Chapter X. Question 10 the eternity of God
WE now come to consider eternity, because, as will at once be seen, eternity follows from immutability, since it is the duration of the absolutely immobile being. There are two things which St. Thomas considers in this question: (1) eternity as such is considered in the first three questions, namely: what is eternity, whether God is eternal, whether to be eternal belongs to God alone; (2) in the remaining articles eternity is compared with created durations, that is, with reference to our continuous time, to the discrete time of the angels which is measured by their successive thoughts, and to aeviternity, or the duration of the angelic substance and the separated soul, which as substances are immutable, though they had a beginning.
In these last three articles the comparison is made from on high, namely, from eternity as it has already been defined. In the first three articles, however, there is already a similar comparison made, but it starts as it were from below, and by way of investigation finally formulates the definition of eternity.
WHETHER THIS IS A GOOD DEFINITION OF ETERNITY: “THE SIMULTANEOUSLY-WHOLE AND PERFECT POSSESSION OF INTERMINABLE LIFE”
State of the question. The definition of Boethius is the subject of inquiry.! It must be observed that this definition is implied in what Holy Scripture says about God’s immobility, as we shall state in the second article. Among the philosophers, Plato likewise says that time is the mobile image of immobile eternity.” Aristotle says equivalently, “God is the everlasting and noblest living being. In God there is both life and duration that is continual and eternal.”1 In like manner, farther on,* he shows that God is subsistent23 intellection who continually understands Himself, transcending succession of time. Moreover, Aristotle defined time as “movement that is estimated according to its before and after.”-5 Thus the motion of the sun is measured in time, inasmuch as one revolution is called a day, and this day consists of distinctly different hours according to a before and after. Thus we have already at least a confused notion and a nominal definition of eternity.
Plotinus ê explains eternity in the same way, speaking not only of the immobility of eternity but also of its indivisibility, whereas time is divided into years, days, and hours. Hence Plotinus says that, if one were to say that eternity is life, interminable and totally present to itself, none of it pertaining to the past or to the future, such a one is not far from its true definition.
St. Augustine says the same,’ speaking of the indivisible and ever constant now of eternity, whereas time is fleeting. Thus gradually the transition is effected from the nominal and confused definition to the real and distinct definition. Then Boethius (t524) gave us the same concept of eternity in the aforesaid classical definition, saying that it is “the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.”
St. Thomas shows here that this definition is a good one, since it is in accordance with the laws governing the search for a definition, inasmuch as by these laws there is a methodical transition ’ from a confused to a distinct notion.’ But St. Thomas first of all sets forth the difficulties, the two principal ones being these: (1) a whole is what has parts. But this does not apply to eternity, which is simple; (2) further, if a thing is said to be whole, perfect is a superfluous addition; nor does it seem that possession implies duration.
Yet the reply is that this definition is a good one, since it properly expresses eternity as the interminable duration, which is without succession, and so it is spoken of as “being simultaneously whole.”
This is not, strictly speaking, demonstrated in the body of the article, for, as it is pointed out elsewhere,’ it is not the definition of a thing but its property that is, strictly speaking, demonstrated. The definition is sought by a certain investigation, says Aristotle,"° by a division of its genus or quasi-genus (in the present instance, the notion of duration) and then comparing the thing to be de-
e Enneades, Illa, Bk. VII, chap. 4.
fined with things similar and dissimilar (in the present instance, by comparing the confused notion of eternity, according to its nominal definition, with time). Yet in the body of the article there is a sort of demonstration, inasmuch as eternity is deduced from God’s absolute immobility. This will be made clearer in the second article.
The argument of the article by the way of investigation may be summed up as follows:’We must come to the knowledge of eternity by means of time. But time is but the numbering of movement by before and after. Contrary to this, in the duration of that which is without movement, there is absolute uniformity, without any before and after. Moreover, what is absolutely immutable is interminable, without beginning and end, whereas those things that are measured by time have a beginning and an end. Thus, therefore, eternity has two characteristics: (1) uniformity without succession, and so it is truly spoken of as “being simultaneously whole”; (2) interminableness, so that it can be truly said to be “the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.”
It must be observed that the first characteristic is the principal one, and so also if the movement of the heavenly bodies and time were eternal, as Aristotle thought, that is without beginning and end, time would still be distinct from eternity; for in time there is always a succession of centuries and years, although there would never have been a first or last day. Hence the principal difference between eternity and time is that the former is without before and after or that it is “being simultaneously whole.”
