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Chapter IX. Question 9 the immutability of God

From the truth that God is the self-subsisting Being, we have thus far deduced that He is absolutely simple, perfect and good, infinite and immense, and everywhere present inasmuch as He maintains all things in being. From the very fact that God is the self-subsisting Being, it likewise follows that He is absolutely immutable, with an immutability not of inertia but of supreme perfection, which belongs to God alone.

We shall see that, although this immutability is expressed in negative terms (inasmuch as our knowledge is first of mutable things), yet in itself it is something absolutely positive; and it can be expressed by the word “stability,” whereas the mutability of things in the world is their instability.

Evolutionist philosophy does its utmost to eliminate the word “stability,” for it maintains that all immutability is imperfect, being like the immobility of an inert, lifeless thing. On the contrary, supreme life is absolutely immutable or supremely stable. The refutation of pantheism is completed in this question, inasmuch as the self-subsisting Being, since He is absolutely identical with Himself and stable, is really and essentially distinct from the changeable world and from the soul that is always capable of further perfection in knowledge and love. There are now two points of inquiry: 1 Is God altogether immutable? (2) Does it belong to God alone to be altogether immutable?

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE

State of the question. The difficulty here is that St. Augustine says: “The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time nor by place.”(1) In like manner wisdom is said to be more mobile than all active things.? We also read in the Scripture: “Draw nigh to God, and

He will draw nigh to you.”2 In all these utterances we must distinguish between the metaphorical and the literal sense. The analysis of concepts contained in revelation is of great importance in speculative theology, and this is prior to the deduction of the theological conclusion. ‘This point is brought out clearly in the present article, in which the reply is not a theological conclusion but an explanatory proposition of the faith.

Reply. God is altogether immutable. This must be stated most emphatically against absolute and. pantheistic evolutionism.

This truth is expressed in Holy Scripture by the following texts: “I am the Lord and I change not.” + “God is not a man, that He should lie; nor as the son of man, that He should be changed.”3 “The heavens shall perish, but Thou remainest; and all of them shall grow old like a garment. And as a vesture Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed, but Thou art always the selfsame, and Thy years shall not fail.” * “For she is the brightness of eternal light. . . . And being but one, she can do all things; and remaining in herself the same, she reneweth all things, and through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls.” 7 “Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.” 8 “And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man.” °?

The councils on several occasions also affirmed God’s immutability. Thus the Council of Nicaea anathematizes those who say that the Son of God is “changeable.” 1° The Fourth Lateran Council says: “We firmly believe and absolutely confess that the one and only God is eternal, immense, and unchangeable.” 1! In like manner, the Vatican Council declares: “God, as being one, sole, absolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance, is to be declared as really, and essentially distinct from the world.” 12?

Three proofs are given from reason that God is absolutely immutable: (1) inasmuch as He is pure Act; (2) inasmuch as He is absolutely simple; (3) inasmuch as He is not perfectible.

  1. Everything that is changeable must be in potentiality, as re-4

5 ceiving determination; but God is pure Act without the admixture of any potentiality, because He is the first Being (fourth proof), and act is absolutely prior to potentiality; therefore God is absolutely immutable.

It is, indeed, quite clear that potentiality is spoken of with reference to its act, and, in the order of dignity and nature, it presupposes this act. If, then, there were potentiality in God, He would not be really the first Being, and there could be imperfection in Him; a certain part in Him would not be God. He would thus be no longer the self-subsisting Being. But if He were not the self-subsisting Being, then existence would be predicated contingently of Him. Thus God would be participated being; He would be like the highest angel in whom there is an admixture of potentiality, namely, essence subordinate to existence, and an operative faculty that is subordinate to operation. There is here a recapitulation of what was said on this subject, but without repetition, which is somewhat like circular contemplation."

God’s immutability is proved from His absolute simplicity, Indeed, everything that is mutable is in some way composite; for it partly remains as it was, and partly passes away, or at least can do so. This means that it is variable. In other words, every mutation presupposes a subject that is susceptible to variation, Thus in everything that is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found; but there cannot be any composition in God.

God’s immutability is proved from the fact that He is not susceptible to further perfection. For indeed everything that is moved acquires something. But God, since He is the very plenitude of being, cannot acquire anything; nor can He lose anything, for He is the necessary Being, the self-subsisting Being.

