Chapter XX. Question 20 God’s love

‘Furs question treats of God’s love as being the principal act of His will: (1) its existence (a. 1); (2) its object (a. 2); (3) the mode of this love (a. 4, 5): Whether God loves all things equally, or whether He loves the better things more.

FIRST ARTICLE WHETHER LOVE EXISTS IN GOD

State of the question. The point of inquiry in this article is whether love is formally and not merely virtually in God. It seems that love is not formally in God, for love is a passion, and there are no passions in God. Moreover, love is of the same order as anger and sorrow, and these are not in God. Lastly, love is a uniting force, the connecting link between lovers. Hence this does not seem to exist in God, who is most simple.

Yet the answer is: We must assert that in God there is love in the strict sense, not merely metaphorically.

1. This conclusion is of faith and is expressed many times in Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “God is charity.” 1

2. It is also proved by reason as follows: Love is the first act of the will; but will is formally in God; therefore love is formally in Him.

The major is evident from the fact that the will is specified by lovable good, and its love of good is prior to its avoidance of evil, and its love of good simply as such is prior to its sadness or its joy by reason of the absence or presence of good. To love means nothing else but to will good. Love is nothing else but the inclination to good, or, if one is already in possession of good, as God is, then it is complacency in the same. But this perfection includes no imperfection. Therefore love not only exists in God, but exists in Him formally and eminently.? It is not a question here of love as a pas-

1I John 4: 16. 2 Cf. ad gum. 595 sion, or as an act of the sensitive appetite, but as it is an act of the intellectual appetite.’

Corollary. Joy is likewise formally in God, because it is satisfaction in the good possessed. The reason is that there is no imperfection in the formal concept of joy, as there is none in the concept of love. On the contrary, anger and sadness imply imperfection, and can exist in God only virtually or metaphorically. Sadness is affliction of mind because of present evil, and this sadness at having been offended gives rise to anger, which is the appetite for revenge. Hence when Holy Scripture says that God repents or is angry, this repentance and anger must be understood in a metaphorical sense. Thus anger signifies justice that inflicts the deserved punishment.

First doubt. Of what kind is the love by which God loves Himself?

The answer. From what has been said it is clear that God infinitely and necessarily loves Himself.* But this most eminent love is not, in the strict sense either the love of concupiscence or of friendship, but is something higher." For the love of concupiscence is that by which we will something as being good especially for ourselves; and the love of friendship is that by which we love another, wishing good for the other as we wish it for ourselves. But God is absolutely identified with His love for Himself. Hence this love transcends both the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship.

Objection. There is between the divine persons, for example, between the Father and the Son, a mutual and amicable love that is accompanied by a supreme communication of good things. Therefore the love of friendship exists formally in the divine persons.

Reply. I deny the antecedent; for this mutual love between the divine persons is not formally such on the part of the act itself of love, but only on the part of the Persons loving, who by one sole act love Themselves. Hence it is not simply friendship, but something more than this, that is, it is not unifying love, but unity of love and identity of good things.

Second doubt. Can zeal be properly attributed to God? It can, because zeal is intense love that vigorously repels all that is contrary to it; and there can be no imperfection in it, such as that of envy or suspicion. Thus God is said to be zealous.®

Third doubt. Is hatred properly attributed to God?

Reply. The evil of enmity by which we will evil as such to another is only metaphorically in God; for God does not will evil as such to the sinner, but as it is a just punishment. Now, to be sure, the just

5 See John of St. Thomas’ commentary on this article. 6 Ex. 34: 14.

judge condemning the murderer to death, does not do this because of hatred for him, but from love of justice. Far more so, does God do this, of whom it is said: “Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living,” 7 but loves justice. Thus the devil is strictly so, the enemy of God; but God is not, strictly so, the enemy of the devil.

But as for the hatred of abomination by which the just person detests sin as an evil, it is disputed whether this is attributed properly or only metaphorically to God. Suarez, Vasquez, and several modern theologians affirm that it applies properly to God, because Holy Scripture says that God hates iniquity, and that sin is displeasing to Him. Hence they say that He formally detests it as simply evil, although He permits it, and afterward punishes it.