Contrary to this, our life is not simultaneously whole, for it consists of the distinct periods of infancy, youth, adult age, prime of life, and old age. Our life is also divided into periods of labor, prayer, sleep, and the like, so that there is a great variety and instability in this succession. Hence the now of time is the current now between the past and the future, so that past and future do not actually exist but exist only in the mind, whereas the now of eternity is a standing now, which is absolutely permanent and immobile, and we find this already equivalently expressed, although less distinctly, in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.
Thus the definition of Boethius is a good one, since it complies with the rules to be observed in the search for a definition. The transition is effected methodically from a confused to a distinct notion, and this by a correct division of duration, and by a com- parison of one’s already confused notion of eternity with that of time.
This hunt or search presupposes the true definition of time as given by Aristotle, who says that it is movement estimated by its before and after, for example, the movement of the sun is estimated by its successive revolutions and portions of one revolution. It seems that this definition !? is a good explanation of what is obscurely implied in the popular or common notion of time and its parts, namely, century, year, day, hour. This is the realistic notion of time. On the contrary, Kant proposed an idealist notion of time, which in his opinion is an a priori subjective form of our sensibility, in which things appear to us as a succession of phenomena.
But Kant unjustifiably denied the reality of time, giving as his reason the false antinomies that would result from this. In his opinion, it is equally demonstrated that the world had and did not have a beginning in time. But, as St. Thomas points out: “By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist.” 1° God, who created with absolute freedom, could have eternally created, so that there never would have been a first day; just as the imprint of a foot in the sand would be eternal, if the foot were eternal. And even if the movement of the sun and time had been eternal creations, as we remarked, there would still be a complete distinction between time and eternity, only this latter being simultaneously whole.
The proof given in the argumentative part of the article may be presented in the following syllogistic form: What is absolutely immutable is simultaneously-whole and interminable; but eternity is attributed to a thing that is absolutely immutable, just as time is attributed to things that are mobile; therefore eternity must be simultaneously-whole and interminable duration.
The solution of the difficulties confirms this conclusion.
Reply to first objection. Eternity is conceived by us as being negatively interminable, because our knowledge is first of things that come to an end.
Reply to second objection. “Interminable life” is predicated of eternity rather than “interminable being,” because what is truly eternal is not only being, but also life, in fact, self-subsistent life. But life extends to operation, and not to being. Hence it is clear that both God’s being and His operation are measured by eternity,
12 See St. Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Bk. IV, chap. 11, lect. 20. 13 Summa theol., Ia, q.46, a.2.
whereas the angel’s immutable essence and operations are not measured the same way.*4
Reply to third objection. Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but inasmuch as it is wanting in nothing. In this we see the imperfection of our knowledge.
Reply to fourth objection. Sacred Scripture speaks metaphorically of the “days of eternity.” 15
Reply to fifth objection. The word perfect is not a superfluous addition, for simultaneously whole excludes past and future, and perfect excludes the passing now, which is imperfect.
Reply to sixth objection. Lastly eternity is said to be perfect possession rather than duration, to designate the indeficiency of eternity; for what is possessed, is held firmly and quietly. On the contrary, a boy does not yet possess the maturity of old age, nor does the old man possess the complete vitality of youth. So also in the interior life, the beginner does not yet possess the perfection of the unitive life.
Therefore the above definition of eternity is a very fine one, especially as regards the words “being simultaneously whole.” This last expression must be the object not only of speculation, but also of acquired contemplation resulting from sacred theology, and of infused contemplation which is the result of living faith that is illumined by the gifts of intellect and wisdom.
As a complement to this investigation into the true notion of eternity, it must be observed that great geniuses have a certain experimental knowledge of a life which by remote comparison can be called “simultaneously whole.” For the most sublime manifestations of art (for instance, of music) are a certain remote participation of this kind of perfection. Thus it is said of Mozart that he heard all together a whole melody that he was composing, in that he was hearing it or previously heard it in the thought that gave it birth; whereas others heard it only successively. Thus great mathematicians by one intellectual act perceive the many elements of a very complex problem. In like manner great philosophers and theologians toward the end of their life have a sort of simultaneously whole knowledge of their science, inasmuch as they see it from on high as an irradiation of its principles. So also the contemplative experiences the joy of infused contemplation, and it remains with him during the day as a sort of latent reserve force, possessing this throughout the day as it were from on high; for when the time of prayer comes to an end, there is not a complete cessation’ of prayer, for it continues as it
were during the time of study or even of recreation. Thus the inferiority inherent in multiplicity gradually resolves itself into the superiority of unity, and this finds its realization in the unitive life of the saints. Hence St. Augustine +° exhorts us to a loving union with God and His eternity, peacefully awaiting the events of time, which are, as it were, beneath us, beneath the summit of the soul that is united with God.
