Article 1 — Whether all things desire the good

The question concerns the will and the desire for the good. And first, it is asked whether all things desire the good. (Parallel texts: above: q. 21, a. 2; ST I.5.1; I.5.2, ad 1; I.5.4; In I Sent., d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1; SCG I.40; III.3; Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, bk. 1, lect. 1; Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius's On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lects. 3, 9.)

Obj. 1: It seems not. For being is related to truth and goodness in the same way, since it is interchanged with both of them. Also, just as knowledge is related to truth, so is desire related to goodness. But not every being knows truth. Therefore, neither does every being desire goodness.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if what is prior is removed, the posterior is also removed. But in an animal, knowledge precedes desire. However, knowledge is in no way shared with soulless things, such that we could say they know naturally. Therefore, neither is desire shared with the same things, such that we could say they naturally desire the good.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Boethius in the Hebdomads, (Ed. Peiper, p. 170,54.) each thing is said to desire another inasmuch as it is like itself. Thus, if something desires goodness, it itself must be similar to the good. However, since things are similar insofar as their quality or form is one, the form of goodness must be in the one desiring goodness. But it cannot be there according to natural being, for then it would no longer desire goodness, since no one desires what one already has. Therefore, the form of goodness must preexist in the one desiring goodness in the manner of an intention. But whatever has something within itself in this manner is itself knowing. Therefore, there cannot be a desire for the good except in those knowing; and so the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if all things desire goodness, this must be understood about the goodness that all can possess, for nothing desires, whether naturally or rationally, what is impossible for it to have. But the goodness that is shared with all existing things is nothing else than being. Therefore, it is the same to say that all things desire goodness and that all desire being. But all do not desire being, rather, it seems that none do. For all have being, and one only desires what one does not have, as is clear from Augustine in On the Trinity 9*,* (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 12 (PL 42:971); cf. Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 118:20, sermon 8, para. 4 (PL 37:1522; CCSL 40).) and from the Philosopher in Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 1.15, 192a20.) Therefore, not all things desire goodness.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, oneness, truth, and goodness are equally interchanged with being. But not all existing things desire oneness and truth, thus, neither being.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 7.3, 1146b31 sqq.; 7.9, 1151a29.) some people act against reason, even though possessing right reason. However, they would not act unless they desired and willed. But, what is against reason is evil. Therefore, some desire evil, and so not all desire goodness.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the goodness that all desire is being, as the Commentator says in the beginning of the Ethics. (The Leonine editors were not able to find this reference. See Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 where the same sentence is ascribed to Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 11 (PL 63:774B); cf. especially to Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 6; Albert the Great, Commentary on Dionysius' On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) But some do not desire being, rather, they desire non-being, like the damned in hell, who also desire the death of the soul, so that they might completely not exist. Therefore, not all desire goodness.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as the apprehensive powers are compared to their objects, so also are the appetitive powers. But the apprehensive power should be stripped of the form of its object so that it might know, just as the pupil is stripped of color. Therefore, the one desiring goodness should be stripped of the form of goodness. But all things have the form of goodness. Therefore, nothing desires goodness.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, to do something because of an end belongs to the Creator, to nature, and to one acting from a plan. But both the Creator and the one acting from a plan, namely a creature like man, acting for an end and desiring or loving goodness, have knowledge of the end or the good. Thus also nature, which is like a mean between the two inasmuch as it presupposes the work of creation and is presupposed in works of art, if it should desire the end for which it acts, then it must know it. But it does not know it. Therefore, even natural things do not desire goodness.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, whatever is desired is sought. But according to Plato, (Plato, from Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, comm. 5.) nothing can be sought about which one has no knowledge, just as if someone were to search for an escaped slave, when he found him, he would not know he had found him unless he already knew him. Therefore, what has no knowledge of goodness does not desire it.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, to desire the end belongs to what is ordered to the end. But the final end, which is God, is not ordered to an end. Therefore, he does not desire either the end or goodness, and so not all desire goodness.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, nature is determined to one thing. Therefore, if things naturally desire goodness, they ought not to naturally desire some other good. But all things naturally desire peace, as is clear from Augustine in City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 19, ch. 12 (PL 41:637). (Marietti, bk. 14, cc 12-13.)) and from Dionysius in On the Divine Names 12. (It is actually Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 11, para. 1 (PG 3:948D) according to ST II-II.29.2, s.c. 1.) And again, all things desire the beautiful, as is also clear from Dionysius in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 19 (PG 3: 716C).) Therefore, not all things naturally desire goodness.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, just as someone desires an end when he does not have it, so also does he delight in it when it is had. But we do not say that inanimate things delight in goodness. Therefore, it should not be said that they desire goodness.

On the contrary (1) is what Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 19 (PG 3: 716C).) existing things desire beauty and goodness; and everything that they do, they do on account of this, that it seems good to them; and the intention of all existing things has both a good beginning and an end.

Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 1.1, 1094a2–3. Sec. transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 1).) that some defined goodness well, saying that goodness is what all desire.

Furthermore (3), anything that acts, acts for an end, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.4, 994b13.) But what acts on account of another desires it. Therefore, all desire the end and the good, which has the notion of an end.

Furthermore (4), all desire their own perfection. But each thing is perfect inasmuch as it is good. Therefore, all desire goodness.

I answer that it must be said that all things desire goodness, not only those having knowledge, but also those lacking in knowledge. In evidence of this, it should be known that some ancient philosophers (From Aristotle, Physics 2.12, 198b10 sqq..) held that effects occurring in nature come from the necessity of preceding causes, but not in such a way that natural causes were disposed in such a way because of the appropriateness of such effects. The Philosopher disproves this in Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 2.13, 198b34.) from the fact that, according to this view, if such appropriateness and usefulness had not been intended in some way, they would happen by chance, and so would not happen for the most part, but rather in the least, like other things which we say happen by chance. Hence, it is necessary to say that all natural things are ordered and disposed to their appropriate effects.

However, something happens to be ordered or directed to an end in two ways: in one way by itself, like a man who directs himself to the place where he tends, in another way by another, like an arrow which is directed towared a determinate place by an archer. Indeed, only those that know the end can be directed to that end by themselves, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But what does not know the end can also be directed to a determinate end by another, as is clear with the arrow. Yet this happens in two ways. For sometimes what is directed to an end is only impelled and moved by the one directing, but without acquiring a form from the one directing, according to which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. And such an inclination is violent, like the arrow directed toward a determinate target by the archer.

However, at other times, what is directed or inclined to an end acquires some form from the one directing or moving, according to which such an inclination belongs to it. Hence, such an inclination will be natural, as if having a natural principle, just as the one who gave weight to the stone inclined it so that it would be naturally moved downward. In this way, the one begetting is the mover for heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher in Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 8.8, 256a1.) And in this way all natural things, having within themselves some principle of inclination, are inclined to what is appropriate for them, for which reason their inclination is natural, so that they themselves somehow move, and are not only led to their appropriate end. For violent things are only led, since they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural things also move toward the end, inasmuch as, by the principle impressed within themselves, they cooperate with the one inclining and directing.

However, whatever is directed or inclined toward something by another, is inclined to war what is intended by the one inclining or directing, just as the arrow is directed to the same target that the archer intends. Hence, since all natural things are inclined to their ends by some natural inclination from the first mover, which is God, that toward which each thing is naturally inclined must be what is willed or intended by God. But since God has no other end for his will than himself, and he himself is the very essence of goodness, all other things must be naturally inclined toward goodness. However, to desire is nothing else than to seek something, as though tending toward something to which it is ordered. Hence, since all things are ordered and directed by God toward goodness, and in such a way that there is a principle within each thing by which it itself tends toward goodness, as though seeking the good itself, one must say that all things naturally seek after goodness. For if all things were inclined toward goodness without having in themselves a principle of inclination, they could be said to be led to the good, but not as desiring goodness. But all things are said to seek after goodness by reason of an impressed principle, as if willingly tending toward goodness, for which reason it is said in Wis. 7:1 (It is actually Wisdom 8:1.) that divine wisdom disposes all things sweetly, for each thing tends by its motion to what is divinely ordered.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, it must be said that truth and goodness are in some way similarly related to being, and in some way dissimilarly. This is because it is similar with respect to the conversion of the predicate. For just as each being is good, so also is it true. But it is dissimilar with respect to the order of a perfecting cause. For truth does not have an order of a perfecting cause for all beings, like goodness, since, namely, the perfection of truth is found only with respect to the notion of form. Hence, immaterial things alone can be perfected by the true, since they alone can receive the notion of the form without material being. But since goodness is perfective both with respect to the notion of the form and being together, it can perfect both material and immaterial things. And therefore, all things can desire goodness, but not all can know truth.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that some say (Non invenimus.) that just as there is a natural desire within all things, so also a natural knowledge. But this cannot be true, for since knowledge happens by assimilation, a likeness in natural being does not cause knowledge, but rather impedes it, for which reason the organs of sense must be stripped of the forms of sensible things, so that they can receive them with according to a spiritual being, which causes knowledge. Hence, those things which can in no way receive something, except with respect to material being, can in no way have knowledge. Nevertheless, they can desire, inasmuch as they are ordered to something existing in natural being. For desire does not regard spiritual being of necessity, as does knowledge. Hence, there can be a natural desire, but not natural knowledge. And neither is this is impeded by the fact that desire follows upon knowledge in animals, for even in natural things it follows upon either apprehension or knowledge, yet not of the ones desiring, but of the one who orders it to an end.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that whatever desires something, desires that thing inasmuch as it has some likeness to it. But that likeness, which is according to spiritual being, is not sufficient, otherwise an animal would have to desire whatever it knows. Rather, the likeness must be with respect to real being. But this likeness can be considered in two ways. In one way inasmuch as the form of one thing is in another according to perfect actuality, and when something is likened to an end in this way, it does not tend to the end, but rests in the end.

