of things by the highest of causes, but it is not the cause of things. In all these examples there is similarity of two proportions, namely, as being is predicated of the creature in relation to its existence, so being is predicated of God in relation to His existence; but God alone is His existence. And as the Lateran Council says: “Between God and the creature so great a similarity cannot be detected, as not to detect a greater dissimilarity between them.” 45

Therefore the analogous notion cannot be perfectly prescribed from its analogates, because it expresses what is proportionally alike in each (for example, being is that which exists); and that which is proportionally alike cannot be conceived without the very members of the proportionality being included confusedly in the concept.‘® Contrary to this, the univocal notion, such as humanity, animality, can be perfectly prescinded or abstracted from its various subjects. The univocal notion can be represented by the symbol o; the analogical notion, however, by the symbol 8.

The analogy of attribution can express the relation of one thing to another (as of the air to the health of the animal), or of several things to one object (as of the salubrious air and the healthful remedy to the health of the animal). And since extrinsic denomination suffices for this analogy of attribution in the secondary analogates (for the air is not intrinsically healthy), this analogy does not as yet clearly make known in what the analogates are intrinsically alike, when they are truly so alike. Hence, although this analogy is

46 Being is that which exists either of itself (God), or by reason of another (creature), or in itself (substance), or in another (accident). Thus there is truly an analogical concept in the analogy of proper proportionality, whereas there is a univocal concept (as of health) in the analogy of attribution, which is applied to others by extrinsic denomination.

perhaps prior in the way of investigation, yet if we wish to know in what the analogates, which have something intrinsically in common, are intrinsically alike among themselves, we must have recourse to the more profound analogy of proportionality. Thus from the relation of sense perception to the sensible object, we know analogically the relation of the intellect to the intelligible object, although it is of a higher order; also from the relation of the sensitive appetite to sensible good, we know analogically the higher relation of the will to rational or spiritual good. Likewise from the relation of created being to its existence, we know analogically of the conformity between the uncreated Being and His existence, who is, however, the self-subsisting Being. Similarly from the relation of human wisdom to things known by it we know analogically what divine wisdom is, although this latter is the cause of things, whereas our wisdom is caused by things.

It is of this proportionality that St. Thomas frequently speaks, as in the following passage: “Sometimes the attention is directed to conformity between two terms not proportionate to each other, but which are proportional, as between 6 and 4, for 6 is to 3, as 4 is to 2g... . Thus seeing is predicated (analogically) of both corporeal and intellectual vision because, as sense perception is in the eye, so intellectual perception is in the mind.” 47 This is the similarity that prevails between the created being and the uncreated Being, and they are both intrinsically beings (that which exists, that whose act is existence), but it is a different mode of existence in each. God alone is His existence, whereas the creature has existence, and has it dependent upon another. St. Thomas speaks of this analogical likeness (and indeed intrinsic) in the reply to the first objection of this article: “The universal agent (God), while it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent.” 48 In the reply to the second objection, he says: “The creature’s likeness to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing.” +9

1. Objection of the agnostics. There is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. But the aforesaid analogy would suppose this proportion.

Reply. That there is no quantitative or proper proportion, this

I concede; that there is no proportion in the sense of proportionality, this I deny. Thus a likeness that is dependent on the divine causality is sufficiently established.*°

Instance. The difference between God and the creature is greater than that between the creature and nothingness. Hence the Scripture says: “My substance is as nothing before Thee.” § But there is no analogy between the created being and nothingness. Therefore there is no analogy between God and the creature.

Reply. I distinguish the major. That the difference is greater as regards the mode of being, this I concede; greater according to the idea of being, this I deny.

Instance. The divine perfections, such as intellection and volition, cannot be identified without being destructive of one another. But, according to the aforesaid doctrine, they are identified in God. Therefore they are destructive of one another.

