Article 13 — Whether intention is an act of the will.

Thirteenth, it is asked whether intention is an act of the will. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 38, a. 3; ST I-II.12.1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for in Luke 11:34, the light of your body is your eye, the Gloss has that it is intention. (Glossa interlinearis, at Luke 11:34, (in Glossa ordinaria 5.857).) But the eye within the soul is reason or understanding. Thus, intention pertains to reason or understanding and not to the will.

Obj. 2: But it was said that intention belongs to the will in its order to reason, and to that extent it was compared to the eye.

On the contrary, the act of a higher and prior power does not depend upon that of one posterior. But the will is prior to the intellect in acting, for the will moves the intellect, as was said, (a. 12) therefore, the act of the will does not depend upon reason. Thus, intention pertains to reason or understanding and not to the will.

Obj. 3: But it was said that the act of the will depends upon reason inasmuch as it requires knowledge of what is willed, and thus even though intention is an act of the will, it nevertheless pertains to reason in another way.

On the contrary, there is no act of the will that does not require knowledge; hence, in this regard, no act, neither willing nor loving, should be simply attributed to the will, but to both reason and will together: which is false, and therefore also what went before, namely, that intention is an act of the will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the name "intention" implies a relation to an end; but it pertains to reason to refer something to an end; thus, intention is an act of reason and not of the will.

Obj. 5: But it was said that there is in intention not only a relation to an end but an act of the will referred to an end, and both of these are signified by the name "intention."

On the contrary, that action is set before the relation to the end as what is material is presupposed to what is formal. But something is better named from what is formal than from what is material. Thus, intention is better named from what belongs to reason than from what belongs to the will, and so it ought to be placed more as an act of reason than of the will.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as the first mover directs all of nature, so also does reason direct the will; but intention in natural things is more properly attributed to the first mover than to natural things themselves, since natural things are not said to intend something except insofar as they are directed by the first mover; thus, within the powers of the soul as well, intention ought to be attributed more to reason than to the will.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, properly speaking, intention is only within what knows; but the will is not a knower. Therefore, intention does not belong to the will.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, there cannot be one act of those things that are in no way one; but the will and reason are in no way one since they pertain to diverse genera of the soul's powers; for the will is in the appetitive power but reason is in the intellective. Thus, reason and the will cannot have one act, and so if intention is in some way an act of reason, it will not be an act of the will.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.5, 1111b26.) the will only pertains to the end; but in one order there is only one end. Therefore, with regard to its act, the will is only compared to one end. But there is no order where there is only one thing. Therefore, since intention implies order, it seems that in no way does it pertain to the will.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, intention seems to be nothing else than the direction of the will toward the final end; but it belongs to reason to direct the will; therefore, intentions pertains to reason.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, just as in the perversity of sin error belongs to reason, contempt to the irascible, and disorder of the will to the concupiscible, so also contrarily, in the reform of the soul, faith belongs to reason, hope to the irascible, and charity to the concupiscible. But faith is what directs intention according to Augustine. (Cf. Enarr. 2 in Ps. xxxi. n. 4 (PL 36, 259).) Therefore, intention belongs to reason.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.5, 1111b20.) the will is of both the possible and the impossible, but intention is only of what is possible; therefore, intention does not belong to the will.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, whatever is not in the soul is not in the will; but intention is not in the soul, since it is neither a power, for then it would be natural and then merit would not consist in it; but neither is it a habit, for then it would exist in those sleeping; and neither is it a passion, for then it would belong to the sensitive part, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 7.6, 248b27.) However, it is these three alone that exist within the soul, as is said in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.5, 1105b20.) Therefore, intention is not in will.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, it belongs to reason to order, for this pertains to the wise man, as is said in the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a17.) But intention is a certain ordering toward an end. Therefore, it belongs to reason.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, intention belongs to one standing distant from the end, for this preposition "in" implies distance. But reason is more distant from the end than the will, for reason only demonstrates the end, but the will inheres in the end as a proper object. Therefore, to intend belongs more to reason than to the will.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, every act of the will either belongs to it absolutely, or in comparison to higher powers, or in comparison to what is lower. But to intend is not absolutely an act of the will, for then it would be the same as to will and to love; neither is its act in an order to what is higher, that is, to reason, for its act in that case is to choose; neither is its act in an order to what is lower, since its act in that case is to command; therefore, to intend is in no way an act of the will.

On the contrary (1), intention is only about the end; but the end and the good is the object of the will; therefore, intention pertains to the will.

Furthermore (2), to intend is to pursue something; but pursuit or flight pertain to the will, not to reason, to which it only pertains to say that something is to be pursued or fled; therefore, intention belongs to the will.

Furthermore (3), all merit consists in the will; but intention is meritorious, and merit or demerit is most of all considered with regard to it; therefore, intention belongs to the will.

Furthermore (4), Ambrose says that affection imposes a name upon your works; (De officiis I c. 30 (PL 16, 71 B) ex quo Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 4 c. unic.) but an act is judged to be good or bad from the intention; thus, intention seems to be contained in affection, and so it seems to belong to the will and not to reason.

I answer that it must be said that intention is an act of the will, which is indeed manifestly apparent from its object. For a power and an act must accord in an object, since a power is not ordered to an object except by an act: the same object must belong to the seeing power and to sight, namely color. Therefore, since the object of the act of intention is the good and the end, which is also the will's object, intention must be an act of the will. Nevertheless, it is not an act of the will absolutely but in order to reason.