On the contrary, St. Thomas says: “Hence (because God cannot will evil) it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed (properly) to God. Just as love is related to good, so is hatred to evil; for we will good to those we love, but evil to those we hate. Therefore if God’s will cannot be inclined to evil, as was said above,’ it is impossible for Him to hate anything.” ° Hence several Thomists, such as John of St. Thomas and Gonet, hold that hatred of iniquity is only metaphorically or virtually in God, as a consequence of His love of justice. They say that no act of the divine will refers strictly to what is evil, either as to be pursued or as to be avoided, and that it is directly in conflict with.it. No act of God can be formally avoidance of evil; for avoidance of evil belongs properly only to the created will, since it is imperfect, and it may find itself opposed by evil, and be prevented from attaining its good. But God’s will is most perfect; no evil can oppose it and prevent it from attaining its good. Therefore hatred of iniquity is not formally but virtually in God, inasmuch as it is virtually contained in His love of justice, and inasmuch as sin is directly opposed to His created virtue, that is, to charity or justice. Similarly, reasoning is virtually contained in the divine intellect. This seems at least to be the more probable opinion.

Fourth doubt. Do hope and desire properly belong to God?

The answer is in the negative. The reason is that hope refers to future good, which is something arduous or difficult of attainment, and this cannot be said of God. But desire refers to absent good, which is neither formally nor eminently possessed by the one who desires it. But God possesses all things eminently.

9 Ibid., chap. 96. See also the commentary of Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis) on this chapter.

SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS

State of the question. It seems that God does not properly, but only metaphorically, love things apart from Himself, for Dionysius says: “Love places the lover outside himself,” *° and this, so it seems, would be an imperfection for God. Moreover, God's love is eternal and He alone is eternal; hence it seems that God loves only Himself and not things apart from Himself.

Aristotle seems to admit this, even Plato, as also the Neoplatonists, and among modern philosophers Spinoza, who maintains that the world proceeds of necessity from God, but is not loved by Him.

But the answer is: God loves all existing things, and indeed in the strict sense of the term. f

1. This conclusion is of faith, for the Scripture says: “Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of those things which Thou hast made.” = And in the New Testament we read: “God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son.” 1? Nor is there any reason, as will immediately be stated, for restricting these words to a metaphorical sense.

2. The proof from reason is as follows: To love anything is to will good to that thing; but God wills good to all things that are, were, or will be, that is, He wills at least their existence, which depends on His divine will; therefore God properly loves all existing things.

Moreover, “the love of God infuses and creates goodness (in things),” 13 whereas, on the contrary, our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, and thus it calls forth our love, whereby we will the preservation and increase of goodness in another.

Therefore God’s love with reference to creatures is in no way passive, but active; in fact, it creates, conserves, and vivifies this love in them. It does not presuppose lovableness in the object, but posits this in it. Thus grace that makes one pleasing to God is the effect of His love elevating us to a participation of His intimate life.1* Thus the treatise on grace is connected with the treatise on God.

There is no imperfection in what is formally denoted by this concept. However, God’s love of creatures is not said to be an ab-

18 See end of argumentative part of this article.

solutely simple perfection in the strict sense, because this love is a free act, as stated above,'* and therefore it is not better for God to have this love than not to have it.

Reply to first objection. The expression, “love places the lover outside himself,” is improperly used to signify that the lover wills good to the beloved; and in this latter, there is no imperfection.

Reply to second objection. As God knows future things eternally, He loved them eternally. In fact, the creative action is eternal, although its effect takes place in time. It is a formally immanent action, and is only virtually transitive inasmuch as it produces an external effect. Thus the effect is new, but not the action.

Reply to third objection. God loves rational creatures with the love of friendship, inasmuch as He wills them good, especially the good of eternal life. God, strictly speaking, does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship (because they are incapable of returning this love and sharing in His life), but with the love of quasi-concupiscence, inasmuch as He orders them to rational creatures, and thus indirectly to Himself.

Reply to fourth objection. God loves sinners in so far as they belong to a certain kind of nature, and He preserves them in existence; but He does not love them in so far as they are sinners, or as they are deficient in good.

First doubt. Does God love possible things? He does not indeed in the sense that He wills to give them existence, and this constitutes the distinction between possible and future things. But God loves His essence as it is infinitely capable of being participated in ad extra; and as the number of possible things is infinite, so He loves His omnipotence.

Second doubt. Does God love futuribilia, conditioned futures that will not come into existence?

Reply. He loves these conditionally. We discussed this point when treating of 1€ God’s antecedent will, which is conditional.

THIRD ARTICLE WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS EQUALLY

State of the question. The difficulty presents itself because we read in Holy Scripture that “He hath equally care of all.” 17 Moreover, God's love, inasmuch as it is the unique uncreated act, does not

admit of degree. Lastly, God is not said to know some things more than others. Therefore He does not love some things more than others.