This must be said in refutation of absolute evolutionism, whether of the idealist type as proposed by Hegel or of the empirical type as proposed by Henry Bergson. Hence universal being, which according to Hegel’s opinion is the principle of all things, cannot be the true God; for, if it were, it would be the self-subsisting Being, absolutely immutable or stable, incapable of any evolution. Absolute evolutionism must say that the principle of all things is “the creative evolution of itself.” It then admits that something becomes universal which is its own reason for this. Such an admission means the denial of the real or ontological validity of the principle of identity or of contradiction (being and non-being are identified in this becoming, which is its own reason for such); it likewise means the denial of

13 Aristotle affirmed this in his Metaphysics, Bk. XII, chaps. 7, 9. 14 Summa theol., Ila Iae, q-100, a.6.

the real validity of the principle of efficient causality and of finality; for the evolution of anything to something more perfect would always tend to this without any efficient cause and without being directed to any end. Thus the greater would always be produced from the less, the more perfect from the less perfect; for there is more in what exists than in what is becoming and does not as yet exist; there is more in the adult and developed man than in the embryo and the child.

Corollary. Hence the immobility of inertia, which is inferior to motion and our activity, must not be confused with the immobility of perfection, which is the supreme stability of Him who is selfsubsisting Being, Intelligence, and Love. These two immutabilities are distinct, just as the infinity of matter, which is always capable of further determination and perfection, is distinct from the infinity of perfection, as was stated above."® Thus equally so, supreme and permanent contemplation is distinct from the ever changeable aberrations of error, as also the supreme love of the supreme good is distinct from the human emotions.?®

Reply to first objection. Augustine says that “God moves Himself neither by time nor by place,” meaning that God’s mode of operation, namely, by understanding, willing, and loving, transcends time. The expression is metaphorical, and it owes its origin to the fact that there is no intellection in us without movement or transition from ignorance to knowledge. Hence what must be carefully considered in analogy, is the analogical concept, which is attributed formally and analogically to God (such as life, intellection, love), and the imperfect and created mode (movement), which is not attributed properly but only metaphorically to God.

Reply to second objection. Wisdom" is called mobile by way of similitude, or metaphorically, not formally but causally, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things. This means that it is mobile, not in itself, but according as it produces all mutations of things. We find this stated in the canonical hour of none as follows:

God, powerful sustainer of all things,

Thou who dost remain permanently unmoved, Determining the course of time

By the successions of the light of day.

16 See what St. Thomas says farther on (Ia, q.18, a.g), in the article entitled: “Whether life is attributed to God,” which discusses God's absolutely immobile and most perfectly stable life, a life that is without variation and succession, and that is measured by eternity, as stated in q.10, a.2.

Thus also metaphorically and causally God is said to be angry, inasmuch as, like an angry man, He punishes sinners.’

Reply to third objection. In like manner, it is in a metaphorical sense that God is said to approach to us inasmuch as we receive the influx of His goodness.

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER TO BE IMMUTABLE BELONGS TO GOD ALONE

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to distinguish between God’s absolute immutability and that of the angel and the human soul, their substances being incorruptible. It is also the purpose of this article to distinguish between God's absolute immutability and-that of the blessed, who are in possession of eternal life.

Conclusion. God alone is altogether immutable.

Thus St. Augustine says: “God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable.” 18

It is proved from reason by distinguishing between incorruptible and corruptible creatures.

  1. All created things, even the incorruptible, are, as regards substantial being, mutable by an extrinsic power that is in God. For God, indeed, by a most free act of His power brought creatures into existence, and He freely preserves them in the same. He can, therefore, by His absolute power, annihilate all things, although He would never do so by His well-ordered power (whether ordinary or extraordinary).

  2. All created and corruptible things are mutable, as regards their substantial being by an intrinsic power that is in them; for these are composed of matter that can lose its present form and receive another.?°

  3. All creatures, as regards their accidental being, are mutable by an intrinsic power. Even in the angels there is mutability as regards their choice of either good or evil. All were created good and in grace, and some freely merited their eternal happiness, whereas others sinned. In fact, the blessed are capable of receiving

18 De natura boni, chap. ı.

20 St. Thomas, along with the ancient physicists, thought that the heavenly bodies are incorruptible, since there were no signs of corruptibility to be seen in them. This was explained inasınuch as the form of ether (quintessence) perfectly completed the capacity of matter.

But nowadays spectral analysis has shown that the same chemical combinations are to be found in the stars and in terrestrial bodies. Heavenly bodies are therefore corruptible.

new accidental illuminations and of acquiring accidental glory. Finally, there is mutability in the angels by way of virtual contact, inasmuch as they can act in this place or that, and do not always act in the same place.