Reply. I distinguish the major. That they cannot be immediately identified so that intellection is the same as volition, or vice versa, this I concede; that they cannot be identified in the formal and more eminent notion of the Deity without being destructive of one another, this I deny.5? Superior beings unite in themselves the various perfections of inferior beings. So eminent is the formal notion of the Deity that it is equivalent to intelligence, will, and other perfections, which are contained therein formally and eminently. The Deity truly furnishes the foundation for these different concepts.

And the aforesaid perfections cannot indeed be thus identified according to their created mode, but according to the uncreated mode. In fact, essence and existence, as well as operative power and operation, demand according to their proper exigencies that they be identified, since they are contained in the Deity without any potentiality. But intellection and volition are identified not under the aspect of being, but under the aspect of Deity. Therefore the intimate reconciliation of God’s attributes remains a mystery for us, since we have not the proper concept of the Deity.

Objections of Scotus and the Scotists. Although they admit analogy of being, yet they seek to retain univocity of being between God and creatures. For Scotus, the formal notion of being is not only proportionately but also absolutely one in God and creatures.

First objection. The concept of being prescinds completely from God and creatures, since anyone can be certain, for instance, that charity is an entity and yet can doubt whether charity is either

50 Cf. De veritate, q.2, a.1, 11; q.22, a.7 ad gum. 51 Ps. 38: 6. 52 See Cajetan, Com. in Iam, q.13, 2.5, nO. 7.

God or something created. Therefore the concept is absolutely one.

Reply. Concerning this doubt, it suffices to say that the analogous concept does not clearly express the analogates, though it actually implies them, and not merely virtually, as the genus includes the various species. For being, indeed, is that which exists either of itself or by reason of another, and the various modes of being are still being, whereas rationality is not animality.

Instance. If God and creatures were actually implied in the concept of being, then God would be predicated of anything whatever about which being is predicated. But the consequent is absurd. Therefore the antecedent is also.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: If the concept of being actually and conjointly implies God and creatures, then I concede the antecedent; if the concept implies them separately, then I deny the antecedent. For being is that which exists, either of itself or by reason of another; or it is predicated separately but not conjointly of God and creatures.”

WHETHER NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE PREDICATED PRIMARILY OF CREATURES

State of the question. It seems that they are predicated primarily of creatures, for our first knowledge is of creatures. “We name God from creatures.” 5

St. Thomas replies to this with the following distinctions:

1. All names that are applied metaphorically to God are applied primarily to creatures, for they mean only similitudes to creatures. ‘Thus God is metaphorically said to be angry, and anger is primarily predicated of the movement of the sensitive irascible appetite.

2. Names that are not applied to God metaphorically but properly, are applied to Him primarily as regards what the names signify, and primarily to creatures as regards the imposition of the names. The reason for the first part of this conclusion is that they are applied to God not as the cause only, but also substantially. The reason for the second part is that, in the way of investigation, our first knowledge is of creatures.

58 Consult Cajetan’s commentary on this article, and his treatise De analogia nominum, chaps. 5, 10. See also the appendix to the seventh article of this question in which the doctrine of St. Thomas is compared with that of Scotus and Suarez.

And so this explains why Christ said: “None is good but one, that is God,” 5 and why St. Paul wrote: “I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named.” * This article, in thus explaining these revealed words, is of great importance in the refutation of agnosticism, just as the third article is, in which it is stated that these names are applied to God in the literal sense, and not metaphorically or symbolically.

WHETHER NAMES WHICH IMPLY RELATION TO CREATURES ARE APPLIED TO GOD TEMPORALLY

The question is whether such names as Creator, Lord, Savior, can be applied to God eternally. It seems to be so, because the creative action is the same as God’s essence, so that it is eternal, although its effect takes place only in time. Moreover, if these names were applied to God temporally, it could be said that God became the Savior, and this would denote a certain change in God. At least it would posit a new relation in God toward creatures, and not only a logical but a real relation, because God is really the Creator and the Savior.

