Article 5 — Whether the will wants anything by necessity

Fifth, it is asked whether the will wants anything by necessity. (Parallel texts: ST I.82.1; I-II.10.1; In II Sent., d. 25, a. 2; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does since, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 4 (PL 42:1018).) all things desire beatitude with one will. But whatever is commonly desired by all is is desired by necessity. For if it were not by necessity, it would happen that it not be desired by something. Therefore, the will desires something by necessity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, anything moving that possesses a perfect power moves its mobile by necessity. But, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.15, 433b11.) goodness moves the will as apprehended. Therefore, since something is a perfect good, such as God and beatitude, as is also said in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 1.18, 1101b30.) there will be something that moves the will by necessity, and so something will be desired by the will necessarily.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, immateriality is the reason why a power cannot be forced, for powers fitted with organs are forced, as is clear primarily with regard to the motive power. But the intellect is more immaterial than the will, which is clear from the fact that it has a more immaterial object, namely the universal, whereas goodness existing in particular things is the will's object. Therefore, since the intellect is forced to hold something by necessity, as said in the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1015b6.) it seems that the will also desires something by necessity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, necessity is not removed from the will except by reason of freedom, to which necessity seems to be opposed. But not all necessity impedes freedom, hence Augustine says in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 41:152).) if those things are defined to be necessary in regard to which we say 'It is necessary that it be so or that it be done so,' I know not why we should fear that it would remove from us the will's freedom. Therefore, the will wants something by necessity.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that is necessary which cannot not be. But God cannot not will goodness, just as he cannot not be good. Therefore, he wills goodness necessarily, and so there is a will that necessarily wills something.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Gregory, a sin that is not removed by penance quickly leads to others by its weight. (Cf. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 25, ch. 9 (PL 76:334B); see also Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 36, ch. 3.) However, a sin is not committed except by the will, according to Augustine. (Cf. Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 14 (PL 34:133).) Therefore, since pulling is a certain violent motion, as is clear from the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 243a24.) someone can be violently forced to will something by necessity.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to what the Teacher says in the Sentences, and which he takes from the words of Augustine, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 25, ch. 5; cf. Augustine, City of God, bk. 22, ch. 30 (PL 41:802).) in the second state, that is in the condition of guilt, a man cannot but sin, even mortally, before reparation, but after reparation at least venially. But both mortal as well as venial sin is voluntary. Therefore, there is a condition of man in which he cannot but will that in which the state of sin consists, and so the will wills something by necessity.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, to the extent that something is more apt to move, so much more is it apt to impose necessity. But goodness is more capable of moving than truth; for goodness is in things, but truth is only in the mind, as is said in the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25.) Therefore, since truth forces the intellect, much more vigorously does goodness force the will.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, goodness impresses more forcefully than truth, as is clear from the fact that love, which is an impression of goodness, is more unitive than knowledge, which is an impression of truth. For love is a certain life uniting the beloved to the lover, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 10 (PL 42:960); cf. ST I-II.28.1.) Therefore, goodness is more able to impose necessity upon the will than truth upon the intellect, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, to the extent that any power has more control over its objects, so much less can it be forced by them. But reason has more control over its objects than the will, for according to Augustine in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12. It is actually On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 23 (PL 34:473).) reason forms the species of things within itself, however, the will does not, but it is rather moved by desirable tings. Therefore, the will is more capable of being forced by desirable things than reason by knowable things, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, whatever is in something essentially, is within it by necessity. But to will something is within the will essentially. Therefore, the will wills something by necessity.

Proof of the minor: the highest good is willed essentially. Thus, whenever the will is carried toward it, it wills essentially. But it is always carried toward it, for it is borne toward it naturally. Therefore, the will always wants the highest good essentially.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, necessity is found to exist in the cognition of knowledge. But, just as all men naturally want to know according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.) so also do they naturally want goodness. Therefore, the necessity of goodness is found in the will.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, a Gloss on Romans 7:15 (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 7:15, 6.96; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 7:15 (PL 191:1423A).) says that the will wants goodness naturally. But anything that is within according to nature is so necessarily. Therefore, the will wants goodness by necessity.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, anything that can be increased and diminished can also be completely removed. But the will's freedom is increased and diminished, for according to Augustine (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 105 (Marietti ch. 55)(PL 40:281); see Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 25, ch. 4.) man had a freer will before sin than after sin. Therefore, free choice can be completely removed, and so the will can be forced by necessity.

On the contrary (1), according to Augustine in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 41:152).) if something is voluntary it is not necessary. But all that we will is voluntary. Therefore, the will does not want something by necessity.