On the other hand, St. Augustine says: “God loves all things which He has made, and among them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only begotten Son; and, much more than all, His only-begotten Son Himself.” 18

The answer is that God loves all things equally on the part of the very act of the will, because by one and the same act He loves all things. But He does not love all things equally on the part of the good willed, but He loves the better things more.

The first part requires no special proof, for there are not several acts in God differing in intensity. Hence the saying, “God has equally care of all,” 19 because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.*°

The second part of the proof presents no difficulty. On the part of the good willed, we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, although we do not will with greater intensity. But God wills a greater good for some creatures than for others; for some He wills only existence, for others life, for others intelligence, for others the life of grace, for others the life of glory, and for Christ the hypostatic union. Therefore God does not love all things equally on the part of the good willed.

Corollary. This is expressed at the end of the argumentative part of this article as follows: “Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things (a. 2), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” This can be called the “principle of predilection,” and it is most universal. It holds good for whatever being is better than another: for the plant with reference to the stone, for the animal with reference to the plant, for man with reference to the animal, for the just person with reference to the wicked one, for the elect with reference to others.

The doctrine of gratuitous predestination is virtually contained in this principle. There is a better explanation of this doctrine in the following article, in which we see that it is both a naturally knowable and a revealed truth.

20 On the contrary it is proper for us to love God more intensively than creatures. For the observance of the precept, indeed, it suffices that we love God appraisively above all things; but the saints in heaven also love God intensively above all things, which is what we must strive to do.

FOURTH ARTICLE WHETHER GOD ALWAYS LOVES THE BETTER THINGS MORE

State of the question. The difficulty arises from the following considerations. (1) Although Christ is better than the whole human race, yet “God delivered Him up for us all.” 21 Therefore it seems that He loves the human race more than He loves Christ. (2) An angel is better than a man, and yet God showed that He loved men more by sending them His Son. (3) Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more, as our Lord’s question shows: “Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?” 22 Yet Jesus loved John more, who was called the disciple whom Jesus loved. (4) The innocent man is better than the repentant, and yet it is said: “There shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninetynine just who need not penance.” ?3 (5) The just man who is foreknown (not predestined) is better than the predestined sinner, and yet God loves the predestined sinner more.

Nevertheless the answer is: “The reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves the better things more.

1. This truth is expressed clearly in revelation, as stated in various texts of Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “How could anything endure (in good), if Thou wouldst not? 24 And our Lord said: “Without Me you can do nothing,” ?* in the order of salvation. “For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” *° ‘Thus of the two thieves who died on Calvary, one of them by God's special mercy was saved. This is the principle of predilection, namely, that no one would be better than another unless loved more by God. This principle virtually contains, as we said, the whole doctrine of predestination, according to which some attain to eternal life and are called the elect, because they were loved and helped more by God.?7

2. For this answer the proof from reason is more than a theological conclusion since it is a truth revealed in Holy Scripture. It is as

27 Summa theol., Ia, qG-23, a-4s Be follows: God’s will is the cause of goodness in things; 7 but God’s love for anything is greater in so far as He wills a greater good for it; therefore the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills a greater good for them.

This conclusion follows as a corollary from the principle of causality, and may be fully expressed as follows: Every contingent being requires a cause, and in the final analysis the first cause, which is God. Thus God is the cause of the entity and goodness of things. Hence no being would be better than another unless God willed a greater good for this being than for another, as it was already stated in the preceding article.

It must be observed that this principle, as thus expressed, concerns God’s consequent will, on which depends any good whatever that here and now happens, whereas what really can happen depends on His antecedent will, such as that His commandments can really be observed, even when they are not actually observed.”

Moreover, this principle is most universal and admits of no exception, that is, it applies to all created beings, and especially to men and angels, in this sense that no one would be better than another (by an act easy or difficult to perform, natural or supernatural, first or final), unless he were loved more by God.

This principle is declared by St. Augustine when he says of the good and bad angels: “If both the good and bad (angels) were created equally good, then, whereas the latter fell by their evil will, the former were more abundantly assisted, and reached that state of complete happiness which made them absolutely certain of never losing it.” *° This means that, as men are predestined, so the good angels were previously loved, chosen, and predestined.

The solution of the objections confirms this conclusion.