The reply is: The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

The reason for this is clearly given at the end of the argumentative part of this article. It is that these names are predicated not indeed because of any change in God, but because of some change in the creature; so that these names denote a real relation of dependence of the creature upon God, and only a logical relation of God toward the creature.

This is possible because “the two extremes are not of the same order.” Thus there is a real relation of the visual faculty to the thing visible; but there is not a real relation of the visible object considered according to its physical entity to the visual faculty, for this physical order is distinct from the cognitive order. Likewise there is a real relation of knowledge to the thing knowable; but the thing knowable considered in itself is not in real relation to knowledge, because the thing in itself is of another order, namely, of the physical. Hence the thing is said to be known only by extrinsic denomination, according to a logical relation. But God completely transcends the order of created beings, and all created beings are ordered to Him, and not conversely.

Thus these names (Creator, Savior, Lord) are applied to God temporally, not because of a change in God, but because of a change in creatures.

Reply to first objection. “ ‘Creator’ and ‘Savior’ are applied temporally in their relation to creatures, but not as they signify the divine essence,” since the creative action is the same as the divine essence. i

This completes the first part of this question, which is a discussion of the divine names in general. The solution of the following doubt is appended to this part by way of recapitulation.

THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS COMPARED WITH THE TEACHINGS OF SCOTUS AND SUAREZ

THE EMINENCE OF THE DEITY

What is meant by the statement that the divine perfections are contained “formally and eminently” in God?

It is generally admitted that absolutely simple perfections are contained “formally and eminently” in God. What this means, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, must now be the subject of inquiry.

All theologians are aware of the necessity of defending this doctrine so as to avoid the nominalism of modern agnostics, who to some extent revive the opinion of Maimonides (Rabbi Moses), who said that the divine attributes are contained virtually and eminently in God, as mixed perfections are, rather than formally and eminently.

But theologians are not all agreed as to the meaning of this last expression, and so its exact signification is now sought. First of all we must recall very briefly what is commonly admitted on this subject, as recorded by St. Thomas in the various articles of this thirteenth question, and in the same order as presented by him. I. What does the adverb “formally” signify in the above expression?

1. These absolutely simple perfections are said to be formally in God inasmuch as they are in Him substantially and in the literal sense." Substantially, indeed, and not merely causally, as if “God is good” meant, as Maimonides contends, merely that “God is the cause of good things.” §* In the literal sense, too, and not merel metaphorically. Thus, in the literal sense, God is said to be just, and metaphorically He is said to be angry.%

The reason for this twofold assertion is that absolutely simple perfections, such as goodness, wisdom, love, imply no imperfection in their formal signification, since they differ from the finite mode of these perfections in creatures. And it is clear that the First Cause must possess eminently all created perfections that imply no imperfection.*t There is not the least doubt about this part of the question.

2. The names that express the above-mentioned perfections are not synonymous. This is said in refutation of the nominalists who asserted that there is only a logical and verbal distinction between the divine attributes, such as between Tullius and Cicero. If this were so, then, just as it is purely optional for one to write Cicero instead of Tullius; so it would be purely optional for one to write divine justice instead of mercy, and thus it could be said that God punishes by His mercy, and forgives by His justice.*? This second assertion is likewise most certain, and is commonly admitted by Thomists, Scotists, and Suarezians.

3. The aforesaid perfections are predicated of God neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. Hence in the expression “formally and eminently” the meaning is: formally and eminently, not univocally. For St. Thomas says: “Every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree (which means, according to the context, not univocally), but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner. . . . All perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly and simply.” 63

‘These texts are of great importance. St. Thomas defines analogy for us in these texts, though not in the way Suarez does.*t For those who accept the principles of Suarez, analogues are such as have a