But if Mozart heard all at once the various parts of a melody which he was composing, so we can conclude that God possesses His life all at once and sees simultaneously from on high the entire sequence of centuries. Thus eternity is like the apex of a cone, the base of which represents time. All the successive points of this base correspond to the one point of the apex.
But many difficulties, especially about the problem of evil, result from the fact that we do not see from on high the succession of time, but only successively. Thus we do not know that it is for the greater good of the world and of the Church that God permits this or that very great evil actually to happen. But if this succession of time were seen from on high by one glance, then evil would appear as a certain particularization that is a condition of the higher good, as in a picture we have the harmonious blending of light and shade, especially so in the “light transcending obscurity.” In the above examples, as in that of the musical composition which is quoted by H. Bergson, there is a certain experimental knowledge of a life that bears a certain analogical resemblance to eternity. Thus the investigation is completed in a less abstract and more concrete way.
Solution of certain difficulties. As Cajetan remarks, Aureolus raised several objections against this article of St. Thomas. In the first place, he says that uniformity, because it does not differ from immutability, is not the chief characteristic of eternity.
In reply we must say with Cajetan that uniformity differs from immutability as a property differs from its essence. Immutability is the denial of the possibility of change. Uniformity adds to immutability the idea of unity of form, and this can be attributed also to motion; for we speak of uniform motion, the velocity of which is always the same, and thus it differs from variation in motion. In fact, we speak of a uniformly accelerated motion, such as the fall of a stone, or of the uniformly retarded motion of a stone thrown in the air. And just as there is uniformity in motion or succession, so also there is the same in immobility or permanence. Immutability is opposed to motion, whereas, on the other hand, uniformity is not, for there can be uniformity in motion. Consequently it is false to
say that there is no distinction between uniformity and immutability. Hence eternity is correctly and more briefly defined as the uniformity of an absolutely immutable thing.
But again Aureolus objects, saying that time is not the variation of motion, and therefore uniformity is not the uniformity of the immobile.
We reply to this by distinguishing the antecedent. That time is not solely the variation of motion, this I concede; that it is not variation of motion according to before and after, this I deny. Therefore the uniformity of the immobile, in which there is no before and after, suffices for the constitution of eternity. This point will be made clearer in the following article.
SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER GOD IS ETERNAL
State of the question. The purpose of this article is to show in what particular sense God is eternal and is His eternity, and also to explain how eternity can be called the measure of God, although He is not measured; whereas even the sun’s motion is measured, inasmuch as its revolutions are numbered. `
Reply. God is not only eternal, but He is His eternity.
- It is of faith that God is eternal and is so essentially. This truth is clearly stated in many texts of Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “Abraham . . . called upon the name of the Lord God eternal.” 17 “For He is the living and eternal God.” 18 God is often called eternal.1°
The Athanasian Creed says: “The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal.” The Fourth Council of the Lateran declares: “We firmly believe that there is only one true God, who is eternal.” 2°
According to Vacant,” it is of faith that God has neither beginning nor end. That there is no succession in God is a certain truth and is proximate to the faith. Vacant ?* thinks, however, that this does not as yet appear to be a dogma of the faith.
- In the body of the article God’s eternity is deduced from His immutability, and may be expressed by the following syllogism: Eternity follows immutability, as time follows movement; but God
is supremely immutable; therefore it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. It is also stated that God is His own eternity. For God and God alone is His own existence and essence; consequently God is His own duration.
This is the same as saying that everything survives inasmuch as it retains its existence; but God alone is His existence. Therefore He alone is His own uniform duration. Thus St. Thomas holds that eternity is God’s duration. Wherefore the notion of duration is far more universal than that of time. Duration is predicated analogically of eternity, of our continuous time, of the discrete time of the angels, and of aevum or aeviternity, as will be stated farther on.
