Lecture 1 — Voluntary and Involuntary Action

Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and since praise and censures are apportioned for what is voluntary but pardon—or at times even pity—for what is involuntary, the study of the voluntary and the involuntary is required of those who intend to treat of virtue. [382]

It is useful also for legislators in decreeing honors and punishments. [385]

Involuntary actions seem to be those that arise either from violence or from ignorance. [386]

The violent action is one whose principle is from outside and to which the person involved or the recipient contributes nothing, for example, if he is driven somewhere by the wind, or if he is in the power of other men. [387]

Some things are done because of the fear of greater evils or because of the hope of some good. Thus a tyrant, having in his power the parents or children of a certain man, commands him to do a disgraceful deed on condition that they will be spared if he does it, but killed if he does not do it. Here a doubt arises whether the man’s actions are voluntary or involuntary. A similar case is found in the decision to throw goods overboard during storms at sea. Absolutely speaking, no man would do so voluntarily, but if it means that his life and that of others are saved as a result, a sensible man will do it. [388]

Operations of this kind are mixed. However, they approach more closely to voluntary actions, for they are voluntary at the time they are done, and the end of the action conforms to this particular time. An action, then, must be called voluntary or involuntary by reference to the time at which it was done. In our case, the man acts voluntarily because the principle moving his bodily members in these operations is within the man himself. Actions whose source is within man are in his power to do or not to do, and this belongs to the nature of the voluntary. But the actions may be called involuntary simply, for no one would choose to do such a thing in itself. [390]

382. Since virtue is concerned with passions. After the Philosopher has treated virtue in general, he treats here certain principles of virtuous acts. In defining virtue, he said [305] that virtue is a habit of correct choosing, because virtue works by means of choice. Now he logically discusses choice together with the voluntary and willing. The voluntary is common to these three, for the voluntary is anything that is freely done; choice, however, concerns the things that are for the end; and willing considers the end itself.

Hence, this section falls into two parts.

In the first part, he deals with the three previously mentioned principles of virtuous actions.

In the second part, at since willing regards the end (1113b3; [496]), he will compare these principles with the acts of the virtues.

His initial point calls for a threefold procedure.

First, he determines the voluntary and the involuntary.

Second, at after the treatise (1111b4; [432]), he deals with choice.

Third, at as was stated before (1113a15; [388]), he treats the act of willing.

In regard to the first of these, he does two things.

First, he shows that it pertains to the present discussion to consider the voluntary and the involuntary.

Second, at involuntary actions seem (1109b35; [386]), he actually treats them.

Two reasons are advanced in proof of the first point.

383. The first of these reasons is taken from what is peculiar to our present study concerning the virtues. He concludes from his previous remarks that moral virtue, our present concern, deals with passions and actions in such a way that, in the things that are voluntary in regard to actions and passions, praise is due to anyone acting virtuously and blame to anyone acting viciously. But, when someone involuntarily performs an action in accordance with virtue, he does not merit praise. On the other hand, if his action is contrary to virtue, he deserves pardon because he acted involuntarily, and so is less blameworthy. Sometimes he even deserves pity and should be entirely freed from blame.

384. Pardon can also be distinguished from pity in this way: we speak of pardon when censure—that is, a penalty—is lessened or entirely absolved as a consequence of the judgment of reason. Pity, on the other hand, arises as a consequence of an emotion. But praise and blame are peculiarly due to virtue and vice. Therefore, the voluntary and the involuntary, according to which the reason for praise and blame is diversified, ought to be treated by those who intend to study virtue.

385. At it is useful (1109b34), he gives the second reason. This is taken from the viewpoint of political science, to which the present study is ordered. It is useful for legislators, he says, to consider the voluntary and the involuntary that they may decree honors for the law-abiding and punishments for the law-breakers, for in regard to these, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary is of importance.

386. Then, at involuntary actions seem (1109b35), he deals with the voluntary and the involuntary.

First, he treats the involuntary;

second, at since the involuntary (1111a22; [425]), he treats the voluntary.

The reason for this order is that the involuntary proceeds from a simple cause, such as ignorance alone or violence alone, but the voluntary has to take place by the concurrence of many factors. The explanation of the involuntary is achieved in three stages.