64 Consult Suarez (Disp. metaph., disp. 2, sect. 2, no. 34), who, in discussing the unity of the concept of being, says: “Now I merely assert that everything which has been said concerning the unity of the concept of being, appears to be clearer and more certain than that being is analogous. Therefore, in order to defend analogy, it is not right to deny the unity of the concept; but if one of the two must be denied, it is analogy, which is uncertain, that is to be denied rather than unity of concept, which seems to be demonstrated by sound arguments. See also Disp. metaph., disp. 28, sect. 3, nos. 9, 11; disp. 32, sect. 2. See also Delmas, S.J., Metaphysica, p. 61; Frick, S.J., Ontologia, no. 23. For those who take the opposite view, consult A. Martin: “Suarez métaphysicien et théologien” (Science catholique, July, September, 1898); Norbert del Prado, O.P., De veritate fundamentali, pp. 196 f.: “Suarez recedens a D. Thoma per viam Scoti graditur.”

common name, but the meaning signified by the name is relatively speaking different and absolutely speaking the same. But the Thomists maintain that St. Thomas defined analogues as having a common name, but the meaning signified by the name is absolutely speaking different in the analogates, and relatively speaking the same in them, that is, they are alike according to some proportion, or proportionally the same.®5

This Thomistic formula expresses adequately the teaching of St. Thomas in the text just quoted, in which he speaks ex professo on this subject, and says: “Every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree (that is, not univocally, as is evident from the preceding paragraph in the context), but in a measure that falls short.” 6 A little farther on in this same article, he says: “This term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man.” The term is predicated, indeed, in proportionally the same sense, inasmuch as wisdom in general is knowledge by the highest of causes; but God’s wisdom is the cause of things, whereas created wisdom is caused or measured by things.*?

The way St. ‘Thomas expresses himself here is completely in agreement with what is commonly admitted in logic, which establishes a distinction betwen analogues and univocals. Thus it is said that the generic and univocal name “animality” expresses absolutely the same notion or “a living body endowed with sensitive life,” in both the higher and the lower forms of animal life, as in the lion and the worm." But the meaning signified by the name “knowledge” is absolutely speaking different and only proportionally the same in sensation and intellection, since sensation is related to the sensible as intellection is to the intelligible. Likewise the meaning signified by the name “love” is only proportionally the same in sensitive love and in spiritual love. Therefore, while the univocal perfection can be perfectly abstracted from the inferior grades of being, as in predicating “animal” of the lion and the worm, by not

65 Consult Cajetan, De analogia nominum, chap. 6; also Com. in Iam, q.13, a.5, NO. 15; John of St. Thomas, Cursus phil., Logica, q.13; Goudin, Philosophia, Logica major, Ta, dist. II, q.1, a.2; J. M. Ramirez, “De analogia secundum doctrinam Aristotelico-thomisticam” (La Ciencia Tomista, July, 1921, January, 1922).

67 Cf. q.13, a.5 (end of argumentative part of the article); also Ia, q.4, 2.2, 3, in which St. Thomas says the same.

68 Thus in the genus animality we already find verified what Suarez considers to be the definition of analogy; for in this case the meaning signified by the name is, absolutely speaking, the same (a living body endowed with sensitive life) and, relatively speaking, different, inasmuch as animality applied to the higher forms of life implies the presence of all the internal and external senses, but it is not so of animality as applied to the lower forms of life.

considering the differentiae that are extrinsic to, the genus, the analogous perfection cannot be perfectly abstracted from its analogates,*® because the similarity of the proportions is not conceived without conceiving confusedly or actually and implicitly the members of the proportionality. Hence it is difficult to define knowledge in general, so that it can be applied in the strict sense to sensation, to created intellection, and to the divine intellection. In like manner it is difficult to define being, such that it applies equally to God, to created substance, and to accident.

But from this, that the analogous concept is only proportionally the same, it follows, as St. Thomas notes,” that there can be an infinite difference between two analogates. Now there is, indeed, a vast difference between sensitive knowledge and intellective knowledge; yet the term “knowledge” is applied to both analogically and properly, and not merely metaphorically.

