Article 7 — Whether one merits by wanting whatever one wants by necessity

Seventh, it is asked whether one merits by wanting whatever one wants by necessity. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.88.6; II-II.189.2; SCG III.138.)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for one naturally wants whatever one wants by necessity. But we do not merit through natural things, so we do not merit by such a will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, merit and demerit concern the same thing, but no one demerits with regard to what one cannot avoid, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Two Souls, ch. 10 (PL 42:103); ch. 11 (PL 42:103); On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PL 32:1295); cf. ST I-II.109.8, obj. 1.) Therefore, no one merits with regard to what one wants by necessity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one merits except by an act of virtue, however, every act of virtue is from choice and not from natural inclination. Therefore, no one merits in what one wants by necessity.

On the contrary (1), every creature naturally desires God by necessity, but we merit by the love of God, therefore, someone can merit inasmuch as one wills necessarily.

Furthermore (2), beatitude consists in eternal life, but the saints merited by desiring eternal life, thus someone merits by wanting what one naturally wants.

I answer that it must be said that by wanting what one naturally wants, in one respect one merits and in another respect one does not. In evidence of this, it must be known that things have been naturally provided to both man and the other animals in a different manner, with respect to both body and soul. For special coverings with regard to the body have been provided to other animals, such as thick skins and feathers, and also certain defences, such as horns, claws, and other such things, for they have few means for acting to which determinate tools can be ordered. But these have been provided to man in general inasmuch as hands have been given to him by nature, by which he is capable of preparing various coverings and protections for himself; and this is the case because man's reason is so complex and bearing upon various things such that sufficient determinate instruments could not be prepared for him.

It is similarly the case on the part of apprehension, inasmuch as there have been placed within other animals, with regard to their natural judgment, certain particular notions that are necessary for them, such as for the sheep, that the wolf is its enemy, and other things of this kind. But in place of these, there have been placed within man naturally understood universal principles, by which he can proceed to whatever is necessary for him. It is similarly the case on the part of the appetite. For within other things has been placed a natural appetite for some determinate thing, as being downward for what is heavy, and as being agreeable for any animal according to its nature. But a desire for the final end in common has been placed within man, so that he naturally desires that he be complete in goodness. But it has not been determined for him by nature in what this completion consists, whether in virtue, knowledge, pleasures, or other such things.

Thus, when helped by divine grace he apprehends with his own reason that some particular good is his own beatitude, in which his beatitude truly consists, then he merits, yet not from the fact that he desires the beatitude which he naturally desires, but from the fact that he desires this particular which he does not desire naturally, namely, the vision of God, in which his beatitude truly consists. But if someone should be led by erroneous reason to desire some particular as his beatitude, such as bodily pleasures, yet in which his beatitude does not truly consist, he demerits by desiring beatitude in this way, not because he desires beatitude, but because he undeservedly desires that in which his beatitude does not consist. Therefore, it is clear that, in itself, wanting what one naturally wants is neither meritorious nor blameworthy, but inasmuch as it is specified to this or that thing it can be meritorious or blameworthy. And the saints merit in this way by desiring God and eternal life.

And thus the response to the objections is clear.