In the reply to the first objection the words of Boethius are explained, namely: “The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity.” This latter now is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. This means that the apprehension of eternity is caused in us inasmuch as we apprehend the now standing still. Eternity has complete existence extramentally, whereas, on the other hand, time has complete existence only in the mind, inasmuch as past and future exist only in the mind.
What is real in time is the now that flows away, and it is said to flow away like movement, which is the act of a being in potentiality inasmuch as it is such, the act of a further perfectible and to be perfected being, the successive transition from potentiality to perfect actuality. Contrary to this, the now of eternity is spoken of as standing still, and corresponding to it are all the successive moments of time, just as all the points in the base of a cone correspond to its apex. Thus there is but one instant in the immobility of eternity.
In this reply to the first objection there is an explanation of St. Augustine’s words: “God is the author of eternity,” which are to be understood of participated eternity consisting in the eternal life of the saints. Their beatific vision begins but will not end, and there is no succession or variation in this vision at least as regards the primary object, which is God’s essence clearly seen. Thus, strictly speaking, their life is not only said to be a future life with reference to ours, but it is eternal life, because it is measured by participated eternity.
It must be observed that just as a beginning is not repugnant to the idea of participated eternity, so also the end is not absolutely repugnant to this idea, provided there is no succession in this participated eternity. Therefore if St. Paul had on this earth the beatific vision as a transient act, this vision could have been measured by. participated eternity, transcending our continuous time and the discrete time of the angels in which their successive thoughts are measured.
Reply to second objection. When the Scripture says that “the Lord shall reign forever and ever,” ** this means always. Others change the phrase to “forever and always,” thus making it in a way redundant. St. Thomas points out that eternity transcends time, and this would be the case even if time were unlimited as regards the future.
Reply to third objection. It is pointed out that eternity is said to be the measure of God “according to the apprehension of our mind alone.” In several other passages St. Thomas says that eternity is the measure of divine life. This must be understood of intrinsic measurement, inasmuch as God is His eternity. Thus God is not measured. Contrary to this the motion of the heavenly bodies is measured by a recurrent succession of revolutions or of days, and all the more so is the motion of other bodies, which is measured extrinsically according to solar time. There was formerly a dispute of minor importance on this subject, as can be readily seen by consulting Billuart.
Reply to fourth objection. “Eternity includes all times” or “comprises all time,” which means that it virtually contains all inferior durations, just as the apex of a cone virtually contains all the points of its base, or the center of a circle dll the radii and points of its circumference.
Doubt. How are created things said to be present in eternity?
The Thomists hold, as will be stated farther on, that creatures are physically present in eternity, coming under God’s direct vision. John of St. Thomas says: “Eternity does not immediately measure created things on the supposition that they have already undergone a passive change and been passively produced, but it measures them precisely for the reason that they are contained in the divine action, which contacts and regards created things as its terminus.?* Indeed, not only God’s intellection and volition are eternal, but even His external action is eternal, and yet it has its effect in time. “From the eternal (free) action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, namely, that which has being after not being.” 25
Thus created things are really present in eternity, and are not merely either possible or future. They are contained in the divine essence not as merely having the power or will to produce them, but as actually producing them. Thus God’s knowledge of these things is intuitive, although they may not as yet have been passively produced. It is evident that this presence of things in eternity or in God’s
24 Com. in Iam, disp. IX, a.g. Billuart (De Deo, diss. VI, a.3), Gonet, and many other Thomists say the same.
eternal action presupposes God’s free decree, for the action spoken about here is a free one. Thus St. Paul’s conversion was eternally present to God’s intution only because He eternally willed it; otherwise this conversion would not be a contingent but a necessary act.
THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER TO BE ETERNAL BELONGS TO GOD ALONE
There are two conclusions in this article: (1) Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on absolute immutability, which is in God alone; (2) creatures share in God’s eternity, just as they do in His immutability. Thus it is said by participation that “the earth standeth forever.” 2° Thus, because of the length of their duration, the mountains are said to be eternal and their peaks to be covered with perpetual snow. Incorruptible spiritual substances share more fully and in a nobler manner in the nature of eternity. This is especially so of the blessed, who are said to have eternal life, inasmuch as the beatific vision, whose primary object is always the same, is measured by participated eternity. It is, indeed, an absolutely immutable operation.
Several Thomists remark that, just as the different motions of the earth are measured by solar time, or according to the measure of the sun’s motion, so also the beatific vision is measured according to God's eternity, inasmuch as, by reason of the object or of God who is clearly seen, there is a participated eternity in this vision.??