Furthermore (2), Bernard says that free choice is most powerful under God, (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 10 (PL 182:1019A-B).) but whatever exists in such a way cannot be forced by another. Therefore, the will cannot be forced such that it would want something by necessity.

Furthermore (3), freedom is opposed to necessity. But the will is free, thus, it does not want something by necessity.

Furthermore (4), Bernard says that from its inborn nobility, free choice is moved by no neccessity. (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 3 (PL 182:1004D).) But the will's dignity cannot be removed. Therefore, the will cannot want something by necessity.

Furthermore (5), according to the Philosopher, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b4.) rational powers are related to opposites. But the will is a rational power, for it is within reason, as is said in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.14, 432b5.) Therefore, it is related to opposites, and so it is not determined to something by necessity.

Furthermore (6), whatever is determined to something by necessity is naturally determined to it. But the will is divided against natural appetite, therefore, the will does not want something by necessity.

Furthermore (7), something is said to be within us as voluntary such that we are in command of it. But whatever is within us and over which we are in command we can either will or not will. Therefore, the will is capable of willing or not willing everything that it wants, and so it does not want something by necessity.

I answer that it must be said that, as can be gathered from the words of Augustine in the City of God, (It is actually Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 41:152).) there is a twofold necessity, namely the necessity of coercion, and this can in no way be found in the will, and the necessity of natural inclination, as when we say that God lives by necessity: and the will necessarily wants something by such a necessity. In evidence of this, it must be known that among ordered things, the first must be contained within the second, and there is found in the second not only what belongs to it with regard to its proper notion, but also what belongs to it with regard to the notion of what is first; just as it belongs to man to not only use reason, which pertains to him with respect to the proper difference of rationality, but also to make use of sensation and food, which likewise belong to him on account of his genus, which is animal or living thing. And we also similarly see in the senses that since the sense of touch is like a foundation for the other senses, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.3, 413b4.) there is in the organ of each sense not only the properties of the sense whose organ it is, but also the properties of touch; just as the eye not only senses whiteness and blackness, inasmuch as it is an organ of sight, but it also senses hot and cold and is corrupted by their extremes inasmuch as it is an organ of touch.

However, nature and will are ordered in such a way that the will itself is a certain nature, for everything that exists within things is said to be a certain nature. And thus, one should find in the will not only what pertains to the will, but also what pertains to nature. However, it belongs to every created nature that it be ordered to goodness by God, desiring it naturally. Thus, there is within the will a natural desire for the good that is appropriate for it. And beyond this, it pertains to it from its own determination to desire something not out of necessity, which belongs to it inasmuch as it is a will. However, the order of nature is related to the will just as the order of what the will naturally wants is related to whatever in respect of which the will is not determined by nature. And thus, just as nature is the foundation of the will, so also is the desirable that is naturally desired the beginning and foundation of other desirable things. However, in desirable things the end is the foundation and the beginning of whatever is for the sake of the end, since whatever is for the sake of the end is not desired except by reason of the end. Therefore, whatever the will wants by necessity, as though determined to it by a natural inclination, is the final end, like beatitude and whatever is included within it, such as to exist, the knowledge of truth, and other such things. But it is not determined by necessity to other things from a natural inclination, but rather by a disposition that is without any necessity.

However, even though the will wants the final end by a necessary inclination, in no way should it be conceded that it it is forced to want it. For force is nothing else than the application of a certain violence. However, the violent, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a1. Sec. transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 179 et 181).) is that whose principle is from outside, which suffers the violence, contributing nothing; as for example, a stone when thrown upward, for in no way is it inclined to this motion with respect to itself. But, since the will is a certain inclination, inasmuch as it is a certain appetite, it cannot happen that the will should want something and its inclination not be toward it. And so, it cannot happen that the will wants something by force or violence, even though it does want something by a natural inclination. Therefore, it is clear that the will does not necessarily want something by the necessity of force. Nevertheless, it necessarily wants something by the necessity of natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that the common desire for beatitude does not follow from any force, but from a natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that however much a good thing efficaciously moves the will, it is nevertheless unable to force it, for inasmuch as one holds that it wills something, one holds that it has an inclination within it, which is contrary to being forced. But it follows from a certain perfection of that good that the will is determined to it by an inclination of natural necessity.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the intellect naturally understands something just as the will naturally wants something. But force is not contrary to the intellect with regard to its definition, as it is for the will. For although the intellect has an inclination toward something, yet it does not indicate the inclination itself of a man, but the will denotes the very inclination of a man. Hence, whatever happens with respect to the will happens with respect to a man's inclination, and in this sense it cannot be violent. But the act of the intellect can be contrary to the inclination of a man, which is the will, as when someone likes an opinion, but is led by the intellect because of the efficacy of arguments to assent to what is contrary.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Augustine spoke of natural necessity, which we do not exclude from the will with regard to some things. And this necessity is also found in the divine will and the divine being; for it is necessary through its very self, as is said in Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1015b9. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 4, as said below in q. 24, a. 10.)

