Article 14 — Whether the will wants the end and intends what is for the sake of the end by the same motion

Fourteenth, it is asked whether the will wants the end and intends what is for the sake of the end by the same motion. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 38, a. 4; ST I-II.8.3; I-II.12.4.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not: for it is impossible that the same act be both good and bad; but an evil will happens to be together with a good intention, as when someone wants to commit robbery so as to give alms. Therefore, intention and willing are not the same act.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 10.5, 1174a19.) motions that terminate at the mean and at the extreme differ according to species. But what is for the sake of the end and the end itself are related in some way as means and extremes. Therefore, the intention for the end the will for what is for the sake of the end differ according to species, so they are not one act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.10, 1144a31; 7.8, 1151a16.) the ends in practical sciences are as the beginnings in demonstrative sciences. But the intellect's act by which principles are understood is not the same as the act by which conclusions are considered, which is clear from the fact that they arise from diverse habits, for understanding is a habit of principles, but knowledge is of conclusions. Therefore, the will's act by which we intend the end in operative sciences is not the same as that by which we want what is for the sake of the end.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, acts are distinguished by objects; but the end and what for the sake of the end are diverse. Therefore, the intention of the end and the will for what is for the sake of the end are not the same act.

On the contrary (1), two acts cannot belong to the same power at the same time; but the will intends the end at the same time as when it wills what is for the sake of the end. Therefore, the intention of the end and the will for what is for the sake of the end are not diverse acts.

Furthermore (2), just as light is the reason for the visibility of color, so also is the end the reason for the desirability of what is for the sake of the end. But sight sees colors and light by the same act. Therefore, the will intends the end and wants what is for the sake of the end by the same act.

I answer that it must be said that there is a twofold opinion regarding this question, as the Teacher says in the Sentences. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 38, ch. 4.) For some said that the intention of the end is an act other than the will for what is for the sake of the end. Whereas some have said to the contrary that it is one act and that their distinction is only with regard to the variety in things. However, each opinion is true in a certain respect.

In evidence of this it must be known that since an act's unity should be considered from the unity of the object, if there are two things that are one in some way, the act that is brought to bear on them insofar as they are one will itself be one; but the act that is brought to bear on them insofar as they are two will be two. For example, the parts of a line are in some way two, and in some way they are one inasmuch as they are united into one whole: and thus, if the act of sight is brought to bear upon two parts of the line inasmuch as they are two, that is, upon each one essentially with regard to what is proper to them, there will be two visions, and neither will they be able to be seen at the same time. However, if it should bear upon the entire line, including both parts, there will be one vision and the entire line will be seen at once.

But all things that are ordered one to another are many inasmuch as they are certain things considered in themselves, yet they are one with regard to the order that they have toward one another; and thus, the soul's act, which is brought to bear upon them inasmuch as they are ordered to each other, is itself one; but the soul's act, which is brought to bear upon them inasmuch as they are considered in themselves, is many.

This is clear in the consideration of the statue of Mercury, which if one considers it inasmuch as it is a certain thing, then its consideration will be other than the consideration of Mercury of whom the statue is an image. However, if the statue should be considered as an image of Mercury, the way in which that the statue and Mercury is considered will be the same.

Similarly, when the motion of the will is borne toward the end and toward what is for the sake of the end, if it should be borne toward them inasmuch as they are both certain things existing through themselves, the will's motion will be diverse; and so that opinion is correct which says that the intention of the end and the will for what is for the sake of the end are diverse acts. However, if the will is borne toward one of them inasmuch as it has an order toward another, then there is one act of the will toward both; and so the other opinion is true which holds that the intention of the end and the will for what is for the sake of the end are one act.

But if the notion of intention should be correctly examined, this opinion is found to be more true than the other. For the will's motion toward the end, taken absolutely, is not called intention, but rather will; however, the will's inclination toward the end inasmuch as what is for the sake of the end terminates in the end is called intention. For whoever wants health is said to will it simply; but one is only said to intend it when one wants something for the sake of health. Therefore, it is to be conceded that intention is not an act other in number than willing.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that even though one act cannot be good and bad, yet there can be good circumstances of any bad act, such as when an act is vicious if one eats more than one should, even though one eats when one should; and so the will by which one wants to steal so as to feed the poor is an evil act simply, but having some good circumstance: for that for the sake of which is held to be one of the circumstances. (Cf. Cicero, On Invention, bk. 1, ch. 26, according to ST I-II.7.3; Albert the Great, Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the words of the Philosopher should be understood when one stops in the middle; for when one passes through the middle to the end then the motion is one in number; and so also when the will is moved toward what is for the sake of the end but with an order to the end, it is one motion.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that when both a principle and a conclusion are considered through themselves, they are diverse considerations; but when the principle is considered as ordered to a conclusion, there is the same consideration of both, as is the case in syllogizing.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the end and what is for the sake of the end are one object inasmuch as one is considered as ordered to the other.