Reply to second objection. The punishment in hell is eternal inasmuch as it never ends. However, “in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time” in accordance with a certain change in sensible pain.
Reply to third objection. The principles of demonstration are called eternal truths but in a negative sense, in that they abstract from time and place and are absolutely necessary. Moreover, they are positively eternal inasmuch as they are positively in the intellect of God, who alone is positively eternal.
FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER ETERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME
State of the question. It is not, strictly speaking, a question here as to whether there is a difference, but it is asked what is the reason for this difference. Thus eternity and time are compared from on high, whereas in the first article the ascent of the mind was made by
26 Eccles. 1: 4. 27 Consult the commentaries of Bannez and John of St. Thomas.
the way of investigation, from time to the definition of eternity. Now by the way of sapiential judgment, time is judged from the highest of causes, or from eternity as already defined. ‘There are three difficulties: (1) It seems that eternity does not differ from time, because they occur together. Hence it seems that time is a part of eternity, just as an hour, which occurs along with a day, is a part of a day. In other words, the finite cannot coexist with the infinite, unless it is a part of the infinite, as several pantheists say. (2) According to Aristotle,?* the now of time remains the same in the whole of time. Therefore it does not differ from the now of eternity. (3) Eternity, which comprises all time, seems to be the measure of all things inasmuch as they proceed from God, and so it does not differ from time.
Yet the reply is that time and eternity are not the same, because eternity is simultaneously whole, whereas time has a before and an after. ‘
In the body of the article, St. Thomas shows that, even if time had neither beginning nor end, it would differ from eternity, inasmuch as it would consist of a succession of years and centuries, namely, of a before and an after; whereas only eternity is simultaneously whole. He even says that the difference, which is founded on the fact that time has a beginning and will have no end, is an accidental one, which means that it could as well not be so. Therefore the reason for the difference lies essentially in the fact that eternity is the measure of permanent being, whereas time is the measure of movement. The solution of the difficulties confirms this.
Reply to first objection. Eternity and time can coexist and yet time is not a part of eternity, because they are not of the same genus, but only analogically agree in point of duration. So the finite being and the infinite being can coexist, and yet the finite is not a part of the infinite, because they are not of the same genus; but they are alike in this, that being is predicated analogically of each. Infinite being is self-existing being, whereas finite being is participated being, and is not its own being. There is never any variation from this in the refutation of pantheism.
Reply to second objection. What sort of identity is there between the now of time and the whole of time as this differs from the identity between the now of eternity and eternity? The now of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, just as movement is measured by time; but it differs in aspect, for what is movable is first here and then there. On the contrary, the permanent now of eternity is absolutely the same as regards both its subject and its aspect.
St. Thomas says with profundity of thought in this article: “The
flow of the now as alternating in aspect, is time,” just as the progressive passive actualization of the movable is movement. When he says that the now differs in aspect in the whole course of time, he does not mean that alternation is merely according to aspect and is not anything real. He is speaking, as he does in one of his commentaries,2® in which he says that terminative transitive action and passion are the same as movement, but differ in aspect, inasmuch as action is movement as coming from an agent, and passion is movement as found in the movable. This means to say that they are the same as regards their subject, but that they differ according to their constitutive aspects, and so, according to the Thomists, there is a modal distinction between terminative action and passion. In like manner, St. Thomas says: “Man and white are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another.” 3 He does not mean that whiteness, which is an accident, is not really distinct from the substance of man; but it can be said that this man is white, so that in this proposition as in every affirmative proposition, “the predicate and the subject signify the same thing in reality.” 3
There is a most manifest difference, at least in the abstract sense, between the passing now of time and the permanent now of eternity. The passing now of time comes within our experience, but the permanent now of eternity does not. Hence eternity is less intelligible to us than time, but it is more intelligible in itself. For in itself the now of time is scarcely intelligible, because it is almost nothing, is among the inferior limitations of being, is always changing, and when it is said that the present moment is, it already is not. On the contrary, the now of eternity is always permanent, always is; in fact, it is the self-subsisting Being, inasmuch as God is His eternity.
Reply to third objection. The being of corruptible things, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time. However, as we remarked above, since created things are not passively produced in themselves, but are present in God as the terminus of His eternal action, they are measured by eternity. Thus eternity is the measure of all measures and includes all times.