On the contrary, God is absolutely immutable as regards substantial being, which is absolutely necessary and not contingent, nor is there any accident in God. Moreover He always preserves in being all existing things by His virtual contact. Hence it is only in those things external to God that there can be mutability, as when the blessed begin to see Him. God's free act is a difficulty which must be later examined.”

It must be noted that God can annihilate all created things by His absolute power, but not by His well-ordered power (whether ordinary or extraordinary), for no end can be assigned as reason why God should annihilate the angels, the blessed, and Christ's humanity. Yet it remains true to say that all created things can be annihilated by an extrinsic power.

On this point Cajetan remarks that the potentiality of created things does not refer primarily to non-existence, because potentiality refers essentially to actuality, and not to its opposite. Real potentiality by its very nature is directed to actuality, although it cannot directly reduce itself to actuality; hence a thing is said to be in potentiality to exist in a particular way and not to exist in a certain other, just as active potency of itself means that a thing is capable of acting and not acting. In other words, potentiality is really ordained for actuality, and is not really but logically ordained for its opposite.

Hence in created things there can be no real potency for nonexistence except in a secondary sense, inasmuch as in anything there is a potency to exist in another way that is incompatible with the existence that it actually has. Thus in composites of matter and form there is a real potency to exist in another way, inasmuch as the matter can receive another form, which can give it a different existence. Hence for anything to have a real potency and not merely a logical potency for non-existence, it must have matter that is capable of receiving another form.

Therefore in the essence of the angel and of the soul there is a

21 Summa theol., ta, q.19, a.3. We must say that God’s free act is not an accident, for it is not the actuation of divine liberty that was prior to this simple potency. There is only one act of love in God, by which He necessarily loves His own goodness, and not necessarily creatable and created goodness. Thus the possibility of a free act in God does not posit mutability in Him, Moreover, this act is eterna] and irrevocable.

On this point consult what St. Thomas says about the incorruptibility of the angels (Ia, q.50, a.5), and of the soul (Ia, q.75, a.6).

real potency for existence, and only a logical potency for nonexistence; corresponding to this there is the real power of God, who can annihilate all things created and freely maintained in being by Him. For just as the power of creating presupposes only a logical potency or a possibility on the part of the thing creatable, so the power to annihilate presupposes only the possibility of annihilation. In incorruptible things there is therefore no real potency for non-existence.

Corollary. Therefore the instability in any being arises solely from the possibility of its desiring some other reality which it does not have, for nothingness is not desired by anyone. Hence instability comes from the imperfection of that which is possessed, inasmuch as this does not fully satisfy the capacity for desiring.

Therefore the more we approach to God, the more stability takes the place of instability. This is the immutability of perfect sanctity that exists in heaven.?? The saints in heaven adhere immutably to God, so that sin is no longer possible.?? This immutability is of a higher order and is by participation.

On the other hand, there is an inferior kind of immutability that proceeds not from the illimitation of being, but from the limitation of its capacity or desire, which is found in those, as St. Paul so vividly expresses it, who are already filled and have no higher aspirations. For he says: “You are now full, you are now become rich.” ** This is an inferior kind of immutability, a sort of inert egotism, fanaticism, or sectarianism, since such persons do not sufficiently aspire to the higher truth and goodness.

Intermediate between this inferior kind of immutability of those who are now filled and the higher immutability of the blessed, is the praiseworthy mutability of the holy wayfarer who is, like Daniel, “a man of desires” *® and who always aspires to something higher. This praiseworthy mutability, which tends toward the higher immutability, differs entirely from the instability of the dilettante, who regards no truth as immutable, who does not tend toward God, but who is always of a fickle disposition.

Reply to second objection. The good angels have a participated immutability of the will for good.

And so this terminates the question of God’s immutability compared with that of any created being whatever. This question perfects the teaching proposed by St. Augustine since it brings out

clearly the distinction between mutability that is the result of intrinsic power, and mutability that is the result of extrinsic power. In this we have a wonderful application of the Aristotelian distinction between real potentiality and actuality.

Footnotes

  1. De Gen. ad lit., Bk. VIIL, chap. 20. ↩

  2. James 4: 8. ↩

  3. Num. 23: 19. ↩

  4. Mal. 3: 6. ↩

  5. Rom. 1: 23. See also Eccles. 42: 16; Prov. 19: 21. 10 Denz., no. 54. ↩

Chapter 10 of 27