Moreover, the terminology of St. Thomas, according to which the idea of an analogical perfection is not absolutely but only proporuonally the same in God and in creatures, is completely in agreement with that of the Fourth Lateran Council, which says: “Between the Creator and the creature not so great a similarity can be detected, as not to detect a greater dissimilarity.” ™ ‘Therefore, when we say that perfections implying no imperfection are in God formally, the word “formally” must be understood not univocally but analogically; in the literal sense, however, and not metaphorically; just as in the created order knowledge is predicated of sensation and intellection analogically, but properly."? Having explained what is meant by “formally,” we must now declare what is implied by “eminently.”

II. What is meant by the adverb “eminently” in the abovementioned expression?

1. From what has been said, it follows that the most eminent mode in which the divine attributes are contained in God is in itself mysterious, and is expressed. only negatively and relatively, as when God’s wisdom is spoken of as not finite, as supreme, highest.

Hence St. Thomas says: “This term ‘wise’ applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified (as distinct from the essence of man, his existence, power . . . ); whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the

69 See Cajetan, De analogia nominum, chap. 5.

72 Cf. John of St. Thomas, Logica, q.13, a.5. M. T. L. Penido, La róle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique, pp. 53-60, 136-45. There are not two unknowns in proportion. Objections of Father Descogs; Is proportionality fictitious? Is it primary?

thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.” 7? In this we already have the explanation of the adverb “eminently” in the expression “formally and eminently.” But this requires further explanation.

2. From what has been said it follows likewise, against Scotus, that there is no actual-formal distinction between the aforesaid divine perfections arising from the nature of these. For this distinction, according to Scotus, is more than virtual, inasmuch as it is prior to the mind’s consideration. But a distinction that is prior to the mind’s consideration is already real, however slight it may be. A real distinction, however, between the divine attributes is incompatible with God's absolute simplicity. Therefore the Council of Florence says: “In God all things are one and the same where there is no relation of opposition.” 14

Therefore a virtual and indeed minor distinction is the only kind that can be admitted between the divine attributes. It is a distinction by way of implicit and explicit connotations, inasmuch as one attribute actually implies the others.

Yet it must be maintained, against the nominalists, that the divine names are not synonymous, that there is not only a distinction of names, for instance, between mercy and justice, as between Tullius and Cicero.

3. Then the difficult question is posited of the identification of the divine perfections in God, in such a manner that they are not destructive of one another, but remain in God formally, or substantially and properly, and are not synonymous. The question here concerns the difficulty of combining the two adverbs “formally” and “eminently.” At first sight it seems that, as regards their signification, the latter is destructive of the former. It is indeed not difficult to see how the seven colors of the rainbow are contained in white light; but it contains them only virtually and not formally, for white light is formally neither blue nor red, whereas the Deity is formally good, intelligent, merciful. . . . It is particularly this difficulty that Scotus proposed, and he defended his actual-formal distinction between the divine attributes arising from the nature of these, because he deemed their formal identification an impossibility. As Scotus sees it, for the divine attributes to exist formally in God, they must be in Him as distinct formalities and more than virtually.

Is this identity an impossibility? Cajetan replies that there are two ways of understanding this: “(1) If we suppose that the proper formal concepts of wisdom and justice constitute one formal con-

cept, such that this one concept is not another concept, but is only the proper concept of wisdom and justice. And this sort of identity is absolutely impossible, involving two contradictories. . . . (2) If we suppose that the concepts of wisdom and justice are eminently included and formally identified in one formal concept of a higher order. And this identity is not only possible, but is actually so with all perfections in God. For it must not be thought that the formal concept that belongs properly to wisdom is found in God; but, as stated in the article, the concept of wisdom in God is not the proper concept of wisdom, but is the proper concept of a higher order, namely, of the Deity, and it is a concept that is formally and eminently common to justice, goodness, power, and other attributes. For, just as in rational creatures the reality which is wisdom and the reality which is justice are elevated so as to constitute one reality of the higher order, which is the Deity, thereby constituting one reality in God, so the formal concepts of wisdom and justice are elevated so as to constitute one formal concept of a higher order, the proper concept, namely, of the Deity. They constitute numerically one formal concept, containing eminently what is implied in each concept: not only virtually, as the concept of light includes the concept of heat, but formally, as the concept of light includes the concept of calorific energy.7> Whence St. Thomas, with that most keen penetration of his divine-like intellect, inferred from this that wisdom is not predicated of God and creatures in the same sense.” 7° This means, as Cajetan says farther on: “There is not absolute unity of concept,” 77 but a proportionate unity, as Cajetan had said in another treatise.78