FIFTH ARTICLE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AEVITERNITY AND TIME State of the question. The purpose of this question is to inquire into the proper meaning of aevum (age). This word, which is still
one in common use, as when we speak of the Middle Ages (medium aevum), means, among Latin authors, either a certain age of the human race or that of some man—thus the first age corresponds to the period of youth, whereas full age corresponds to maturity—or perpetual duration (Varro). Aeviternal means also perpetual.
The Scholastics say that aeviternity is “the measure of spiritual substances.” Previous to this, St. Augustine *? had said that we must admit a certain intermediate duration between eternity and time. This intermediate duration is difficult to conceive. It is, indeed, not so intelligible in itself as eternity, and not so intelligible to us as time, because it does not come within our experience. The principal difficulty that confronts us in distinguishing between aeviternity and time is that, if aeviternity is not eternity, then it is not simultaneously whole. Therefore it has a before and an after, and hence it does not seem to differ from time.
Yet the reply is that aeviternity differs from time and from eternity, as the mean between them.
The proper reason for this difference is not given by some, whose conception of eternity is more material than formal. They said that eternity has neither beginning nor end; that aeviternity has a beginning but no end (inasmuch as the angels were not created from eternity); that a time has both beginning and end. But this difference is accidental, because even if aeviternal things had always been, aeviternity would be distinct from eternity.
Others said that aeviternity differs from eternity, in that it has a before and an after; and that it differs from time, .because it has neither youth nor age. But this involves a contradiction; for if aeviternity has a before and an after, it also has youth and age. It would have youth when the after part appears, and age in the receding of the first part. In like manner, if the aeviternal thing were not subject to youth and age, this would be because it is immutable, and hence it would have neither before nor after.
But the true difference consists in this, that aeviternity is the mean between eternity and time, because it is unchangeable, though it has changeableness annexed to it. It is proved as follows: In so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity, But mutation, whose measure is time, recedes more from eternity, than does immutation, to which, however, mutation is annexed, whose measure is aeviternity. Therefore aeviternity is the mean between eternity and time
St. Thomas explains this in his reply to the first objection, in which he says: “Spiritual creatures, as regards successive affections and intelligences, are measured by time (not by continuous time, however,
such as solar time, but by discrete time). . . . But as regards their nature, they are measured by aeviternity, and as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.”
Thus aeviternity is the measure of an immutable thing, which in its operations, however, is connected with change. Hence aeviternity has not in itself either before or after, as stated in the second opinion; but before and after are compatible with it.
Scotus objects to this, remarking that at least several angelic operations are not successive but permanent. Hence they are measured, he says, not by discrete time but by aeviternity.
Bannez replies by saying that there are three kinds of angelic operations. (1) There are those angelic operations that are connatural to the angel and unceasing. These are measured by aeviternity, as St. Thomas himself says.** Thus the angel’s natural knowledge of himself, of God as the Author of nature; and his natural love of himself and of God are of this first kind. (2) Then there are those immanent angelic operations that are not permanent but successive. These are measured by angelic discrete time. This time refers to the number of angelic thoughts, as St. Thomas states farther on as follows: “If the time of the angel’s motion is not continuous, but a kind of succession of nows, it will have no proportion to the time which measures the motion of corporeal things, which is continuous, since it is not of the same nature.” ** Thus one angelic thought constitutes one angelic moment, and it can last for several years of our continuous solar time. Thus with those saints who are still wayfarers, when they are in ecstasy, there is a sort of immobile and loving contemplation that takes place in the summit of their soul, and sometimes this lasts for several hours of our continuous time. (3) There is finally, the virtually transitive operation of the angel by which he locally moves bodies. It is measured terminatively by our continuous time, in that the movement of this body is measured by solar time and it lasts, for instance, half an hour.
Doubt. How can aeviternity be simultaneously whole, although before and after are compatible with it, as St. Thomas says in his reply to the second objection?
The difficulty is that if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it contains time eminently, just as eternity does. Such being the case, the angels would have a natural knowledge of future contingent things, and they would not have to wait for their realization.
St. Thomas replies to this by saying that aeviternity is simultaneously whole inasmuch as the angel’s substantial being is im-
mutable, and is not the subject of succession.** However, aeviternity does not contain time eminently as eternity does, because angelic being does not contain eminently the being of mutable things, as the first cause in its action contains all things that are. Moreover, as it has been remarked, the angelic knowledge of particular things is not measured by aeviternity but by discrete time. Thus angels cannot have a natural but only a conjectural knowledge of future contingent things. Hence aeviternity coexists with our continuous time somewhat as an immovable stone placed in a river, coexists with the various parts of the flowing water. But eternity is like a mountain peak from which the whole river is seen by one glance. And so this proves that aeviternity is the mean between eternity and time.