But in another way, that likeness can be considered inasmuch as the form of one thing is in another incompletely, that is, in potency; and so, inasmuch as something possesses within itself the form of the end and the good in potency, it tends to the good or the end, and desires it. And with respect to this way, matter is said to desire form inasmuch as form is within it in potency. And therefore, the more perfect this potency is and closer to actuality, so much does it cause a more intense inclination. From this it happens that every natural motion strains toward an end whenever what tends toward the end is, indeed, more similar to it.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that when it says "all desire goodness," goodness does not have to be determined to this or that thing, but rather it is to be taken in common, since each thing naturally desires the good that is appropriate for itself. Yet, if goodness should be determined to something one, this one thing will be being. And this is not prevented by the fact that all things have being, for whatever has being desires its continuation, and what has being in act in one way has being in potency in another way, just as air is air in act and is fire in potency; and so whatever has being in act desires to exist in act.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that oneness, and truth do not have the notion of an end, like goodness. And so, neither do they define it as the notion of the desirable.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that whatever acts contrary to reason desires goodness essentially. For example, one who fornicates considers what is good and delightful according to the senses, but what is evil according to reason is beyond his intention. Hence, goodness is desired essentially, but evil is desired accidentally.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that just as something exists as being desirable, so also does it exist as being good. However, it was said above (a. 5) that something is not called good simply and absolutely according to substantial being, unless one should adjoin other appropriate perfections. And therefore, substantial being itself is not absolutely desirable, except with appropriate perfections adjoined. Hence, the Philosopher says in Ethics, (Aritotle, Ethics 9.9, 1170a22. Second translation: Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 339).) existence is delightful for all. However, one must not take up an evil and corrupt life, nor one that is sad, for this is evil simply and should be simply avoided, even though it is desirable in some respect. However, in both desiring and avoiding, something is good and corruptive of evil or else evil and corruptive of goodness for the very same reason. For we say that to lack evil is good, according to the Philosopher in Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 5.1, 1129b8.) Thus, non-being has the notion of goodness inasmuch as it removes existing in a state of sadness or wickedness, which is evil simply, even though it is good in some respect. And non-being can be desired in this way under the notion of goodness.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that it is not always true that, in apprehensive powers, the power is completely stripped of the form of its object. For this fails in those powers which have a universal object, as in the intellect whose object is "what," but only when it has the whatness. Nevertheless, it must be stripped of those forms which it receives. This also fails in the sense of touch because even though it has particular objects, yet they pertain to the animal by necessity. Hence its organ cannot be wholly without heat or coldness. But it is somehow apart from heat and cold inasmuch as it is mixed somewhere in the middle. However, the middle is neither of the extremes. But desire has a common object, namely goodness. Hence, it is not totally stripped of goodness, but only of that goodness which it desires; yet, it has it in ability, and in this respect, it is likened to it, just as the apprehensive power is in potency to the form of its object.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that, as is clear from what was said, knowledge of the end is required in anything that is directing toward that end. However, nature does not direct to an end, but it itself is directed. But God and the one acting from a plan also direct anything toward its end; and therefore, they must have knowledge of the end, yet not a natural thing.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the objection proceeds correctly with regard to what desires the end, as though directing itself to the end, for it is necessary that it know when it should arrive at the end. However, it is not necessary insofar as it is only directed to the end.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that something tends to an end which it does not yet have, and it also delights in that end when it already has it by the very same nature, just as by the same nature earth is moved downwards and also rests there.

Therefore, it does not belong to the final end to tend toward an end, but rather to enjoy the end in itself. And even though this cannot properly be called desire, nevertheless, it is something pertaining to the genus of desire, from which every desire is derived. For inasmuch as God enjoys himself, he directs other things toward himself.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that desire's termination in goodness, peace, and beauty, is not its termination in different things. For inasmuch as something desires goodness, it also desires beauty and peace: peace, inasmuch as it is limited and formed in itself, which is not included in the notion of goodness; but goodness adds an order of being perfective of another. Hence, whoever desires goodness, desires beauty by this very fact. However, peace implies a removal of what disturbes and impedes the attainment of goodness. Yet, inasmuch as something is desired, the removal of what impedes it is also desired. Hence, goodness, beauty, and peace are desired together by the same appetite.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that delight includes in its definition the knowledge of goodness, namely that it delights. And for this reason, only what knows the end can delight in the end as possessed. But desire does not imply knowledge in the one desiring, as is clear from what was said. Nevertheless, taking delight broadly and improperly, Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 10 (PG 3:708A).) that beauty and goodness are delightful and lovable for all.