This, then, is the meaning given by the Thomists to the expression “formally and eminently.” By “formally” is meant that the perfections are in God substantially and not causally, literally and not metaphorically; nevertheless they are predicated analogically. The term “eninently” excludes an actual-formal distinction between God's attributes, and expresses their identification or rather identity in the most eminent formal concept of the Deity, whose proper mode is in itself unknown to us, and is known only negatively and relatively in this life.

This is practically what St. Thomas says, as in the following passages: “These perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided, and multiplied... .

76 Nowadays we would say: As white light contains the seven colors not formally but virtually, having the power to produce these colors.

78 De analogia nominum, chap. 6.

So also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.” * Also: “The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.” ®° Hence the divine attributes are so identified in the most eminently formal concept of the Deity as not to be destructive of one another. They are contained formally in the Deity, yet not as distinct formalities. In fact, the divine perfections are so identified without being destructive of one another in the eminence of the Deity, that they exist there in their most pure state without any admixture of imperfection. Thus God alone is essential Being, essential Goodness, and similarly for the other attributes.

4. It is easier to explain this identification for those perfections which are of the same order, and between which there is only an extrinsic virtual distinction, namely, one that has its foundation only in creatures. Thus intelligence, intellection, the divine truth always understood, are most evidently identified, inasmuch as God is the self-subsisting Being, who is identical with the maximum Truth that is of itself and always actually understood.

It is more difficult to explain the identification of those perfections that do not belong to the same order, such as intellection and love, mercy and justice. Nevertheless, from what has been said it is clear that they are identified in the eminence of the Deity, which is eminently and formally intellection and love, mercy and justice.

5. This same explanation holds good for saying that there is no actual-formal but only a virtual distinction between the divine nature and the subsistent relations which constitute the divine Persons, as, for instance, between the divine nature that is communicable ad intra and incommunicable paternity.

Hence Cajetan says: “In itself, not according to our manner of speaking, in God there is but one formal concept, which is not purely absolute or purely relative or purely communicable or purely incommunicable, But it is a concept which in a most eminent and formal way contains whatever there is of absolute perfection, and whatever is demanded by the Trinity in a relative sense. . . . For the divine reality is prior to being and all its differences. It is above being and above the one. . . .”’* For the same reason, therefore, the divine reality transcends the absolute and the relative, which are contained in it formally and eminently.

79 Summa theol, la, q.13, a.4. 80 Ibid., ad 2um. See also a.5, c. 81 Com. in lam, q.39, a.1, no. 7.

This doctrine of the eminence of the Deity elucidates especially three questions which are of the greatest importance in dogmatic theology.

1. What stands out clearly from this doctrine is that reason alone can demonstrate the existence in God of a truth and life that are of the supernatural order, inasmuch as the Deity or God's intimate life transcends the proper object and powers of any created or creatable being. As St. Thomas says: “It is most evident that some divine intelligibles absolutely transcend the native power of human reason.” 8?

2. It is likewise evident from this doctrine of the eminence of the Deity that sanctifying grace must be called a participation of the divine nature, since it is a physical, formal, and analogical participation of the Deity as this is in itself; and so this participation radically ordains us to see the Deity as it really is. Thus the question of whether grace is a participation of the divine infinity is clearly seen to be of less importance. Certainly there is no subjective participation of the divine infinity, for by this it would be limited. But grace ordains us to see the Deity, of which it is a true participation. Now, stones are like God according to being, plants according to life, human and angelic intellects according to intellection, but by grace alone we are like God according to the Deity.

