Article 15 — Whether choice is an act of the will

Fifteenth, it is asked whether choice is an act of the will. (Parallel texts: ST I.83.3; I-II.13.1; In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2; Commenatry on Aristotle's Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 6, 9; bk. 6, lect. 2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, but rather an act of reason: for ignorance pertains not to the will but to reason; but a perversity of choice is a certain ignorance, hence every evil is said to be ignorant by an ignorance of choice, as is clear in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.3, 1110b28.) Thus, choice pertains to reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as examination and argumentation pertain to reason, so also does conclusion. But choice is like a certain conclusion of counsel, as is clear in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.3, 1112b20; 7.3, 1147a24.) Therefore, since counsel pertains to reason, so also will choice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 8.13, 1163a22.) the principality of moral virtue consists in choice; but as he says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.13, 1144b1–17.) among the moral virtues, the one that is principle and that formally completes the notion of virtue is prudence. Therefore, choice pertains to prudence. But prudence is within reason, thus, also choice.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, choice implies a certain discretion; but to discern belongs to reason, thus, also to choose.

On the contrary (1), to choose is to prefer one before another among two proposed alternatives, as is clear from John Damscene. (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:945B).) But to prefer is an act of the will and not of reason, and so also to choose.

Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.6, 1112a15.) that choice is the desire for what was deliberated beforehand; but desire belongs to the will and not to reason, and so also does choice.

I answer that it must be said that choice possesses something both of the will and of reason. However, the Philosopher seems to leave in doubt whether it is properly an act of the will or of reason in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.2, 1139b4.) where he says that choice is an appetite of the intellective faculty, that is, an appetite ordered to the intellect, or of the intellect, that is, of the intellect as ordered to the appetite. However, the first is more true, namely, that it is an act of the will ordered to reason.

That it is directly an act of the will is clear from two things: the first is from the notion of the object, for the proper object of choice is whatever exists for the sake of the end, which belongs to the notion of goodness that is an object of the will, for the end is said to be good, such as what is honorable or delightful, and what is for the sake of the end, such as the useful. (Ambros. De officiis I c. 9 (PL 16, 35) sec. Thomam I Pars q. 5 a. 6.) In the second place, this is clear from the notion of the act itself, for choice is the final acceptance according to which something is taken up as needing to be pursued; which pertains not to reason but to the will, for however much reason prefers one things to another, one is not accepted as worthy of pursuit until the will is inclined toward one rather than the other; for the will does not follow reason of necessity.

Nevertheless, choice is not absolutely an act of the will, but as ordered to reason, inasmuch as there appears within choice what is proper to reason, namely, to compare or to prefer one thing to another, which is indeed found in the will's act from the influence of reason inasmuch as reason itself proposes something to the will not as useful simply, but as useful for the sake of the end.

Thus, it is clear that the acts of the will are to will, to choose, and to intend: to will inasmuch as reason proposes some good thing to the will absolutely, whether it is to be chosen for its own sake as an end or for another as what exists for the sake of the end, for we call both of them "to will;" but to choose is an act of the will inasmuch as reason proposes the good to it as something useful for the end. However, to intend is an act of the will inasmuch as reason proposes the good to it as an end to be pursued insofar as it for the sake of the end.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that ignorance is attributed to choice with respect to what it has from reason.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that there is a twofold conclusion of practical inquiry: one that is in reason, namely a determination, which is a judgment about what was deliberated; but another that is in the will, and of such a kind is choice, and it is called a conclusion according to a certain likeness, for just as in speculative sciences one ends with a conclusion, so also in practical sciences one ends at last in activity.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that choice is said to be a principal in moral virtue both from the part that it has from reason as well as from the part that it has from the will: for both are required for the notion of a moral virtue; and choice is said to be a principle with regard to external acts. Hence, it is not necessary that choice is completely an act of prudence, but it participates something of prudence just as it does of reason.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that discretion is found in choice inasmuch as it pertains to reason, whose property the will follows in choosing, as has been said.