First, he divides the involuntary.

Second, at the violent action is (1110a1; [387]), he treats one member of the division.

Third, at every action done (1110b18; [406]), he treats the other member.

He says first that some involuntary actions seem to be of two kinds: those arising from violence and those arising from ignorance. This division is made in order to indicate that the involuntary is a privation of the voluntary. But the voluntary implies a movement of the appetitive power presupposing a knowledge via sense or reason, because a good perceived moves the appetitive power. A thing is involuntary on two accounts: first, because the movement of the appetitive power is excluded, and this is the involuntary resulting from violence; second, because a mental awareness is excluded, and this is the involuntary resulting from ignorance.

387. Next, at the violent action (1110a1), he deals with the involuntary resulting from violence. Here he proceeds in two ways.

First, he discloses what the violent action is.

Second, at if someone should say (1110b9; [400]), he rejects an error about this.

His initial point requires a triple consideration.

First, he makes known what the violent action is;

second, at some things are done because of the fear (1110a4; [388]), what the morally forced action is;

third, at what sort of actions (1110b1; [398]), he concludes with a summary.

He says first that the violent action is one whose principle is from outside. It was just noted [385] that violence excludes the appetitive movement. Hence, since the appetitive faculty is an intrinsic principle, it is appropriate that the forced action arise from an extrinsic principle. However, not every action whose principle is from the outside is a violent action, but only that action that is derived from an extrinsic principle in such a way that the interior appetitive faculty does not concur with it. This is what he means by his statement that a violent action must be such that a man contributes nothing to it by means of his own appetitive faculty. A man is here said to be an agent inasmuch as he does something because of violence and a patient inasmuch as he suffers something because of violence. Aristotle gives an example of when the air or wind drives a thing to some place by its violence, or when rulers, having dominion and power, exile someone against his will.

388. At some things (1110a4), he explains what a morally forced action is. Three steps clarify this conclusion.

First, he raises a doubt.

Second, at operations of this kind (1110a11; [390]), he solves the doubt.

Third, at people doing such actions (1110a19; [396]) he clarifies the solution.

He says first that a man sometimes performs an action because he fears to incur greater evils or because he is afraid to lose some good. A tyrant, for instance, has under his dominion and power the parents or children of a certain man. This tyrant commands the man to do a disgraceful deed on condition that, if he does it, his relatives will be spared but, if he refuses, they will be killed.

389. There is then a doubt whether things done because of such fear should be called voluntary or involuntary. He gives another example of sailors who, during storms at sea, throw merchandise overboard. Absolutely speaking, no man does this voluntarily, but what he and his shipmates do in order to save their lives would be done by any sensible man in a similar situation.

390. Then, at operations of this kind (1110a11), he solves this doubt by concluding from his previous remarks [387] that the aforementioned actions done out of fear are mixed, that is, have something both of the involuntary (inasmuch as no one absolutely wishes to throw his goods overboard) and of the voluntary (inasmuch as a sensible man wishes this for the safety of himself and others). However, these actions approach more closely to the voluntary than to the involuntary. The reason is that throwing merchandise overboard, or any action of this kind, can be considered in two ways: one, absolutely and in general, and thus it is involuntary; the other, in the particular circumstances occurring at the time the action is to be done, and according to this, it is voluntary. But, since actions are concerned with particulars, the nature of the action must be judged rather according to the considerations of particulars than according to the consideration of what is general. This is what he means in his statement that these actions were done voluntarily at the time they were performed (that is, after having considered all the particular circumstances then occurring), and the end and completion of the action conform to this particular time.

391. Therefore, an action must be properly called voluntary or involuntary in view of the time at which the agent performed it. It is obvious that he acts voluntarily at the time. This is evident because, in these actions, the principle moving the bodily members to act is within the man himself. It would be different, however, if his members were not moved by himself, but by a more powerful agent. The things done by an intrinsic principle are in the power of man to do or not to do, and this belongs to the nature of the voluntary. Obviously, then, actions of this kind are properly and truly voluntary. They are, however, involuntary simply—that is, considering them in general—because no one, as far as it lies within himself, would choose to do a thing of this kind except out of fear, as was just stated [390].