3. Finally, in this doctrine of the eminence of the Deity we have a sublime explanation of why we cannot perceive in this life how God's universal will to save is intimately reconciled with the mystery of predestination. This would be to perceive how infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in the eminence of the Deity, and why God mercifully elected this particular person rather than a certain other.

This theological contemplation of the eminence of the Deity, provided it is united with an ever-increasing charity, normally disposes one for infused contemplation, which, under the special inspiration of the Holy Ghost, proceeds from vivid faith illumined by the gifts of understanding and wisdom, and which, in a mystic darkness and in a more exalted way, attains to the Deity or to “that” light inaccessible whom, as St. Paul says, “no man hath seen nor can see,” $ except in Heaven.*4

82 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 3, $3. See also Ia, q.12, a.4. This has been proved extensively by us in De revelatione, I, 337-70, where it is proved that there is a truth and life of the supernatural order in God, or of an order of supernatural mysteries.

84On this point consult the discussion in Acta Pont. Academiae romanae sancti Thomae Aq., in which several objections are answered.

EIGHTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE NAME “GOD” IS A NAME OF THE NATURE

State of the question. Certain divine names in particular are now considered. The question is whether “God” (@cés) is a name of the nature or of operation.

Reply. God is a name of operation as regards the imposition of this name, by the way of investigation; but it is a name of the nature as regards what is meant by this name.

The reason is that we have not immediate knowledge of the essences of things, and especially of God’s essence; but we know them only by their operations. Thus the name “stone” designates the nature of the stone, but many hold that this name is derived from its act, since it hurts the foot. But the divine operation from which this name “God” is imposed, seems to be that by which God knows and ordains all things, at least according to the etymology given by Dionysius. Hence the name “Deity” expresses properly the divine nature.

At the end of the reply to the second objection there is again a reference to the three ways by which God is known, namely, by causality, by eminence, and by negation.

NINTH ARTICLE WHETHER THE NAME “GOD” IS COMMUNICABLE

Reply. This name “God” is incommunicable in reality (in the literal sense), but communicable in opinion and metaphorically.

The reason for the first part is that the divine nature or the Deity is in itself incommunicable to creatures. There can be only one God." Nevertheless from revelation we know that God the Father communicates the Deity to the Son and the Holy Ghost. Hence nothing outside God can properly be called God.

The reason for the second part is that men, adopting the erroneous opinion of polytheists, spoke of several gods. Moreover this name is predicated metaphorically of the just because of the grace or participation of the divine nature which they have. Thus the Scripture says: “I have said, you are gods.” 88

Hence while being, life, and intellection are naturally partici-

85 The reference is to the Latin name; for lapis implies laedit pedem (“it hurts the foot”). [Tr.]

pable in stones, plants, and rational creatures, thé Deity is not naturally but only supernaturally participable by grace, which is a formal-participation of the Deity, or of the radical principle of the operations by which God sees and loves Himself.

WHETHER THIS NAME “‘GOD’’ IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF + THE TRUE GOD, OF IDOLS, AND OF THE JUST

Reply. This name is predicated of God alone, in fact uniquely so. Of idols it is predicated analogically in accordance with the false opinion of the polytheists; of the just it is predicated analogically by a certain participated likeness.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE WHETHER THIS NAME “HE WHO IS” IS THE MOST PROPER NAME OF GOD

Reply. It is in the affirmative, and for three reasons: (1) because God alone is His existence, so that His existence is His essence; (2) because this name, “He who is,” determines no mode of being, and therefore it denominates the infinite ocean of substance, and thus it comprehends all other names confusedly. “Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God”; 3 (3) because this name, “He who is,” signifies present existence, and so it expresses God’s eternity, which transcends past and future.