SIXTH ARTICLE WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE AEVITERNITY
State of the question. The purpose of this article is to compare the unity of aeviternity of all aeviternal things, namely, of angels and of disembodied spirits, with the unity of time of all sensible movements.
The reply of St. Thomas is that, according to the truer opinion, there is one aeviternity for all subordinate aeviternal things, just as there is one time for all subordinate sensible movements in the universe. For it is evident that to form an idea of the unity of duration of spiritual beings, we must first consider the unity of duration of sensible things. But the unity of duration of sensible things or the unity of continuous time depends on the fact that the movement of the first movable (we are speaking of the sun in our solar system) is supposed to be uniform. Thus solar time is the intrinsic measure of solar movement and the extrinsic measure of other subordinate movements. Thus time is one and continuous, By analogy, therefore, there is one aeviternity, inasmuch as there is subordination among the angels, and thus the being of all subordinate aeviternal beings is measured extrinsically, as it were, according to the intrinsic measure of the first aeviternal being, or of the highest angel. This opinion presupposes that the angels are not equal, but are subordinated, or that they proceed from God in a certain degree and order.*?
It must be observed that unity of continuous time presupposes, but does not apodictically prove as many think, that the apparent movement of the sun is uniform, or that the real movement of the earth around the sun is uniform, that is, always of the same velocity.
36 Quodl., q.10, a.4; also reply to third objection of this article. 37 Summa theol., la, q.47, a.2.
But this, as many think, is not apodictically true, for there would have to be first a fixed unity of time which is reckoned according to a presupposed uniformity of movement. Nevertheless the hypothesis of the uniformity of the sun's apparent movement is confirmed by the harmony that prevails between the various ways we have of measuring time, for instance, in the clocks we use.?8 Moreover, this hypothesis, which was already explicitly formulated by Aristotle,*® is more in conformity with the simplicity of the laws of nature than is the hypothesis of some non-uniform but accelerated or retarded movement, or of one that is sometimes accelerated and sometimes retarded with compensation, whose velocity is not always the same. Therefore the truer opinion is that there is one time and one aeviternity.
Yet the fourth objection in this article states that things not dependent on one other, do not seem to have one measure of duration. But aeviternal things do not depend on one another, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Consequently there is not only one aeviternity.
St. Thomas replies by saying: “For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be simpler than the rest.” Thus arithmetical unity is the principle of number, and the letter is the principle of unity for the syllable.
Recapitulation. And so we bring to an end this beautiful question of eternity, which is compared with other durations. From the foregoing we clearly see that the principle characteristic of eternity is not to be without beginning and end, but to be simultaneously whole, without succession and variation, according to a most perfect uniformity. Hence there is but one and permanent now of eternity. On the contrary, the now of continuous time alternates between the past and the future, Aeviternity is the mean between time and eternity, and so it is “‘simultaneously whole, but before and after are compatible with it,” 4 according to a succession of thoughts in the angels. Finally, in the discrete time by which these successive thoughts of the angels are measured, there are several standing, successive nows; so that one angelic thought or contemplation is present in the same moment of time, and a subsequent thought in another, without any continuous time intervening; whereas in our time two moments are always separated from the one time that is infinitely divisible. Thus also, while the angels move bodies locally, as stated farther on, “the time of an angel’s motion can be non-continuous; so an angel can
88 Cf. Lechalas, Espace et temps, p. 84. 39 Physics, Bk. VIII, chap. 14; Metaph., Bk. X, chap. 1. 40 Summa theol., la, q.10, a.5 ad gum.
be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant without any time intervening.” 4
Wherefore “the standing now” of eternity is like the apex of a cone, the base of which would represent the successive parts of time. But between the apex and the base is aeviternity to which change is annexed, and discrete time consisting of several successive standing nows. Thus a more profound knowledge is acquired of the definition of eternity as formulated by Boethius, who says it is “the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” + The unitive life of the saints, already here below, approaches this eternity, and especially so does the beatific vision of which participated eternity is the measure.
Footnotes
Chapter 11 of 27