Article 12 — Whether the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul.

Twelfth, it is asked whether the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul. (Parallel texts: ST I.82.4; I-II.9.1; SCG II.26; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not, for the mover is naturally prior to the moved. But the will is posterior to the intellect, for nothing is loved or desired except what is known, according to Augustine in On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (PL 42:971).) Therefore, the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the will moves the intellect in its own act, then it follow that the intellect understands that the will wants it to understand. But the will does not want something unless it be understood. Therefore, the intellect first understood understanding itself before the will wanted it. But before the intellect understands this, one must hold that the will wants it, for the intellect was held as being moved by the will. Therefore, one must go on to infinity; but this is impossible, thus, the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every passive power is moved by its own object. But the will is a passive power, for it is an appetite that moves having been moved, as said in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.15, 433b16.) Therefore, it is moved by its object. But its object is the understood or apprehended good, as said in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.15, 433b11.) Thus, the intellect or another apprehensive power moves the will and not conversely.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that one power is said to move another is only the case on account of the command that one has over another the other. However, to command pertains to reason, as said in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.20, 1102b30.) Therefore, it belongs to it to move the other powers and not to the will.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Augustine in On the Literal Intrepretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch.16 (PL 34:467).) the mover and the agent is nobler than what is moved or made. But the intellect is nobler than the will, at least with respect to sensible things, as was said. Therefore, it is not moved by the will, at least with respect to these things.

On the contrary (1), is what St. Anselm says in the book On Likenesses, (Pseudo-Anselm (Eadmer), On Likenesses, ch. 2 (PL 159:605C).) that the will moves all the powers of the soul.

Furthermore (2), according to Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 21 (PL 34:388–89); cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 8, a. 17.)

Furthermore (3), according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.4, 994b13.) all motion is for the sake of an end. But the good and the end is the object of the will. Therefore, the will moves the other powers.

Furthermore (4), according to Augustine, (Cf. Augustine, City of God, bk. 11, ch. 28 (PL 41:342); Confessions, bk. 13, ch. 9 (PL 32:849); Epistle 55, ch. 10 (PL 33:212); Epistle 157, ch. 2 (PL 33:677).) love does in spiritual things what weight does in bodily things; but weight moves bodily things; therefore the will's love moves the spiritual powers of the soul.

I answer that it must be said that the intellect moves the will in one way, and the will moves the intellect and the other powers in another way. In evidence of this, it must be known that both the end and the efficient cause are said to move, but differently. For since two things are considered in any action, namely the one acting and the reason for the acting, as for example in heating, fire is the agent and the reason for the action is heat, so also in moving the end is said to move as the reason for moving, but the efficient cause as the one doing the motion, that is, as the one drawing the mobile from potency into act. However, the reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it acts; hence, it must be within the agent in order for it to act.

But, it is not within it according to perfect natural being, for motion ceases when this is possessed, rather, it is within the agent in the manner of an intention; for the end is prior in intention but posterior in being. Therefore, the end preexists properly within the mover according to intellect, to which it belongs to receive something in an intentional mode and not with regard to natural being. Hence, the intellect moves the will in the way that the end is said to move, namely, inasmuch as it preconcieves the notion of the end and proposes it to the will.

But it belongs to the will and not to the intellect to move as an agent cause, inasmuch as the will is compared to things with regard to how they exist in themselves; however, the intellect is compared to things with regard to how they exist in a spiritual mode within the soul. To act and to be moved belongs to things with regard to their own being by which they subsist in themselves and not as they are in the soul in the manner of an intention, for it is not the fire within the soul that heats but that within wood. Hence, the comparison of the will to things is with regard to how motion belongs to them, but this is not the case with regard to the intellect's comparison with them. Furthermore, the will's act is a certain inclination toward something, but not the intellect's act. However, an inclination is the disposition of a mover inasmuch as an efficient cause moves. Hence, it is clear that the will and not the intellect moves in the manner of an agent cause.

However, it belongs to the higher powers of the soul to reflect upon themselves, inasmuch as they are immaterial. Hence, both the intellect and the will reflect upon themselves, upon one another, upon the essence of the soul, and upon all its powers. For the intellect understands itself, the will, the essence of the soul, and all the powers of the soul; and similarly the will wants itself to will, it wants the intellect to understand, and it wants the soul to exist, and so on with the others. However, when any power bears upon another, it is compared to it with regard to its own peculiarity: as for example, when the intellect understands that the will wills, it receives into its very self the reason for willing; hence also, when the will itself bears upon the powers of the soul, it bears upon them as upon things to which belong motion and operation, and it inclines each one to its own proper operation; and thus the will not only moves exterior things in the mode of an agent cause, but also the very powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that since there is a likeness of circular motion in reflection, in which that motion is last which in the beginning was first, one must say that in reflection what was first before afterwards becomes posterior. Thus, even though the intellect is simply prior to the will, it becomes posterior to the will by reflection, and so the will can move the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that one does not have to proceed to infinity, for one stops at natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its own act.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the argument shows that the intellect moves in the manner of an end, for the apprehended good is related to the will in this way.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that command pertains to the will and to reason differently: it pertains to the will inasmuch as command implies a certain inclination, but to reason inasmuch as this inclination is assigned and ordered to execute through this or that means.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that any power surpasses another in what is proper to it, such as touch, which is more perfectly compared to heat, which it senses through itself, than sight, which senses heat by accident; and similarly the intellect is more fully compared to truth than is the will, and conversely, the will is more perfectly compared to goodness, which is in things, than is the intellect. Hence, even though the intellect is simply more noble than the will, at least with respect to some things, nevertheless, the will is found to be nobler with regard to the notion of causing motion, which belongs to the will by reason of its proper object.