Reply to first objection. Nevertheless, “as regards the object intended by the name, this name ‘God’ is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature,” namely, the Deity which eminently and formally contains being, life, and intellection. St. Thomas distinguishes between the Tetragrammaton and the name “He who is”; but nowadays all identify these two names.*°

Reply to second objection. Supreme Good is God’s principle name, as regards causality, inasmuch as He is the end of all things, and the end is the first of causes. But ” What is” is His principal name absolutely.”

89 See argumentative part of this article.

90 Undoubtedly the Scholastics knew that the Hebrew name “Yahweh” is the Tetragrammaton or word of four letters; but they were ignorant of its true pronunciation. This pronunciation of hybrid form is of recent origin, not being heard before the sixteenth century. This ignorance probably explains why several Scholastics erred in distinguishing, though on insufficient grounds, between the ‘Tetragrammaton and the divine name, “He who is.” Cf. Prat, Dict. de la Bible

WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS CAN BE FORMED ABOUT GOD

State of the question. This article may be looked upon as a recapitulation of the preceding articles, its purpose being the laying down of rules for the forming of affirmative judgments. That difficulties arise is owing to the fact that Dionysius says, in what is called his negative theology: “Negations about God are true, but affirmations are vague.” °? For God is ineffable, and we have no proper concept of the Deity, which for us pilgrims is like “a great darkness” or “an obscure night.” Moreover, God is a simple form, in no way composite, whereas there is composition in affirmative judgments.

Reply. Nevertheless, true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. The first proof of this is the fact that there are several propositions about God that are of faith.

Another proof of this may be expressed by the following syllogism: In every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. Thus in the proposition “Peter is white” (“Peter” and “white” are the same in subject). But God, considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple; yet our intellect knows Him according to different conceptions. Therefore two affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

Reply to first objection. “Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.” 9 Thus abstract names signify the form only, and concrete names signify the composite subject in which there is such a form, whereas God is pure subsisting form.°#

Reply to third objection. “Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite.” But there is imperfection in its manner of understanding.

And so this terminates the question about divine names, in which St. Thomas most correctly determines the just and transcendent mean between the two opposite errors, namely, of agnosticism and a certain anthropomorphism. Agnosticism is avoided, as it is af-

93 Cf. a.3. 94 Cf. ad 2um., firmed that absolutely simple perfections are substantially and properly in God, and are primarily in Him rather than in creatures. Anthropomorphism is avoided, as it is affirmed that these perfections are not predicated univocally of God and creatures, but analogically, according to a likeness of proportions. Just as there is an existence that belongs properly to the creature, so there is an existence that belongs properly to God, and He is His own existence. Just as there is a wisdom that belongs properly to man, so there is a wisdom that belongs properly to God, and He alone is His own intellection, as will be more clearly explained farther on. This method of analogy is applied to all questions about the one and triune God, which is most accurately determined in this thirteenth question. Analogy is necessary both for the natural knowledge of God and for the supernatural knowledge of revealed mysteries. Thus with the former there is evidence resulting from demonstration, with the latter there is obscurity of faith. For God, in the manifestation of the mysteries of His intimate life, made use of such analogical notions as those of nature, person, paternity, filiation, and these are in us as naturally acquired. Hence, as regards God the author of nature, the legitimate analogies can be known by reason alone; but it is not so if it is a question of God the author of grace, in His intimate life.

Footnotes

1. De div. nom., chap. 1. ↩

2. Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. 1. ↩

3. On this subject of the real validity of the principle of contradiction, as founded on the first notion of being and on the principle of its primary opposition to nonbeing, consult Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. IV. ↩

4. Summa theol., Ia, q-2, 4.33 q-4, 4-3; q-12, a.4. ↩

5. De potentia, q.7, a.5 ad tum. ↩

6. Com. in Iam, q.1, 2.7; q.86, a.1, no. 7. ↩