In evidence of this it must be known that whenever there are two ordered agents, the second agent can can move or act in two ways: in one way with regard to what belongs to its nature, in another with regard to what belongs to the nature of a higher agent. For the impression of the higher agent remains in the lower, and because of this the lower agent not only acts by its own proper action, but by the action of the higher agent; as when the sphere of the sun is moved by its proper motion, which is completed in the space of one year, and like the motion of the first mobile, which is a daily motion; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.6, 1072a9–17; 12.4, 1071a15; ST I.104.2; Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a15–337a15.) similarly, water is moved by its own proper motion by tending toward the center, and it has a certain motion from the influence of the moon which moves it, as is clear from the flowing out and the flowing in of the tides.

Mixed bodily things also have certain operations proper to them, which follow upon the nature of the four elements, such as to tend downwards, to heat or to make cold; and they have other operations from the influence of the heavenly bodies, such as the magnet, which attracts iron. And although no action of a lower agent takes place without the action of a higher agent being presupposed, yet that action is attributed to it absolutely which belongs to it with regard to its own nature, such as for water to move downwards; but those actions which belong to it from the influence of a higher agent are not attributed to it absolutely, but in order toward something else, as to flow out and to flow in is said to be the proper motion of the sea not inasmuch as it is water, but inasmuch as it is moved by the moon.

However, reason and will are certain operative powers ordered to each other; and reason is prior, considered absolutely, even though the will becomes prior by reflection and it is higher inasmuch as it moves reason. Hence, the will can have a double act: one that belongs to it with regard to its own nature inasmuch as it tends absolutely to its proper object, and this act is attributed to the will simply, such as to will and to love, even though the act of reason is also presupposed to this act; but it has another act that belongs to it with regard to how reason's impression is left in the will. For since it is proper to reason to order and to compare, whenever there appears any comparison or ordering in the act of the will, such an act will belong to the will not absolutely but in order to reason; and in this way to intend is an act of the will, for to intend seems to be nothing else than to tend toward something else as toward an end insofar as one wills. And in this respect intending differs from willing, for willing tends toward an end absolutely, but intending denotes an order to an end inasmuch as it is an end to which are ordered whatever things are for the sake the end. For, since the will is moved toward its own object proposed to itself by reason, it is moved differently inasmuch as that object is proposed to itself differently.

Hence, when reason proposes something to itself as absolutely good, the will is moved toward it absolutely, and this is to will; however, when it proposes something to itself under the notion of a good to which other things are ordered as to an end, then it tends toward it according to a certain order, which is found in the act of the will not with regard to its own proper nature but with regard to the exigency of reason, and in this way to intend is an act of the will as ordered to reason.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that intention is likened to the eye with regard to how a property of reason is found in intention.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that reason moves the will in some way, and the will moves reason in some way, as is clear from what was said; and so each is prior to the other according to different aspects, and to both can be attributed an act ordered to the other.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that even though any act of the will presupposes reason's knowledge, yet there does not always appear what is proper to reason in the will's act, as is clear from what was said, hence the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that it belongs to reason to have an active relationship to an end, for it pertains to it to refer things to an end; but a passive relationship can belong to anything directed or related to an end by reason, and so it can belong to the will; and in this way a relation to an end pertains to intention.

Reply Obj. 5: And in this the solution to the fifth is clear.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that in the first mover there is found not only knowledge, but will, and therefore intention can be properly attributed to it; but only knowledge pertains to reason, hence the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that to intend belongs also to what does not know, for natural things also intend the end, even though intention presupposes some knowledge. However, if we are speaking of animal intention, then it only belongs to what knows, just as not to will. Nevertheless, to intend and to will do not have to belong to the same power that also knows, but rather to the same subject: for some power is not properly said to know or to intend, but rather the subject through the power.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that reason and will are one in order, just as the universe is said to be one; and thus nothing prevents one act from belonging to both of them: to one immediately and to the other through some means.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that even though the will principally regards the end inasmuch as what is for the sake of the end is only desired because of the end, nonetheless, the will also regards what is for the sake of the end. For when the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.4, 1111b26; sec. transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 183).) that the will regards the end, but choice regards what is for the sake of the end, it is not in this respect that it is said that the will always regards the end, but rather sometimes and primarily; and from the fact that choice never regards the end, it is shown that to choose and to will are not the same.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that active direction toward an end pertains to reason, but passive direction can pertain to the will, and it pertains in this way to intention.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that faith directs intention just as reason direct the will; hence, just as faith belongs to reason, so also does intention belong to the will.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the will does not always regard what is impossible, but sometimes it does; and this suffices with regard to the Philosopher's intention to show the difference between the will and choice, which always regards what is possible, so that to choose is not completely the same as to will. Similarly, neither is to intend wholly the same as to will, but this does not exclude it being an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that intention is a certain act of the soul. However, the soul's actions are not contained in that member of the Philosopher's triple division, for actions do not belong to the soul as being within the soul, but rather as being from the soul. Or one could say that actions are contained under habits just as a thing that is derived from a principle is contained in its principle.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that it pertains to reason to order, but to be ordered can pertain to the will; and in this way intention implies a setting in order.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that that argument would follow if nothing else were required for intention except distance; however, inclination is required together with some distance, which inclination belongs to the will and not to reason, hence, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that intention is an act of the will as ordered to reason that is ordering what is for the sake of the end to the end itself; but choice is an act of the will as ordered to reason, comparing to each other the things that are for the sake of the end: and choice and intention differ for this reason.