Reply Obj. 5: Hence, the solution to the fifth is clear.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that committed sin does not draw the will by force but rather by inclination, inasmuch as it removes the grace by which man was being strengthened against sin, and inasmuch as from an act of sin a disposition and habit is left in the soul, inclining it to further sin.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that regarding this there are two opinions, for some say that howsoever much a man might be in a state of mortal sin, he can avoid mortal sin by the freedom of the will; and they expound on what is said: that he is not able not to sin; that is, that he is not able to have a sin, just as seesing is said to be a possession of sight and also the use of sight. However, according to this, he is able not to sin, that is not to use sin. And in the respect, it is clear that no necessity is imposed upon the will to make it consent to sin. However, others (Others: Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 28, a. 2, q. 2.) say that just as man in the state of this life cannot avoid venial sin, not indeed that he cannot avoid this or that sin, but that he cannot avoid all venial sin such that he would not commit any, so also is it the case regarding mortal sins in one who does not have grace. And it is also clear in this respect that the will has no necessity to want this or that thing, even though without grace it is found to fall short of an unfailing inclination toward goodness.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that a form received into something does not move that in which it is received, but the very having of such a form is itself to be moved; but it is moved by an exterior agent, just as the body that is heated by fire is not moved by the received heat but by the fire. So also is the intellect not moved by an already received form or by the truth which follows upon that form, but rather by an exterior thing that impresses upon the intellect, such as the agent intellect, or a phantasm, or other such things. Furthermore, goodness is proportioned to the affection just as truth is to the intellect. Hence, inasmuch as truth is in the apprehension, it moves the intellect no less than goodness moves the affections. Likewise, that the will is not forced by goodness does not come from an insufficiency in goodness to move it, but from the very notion of the will, as is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 9: From this, the response to the ninth is clear.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that a thing which is outside the soul does not impress its own form upon the potential intellect except by the act of the agent intellect, and to that extent the soul is said to mold within itself the very forms of things. Similarly, the will tends to the desirable thing not without the act of the will. Hence, the argument does not follow. One can also respond in a similar to the previous two objections.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the first goodness is willed through itself, and the will wants it naturally and through itself. Yet it does not always want it in act. For what is naturally agreeable to the soul must not always be in the soul in act, just as naturally known principles are not always considered in act.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the necessity by which we necessarily know something through knowledge and the necessity by which we necessarily seek after knowledge do not pertain to the same necessity. For the first can be with respect to the necessity of force, but the second can only be with respect to the necessity of natural inclination. And so the will also wants what is good inasmuch as it naturally wants goodness.

Reply Obj. 13: And from this the solution to the thirteenth is clear.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that the freedom which is grown and diminished is the freedom from sin and misery, and not the freedom from being forced. (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, cc. 8, 9 (PL 182:1014, 1016); see especially Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 25, ch. 8.) Hence, it does not follow that the will can be led to being forced.

Reply Sed Contra 1: However, to the first contrary objection it must be said that this authority should be understood with regard to the necessity of force, which is opposed to the will, but not with regard to the necessity of natural inclination, which according to Augustine in City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 41:152).) is not opposed to the will.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that it does not pertain to the will's impotence if it should be borne from necessity toward something by a natural inclination, but rather to its strength, just as the heavy is more powerful to the extent that it is borne downward by a greater necessity. However, it would pertain to its weakness if it were forced by another.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that, according to Augustine, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 41:152).) freedom is opposed to the necessity of force, but not to the necessity of natural inclination.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that natural necessity is not opposed to the dignity of the will, but only the necessity of force.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth it must be said that the will is related to opposites inasmuch as it is rational. For this is to consider it with regard to what is proper to it. But inasmuch as it is a certain nature, nothing prevents it from being naturally determined to one thing.

Reply Sed Contra 6: To the sixth it must be said that the will is divided against natural appetite taken up with a certain precision, that is inasmuch as it is only natural, as man is divided against what is only animal. However, it is not divided against natural appetite taken absolutely, but includes it just as man includes animal.

Reply Sed Contra 7: To the seventh it must be said that that argument also follows with regard to the will inasmuch as it is a will. For this is proper to the will inasmuch as it is a will that it be master of its own acts. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a17; as referred by Aquinas in Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6, a. 1, s.c. 3; cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A).)