Reply to first objection. “God loves Christ more than He loves the entire created universe because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him a name that is above all names, in so far a, He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror,” since he became the conqueror of sin, the devil, and death. Farther on we find St. Thomas saying: “Had sin not existed, the incarnation would not have been”; ®& but he adds: “There is no reason, however, why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good

therefrom. Hence it is written (Rom. 5: 20): “Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.” Hence, too, in the blessing of the paschal candle, we say: “O happy fault that merited such and so great a Redeemer.” This means that, had sin not existed, the incarnation would not have been; but, on the other hand, God permitted Adam’s sin and original sin only for a greater good, and after the Fall this greater good is known to be the redemptive incarnation, which is the source of all our graces. Hence the doctrine of this article is confirmed, namely, that no one thing would be better than another unless it were loved more by God, and Christ was and is loved by God more than the entire created universe.

Reply to second objection. “God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of union with the Godhead. . . . God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give to a sick servant some more costly delicacy, which he does not give to his own son in sound health.”

But the fallen angels were incapable of redemption because, as stated farther on, “the angel’s free will is flexible to either opposite

| before the choice but not after,” *? so that their choice is a participa- | tion in the immutability of the divine choice.

Reply to third objection. As to whether Christ loved Peter more ‘than John, St. Thomas remarks at the end of his reply, that “it may ‘seem presumptuous to pass judgment” on which of the two, either ! Peter or John, Christ loved more with the love of charity. It is also presumptuous to say which of the two God loved more, absolutely speaking, and ordained to a greater degree of eternal glory. For, as ‘the Scripture says: “The Lord is the weigher of spirits,” ** and there ‘is no other. Moreover, there is no certain statement about this in revelation.

Reply to fourth objection: “Whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and the better loved who have more grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved.

God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent.” From this something of great importance follows concerning predestination. It is that, if one of two sinners rises from sin, this is solely because of God’s special mercy, who converts one rather than another. But if anyone keeps baptismal innocence until death,

this is a sign of God’s greater grace, who thus preserved such a person in the performance of good works.

Reply to fifth objection. The non-predestined just person is better than the predestined sinner, although according to some other time he is worse.

Corollary. The validity and importance of the principle of predilection.

Hence the principle enunciated in the preceding article remains intact, namely, that, other things being equal, no one thing would be better than another unless it were loved more by God, or unless God willed it a greater good. Hence God loves the better things more. The whole doctrine of gratuitous predestination, which is explained farther on,** is virtually contained in this most exalted and most universal principle,

Moreover, this most exalted principle precludes from either priority or posteriority, which are expressed in the formulas: “before the foreseeing of merits” and “after the foreseeing of merits,” and in some measure it transcends the distinction between the orders of intention and execution, But, as we have already clearly seen, it contains virtually, as it were from on high, what is called predestination before the “foreseeing of merits.” In a manner more sublime it ab- - stracts from the less important principles on which perhaps too much stress is laid at times, whereas it does not present clearly enough this » principle of predilection.

This exalted principle presupposes with reference to our salutary ' acts, whether easy or difficult to perform, that God’s consequent wil! , is of itself efficacious, and that consequently grace is of itself effica- - cious, and not because our consent was foreseen by God.

Therefore Molina indirectly denies this principle of predilectior t when he says that grace is not of itself efficacious, by asserting that t “of two that are called and equally aided by grace, it can happen that one of them is converted and the other not. In fact, it is possible : for one who has received a less grace to rise again, when another who) has received a greater grace does not rise again, and remains obdu- - rate.” ss

This principle is likewise indirectly denied for salutary acts easy. to perform, by the congruism of the Sorbonne. Thus Tournely held! that grace of itself efficacious is required only for salutary acts difficult to perform, but not for easy ones, as if greater and less differentiated the species. Then if this principle admitted of exceptions, | it would no longer be metaphysically certain.

85 Concordia, pp. 51, 565 (Paris ed.). Consult also the index of this work under: the word “Auxilium.”

It is likewise indirectly denied by the Augustinians, such as Berthi and Noris, who in the time of Jansenism wrote and admitted that grace of itself efficacious is required only as a consequence of original sin, because of the moral weakness of human nature, but not because of man’s dependence on God. Hence they indirectly denied the principle of predilection for the state of innocence and for the angels, as if Molinism truly applied to the angels. But a metaphysical principle that admits of exceptions is no longer metaphysical, and is, moreover, of no value. On the contrary, the sublimity and absolute universality of this exalted principle so beautifully illustrates all questions concerning grace and predestination, either for men in any state of life, or for the angels.