Article 4 — Whether the will in rational beings is a power other than the appetite of the sensitive part

Fourth, it is asked whether the will in rational beings is a power other than the appetite of the sensitive part. (Parallel texts: Below: q. 25, a. 1; Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 14; ST I.80.2; I.80.2.)

Obj. 1: And it seems not. For an accidental difference among objects does not differentiate powers. But the objects of the will and the appetite do not differ except by accidental differences regarding goodness, which is the essential object of the appetite. For they do not seem to differ in any other way except inasmuch as the will pertains to the good apprehended by the intellect, whereas the sensitive appetite pertains to the good apprehended by sense; which belong to the good inasmuch as it is good. Therefore, the will is not a different power from the appetite.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the appetitive, the sensitive, and the intellective powers differ with respect to the particular and the universal, for the sense apprehends particulars, but the intellect universals. But the appetites of the sensitive and intellective parts cannot be distinguished in this way, for every appetite is for the goodness that is within existing things, which is not universal but particular. Therefore, one should not say that the rational appetite, which is the will, is a power different from the sensitive appetite in the way that the intellect is a power different from sensation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the appetitive power follows upon apprehension, so also does the motive power follow upon the appetitive. But the motive power is not a different power in rational and irrational things. Therefore, neither is the appetitive; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.14, 411a26.) the Philosopher distinguishes five kinds of powers and operations of the soul, one of which includes generation, nutrition, and growth; the second, sensation; the third, appetite; the fourth, local motion; the fifth, understanding; wherein understanding is distinguished from sensation, but not the intellective appetite from the sensitive appetite. Therefore, it seems that the higher appetitive power is not distinguished from the lower in the same way that the higher apprehensive power is distinguished from the lower.

On the contrary (1) is that the Philosopher distinguishes will from the sensitive appetite in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.14, 432b5.)

Furthermore (2), things that are ordered to each other must be distinct. But, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.16, 434a13.) the intellective appetite is higher than the sensitive appetite, and it also moves it as one sphere moves another sphere, as stated in the same place. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.11, 434a13. Sec. transl. veterem (ed. Alonso, p. 375,27).) Therefore, the will is a different power than the sensitive appetite.

I answer that it must be said that the will is a different power than the sensitive appetite. In evidence of this it must be known that just as the sensitive appetite is distinguished from the natural appetite by reason of its more perfect mode of desiring, so also is the rational appetite distinguished from the sensitive appetite. For inasmuch as a nature is closer to God, so much is a more express likeness of divine dignity found within it. However, it pertains to divine dignity that it should move, incline, and direct all things, though it itself is not be moved, inclined, or directed by any other. Hence, inasmuch as any nature is closer to God, so much less is it inclined by another, and is made in such a way as to incline itself more.

Therefore, non sensitive nature, which is most remote from God by reason of its materiality, is inclined to some end, yet there is not something inclining within it, but only a beginning of an inclination, as is clear from what was said. (Above: a. 3.) But sensitive nature, being closer to God, has within itself something that inclines, namely the apprehended desirable thing, and yet this inclination is not under the control of the animal itself that is inclined, but rather is determined for it by another. For, at the sight of what is delightful, the animal cannot help but desire it, since animals do not have mastery over their inclination. Hence, it does not act, but is rather acted upon, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960D).) And it happens thus because the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ and is therefore closer to the dispositions of matter and corporeal things, such that it should be moved rather than move.

But the rational nature, which is closest to God, not only has an inclination toward another, as unensouled things do, and not only does this inclination move as being determined from elsewhere, as in the case of sensible nature, but furthermore, it possesses the inclination itself under its control, so that it is not necessary that it be inclined to the apprehended desirable thing, but it can be inclined or not inclined. And so the inclination is not determined for itself by another, but rather by itself.

And this pertains to it inasmuch as it does not use a bodily organ, so that by drawing away from mobile nature, it comes closer to the nature of the mover and the agent. However, that something should determine for itself an inclination toward an end cannot take place unless it should know the end as well as the relation of the end to what is for the sake of the end, which only pertains to reason. And thus, such an appetite, not determined necessarily by another, follows upon the apprehension of reason. Hence, the rational appetite, which is called will, is a power different from the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the will is not directly distinguished from the sensitive appetite inasmuch as it follows upon this or that apprehension, but rather inasmuch as it determines an inclination for itself, or else it has an inclination determined by another, both of which require a power that does not exist in the same manner. But such diversity requires a diversity of apprehension, as is clear from what was said. Hence, the distinction of appetitive powers is understood consequent to the distinction between the apprehensive powers, and not primarily.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although the appetite always tends toward something existing in reality, which exists in a particular way and not universally, nevertheless, at times it is moved to desire through the apprehension of a universal condition, as when we desire this good thing by simply considering that goodness itself should be desired, but at other times by the apprehension of a particular according to its particularity. And so, just as the appetite is distinguished consequently to the different apprehensions which it follows, so also is it distinguished as a consequence by the universal and the particular.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that since motion and activities are among singulars, and there cannot be a descent from a universal proposition to a particular conclusion except by means of a particular assumption, a universal concept of the intellect cannot be applied to the choosing of an activity, which is like the conclusion in practical things as said in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 7.3, 1147a24.) except by means of a particular apprehension. Therefore, the motion that follows upon the universal apprehension of the intellect by means of the particular apprehension of sensation does not require one motive power corresponding to the intellect and another corresponding to sensation, as is the case for the appetite which immediately follows upon apprehension; and furthermore, the commanded motive power, about which the objection is concerned, is fitted with muscles and nerves. Hence, it cannot belong to the intellective part, which does not use an organ.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that since sensation and intellect differ through the accounts of the apprehensible inasmuch as it is apprehensible, it for this reason that they pertain to different kinds of powers. For sense tends to apprehend the particular, but the intellect tends to apprehend the universal. But the higher and lower appetites do not differ by means of differences in the appetible inasmuch as it is appetible, since each appetite tends at some point to the same good thing. But they do differ with regard to different modes of desiring, as is clear from what was said. And thus, they are indeed diverse powers, but not diverse kinds of powers.